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




# CAESAR'S CONQUEST OF GAUL







Walker & Bonnell

*Julius Caesar*  
*from the marble bust in the British Museum.*







# CAESAR'S CONQUEST OF GAUL

BY

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## PREFACE

As this book has far outgrown my original conception, I will explain how it came to assume its existing form. Eleven years ago it occurred to me that an English narrative of Caesar's conquest of Gaul might help to relieve the weariness of the schoolboys whose lot it is to flounder, in ceaseless conflict with the Ablative Absolute, through the pages of the *Commentaries*; might help them to realise that those pages were not written for the purpose of inflicting mental torture, but were the story of events which did really happen, and many of which rival in interest the exploits of Cortes or of Clive. I hoped too that a few "general readers" might, if they could overcome their aversion to the title of the book, find something to interest them in its contents. In my ignorance I promised myself a comparatively easy task. Certain chapters of history, which I had written before, had cost me prolonged research and anxious toil. For the history of the Gallic war, on the other hand, I imagined that virtually the sole original authority was the *Memoirs* of the conqueror. Virtually the sole original authority, but so great a one that it would be impossible, I thought, for a man who honestly worked upon it to produce a really bad book. So I said to myself, Let me once master the *Commentaries*, and it will go hard with me if I cannot, with the aid of Napoleon's *Histoire de Jules César*, and sundry other books which I must of course consult, evolve from such material a readable narrative. I shall be spared the labour of searching through Blue Books, forgotten memoirs and dusty bundles of MSS. It is

needless to say that I soon found out my mistake. The list of the "sundry other books" was continually lengthening. Though for the narrative as a whole, Caesar is virtually the sole original authority,—for Plutarch and Suetonius, Dion Cassius, Florus and Orosius do not count for much,—yet, in order to understand his military system and to supplement the information which he gives on certain points, we are obliged to have recourse to many other writers, ancient and mediæval, historians, geographers, chroniclers, compilers of itineraries. He has left many questions obscure,—questions of geography, of ethnology, of sociology, of religion, of politics, and of military science. To throw light upon these questions, and to explain the difficulties in his language, has engaged the labour of a host of scholars,—geographers, antiquaries, anthropologists, ethnologists, archaeologists, military specialists, philologists, learned editors; and the works which they have produced, the greater part of which are scattered in the learned periodicals of foreign countries, would fill a large library. If the bulk of these works are mainly controversial or exegetical, if they are largely devoted to the discussion and elucidation of ancient texts, yet on this point or on that many of them are virtually original authorities. They contain scraps of genuine information, which enable one to fill up gaps in the memoirs of the conqueror. Excavators have discovered disputed sites. Coins, inscriptions, rusty weapons, and even skulls have added items to our store of knowledge. Soldier-scholars, trained to observe the geographical features of a country, have travelled, *Commentaries* in hand, through the length and breadth of France and Belgium and Alsace and Switzerland; and, if prejudiced zeal or local patriotism have often misled them, their united labours have not been in vain.

Nor was this all. It was not enough for my purpose merely to write a narrative of the conquest. I was obliged of course also to write an introduction, in order to render my narrative of the conquest intelligible; and gradually it became evident

that, if I wished to avoid defrauding and insulting the purchasers whom I hoped to attract, even this brief chapter could not be written without recourse to the most recondite materials. Since the publication of the standard histories of Thierry, Mommsen, Merivale and others, new light had been thrown upon the ethnological and other questions which I had set myself to handle. Some opinion I must hazard regarding the degree of political development which the Gauls had reached; and, if it were to be worth printing, I must form it at first hand. I had no intention of writing a history of the Gauls: my subject was only their conquest by Julius Caesar; but I was bound to take as much pains to understand their history as if I had been ambitious of writing it. As I plunged deeper and deeper into the slough, I saw that many of the problems were insoluble; but this did not absolve me from the duty of grappling with them. Even if a historical or geographical problem cannot be solved with mathematical certainty, probability may be attainable; and if one solution is as good or as bad as another, the reader has a right to ask the reason why. It is something even to fix precisely the extent of one's ignorance. Either I must leave the subject alone, or I must master it. If the study of Caesar is arduous, it is fascinating. Year after year I read on and on, quite as much for the delight of learning as with the ambition of instructing. And I determined to do my best to produce something which should not only be useful to teachers and interesting to general readers, but should also be worthy of the notice of scholars and of students of the art of war.

To praise the *Commentaries* of Caesar, *laudatos toties a laudatis*, would be almost impertinent. But I may be allowed to say why I hope that a better fate may yet be in store for them than to serve as a mere whetstone for gerund-grinders. At present, I believe that the book is rarely used in education, at least in this country, except by young boys, and never read through by them. But, even if only one or two of the seven

*Commentaries* can be read, they can at all events be read not merely as a lesson in construing but also as history. Something, I gladly acknowledge, has already been done to promote this object. Much, however, still remains to be done. Unfortunately, the editions of the *Commentaries* which have been published in this country are defective, especially in the department of geography. Most of the editors are far too prone to submit to the authority of Napoleon. Those of them who have worked in the most intelligent spirit, sometimes, for want of drudgery, lead their readers farthest astray. I know of one who, inspired by the hope of firing the imagination of youthful scholars, embellished his edition with pictures with which only one fault could be found,—that the greater number represented places where Caesar had never been. If a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, a little research is labour thrown away. The fact is that, if a man professes to explain the geography of the Gallic war, he must do one of two things. Either he must go into the subject as an independent inquirer, pursuing his researches whithersoever they may lead him,—and to do this requires an amount of labour so enormous that it would not pay the editor of a school-book to undertake it,—or he must take Napoleon, or some such writer, as his guide; in which case he will assuredly be led into a great many mistakes.<sup>1</sup>

Nor is there any reason, apart from the consideration of what subjects are most remunerative, why Caesar should only be used as an elementary text-book. The reform which I hope to see one day accomplished is that he should be read by more advanced students as well. Boys in the highest class of a public school could easily read the whole work through, side by side with other authors, in the course of a couple of years. By doing so, their knowledge of Latin would gain at least as much as their knowledge of history.

<sup>1</sup> I may be allowed to refer to an article which I contributed to the *Westminster Review* of August 1892, pp. 176-7. The really valuable part of the Emperor's book is that which is based upon the results of Colonel Stoffe's excavations.

I do not know whether educationists will consider this ideal desirable. But is it even attainable? Not certainly at present. It does not "pay" to teach Caesar to the more advanced scholars of public schools. If there is ever to be a reform, it must begin with the universities. And there is another class of students for whom the *Commentaries* would be peculiarly appropriate,—the candidates for the Royal Military Academy and for the Royal Military College.

But this book is not addressed only, not even primarily, to teachers; and for pupils, in its present form, it is of course too costly and too large. The narrative is addressed both to scholars and to those general readers, civil and military, who are interested in history. The second part is addressed in the first instance to scholars; and if it wins their approval, I hope that the labour spent upon it will not repel other readers who are willing to be interested in the subject. Of all that has been done in France, Germany, Italy and Belgium to solve the problems of Gallic history nothing is known in this country, except to a few students. And yet to those who care for history the study would be full of entertainment. The story of the conquest of Gaul, if that of any war of antiquity, is still worth reading: for not only were the operations intrinsically interesting, but their results are of permanent importance. Mr. Freeman was right when he called the conquest "one of the most important events in the history of the world."<sup>1</sup> The war with Hannibal, and it alone, rivals the Gallic war in interest. And the Gallic war has this great advantage over the war with Hannibal, that we know far more about it. Viewed simply as military history, intelligible without being technical, the *Commentaries* are by far the most valuable work of antiquity: they are among the most valuable of any age.<sup>2</sup> Let any soldier who possesses a fair knowledge

<sup>1</sup> *General Sketch of European History*, 1874, p. 77.

<sup>2</sup> I am not sure that the *Civil War* is not even more interesting than the *Gallic War*; for in his later work Caesar describes the campaigns which he con-



of Latin read Livy's description of the battle of Cannæ: let him then read Caesar's description of the battle with the Nervii, and he will have made up his mind. He will appreciate the difference between military history as written by a mere literary artist and military history as written by a literary artist who was also a general.

I said that I would not take upon myself to praise the *Commentaries*: but when one has derived great and wholesome pleasure from a book, it is hard to refrain from expressing one's gratitude and admiration. Not to repeat encomiums that are familiar to all who take any interest in the classics, I will only speak my own thoughts; for I would fain persuade all who have not wholly forgotten their Latin,—all who love good literature; all who can appreciate an informing story well and truly told,—to get a copy of Caesar, and read him through from end to end. I sometimes wish that the book had never been used, in the way it has been used, as a school-book at all. For the reminiscences of the Fourth Form are at once so vivid and so dreary, that even classical scholars, many of them, pass through life without reading this great classic. In boyhood they plodded through the pages, chapter by chapter, forgetting one chapter before they began the next, reading one book and missing the others, and of the whole story or even of single episodes forming no idea. Some critics say that the narrative is dull, cold and colourless. I do not believe that any one would maintain these charges if he read the book rapidly through; and otherwise no story can be fairly judged. Macaulay himself might be dull, if he were read by a foreigner at the rate of a single paragraph a day. Caesar certainly did not pour out his spirit with the fervid passion of a Napier. But if a man's heart beats faster when he reads how Badajoz was stormed and how "six thousand unconquerable British soldiers" fought their way up "the

ducted against civilised enemies, one of whom was, as a strategist and tactician, perhaps unequal. (See H. A. Bruce's *Life of General Sir William Napier*, ii. 341.)

fatal hill" of Albueria, he will not be unmoved by Caesar's account of the battle with the Nervii or of the last struggle of Vercingetorix. If his eyes become dim when they light on Napier's epitaph on Colonel Ridge,—“And no man died that night with more glory; yet many died, and there was much glory,”—he will hardly keep down a tear when he reads how Sextius Baculus arose and saved the camp at Aduatuca, “facing fearful odds,” till he was borne back fainting to his sick-bed. No, Caesar is not dull, except to minds enervated by sensational reading. There is no tinsel in his narrative: but it is not void of colour. His style is severe: but it is not frigid. Like Thucydides and the historian of the Acts of the Apostles, he has no sentimentality, but no lack of sentiment. His passion never breaks from his control: but it communicates itself to us. Intent simply on telling his tale, he rises without an effort, whenever the subject inspires, to genuine eloquence. It is true that that swift narrative often baffles curiosity, even when curiosity is legitimate: but it is idle to wish a good book other than it is. Enough that this book is worthy of its theme and of its author. We know on the highest authority that even in our age the soldier who means to study his profession cannot afford to neglect the *Commentaries*.<sup>1</sup> And if a time should ever come when for purely professional purposes they shall have lost their value, they will still be worth reading for themselves.<sup>2</sup> They were written, with a purpose no doubt

<sup>1</sup> “The statement,” says General Maurice (*War*, 1891, p. 12), “of the most brilliant and successful general of the British army of to-day appears to be indisputable that a perusal of the words of even Caesar himself will suggest to any thoughtful soldier who knows something also of modern war, reflections that he may afterwards recall with advantage as applicable to modern campaigns.” (See Lord Wolseley's *The Soldier's Pocket-Book*, 5th ed., p. 286.) The great Napoleon, himself a diligent student of the *Commentaries*, recommended all aspiring officers to read them. (*Mémoires, notes et mélanges*, ii. 155.)

<sup>2</sup> “La partie divine de l'art,” writes Colonel Stoffel (*Hist. de Jules César, Guerre civile*, i. v.), “est restée la même et elle ne changera jamais. L'étude des campagnes de César est fertile en renseignements. On y trouvera l'application presque constante des vrais principes: tenir ses forces réunies, n'être vulnérable nulle part, marcher avec rapidité sur les points importants, s'en rapporter aux moyens naturels, à la réputation de ses armes, à la crainte qu'on

but still in the main honestly, by the greatest man of the world who has ever lived; and men of the world who are also lovers of literature will best appreciate and most enjoy them. Whoever cares for a great book in a small compass, and will give it the attention that it demands; whoever can appreciate literary qualities that have fallen out of fashion but will have their turn again,—masculine strength, simplicity, directness, reserve, relevancy; and, above all, the natural dignity that belongs to “the foremost man of all this world” writing the history that he had himself made,—whoever cares for these things should read Caesar’s *Commentaries*, and he will have his reward.<sup>1</sup>

Let me try to explain the scope of my own book. It does not narrate the events of the conquest in precisely the same detail, from first to last, in which Caesar narrated them; for such a narrative, even if it were skilfully composed, would inevitably weary a modern reader; and where it wearied, it would also fail to instruct. Caesar doubtless knew, though it was not his way to say so, that his book would be a κτήμα ἐς αἰῶν: but he wrote, first of all, for his own generation; and, regarded as material for history, some of his matter, if only a little, has lost its interest. Nothing, for instance, would be gained by narrating in full detail the campaign of Crassus in Aquitania. The general reader would be bored by what he could not but regard as an anticlimax to the more dramatic struggle of Caesar with the Veneti; and the student of Roman warfare would learn nothing that he might not learn as well or better from a study of the operations which Caesar con-

inspire et aussi aux moyens politiques pour maintenir dans la fidélité ses alliés, dans l'obéissance les peuples conquis; se donner toutes les chances possibles pour s'assurer la victoire sur le champ de bataille; pour cela faire, y réunir toutes ses troupes. On y remarquera la promptitude dans l'exécution, l'habileté à profiter de la victoire. Enfin on reconnaîtra chez César . . . un chef . . . en qui ni la bonne ni la mauvaise fortune . . . ne troublent l'équilibre.”

<sup>1</sup> But he will not appreciate the forbearance of Caesar's character unless he goes on to read the *Commentaries on the Civil War*. See, for instance, i. 71-85, and Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 65-4, 66, 71-4.

ducted in person. On the other hand, of such events as the siege of Avaricum, the blockade of Alesia, the campaign of that great marshal, Labienus, against the Parisii, indeed of almost every operation of the war, I have tried to give a full and clear account, which might at once satisfy professional and interest general readers. Moreover, knowledge derived from personal exploration of the country, from the results of excavation, from Cicero's letters and other ancient authorities, from the researches of anthropologists, and from various monuments, has made it possible, as the reader of the Second Part will discover, to fill up certain gaps in Caesar's narrative. The two expeditions to Britain I have, of course, not described at all, but only made such a passing allusion to them as was necessary to a right understanding of my subject,—the conquest of Gaul. I do not, profess to have followed the whole of Caesar's track, because the thing is impossible: only sections of the track can be traced with certainty, and we often have to be content with the knowledge of the general direction of his march. But I have travelled long distances in order to explore the known sites at which important events occurred. I hold that discussions on questions of evidence ought to be rigidly excluded from narrative; and my narrative therefore takes for granted the conclusions at which I have arrived in the Second Part of the book. Let me take the opportunity of expressing my gratitude to Colonel Stoffel, the principal collaborator of the late Emperor Napoleon, who has sent me a most interesting account, which will be found on pp. xxviii.-xxx., of the method by which he discovered Caesar's camps and entrenchments near Mont Auxois (Alesia) and at other places; and also to Major-General J. F. Maurice and Major-General Sir Coleridge Grove, who allowed me to consult them on certain military questions, which are discussed in Part II., and whose opinions, I was glad to find, generally confirmed my own conclusions.

One word regarding the Second Part of this volume. I

dare say the impatient reader, who measures its length against that of the narrative, will be inclined to reverse Prince Hal's dictum, and cry, "Oh, monstrous! but one half-pennyworth of sack to this intolerable deal of bread." But the remedy is in his own hands. It is not for me to warrant the quality of my sack: but whoever has no appetite for the bread can leave it untouched. It happened once at a dinner party that the lady whom I had taken in asked me whether I had read an account of a certain battle by a famous historian. I replied that I had not, but that, if the critics were to be believed, it was most likely full of mistakes. "What does that matter," rejoined my neighbour, "so long as he makes a good battle of it?" It was a delicious little speech; and I verily believe that, if it had been addressed to the late Mr. Freeman, he would not have had the heart to scold the lady. For my part, I have always been grateful to her for her frank avowal. She made it so clear to me that the majority of readers who take up a history care nothing whether it is accurate or not, provided it is interesting. Still, while I should like to think I had succeeded in "making a good battle of it," I do like to make sure that this or that statement is true before committing it to paper; and so, for my own satisfaction and for the satisfaction of scholars and the few general readers who are not satisfied with results, but want to know the evidence on which they are based, I have written my Appendix. Those who are at all familiar with the difficulties of the subject will not think that it has run to an undue length.<sup>1</sup> For a writer who deals with ancient history is at one great disadvantage as compared with a writer whose period falls within more recent times. He is obliged to spend years of labour in finding out the truth on matters of geography, military science and the like, which his fellow-labourer finds ready to his hand.

My object in writing the Second Part has been to determine

<sup>1</sup> Long indeed remarks (*Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 4) that an adequate commentary on Caesar's memoirs "would fill several volumes": but this was the estimate of a man who had not attempted the task.

what can and what cannot be proved in regard to those points which are still in dispute, and to furnish readers with the materials for forming their own opinion. My method has been not only to state my own reasons for the opinions which I have formed, but also to present, in the briefest possible compass, the reasons for the views from which I dissent. It is true that a point can hardly be called disputed when a decision, all but unanimously accepted, is cavilled at by a few crotcheteers. Astronomers do not waste their time in defending the conclusions of Copernicus and Kepler against the assaults of "Parallax"; and I once thought that it would not be worth while to answer the objections of the antiquaries who, even after the appearance of the famous article by the Duc d'Aumale in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, of the *Dictionnaire archéologique de la Gaule*, of M. A. de Barthélemy's admirable article in the *Revue des Questions Historiques*, and of Ernest Desjardins's candid recantation, persisted in identifying Alesia with Alaise. But, for reasons which I have given in the Appendix, I decided that it would be expedient to treat M. Quicherat and his school, and even M. Maissiat, with more respect than "Parallax."

So far as I am aware, this is the only English narrative which deals specially with Caesar's conquest of Gaul. Narratives more or less detailed are to be found in Mr. Froude's *Caesar*, in Mr. Warde Fowler's *Julius Caesar*, in Colonel Dodge's *Caesar*, in Dean Merivale's *History of the Romans under the Empire*, in Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, and in the English translations of Mommsen's *Römische Geschichte*, the late Emperor Napoleon's *Histoire de Jules César*, and Duruy's *Histoire des Romains*. None of these writers, however, makes any systematic and comprehensive attempt to discuss doubtful points; and even the von Gölbers, father and son, in *Cäsars Gallischer Krieg*, which has not been translated, have not regarded this task as falling within their scope. Indeed there has not hitherto appeared in any language a book which attempts to collect, to co-ordinate and to estimate the results

of the innumerable researches which have aimed at throwing light upon the problems of Gallic history, and most of which are practically inaccessible. Mommsen, strictly subordinating his narrative to his great historical scheme, goes into details hardly at all. Mr. Froude writes, not as a military historian but as the biographer of Caesar; and his brilliant sketch, which has been as enthusiastically, if not as widely, admired as his larger works, necessarily omits much that would interest not only military but even general readers. On geographical questions he almost invariably follows Napoleon; and his book would certainly have been not less trustworthy than it is if he had never looked at any other commentary. The scheme of his work and the rules of art compel him to dismiss battles such as that with the Helvetii or Ariovistus in a single sentence; even when he is describing such important operations as the siege of Avaricum or the attack on Gergovia, he leaves very much to the imagination of his readers; and throughout his narrative he draws freely upon his own.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, as he apparently wrote the entire work in less than a year,<sup>2</sup> it is safe to say that he did not waste much time in investigation. Colonel Dodge's account, which, like Mr. Fowler's brief sketch, did not appear until the rough draft of my own narrative had been completed, is sufficiently full: but he too, like Mr. Froude, is a faithful follower of Napoleon; and Napoleon, as I shall show, makes many serious mistakes. The colonel claims credit for having studied the works of "the best recognised modern critics," and for having visited "the theatre of Caesar's campaign and his many battle-fields." But if a map wants to find out what can and what cannot be known about the Gallic war, he must not shrink from the labour of checking the

<sup>1</sup> See my article in the *Westminster Review* of August 1892, pp. 174-89.

<sup>2</sup> In a letter, dated May 3, 1878, to Mr. John Skelton, Froude says, "I am reading up Caesar and his times, with a view to writing a book about him." In a letter dated February 6, 1879, he says, "Caesar is in the press." The book was published some time before July of the same year. (*Blackwood's Magazine*, December 1894, pp. 772, 774.)

opinions of "the best recognised modern critics" by the works of unrecognised scholars who have wrought diligently in the same field; and, if I may be pardoned the Hibernicism, it is of no use to visit battle-fields, unless it is certain that battles were fought upon them. Merivale wrote before the modern era of continental research had begun: he worked upon a scale which forbade him to describe military operations in detail; and I am obliged to say that whoever compares his pages with the *Commentaries* will find that some of his most impressive passages are purely fictitious.<sup>1</sup> Long's narrative, which forms the bulk of his fourth volume, is very full,—too full perhaps in parts: but Long had a hearty contempt for the general reader. Moreover, his knowledge of Gallic geography, although thoroughly sound, was very far from complete. Every student of Caesar is, indeed, under the deepest obligations to him; for no man ever brought a stronger judgement to the study of the problems which Caesar left us to solve. He knew his ancient texts by heart: he was perfectly familiar with the works of such modern authorities as d'Anville, Walckenaer, Rüstow and von Göler: but of the enormous mass of articles which are scattered among the transactions of the numerous French archaeological societies and other periodical publications, as well as of the numberless monographs and pamphlets which have been published independently, and of the mediæval chronicles which bear upon the subject, he knew very little. No doubt ninety-nine hundredths of the printed matter contained in these works are valueless: but amid the dross of verbiage and declamation with which too many of them abound there lie embedded grains of solid information. Moreover, since Long wrote, light has been thrown upon various matters, which, in his time, were obscure.

It is to be wished rather than hoped that the appalling mass of printed matter which, for four centuries, has been accumulating round the *Commentaries*, may not be swelled in

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 127, n. 1, 133, n. 3, *infra*.



the future by mere verbiage. If only the editors of German periodicals would restrain the ardour of the emendators who inundate them with futile conjectures, they would be setting a good example. The *Tabula Coniecturarum* which Meusel prints at the end of his great *Lexicon Cæsarianum* fills thirty-six pages super royal octavo, closely printed in double columns; and of all these conjectures those which really deserve the name of emendations would not fill a single page; while those which have been unanimously adopted might be counted upon the fingers of one hand. In the Greek state of Locri there was a rule that whoever proposed a new law should do so with a rope round his neck, and, if his proposal were rejected, should be strangled on the spot. It would be a good thing if editors would combine to deal with emendators in a like spirit. Death would perhaps be an excessive penalty even for a bad conjecture: but whoever proposed an emendation which failed within a certain period to win general acceptance might be forbidden ever to contribute to a learned periodical again. We have not yet got, nor will conjectural emendation give us, a final critical edition of the *Commentaries*: but for the purposes of history, in the most comprehensive sense of the word, the text is good enough. Very few of the passages in which it is uncertain offer a stumbling-block to the historian; and those mainly in points of minute detail. Many of the geographical and other problems are now solved; and I hope that I have succeeded in contributing something to the result. Others, as I have tried to show, are at present insoluble, and must remain so unless and until fresh discoveries throw light upon them. But excavation, carried out regardless of cost and intelligently directed, has already been so active in France that I doubt whether, for the period of Cæsar's campaigns, it has many surprises in store for us. It is perhaps conceivable that the future may reveal some lost memoirs which may supplement Cæsar's own narrative. But even if our positive knowledge is not destined to be increased, we know enough

already for essential purposes; and the most that further research of happy chance can bring to light is very little in comparison with what has been already discovered. And when the catalogue of "programmes" and dissertations is complete, when modern research and modern literary skill shall have combined to produce the final history of the Gallic war, the unpretending little book which Caesar wrote two thousand years ago in the scanty leisure of a busy life will outlive them all!

17 DOURO PLACE, KENSINGTON, W.

*July 23, 1899.*

## THE BUSTS OF JULIUS CAESAR

WHOEVER wishes to know all that can be known about the busts of Caesar should read Bernoulli's learned and beautifully illustrated *Römische Ikonographie*. That work will tell him what busts are generally regarded as authentic: but what we really want to know is which of the authentic busts offers the most faithful likeness; and this is what neither Bernoulli nor any one else can certainly tell. It comes to this, that every one must study for himself Caesar's history, form his own idea of his character, and then use his own judgement; and if a man distrusts his own judgement and finds a learned treatise tiresome, perhaps he might do worse than take Mr. Baring Gould for his guide. It is true that the author of *The Tragedy of the Caesars* sometimes lets his imagination run away with him. He has, I think, idealised the character of Caesar, and read his ideal in, or rather into his favourite busts. But it is impossible for him to take pen in hand without being interesting; and, accurate or not, a man of his calibre cannot fail to throw light upon any subject with which he deals.

A portrait which has done duty in many works on Caesar is taken from the colossal bust of Naples. This seems to me, not indeed, as Mr. Baring Gould<sup>1</sup> thinks, characterless, but, at any rate, no true presentment of the character of Caesar. The face is powerful, but heavy if not brutal.<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Warde Fowler<sup>3</sup> suggests that the real Caesar may be represented by the green basalt bust of Berlin. The breadth of skull, which characterises the marble bust in the British Museum, and, in varying degrees, all the others, is absent from this: but Mr. Baring Gould<sup>4</sup> suggests that the block of basalt which the sculptor used may have been too narrow. Surely this is pushing conjecture too far. M. Salomon Reinach,<sup>5</sup> on the other hand, points out that the type of the basalt bust is not to be found on any of the coins of Caesar,<sup>6</sup> and that it is similar to the type represented in the bust of an Alexandrine Greek in the Imperial Museum of Vienna. Mr. J. C. Ropes,<sup>7</sup> indeed,

<sup>1</sup> *The Tragedy of the Caesars*, i. 3, 116.

<sup>2</sup> The illustrations of this bust in Mongez's *Iconographie romaine* (tome ii.) are idealised. Compare them with Taf. xiii. in Bernoulli's book.

<sup>3</sup> *Classical Review*, vii., 1893, p. 108.

<sup>4</sup> *The Tragedy of the Caesars*, i. 106.

<sup>5</sup> *Gazette des Beaux-Arts*, 3<sup>e</sup> pér., t. vii., 1892, pp. 474-6.

<sup>6</sup> See the beautiful illustrations of the coins in H. Cohen's *Description générale des monnaies de la république romaine*, 1857.

<sup>7</sup> *Scribner's Mag.*, i., 1887, pp. 132, 135.

speaks of "a mark by which one can generally recognise the authentic busts of Caesar, namely a scar or furrow on the left side of the face"; and he adds that this mark is to be found on the bust in the British Museum, and also on the basalt bust. There is certainly a furrow on the left side of the bust in the British Museum: but there is a corresponding, though shorter, furrow on the right side; and I used to think that both of them simply represented lines such as are to be seen on the faces of many men who have passed middle life. I have, however, since noticed that some of the coins<sup>1</sup> show a furrow on the right cheek with great distinctness. But, whatever may be the worth of the furrows as evidence, Bernoulli, as well as M. Reinach, questions the authenticity of the basalt bust; and only an enthusiast could detect any similarity between it and any of the other busts, the authenticity of which is admitted.

M. Geffroy,<sup>2</sup> the director of the École française de Rome, remarks that Signor Barracco possesses a bust of Caesar, the genuineness of which is proved by its bearing on the crown of the head the star mentioned by Suetonius. Undoubtedly this bust was intended to represent Caesar: but what proof is there that the artist ever saw Caesar, or even worked with an authentic portrait before him? If any one thinks this question vexatious, I beg him to suspend his judgement until he has finished reading this note. Suetonius<sup>3</sup> says that, on the occasion of the first games which Augustus held in honour of Julius, a comet appeared; that the comet was regarded as a sign that Caesar's soul had been received into heaven; and that, in consequence, the image of a star was placed upon the head of his bust. Now M. Geffroy cannot prove that the bust in Signor Barracco's possession is the very bust of which Suetonius speaks, or even a replica of it; for it is probable that a posthumous bust or busts were produced with a star upon the head; and if Signor Barracco's bust was posthumous, as he himself believes that it was,<sup>4</sup> it must either have been a copy of an original or simply a work of memory or of imagination. It was found in the delta of the Nile; and two photographs of it are reproduced in a volume entitled *La collection Barracco*, by G. Barracco and W. Helbig. The face is covered with a beard of about a fortnight's growth.<sup>5</sup> The shape of the head is strikingly different from that of the bust in the British Museum, and its relative breadth is much less; though in both the forehead, as distinguished from the head itself, is remarkably narrow. In expression the two busts have hardly any resemblance.

Mr. Baring Gould has a very high opinion of the bust in the

<sup>1</sup> See Bernoulli, Nos. 53 and 62, and Mommsen, *Hist. de la monnaie rom.*, t. iv. Pl. xxxii. No. 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. arch.*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. xx., 1892, p. 256.

<sup>3</sup> *Divus Iulius*, c. 88. Cf. *Archæologische Zeitung*, xix., 1867, pp. 110-13.

<sup>4</sup> "Nous pouvons conclure que la statue dont provient notre tête fut exécutée après la consécration de César." *La collection Barracco*, by G. Barracco and W. Helbig, 1893-4, p. 61.

<sup>5</sup> The authors of *La collection Barracco* conjecture that Caesar had let his beard grow as a sign of mourning for Pompey, just as, according to Suetonius (*Divus Iulius*, c. 67), he did while he was avenging the massacre at Aduatua.

British Museum : so has Bernoulli ;<sup>1</sup> and, given the authenticity of the bust, which is generally admitted,<sup>2</sup> I do not think that any one could doubt that it was the work of a sculptor who, as Mr. Baring Gould says, "knew Caesar and loved him," or at least understood and admired him. But Mr. Baring Gould tells us that Mr. Conrad Dressler, the sculptor, who shares his admiration for the bust, has pronounced that Caesar could not have sat to the artist, because the extraordinary breadth of the skull above the ears is anatomically impossible.<sup>3</sup> When I read this it struck me as most unlikely that a sculptor who is assumed to have known Caesar well would have cared to model his bust from memory, or that his memory would have been so defective ; and it seemed quite incredible that a sculptor who was capable of producing such a work of art should have lacked an elementary knowledge of anatomy. I asked Mr. Hope Pinker, whose bust of Sir Henry Acland is a speaking likeness, for his opinion. It confirmed my own. Have Mr. Baring Gould and Mr. Dressler forgotten the bust of the youthful Augustus which stands in the British Museum, within a few feet of the bust of Caesar ? Let them look at it again, and I think they will admit that its breadth above the ears is just as remarkable as that of its neighbour.<sup>4</sup>

Mr. Baring Gould considers a bust in the Louvre, of which he gives an illustration, as good in its way as the bust in our national collection : but it seems to him to represent the militant rather than the reflective side of Caesar's character.<sup>5</sup> To my mind the bust in the British Museum represents, as a bust should do, not one side of the man's character, but the whole. The bust in the Louvre has features of the Caesarian type ; but the expression is quite different. Mr. Dressler has remarked that, in default of direct evidence, there is no better test of the fidelity of a portrait than the impression which it leaves upon the mind of an intelligent observer.<sup>6</sup> The test is obviously imperfect : but it is worth pages of discussion. Nor would I hesitate to apply that test, according to the measure of my intelligence, if only it were certain that the bust in the British Museum is really an authentic bust of Julius Caesar. But even this certainty is wanting. There is not in existence a single bust of which it can be said, with absolute certainty, both that the sculptor intended it to be a portrait of Caesar, and also that either Caesar sat for the likeness or the sculptor had personal knowledge or an authentic likeness to guide him. Some years ago I asked an

<sup>1</sup> "Among those busts," says Bernoulli (p. 171), "which recommend themselves by their resemblance to the coins this is the one which most suggests Caesar."

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Cecil Smith, of the British Museum, tells me that Herr Furtwängler, the well-known writer on classical sculpture, regards the bust as a forgery. I have not been able to discover any reference to it in those works of Herr Furtwängler which are catalogued in the Museum. If the sculptor was a forger, he was also a genius ; but no forger would have thought of portraying that narrow forehead in combination with a broad head.

<sup>3</sup> *The Tragedy of the Caesars*, i. 114-15.

<sup>4</sup> Only the other day I saw a child, whose head, extraordinarily broad, projected above the ears as much as that depicted by the bust in the Museum. 16. 11. 97. The bust is not more brachycephalic than the heads of many living Auvergnats and inhabitants of the department of Jura.

<sup>5</sup> *The Tragedy of the Caesars*, i. 115.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 9-10.

prominent authority on Greek and Roman sculptures whether there was any doubt of the authenticity of the marble bust. "Oh! no," he answered; "no doubt whatever." But he could not give me any proof. The bust was once believed to represent Cicero. If physiognomy is any index to character, it is certain that that calm face bore no resemblance to his: but the conjecture, absurd as it was, would never have been made if there had been direct evidence that the bust was intended for Caesar. Evidence, however, there is none for the authenticity of this or of any one of the so-called busts of Caesar, except such evidence as is to be got from the study of the texts and of the coins. The evidence of the texts is very scanty; and most of the coins differ widely among themselves.<sup>1</sup> The contemporary coins which bore Caesar's effigy were the work of five different agents,—L. Aemilius Buca, L. Flaminius Chilo, M. Mettius, P. Sepullius Macer, and C. Cossutius Marcellinus. None of them were struck before 44 B.C., the year of Caesar's death. Others, known as the Voconian group, were executed a few years later.<sup>2</sup> In the *Description of the Collection of Ancient Marbles in the British Museum*<sup>3</sup> it is affirmed that there is an agreement among the Aemilian and Voconian coins "which is perfectly satisfactory," and that with all of them the bust in the Museum "exhibits a striking similarity." Well, the reader should look through Cohen's *Description générale des monnaies de la république romaine*, and judge for himself. The Aemilian coins are numbered 15, 16, 17, and 18 on Plate ii.; the Voconian 1 and 2 on Plate xlii. No. 2 certainly resembles 15, but differs widely from 1; 17 and 18 are about as much like the others as Gladstone was like Beaconsfield; and, in expression, none of the six resembles any of the busts. All that can be said is that, in profile, there is a general resemblance between No. 15, No. 2, Nos. 2 and 3 on Plate xvi., 3 on Plate xviii. and 4 on Plate xxvii.; that the type of face depicted on these six coins is not unlike that of the bust in the British Museum; and that the lean muscular neck shown in the former resembles that of the latter. When one looks at different portraits of any well-known modern face, one can always tell at a glance whom they were intended to represent. Similarly, the portraits of Queen Elizabeth, for instance, are all unmistakable. And, to go back to ancient times, it does not need an expert to tell that the busts of Augustus were all intended to portray the same face. But the busts of Caesar differ from each other so much in expression, and some of them even in feature, that, although there is a certain vague "Caesarian" type common to all, an untrained eye, if the inscriptions were removed, would probably take them for portraits of different men. The conclusion appears to be either that most of the sculptors were unable to catch a likeness, or that most of them worked from memory or

<sup>1</sup> The face on a coin in the British Museum, an illustration of which is given in Mr. Warde Fowler's *Caesar*, is that of an imbecile buffoon.

<sup>2</sup> E. Babelon, *Descr. hist. et chron. des monnaies de la république rom.*, 1886, i. i., p. 497, t. ii., p. 560; Mommsen, *Hist. de la monnaie rom.*, t. ii., 1870, p. 545, n. 17.

<sup>3</sup> Part xi., 1861, pp. 39-40.

imagination, or, finally, that some of the busts were not meant to represent Caesar at all. But this much is certain :—if the original of the bust in the British Museum was not Caesar, he was a very great man, perhaps the noblest Roman of them all ; and who ? The experts cannot help us to arrive at a definite conclusion ; and for my part I am content to accept as the likeness of Caesar the noble bust which has approved itself to Mr. Froude, to Bernoulli, to Mr. Baring Gould, and to other well-qualified judges.<sup>1</sup>

This bust represents, I venture to say, the strongest personality that has ever lived, the strongest which poet or historian, painter or sculptor has ever portrayed. In the profile it is impossible to detect a flaw : if there is one in the full face, it is the narrowness of the forehead as compared with the breadth of the skull. The face appears that of a man in late middle age. He has lived every day of his life, and he is beginning to weary of the strain : but every faculty retains its fullest vigour. The harmony of the nature is as impressive as its strength. No one characteristic dominates the rest. Not less remarkable than the power of the countenance are its delicacy and fastidious refinement. The man looks perfectly unscrupulous ; or, if the phrase be apt to mislead, he looks as if no scruple could make him falter in pursuit of his aim : but his conduct is governed by principle. Passion, without which, it has been truly said, there can be no genius, inspires his resolve and stimulates its execution : but passion, in the narrow sense, is never suffered to warp his action. He is kindly and tolerant : but, to avoid greater ills, he would shed blood without remorse. "The mild but inexorable yoke of Caesar."—so Mr. Strachan-Davidson<sup>2</sup> describes the ascendancy to which Cicero reluctantly submitted ; and mild inexorability is apparent in the expression of this man. He can be a charming companion to men ; and, though he is no longer young, he knows how to win the love of women. He sees facts as they are, accepts and makes the best of them. Knowledge of men has made him cynical : but the cynicism is dashed by humour. Look at the profile from the left, and you will note an expression of restrained amusement, as of one who is good-naturedly observant of the weaknesses of his fellows. If his outlook passes beyond mundane things and strains after the unknown, he does not let us into the secret of his thoughts.

<sup>1</sup> In the *Description of the collection of Ancient Marbles in the British Museum* (Part xi., pp. 39-40) it is asserted that "the general character of the features of Caesar are as well known and as clearly marked as those of any personage of Roman times," and that "the features of the marble bust agree with them." If this statement requires some qualification, it may, I think, be affirmed that the marble bust agrees as well as any other with the coins, and that, as Bernoulli says, it is the one which "most suggests Caesar." It is interesting to compare it with Visconti's illustrations (in Mongez's *Iconographie romaine*, t. ii.) of the Neapolitan, Capitoline and St-Cloud busts. These three, though they differ in expression, represent, I feel sure, the same man. The lines of the forehead in them and in the British Museum bust are alike ; and there is a certain resemblance in the profile and the shape of the head, though the jaw in the St-Cloud bust is squarer, and the chin more prominent than in the other three. The ear of the former is very like that of the British Museum bust, and, like it, lies very close to the head.

<sup>2</sup> *Cicero*, 1894. p. 268.

But if the ordinary observer is unable to discern that look of faith, that "far-off look" which Mr. Baring Gould<sup>1</sup> loves to fancy that he can read in the expression, he cannot fail to recognise the stamp not only of will and of intellect, but also of nobility. The bust represents a man of the world, in the fullest meaning of the term. It alone represents a man such as Caesar has revealed himself in his writings, and as his contemporaries have revealed him in theirs; and that is why I have chosen it to illustrate this book.

## BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Bibliographies of Gallic history, either special or included in more comprehensive bibliographies, abound: but there is none, either for the whole period or for Caesar's conquest, which is even approximately complete. I have not attempted to compile one, first because I do not think that the task is worth performing, and secondly because such a bibliography, even if it were required by those who may read this book, could not be completed without years of additional labour, and would by itself fill a small volume. Very many works which I have read are not mentioned in my notes, because some are either worthless or unnecessary for my purpose, and others only repeat arguments or statements for which I had already given references; but all those to which it was necessary to call attention are duly quoted. I found my way through the mazes of the subject by degrees. A single reference often led to many others. A considerable number of works are enumerated under the head of *Cæsar* in the Catalogue of the British Museum. From this I passed to the chapter entitled "Sources" in the late Ernest Desjardins's *Géographie de la Gaule romaine*; C. E. Ruelle's *Bibliographie générale des Gaules*, 1880 (which is strong on the French, but very weak on the German side); *Bibliographie des travaux historiques et archéologiques publiées par les sociétés savantes de la France*, 1888 etc., by R. de Lasteyrie and E. Lefèvre-Pontalis; F. L. A. Schweizer's *Handbuch der classischen Bibliographie*, 1832; C. H. Hermann's *Bibliotheca scriptorum classicarum*, 1871; A. Blau's annual *Bibliotheca philologica*, 1849 etc.; W. Engelmann's *Bibliotheca scriptorum classicorum et Græcorum et Latinorum*, 1880-82; G. Fock's *Catalogus dissertationum philologicarum classicarum*, 1893; *Bibliotheca philologica classica* published in Bursian's *Jahresbericht über die Fortschritte der classischen Alterthumswissenschaft*; *Jahresberichte des philologischen Vereins zu Berlin*; the *Revue des revues et publications d'Académies relatives à l'antiquité classique* (accompanying the *Revue de philologie*); the *Revue historique*, the *Revue des questions historiques* and the *Revue archéologique*; O. Lorenz's periodical *Catalogue générale de la librairie française*; an article by Major Max Jähns on *Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt*, 1883, pp. 343-86; Meusel's *Lexicon Cæsarianum*, 1887-93; E. Reclus's *Nouvelle géographie*

<sup>1</sup> *The Tragedy of the Cæsars*, i. 114-15.



*universelle*, tomes ii. and iv., the footnotes to which contain many valuable references; Poole's *Index to Periodical Literature*; and for ethnology, *L'Anthropologie*, *Centralblatt für Anthropologie*, *Ethnologie und Urgeschichte*, and other periodicals, devoted to the same subject, which will be found mentioned in my essay on "The Ethnology of Gaul." For fear I might have overlooked any references to articles in foreign periodicals, I also worked through the back numbers of all the transactions of learned societies, French and German, which I could find on the shelves of the gallery which they occupy in the British Museum.

### MR. STOCK'S EDITION OF CAESAR'S *GALLIC WAR* AND COLONEL STOFFEL'S EXCAVATIONS

The Delegates of the Clarendon Press have lately published an edition of Caesar's *Gallie War* by Mr. St. George Stock. The book is avowedly intended "to treat Caesar as an historian"; and it is issued in the form of an important work. It is not my business to review it; but I think it right to point out some very gross errors into which the editor has fallen, as they tend to discredit the work, historically most important, of a distinguished French officer, who has done a great deal to illustrate the geography of Caesar's campaigns, and are likely, if not corrected, to mislead the students of Oxford University to whom the book is primarily addressed.

Mr. Stock affirms in his Preface that "on the campaigns of Caesar the late Emperor Napoleon has probably made the largest contributions to knowledge." Referring again to the Emperor's work, he speaks of "the magnificent maps and plans which add so much to its value." Now those continental scholars who have made the study of the *Commentaries* the main business of their lives are aware that whatever "contributions to knowledge" the Emperor may have made were due to excavation. His mistakes were made in dealing with problems for the solution of which he could not invoke the results of excavation. But when I came to examine Mr. Stock's book, I found that the alleged discoveries of camps and trenches at Bourges (Avaricum), Gergovia and Alesia, if not also at Berry-au-Bac, had been rejected by him with contempt. The inference would seem to be that, in Mr. Stock's opinion, a large number of the maps and plans whose magnificence he extols, are purely imaginary, and that the officer who directed the excavations was a liar, — a liar rather than a fool because, if the alleged discoveries were not genuine, the elaborate illustrations, with which the maps abound, of the "profiles" of the trenches, must have been intentionally misleading.

The officer who directed the excavations at Berry-au-Bac, Gergovia and Alesia was Colonel Stoffel, whose character and ability it would be superfluous to eulogise. The comparative smallness of the results which he professed to have achieved is a testimony to their genuineness. The Emperor never pretended that he or his collaborator had discovered

traces of any of the camps which Caesar or his lieutenants made in Gaul, except those which I have mentioned, and two others, made in the eighth campaign, with which Mr. Stock's book is not concerned. He was careful to point out, in his Plan of Alesia, the *lacunae* which existed in his tracing of the lines of contravallation and circumvallation, and to admit that he had failed to discover traces of 18 out of the 23 redoubts. If the excavations had not been made *bona fide*, is it likely that these admissions would have been made?

What has Mr. Stock to say in support of his scepticism? He has assured, he tells us (p. 260), by the secretary of the local society of antiquaries that the camp traced on the Plan of Avaricum was "a pure effort of imagination." Napoleon himself says that the camp "a été retrouvé en partie par les fouilles." I do not know whether Colonel Stoffel had anything to do with these excavations. At all events, we have to choose between the secretary's recollection of what happened 35 years ago and the contemporary statement of Napoleon.


Regarding the Emperor's Plan of Gergovia, Mr. Stock delivers himself as follows (p. 316):—"That the conclusions in 'Jules César' were arrived at on purely *a priori* grounds is indicated by the Emperor himself, who says in a note (vol. ii. p. 328), 'It is by seeking the essential conditions required for the placing of troops that Baron Stoffel succeeded in finding the camps.'" The word "purely" only serves to reveal Mr. Stock's ignorance of his subject. The conclusions were not arrived at "on purely *a priori* grounds" but were based, as I shall presently show, upon the results of excavation directed by intelligent comprehension of Caesar's narrative and by knowledge of military requirements. What Mr. Stock means at as "this high *a priori* method" is the one method which any sensible inquirer would, in the circumstances, have adopted. Colonel Stoffel, being a soldier who knew his business, reconnoitred the country round Gergovia, noted the one site which a general of ordinary good sense would have selected for his camp,—the site which was at once defensible, sufficiently near to Gergovia, and close to running water,—walked up to it, set his labourers to work, and found the entrenchments of which he was in search.

Finally, referring to the Emperor's Plan of Alesia, Mr. Stock says (p. 296), "Of Camp A we could discover no trace at all. But I fancy that our labour in this direction was vain from the first, since the Emperor himself speaks of Camp B as the only known example of visible traces of a camp made by Caesar. This is a tacit admission that the other camp was discovered by a latent process, which has played a large part in the construction of these plans. The fact seems to be that the military eye, especially when quickened by the prospect of imperial favour, can discern things which would for ever escape the gaze of a civilian."

It is a pity that Mr. Stock did not take the trouble to inform himself before levelling this grotesque insult against Colonel Stoffel. "Latent" the process is if one is ignorant of the methods of excavation, but otherwise quite intelligible. Mr. Stock affirms, as emphatically as Napoleon

himself, the identity of Mont Auxois with Alesia. Excavations were unquestionably made by an army of workmen at great cost. Does Mr. Stock imagine that the Emperor would have incurred this expense if there had been no possibility of obtaining satisfactory results? Did it never occur to him that the trenches which excavation revealed were afterwards filled up? What is truly comical is that he should have expected to find Caesar's works still visible, and, because he did not see the traces which excavation could alone bring to light, should have leaped to the conclusion that Colonel Stoffel never discovered them.


Colonel Stoffel has written me a letter which, if Mr. Stock can understand a singularly lucid description, will convince him of the absurdity of his scepticism. Substantially, the colonel confirms my own preconceived notions. "Vous désirez," he writes, "savoir par quelle méthode j'ai retrouvé les traces des camps que l'armée de César construisit dans la guerre des Gaules. Il est nécessaire de commencer à indiquer quelques notions préliminaires. Les terrains dans lesquels ces camps furent établis présentent, comme tous les terrains cultivés, une couche supérieure de terre végétale, appelée *humus*, laquelle varie d'épaisseur selon les différentes contrées, et peut avoir depuis un ou deux




pieds jusqu'à quatre ou cinq pieds et plus. Au dessous de cette couche de terre végétale se trouve le terrain vierge (ou le sous-sol), qui est, selon les contrées, ou marneux, ou siliceux, ou calcaire. À Alesia (dans la plaine des Laumes) c'est de la marne épaisse et ferme; à Berry-au-Bac c'est une marne plus légère; à la Roche-Blanche (en face de Gergovia) c'est un calcaire ferme et blanc. Lorsque, après une bataille, ou après un siège, l'armée romaine quittait son camp, les habitants du pays en détruisaient les retranchements afin de pouvoir de nouveau cultiver leurs champs. Ils rejetaient les terres du parapet dans le fossé. Ce fossé était, de la sorte, plein d'une terre mêlée, composée de terre végétale, de terre vierge, et souvent d'objets que les soldats romains avaient pu laisser sur le parapet, tels que débris d'armes, boulets en pierre, monnaies, ossements, etc. Pendant quelque temps la partie supérieure du fossé comblé présentait la forme AB (slightly convex), à cause du foisonnement des terres; mais avec le temps, et grâce à la culture de chaque année, elles se tassèrent au niveau du sol avoisinant, ce qui fait que partout les traces des camps de César ont disparu. En tout cas, la terre de remplissage des fossés est une terre meuble et, fait important à remarquer, elle reste meuble, sans jamais reprendre la consistance du terrain vierge, si bien qu'aujourd'hui, après 2000 ans écoulés, elle se détache aisément à la pioche. C'est là ce qui permet de retrouver les fossés lorsqu'on a

su déterminer l'emplacement d'un camp. C'est là, comme vous le dites très bien, la première condition. Il faut donc, avant tout, étudier le terrain où on suppose que le camp était placé, ce qui exige une connaissance parfaite des *Commentaires* de César et des connaissances militaires spéciales.

"Cela posé, voici comment j'ai toujours procédé pour retrouver les fossés d'un camp. Soit ABCD une étendue de terrain dans laquelle je sup-




posais placé le camp qu'il s'agissait de découvrir ; et admettons, pour fixer les idées, que la couche de terre végétale ait 70 centimètres d'épaisseur. Je plaçais les ouvriers, avec pelles et pioches, sur plusieurs files *fff.*, dans une direction perpendiculaire à un des côtés supposés du camp, les ouvriers de chaque file à 20 ou 30 mètres les uns des autres. Chacun d'eux était chargé d'enlever la couche de *humus* sur deux pieds de largeur. Si, après avoir enlevé cette couche sur 70 centimètres de profondeur, ils sentaient que leurs pioches frappaient un terrain résistant, c'est que celui-ci n'avait jamais été remué et qu'on n'était pas sur le fossé romain. Les ouvriers continuaient alors à avancer, et cela tant qu'il ne se produisait rien de nouveau. Mais lorsqu'ils arrivaient, sans s'en douter, sur le fossé en *xy*, c'était autre chose. Alors, après avoir enlevé la terre végétale jusqu'à la profondeur de 70 centimètres, ils ne trouvaient plus, comme précédemment, un sol vierge résistant ; au contraire, ils rencontraient une terre meuble qui se détachait facilement, ce qui permettait de supposer qu'elle avait été autrefois remuée. Je faisais alors élargir la tranchée en lui donnant six pieds de largeur (*ed*) au lieu de deux pieds (*xy*), afin que les ouvriers pussent travailler plus commodément ; et ils approfondissaient la tranchée jusqu'à ce qu'ils rencontrassent



le sol naturel. D'ailleurs on reconnaissait bientôt si on était, oui ou non, sur le fossé romain ; car, si on y était réellement, on distinguait sans peine sur les deux bords *et et fd* de la tranchée, à droite et à gauche des ouvriers, le profil du fossé qui se détachait par la couleur de la terre mêlée (celle de l'ancien parapet) sur la couleur de terre vierge qui l'encadrait.

"Je n'ai rien vu de plus curieux que les profils des petits fossés du petit camp que j'ai mis à découvert sur la colline de la Roche-Blanche. Là, la couche de terre végétale, épaisse tout au plus de 50 à 60 centimètres (si j'ai bonne mémoire), repose sur un sol de calcaire dur et blanc comme de la craie : aussi les fossés du camp, remplis d'une terre mélangée



de humus et de craie, présentaient-ils des profils qui tranchaient sur la terre dont ils étaient entourés aussi nettement que le triangle ABC ci-contre tranche sur le papier blanc. L'Empereur, qui était venu visiter mes fouilles à Gergovia, fut tellement frappé et émer-

veillé en voyant ces profils, qu'il songea à acheter la colline de la Roche-Blanche pour les conserver. Il abandonna cette idée lorsqu'il sut que les habitants désiraient ne pas être dépossédés, et il m'ordonna de combler mes tranchées et de tout mettre dans l'état primitif.

"Pour en revenir aux recherches nécessaires pour déterminer l'emplacement d'un camp, il est à peine besoin d'ajouter que quand j'étais parvenu à retrouver un des points par le profil du fossé, je me bornais à en retrouver cinq ou six autres dans la longueur de chaque côté, ce qui suffisait pour délimiter le camp et en connaître la forme exacte. . . . A Alesia, les recherches ont duré plus de deux ans, parce qu'il fallait retrouver non seulement les traces des camps, mais encore celles de lignes de contrevallation et de circonvallation. J'y ai employé plus de 300 ouvriers. Vous comprenez, Monsieur, que je ne puis que sourire en apprenant qu'un certain Mr. Stock se refuse à croire à mes découvertes. . . . Lorsqu'il a visité les lieux, que n'a-t-il interrogé les nombreux ouvriers que j'ai employés et dont la plupart vivent encore ? Ils lui auraient raconté les trouvailles de toutes sortes qu'ils ont faites dans le fond des fossés, à 6, 8 ou 15 pieds sous terre, débris d'armes, boulets, monnaies par centaines, et ils lui auraient expliqué que ces objets n'avaient pas été mis là par le bon Dieu à la création du monde."

As the reader may have perceived, I do not at all mean to imply that Napoleon's maps are all trustworthy. On the contrary, it will be shown in Part II. of this book that some of them are largely conjectural and that several are either wholly or in part erroneous.

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[I hope that readers who use the map and plans will turn to the article in Part II. on "The Map of Gaul" (pp. 329-32). Those who may wish to test their accuracy should also consult the Geographical Index (pp. 335-514) and various notes in Section VII. (pp. 607 ff.), which are referred to in footnotes to the Narrative.]

## ERRATA

Page 190, footnote 4, *for* 1855 *read* 1835.

., 283, line 12, *for* Houdin *read* Boudin.

., 375, footnote 4, delete "the" before "É<sup>1</sup>vian

# PART I







# CAESAR'S CONQUEST OF GAUL

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

THREE centuries before the birth of Caesar, while patrician Gaulic invasion of Italy: was still struggling with plebeian, while both were still contending with rival peoples for supremacy, the Gauls first battle of the Allia and its results. encountered their destined conquerors. For a generation or more,<sup>1</sup> the Celtic wanderers, whose kinsmen had already overflowed Gaul, crossed the Pyrenees and passed into Britain and into Ireland, had been pouring, in a resistless stream, down the passes of the Alps. They spread over Lombardy. They drove the Etruscans from their strongholds in the north. They crossed the Po, and pushed further and further southward into Etruria itself. At length they overthrew a Roman 388 B.C. army in the battle of the Allia, and marched unopposed through the Colline Gate. The story of the sack and burning of the city was noised throughout the civilised world; yet the disaster itself hardly affected the history of Rome. It probably tended to rivet the bonds of union between her and the other cities of Latium, and to strengthen her claim to supremacy in Italy. From time to time during the next century the Gauls returned to plunder: but their incursions were repelled; and the champion of Italian civilisation was Rome.

But the Roman dread of the Gauls long remained; and more than once Rome's enemies enlisted their services against Gallic tribes assist the enemies of Rome. her. In the last Samnite war, one of the most crucial events of Rome.

<sup>1</sup> Regarding the date of the Gallic invasion of Italy, and the place from which the invaders came, see pp. 548-50, *infra*.



295 B.C. of Roman history, Samnites, Etruscans and Gauls made a desperate effort to crush the rising power; and after this attempt had been frustrated, the Etruscans once again rose in revolt, and their Gallic mercenaries destroyed a Roman army under the walls of Arretium. It was not until the  
 283 B.C. Senones had in their turn been defeated and expelled from Italy, and the Boii, who hastened to avenge them, had been  
 282 B.C. crushed near the lake of Vadimo, that the republic was finally released from the fear of Gallic invasion.

The Romans fight their way to the Po; Years passed away. Rome became mistress of the peninsula and determined to vindicate her natural right to the rich plain on her own side of the Alpine barrier. The Gauls offered a strenuous resistance, and even assumed the offensive. Reinforced by a swarm of free-lances from the valley of the upper Rhône, they boldly crossed the Apennines and plundered Etruria. The Romans were taken by surprise: but in the  
 225 B.C. great battle of Telamon they checked the invasion; and within two years they fought their way to the right bank of the Po. The Insubres on the northern side still held out: but before the outbreak of the second Punic war Mediolanum, or Milan, their chief stronghold, was captured; and the fortresses of Placentia and Cremona were founded.

and conquer Cis-alpine Gaul 218 B.C. But the work of conquest was only half completed when Hannibal descended into the plain, and the exasperated Gauls rallied round him. When Rome emerged, victorious, from her great struggle, they knew what was in store for them, and made a last desperate effort to win back their liberty.  
 200 B.C. Placentia was sacked, and Cremona was invested. The Roman army which marched to its relief gained a victory,  
 199 B.C. but was in its turn almost annihilated by the Insubres. The Gauls, however, could never long act together: their countrymen beyond the Alps gave them no help: the league of the northern tribes was rent by discord and treachery; and the  
 196 B.C. Insubres and Cenomani were compelled to accept a peace, which allowed them indeed to retain their constitution, but forbade them to acquire the Roman citizenship. South of the Po the Boii strove frantically to hold their own: but in a series of battles their fighting men were well nigh exterminated: the Romans insisted upon the cession of half

their territory; and on both sides of the river the survivors were gradually lost among Italian settlers.

Eastward and southward and westward the empire of the Romans spread. They conquered Greece. They conquered Carthage. They conquered Spain. But between the central and the western peninsula they had no means of communication by land save what was afforded by the Greek colony of Massilia. • It was an entreaty from the Massiliots for protection, that gave occasion to the wars which resulted in the formation of the Province of Transalpine Gaul; and the natural willingness of the Senate to support their most faithful allies was doubtless stimulated by the desire to secure possession of the indispensable strip of coast between the Alps and the Pyrenees, partly also perhaps by the idea of creating a Greater Italy for the growing Italian population. In 155 B.C. the Romans stepped forward as the champions of Massilia against the Ligurian tribes between the Maritime Alps and the Rhône. The highlanders who inhabited the forest-clad mountains above the Riviera were crushed in a single campaign: after an interval of thirty years their western neighbours, the Salyes, were forced to submit; and their seaboard, like that of the other tribes, was given to the Massiliots. But the Romans had come to stay. The Aedui, who dwelt in the Nivernais and western Burgundy, calculated that the support of the Republic would help them to secure ascendancy over their rivals; and by a treaty, fraught with unforeseen issues, they were recognised as Friends and Allies of the Roman people. The Allobroges, on the other hand, whose home was between the Lake of Geneva, the Rhône and the Isère, refused to surrender the king of the Salyes, who had claimed their protection; and the king of the Arverni, with all the hosts of his dependent tribes, marched to support them. Just twenty years before the birth of Caesar a great battle was fought at the confluence of the Rhône and the Isère. The Gauls were beaten; and the bridges over the Rhône broke down beneath the multitude of the fugitives.

This victory was, in the strictest sense, decisive. The Romans were now masters of the lower Rhône; and if they were ever to penetrate into Further Gaul, their base could be advanced

Formation  
of the  
Roman  
Province in  
Transal-  
pine Gaul.

[Mar-  
seilles.]

125 B.C.

123 B.C.

121 B.C.

some hundreds of miles. The Arverni, whose hegemony had extended to the Rhine and the Mediterranean, had received a blow from which they never recovered.

The Province which was now formed stretched from the Maritime Alps to the Rhône. Succeeding consuls rapidly extended the frontier until it ran along the Cevennes and the river Tarn down into the centre of the Pyrenees. The tribes were obliged to pay tribute; and their subjection was assured by the construction of roads and fortresses. The heavy exactions of the conquerors provoked frequent insurrections: but year by year the Provincials became steadily Romanised. Roman nobles acquired estates in the Province, and sent their stewards to manage them. Roman merchants built warehouses and counting-houses in the towns; and the language and civilisation of Rome began to take root.<sup>1</sup> Narbo with its spacious harbour was not only a powerful military station, but in commerce the rival of Massilia. Meanwhile events were paving the way for the conquest of the great country that stretched beyond the Rhône and the Cevennes to the Rhine and the Atlantic Ocean.

[Nar-  
bonne.]

Gaul and  
its inhabi-  
tants.

The aspect of this region was, of course, very different from that of the beautiful France with which we are familiar. The land of gay cities, of picturesque old towns dominated by awful cathedrals, of corn-fields and vineyards and sunny hamlets and smiling chateaux, was then covered in many places by dreary swamps and darkened by huge forests. Gaul extended far beyond the limits of modern France, including a large part of Switzerland, Alsace and Lorraine, Belgium and southern Holland. The people were divided into three groups, differing in race, language, manners and institutions. Between the Garonne and the Pyrenees were the Aquitani, of whom certain tribes were akin to the Iberians of Spain. North-east of the Seine and the Marne, in the plains of Picardy, Artois and Champagne, on the mist-laden flats of the Scheldt and the lower Rhine and in the vast forest of the Ardennes, dwelt the Belgae, who may have partially mixed and were continually at war with their German neighbours. The lowlands of Switzerland, Alsace

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, *Pro. Fonteio*, 11.

and Franche Comté, the great plains and the uplands of central France, and the Atlantic seaboard, were occupied by the Celts.

Modern science, however, has established a more detailed Ethnology  
of Gaul. classification. Neither in Aquitania nor in Celtica nor in the land of the Belgae were the people homogeneous. To what era is to be assigned the first appearance of man in Gaul, is still a disputed question. Some ethnologists affirm that even in the tertiary epoch, more than a million years ago, the country round Aurillac was inhabited by men, if men they can be called, who wrought for themselves flint implements which remain as their sole memorial.<sup>1</sup> Even after the close of that period our own country was still part of the continent, and the great ice-age had not yet begun. Thenceforward uncertainty disappears. In the quaternary epoch came the palæolithic races, whose existence is attested not only by their weapons but by their own remains. These men maintained themselves in Gaul during the second interglacial epoch, and sheltered in caves throughout the countless centuries in which the glaciers were spreading and receding and spreading again over the uplands of central Europe.<sup>2</sup> Earliest of all were the Neanderthal, or, as they are sometimes called, the Canstadt race, with their low brutish foreheads and huge beetling brows, whose skeletons have been found in the basin of the Meuse and between the valley of the Rhine and Auvergne. Towards the close of this epoch appeared the dawn of pictorial art. From the caves of La Madelaine and Les Eyzies in the basin of the Dordogne have been recovered tusks of mammoths and horns of reindeer, engraved with likenesses of horses, of fish and of men.<sup>3</sup> The palæolithic races were all dolichocephalic: their heads, that is to say, were long in proportion to their breadth; and the

<sup>1</sup> See A. Bertrand, *La Gaule avant les Gaulois*, 2nd ed., 1891, pp. 31-52; A. H. Keane, *Ethnology*, 2nd ed., 1896, pp. 91-2; and, for a full discussion of the whole subject of this and the next three paragraphs, my essay on "The Ethnology of Gaul" (pp. 245-322, *infra*).

<sup>2</sup> See J. Geikie, *The Great Ice Age*, 3rd ed., 1894, pp. 577-84, 608, 612, 634-5, 687, 689-90. But see also p. 823, *infra*.

<sup>3</sup> See the illustrations in Bertrand's *La Gaule avant les Gaulois*, pp. 84, 87-91, 93-5, 102.

same characteristic is found in the skulls of the tall Cro-Magnon race, and of the slender stunted people of l'Homme Mort, who, though they may have been descended from the older inhabitants, belonged to the neolithic age. Both of these peoples, who are called after the caverns in which the first specimens were found, appear to have been diffused over the length and breadth of Gaul. But as the new epoch advanced, new races began to appear; and the invaders who came from the east, and gradually subdued the feebler aborigines, were characterised by brachycephaly, or great breadth of skull. Among the neolithic peoples were some whose chiefs erected dolmens, or vast structures of stone, to cover the sepulchres of their dead. It is believed by some ethnologists that the dolmen-builders belonged, in part, to the fair, blue-eyed, African race, known as the Tamahu, whose features were portrayed in Egyptian wall-paintings more than three thousand years ago; while others hold that the great majority of them came from the north and east, and were identical with the Ligurians, who in historical times were apparently confined within the limits of the modern Provence. The dolmens are not all of one pattern: some of them contained implements, of bronze as well as of flint; and the skeletons which have been found in them belong to more than one race. The era in which they were constructed was marked by considerable commercial activity; for some of them have yielded ornaments of jade and turquoise, which must have been imported into Gaul. The huge stone monuments which Cæsar doubtless saw when his legions entered Brittany were only one of many groups which extended along the coast from the Pyrenees to the Channel, and were scattered over central Gaul: but not a single dolmen has been found on Gallic soil east of the great barrier formed by the Jura and the Vosges.<sup>1</sup> The neolithic races were of manifold types: but it has been suggested that the latest were the sturdy, dark, round-headed people whose descendants still form the mass of the population not only of France, but also of southern Germany. Probably this type,

<sup>1</sup> Bertrand has published a map showing the distribution of the Gallic dolmens. See *La Gaule avant les Gaulois*, 1891, p. 128.

which some ethnologists call the "Auvergnat" and others the "Ligurian," summed up the characteristics of divers intermingled groups.

The earliest inhabitants of Gaul about whom history has anything to tell were the Iberians, who dwelt between the Rhône and the Pyrenees. The "Iberian question" is one of the problems which amuse and baffle ethnologists; for there can be little doubt that in the land which belonged to the Iberians of history, in Spain as well as in southern Gaul, there prevailed two forms of speech,—Basque and the uncouth, undeciphered language in which were engraven the so-called Iberian inscriptions. But the researches of anthropologists would seem to show that, if the Iberians were not one race, the bulk of them were small and dark, and were akin to the neolithic people of l'Homme Mort. On their east dwelt the Ligurians, small and dark like them, and, as some believe, an offshoot from the same stock, though others insist that they were the purest representatives of the round-headed "Auvergnat" type. According to the ancient geographers, the land which belonged to them in Gaul was the mountainous tract between the Rhône, the Durance, and the Cottian and Maritime Alps: but Ligurians were mingled with Iberians on the west of the Rhône; and it is certain that in Caesar's time Liguria, as well as the land of the Iberians, was also peopled by the descendants of Celtic invaders. It was perhaps in the eighth century before the Christian era that the tall fair Celts began to cross the Rhine<sup>1</sup>: but it is unlikely that even these invaders were homogeneous; and those to whom belonged the characteristics which the ancient writers associated with the Gallic or Celtic type may have been accompanied by the descendants of aliens who had joined them during their long sojourn in Germany. Successive swarms spread over the land, partly subduing and mingling with the descendants of the palæolithic peoples and of their neolithic conquerors, partly perhaps driving them into the mountainous tracts. Physically, they resembled the tall fair Germans whom Caesar and Tacitus describe: but they differed from them in character

<sup>1</sup> See p. 823.

and customs as well as in speech. And although the *tumuli*, in which remains of their dead have been discovered, contain implements of iron,<sup>1</sup> there are writers who maintain that the earliest hordes had begun to arrive in neolithic times. The Belgic Celts were the latest comers; and among the Belgae of Caesar's time the aboriginal elements were comparatively small. If Caesar was rightly informed, the languages of the Belgae and the Celtae were distinct. Both, it is needless to say, were Celtic, and the difference may not have been great; for if a Goidelic dialect was spoken anywhere in Gaul, the vestiges of Gallic that remain belong to the Brythonic branch of the Celtic tongue. In Aquitania the natives remained comparatively pure, and formed a separate group, which, in Caesar's time, stood politically apart from the Celtae as well as from the Belgae. They are generally spoken of as an Iberian people: but the name is misleading. The conquering Celts, as the evidence of nomenclature shows, had penetrated, though probably in small numbers, beyond the Garonne; and evidence supplied by recent measurements of the heads of living inhabitants appears to show that in certain parts of Aquitania the "Auvergnat" element was considerable. But it is certain that the Celtic language was not generally spoken in Aquitania; and the Iberian type was sufficiently conspicuous to give some colour to the popular theory.

Thus when Caesar entered Gaul, the groups whom he called Belgae, Celtae and Aquitani were each a medley of different races. The Belgae were the purest and the least civilised of the three; and both in Belgic and in Celtican Gaul the Celtic conquerors had imposed their language upon the conquered peoples. Even in a political sense, the Belgae and the Celtae were not separated by a hard and fast line; for the Celtican tribes of the Carnutes were among the clients of the Belgic Remi, while on the other hand the Celtican Aedui claimed supremacy over the Belgic Bellovaci. But if not scientifically complete, the grouping adopted by

<sup>1</sup> A map showing the distribution of the *tumuli* both in Belgic and in Celtican Gaul will be found in M. Bertrand's *Archéologie celtique et gauloise*, 2nd ed., 1889, p. 264. See my essay on "The Ethnology of Gaul," pp. 284, 300. *infra*.

Caesar was sufficient for the purpose of his narrative. Just as a modern conqueror, without troubling himself about recondite questions of ethnology, might say that the people of Great Britain were composed of Englishmen, Scotchmen and Welsh, so Caesar, knowing and caring nothing about ethnical subdivisions, divided the people of Gaul into Belgae, Celtae and Aquitani.

But who would be content with the mere knowledge of the physical characteristics of the races, more or less intermingled, of which a people was composed? Measurements of skulls, tables of stature, diagrams illustrating tints of hair or of complexion,—these things have their uses; but they leave our curiosity unsatisfied. Even the arrows and the harpoons that have been found in the caves of Perigord and the Dordogne, the pottery, the tools and the ornaments that have been taken from the dolmens to enrich the museums of France, have only enabled the most diligent of antiquaries to piece together an outline of the culture of paleolithic and neolithic men. They hunted and fished; they domesticated animals; they learned to sow and reap and grind their corn; they tried to propitiate the spirits with which their imagination peopled the lakes and springs.<sup>1</sup> All this we know: but when the races have amalgamated into the three groups of Belgae, Celtae and Aquitani, and the epoch of Roman conquest is approaching, we desire to know more. What manner of men were the inhabitants of Gaul? If this question can be answered, the answer can only come from a mind subtle and powerful no less than well-informed. Every man has his own character. Yet, with all the idiosyncrasies which distinguish them one from another, Yorkshiremen have a common type of character which differentiates them from the men of Kent: Englishmen have a common type which differentiates them from Scotsmen; and finally Englishmen and Scotsmen have something in common, which, in the eyes of foreign observers, differentiates the people of Great Britain, morally and intellectually, from the other nations of the earth. For in our own, as in other lands,

<sup>1</sup> See A. Bertrand, *La religion des Gaulois*, 1897, pp. 191-3, 268-9. and J. Rhys, *Celtic Heathendom*, 1888, pp. 105-6.



long association, intermarriage, the prolonged influence of common conditions of life have given to originally distinct groups, without destroying the individuality of any, a common recognisable, if indefinable, mental, and even physical, type. To some, though for obvious reasons a less degree, the same causes must have operated in Gaul. Setting aside the Aquitani, of whom Caesar had little to tell, and perhaps also the Belgae, the medley of peoples whom he called "Galli" had probably so far coalesced that they had acquired certain common traits of character. Perhaps when he described the features of the Gallic temperament which had most impressed him in the course of the war, he took little note of the lowest class, the cultivators and the shepherds, who had little to do with political life: but we can hardly suppose that his remarks applied only to the ruling class or to the purer Celts.<sup>1</sup> To attempt the portrayal of national character is often as misleading as it is tempting: but guided by Caesar's observations, we cannot go far astray even if we do not go very far. The Gauls were an interesting people, enthusiastic, impulsive, quick-witted, versatile, vainglorious and ostentatious, childishly inquisitive, rash, sanguine and inconstant, arrogant in victory and despondent in defeat, submissive as women to their priests, impatient of law and discipline, yet capable of loyalty to a strong and sympathetic ruler.

Civilisation  
of the  
Gauls.

The Gallic peoples had all risen far above the condition of savages; and the Celticans of the interior, many of whom had already fallen under Roman influence, had attained a certain degree of civilisation and even of luxury. Their trousers, from which the Province took its name of Gallia Braccata, and their many-coloured tartan shirts and cloaks excited the astonishment of their conquerors. The chiefs wore rings and bracelets and necklaces of gold; and when those tall fair-haired warriors rode forth to battle with their helmets wrought in the shape of some fierce beast's head and surmounted by nodding plumes, their chain armour, their

<sup>1</sup> See especially *B. G.*, ii. 1, § 3; iii. 19, § 6; iv. 5, §§ 2-3, 13, § 3; vii. 20-21; and compare Strabo, *Geogr.*, iv. 4, §§ 2-6. I am not sure whether Caesar's remarks apply to the Belgae.

long bucklers and their huge clanking swords, they made a splendid show. Walled towns or large villages, the strongholds of the various tribes, were conspicuous on numerous hills. The plains were dotted by scores of open hamlets. The houses, built of timber and wicker-work, were large and well-thatched. The fields in summer were yellow with corn. Roads ran from town to town. Rude bridges spanned the rivers; and barges, laden with merchandise, floated along them. Ships, clumsy indeed but larger than any that were seen on the Mediterranean, braved the storms of the Bay of Biscay and carried cargoes between the ports of Brittany and the coast of Britain. Tolls were exacted on the goods which were transported on the great water-ways; and it was from the farming of these dues that the nobles derived a large part of their wealth. Every tribe had its coinage; and the knowledge of writing, in Greek and in Roman characters, was not confined to the priests. The Aeduans were familiar with the plating of copper and of tin. The miners of Aquitaine, of Auvergne and of the Berri were celebrated for their skill. Indeed in all that belonged to outward prosperity the peoples of Gaul had made great strides since their kinsmen first came in contact with Rome.<sup>1</sup>

But the growth of material prosperity had not been matched by true national progress. The Aquitani, indeed, the maritime tribes and the Belgae were untouched by foreign influences: but the Celts of the interior had been enfeebled by contact with Roman civilisation. Much nonsense has been written about the enervating effect of luxury. Its effect, however, when it is suddenly introduced among a half-civilised people, is quite different from its effect when it is a natural growth. The Gauls had lost the strength of barbarism, and had not gained the strength of civilisation. They had once, as Caesar remarked, been more than a match

<sup>1</sup> Livy, vii. 10, xxxviii. 17; Virgil, *Aen.*, viii. 660, 662; Propertius, iv. 10, 43; Tacitus, *Hist.*, ii. 20; Strabo, *Geogr.*, iv. 4, § 3; Diodorus Siculus, v. 28, 30; Caesar, *B. G.*, i. 18, §§ 3-4, ii. 5, § 6, vii. 34, § 3, etc.; *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 450 and illustrations *passim*; J. G. Bulliot and H. de Fontenay, *L'art de l'émaillerie chez les Éduens*, 1875; Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 566-70; *Journal des Savants*, 1880, pp. 45, 52-3, 76-8; *Revue des Deux Mondes* 1881, p. 733; *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. xvi., 1867, pp. 69-72.

for the Germans: but enervated by imported luxury, and cowed by a succession of defeats, they no longer pretended to be able to cope with them.

Their political and social organisation.

Their constitution was of course based upon the tribe.<sup>1</sup> Each tribe had its council of elders, and had once had its king: but in certain tribes the king was now superseded by an annually elected magistrate; while in others perhaps the council kept the government to itself. A rule which prevailed among the Aedui illustrates the jealousy which was felt of monarchical power. In that state the chief magistrate, who was known as the Vergobret, was forbidden to stir beyond the frontiers of the country, from which it may be inferred that it was not lawful for him to command the host. The executive was generally weak. Like the Anglo-Saxon thanes and the Norman barons, the nobles surrounded themselves with retainers,—loyal followers or enslaved debtors:<sup>2</sup> and none but those who became their dependents could be sure of protection. On the other hand, none but those who were strong enough to protect could be sure of obedience. The oligarchies were no more secure than the monarchs whom they had supplanted. These men or their descendants sullenly plotted for the restoration of their dynasties, and, reckless of the common weal, they were in the mood to grasp the hand even of a foreign conqueror, and reign as his nominees. Here and there some wealthy noble, like Pisistratus in Athens, armed his retainers, hired a band of mercenaries, won the support of the populace by eloquence and largess, and, overthrowing the feeble oligarchy, usurped supreme power. The populace were perhaps beginning to have some glimmering of their own latent strength: but there is no evidence that anywhere they had any definite political rights. The Druids and the nobles or, as Caesar called them, the knights, enjoyed a monopoly of power and considera-

<sup>1</sup> Sir Henry Maine (*Early Hist. of Institutions*, 1875, p. 30) speaks of "Caesar's failure to note the natural divisions of the Celtic tribesmen, the families and septs or sub-tribes." See, however, F. de Coulanges, *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France,—la Gaule rom.*, 1891, v. p. 8-9, and pp. 519-21, *infra*.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, i. 18, §§ 4-5; ii. 1, § 4; vi. 11, § 4, 13, §§ 1-2, 15; vii. 40, § 7. Cf. F. de Coulanges, *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France,—la Gaule rom.*, pp. 37-8.

tion :<sup>1</sup> the bulk of the poorer freemen, ground down by taxation and strangled with debt, had no choice but to become serfs.

And if in individual tribes there was anarchy, want of unity was the bane of them all. It was not only that Belgian and Aquitanian and Celtican were naturally distinct. This distinction might have been as readily overcome as that between English and Scotch and Welsh. But the evil was more deeply seated. It is of course true that disunion is the normal condition of half civilised peoples. The Old English tribes showed no genius for combination: it was the strong hand of an Egbert, an Edgar, an Athelstan, that laid the foundations of the English kingdom. Nor was the kingdom united, except in the loosest sense, even on the eve of the Norman Conquest. If Harold was formally king over all England, his subjects felt themselves Yorkshiresmen or men of Kent rather than Englishmen. Moreover, the circumstances of the Gauls were peculiarly unfortunate. Their patriotism, if it was latent, was real: they were proud of what their fathers had achieved in war; and the sense of nationality was stirring in their hearts. If they had been unmolested or had been exposed to attack only from a single enemy, it seems probable that a Vercingetorix would have welded them into an united nation. But menaced as they were by the Germans on the one hand and by the Romans on the other, their tendency to disunion was increased. This much we may safely conclude,—that the Gauls were not well fitted for developing from their own resources a coherent polity. If the Englishman was provincial and unpatriotic, the Gaul was factious and impracticable. Much glib generalisation has been hazarded regarding the hypothetical defects of the Celtic character: but only a very rash or a very discerning historian would undertake to say how far the evil was due to circumstances, how far to an inherited strain.

<sup>1</sup> Sir Henry Maine (*Early Hist. of Institutions*, p. 29) holds that the Equites, or Chiefs, though to some extent they were a class apart, did not stand in such close relation to one another as they stood to the various septs or groups over which they presided. He bases his criticism of Caesar's account of the Gallic institutions, which, he thinks, "is accurate as far as it goes," but "errs in omission of detail," upon "the evidence concerning a Celtic community which the Brehon tracts supply."

Organism and environment are for ever acting and reacting upon one another. While, however, it is foolish to pass sweeping judgements upon a people, of whom, except during the few years that preceded the loss of their independence, we have only the scantiest knowledge, it would be a great mistake to leap to the conclusion that, in political capacity, one race is as good as another. What aptitude for self-government or for stable government of any kind the descendants of the Gauls<sup>1</sup> have exhibited during the past century, is known to all the world. No one would deny that the Greeks were endowed with a genius for art and literature which their environment doubtless helped to develop; and it may be that the Celts were but poorly endowed with political talent, and that circumstances had helped to stunt its growth. The important fact is, explain it as we may, that the tribal rulers of Gaul had not achieved even that initial step towards unity which the kings of Wessex, Mercia and Northumberland achieved when they swallowed up the petty kingdoms of the heptarchic period. Or perhaps it would be more true to say that, when the Romans first established themselves on the west of the Alps, the Arvernian king had achieved that step; but that first his defeat on the banks of the Rhône, and afterwards the revolution which subverted the royal power, had broken his supremacy and dealt a fatal blow to the political development of Gaul. There, as in Latium, the downfall of the monarch inevitably weakened the power of the tribe; and the oligarchies, if they had the power, were not granted the time to work out their own salvation. Individual tribes, such as the Aedui and the Sequani, did indeed achieve some sort of supremacy over their weaker neighbours. There were leagues of the Belgae, the Aquitani and the maritime tribes. But supremacy had not hardened into sovereignty;<sup>2</sup> and the leagues

<sup>1</sup> To avoid possible misconception, I ought perhaps to say that I use the word "Gauls" in the wider sense in which Caesar used it,—meaning the inhabitants of Gaul, without distinction of race, who formed the great majority of the ancestors of the French people.

<sup>2</sup> Certain "client" tribes appear to have paid tribute and rendered military service. But hegemony was not firmly grasped, and client tribes transferred their allegiance from one overlord to another. See pp. 528-9.

were loose, occasional and uncertain. If some powerful baron, stimulated by ambition or impressed by the evils of disunion, succeeded in clutching the power of a Bretwalda, he was forthwith suspected by his brother nobles of a design to revive the detested monarchy, and was lucky if he escaped the stake. The country swarmed with outlawed criminals, who had fled from justice, and exiled adventurers, who had failed to execute *coups d'état*. Nobles and their clients lived sword in hand; and hardly a year passed without some petty war. Every tribe, every hamlet, nay every household was riven by faction. One was for the Romans and another for the Germans: one for the Aedui and another for the Sequani: one for a Divitiacus and another for a Dumnorix; one for the constitutional oligarchy and another for the lawless adventurer. All, in short, were for a party; and none was for the state.<sup>1</sup>

"Ἀπωλόμεθ' ἄν," said Themistocles, "εἰ μὴ ἀπωλόμεθα":<sup>2</sup> like the English, whom the Normans chastened, the Gauls needed the discipline of foreign conquest.

Yet in Gaul, as in England before the Norman Conquest, The Druids. there was one influence which tended to make every man feel that he and his fellows belonged to one nation,—community of religion. Local superstitions doubtless flourished side by side with the official cult; but Druidism, which recognised and regulated them all, was the religious force which affected the destiny of the people. The question of the origin and affinities of Druidism has given rise to superabundant speculation, which has led to no certain result. Cæsar was informed that the system was believed to have been imported from Britain. At all events, there is no evidence that it was known to the Celts of Cisalpine Gaul; nor is it certain that in Transalpine Gaul it existed outside the limits of the region which was inhabited by the "Celtae." Scholars,<sup>3</sup> whose opinion carries weight, accept Cæsar's statement, and hold that the Druids had entered Gaul at a comparatively recent date, and had established their priestly

<sup>1</sup> See various Notes in Part II., Section IV.

<sup>2</sup> "We should have been undone if we had not been undone." Plutarch, *Themistocles*, 29.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. M. Alexandre Bertrand.

supremacy without extirpating the superstitions of the older races. From the study of the remains of certain typical Gallic fortresses they have inferred that the Druids created a school of architecture, and from the laconic statement of a Greek writer<sup>1</sup> that they were the great civilisers of Gaul. Other scholars of equal eminence<sup>2</sup> maintain that the Celtic conquerors, holding a creed which had much in common with that of the Romans, found Druidism existing in Gaul, and that Druidism was strong enough to secure terms, and finally to make itself supreme. But all that we know for certain about the Gallic branch of this strange hierarchy we learn from the brief notices of Caesar and other ancient writers; and Caesar has told us all that was essential for the subject of his narrative. The Druids formed a corporation, admission to which was eagerly sought: they jealously guarded the secrecy of their lore; and full membership was only obtainable after a long novitiate. They were ruled by a pope, who held office for life; and sometimes the succession to this dignity was disputed by force of arms. They were exempt from taxation and from service in war. They had, as the priests of a rude society always have, a monopoly of learning. The ignorance and superstition of the populace, their own organisation and submission to one head gave them a tremendous power. The education of the aristocracy was in their hands. The doctrine which they most strenuously inculcated was that of the transmigration of souls. "This doctrine," said Caesar, "they regard as the most potent incentive to valour, because it inspires a contempt for death."<sup>3</sup> They claimed the right of deciding questions of peace and war. Among the Aedui, if not among other peoples, at all events in certain circumstances, they exercised the right of appointing the chief magistrate. They laid hands on criminals, and, in their default, even on the innocent, imprisoned them in monstrous idols of wicker-work, and burned them alive as a sacrifice to the gods. They

<sup>1</sup> Timagenes, quoted by Ammianus Marcellinus, xv. 9, §§ 4, 8.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. Professor Rhys, *Celtic Britain*, 2nd ed., 1884, pp. 67-9; *Celtic Heathendom*, 1888, pp. 105-6, etc.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 14, § 5.

practically monopolised both the civil and the criminal jurisdiction; and if this jurisdiction was irregular, if they had no legal power of enforcing their judgements, they were none the less obeyed. Every year they met to dispense justice in the great plain, above which now soar the spires of Chartres cathedral. Those who disobeyed their decrees were excommunicated; and excommunication meant exclusion from the civil community as well as from communion in religious rites.<sup>1</sup> One religious custom, of which Caesar himself witnessed examples, suggests an interesting question. When the warriors of a Gallic tribe had made a successful raid, they used to sacrifice to Toutates, whom Caesar recognised as the counterpart of Mars,<sup>2</sup> a portion of the cattle which they had captured: the rest of their booty they erected in piles on consecrated ground. It rarely happened that any one dared to keep back part of the spoil; and the wretch who defrauded the god, was punished, like Achan,<sup>3</sup> by a terrible death. Along with Druidism there prevailed, at least among the Celtic conquerors, the worship of divinities which appeared to Caesar to resemble those of Greece and Rome; and it seems probable that the Druids had sanctioned, in order to control the polytheism which was not part of their original creed.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 532-6. The latest theories about Druidism are to be found in *La religion des Gaulois* (1897), by the veteran French scholar, M. Alexandre Bertrand, who has devoted his life to the study of the prehistoric antiquities and the early history of his own country. The conjectures in which his book abounds are supported by arguments drawn from a wide knowledge of coins, megalithic and other monuments, as well as from a study of classical and Irish texts: they are sometimes convincing, and always interesting and ingenious. The book was ably reviewed by M. Salomon Reinach in the *Revue archéologique*, xxxii., 1898, pp. 451-2.

<sup>2</sup> See *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, vol. vii. No. 84. M. R. Mowat has proved (*Bull. Epigr.*, i. 62-8) that Esus, the Gallic deity who is generally identified with Mars, is to be identified with the Roman god, Silvanus. See Rhys, *Celtic Heathendom*, pp. 44, 49, 64-5.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 49-50.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 3, § 4, 16, § 3, 17, §§ 3-5. M. Bertrand insists (*La religion des Gaulois*, p. 340) that the worship of the three chief Gallic deities, Toutates, Taranis and Esus (see Lucan, *Pharsalia*, i. 444-6), "ne pénétra pas dans les contrées où les druides dominaient," that is to say, the land of the Celts: but on page 354 he modifies this assertion; and his own work furnishes proof that monuments of the worship in question have been discovered in numerous



Invasions  
of the  
Cimbri and  
Teutoni.

113 B.C.

109 B.C.

105 B.C.

102 B.C.

101 B.C.

But though religion might perhaps foster the idea, it could not supply the instant need of political union. Over the vast wooded plains of Germany fierce hordes were roaming, looking with hungry eyes towards the rich prize that lay beyond the Rhine. Moreover, the danger of Gaul was the danger of Italy. The invader who had been attracted by "the pleasant land of France" would soon look southward over the corn-fields, the vineyards and the olive-gardens of Lombardy. When Caesar was entering public life, men who were not yet old could remember the terror which had been inspired by the Cimbri and Teutoni,—those fair-haired giants who had come down, like an avalanche, from the unknown lands that bordered on the northern sea. They descended into the valley of the Danube. They overthrew a Roman consul in Carinthia; crossed the Rhine and threaded the passes of the Jura; and overran the whole of Celtic Gaul. Four years after their first victory, they defeated another consul in the Province. Then they vanished: but four years later they reappeared; and two more armies were destroyed on the banks of the Rhône. The panic-stricken Italians dreaded another Allia: but, while Italy lay at their mercy, the Cimbri turned aside; and when, after three years' wandering in Spain and Gaul, they rejoined the Teutoni and the two swarms headed for the south, Marius was waiting for them on the Rhône, and his brother consul in Cisalpine Gaul. Once more the host divided; and while the Teutoni encountered Marius in the neighbourhood of Aix, the Cimbri threaded the Brenner Pass, and descended the valley of the Adige. The ghastly appellation of the Putrid Plain commemorated the slaughter of the Teutoni: the Cimbri were annihilated at Vercellae, near the confluence of the Sesia and the Po.<sup>1</sup>

But if this danger had been averted, the movements of the other German peoples might well cause anxiety. Pressing resolutely onward, they fought their way through the outlying Celtic territory, up to the right bank of the

districts of the land of the Celtae, namely in the departments of Allier, Charente-Inférieure, Côte-d'Or, Doubs, Indre, Maine-et-Loire, Puy-de-Dôme, Saône-et-Loire, Seine and Vosges.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 551-6.

Upper Rhine. Some years before the conspiracy of 71 B.C. Catiline<sup>1</sup> an opportunity was afforded them of making good their footing in the heart of Gaul. A bitter enmity had for many years existed between the rival tribes of the Aedui and the Sequani. The Aedui were the stronger; and they enjoyed the countenance of Rome. The Sequani hired the aid of a German chieftain, Ariovistus, who crossed the Rhine with fifteen thousand men. They were enchanted with the country, its abundance and its comparative civilisation; and fresh swarms were attracted by the good news. After a long struggle the Aedui were decisively beaten, and had to pay tribute and give hostages to their rivals. Their chief magistrate, the famous Druid, Divitiacus, went to Rome and implored the Senate for help. He was treated with marked distinction, made the acquaintance of Caesar, and discussed religion and philosophy with Cicero:<sup>2</sup> but the Senate did not see their way to interfere on his behalf. All that they 61 B.C. did was to pass a vague decree that whoever might at any time be Governor of Gaul should, as far as might be consistent with his duty to the republic, make it his business to protect the Aedui and the other allies of the Roman people. Meanwhile the Sequani had found that their ally was their master. He was not going to return to the wilds of Germany when he could get a fertile territory for the asking. He compelled the Sequani to cede to him the northern portion of Alsace. At length they and their Gallic allies, including, as it should seem, even the Aedui, mustered all their forces and made a desperate effort to throw off the yoke: but they sustained a crushing defeat; 60 B.C. and their conqueror was evidently determined to found a German kingdom in Gaul.

Meanwhile the Allobroges, who had never yet fairly accepted their dependent condition, had risen in revolt. They were still embittered by defeat when the Roman agents in the Province were alarmed by the appearance of bands of marauders on the right bank of the Rhône. They had been sent by the Helvetii, a warlike Celtic people,<sup>3</sup> who

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 557-8.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero, *De Div.*, i. 41, § 90.

<sup>3</sup> See my essay on "The Ethnology of Gaul," p. 296.

Threatened  
invasion  
of the  
Helvetii.

107 B.C.

dwelt in that part of Switzerland which lies between the Rhine, the Jura, the lake of Geneva and the Upper Rhône. The Romans had already felt the weight of their arms. A generation before, the Tigurini, one of the four Helvetian tribes, had thrown in their lot with the Cimbri. They had spread desolation along the valley of the Rhône, defeated a consular army, and compelled the survivors to pass under the yoke. Now, in their turn, they were hard pressed by the Germans; and they had formed the resolution of abandoning their country and seeking a new home in the fertile land of their kinsmen.

The author of the movement was Orgetorix, the head of the Helvetian baronage. His story throws a vivid light upon the condition of the Gallic tribes. He persuaded his brother nobles that they would be able to win the mastery over Gaul. He undertook a diplomatic mission to the leading Transalpine states. Two chiefs were ready to listen to him, Casticus, whose father had been the last King of the Sequani, and Dumnorix, brother of Divitiacus, who was at that time the most powerful chieftain of the Aedui. If Divitiacus saw the salvation of his country in dependence upon Rome, his brother regarded the connexion with abhorrence. He was able, ambitious and rich; and the common people adored him. Orgetorix urged him and Casticus to seize the royal power in their respective states, as he intended to do in his, and promised them armed support. The three entered into a formal compact for the conquest and partition of Gaul. But the Helvetii had still to be reckoned with. They heard that their envoy had broken his trust, and immediately recalled him to answer for his conduct. He knew that, if he were found guilty, he would be burned alive; and accordingly, when he appeared before his judges, he was followed by his retainers and slaves, numbering over ten thousand men. The magistrates, determined to bring him to justice, called the militia to arms: but in the meantime the adventurer died, perhaps by his own hand.

But the idea which he had conceived did not die. The Helvetii had no intention of abandoning their enterprise;

nor Dumnorix of abandoning his. He had married a daughter of Orgetorix; and he was quite ready to help them, if they would make it worth his while. They resolved to spend two years in preparing for their emigration; bought up waggons and draught cattle; and laid in large supplies of corn. Their purpose threatened Rome with a twofold danger. Once they had gone, the lands which they left vacant would be overrun by the Germans, who would then be in dangerous proximity to Italy; and there was no telling what mischief they might do in Gaul. Above the din of party strife at Rome the note of warning was heard. Men talked anxiously of the prospects of war; and the Senate sent commissioners to dissuade the Gallic peoples from joining the invaders.<sup>1</sup> Diplomacy, however, was powerless to shake the purpose of a brave and desperate nation. Perhaps the Senate failed to realise the gravity of the crisis. Perhaps they shrank from putting the sword into the hands of the man who might ultimately turn it against themselves.

But the hesitation of an effete Senate was soon to give way to the energy of a leader of men. One of the consuls for the year 59 was Julius Caesar. About the time of the election Ariovistus made overtures for an alliance with Rome; and doubtless with the object of securing his neutrality in view of the threatened Helvetian invasion, the Senate conferred upon him the title of Friend of the Roman People. They had already half promised to protect their Gallic allies. They now practically guaranteed to the conqueror of those allies the security of his conquest. And in this latter policy Caesar, if we may believe his own word, fully concurred. He must have seen the impending troubles. But he was not yet free to encounter them; and he doubtless approved of any expedient for keeping the barbarian chief inactive until he could go forth in person to encounter him. That time was at hand. In the year of his consulship Caesar was made Governor of Illyricum, or Dalmatia, and of Gaul, that is to say of Gallia Cisalpina, or Piedmont and the Plain of Lombardy, and of Gallia Braccata, or, as it was usually called, the Province. If Suetonius<sup>2</sup> was rightly informed, his

Consulship  
of Caesar.

How he at-  
tempted to  
provide  
against the  
Helvetian  
danger.

He is ap-  
pointed  
Governor  
of Gaul.

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, *Ep. ad Att.*, i. 19, § 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Divus Iulius*, 22.

commission gave him the right to include Gallia Comata,—“the land of the long-haired Gauls,”—that is to say the whole of independent Gaul north of the Province, within his sphere of action.<sup>1</sup> He had already gained distinction in Spain both as a general and as an administrator: but hitherto he had had no chance of showing the full measure of his powers. He was at this time forty-three years old.<sup>2</sup> In person he was tall and slight, but well-knit; and, if he was as licentious as the mass of his contemporaries, his constitution, fortified by abstemious habits, was capable of sustaining prodigious efforts. His broad dome-like skull; his calm and penetrating eyes; his aquiline nose; his massive yet finely moulded jaw, expressed, like no other human countenance, a rich and harmonious nature,—intellect, passion, will moving in accord. And, if his vices were common, his generosity, his forbearance, his equanimity, his magnanimity were his own. He believed, with the faith of a devotee, that above himself there was a power, without whose aid the strongest judgement, the most diligent calculation might fail. That power was Fortune; and Caesar was assured that Fortune was ever on his side.<sup>3</sup> But it would be impertinent to this narrative to attempt to analyse the character,—to which our greatest poet has done less than justice,—of the greatest man of action who has ever lived. Whatever quality was lacking, the want in no wise affected his fitness for the task which he had now to perform.

His army.

His appointment carried with it the command of an army consisting of four legions, perhaps about twenty thousand men.<sup>4</sup> One of them was quartered in Transalpine Gaul: the other three were at Aquileia, near the site of the modern Trieste. He could also command the services of slingers from the Balearic isles, of archers from Numidia and Crete, and of cavalry from Spain.<sup>5</sup> Various military reforms had been introduced by Marius; and the legions of Caesar were, in

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 195, 823.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 560-1.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, *Ep. ad Att.*, x. 8B; Caesar, *B. G.*, v. 58, § 6; vi. 30, § 4, 35, § 2, 42, §§ 1-2; vii. 89, § 2; *B. C.*, iii. 10, § 6, 68, § 1, 95, § 1 etc.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 561, 563-7.

<sup>5</sup> The succeeding narrative will show that Caesar raised the bulk of his cavalry during the Gallic war year by year in Gaul itself.

many respects, different from those which had fought against Hannibal. They were no longer a militia, but an army of professional soldiers. Each legion consisted of ten cohorts; and the cohort, formed of three maniples or six centuries, had replaced the maniple as the tactical unit of the legion. From the earliest times the legion had been commanded by an officer called a military tribune. Six were assigned to each legion; and each one of the number held command in turn. But they now often owed their appointments to interest rather than to merit; and no tribune in Caesar's army was ever placed at the head of a legion. They still had administrative duties to perform, and exercised subordinate commands. But the principal officers were the *legati*, who might loosely be called generals of division. Their powers were not strictly defined, but varied according to circumstances and to the confidence which they deserved. A *legatus* might be entrusted with the command of a legion or of an army corps; he might even, in the absence of his chief, be entrusted with the command of the entire army. But he was not yet, as such, the permanent commander of a legion. The officers upon whom the efficiency of the troops mainly depended, were the centurions. They were chosen from the ranks; and their position has been roughly compared with that of our own non-commissioned officers. But their duties were, in some respects, at least as responsible as those of a captain: the centurions of the first cohort were regularly summoned to councils of war; and the chief centurion of a legion was actually in a position to offer respectful suggestions to the legate himself.<sup>1</sup> Every legion included in its ranks a number of skilled artisans, called *fabri*, who have been likened to the engineers in a modern army: but they were not permanently enrolled in a separate corps.<sup>2</sup> They fought in the ranks like other soldiers; but when their special services were required, they were directed by staff-officers called *præfecti fabrum*. It was their duty to execute repairs of every kind, to superintend the construction of permanent camps, and to plan fortifications and bridges; and it should

<sup>1</sup> See *B. G.*, iii. 5, § 2.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 583.

seem that they also had charge of the artillery,<sup>1</sup>—the *ballistae* and catapults, which hurled heavy stones and shot arrows against the defences and the defenders of a besieged town.

The legionary wore a sleeveless woollen shirt, a leathern tunic protected across breast and back by bands of metal, strips of cloth wound round the thighs and legs, hob-nailed shoes, and, in cold or wet weather, a kind of blanket or military cloak. His defensive armour consisted of helmet, shield and greaves: his weapons were a short, two-edged, cut-and-thrust sword and a javelin, the blade of which, behind the hardened point, was made of soft iron, so that, when it struck home, it might bend and not be available for return. These, however, formed only a part of the load which he carried on the march. Over his left shoulder he bore a pole, to which was fastened in a bundle his ration of grain,<sup>2</sup> his cooking vessel, saw, basket, hatchet and spade. For it was necessary that he should be a woodman and navvy as well as a soldier. No Roman army ever halted for the night without constructing a camp fortified with trench, rampart and palisade.

The column was of course accompanied by a host of non-combatants. Each legion required at least five or six hundred horses and mules to carry its baggage:<sup>3</sup> and the drivers, with the slaves who waited on the officers, formed a numerous body. Among the camp followers were also dealers who supplied the wants of the army, and were ready to buy booty of every kind.<sup>4</sup>

His intentions.

What line of policy Caesar intended to follow, he has not told us. While he was going forth to govern a distant land,

<sup>1</sup> See Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, ii. 19.

<sup>2</sup> Sometimes a sixteen days' ration was served out; but the amount certainly varied according to circumstances. See pp. 537-8.

<sup>3</sup> Caesar nowhere mentions that he used waggons or carts during the Gallic war, though it seems certain that he must have used some, to carry artillery and material for mantlets and the like. See *Bell. Afr.*, 9; *B.G.*, iii. 42, § 3; and Daremberg and Saglio, *Dict. des antiquités grecques et rom.*, i., 929.

<sup>4</sup> W. Smith, *Dict. of Gr. and Roman Ant.*, i. 346, 811-12, 851; ii. 588-9, 614; Polybius, vi. 23; F. Fröhlich, *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, 1891, pp. 56-7, 62-4, 66-7, 75; Stoffel, *Hist. de Jules César*, — *Guerre civile*, 1837, ii. 339, n. 2; Daremberg and Saglio, *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, ii. 957, 1447, 1605-6; W. Rüstow, *Heerwesen und Kriegführung Cäsars*, 1857, pp. 16-19; Frontinus,

the government of his own was lapsing into anarchy. He must have seen that the Germans would soon overrun Gaul unless the Romans prevented them; and that the presence of the Germans would revive the peril from which Marius had delivered Rome.\* We may feel sure that he had determined to teach them, by a rough lesson if necessary, that they must advance no further into Gaul, nor venture to cross the boundaries of the Province or of Italy. It can hardly be doubted that he dreamed of adding a new province to the empire, which should round off its frontier and add to its wealth. But whether he had definitely resolved to attempt a conquest of such magnitude, or merely intended to follow, as they appeared, the indications of Fortune, it would be idle to conjecture. Ambitious though he was, he only courted, he never tempted her. The greatest statesman is, in a sense, an opportunist. When Caesar should find himself in Gaul, he would know best how to shape his ends.

*Strat.* iv. 1, § 7; Josephus, *De bello Judaico*, iii. 5, § 5; Ammianus Marcellinus, xvii. 9, § 2; Caesar, *B. C.* i. 78, § 1; Cicero, *Tusc.* ii. 16, § 37. See also various notes in Section VI. of this book. There is no evidence that there was any medical staff in Caesar's army or under the Republic at all, though it may perhaps be inferred from a passage in Suetonius (*Divus Augustus*, 11) that wealthy officers were attended by their private surgeons.



## CHAPTER II

### CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE HELVETII AND ARIOVISTUS

58 B.C. ABOUT the middle of March a startling announcement reached Caesar. The Helvetii had actually begun to move; and their hordes would soon be streaming over the Roman Province. Three neighbouring tribes, the Raurici, the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi, and also the Boii, who had long ago migrated into Germany, had been induced to join them; they had laid in sufficient flour to last for three months; and, to stimulate their resolution and enterprise, they had deliberately cut themselves off from all prospect of return by burning their homes. On the 24th<sup>1</sup> of that very month the whole vast multitude, numbering, according to their own muster-rolls, three hundred and sixty-eight thousand,<sup>2</sup> was to assemble opposite Geneva, ready to cross the Rhône.

Caesar instantly left Rome, and, hurrying northward ninety miles a day,<sup>3</sup> crossed the Alps, took command of the Provincial legion, ordered a fresh levy, and reached Geneva at the end of a week. He immediately destroyed the bridge by which the Helvetii intended to cross the river. They sent ambassadors to say that they only wanted to use the road through the Province, and would promise to do no mischief. Would Caesar give them permission? Caesar had of course no intention of granting their request: but, as he

<sup>1</sup> March 28 of the unreformed calendar. See Napoleon III., *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 46, 521 ff.; Stoffel, *Guerre civile*, ii. 303-4. The date is fixed in accordance with the calculations of the famous astronomer, Le Verrier. But see W. Smith's *Dict. of Grk. and Roman Antiquities*, i. 343.

<sup>2</sup> See my essay on "The Credibility of Caesar's Narrative," pp. 222-5, *infra*.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, *Caesar*, 17. See also *B.G.*, i. 7, § 1; Suetonius, *Divus Iulius*, 57, and the map of Gaul.

wanted to gain time for his levies to assemble, he told the ambassadors that he would think over what they had said, and give them an answer on the 8th of the following month.<sup>1</sup> He made good use of the interval. The legion was with him; and the Provincial levies arrived in time to join in executing the design which he had formed. The road by which the Helvetii desired to march led through Savoy; and the river was at certain points fordable. It should seem that they had not yet had time to assemble in force. Along the southern bank of the Rhône, between the lake and the Pas de l'Écluse, —a distance of about seventeen miles,—Caesar threw up lines of earthworks in the few places where the banks were not so steep as to form a natural fortification.<sup>2</sup> The soldiers were posted in redoubts behind the works. When the ambassadors returned, Caesar plainly told them that he would not allow the Helvetii to pass through the Province. Undeterred by this rebuff, the emigrants made several attempts to force the passage of the river. Some of them waded; others made bridges of boats, and tried to storm the ramparts; but the soldiers pelted them with missiles and sent them staggering back.

He promises to reply in a fortnight, and meanwhile fortifies the left bank of the Rhône.

He prevents the Helvetii from crossing.

<sup>1</sup> F. Eyssenhardt (*Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Pädagogik*, lxxxv., 1862, p. 760) accepts Dion Cassius's statement (*Hist. Rom.*, xxxviii. 31) that Caesar held out to the Helvetian envoys the hope that he would allow them to pass through the Province. Otherwise, he insists, it is impossible to explain why the Helvetii waited for the day which Caesar had appointed. Caesar neither says nor implies that he did not hold out such a hope to the envoys. On his own showing, indeed, he intended to deceive them. I suspect, however, that this is one of Dion's embellishments, because I believe that Caesar would have kept the fact to himself instead of blurring it out to any of the "excellent authorities" whom Dion is assumed to have followed (see pp. 178-81. *infra*). But Dion may have hit upon the truth. Caesar would certainly have held out such a hope to the Helvetii, if it had been worth his while to do so. "As a nation," writes Lord Wolseley, "we are bred up to feel it a disgrace even to succeed by falsehood . . . we will keep hammering along with the conviction that 'honesty is the best policy' and that truth always wins in the long run. These pretty little sentences do well for a child's copy-book, but the man who acts upon them in war had better sheathe his sword for ever." *Soldier's Pocket-book*, 5th ed., 1886, p. 169. Again, the general "can, by spreading false news among the gentlemen of the press, use them as a medium by which to deceive an enemy." *Ib.*, 4th ed., p. 337.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 608, and my essay on "The Credibility of Caesar's Narrative" (pp. 184-5).

58 B.C.

The  
Sequani  
allow them  
to march  
through  
the Pas de  
l'Écluse.

Only one route now remained,—the road that winded along the right bank of the Rhône, beneath the rocky steepes of the Jura, through the Pas de l'Écluse. The emigrants might, it would seem, have made their way into Gaul by the route that leads to Pontarlier or one of the other passes in the Jura: but either because they shrank from encountering Ariovistus or for some other reason, of which Caesar took no account, these routes were out of the question.<sup>1</sup> The road that led through the Pas de l'Écluse was so narrow that there was barely room for a single waggon to move along it at a time: beyond the pass, it led into the territory of the Sequani: and if they offered the slightest opposition, it would be hopeless to attempt to get through. They refused at first to grant a safe-conduct: but Dumnorix, at the request of the Helvetii, willingly acted as mediator. He had established his influence with the Sequani by wholesale bribery; and, after a little negotiation, he succeeded in procuring for his friends the favour which they sought. The Helvetian leaders undertook to restrain their people from plundering; and hostages were exchanged for the fulfilment of the compact. The ultimate object of the emigrants was to settle in western Gaul, in the fertile basin of the Charente. Thence they would be able to make raids upon the open corn-growing districts of the Province: and their mere presence would be a standing menace to Roman interests in Gaul. But first they would have to make their way along the valley of the Rhône, across the plain of Ambérieu, and over the plateau of Dombes to the Saône. Caesar calculated that while their huge unwieldy column was crawling along the muddy tracks, he would have time to raise a new army, strong enough to cope with them. Leaving his ablest lieutenant, Labienus, to guard the lines on the Rhône, he hastened back to Cisalpine Gaul; raised two new legions on his own responsibility; withdrew the other three from their winter-quarters; and marched back by the road leading along the valley of the Dora Riparia and over Mont Genève. The mountain tribes, who doubtless hoped to plunder his baggage train, attempted to stop his advance: but again and again he dashed them aside until,

Caesar goes  
back to  
Cisalpine  
Gaul, re-  
turns with  
reinforce-  
ments and  
encamps  
above the  
confluence  
of the  
Rhône and  
Saône.

<sup>1</sup> See p. 607.

descending into the valley of the Durance, he pushed on 58 B.C.  
 through the highlands of Dauphiné, past Briançon, Embrun [The Graioceli, Ceutrones, and Caturiges.]  
 and Gap,<sup>1</sup> crossed the Isère and the Rhône, and encamped on  
 the heights of Sathonay, near the point where the rushing  
 current is swelled by the tranquil stream of the Saône. About  
 June 7-9?

• He was only just in time. The bulk of the Helvetii had The Aedui  
 crossed the Saône, and descended, like a swarm of locusts, solicit his  
 upon the cornfields and homesteads of the Aedui. aid against  
 Envoys the Helvetii.  
 came to beg Caesar to remember the loyalty of their country-  
 men, and help them to get rid of the invaders. Labienus  
 with his legion had already joined him. The rearguard of  
 the Helvetii, numbering about a fourth of the entire host,  
 were gathered on the eastern side of the river, in the valley  
 of the Formans, eleven miles to the north.<sup>3</sup> Caesar left his  
 camp soon after midnight, marched quietly up the valley of the  
 Saône over ground which masked his approach, and launched He defeats  
 his legions upon the unsuspecting multitude, as they were and dis-  
 crowding into their boats. Those who escaped the slaughter perses the  
 vanished in the surrounding forests. They and their slain rearguard  
 of the  
 kinsfolk belonged to the tribe called the Tigurini,<sup>4</sup> by which Helvetii  
 fifty years before, a Roman army, under the consul Lucius  
 Cassius, a kinsman of Caesar, had been defeated and compelled  
 to pass under the yoke.

Within twenty-four hours Caesar had thrown a bridge of His passage  
 boats<sup>5</sup> over the river, and transported his entire army to the of the  
 right bank. The Helvetii, who had taken three weeks over Saône.  
 the passage, were greatly alarmed, and sent an embassy to The Hel-  
 meet him. The principal envoy was an aged chief named vetii at-  
 Divico, who, in his youth, had commanded the army which tempt to  
 defeated Cassius. He said that his countrymen were willing negotiate.  
 to settle wherever Caesar pleased, if he would only leave them but reject  
 unmolested. But if he was bent upon war, they were ready Caesar's  
 and he would do well to remember that they had already terms.

<sup>1</sup> Between Briançon (Brigantio) and the Rhône the itinerary is not absolutely certain; but Caesar must have gone either by the route indicated in the text or by the valley of the Romanche and Grenoble. See *Carte de France* (1: 200,000), Sheet 60, and p. 609, *infra*.

<sup>2</sup> See Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 57, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 610-13.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 20. *supra*.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 606.

3 B.C. defeated a Roman army. Caesar replied that he remembered the treacherous exploit of which they boasted, and remembered it with indignation. Besides, even if he were inclined to let bygones be bygones, he could not overlook the outrages of which they had just been guilty. Still he was ready to make peace with them, upon certain conditions. They must compensate the Aedui for the damage which they had done, and give hostages for their future good behaviour. Divico haughtily replied that the Helvetii, as the Romans had the best of reasons to know, were accustomed to receive hostages, not to give them.

Next day the emigrants broke up their encampment. To reach the valley of the Charente, it was necessary to cross the Loire. The direct line intersected that river near Roanne. But the rugged country between the basins of the Saône and the Loire was, in this direction, impassable; and beyond Roanne the mountains of Le Forez barred the way. The only course was to move up the valley between the Saône and the hills of Beaujolais until a practicable route could be found. Caesar sent on his cavalry to watch the enemy's movements. They were composed of levies from the Province and from the Aedui; and the Aeduan contingent was commanded by *Dumnorix*. They ventured too near the Helvetian rearguard, and lost a few men in a skirmish. For a fortnight the two armies continued to advance northward and then north-westward, never more than five miles apart. The Helvetii probably turned off from the Saône near Mâcon, and moved up the valley of the Petit Grosne.<sup>1</sup> Their vast column must have extended at least fifteen miles in length.<sup>2</sup> The advanced guard, composed of the Boii and Tulingi,<sup>3</sup> was followed by the train of waggons, drawn by horses or oxen; and last of all came the Helvetian fighting men.<sup>4</sup> Elated by their recent success, the Helvetii occasionally faced about and challenged their pursuers: but Caesar would not allow his men to be drawn into a combat. He was looking for a

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 613-4.

<sup>2</sup> See Stoffel, *Hist. de Jules César*,—*Guerre civile*, ii. 451, and my essay on "The Credibility of Caesar's Narrative" (pp. 222-4, *infra*).

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 621-2.

<sup>4</sup> Probably some of the fighting men marched parallel with the waggons. See p. 622 and n. 1.

favourable opportunity to fight a decisive battle: but for the 58 B.C. time he had enough to do in trying to prevent the enemy from plundering his allies. Nor was this his only anxiety.

He depended upon the Aedui for his supplies: but day followed day, and no supplies came. On the Saône indeed he had a flotilla of barges laden with corn: but the necessity of following the Helvetii had led him far away from that river. Caesar pressed for supplies, owing to the intrigues of Dumnorix.

The Aeduan chiefs in his camp promised, protested and poured forth excuses, till he lost all patience and accused them of deliberate breach of faith. This challenge elicited a full disclosure. Liscus, the Vergobret or chief magistrate of the Aedui, spoke on behalf of his brother chiefs. It appeared that there were certain individuals whose power was actually greater than that of the Government. They had exerted their influence over the people to prevent them from sending supplies, telling them that if the Romans succeeded in defeating the Helvetii, they would use their victory to enslave the Aedui as well as the other tribes. Liscus concluded by telling Caesar that he had revealed the truth at the risk of his life, and had only spoken under compulsion. Caesar had no doubt that by "certain individuals" he meant Dumnorix. But he had no intention of discussing matters of state in the presence of men whose discretion could not be trusted. He therefore told all the chiefs, except Liscus, that they might go. Liscus then spoke out frankly. He admitted that Dumnorix and no other was the man. He had amassed great wealth, and had spent it lavishly in buying popular support. He had acquired great influence with the Bituriges and other tribes by arranging marriages between the women of his family and powerful chieftains. Not only was he politically connected with the Helvetii, but he privately detested Caesar, because Caesar had set him aside and restored his brother Divitiacus to power. In his own country he was the leader of the anti-Roman faction. The interests of the Helvetii were his interests. If they succeeded, they would help him to mount the throne: if they failed, he would be worse off than before. He had kept them regularly supplied with information; and in the cavalry skirmish, a few days before, he had set the example of flight.

58 B.C.

Caesar hardly knew how to act. Dumnorix was evidently one of the most powerful and implacable enemies whom he had to fear. He could not afford to overlook such flagrant hostility; but he was afraid of offending Divitiacus, whom he particularly desired to conciliate. He summoned him to his tent, and, addressing him through the medium of Gaius Valerius Procillus, a distinguished Provincial, his principal interpreter and trusted friend, earnestly pressed him to consent to his punishing Dumnorix. Divitiacus, with a burst of tears, begged him not to be too hard upon his brother; or it would be said that it was he who had advised the infliction of the punishment, and public opinion would brand him as a monster. Caesar pressed his hand kindly, and bade him dismiss his fears. His regard for him, he said, was so great that he was willing to condone the insult which had been offered to his Government and the provocation which he had himself received. The truth was that he had no choice. He had not yet won the prestige that would only come from victory; and with powerful enemies before him, and doubtful allies around him, upon whose goodwill he depended for the means of subsistence, it would be folly to raise a hornet's nest about his ears. He contented himself therefore with sending for Dumnorix, and giving him a severe rebuke and a stern warning. This once, he said, for his brother's sake, his conduct should be overlooked. At the same time he gave secret orders that Dumnorix should be watched, and his movements reported.

His abortive attempt to surprise the Helvetii.


Next morning Caesar made an attempt to surprise the enemy, which only failed through the stupidity of an officer. They had encamped, his scouts reported, at the foot of a hill eight miles distant. He at once sent a party to reconnoitre the hill, and ascertain whether it would be possible to ascend it from the rear. They reported that such an ascent was easily practicable. In the middle of the night Caesar sent Labienus with two legions, under the guidance of the exploring party, to climb the hill and swoop down upon the enemy's rear, while he should himself attack them in front. About two hours after the departure of Labienus, he sent forward his cavalry, and followed along the track by which





# DEFEAT OF THE

(After Col. Stoffe)



## REFEREN

- S . . . . Summit of hill of A
- C . . . . Entrenchment for p
- RR . . . . 4 legions in line o
- HH . . . . Helvetii
- HH . . . . Helvetii forced to
- TT . . . . Boii & Tulingi
- rr . . . . Roman 6<sup>th</sup> line fac
- hh . . . . Helvetii renewing
- Roman line of mar
- Helvetian " "

The contours denote intervals in

Scale 1: 5600

Kilometres

the enemy had advanced. Publius Considius, an officer of 58 B.C. experience and reputation, was sent on ahead with scouts to reconnoitre. Shortly before sunrise Caesar was within a mile and a half of the enemy, who suspected nothing. Suddenly Considius rode back at a gallop and told him that all had gone wrong: not Labienus, but the enemy occupied the height; he had recognised them by their arms and standards, and was sure that he had made no mistake. Caesar at once led his troops on to another hill close by, and formed them in line of battle. Labienus meanwhile was wondering why he did not come; and when it was too late, Caesar learned that Considius had been the dupe of his own fears.

The legions moved on in the afternoon, and encamped About  
about three miles in the rear of the Helvetii, near the site June 28?  
of Toulon-sur-Arroux.<sup>1</sup> The day after, as no corn-carts had Hemarches  
appeared and only two days' rations were left, Caesar struck for Bib-  
off to the right, and marched for Bibracte, the capital of racte, to  
the Aedui, a thriving town situated on Mont Beuvray, about get sup-  
sixteen miles to the north, where he knew that he would plies.  
find granaries stored with corn. The route ran along the  
watershed between the Arroux and one of its affluents, a  
rivulet called the Auzon. The Helvetii were far on their  
way, the head of the column having passed Luzy and turned  
westward down the valley of the Alène, when some deserters  
from Caesar's cavalry brought them the news. Fancying  
that he was afraid of them, or hoping to prevent him from  
reaching Bibracte, they turned likewise, marched back  
rapidly, and attacked his rearguard near Armeecy, about  
three miles north of Toulon. Caesar sent his cavalry to  
retard their advance, while he ordered the infantry to retrace  
their steps and ascend the slopes of Armeecy. The whole  
movement must have occupied about two hours. Half-way  
up the hill, the four veteran legions were ranged in three  
lines of cohorts, each line being eight men deep.<sup>2</sup> The  
soldiers' packs were collected on the top, under the protection  
of the auxiliaries and the two newly-raised legions, who  
were ordered to entrench the position. The baggage-train

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 618-9.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 590.

may either have been parked on the ridge along which it was moving, or have continued its march towards Bibracte. It was exposed to no danger from the Helvetii; and, as the Aedui were, for the most part, friendly, a slender escort would have sufficed to protect it.<sup>1</sup> The opportunity for which Caesar had been waiting had at last come. Although the enemy were now between him and Bibracte, the hill of Armecy was the best position which he could have chosen. If he won, the road would of course be open. If he lost,—but he did not intend to lose. It was his first pitched battle; and he knew that for him and his army defeat would be destruction. The Helvetii would fight desperately: his legions, except perhaps the 10th, had not yet come to know him; and he could not fully trust all his officers. He therefore dismounted and made his staff do the same, so that the men might see that their officers shared their dangers. The waggons of the Helvetii were parked, as they came up, on rising ground to the left of the road; and about one o'clock in the afternoon the whole mighty host, congregated in compact masses, flung back Caesar's horsemen and with shields closely locked pressed up the hill against the Roman line. The men in the front rank held their shields before their bodies, while those behind bore theirs horizontally above their heads.<sup>2</sup> The legionaries in the front ranks stood with their javelins in their hands, ready to throw. On the plateau above, recruits and auxiliaries were hard at work with their entrenching tools. When the enemy were within a few yards, the centurions gave the word. Down flew a shower of javelins; and the mass began to break. The blades of the javelins, composed of soft iron, had bent as the points penetrated the shields.<sup>3</sup> Sword in hand, the cohorts of the first line charged: many of the Helvetii, finding their shields nailed together by the javelins, which, pull and wrench as they might, were not to be torn out, flung them away, and parried the thrusts as best they could:

<sup>1</sup> See p. 620.

<sup>2</sup> See W. Smith, *Dict. of Greek and Roman Ant.*, ii. 808; and Stoffel, *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, 1890, p. 69.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 24, *supra*.

but they were soon overborne, and fell back to a hill about 58 B.C. a mile north of Armecy. The Romans were following when the Boii and Tulingi, who had just arrived upon the field, rushed upon their flank and rear. The Helvetii took heart again and returned to the attack; and, while the first two lines of the Romans closed with them, the third faced about, and confronted their fresh assailants.

Long and fiercely the battle was fought out. In due time the cohorts of the second line relieved those of the first, advancing between the files as the latter withdrew; and again the first line relieved, in its turn, the second.<sup>1</sup> Gradually the Helvetii were forced further up the hill; while the Boii and Tulingi retreated to their baggage. Standing behind the wall of waggons, they hurled down stones and darts upon the advancing Romans, and thrust at them with long pikes when they attempted to storm the laager. The struggle was prolonged far into the night. At length the legionaries burst through the barrier. Women and children who could not escape were slaughtered; and the flying remnant of the invading host disappeared in the darkness of night.<sup>2</sup>

Defeat of  
the Hel-  
vetii near  
Bibracte.

Before the sun went down, evil tidings must have reached the non-combatants who were still wending their way towards the field. It is certain that many of the waggons never came into the laager.<sup>3</sup> What despair fell upon the baffled emigrants; how the jaded cattle were headed round again towards the north, and goaded through that night; how those who escaped the slaughter tramped after, and told the tale of the calamity; the din, the confusion, the long weariness of the retreat,—these things it is easy to imagine, but those only who have shared the rout and ruin of a beaten army can adequately realise.

Caesar was unable to pursue. His cavalry were weak

<sup>1</sup> See Stoffel, *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 120-21, and pp. 593-4, *infra*.

<sup>2</sup> If Caesar's estimate (see p. 26 *supra*) of the number of the emigrants was correct, and unless a considerable proportion had dispersed on the march, over 100,000, as Colonel Stoffel calculates, must have perished in the battle. See my essay on "The Credibility of Caesar's Narrative" (pp. 222-5, *infra*). All questions relating to the battle are discussed on pp. 610-25.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 223-4.

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Caesar's  
treatment  
of the fugi-  
tives.

and untrustworthy; and he had to give the wounded time to recover, and to bury the teeming corpses that might have engendered a pestilence among his allies: but he sent mounted messengers to warn the Lingones, through whose country the fugitives would have to pass, to give them no help. The Lingones occupied the country round Tonnerre and Bar-sur-Aube as well as the plateau of Langres. At the end of three days Caesar started in pursuit. On the way he was met by envoys, whom the Helvetii, now reduced to utter destitution, had sent to arrange terms of surrender. He bade them tell their countrymen to halt, and await his arrival. When he overtook them, he ordered them to give hostages, and to surrender their arms and a number of slaves, who had escaped to them. Six thousand Helvetians slipped away in the night, and took the road towards the Rhine: but Caesar sent peremptory orders to the inhabitants to hunt them down and bring them back; and on their return, they were all put to death. The Boii were allowed, at the request of the Aedui, who appreciated their martial qualities, to settle in Aeduan territory. It would seem that the tract assigned to them was in the neighbourhood of St-Parize-le-Châtel, between the Allier and the Loire. The Helvetii and the other tribes, who would be most useful as a barrier between the Germans and the Province, were sent back to their own land; and the Allobroges were directed to supply them with grain.

Settlement  
of the Boii.

Envoys  
from Cel-  
tican Gaul  
congratu-  
late Caesar,  
and solicit  
his aid  
against  
Ariovistus.

The news of this brilliant victory produced its natural effect. The success of the Helvetii would have been a calamity to all, except Dumnorix and his following; and this calamity Caesar had averted. He appeared as the conqueror, not of Gaul but of the invaders of Gaul. At the worst, his rule would be preferable to the tyranny of Ariovistus; and he would doubtless be glad to aid in expelling his rival. The patriots in the tribal councils, if they offered any opposition, were outvoted. Chieftains came from all parts of central Gaul to congratulate the conqueror. They told him that they had certain important proposals to lay before him; and, with his express sanction, they then and there convoked a council to arrange details. The

meeting took place some days later. After the council had 58 B.C. broken up, Caesar consented, at the pressing request of the chiefs, to give them a private interview. They earnestly begged him to keep what they were going to say a close secret; for if it were to get abroad, they would be made to suffer cruelly. Divitiacus, who spoke for them, related how Ariovistus had established his footing in the land of the Sequani, defeated the Aedui and their dependents, and finally overthrown the combined forces of the Aedui, the Sequani, and their respective allies.<sup>1</sup> At that moment there were a hundred and twenty thousand Germans in their midst; and the Gauls would soon be expelled from their own country. The Sequani had already been forced to cede a third part of their territory; and they would soon be forced to give up another third; for a fresh horde, the Harudes, numbering four and twenty thousand, had recently crossed the Rhine. Ariovistus was a cruel bloodthirsty tyrant; and, if Caesar would not help them, they must all go forth, like the Helvetii, and seek some new home.<sup>2</sup>

Caesar assured the chiefs that they might rely upon his support. Their interests indeed coincided with his. He saw that it was absolutely necessary to stop the flow of German invasion. Like the Cimbri and Teutoni, these fierce hordes might, if they were not checked, soon overrun the whole of Gaul, and thence pour into Italy. Moreover, the interest as well as the honour of Rome required that she should protect her allies; and the Aedui were allies of long standing, whose fidelity had been rewarded by the title of "Brethren." And there was another reason why Caesar should interfere. Like Clive, when he found himself confronted by Dupleix, he could not stand still. He must either advance or retreat. If he shrank from espousing the cause of the Gauls, he would lose the credit which his victory had won, and perhaps force them to make common cause with Ariovistus against him. Peaceful methods, however, might be tried first. The Roman army was comparatively weak. Ariovistus was master of a formidable host

Failure of his attempts to negotiate with Ariovistus.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 558-9.

<sup>2</sup> See my essay on "The Credibility of Caesar's Narrative" (pp. 187-9).

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and it would be foolhardy to attack him without absolute need. He had been treated with distinction by the Senate; and there was just a chance that he might listen to reason. He was then probably in the neighbourhood of Strasbourg. Caesar sent ambassadors to ask him to name some intermediate spot for a conference. Ariovistus told them to say that if their master wanted anything from him, he must take the trouble to come to him in person. He could not risk his safety by moving outside his own territory without his army; and to move and feed his army would involve an amount of exertion which he did not care to undergo. Meanwhile he should like to know what business Caesar had in a country which the Germans had won by their own swords.

Caesar now assumed a more peremptory tone. Ariovistus had rejected his invitation. Very good! Then these were his terms. Not another man must set foot across the Rhine: the hostages of the Aedui must be restored; and Ariovistus must positively cease to molest that people or their allies. If he obeyed, Caesar would be his friend. If not, he should know how to avenge the wrongs of the Aedui. The Senate had decreed, three years before, that the Governor of Gaul for the time being should protect the Aedui and the other allies of the Republic; and he intended to obey his instructions.

Ariovistus haughtily replied that he was a conqueror; and, as a conqueror, he had a right to treat his subjects as he pleased. He did not interfere with the Romans: what right, then, had the Romans to interfere with him? He would not molest the Aedui so long as they paid their tribute: but most certainly he would not give up the hostages; and if the Aedui did not pay, much good would their alliance with the Romans do them! For Caesar's threats he cared nothing. No man had ever withstood Ariovistus and escaped destruction. Let Caesar choose his own time for fighting. He would soon find out what mettle there was in the unbeaten warriors of Germany.

With this message came the alarming news that a host of Suevi had appeared on the eastern bank of the Rhine, and

that the Harudes were actually harrying the lands of the 58 B.C. Aedui. Caesar, the most reticent of writers, has told us that he was seriously alarmed.<sup>1</sup> The Gauls were waiting to see whether he or Ariovistus was to be master. If he suffered any reverse, they would probably rise in his rear; and between them and the Germans his army might perish. Not a moment was to be lost if the formidable Suevi were to be prevented from reinforcing the army of Ariovistus. With all possible speed Caesar made arrangements with the Aedui and the Lingones for the forwarding of supplies, and immediately put his army in motion. Three days later he heard that Ariovistus was marching to seize Vesontio, now Besançon, the chief town of the Sequani, a strong place well stored with all munitions of war. Marching night and day at his utmost speed to anticipate him, he reached the town before the enemy had emerged from Alsace.

Hemarches  
against  
Ariovistus  
and seizes  
Vesontio.

Vesontio, which now became Caesar's base, was an ideal Gallic stronghold. The town stood on a sloping peninsula, round which the Doubs swept in a curve that nearly formed a circle; while the isthmus, little more than five hundred yards wide, rose from either bank into a steep and lofty hill, girt by a wall, which gave it the strength of a citadel, and connected it with the town. During the short time that Caesar stayed there to collect supplies, his soldiers had plenty of opportunities for gossiping. The people of the place, and especially the traders, whose business had brought them into contact with the Germans, told marvellous stories of their great strength and desperate bravery:—one could not bear even to look them in the face, so terrible was the glare of their piercing eyes. The Roman soldiers were brave: but they were liable to fits of panic; and they were very credulous. The idle chatter of their new acquaintances completely demoralised them. The mischief began with the tribunes, the officers of the auxiliary corps, and others who formed the personal following of the General. Many of them were soldiers only in name. Like every other Roman governor, Caesar had been obliged, for political reasons, to find places in his army for fashionable idlers and disappointed

Panic in  
the Roman  
army.

<sup>1</sup> B. G., i. 37, § 4.



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professional men, who had had no experience of war, and simply wanted to mend their fortunes by looting.<sup>1</sup> Now that there was a prospect of real stern fighting, they began to tremble. Some invented excuses for asking leave of absence. Others felt bound, for very shame, to stay: but they could not command their countenances enough to look as if they were not afraid. Sometimes indeed, in spite of themselves, they gave way to tears. Gradually even centurions and seasoned veterans were infected by the general alarm. Some of them indeed made an effort to disguise their fears. They told each other that it was not the enemy, but only the forests between them and the enemy and the probable failure of supplies that they dreaded. All over the camp men were making their wills; and Caesar was actually told that, when he gave the order to march, the men would refuse to obey.

How  
Caesar re-  
stored con-  
fidence.

He immediately sent for the tribunes and centurions, and gave them a severe lecture. What business had they to ask where he intended to march? It was most unlikely that Ariovistus would be mad enough to fight: but supposing he did, what was there to be afraid of? Had they lost all confidence in themselves, all faith in their general? What had these terrible Germans ever really done? The crushing defeats which Marius had inflicted upon the Cimbri and Teutoni, the defeats which had been inflicted upon the gladiators, trained though they were in Roman discipline, in the recent servile war, gave the real measure of their prowess. Even the Helvetii had often beaten them; and the Helvetii had gone down before the legions. To talk about the difficulty of the country or the difficulty of getting supplies was downright impertinence. It was as much as to assume that the General did not know his own business. Supplies were coming up to the front from the friendly tribes; and the croakers would soon see that their alarm about the forests was absurd. As for the story that the army was going to mutiny, he did not believe it. Armies did not mutiny unless generals were incapable or dishonest. His integrity had

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 39, § 2. See also Cicero, *Ep. ad Fam.*, vii. 5-6, 8, 10, 18; and *Quint. frat.*, ii. 13, § 3.

never been called in question; and the late campaign proved <sup>58 B.C.</sup> that he could command. Anyhow on the very next night he intended to march; and if nobody else would follow him, he would go on with the 10th legion alone; for it, at all events, was faithful to its commander.

• This vigorous little speech had a marvellous effect upon the troops. From despair their spirits bounded to the highest pitch of confidence; and they were only impatient to measure swords with the enemy. The men of the 10th, flattered by Caesar's trust in them, sent him a message of thanks through their officers; while the other legions asked theirs to tell him that they were sorry for what had occurred. At the hour which he had fixed Caesar struck his camp. He left a detachment to hold Vesontio. Before him all was unknown: but he had full faith in Divitiacus; and Divitiacus undertook to be his guide. To avoid the broken wooded country between Besançon and Montbéliard, he made a circuit, northward and eastward, of about fifty miles, and then, threading the pass of Belfort, debouched into the plain of the Rhine, and pushed on rapidly past the eastern slopes of the Vosges till he reached a point within twenty-two miles of the German encampment. He has not told us where he formed his own camp: probably it was on the river Fecht, between Ostheim and Gemar.<sup>1</sup> Ariovistus, who was on the north, sent messengers to say that, as Caesar had come nearer, he had no objection to meeting him. Caesar accepted his proposal; and the conference was fixed for the fifth day following. Ariovistus, who knew that Caesar's cavalry were weak, pretended to be afraid of treachery from the legions, and insisted that they should each bring with them a cavalry escort only. Caesar was unwilling to raise difficulties: but, as all his cavalry were Gauls, and he did not care to trust his safety to them, he mounted the 10th on their horses. The place of meeting was a knoll, rising above the plain, nearly equidistant from the Roman and the German camp. Caesar stationed the bulk of his escort about three hundred yards off: Ariovistus did likewise; and each rode up with ten horsemen to the knoll. Ariovistus had stipulated that

He resumes  
his march  
against  
Ariovistus.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 636-8.

58 B.C.

His conference with Ariovistus.

they should hold the conference without dismounting. Caesar began by reminding Ariovistus of the honours which the Senate had conferred upon him; and afterwards repeated the demands, which he had already made through his envoys, on behalf of the Aedui. Ariovistus replied that he had only crossed the Rhine in response to Gallic appeals. The country which he occupied in Gaul had been formally ceded to him by Gauls: it was not he who had attacked them, but they who had attacked him. He had overthrown their entire host in battle; and, if they cared to repeat the experiment, he was ready to fight them again. As for the friendship of the Romans, it was only fair that he should get some solid advantage out of it; and if he could only retain it by giving up the tribute which he received from his subjects, he would fling it aside as readily as he had asked for it. He had entered Gaul before the Romans. Caesar was the first Roman Governor who had ever passed beyond the frontier of the Province. What did he mean by invading his dominions? His part of the country belonged to him just as much as the Province belonged to Rome. Caesar talked a great deal of the titles which the Senate had bestowed upon the Aedui; but he knew too much of the world to be imposed upon by such shams. The Aedui had not helped the Romans in the war with the Allobroges; and the Romans had not stirred a finger to help their "Brethren" against himself. He had good grounds for suspecting that the friendship which Caesar professed for him was another sham, — a mere blind under cover of which Caesar was plotting his ruin. He happened to know what was going on in Rome; and there were prominent men there who would be glad to hear of Caesar's death. If Caesar did not withdraw from his country, he would expel him by force of arms: but if he would only go away and leave him in peace, he would show his gratitude. Caesar quietly answered that it was impossible for him to go back from his word or to forsake the allies of his country; and, he added, if history were to be appealed to, the claim of the Romans to supremacy in Gaul was better founded than that of the Germans. He was still speaking when a soldier rode up and warned him

That a number of Germans were edging up towards the knoll and stoning his escort. Riding back to his men, he withdrew them without attempting to retaliate; for, though he was confident that his splendid legion could easily beat the Germans, he was determined not to give them any pretext for accusing him of foul play.

Exasperated by this outrage, the Romans became more than ever impatient for battle. Two days later Ariovistus requested Caesar to meet him again, or else send one of his generals. His motive doubtless was the hope of gaining time; for he had a superstitious reason for wishing to postpone the battle. Caesar saw no reason for further discussion, and did not care to expose his lieutenants to the tender mercies of a treacherous barbarian: but he sent his interpreter, Procillus, and a man called Mettius, whom, as he believed, Ariovistus could have no motive for injuring. They were instructed to hear what Ariovistus had to say, and bring back word. The moment he saw them, Ariovistus flew into a passion. "Why have you come here," he shouted: "to play the spy?" and when they attempted to explain, he cut them short and put them under arrest.

Mission of  
Procillus  
and Met-  
tius.

On the same day he made a long march southward, and halted about six miles north of Caesar's camp, at the very foot of the Vosges. He had conceived a daring plan. Next morning his column ascended the lower slopes, marched securely along them past the Roman army, and took up a position two miles south of Caesar's camp. As he looked up at the huge column winding leisurely by, Caesar saw that he was being outmanœuvred: to send the legions up the hill side would be to court destruction; and he could only wait, a passive spectator, while Ariovistus was cutting his communications and barring the road by which he expected his supplies.<sup>1</sup>

Ariovistus  
cuts  
Caesar's  
line of  
communi-  
cation.

Next day Caesar formed up his army immediately in front of the camp, under the protection of his artillery.

How  
Caesar  
regained  
command  
of it.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 636-7. Napoleon (*Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 89, n. 2) infers from Caesar's narrative (*B. G.*, i. 48, § 2) that Ariovistus only succeeded in cutting Caesar's communication with the convoys that were coming up from the Aedui and the Sequani, not with those which he expected from the Leuci and the Lingones.

58 B.C.

Ariovistus might attack if he liked: but if he attacked, it would be at his peril; if he declined the challenge, the legionaries would be assured that the Germans were not invincible.<sup>1</sup> Ariovistus remained where he was. On each of the four following days Caesar offered battle: but the enemy would not be provoked into leaving their camp. Cavalry skirmishes indeed took place daily, but without any decisive result. The Germans had light-armed active footmen, who accompanied the cavalry into action: they were trained to run by the horses' sides, holding on to their manes; and if the troopers were forced to retreat, they supported them and protected the wounded. As the infantry remained obstinately in their camp, and it was necessary for Caesar to win back communication with his convoys, he resolved to take the initiative. Forming his legions in three parallel columns,—prepared, at a moment's notice, to face into line of battle, he marched back to a point about a thousand yards south of Ariovistus's position, and there marked out a site for a camp. One column fell to work with their spades, while the other two formed in two lines to protect them. Ariovistus sent a detachment to stop the work; but it was too late: the fighting legions kept their assailants at bay, and the camp was made. Two legions were left to hold it; and the other four returned to the larger camp. Next day Caesar led his men into the open, but not far from his camp, and again offered battle. Ariovistus again declined the challenge: but, as soon as the legions had returned to their entrenchments, he made a determined attempt to storm the smaller camp, and only drew off his forces at sunset. Caesar now learned from some prisoners that the enemy had been warned by their wise women, whose divinations they accepted with superstitious awe, that they could not gain the victory unless they postponed the battle until after the new moon.

The Germans from superstition delay to fight a pitched battle.

Sept. 18.

Caesar attacks them.

Caesar saw his opportunity. He waited till the following morning; and then, leaving detachments to guard his two camps, he formed his six legions, as usual, in three lines, and

<sup>1</sup> See Stoffel, *Hist. de Jules César*,—*Guerre civile*, ii. 342-5; *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 64, and Caesar, *B. C.*, iii. 55, § 1, 84, § 2.

marched against the enemy. They had no choice but to 58 B.C. defend themselves. Their waggons stood in a huge semi-circle, closing their flanks and rear; and, as they tramped out, their women stretched out their hands and piteously begged them not to suffer their wives to be made slaves. The host was formed in seven distinct groups, each composed of the warriors of a single tribe. As the Romans were numerically weaker than their opponents, the auxiliaries were drawn up in front of the smaller camp, to make a show of strength. Each of the *legati* was placed at the head of a legion, in order that every one might feel that his courage in action would not be overlooked. Caesar commanded the right wing in person, and, noticing that the enemy's left was comparatively weak, directed against it his principal attack, in the hope of overwhelming it speedily and thus disconcerting the rest of the force. But before the Romans in the front ranks could poise their javelins, the Germans were upon them; and they had barely a moment to draw their swords. Quickly stiffening into compact masses, the Germans locked their shields to receive the thrusts: but some of the Romans flung themselves right on to the phalanxes: they tore the shields from the grasp of their foes, and dug their swords down into them; and, after a close struggle, they broke the formation, and their weapons got freer play. The unwieldy masses, unable to manœuvre or to deploy, reeled backward, dissolved, and fled. But the Roman left, overpowered by numbers, was giving ground. Young Publius Crassus, son of the celebrated triumvir, who was stationed in command of the cavalry, outside the battle, saw the crisis, and promptly sent the third line to the rescue. The victory was won, and the whole beaten multitude fled towards the Rhine. But the Rhine was some fifteen miles away;<sup>1</sup> the Ill had first to be crossed; and in that weary flight many fell under the lances of the cavalry. Only a few, among whom was Ariovistus, were lucky enough to swim the river or find boats. Caesar, in the course of the pursuit, came upon his interpreter, who was being dragged along in chains by his captors, and had only escaped death by the accident that, on drawing

They are  
defeated  
and ex-  
pelled from  
Gaul.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 638-40.

58 B.C.

lots, they had decided to postpone his execution. There is nothing in Caesar's memoirs more full of human interest than the passage in which, breaking his habitual reserve, he tells us of the joy he felt on seeing this man, for whom he had the greatest respect and regard, alive and unhurt. It gave him, he tells us, a pleasure as great as he had felt in gaining the victory.<sup>1</sup>

The victory was decisive. The Suevi, who were on the point of crossing the Rhine, lost heart and set out homewards. And Caesar,—where was he to go? What use was he to make of his victory? It would be fatal to withdraw his legions into the Province. That would be to invite the German to attempt a new invasion; to confess weakness to the Gaul. Fortune beckoned him on. Gaul was disunited: her foremost state was on his side; and others felt the spell of his success. To bring those gifted peoples under the civilising sway of Rome, to open their broad lands to Italian enterprise,—that was a work to satisfy the most soaring ambition. For the present indeed he must return to Cisalpine Gaul, to conduct the civil duties of his government and watch the politics of Italy: but leaving his legions under the command of Labienus, he quartered them for the winter in the stronghold of Vesontio.<sup>2</sup> In that last act of his we may read the registration of a great resolve; and doubtless he reflected, as he travelled southward, upon the magnitude of the undertaking to which he had committed himself. For to all who had eyes to see and ears to hear he had made it evident that his purpose was nothing less than the conquest of Gaul.

Caesar  
quarters  
his legions  
at Vesontio.

Signifi-  
cance of  
this step.

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Stoffel (*Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 67-72) gives a detailed description of the battle, which is partly imaginary, but nevertheless well worth reading. The imagination is totally different from that of a rhetorical historian: it is the imagination of a soldier, who understands what he is writing about; and the description, which recommends itself as substantially true, helps one to realise what a battle was like in the circumstances of ancient warfare.

<sup>2</sup> So Napoleon conjectures with probability (*Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 97): we only know for certain that the winter-quarters were in the country of the Sequani (*B. G.*, i. 54, § 2). But Napoleon's conjecture is supported by the fact that Caesar had garrisoned Vesontio (*Ib.*, 38, § 7).

## CHAPTER III

### THE FIRST CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BELGAE

THE results of the campaign which Caesar had just concluded 57 B.C. may be summed up in a single sentence:—he had secured, Results of the first campaign. at least for a time, the virtual submission of central Gaul; and he had paved the way for the conquest by destroying or expelling the barbarian hordes who threatened to anticipate him.

But the Gauls were not yet ready to bow their necks beneath the Roman yoke. Caesar's victories were doubtless talked of in every village from the Rhine to the Atlantic; and it needed less than the Celtic quickness to perceive their significance. Before the close of winter he heard rumours that the warlike Belgae were conspiring; and these rumours were confirmed by a despatch from Labienus. The Belgae conspire against Caesar. The tribes were binding each other, by the interchange of hostages, to mutual fidelity. They were fearful that Caesar would first conquer the rest of Gaul, and then conquer them. Moreover, they were egged on to fight by certain influential chiefs from Celtican Gaul. The motives of these counsellors were various. Some simply desired to make their country free. It was all very well, they argued, to have got rid of the Germans: but these new intruders were not a whit more welcome. If Caesar had expelled Ariovistus, he was evidently determined to take his place. The legions had settled down in the country; and they intended to make the country support them. Others, merely because they were Gauls, longed, above all things, for revolution. Then there were princely adventurers, who were plotting to seize royal power, and who foresaw that, if Gaul became a Roman province, they would



57 B.C.

be obliged to submit to law, and would no longer be allowed to hire troops for the gratification of their ambition.

Caesar returns to Gaul, and marches against them.

On his own responsibility and at his own cost, Caesar instantly raised two new legions in Cisalpine Gaul, and sent them in the early spring to join Labienus. As soon as the herbage was sufficiently forward to make it safe to take the field, he crossed the Alps and rejoined his army at Vesontio. The tribes nearest to the Belgae, whom he charged with the duty of collecting information, reported that they were busily raising and concentrating levies. Having arranged for supplies of corn, Caesar pushed on and, after another fortnight's marching, appeared on the northern bank of the Marne.

The Remi submit, and help Caesar.

The Belgae were taken completely by surprise. Engrossed in their preparations against Caesar, they had never dreamed that Caesar might anticipate them. One tribe, the Remi, who occupied the country round Reims, Laon and Chalons, were shrewd enough to perceive that his patronage would strengthen their own position. They were subject to the overlordship of their neighbours, the Suessiones, and wanted to shake off the yoke.<sup>1</sup> Two of their leading men, Iccius and Andecumborius, presented themselves in Caesar's camp, and not only submitted on behalf of the tribe, but promised to render him every assistance. Nothing could have been more opportune. He saw that it would be easy to establish in the heart of Belgium a power as devoted to his interests as the Aedui in central Gaul. He gave the envoys a gracious welcome, only stipulating that the Roman senate should present themselves before him, and that the sons of the leading men should be delivered up as hostages. The envoys gave him full information. The Belgae, they said, were full of confidence. They boasted that the Cimbri and Teutoni, who had overrun the rest of Gaul, had never been able to get a footing in their land. The Remi had done their utmost to prevent the Suessiones from taking part

<sup>1</sup> The Roman envoys told Caesar (*B. G.*, ii. 3, § 5) that the Suessiones and the Remi formed one political community. Now Galba was the king of the Suessiones; and therefore, it should seem, had been overlord of the Remi. Mommsen then is doubtless right in affirming that the Remi "discerned in this invasion of the foreigners an opportunity to shake off the rule which their neighbours, the Suessiones, exercised over them." *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 247.





in the movement, but in vain: indeed their king, Galba, <sup>57 B.C</sup> had been unanimously elected commander-in-chief. Every other tribe had joined the league; and Galba was prepared to put over two hundred thousand men into the field.<sup>1</sup> Caesar himself could hardly muster a fourth of this number; and his enemies were the stoutest and the most stubborn of all the warriors of Gaul. His only chance of success was to force their huge host to divide. With this aim,

he asked Divitiacus to raise a levy of Aeduians, and ravage the country of the Bellovaci, which lay beyond the Oise, in the country now dominated by the huge choir of Beauvais. The entire armament was now in full march against him. They were moving down a road which led from La Fère, on the Oise, past Laon to Reims.<sup>2</sup> Caesar determined to choose his own battle-field. Marching rapidly,

He sends Divitiacus to ravage the lands of the Bellovaci.

northward from Reims, he crossed the Aisne by a bridge at Berry-au-Bac, and encamped on rising ground between that river and its tributary, the Miette, a small stream flowing through a marshy ooze. The camp was, as usual, quadrilateral, as nearly square as the lie of the ground allowed. The rampart, eight feet high, was faced with sods and revetted with timber and fascines, to keep its slope of the requisite steepness: along the top of it was set a palisade of interlacing branches;<sup>3</sup> and the ditch which surrounded it was eighteen feet wide and ten feet deep.<sup>4</sup> Caesar's rear was protected by the Aisne; and his supplies could be brought up in safety by the Remi. At the northern end of the bridge he established a *tête-de-pont*; and, to guard its further extremity, he left a detachment about two thousand strong under one of his generals, Titurius Sabinus. Towards mid-

Marches to encounter the advancing host, crosses the Aisne, and encamps near Berry-au-Bac.

night a messenger came into camp with the news that the Belgæ were making a furious attack upon Bibrax, or Vieux-Laon, a Roman stronghold about seven miles to the northwest, and that Iccius, who commanded the garrison, despaired of being able to hold out unless he were promptly reinforced. Caesar instantly despatched a force of slingers, bowmen and light-armed auxiliary infantry to the rescue. The Gauls

The Belgæ attack Bibrax.

Caesar sends his auxiliaries to the rescue.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 228-9.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 644-5.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 588-9.

<sup>4</sup> Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 101, note.

57 B.C.

knew nothing of the scientific methods by which the Romans captured fortified towns. When their numbers were sufficiently great, they used to drive the defenders from the rampart by showers of missiles, and then to demolish a portion of the wall. But Bibrax was defended on the south by impregnable escarpments: it would seem that Galba had neglected to invest this side; and when Caesar's light troops appeared, the impatient and undisciplined host abandoned their attempt.<sup>1</sup> They only lingered long enough to ravage the lands and fire the hamlets within reach of the town.

The Belgæ  
encamp  
opposite  
Caesar.

On the following night the sudden blaze of a line of watch-fires, extending eight miles in length beyond the further side of the Miette, revealed to Caesar their encampment.

Caesar  
makes his  
position  
impreg-  
nable.

So formidable was the appearance of the huge host, so great was their reputation as fighting men, that Caesar did not care to risk a battle until he had seen enough to judge whether he would have a reasonable chance of success. A few cavalry skirmishes convinced him that he had nothing to fear. The rising ground on which the camp stood extended in a south-westerly direction nearly to the confluence of the Miette and the Aisne. The legions were protected in front by the Miette: but on their right the vast numbers of the enemy might outflank them. To prevent this, Caesar made his men dig two trenches, each about three furlongs in length, one southward to the Aisne from the south-eastern angle of the camp, the other northward to the Miette from the north-western; and at the extremity of either trench he caused forts to be constructed and armed with ballistæ and catapults. Along the whole length of the hill, on the left of the camp, he drew up six of his legions in battle array; while the other two remained to guard the camp. The enemy's masses were ranged on the further side of the Miette. Each of the two armies obstinately waited for the other to cross. Meanwhile Caesar's cavalry were scattering the Belgic squadrons. At length, tired of waiting, he led his legions back into camp. There was a ford on the Aisne, about two miles below the *tête-de-pont*, which he had

<sup>1</sup> See my essay on "The Credibility of Caesar's Narrative," p. 229, n. 1, and note on BIBRAX, p. 395.

either failed to notice or had not thought it necessary to 57 B.C. guard. Presently an orderly came from Sabinus, who reported that a body of the enemy were moving down to the bank on his left, evidently intending to cross over, attack his camp, and destroy the bridge. Even if they failed, the corn-fields of the Remi would be at their mercy: the convoys would be cut off; and then the legions would starve. Taking his cavalry, light-armed Numidians, archers and slingers, Caesar hurried down the hill, crossed the bridge, wheeled to the right, and pushed down the bank towards the ford. There were the enemy, splashing through the water. The archers and slingers attacked them, and did terrible execution. The survivors clambered over the fallen bodies, and staggered on under showers of stones and arrows: but those who succeeded in reaching the bank were surrounded by the cavalry and cut to pieces.<sup>1</sup>

The Belgae attempt to cut his communications, but are defeated.

The Belgae were thoroughly disheartened. They had no organised commissariat; and their supplies were running out. Galba had not the genius to control a vast multitude made up of hordes without discipline, with conflicting interests, and distracted by mutual jealousies. Caesar's position was impregnable; and he evidently had no intention of quitting it. His allies would soon be swarming over the frontier of the Bellovaci; and the chiefs of that tribe insisted on returning to defend their families. It was decided, therefore, that each tribe should go back to its own country, and that, whatever district the Romans might invade, all should rally to its defence. But this resolution was merely to save their self-respect. In the night the whole multitude poured out of their encampment with great uproar and confusion, each man struggling to get in front of his fellows. Caesar at first suspected that this movement was merely a ruse: but at daybreak he received positive information that the enemy had really gone, and immediately sent his cavalry, supported by three legions, under Labienus, in pursuit.<sup>2</sup> The rear ranks, when they were overtaken, stood at bay, and resisted

They disperse.

Caesar's cavalry pursue them.

<sup>1</sup> Regarding Caesar's operations on the Aisne, see pp. 645-52.

<sup>2</sup> Caesar wisely entrusted the command of the cavalry to two of his *legati*, one of whom, Cotta, was a soldier of the highest class.

57 B.C. resolutely: but those in front, hearing the shouts of combatants, made haste to escape. The slaughter instant; and the pursuers raced on. As long as daylight lasted, they hung on the rearguard, slaying, pursuing: slaying again; and at sunset they returned to camp. Caesar left the disorganised host no time to rally. Next morning he pushed on westward down the valley of the Aisne. <sup>He marches westward, and receives the submission of the Suessiones, Bellovaci and Ambiani.</sup> a single forced march of some seven and twenty miles he reached Noviodunum, near the modern Soissons, the chief stronghold of the Suessiones, and at once attempted an assault:<sup>1</sup> but though the garrison was weak, the moat was so wide and the wall so high that his troops were repulsed. In spite of their fatigue, they proceeded to fortify their camp and make preparations for a siege. Sappers' huts were constructed for protecting the workers: earth and fascines were shot into the moat; and wooden towers were erected to carry the artillery which was to play upon the defenders of the wall. During the night the contingent of the Suessiones, which had retreated from the camp on the Miette, thronged into the town and reinforced the garrison: but they were so confounded by the formidable appearance of the siege works that they surrendered without striking a blow. Marching <sup>[Breteuil]<sup>2</sup></sup> on westward, Caesar crossed the Oise. Bratuspantium, the chief town of the Bellovaci, opened its gates on his approach; and when he drew near Samarobriva, where now rises the colossal pile of the cathedral of Amiens, the Ambiani likewise tendered their submission. Caesar treated the three tribes with equal clemency and firmness. He punished no one: but he disarmed the garrisons of Noviodunum and Bratuspantium, and required the surrender of hostages of noble birth. Divitiacus, who had rejoined him, interceded for the Bellovaci; and, as his policy was to strengthen the influence of the Aedui, he gave out that it was his regard for those loyal allies which led him to show mercy. But now he learned that his progress was about to be disputed. On the north-east, among the inhospitable forests of the Sambre and the marshes of the Scheldt, dwelt a tribe whose primitive virtues had not yet been enfeebled by contact with civilisa-

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 473-4, 652-4.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 396-8.







tion. No traders were suffered to cross their frontier, for 57 B.C. fear the luxuries of which the rude warriors were still ignorant might sap their manhood. Bitterly taunting their neighbour tribes for having so tamely surrendered, they vowed that for their part they would accept no terms of peace. This people, whom of all his enemies Caesar most respected, and of whom he wrote with one of those rare touches of enthusiasm that here and there relieve the severity of his narrative, were the Nervii.

The Nervii resolve to resist.

A couple of marches brought the legions to the Nervian frontier. The road led through Hainaut, past the site of the modern Cambrai. Three days later Caesar gathered from some rustics, who had been taken prisoners, that the warriors of the tribe were encamped only nine miles off, on the further bank of the Sambre, with their allies, the Viromandui and the Atrebatæ; and that another tribe, the Aduatuci, were marching from the east to join them. He immediately sent on a party of centurions and pioneers to choose a camping ground. It happened that some of his prisoners had escaped to the enemy in the night. They told them that each of the Roman legions was separated, on the march, from the one that followed it by a long baggage train; and that, when the foremost legion, encumbered with their heavy packs, reached the camping ground, it would be easy to overwhelm them and plunder the baggage before the others could come to the rescue. The centurions selected for the site of the camp the heights of Neuf-Mesnil, which slope evenly and gently down towards the left bank of the Sambre. The depth of the river was not more than three feet. From the opposite bank an open meadow, over which were scattered a few cavalry piquets, rose into a hill covered with woods. The space for the camp was measured and marked out. Meanwhile the Roman army was toiling up from behind, its march being delayed by thick hedges, which had to be cut through. The formation was different from that which had been described to the Nervii; for when close to an enemy, Caesar always changed his order of march. In front came six legions in column. Then followed the entire baggage train, protected by the two newly raised legions, which closed

Caesar marches against them.

He learns that they and their allies are encamped on the right bank of the Sambre.

His pioneers mark out a camp on the heights of Neuf-Mesnil.

57 B.C.

blood that he could no longer stand. From the rear ranks men were slinking away to escape the showers of missiles. There were no reserves; and the numbers of the enemy were inexhaustible. Fresh swarms kept pressing up the hill, and closing in on either flank. Seizing a shield from a man in the rearmost rank, Caesar pushed his way through to the front: he called to his centurions by name: he told the men to open up their ranks,—so they would be able to use their swords better,—and charge. At the sound of his voice their spirits rose; and each man of them hoped that the General would see how bravely he could fight. But the 7th also, on their right, were hard pressed. Caesar told the tribunes to bring the two legions gradually closer together, and form them up so as to face the enemy on every side.<sup>1</sup> And now, as the men were relieved from the dread of being attacked in the rear, they fought with renewed confidence. The two legions which guarded the baggage had heard of the fight, and were marching up at their utmost speed. Suddenly above the ridge of Neuf-Mesnil they appeared; and presently the 10th, despatched by Labienus, recrossed the river, hurried up the hill side, and threw themselves upon the enemy's rear. The effect of their appearance was electrical. Even the wounded leaned on their shields, and plied their swords: the scattered camp-followers plucked up courage and turned upon the enemy; while the cavalry did all they could to atone for their flight. The Nervii in their turn were hemmed in. But in their last agony they made good their proud boast. Man by man, beneath the javelin and the thrust of the short sword, their front ranks fell. Higher rose the heap of prostrate bodies; and leaping on to them, the survivors snatched up the fallen javelins and flung them back, till they too fell; and all was still.<sup>2</sup>

So ended this wild fight,—a soldiers' battle, and withal the battle of a great man. Within an hour it was over, fought and wellnigh lost and won.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See p. 824.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 654-60. Caesar's narrative (*B. G.*, ii. 27, §§ 3-5, 28, §§ 1-2) implies that a few of the Nervian contingent escaped: but whether they ran away from the fighting line or had not come into action at all, he does not say.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 660.

The power of the Belgae was broken. What remained to 57 B.C. be done was only matter of detail. The old men of the Nervian tribe, with the women and children, had gathered before the battle in the midst of the marshes formed by the estuary of the Scheldt. Within a few days a deputation came from them to ask an audience of the conqueror. They were shrewd enough to exaggerate their losses.<sup>1</sup> Their army, they said, was all but annihilated. Only five hundred fighting men remained out of sixty thousand; and of six hundred senators no more than three. Wishing to establish a reputation for clemency, Caesar permitted the survivors to retain their lands and even their fortified villages, and warned the neighbouring tribes to refrain from molesting them. He then marched eastward against the Aduatuci. This people were different in origin from the rest of the Belgae. Fifty years before, the Cimbri and Teutoni, marching for the south, had left some of their number, under the protection of six thousand warriors, in Belgic Gaul, to herd the cattle and guard the booty which they could not take with them. After the destruction of their kindred, these men and their descendants had continued to maintain themselves against the enemies who surrounded them: they had achieved, by prolonged fighting, a commanding position; and they now occupied the broad plain of Hesbaye on the northern bank of the Meuse.<sup>2</sup> On hearing of the defeat of their allies, they had returned home and concentrated in one town of great strength, situated on Mont Falhize, opposite the modern fortress of Huy. The Meuse, winding in the shape of a horse-shoe, flowed through the meadows beneath the southern slopes of the hill; and the town, perched above its rocky heights, seemed inaccessible, save by one gentle ascent on the north-east, where a high wall frowned down upon the besiegers. Heavy stones and pointed beams were ranged upon the wall; and in front of it was a deep moat. At first the garrison made a succession of sorties: but Caesar threw up a rampart from one reach of the river, round the north of the hill, to the other; and, as was usual in regular sieges,

Caesar treats the survivors with clemency.

He besieges the stronghold of the Aduatuci.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 169-70.

<sup>2</sup> In 57 B.C. they may also have possessed lands on the right bank. See pp. 349-52.

57 B.C.

a terrace, composed of a core of earth and timber, supported by walls of logs piled cross-wise, was built up at right angles to the wall.<sup>1</sup> On this terrace was erected one of the wooden towers from the stories of which archers, slingers and artillery used to shower missiles among the defenders of a besieged town. It was intended that, as soon as the terrace approached the wall, a battering-ram should be employed to effect a breach. The garrison, confident in the strength of their fortress, watched these operations with ignorant contempt. They despised the Romans for their small stature, and asked them if they imagined that such pygmies as they could get a huge tower like that on to the wall. But the laugh was soon turned against them. When they saw the tower actually moving on its rollers and steadily nearing the wall, they fancied there must be some supernatural power at work, and in great alarm sent out envoys to beg for terms. They would surrender, the envoys said; only they entreated to be allowed to keep their arms, without which they could not defend themselves against their neighbours. Caesar insisted on unconditional surrender. He would take care that their neighbours did not molest them. The chiefs could only submit; and swords, spears and shields were pitched down into the moat until the heap almost reached the top of the wall. Towards sunset all the Roman soldiers who had gone into the town were withdrawn, for fear they might commit any excesses. The garrison had kept about a third of their weapons in reserve, and had improvised rude shields. They calculated that the Romans would be off their guard, and laid their plans accordingly. The contravallation was traced along rising ground. In the middle of the night the Aduatuci poured out of the gates, and advanced to attack it where the ascent was easiest. But Caesar had provided against the chance of treachery. Piles of wood, all ready laid, were set ablaze; and, guided by their light, the troops came streaming from the nearest redoubts. The Gauls fought with the courage of despair: but missiles rained down upon them from the rampart and from the towers which had been

They sur-  
render.

But after-  
wards make  
a treacher-  
ous attack.

<sup>1</sup> The difficult questions relating to the construction of the siege-terrace (*agger*) are discussed on pp. 594-601. See also pp. 109-10, 113.

erected upon it; and they were driven back with heavy loss <sup>57 B.C.</sup> into the town. Next day the gates were burst open, and the Romans rushed in. Caesar was neither vindictive nor cruel: but to those who defied him, and especially to those who broke faith, he was absolutely ruthless. Fifty-three thousand of the Aduatuci,—all who were found within the town,—<sup>Their punishment.</sup> were sold as slaves.<sup>1</sup>

The campaign was over. The prestige which it had won for Caesar was so great that more than one German tribe sent envoys across the Rhine to offer submission. One partial failure alone marred the general success. Amid the clash of arms, Caesar did not forget the commercial advantages which his conquest might secure for Rome. On his way back to Italy,<sup>2</sup> he sent one of his generals, Servius Galba, <sup>Galba's campaign in the</sup> to open up the road leading from the Valais over the Great St. Bernard into Italy, which traders had only been able to use hitherto at great risk and by the payment of heavy tolls. The tribes with which he had to deal were the Nantuates, who occupied the Chablais and the southern bank of the Rhône as far as St. Maurice: the Veragri, whose chief town, Octodurus, stood upon the site of Martigny, near the confluence of the Rhône and the Dranse;<sup>3</sup> and the Seduni, whose name is preserved in the modern Sitten. Galba's force consisted only of the 12th legion, which had suffered so severely in the battle with the Nervii, and a body of cavalry. Skirting the northern shore of the Lake of Geneva, the little column entered the broad valley of the upper Rhône, walled in on right and left by wooded mountains. Having inflicted several defeats upon the mountaineers, stormed several of their strongholds, and compelled the chiefs to surrender their sons as hostages, he posted two cohorts in the neighbourhood of St. Maurice, and took up his own quarters in Octodurus. The left bank of the Dranse, which then flowed in a different channel, down the middle of the valley, was on his right; and his camp was between Martigny-la-Ville and the more southerly Martigny Bourg. Besides the two cohorts which he had detached, he was obliged to send out a number of

<sup>1</sup> See p. 24, *supra*, and note on ADUATUCORUM OPPIDUM, pp. 353-8.

<sup>2</sup> Schneider's *Caesar*, i. 210, note.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 661-2.

57 B.C.

small parties for supplies. The camp was dominated on either side by the heights which border the valley of the Dranse; and the force which remained was insufficient for its protection. The mountaineers resented the deprivation of their children; and, as Caesar half naively remarked, they believed that the Romans, not content with occupying the roads, intended to annex their country. One morning Galba was informed that the heights were covered by armed men. They were evidently determined to cut his communications, and bar his exit from the valley. The fortifications were still unfinished, and the supply of corn was inadequate; for, as the mountaineers had submitted and given hostages, Galba had never dreamed that he might have to fight. A council of war was called. Some of the officers urged Galba to abandon the baggage and fight his way out: but he resolved, with the concurrence of the majority, to defend the camp. The troops had only just time to man the rampart before the enemy rushed down to the attack. They hurled stones and darts from every side. The Romans offered a vigorous resistance; and not a missile which they threw from their commanding position missed its mark. But the enemy's numbers enabled them to bring down fresh men as often as they were wanted: while the Romans had to fight on without relief. For six hours they fought at bay till their stock of missiles was nearly spent, and the enemy were beginning to fill up the trench and to break down the rampart. Just in time, Sextius Baculus, who had fought so gallantly on the Sambre, and a tribune named Volusenus ran to the chief, and convinced him that their only chance of averting destruction was to cut their way out. The men were told to stand quietly on the defensive for a few minutes, and rest themselves. Suddenly, at a given signal, four compact little columns dashed out from all four gates, and cut their way through the loose ranks of the astounded mountaineers. There was no time to rally. Discipline prevailed over numbers; and the mountaineers were driven with heavy loss out of the plain, and chased over the hills. But Octodurus was plainly untenable; and it appeared impossible to obtain supplies. Next day therefore Galba burned all the houses

in the village, and returned to spend the winter in the country of the Allobroges. 57 B.C.

The other legions had already been distributed in their winter-quarters. One, under Publius Crassus, the young general whose promptitude had contributed so much to the defeat of Ariovistus, had been sent, after the battle with the Nervii, to receive the submission of the maritime tribes of Normandy and Brittany.<sup>1</sup> This legion and the remaining six were cantoned along the valley of the Loire, from Angers to Orléans, so as to cut off all communication between northern and southern Gaul. Submission of the tribes of Brittany and Normandy.

In Italy the news of Caesar's victories was received with an outburst of enthusiasm.<sup>2</sup> Men felt that he had avenged the disaster of the Allia; and even the Senate gave expression to the popular feeling. After his despatches had been read, it was decided to hold a thanksgiving service of fifteen days,—an honour which no Roman citizen had ever received before. Rejoicings at Rome.

<sup>1</sup> The Veneti, Unelli, Osismi, Curiosolites. Esubii. Aulerci and Redones.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, *Caesar*. 23.



## CHAPTER IV

### CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE MARITIME TRIBES AND THE AQUITANI

56 B.C.

Delusive  
prospects  
of peace.

THE barbarian invaders of Gaul had been destroyed or driven back: the Belgae had been chastised; and many of the other states had proffered their submission. The Aedui and the Remi were still friendly; and the countenance of Caesar had greatly increased their consequence, and therefore the influence which they were able to exert on his behalf. The Gallic peoples had little consciousness of national unity: they were familiar with the idea of Roman dominion; and, while Caesar did not interfere with their domestic affairs, they were not prepared to make any serious effort to throw off a supremacy which as yet seemed little more than nominal. So confident was Caesar in the prospect of tranquillity that he set out on a political tour to Illyricum,—the most distant quarter of his province. But Gaul was still a long way from being subdued. The legion under Publius Crassus had been quartered in the northern part of Anjou. The most considerable of the neighbouring tribes were the Veneti, who dwelt in the storm-beaten tract of western Brittany which comprises the department of Morbihan and the southern part of the department of Finistère. Like the modern Bretons, they were the stoutest and the most skilful seamen in Gaul: they had a numerous fleet of vessels, clumsy indeed, but of extraordinary size and strength; and their prosperity depended upon the carrying trade with Britain, of which they possessed the monopoly. They, however, as well as the more distant tribes of Brittany and Normandy, professed to submit; and Crassus sent a number of officers to arrange with them

[The  
country of  
the Andes.]

for a supply of corn. But the chiefs of the Veneti were <sup>56 B.C.</sup> beginning to repent of their tame submission. Besides their natural impatience of foreign ascendancy, they had, we are told, a business-like motive for resistance. They had heard, it would seem, that Cæsar was contemplating an invasion of Britain; and they were naturally determined to prevent him from interfering with their trade.<sup>1</sup> Hoping to induce Crassus to restore their hostages, they detained as prisoners the officers who had come to them. With the rash precipitancy of Gauls, the tribes of Côtes-du-Nord and Orne followed their example: soon the whole north-western seaboard was sworn to resist the encroachments of Rome; and an embassy was sent to Crassus, to demand the restoration of the hostages.

Messengers were soon posting with despatches for Cæsar, who was still in Illyricum. He had studied the character of the Gauls to some purpose; and he knew that, if they soon lost heart, their blood was up on the slightest stimulus. Like other peoples, they preferred independence to subjection; and, above all things, their restless spirit craved variety. If he were to overlook the conduct of the Veneti, the other tribes of Gaul would fancy that they might defy him with impunity. The Belgæ indeed were only half subdued; and they were said to have solicited the support of the Germans. Accordingly Cæsar sent instructions to his officers to have a fleet built in the ports at the mouth of the Loire, to raise oarsmen from the Province, and to collect as many pilots and seamen as they could.

Throughout his proconsulate Cæsar was in a position different from that of a modern viceroy, who, if his work is almost beyond his strength, may securely concentrate upon it all the power of his mind. He was ever obliged to look back towards Rome, to look forward to the uncertain but stormy future, when he would have to struggle for political supremacy; and whenever an enemy attempted to weaken his position, he was obliged to parry the blow. Cicero manifested an inclination to oppose him; and he had reason to fear that Pompey would join Cicero. His term of office would expire

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, *Geogr.*, iv. 4, § 1.

56 B.C.

in about two years, on the 1st of March, 54 B.C. If he were recalled then, his work in Gaul would be left unfinished; and he would go back, too soon,—to chaos or civil war. From Illyricum he had returned to Ravenna, where his associate, Crassus, met him. Hearing of Cicero's measures, he moved southward, about the middle of April, to Luca, and invited Pompey to come thither as his guest. At this little town the fortunes of the world were decided. Caesar offered terms of such startling liberality that an agreement was come to at once. It was arranged that his term of office should be prolonged for another five years, and that Pompey and Crassus should exert their influence with the Senate to secure to him the right of increasing his legions to ten, and of charging the state-chest with the pay of those which he had raised on his own responsibility.<sup>1</sup>

ON NEAR

Caesar re-  
turns to  
Gaul.

[The terri-  
tory of the  
Treveri.]

[The Lexo-  
vii, Unelli  
and Curio-  
solites.]

Prepara-  
tions of the  
Veneti.

From Luca he hastened to join his army, and took up his quarters in the neighbourhood of Nantes. His first step was to distribute the legions more widely. Labienus was sent to the country round Trèves, to keep an eye upon the Belgae and to prevent the Germans from crossing the Rhine. Sabinus was directed to disperse the allies of the Veneti in Calvados, the Cotentin and Côtes-du-Nord; while Crassus marched for Aquitania. It is most unlikely that the Aquitanians would have taken up arms on behalf of their alien neighbours: but Caesar may not have been aware of the want of sympathy between the two peoples: and, with or without provocation, he would of course have compelled the former as well as the latter to acknowledge the supremacy of Rome. The Veneti and their allies, who saw that they had irretrievably committed themselves, were equally active. They provisioned their fortresses, assembled their ships in the Venetian ports, and even sent across the Channel to ask for help. They knew the strength of their country, and had little doubt of success. The coast of Morbihan was pierced by long estuaries and broken by numerous inlets, which would greatly hinder the progress of an invading army.

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, *Ad Fam.*, i. 7, § 10, 9, §§ 9-10; *Ad Quintum fratrem*, ii. 6, § 2; Suetonius, *Divus Iulius*, 24; Appian, *B. C.*, ii. 17; Plutarch, *Crassus*, 14, *Caesar*, 21, *Pompeius*, 51. See also Strachan-Davidson's *Cicero*, 1894, pp. 263-70.

Little corn was grown in those parts; and the granaries had 56 B.C. been emptied to supply the forts. Want of food therefore must soon force the Romans to beat a retreat; and, if the worst came to the worst, those born sailors knew that they could take to the stout ships which had weathered so many storms; while the frail Roman vessels would be sure to run aground among the shoals, or to founder in the tempestuous seas that buffeted the rock-bound shore.

The Roman fleet, which included ships impressed from the maritime tribes<sup>1</sup> between the Loire and the Garonne, was soon assembled, under Decimus Brutus, in the estuary of the Loire: but the weather was too stormy for it to put to sea. Meanwhile Caesar crossed the river Vilaine and entered the Morbihan, hoping, by the time the gales moderated, to get possession of the enemy's strongholds. This, however, as he soon found, was a work of extreme difficulty. The forts were situated at the ends of spits or promontories, connected with the mainland by shoals, which, at high tide, were completely submerged. Caesar constructed dykes across the shoals, along which the troops marched to attack the town. Before they could deliver the assault, however, the garrison took to their ships, and sailed away to the nearest fort. The greater part of the summer was frittered away in these tedious sieges; and Caesar was obliged to confess that all his labour had been expended in vain. Accordingly he resolved to wait for his fleet, and encamped on the heights of St. Gildas, south of Quiberon Bay. Hard by, in the river Auray, which discharges itself into the bay, the whole Venetian armada was assembled.<sup>2</sup>

At length the wind moderated; and one morning the long-looked-for fleet was descried in the offing. Forthwith, gliding out from the mouth of the Auray, appeared the hostile squadron, numbering two hundred and twenty sail. They stood out of the water like floating castles. The great sails were made, not of canvas but of leather, to withstand the force of the Atlantic gales. Clustering on the cliffs, the legionaries had a good view of the two fleets as they approached one another. Brutus and his officers were at their

The Roman fleet weather-bound in the Loire.

Caesar's fruitless campaign against the Veneti.

Sea-fight between the Veneti and Brutus.

<sup>1</sup> The Pictones and Santones.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 663-74.

56 B.C.

wits' ends to know what to do. The rams of the light galleys would fail to make any impression on those huge hulls. The deck-turrets were run up: but even then the Romans were overtopped by the lofty poops, and could not throw their javelins with effect. But the Roman engineers had prepared an ingenious contrivance. Two or more galleys rowed up close to one of the enemies' ships. Then, with sharp hooks fixed to the ends of long poles, the Romans caught hold of the halyards, and pulled them taut: the rowers plied their oars with might and main; and the sudden strain snapped the ropes. Down fell the yards: the troops clambered on to the helpless hulk; and the struggle was soon ended by the short sword. When several ships had been thus captured, the rest prepared to escape. But they had hardly been put before the wind when there was a dead calm; and, as they had no oars, they could not stir. The swift little galleys ran in and out among them, and captured them one after another. When the evening breeze sprang up, a few slipped away in the dusk, and ran for the shore: but all the rest were taken.<sup>1</sup>

Punish-  
ment of the  
Veneti.

This battle decided the war. All the chiefs and all the warriors of western Brittany had taken part in it. They had no reserves. They had staked everything upon a single throw, and had lost. Deprived of their ships, the survivors had no means of defending their forts. There was nothing for them therefore but unconditional surrender. They had made a very gallant fight for freedom; and Caesar respected a brave enemy: but he always took the straightest path to gain his end. He determined to teach the whole Gallic people, by a terrible lesson, that it was dangerous to rebel. As the Venetian senate were responsible for the outrage which had led to the war, every man of them was put to death; and all the rest of the tribe, or all that could be caught, were sold into slavery.

Campaign  
of Sabinus  
against the  
northern  
allies of the  
Veneti.

About the same time despatches arrived from Sabinus. The allies of the Veneti, commanded by a chief named Viridovix, had mustered in the peninsula of the Cotentin. The tribes of Calvados and Eure, in their feverish eagerness

<sup>1</sup> See my essay on "The Credibility of Caesar's Narrative (pp. 205-6).

for war, had massacred their senators, simply because they <sup>56 B.C.</sup> counselled peace. Bandits and desperadoes from every part of Gaul, flocked to join the host. Sabinus encamped on a hill; and, having a wholesome respect for their numbers, he could not be provoked to come out and fight. The enemy put him down as a coward, and his own men grumbled at his inaction. But he was simply biding his time. He bribed a Gaul belonging to his auxiliary corps to go over to the enemy, in the guise of a deserter, and tell them that Caesar was in great straits, and that he himself was on the point of going to his assistance. The man had a ready wit and a glib tongue, and played his part well. The Gauls eagerly swallowed the tale, and clamoured to be led to the attack. Their commissariat had, as usual, been neglected; and they were impatient to finish the campaign at a blow. Viridovix and his brother chiefs were obliged to let them have their way. Their plan was to fall upon the Romans before they had time to man the ramparts. The ascent from the plain to the camp was about a mile. The Gauls ran up the slope at the top of their speed, each man carrying an armful of brushwood to fill up the trench. But Sabinus was ready for them. Sallying from the right and the left gate,<sup>1</sup> the disciplined cohorts fell upon the flanks of the panting multitude, and sent them flying. The cavalry allowed few to escape. No second blow was needed. The league fell to pieces at once. As inconstant as they had been impetuous, the tribes abandoned the struggle, and laid down their arms.

Meanwhile Crassus was carrying all before him in Aquitania. Unlike Galba, he took the greatest pains to ensure the regular delivery of supplies. Caesar had only been able to spare him twelve cohorts, or about five thousand men: but he had a powerful body of cavalry and some auxiliaries; and he summoned a number of brave provincials from Tolosa, Carcaso and Narbo to join him. He defeated the Sotiates near the source of the Ciron, and captured their stronghold, the site of which is now occupied by the town of Sos. Thence he penetrated into the basin of the Adour.

Brilliant  
campaign  
of Crassus  
in Aquitania.

[Toulouse,  
Carcassonne  
and Narbonne.]

<sup>1</sup> See Long's *Caesar*, p. 176, note.

56 B.C.

The Aquitanians, in great alarm, obtained reinforcements from their kinsmen, the Iberians of the Pyrenees. The leaders who were chosen had learned the art of war under the famous Sertorius, and their operations showed some degree of skill. They carefully selected a position for their encampment, and fortified it in the orthodox fashion. They sent out detachments to block the roads. Relying on their numbers, which were daily augmented, they hoped to gain a bloodless victory by cutting off the invader's supplies, and harassing his rear as soon as he should be obliged to retreat. But Crassus had no intention of retreating. He could not spare a man to secure his supplies, but he knew that sheer audacity will often work wonders. His men were in great heart, emboldened by the enemy's inaction, and confident in their young leader. Having offered battle in vain, he boldly assaulted the enemy's camp. They resisted stoutly, and threw their javelins from the high rampart with great effect: but they had neglected to secure the rear gate; and some fresh cohorts managed to get round by a circuitous way, break down the feeble defences, and steal in unobserved while the battle was raging at the opposite end. The imprisoned Aquitanians and Spaniards rushed pell-mell out of the entrenchment, and made a desperate effort to escape: but the country was one vast open plain; and they were ridden down and slaughtered in thousands. Forthwith all except the remoter tribes tendered their submission, and voluntarily sent hostages.

Fruitless  
campaign  
of Caesar  
against the  
Morini.

The conquest of the maritime peoples was all but complete. The Morini and the Menapii, two Belgic tribes who had formed an alliance with the Veneti, alone refused to submit. Their country, which extended from the neighbourhood of Étapes to the lower Rhine, comprised the northern parts of the Pas de Calais and of Nord, Flanders, Zeeland and North Brabant. Caesar had over four hundred miles to march, and the summer was nearly at an end: but he felt confident that he would be able to subdue the recalcitrant tribes in one brief campaign. He traversed Brittany and Normandy, joining Sabinus on the way; crossed the Seine and the Somme; and then pushed north-

ward through Artois. Taught by the sad experience of 56 B.C. their impetuous countrymen to avoid a pitched battle, the Morini sought refuge, on the approach of the legions, in their vast forests. While the legionaries were fortifying their camp, the enemy, who had not yet been seen, suddenly dashed out of the woods and attacked them; and although they were beaten off with heavy loss, a few Romans, who chased them too far, were cut off and killed. This mishap made the legionaries more careful. They spent some days in cutting down the trees, piling them up on both flanks, as they advanced, to guard against surprise. The enemy's cattle and part of their baggage fell into their hands. But now the wind blew and the rain fell with such violence that the work of felling the trees had to be suspended: the troops could no longer live safely in tents; and it was necessary to abandon the campaign. The cultivated lands of the Morini were harried and their hamlets burned; and the legions returned to winter in the newly conquered districts between the Seine and the Loire.



## CHAPTER V

### THE MASSACRE OF THE USIPETES AND TENCTERI

55 B.C.      GAUL was now, to all appearance, conquered. Throughout these three years the central tribes, influenced by the example of the Aedui, distracted by intestine rivalries, awed by the genius of the Roman Governor, had remained simply passive. But it was not enough merely to conquer: the conquest had also to be secured against foreign invasion. A fresh incursion of hungry Germans was imminent. The defeat of Ariovistus had struck terror into the Teutonic races: but it had not stilled the inward throes by which they had so long been convulsed. The Suevi had swept before them the lesser tribes of the Usipetes and Tencteri: a land to dwell in and food to eat the fugitives must needs obtain; and now, after three years' wandering, a vast horde of emigrants appeared in the neighbourhood of Emmerich, on the right bank of the lower Rhine.<sup>1</sup> The Menapii occupied lands on both banks of the river. Those who dwelt on the right bank, terrified by the appearance of the huge host, hurriedly abandoned their huts, crossed to the western side, and, joining their kinsmen, prepared to dispute the passage. Baffled in their attempts to cross, the Germans made a feigned retreat, which lasted three days: then marched rapidly back; surprised and massacred the Menapii, who had returned; seized their boats and crossed over; and for the rest of the winter lived at free quarters in the Menapian territory on the west of the Rhine.

The news reached Caesar in Cisalpine Gaul, while he was discharging the civil duties of his government. He knew the

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 678-9.

character of the Gauls,—the frivolity and craving for excitement that impelled them to rush blindly into new connexions without counting the cost. There was indeed no reason why they should trouble themselves to repel one invader for the benefit of another. But the chances were that some of the tribes might be impelled by jealousy of their rivals or hostility to the Romans to welcome the new-comers. Determined to prevent such a coalition or crush it in the making, Caesar returned to Gaul earlier than usual, and proceeded to join the legions, which had concentrated at some point near the lower Seine, probably in the neighbourhood of Evreux. His apprehensions were justified. Certain tribes had entered into negotiations with the Germans; and they had by this time moved as far southward as the territories of the Eburones and the Condrusi. The former included portions of the provinces of Limbourg and Liège: the Condrusi inhabited the district of Condruz, between the Meuse and the Ourthe. Caesar summoned the Gallic chiefs, including those who had committed themselves to a council; and, pretending to be ignorant of the negotiations, told them that he was going to make war upon the common enemy, and called upon them to furnish their regular contingents of cavalry. When the contingents arrived, he made a selection from the whole number, and, having provided for the delivery of his supplies, marched towards the distant country in which he heard that the Germans were encamped. It is impossible to say where he crossed the Meuse, or what route he followed afterwards: but the general trend of his march was towards the neighbourhood of Coblenz. Apparently the Germans were in no aggressive mood. Tired of their enforced wanderings, they only wanted to settle down peaceably in some fertile part of Gaul. When Caesar was still some days' march from their encampment, their envoys met him. The Germans, they said, had no desire to fight: but, if Caesar attacked them, they would not flinch. All they asked was that he should assign them lands, or at all events leave them to enjoy those which their swords had won. They acknowledged no superiors but the Suevi; and against the Suevi the gods themselves could not contend. Caesar replied that he could make no

55 B.C.

Caesar fears that some of the Gallic tribes may join them.

He returns to Gaul, and summons a Gallic council.

He marches against the Usipetes and Tenciteri;

and negotiates with their envoys.

55 B.C.

terms with them while they remained in Gaul. People who could not defend their own country had no right to encroach upon others: besides, there were no lands to spare in Gaul sufficiently extensive to support so vast a multitude. They were welcome, however, if they cared to recross the Rhine, to settle in the country of the Ubii, who had just put themselves under the protection of Rome. The territory of this people,—the only German tribe which had definitely submitted to Caesar,—extended from the neighbourhood of Coblenz to the neighbourhood of Bonn. The envoys said that they would refer Caesar's proposal to their principals, and return with an answer in three days. Till then they hoped that he would advance no further. This request he rejected; for he felt sure that it was simply a pretext to gain time for the German cavalry, who had crossed the Meuse in quest of corn and plunder, to return.

Marching on steadily, he was only eleven miles from the German headquarters when the envoys returned. Again they begged him to halt; and again he refused. They then asked for three days' grace, to arrange terms with the Ubii. What they really wanted, as Caesar saw, was to gain more time. He meant to do the same. He promised, however, not to advance that day beyond a river, four miles distant, where he intended to water; and told them to come back again on the morrow, that he might decide on their request, and to bring with them as many of their leaders as could come. What he desired was to get those leaders into his power, so that their formidable host might be helpless in his hands.<sup>1</sup> Perhaps he knew that his offer to settle the Germans in the country of the Ubii was impracticable: perhaps indeed he had only made that offer in order to gain time, and to put the Germans off their guard: certainly he believed that they were trying to outwit him, and he was determined to outwit them,—determined, by hook or by crook, to secure the essential object of ridding himself and Gaul of these dangerous immigrants, and to secure it at the least possible cost to his own army. Meanwhile, at the urgent entreaty of the envoys, he sent orders to his Gallic cavalry, who had gone

<sup>1</sup> See p. 191.

on in advance, to refrain from provoking a combat. The 55 B.C. envoys took their leave. The cavalry, five thousand strong, were riding quietly along, on the faith of the truce, when, without a moment's warning, a band of horsemen swept down, and scattered them right and left. As they tried to rally, the enemy leaped to the ground, and stabbed their horses in the belly. An Aquitanian noble, named Piso, did his best to save the credit of the Gallic cavalry, hazarding his life to rescue his brother, and when he was unhorsed, fighting against desperate odds till he fell. His brother, who had escaped, would not survive him, and galloped back into the press to die. But their example was wasted. The Gauls were six to one: but they were thoroughly unnerved; and, while many lay dead, the rest galloped away, and never drew rein till they came within sight of the Roman column.

Caesar made up his mind. Those Germans were treacherous savages; and he saw no reason why he should make any terms with them. Besides, this paltry triumph they had stolen would make them heroes to the feather-pated Gauls. To hold his hand until they were reinforced would be sheer madness. Next morning the German chiefs came to his camp,—to apologise, as they said, for the unauthorised attack by their cavalry. Caesar was delighted. He determined to end the business by a single blow, bloodlessly,—for his own men. He refused to hear what the chiefs had to say. Believing, or professing to believe, that they only wanted to cajole him into granting an extension of the truce, he ordered them to be put under arrest, and then marched on rapidly against the Germans. They were taking their ease among their waggons, with their wives and children, when the legions appeared. Confounded by the sight, not knowing what had become of their leaders, they lost all presence of mind, and crying aloud in their terror, ran hither and thither about the camp. The infuriated Romans burst in. The few Germans who were quick enough to seize their weapons, clustered behind the waggons and tried to resist; but, distracted by piercing shrieks, they turned and saw their wives and children flying before the Roman cavalry; and flinging aside their arms, they rushed pell-mell to over-

Their cavalry, in violation of a truce, attack his.

He resolves to attack them at once:

arrests their chiefs, who had come, ostensibly to explain;

and virtually annihilates the host.

55 B.C.

take them. Many were slain in the pursuit. Others scattered over the country and escaped. At length the panting remnant reached the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine.<sup>1</sup> Worn out and desperate, they plunged in; and the swift current swept them away.

His conduct condemned in the Senate.

The conduct of Caesar was fiercely condemned by Cato and others in the Roman Senate. The refusal to listen to the explanation of the German chiefs; their detention, contrary, as it appeared, to the law of nations; and then the virtual extermination of an entire people,—these things perhaps shocked sensitive consciences, and certainly gave a handle to political opponents. Cato actually proposed that the perfidious Governor should be given up to the Germans.<sup>2</sup> Caesar pursued his course unmoved. The sacrifice of life was appalling: but it was made once for all. Thoroughly cowed, the Germans thenceforward ceased to disturb the tranquillity of Gaul.

He bridges the Rhine, punishes the Sugambri, and returns to Gaul.

But Caesar determined to make assurance doubly sure. As the Germans thought so little of crossing the Rhine, he would cross it too, and teach them that invaders might in their turn be liable to invasion. Besides, it was necessary to chastise the Sugambri, the northern neighbours of the Ubii, in whose country the cavalry of the Usipetes and Tencteri had just found a ready welcome. When he sent to demand their surrender, the Sugambrian chiefs asked with what face he, who complained so loudly of the Germans crossing the Rhine, could claim the right to dictate to the Germans in their own country.' The Ubii, on the other hand, besought him to come and help them against the Suevi: his prestige, they said, was so great that the mere appearance of his army would be enough to secure them from attack; and they would gladly undertake to find boats to cross the stream. But Caesar did not think it safe to trust to boats; and he intended to make the passage in a way that would produce a greater moral effect. Broad, deep and swift as the river was, he would throw a bridge across it, to teach the Germans what Roman science could effect. He

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 680-91.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, *Caesar*, 22; Suetonius, *Divus Iulius*, 24.

selected for the spot a site between Coblenz and Andernach, 55 B.C. which was opposite the territory of the Ubii.<sup>1</sup> The Roman engineers were accustomed to bridge rivers: but this was an undertaking of unprecedented difficulty. But Caesar had inspired every man with faith in his star; and all ranks worked with extraordinary energy. Within ten days from the time when the first tree was felled, the great river was spanned by a firm bridge of piles, buttressed to withstand the force of the flood;<sup>2</sup> and the legions were encamped on the German bank. Leaving a strong guard at either end, Caesar marched northward against the Sugambri. Their country extended eastward of Crefeld, Dusseldorf and Cologne. Envoys from various tribes met Caesar on the way, and solicited his friendship. He answered them courteously, and directed them to bring hostages to his camp. The Sugambri, on the advice of the Usipetes and Tencteri, had taken refuge in the outlying forests; and, after burning their villages and cutting their corn, Caesar returned to the country of the Ubii. The Suevi had sent their wives and children into the secure recesses of the vast forest of central Germany, and were banded together somewhere in the heart of their country, ready for battle. But Caesar had neither the force nor the inclination to undertake the conquest of Germany. Having accomplished every object for which he had entered the country,—punished his enemies, reassured his friends, and made the name of Rome respected,—he recrossed the Rhine and destroyed his bridge.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 694-7.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 697-709.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE DISASTER AT ADUATUCA AND ITS RESULTS

55-54 B.C. CAESAR'S attention was now diverted for a time from the  
Caesar's in- affairs of Gaul. During the few weeks of summer that fol-  
vasions of lowed his passage of the Rhine and the latter part of the  
Britain. ensuing season he made his two famous expeditions to Britain. He went to Illyricum in the intervening winter, and did not return to Gaul until the close of the following May. Quintus Cicero, a younger brother of the orator, joined him on the road, and took up the post of a *legatus*. Caesar often found time to write to the elder Cicero, and even to read his verses. The correspondence shows us what manner of men Caesar had to entertain in his army when friends or political associates asked favours of him. Cicero begged him to give a place of some sort to a lawyer named Trebatius; and Caesar, who knew how to render such appointments innocuous, good-naturedly consented in a letter, the kindness and the humour of which are reflected in one which Cicero wrote to Trebatius himself.<sup>1</sup>

Caesar's avowed objects in invading Britain were to inform himself about the island and its inhabitants, and to punish the southern tribes, who had helped their kinsmen in Gaul to resist him. On each occasion he left behind a force sufficient to keep open his communications and to overawe intending rebels; and on the second expedition he took with him all the chiefs whom he had the slightest reason to suspect. The one of all others whom he had been most careful to summon was the notorious Dumnorix, who was as popular with the masses and as determined an enemy of Rome as

Intrigues  
of Dum-  
norix.

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, *Ep. ad Fam.*, vii. 5-6, 8, 10, 18; *ad Quint. frat.*, ii. 13 (15 A).

when he had been detected in his intrigues with the Helvetii.<sup>54</sup> B.C. Quite recently he had caused great alarm and indignation to the Aeduan council by giving out that Caesar intended to make him king.<sup>1</sup> Nothing could have provoked Caesar more; for the success of his policy depended largely upon his keeping the Aeduan government in good humour. Dumnorix was most reluctant to leave the country. He doubtless saw that he might never again have such an opportunity as Caesar's absence afforded of furthering his schemes; and he begged for leave to stay behind. He was terrified, he said, at the prospect of crossing the sea: besides, he had religious duties, which he could not fulfil unless he remained in Gaul.<sup>2</sup> Caesar was of course deaf to his entreaties and his pretended scruples. Dumnorix then tried to induce his brother chiefs to join him in refusing to go. He assured them that Caesar was only taking them to Britain that he might put them all to death. Caesar kept himself informed of his intrigues, and did his best to prevent him from rushing on his doom. All this time the fleet was weather-bound in the Portus Itius,—the harbour of Wissant,—which, in those days, was a bay, fringed by a long shelving beach, and sheltered by the far-reaching headlands of Grisnez and Blancenez.<sup>3</sup> At length the wind shifted; and Dumnorix took advantage of the confusion that attended the embarkation to ride off with the Aeduan cavalry. Instantly stopping the embarkation, Caesar sent a strong body of horse in pursuit with orders to kill him at once if he attempted to resist. He fought desperately for life and liberty: but the troopers failed to support him; and he fell, passionately asserting with his dying breath the independence of his tribe.

The death of this resolute adventurer was a temporary relief to the Roman Governor: but it probably helped to kindle into a flame the discontent which had long been

The Gallic nobles in a dangerous mood.

<sup>1</sup> Caesar's detractors have suggested that he really had made the offer to Dumnorix, in order to purchase his support. I would ask them in reply whether Caesar was a fool. It is much more likely that, as Schneider conjectures (*Caesar*, ii. 26), Dumnorix had made the statement in question in order to exasperate the Aedui against Caesar.

<sup>2</sup> See Schneider's *Caesar*, ii. 27.

<sup>3</sup> See my geographical note on ITIUS PORTUS, pp. 433-43.



54 B.C.

smouldering in the breasts of the Gauls. Doubtless the Aedui were glad enough to be rid of the Helvetii: doubtless others besides the Aedui rejoiced at the overthrow of Ariovistus. But it was not to be expected that they should feel any gratitude to Caesar. Individuals like Divitiacus, tribes like the Remi, had of course gained something by his friendship. But Gaul, as a whole, had so far gained nothing. Not only were the constant presence of the legions and the endless requisitions of corn an intolerable burden, but to the high-spirited Celtic knights the fact of subjection was more galling still. They had indeed partly themselves to blame. Weakness of purpose, mutual jealousy, petty ambition had been their bane. They had not realised, or had not valued their national unity enough to make a united effort for its preservation. The Nervii indeed had fought like heroes: but the bulk of the Belgae had been too selfish, too faint-hearted, too distrustful of each other, above all, too feebly organised to support them. The Veneti had made a gallant resistance: but the enthusiasm of their allies had vanished at the first reverse. The states of the interior had acquiesced in the domination of Caesar, without a blow, nay even without a protest. It would, of course, be unjust to ignore the difficulties with which they had to contend. If Caesar was justified in the severity with which he criticised the infirmities of their national character, it would have been unreasonable to expect from a medley of tribes, which had hardly had time to outgrow their political infancy, the harmonious action which could only have been the fruit of ages of discipline. They were heavily weighted by the selfishness or the astuteness, call it which one will, of the Aedui and the Remi. Above all, no leader had appeared whose personality was sufficiently commanding to rally the patriots of every state round his standard. But, whatever the cause may have been, the chiefs were now in a dangerous mood; and the people were ready to back them. Caesar was perfectly aware of their temper. The harvest in Gaul this season was very scanty; and he was obliged therefore on his return from Britain, in order to ensure an adequate supply of grain, to distribute his legions for the winter over a wide extent of

Distribution of the legions for the winter of 54-53.

territory. As the Belgic states appeared to be the most rest-<sup>54 B.C.</sup> less, their country was selected for the occupation. One legion, under Gaius Fabius, was quartered among the Morini, who had recently submitted to Labienus: another, under Quintus Cicero, among the Nervii, in the neighbourhood of Namur: a third, under Labienus, on the Ourthe, or perhaps the Meuse, near the western frontier of the Treveri. Three, under Trebonius, Crassus and Plancus respectively, were stationed close together at Samarobriua and in the plain [Amiens.] round Beauvais. One, consisting entirely of recruits,<sup>1</sup> with five veteran cohorts, was sent to Aduatuca, in the country of the Eburones. The site of this famous camp has never been identified: but it was certainly east of the Meuse, and not far from Aix-la-Chapelle.<sup>2</sup> The garrison was commanded by Sabinus and Aurunculeius Cotta, the former of whom, as the senior officer, had the superior authority.<sup>3</sup> One legion only, under Roscius, was sent outside Belgic territory to the country of the Esumii, in Orne. Caesar fixed his headquarters at Samarobriua. In view of the prevailing discontent, he determined not to leave Gaul for the winter until the various camps were fortified.

About this time an incident occurred which Caesar may have regarded as a sign of a coming storm. His motto was *Divide et impera*. The Aedui and the Remi had both been faithful to him; and with the object of strengthening their influence and thereby diminishing the chances of revolt, he had always treated them with distinction. Moreover, he had elevated chiefs who had done him service to the thrones of their ancestors in states where monarchy had been overthrown by oligarchy; his object doubtless being not only to put a premium upon loyalty, but also to use the loyal as instruments for keeping the anti-Roman party in check. One of his nominees, Tasgetius, had, for three years, been king of the Carnutes, a tribe which dwelt in the country round Orléans and Chartres. How he used his power, we are not told: but soon after Caesar's return from Britain he was assassinated. Caesar instantly sent Plancus with his

*Divide et impera.*

Assassination of King Tasgetius, Caesar's nominee, by the Carnutes.

<sup>1</sup> See p. 717, n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 335-47.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 709.

54 B.C.

legion, to arrest all who were concerned in the deed, and to terrorise intending rebels.

Intrigues  
of Indutio-  
marus  
against  
Caesar.

All this time one chief in particular, whose pride Caesar had humbled, was busily intriguing against him. In the spring of every year he convened a diet of the Gallic chieftains, partly, it should seem, to test their temper, partly to fix the strength of the cavalry contingents which their respective tribes were to provide. Since the battle with the Nervii, the Treveri, whose cavalry had witnessed the desperate struggle of his legions, had refused to send their representatives; and it was said that they were intriguing with the Germans. Just before the second expedition to Britain, Caesar entered their country at the head of a strong force with the view of re-establishing his authority. Two chiefs, Cingetorix and Indutiomarus, were struggling for supremacy. Cingetorix at once presented himself before Caesar, promised fidelity to Rome, and gave full information of what was going on in the country. Indutiomarus collected levies, and prepared to fight. Many of the leading men, however, influenced by Cingetorix and appreciating the power of the legions, came into Caesar's camp and made terms for themselves. Indutiomarus soon found that he had miscalculated his strength, and hastened to excuse himself. Caesar, who had no time to spare, contented himself with taking hostages for his good behaviour. At the same time he of course did everything to strengthen the influence of his supporter; and Indutiomarus smarted under the feeling that his credit with his countrymen was gone. It is probable that during Caesar's absence he was concocting schemes of revenge. The isolation of the various camps gave him his opportunity. A few days after the legions had taken up their quarters he instigated Ambiorix and Catuvoleus, each of whom ruled one half of the country of the Eburones, to attack the camp of Sabinus and Cotta. Caesar was about two hundred miles away: the nearest camp, that of Cicero, at least forty-five miles: at Aduatuca there were barely six thousand legionaries, all told, and two thirds of them were recruits. Success seemed certain. Ambiorix and Catuvoleus, who had only just taken their quota of corn to the generals, mustered their tribesmen

in great force, surprised and overpowered a fatigue party, <sup>54 B.C.</sup> who were engaged in felling wood outside the camp, and then made a sudden onslaught upon the camp itself. But the camp was strongly fortified, and stood upon rising ground of great natural strength. The troops promptly manned the rampart: a squadron of Spanish horse made a successful sally; and the assailants fell back in discomfiture. Their leaders shouted out that they would like some one to come and talk over matters, so that all disputes might be peaceably settled. Two deputies accordingly were sent out to hear what they had to say. Three years before, Caesar had relieved Ambiorix from the burden of paying tribute to the Aduatuci, and had restored to him his son and nephew, whom they had detained as hostages. Ambiorix began by speaking of Caesar's kindness, and said that he was most anxious to prove his gratitude. He protested that he had not attacked the camp of his own free will, but simply because he could not resist the pressure put upon him by his tribesmen. Nor would they have stirred if they had not been forced to join in the national movement. His very weakness proved that he was speaking the truth. He was not such a fool as to imagine that his feeble levies could stand against the Romans. But the leading powers of Gaul were banded together to recover their independence; and on that very day all the Roman camps were to be simultaneously attacked. He most earnestly entreated Sabinus to be on his guard. A host of Germans had crossed the Rhine, and would be upon him in a couple of days. If the two generals would take his advice, they would abandon their camp at once, and make the best of their way to the quarters of Cicero or of Labienus. He would pledge his word that they should not be molested on the way. He would not merely be making some return for Caesar's kindness: it was to the interest of his people to be relieved from the burden of supplying the camp.

The Eburones, under Ambiorix, make a futile attack on the camp of Sabinus and Cotta.

Their leader, Ambiorix, advises Sabinus to withdraw to one of the nearer camps.

The deputies returned to camp, and reported what they had heard. Sabinus and Cotta were inclined to think that, whether Ambiorix were sincere or not in his professions of friendship, his warning was not to be despised. One thing was certain:—a single petty tribe like the Eburones would

The advice discussed in a council of war.

54 B.C.

never have dared to pit itself against the power of Rome unless it had been strongly supported. The tribunes and centurions of the first rank<sup>1</sup> were summoned to attend a council of war. It took place in the middle of the camp, in full view of the soldiers. Cotta spoke first. He argued that, without Caesar's express command, they had no right to leave the camp. Behind its defences they could defy any force that could be brought against them. Had they not already beaten off the enemy, and inflicted heavy loss upon them into the bargain? They were not pressed for supplies; and doubtless they would soon be relieved. Anyhow, nothing could be more unsoldierlike, more puerile, than to take a step fraught with the gravest issues, by the advice of an enemy.

Most of the officers warmly supported this view. But Sabinus was only irritated by their unanimity. Speaking loudly and passionately, he insisted that it was not a question of being guided by the advice of an enemy, but by hard facts. Caesar had doubtless gone back to Italy, or the Eburones would never have attacked them: so they need not expect help from him. The Rhine was close by. Both Germans and Gauls had many an old score, to wipe out; and they were naturally burning for revenge. The course which he recommended was safe either way. If the whole thing turned out to be a false alarm, then they risked nothing by going to the nearest camp. If, on the other hand, Gauls and Germans were really leagued against them, their one chance of safety was to retreat at once. To follow Cotta's advice would involve, at the best, the miseries of famine and blockade.

The dispute waxed warm. In spite of all that Sabinus could say, Cotta and the centurions remained inflexible. Sabinus rapidly lost all patience. Raising his voice so that the men might hear, "Have your own way," he shouted, "have your own way! Death has no terrors for me! These men will judge between us, and, if anything happens, they'll call you to account for it. If you would only let them, they could reach the nearest camp the day after to-morrow, and

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 571-83.

join hands with their comrades." The generals stood up. 54 B.C. Their friends crowded round them, took them by the hand, and entreated them not to quarrel. Go or stay, all would be well if only they could agree. The strife of words was prolonged till midnight. \* At length, overborne by the authority of his senior, Cotta gave up his point. All ranks were warned that they would have to quit the camp at dawn. The soldiers spent the small hours in looking over their belongings to see what they could carry away, and told each other that, after all, Sabinus was in the right. "They thought," wrote Caesar, "of every argument to persuade themselves that they could not remain without danger, and that the danger would be increased by their fatigue and their long spells of night duty."<sup>1</sup> The drivers had enough to do in loading their cattle. Everybody was too agitated to think of sleep.

In spite of the protests of Cotta, Sabinus decides to abandon the camp.

Meanwhile Ambiorix and his followers, hearing the hum of voices in the camp, concluded that the Romans had determined to follow their advice. Whether Sabinus intended to make for the camp of Labienus or for that of Cicero, the first stage of his route would be the same.<sup>2</sup> Ambiorix prepared to execute his plan.

Just as day was breaking, the Romans marched out of camp, in an extended column encumbered by a heavy baggage train. It seemed as if Sabinus had implicit confidence in the good faith of Ambiorix; for he could not have adopted a more dangerous formation. He had decided to make for the camp of Cicero.<sup>3</sup> After marching about two miles, the head of the column plunged into a defile shut in between wooded hills. Company after company tramped after. The last was just entering the valley when, rushing from the woods, the Gauls threw themselves upon the vanguard: the rear was hustled forward: before, behind, to right, to left, everywhere the enemy's masses were pouring down. Sabinus hurried about from place to place, and feebly attempted to make his dispositions. Cool and collected, Cotta did his best to rally the men; and, as the length of the column made it unmanageable, he agreed with his colleague to abandon the baggage,

The Romans march out.

They are surrounded by the Eburones;

<sup>1</sup> B. G., v. 31, § 5. See p. 710, *infra*.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 347.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 336-7

54 B.C.

and form in a hollow square.<sup>1</sup> It was perhaps the only course to adopt: yet the result was that the Romans lost heart, and the enemy were emboldened; for both knew that such an expedient could only have been resorted to by leaders who despaired. Rough soldiers were actually weeping: confusion was worse confounded; and many contrived to slip away, and ran to save their valuables in the baggage train while there was yet time. The Gauls on the other hand showed extraordinary steadiness; for their leaders told them they had only to win the battle, and they should have plunder to their hearts' content. Still the square remained unbroken. 'Now and again a cohort dashed out; and beneath their short swords many of the Gauls sank down. Ambiorix ordered his men to fall back some paces, and hurl their missiles from a safe distance. He reminded them that they were in good training, and with their light equipment could easily keep out of harm's way. If the Romans charged them, they were to retreat: when the Romans attempted to return to the square, they were to pursue. Maddened<sup>1</sup> by the volleys they were powerless to return,—for they had no slingers and no archers,—one cohort and then another charged. Back darted the nimble Gauls. The right flank of the Romans was exposed, and missiles rained in on their unshielded bodies. The moment the baffled cohort retired, the enemy swarmed all round it; and then followed a swift butchery. The rest stood shoulder to shoulder in the square: but now their courage was of no avail: the enemy would not come to close quarters; and stones and arrows made havoc in the dense ranks. Yet, facing such fearful odds, after seven hours' fighting, they still held out; and, as Caesar put it, throughout that trying time they did nothing unworthy of themselves. Quintus Lucanius, a centurion whom Caesar singled out for special mention, was killed in attempting to rescue his own son. Cotta himself was struck in the face as he was cheering on the men. The sun was sinking. The battle could only end in one way; and Sabinus, catching sight of Ambiorix as he was moving about in the enemy's ranks, sent his interpreter to ask for quarter. Ambiorix replied that

<sup>1</sup> The term "square" is used loosely. See note on *Orbis*, pp. 712-13.

Sabinus might come and speak to him if he liked: he would <sup>54 B.C.</sup> answer for his personal safety; and he hoped his men might be prevailed upon to be merciful. Sabinus asked Cotta to go with him: but Cotta, true to Roman traditions, said that nothing would induce him to treat with an armed enemy. Accordingly Sabinus and a few tribunes and centurions went out alone. They were told to lay down their arms. A parley followed; and Ambiorix purposely spun out what he had to say. While he was speaking, a number of Gauls crept stealthily behind Sabinus; and in a moment he fell dead. Then with a yell of triumph the Gauls rushed into the exhausted legion; and Cotta and the bulk of his men were destroyed. The rest fled for the camp. The standard-bearer, finding himself hotly pursued, flung his eagle inside the rampart, and died fighting like a Roman soldier. His <sup>and virtually annihilated.</sup> surviving comrades defended themselves till nightfall. Then, seeing that hope was gone, they fell upon each others' swords.

A handful of men, more fortunate than their comrades, had managed to escape into the woods. They made their way to the camp of Labienus, and told him the whole story.

Ambiorix instantly followed up his victory. Bidding his <sup>Ambiorix persuades the Nervii to join him in attacking Q. Cicero.</sup> infantry follow, he rode off westward with the horsemen. All that night and the day after he sped over the plateau of Herve and the plain of Hesbaye: just pausing to enlist the Aduatuci in the cause, he pressed on, and next day crossed the frontier of the Nervii. This people had not forgotten how their brethren had been slaughtered, three years before, on the banks of the Sambre. Ambiorix told the chiefs exultingly of his victory. Here was such a chance as they might never have again. Cicero's camp was close by. Why should they not do as he had done,—swoop down upon the solitary legion, win back their independence for good, and take a glorious revenge upon their persecutors. The chiefs caught at the suggestion. The small tribes that owned their sway flocked to join them: the Eburones, flushed with victory, were there to help; and the united host set out with eager confidence for the Roman camp. Their horsemen, hurrying on ahead, cut off a party of soldiers who were felling wood. Not the faintest rumour of the late disaster had reached



54 B.C.  
Siege of  
Cicero's  
camp.

Cicero; and the Gallic hordes burst upon him like a bolt from the sky. Their first onslaught was so violent that even the disciplined courage of the Romans barely averted destruction. Messengers were instantly despatched to carry the news to Caesar; and Cicero promised to reward them well if they should succeed in delivering his letters. Working all night with incessant energy, the legionaries erected a large number of wooden towers on the rampart. The Gauls, who meanwhile had been strongly reinforced, returned in the morning to the attack. They succeeded in filling up the trench: but the garrison still managed to keep them at bay. Day after day the siege continued; and night after night and all night long the Romans toiled to make ready for the morrow's struggle. The towers, of which only the framework had been finished, were furnished with stories and battlements: sharp stakes were made for hurling at the besiegers, and huge pikes for stopping their rush if they should attempt an assault. Even the sick and the wounded had to lend a hand. Cicero himself was in poor health: but he worked night and day; and it was not until the men gathered round him and insisted on his sparing himself, that he would take a little rest. Meanwhile the Nervian leaders, who had expected an easy triumph, were becoming impatient. They asked Cicero to grant them an interview. Some of them knew him personally; and they doubtless hoped that he would prove compliant. They assailed him with the same arguments that Ambiorix had found so successful with Sabinus. They tried to frighten him by describing the massacre at Aduatuca, and assured him that it was idle to hope for relief. But they would not be hard upon him. All they wanted was to stop the inveterate custom of quartering the legions for the winter in Gaul. If he and his army would only go, they might go in peace whithersoever they pleased. Cicero calmly replied that Romans never accepted terms from an armed enemy. They must first lay down their arms: then he would intercede for them with Caesar. Caesar was always just, and would doubtless grant their petition.

Disappointed though they were, the Gauls were not disheartened. They determined to invest the camp in a scien-

tific manner. From the experience of past campaigns they 54 B.C. had got a rough idea of the nature of Roman siege works; and now, with the quickness of their race, they proceeded to imitate them. Some prisoners who had fallen into their hands, gave them hints. Having no proper tools, they were obliged to cut the turf with their swords, and use their hands and even their cloaks in piling the sods: but the workers swarmed in such prodigious numbers that in three hours they had thrown up a rampart ten feet high<sup>1</sup> and nearly three miles in extent.<sup>2</sup> They then proceeded, under the guidance of the prisoners, to erect towers, and to make sappers' huts, ladders and poles fitted with hooks for tearing down the rampart of the camp. The huts, which were intended to protect the men who had to fill up the trench and demolish the rampart, were partially closed in front, and had sloping roofs, built of strong timbers, so as to resist the crash of any stones which might be pitched on to them, and probably covered with clay and raw hides, as a protection against fire.<sup>3</sup> On the seventh day of the siege there was a great gale. The besiegers took advantage of it to fling blazing darts and white-hot balls of clay,<sup>4</sup> which lighted on the straw thatch of the men's huts; and the wind-swept flames flew all over the enclosure. With a yell of exultation, the enemy wheeled forward their towers and huts, and planted their ladders: in another moment they were swarming up: but all along the rampart, their dark figures outlined against the fiery background, the Romans were standing, ready to hurl them down: harassed by showers of missiles, half scorched by the fierce heat, regardless of the havoc that the flames were making in their property, every man of them stood firm; and hardly one so much as looked behind. Their losses were heavier than on any previous day. The Gauls too went down in scores; for those in front could not retreat because of the masses that pressed upon them from behind. In one spot a tower was wheeled right up to the rampart. The centurions of the 3rd cohort coolly withdrew

<sup>1</sup> Including the palisade?

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 713-14.

<sup>3</sup> See Caesar, *B. C.*, ii, 10, and pp. 602-4, *infra*.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 714-15.

54 B.C.

their men, and with voice and gesture dared the Gauls to come on: but none dared stir a step: a shower of stones sent them flying; and the deserted tower was set on fire. Everywhere the result was the same. The assailants were the bravest of the Gauls: of death they had no fear: but they had not the heart to hurl themselves upon that living wall; and, leaving their slain in heaps, they sullenly withdrew.

Still the siege went on; and to the wearied and weakened legion its trials daily increased. Letters for Caesar were sent out in more and more rapid succession. Some of the messengers were caught in sight of the garrison, and tortured to death. There was, however, in the camp a Nervian named Vertico, who, just before the siege, had thrown himself upon the protection of Cicero, and had been steadfastly true to him. By lavish promises he induced one of his slaves to face the dangers which to the Roman messengers had proved fatal. The letter which he had to carry was inserted in the shaft of a javelin. He passed his countrymen unnoticed, made his way safely to Samarobriua, and delivered his despatch. None of the other messengers had arrived; and so close was the sympathy between the peasants and the insurgents that Caesar had not heard a rumour of the siege.

A messenger from Cicero carries a despatch to Caesar.

Caesar marches to relieve Cicero.

It was about four o'clock in the afternoon. Within a few minutes messengers were spurring to the camps in the surrounding country. Cissus was ordered to come in to Samarobriua at once, and take the General's place. It was most important to leave Samarobriua in safe keeping; for there were collected the hostages of the various states, the winter's supply of corn, the heavy baggage of the whole army,<sup>1</sup> and the General's papers and accounts. Fabius was to join Caesar on the road. A letter went to Labienus, expressing the hope that he would be able to march direct to the relief of the besieged camp: but this able officer was trusted to use his own discretion. Plancus and Roscius were too far off to be able to help. About nine o'clock next

<sup>1</sup> *Impedimenta exercitus* (B. G., v. 47, § 2). Perhaps the word "material" would be more accurate than "heavy baggage"; for the troops at Aduatuca, and doubtless also the legions in the other camps, had their heavy baggage with them. It is impossible to say with certainty what the *impedimenta*, to which Caesar alludes, was: but it may have included siege material.

morning, hearing that Crassus was close at hand, Caesar set <sup>54 B.C.</sup> out with Trebonius's legion and about four hundred cavalry. No baggage-train accompanied the column: the men carried all that they required upon their backs. The first march was more than eighteen miles. Fabius joined his chief on the way: but Labienus did not appear. An express came from him instead, from which Caesar learned, for the first time, the fate of Sabinus and Cotta. It is said that, in his first burst of grief and wrath, he swore that he would not shave his beard or cut his hair until he had avenged their deaths.<sup>1</sup> Labienus went on to say that he was himself hard pressed by the Treveri, and thought it foolhardy to leave his camp. Caesar approved his decision, though it left him with barely seven thousand men. Everything now depended upon speed. Passing through the Nervian territory, Caesar learned from some peasants who fell into his hands that Cicero's situation was all but desperate: immediately he wrote a letter in Greek characters, assuring him of speedy relief, and offered one of his Gallic horsemen a large reward to deliver it. He told him, in case he should not be able to get into the camp, to tie the letter to a javelin and throw it inside. Fearing that the Romans might take him for an enemy, the man did as Caesar had directed: but the javelin stuck in one of the towers, and remained unnoticed for two days. A soldier then found it and took it to Cicero, who read the letter to his exhausted troops. As they gazed over the rampart, they saw clouds of smoke floating far away over the west horizon, and knew that Caesar was approaching and taking vengeance as he came.

That night Caesar received a despatch from Cicero, warning him that the Gauls had raised the siege, and gone off to intercept him. Notwithstanding their heavy losses, they numbered, it was said, some sixty thousand men.<sup>2</sup> Caesar made known the contents of the despatch to the troops, and encouraged them to nerve themselves for the approaching struggle. A short march in the early morning brought the legions to a river, on the opposite bank of which the enemy

The Gauls abandon the siege, and march to encounter him.

<sup>1</sup> Suetonius, *Divus Iulius*, 67.

<sup>2</sup> See my essay on "The Credibility of Caesar's Narrative," p. 208.

54 B.C.

were encamped. Caesar had no intention of fighting a battle against such heavy odds on unfavourable ground. Cicero was in no danger; and he was therefore not pressed for time. He sent out scouts to look for a convenient place to cross the river. Meanwhile he marked out his camp on a slope, and constructed it on the smallest possible scale in the hope of seducing the enemy to attack him. But the enemy were expecting reinforcements, and remained where they were. At dawn their horsemen ventured across the river, and attacked Caesar's cavalry, who promptly retreated in obedience to orders. Sitting on their horses, the Gauls could see inside the camp. An attempt was apparently being made to increase the height of the rampart, and to block the gateways. There was every appearance of panic. Caesar had told his men what to do; and they were hurrying about the camp with a pretence of nervous trepidation. The enemy hesitated no longer; and in a short time they were all across the stream. They had to attack up hill: but that mattered nothing against such craven adversaries. Not even a sentry was standing on the rampart. Criers were sent round the camp to say that if any man cared to come out and join the Gauls, he would be welcome,—till ten o'clock. The gates looked too strong to be forced, though there was really only a mock barricade of sods, which could be knocked over in a moment. The Gauls walked right up to the ditch, and began coolly filling it up, and actually tearing down the rampart with their hands,—when from right and left and front the cohorts charged: there was a thunder of hoofs; and reeling backward in amazement before a rush of cavalry, they flung away their arms and fled.

Defeat of  
the Gauls.

Caesar joins  
Cicero.

About three o'clock that afternoon the legions reached Cicero's camp. With keen interest Caesar asked for details of the siege, and gazed with admiring wonder at the enemy's deserted works. When the legion was paraded, he found that not one man in ten was unwounded. Turning to Cicero, he heartily thanked him for the magnificent stand which he had made, and then, calling out, one by one, the officers whom he mentioned as having shown especial bravery, he addressed to them a few words of praise. From some

prisoners, who had served under Ambiorix, he gleaned details <sup>54 B.C.</sup> of the massacre at Aduatuca. Next day he again assembled the men, and described to them what had befallen their comrades. They must not, he said, be downhearted; for Providence and their own good swords had enabled them to repair the disaster.

Meanwhile the news of the relief had spread like wildfire. <sup>Immediate effects of his victory.</sup> Before midnight it was known in the neighbourhood of Labienus's camp, more than fifty miles away. A number of loyal Romans hurried to congratulate the general; and a shout of joy at the gates of his camp told him what had occurred. Indutiomarus, who was on the point of attacking him, beat a hasty retreat. A large force from the maritime tribes of Brittany and Normandy was advancing against the camp of Roscius, when an express came to warn them of Caesar's victory, and they precipitately fled.

But even Caesar could not undo the effect of the annihilation of a Roman legion. The Gauls lacked perseverance: <sup>Many of the nobles continue to intrigue.</sup> they wanted a great leader: but they had broken the spell of Roman success. Except among the Aedui and the Remi, there was hardly a chieftain in Gaul who did not dream of similar victories. Nocturnal meetings were held in secluded places; and embassies passed from tribe to tribe. As Caesar frankly remarked, it was all perfectly natural: the Gauls had once been the most dreaded warriors in the world, and to be forced to submit to Romans was most galling to their self-esteem. The state of affairs was so alarming that Caesar determined to break through his usual practice and spend the winter in Gaul. He ordered Fabius to return to his camp in the country of the Morini. His own quarters were at Samarobriua; and in the neighbourhood of that town he cantoned in three separate camps the legion of Cicero, that of Crassus, and the one with which he had gone to the relief of Cicero. He sent for all the chiefs who were in any way compromised, and when he had thoroughly frightened them by letting them know that he was aware of their intrigues, he tried to convince them that it was their interest to keep the peace. The bulk of the tribes were thus deterred from actually rebelling. The Senones, however, a powerful people

54 B.C.

Schemes of  
Indutio-  
marus.

occupying the country round Sens and Montargis, had the temerity to banish a king whom Caesar had set over them; and when he ordered their council to come to Samarobriua and answer for this outrage, they flatly refused to obey. But of all the malcontents the most daring and the most dangerous was Indutiomarus. Rebuffed by the German chiefs, who answered his appeals for aid by reminding him of the fate of Ariovistus and the Tencteri, he offered rewards to all the outlaws and exiles in Gaul who would join his standard. His prestige rapidly increased; and all the patriots began to look to him for guidance. He summoned the warriors of his own tribe to muster in arms at a stated place; and, in accordance with Gallic custom, the unhappy wretch who arrived last was tortured to death in sight of his comrades. Indutiomarus began by declaring Cingetorix a public enemy, and confiscating his possessions. He then addressed the assembly. His plan was to make a raid into the country of the Remi, and punish them for their desertion of the national cause: then to join the Carnutes and the Senones, and raise a revolt in the heart of Gaul. First of all, however, he determined to make one more attempt against Labienus. But the Roman general was too strongly posted to fear any attack: and he determined to make an end of Indutiomarus and his schemes. He called upon the neighbouring tribes to furnish him with cavalry, which were to arrive on a fixed date; and, like Caesar, he did his best to lure on the enemy by a pretence of fear. Their horsemen rode up to the camp, hurled missiles over the rampart, shouted every insulting epithet at the Romans, and challenged them to come out if they dared. Labienus would not allow his men to reply. The cavalry which he had summoned arrived punctually; and in the night they were secretly admitted into the camp. Caesar afterwards noted with admiration the extraordinary precautions which Labienus had taken to prevent a single man from going outside, lest the enemy should hear that he had been reinforced. Next day, as usual, Indutiomarus and his men spent their time in swaggering round the rampart and abusing the Romans. In the evening, when they were scattered and off their guard, two of the gates were opened:

He is out-  
witted by  
Labienus,  
defeated  
and slain.

the cavalry charged; and the astounded Gauls fled. Labienus <sup>53 B.C.</sup> gave orders that every one should pursue Indutiomarus, and him alone; and he promised a large reward to the man who should kill him. He was caught in the act of fording a river; and his head was cut off. Forthwith the assembled hands of the Nervii and Eburones dispersed; and for a time Gaul was comparatively still.

Only for a time, however. Caesar had reason to believe that the chiefs were hatching a more formidable conspiracy; and he saw that the best way to counteract it was to convince them that, whatever successes they might gain, the fighting strength of Italy was inexhaustible. He accordingly raised two new legions, and asked Pompey, with whom his relations were still amicable, to lend him a third. Rome, whither he must soon return, was convulsed by the throes of anarchy, and the civil war that was coming cast its shadow before: but it was necessary that he should shut out from his mind all distracting thoughts, and perfect his work in Gaul.

Peace did not last out the winter. The Treveri, in spite of the death of Indutiomarus, succeeded in persuading, by promises of gold, some of the more distant tribes of Germany to join them. The Nervii, the Aduatuci, the Menapii and the Eburones were all in arms: the Senones and the Carnutes were still defiant. But Caesar, as usual, was the first to strike. While it was still winter, he left Samarobri-  
 briva with four legions; made a sudden raid into the country of the Nervii; took numbers of prisoners before the bewildered tribesmen could either muster their forces or flee; drove away their herds, ravaged their lands and compelled the cowed chiefs to submit. When he convened his annual council at Samarobri-  
 briva in the early spring, every tribe except the Senones, the Carnutes and the Treveri, sent its representatives.<sup>1</sup> A rapid march southward so disconcerted the Senones that they surrendered at once, and begged the Aedui to intercede for them. The Carnutes, without waiting to be attacked, induced their overlords, the Remi, to do them a like service; and, as time pressed, Caesar accepted, without inquiry, the excuses of both peoples, took hostages

Caesar raises two new legions, and borrows a third from Pompey.

Continued troubles in north-eastern Gaul.

Caesar punishes the Nervii:

forces the Senones and Carnutes to submit;

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 384-5.



53 B.C.

and pre-  
pares to  
punish  
Ambiorix.

As a pre-  
liminary  
step, he  
crushes the  
Menapii.

for their good behaviour, and turned northward to deal with the Treveri and the Eburones. He had not forgotten the shame and the suffering which Ambiorix had brought upon his soldiers; and he was determined to inflict upon him a most signal and awful retribution.

The first step was to deprive him of his allies, the Menapii, the Treveri and the Germans. Caesar had ascertained that he did not intend to fight; and the object was to bar against him every way of escape. The Menapii, alone of all the Gallic tribes, had never formally submitted to Rome. During Caesar's first expedition to Britain, Sabinus and Cotta had mercilessly ravaged their lands: but it was impossible to follow them into their fastnesses. Caesar took his measures with extreme deliberation. He sent all the heavy baggage to Labienus, and at the same time reinforced him with a couple of legions. He then marched in overwhelming force against the Menapii. Without attempting to resist, they again took refuge in their forests and marshes: but this time they were not to escape. Caesar bridged the rivers, constructed causeways over the marshes, and threw three separate columns into their country; and when their flocks and herds were driven away, their villages ablaze, and prisoners taken by scores, they were constrained to surrender. Caesar left a body of horse to watch them under Commius, the king of the Atrebatas, who had done good service in Britain; and warning them, as they valued the lives of their hostages, to give no refuge to Ambiorix or his lieutenants, he pushed southward to deal with the Treveri. Before he could arrive, however, Labienus marched out to meet them, enticed them by a feigned flight across a river, and then, suddenly wheeling round, sent them flying into the woods. Their German allies, who had not had time to join them, returned home; and within a few days the whole tribe submitted. Their leaders fled the country; and Caesar's adherent, Cingetorix, was appointed chief magistrate.

Labienus  
disperses  
the Treveri.

Caesar  
again  
crosses the  
Rhine, and  
threatens  
the allies of  
Ambiorix.

About this time Caesar joined Labienus; and with the twofold object of punishing the Germans and preventing Ambiorix from seeking an asylum in their country, he again

threw a bridge across the Rhine, a little above the site of <sup>53 B.C.</sup> the former one. He left a force to hold the Gallic end of the bridge and keep the Treveri in awe. A few days later he was informed by the Ubii that the Suevi, who had been active in sending reinforcements against Labienus, were massing their warriors and warning their dependent tribes to send in their contingents. He immediately entrenched himself in a strong position, and ordered the Ubii to remove their stores from the open country into their strongholds, to drive in their cattle from the pastures, and to send out scouts to watch the enemy's movements. His hope was that finding themselves short of supplies, they might be enticed to venture a battle at a disadvantage: but the scouts, after a few days' absence, reported that the entire host had fallen back to the outskirts of a huge forest near the mountains of Thuringia. To follow them thither through a wild country, where little or no corn was to be had, would simply be to court destruction. There was nothing for it but to return. But, in order to keep the Germans in constant fear of a fresh invasion, he only destroyed that part of the bridge which touched their bank of the Rhine; built a wooden tower of four stories on its extremity; and detailed twelve cohorts<sup>1</sup> to hold the other end. [About 4000 men.]

And now, having made every preparation that fore-  
 thought could suggest, Caesar bent all his energies to destroy  
 Ambiorix. The road ran westward through the vast forest  
 of the Ardennes. An officer named Minucius Basilus was  
 sent on ahead with the cavalry. He was on no account to  
 allow any fires to be lighted in his camp, lest Ambiorix  
 should be warned of his approach. Caesar followed with  
 the infantry till he reached the deserted camp which, a few  
 months before, had witnessed the self-slaughter of the  
 remnant of Cotta's legion. The entrenchments were still  
 intact. There he left his heavy baggage, and one of the

Returning  
 unsuccessful to Gaul,  
 he marches  
 against  
 Ambiorix.

<sup>1</sup> Caesar makes no further mention of these cohorts, which were probably detachments from various legions; and I suppose that they were withdrawn from the Rhine before the army went into winter-quarters. Their services would certainly have been required in the seventh campaign. Guischart (*Mém. crit. et hist.*, t. iii., 1774, p. 32)\*conjectures that they were supernumeraries: but this is a mere guess.

53 B.C.

newly raised legions to guard it, under the command of Cicero. He promised to return at the end of a week, and charged his lieutenant on no account to allow a single man to venture out of camp until then. The army was divided into three corps, each consisting of three legions or, not counting auxiliaries, about ten thousand men. Labienus was sent to the northern part of the country of the Eburones, in the direction of the islands which bar the mouth of the Scheldt; and Trebonius to the south-western, in the direction of Huy. They were to harry the enemy's country, to ascertain his designs, and to return, if possible at the end of a week, to concert measures with Caesar for a final campaign. Caesar himself marched towards the lower Scheldt, in the hope of catching Ambiorix, who was said to have retreated to the extremity of the Ardennes.

The Ebu-  
rones keep  
up a  
guerilla  
warfare.

Meanwhile that unhappy chief was being driven, like a hunted animal, from lair to lair. Basilus and his cavalry, guided by some peasants whom they had caught in the fields, rode through a wood till they came to a cottage, in a small clearing, where he was said to be hiding: but his retainers gallantly flung themselves upon the Romans, while their chief threw himself on horseback and disappeared among the trees. Catuvolcus, the aged prince who had shared his counsels, was too infirm to bear the hardships of a hunted fugitive, and committed suicide. The Eburones were less civilised than their neighbours, and had no walled towns to retreat to. Ambiorix sent word over the country-side that every one must shift for himself. Many fled the country altogether: others dived into the recesses of the forest: others lurked in the marshes or the islets in the estuary of the Scheldt. Caesar found that there was no regular force to oppose him: but every glen, every bog, every clump of trees held its nest of armed skulkers. Massed in their cohorts and companies, the legionaries were powerless against such foes: the only way to get at them was to send out small flying parties in every direction. But in those narrow woodland tracks it was not easy for even the smallest party to keep together. The enemy knew every inch of the ground: they were wary; and they were desperate: and a few legionaries

who strayed in search of plunder were cut off and killed.<sup>53</sup> B.C. Always careful of his men's lives, Caesar was especially careful now, when their thirst for revenge tempted them to be rash.

In order to spare them as much as possible, he invited the surrounding tribes to come and destroy the Eburones, and enrich themselves with booty. He intended, as he tells us, "that Gauls should risk their lives in the forests, and not his legionaries, and at the same time to surround the Eburones with a mighty host, and, in requital for their signal villainy, to destroy them, root, branch and name."<sup>1</sup> Multitudes of eager plunderers were attracted by the prospect; and Caesar's old enemies, the Sugambri, actually crossed the Rhine with two thousand horse and their attendant light-armed footmen,<sup>2</sup> in the hope of sharing in the spoil. The wretched Eburones were captured by scores, and their cattle driven off. But the Sugambri were soon tempted by a richer prize. One of their captives told them that Caesar was far away, and they need not be afraid of him. Why should they not pounce upon Cicero's camp, and carry off all the stores and the loot which it contained?

It happened that on this very day Caesar was expected in the camp. But Cicero had heard nothing of or from him, and was beginning to fear that he would not be able to keep his promise. Hitherto he had carefully obeyed his instructions, and had not allowed a man to stir outside the rampart. But fresh rations were due: there were corn-fields within three miles of the camp: it was absurd to suppose that the persecuted Eburones would venture an attack so near; and besides it stung him to hear that the men were sneering at his caution. Accordingly he allowed half the legion, with a few convalescent veterans, who were under a separate command, two hundred cavalry and a number of slaves, to go out and cut corn. They were hardly out of sight, when a host of horsemen broke from an outlying wood, swept down upon the camp, and tried to burst in through the rear gate. The dealers who accompanied the army were massacred in their tents outside the rampart; and the

Caesar invites the neighbouring tribes to harry them.

The Sugambri surprise Cicero.

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 34, § 8.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 44, and *B. G.*, i. 48, §§ 5-7.

53 B.C.

cohort on duty barely sustained the first shock. The enemy spread round the camp, looking for an entrance; and it was all that the guards could do to prevent them from breaking through the gates. The commanding nature of the site and the strength of the fortifications forbade any attempt to enter elsewhere. Within, all was confusion and panic; and the superstitious recruits remembered with horror that, on the very spot where they stood, the soldiers of Cotta and Sabinus had perished. Even Cicero lost his presence of mind. But it happened that there was in the camp an invalided centurion, whose deeds of daring Caesar was never tired of extolling,—Sextius Baculus. Ill and weak, he had not tasted food for five days. As he lay in his tent, he heard the uproar, and walked out to see what was the matter. Without a moment's hesitation, he snatched sword and shield from the men close by, and planted himself in the nearest gateway. The centurions on guard rallied round him; and alone they kept the enemy at bay. Severely wounded, Sextius fell down in a faint, and was with difficulty rescued: but his splendid courage shamed the trembling recruits into action; and the camp was saved.

Meanwhile the foragers were on their way back. They heard the uproar. The cavalry rode on, and saw the enemy. The rest followed. The recruits had never seen a sword drawn in anger: there was no cover near; and they were simply confounded by the apparition. They looked passively to their officers for orders: but the bravest of their officers were for the moment unnerved. The Germans, descrying infantry and cavalry in the distance, took them for Caesar's legions and abandoned their attempt on the camp: but presently, seeing how few they had to deal with, rode off to attack them. The slaves, who had rushed up a knoll for refuge, were speedily dislodged, and, flying pell-mell into the maniples, increased their alarm. A hurried consultation was held. The recruits, in spite of all warnings, ended by clustering together on a ridge, where they fancied they might be safe. The handful of veterans who had accompanied the detachment kept their presence of mind, and saved themselves and those who had the sense to follow them by charging boldly

through the enemy's loose array. The recruits stood watching <sup>53 B.C.</sup> them in helpless hesitation. They could not make up their minds to stay where they were; and they knew that they could not follow the example of the veterans. At length they tried to reach the camp anyhow; and many of them were surrounded and slain. Those who escaped owed their lives to their centurions, who threw themselves upon the enemy, for a moment forced them back, and died, fighting to the last man.<sup>1</sup> The Germans rode away with the booty which they had left in the woods. Caesar's advanced guard reached the camp that night, and found the young soldiers almost beside themselves with panic. They were positive that the General himself and his army must have perished; and nothing could quiet them till they actually saw him arrive. But nobody knew better than he how much fortune has to do with war; and he contented himself with telling Cicero that he ought to have followed his instructions to the letter, and not have run the smallest risk.

One more effort was made to catch Ambiorix. Fresh <sup>Caesar ravages the country of the Eburones.</sup> plunderers from the surrounding tribes were hounded on by Caesar to hunt down his people and harry his land. Every hamlet, every building was burned down; everything worth plundering was carried off; and every ear of corn that was not sodden by the rain was devoured; for it was Caesar's deliberate intention that every man, woman and child who escaped the sword should perish of hunger. The soldiers knew that he had set his heart upon getting Ambiorix into his hands; and they made incredible exertions to win his favour. Cavalry in small parties scoured the country in pursuit of the king. From time to time they captured peasants, who declared that he was hardly out of sight. But, in spite of the desperate efforts of his exasperated <sup>Ambiorix eludes pursuit.</sup> pursuers, he was never caught. With four retainers, who would have suffered anything rather than betray him, he was lost in the dark recesses of the Ardennes.

The legions were distributed for the winter,—two on the <sup>The legions distributed for the winter.</sup> western frontier of the Treveri, two among the Lingones,

<sup>1</sup> Caesar does not tell us what became of the cavalry; but we may infer from *B. G.*, vi. 44, § 1, where he estimates his loss at two cohorts, that they escaped.

53 B.C. and the remaining six at Agedincum, now Sens, the chief town of the Senones. One other task Caesar had to perform before he started for Italy. He summoned a Gallic council to meet at Durocortorum, the modern Reims. An inquiry was held regarding the rebellion, which at the time he had necessarily condoned, of the Carnutes and the Senones. Acco, a Senonian chieftain, was convicted of having originated the movement; and, in accordance with Roman custom, he was flogged to death.<sup>1</sup>

Execution  
of Acco.

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 44. § 2, viii. 38, § 5; Suetonius, *Nero*, 49.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE REBELLION OF VERCINGETORIX

A STILLNESS that was not peace lay upon Gaul. \* Only half 52 B.C. subdued, the Celts were smarting under the shock of Caesar's scourge: their proud necks writhed beneath his yoke. News of the murder of Clodius reaches Gaul. Early in the new year a gleam of hope shone out. A rumour ran through Gaul that Rome was a prey to sedition. The notorious Clodius had been murdered by Milo and his bravoes. Furious riots followed. Temples were in flames, and streets ran with blood. The story was of course embellished by the eager imagination of the Gauls. They persuaded themselves that Caesar would be detained in Italy, and that his legions would be at their mercy. Meetings were held in the recesses of forests and other secluded places. Gaulic chiefs encouraged to conspire against Caesar. The death of Acco was keenly discussed. The formality of his execution seemed a sign that Caesar intended to make Gaul into a Roman province. Chieftains told each other that their own turn might come next. They must make a supreme effort to save their unhappy country. At one of these gatherings a definite plan was formed. The great object was to prevent Caesar from rejoining his legions. The conspirators persuaded themselves that there would be no difficulty in doing this; for the generals who commanded the legions would not venture to leave their quarters in Caesar's absence, and Caesar could not make his way to the legions for want of a sufficient escort. The question was put:—who would take his life in his hand, and strike the first blow for fatherland and freedom? He might count upon receiving a liberal reward. The chiefs of the Carnutes instantly responded to the appeal. All they asked was a



52 B.C. solemn assurance that their brother chiefs would not leave them in the lurch. Loud applause followed. Making a sheaf of their standards,—a Gallic ceremony of the gravest import,—the assembled chiefs swore to be true to their countrymen; and a date was fixed for the insurrection to begin.

The Carnutes massacre Roman citizens at Cenabum. Cenabum, one of the chief towns of the Carnutes, stood upon the site now occupied by Orléans.<sup>1</sup> It was thus fitted to be the depot for the grain that came from the plain of La Beauce, and down the Loire from the fertile Limagne d'Auvergne. Some Roman merchants were settled there, and one of Caesar's commissariat officers. When the appointed day came round, a band of the Carnutes, led by two desperadoes, Gutuatrus and Conconnetodumnus, rushed into the town, massacred the Romans, and plundered their stores. The tidings sped swiftly through the length and breadth of Gaul; for whenever an important event occurred, the bystanders made it known by loud shouts, and those who heard them passed on the cry over the country side. When Cenabum was attacked, it was just sunrise. By eight o'clock that night the news, flying from man to man, had reached the country of the Arverni,—the modern Auvergne,—a hundred and forty miles to the south.<sup>2</sup>

The news reaches the Arverni.

Gergovia. Gergovia, the chief town of this people, was situated on a mountain, some two thousand four hundred feet above the sea, about eight miles south-east of the Puy de Dôme. It was equally fitted for a place of refuge and for a capital. Streamlets watered the meadows which compassed it round: forage was abundant; and the town commanded a view ranging over a vast tract. Four miles to the north appeared the gently sloping eminence above which now soar the sombre lava spires of Clermont cathedral: the vast plain of the Limagne, watered by the Allier and backed by the distant range of the Forez, extended on the north-east: above wooded hills and valleys on the west, its summit, crowned by the holiest sanctuary of Gallic worship,<sup>3</sup> towered the huge blunt cupola of the Puy de Dôme; and all around, as far as

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 402-15.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 721-2.

<sup>3</sup> See an interesting article in the *Revue historique*, xxxvi., 1888, pp. 1-28.

the eye could reach, rose the cones of the volcanic land where <sup>52 B.C.</sup> the Arvernian mountaineers had made their home.

At that time there was living in the town a young noble named Vercingetorix. His father, Celtillus, had been the most powerful chief in Gaul: but he had tried to restore the detested monarchy, and had paid for his ambition with his life. A Celt of the Celts, brave, impulsive, chivalrous to a fault, Vercingetorix possessed also, in a fuller measure than any of the patriots who arose before him, the gift of personal magnetism. He called his retainers together, and told them his plans. Their passions were easily inflamed. The government, however, had always adhered to Caesar. The leading men regarded the movement as quixotic, and ordered the young chief to leave the town. But Vercingetorix persevered. He took into his pay all the outcasts and desperadoes in the district. He went from village to village, and harangued the people; and all who listened caught the fire of his enthusiasm. At the head of his levies he returned to Gergovia, and banished the chiefs who had lately banished him. His adherents saluted him as king. He sent out his envoys in all directions: soon nearly every tribe in western Gaul from the Seine to the Garonne joined the movement; and the impressionable Celts, recognising Vercingetorix as the man of destiny who was to save their country, unanimously bestowed upon him the chief command. He levied from each state a definite quota of troops and of hostages, and ordered each to manufacture a definite quantity of weapons by a fixed day. He knew that the tribal militiamen would be of little use except for guerilla warfare, and therefore devoted all his efforts to strengthening his cavalry. Waverers and laggards he soon brought to their senses by ruthless severity. Torture or the stake punished grave breaches of discipline; while minor offenders were sent home, with their ears lopped off or an eye gouged out, to serve as a warning to their neighbours. These methods were effective. An army was speedily raised; and the bulk of the Celtic patriots were united, for the first time, under one great leader.

It must not, however, be supposed that even now the movement was general. The Aedui, jealous of their old

Vercingetorix, notwithstanding the opposition of the Arvernian government, rouses popular enthusiasm for rebellion.

Most of the tribes between the Seine and the Garonne join him, and elect him Commander-in-Chief.

How he raised an army.

The dissentient tribes.

52 B.C.

rivals, the Arverni, and not prepared to break with Caesar, still kept aloof: the tribes who looked up to them remained passive. The Aquitanians naturally took no heed of what was going on among the aliens beyond the Garonne. The Belgae had been terribly punished for their late rebellion; and either for this reason or because they were jealous of their Celtican neighbours, they left them alone. It remained to be seen whether Vercingetorix would be able, by the spell of his personality, or by the victories which he might gain, to rouse the whole people into united action.

The Bituriges join Vercingetorix.

His first step was to send a chief, named Lucterius, the most daring of his lieutenants, to deal with the Ruteni, who dwelt in the district, bordering on the Roman Province, which is now called Aveyron. He himself marched northward, with the remainder of the force, into the great plain of the Berri, which belonged to the Bituriges. This people at once sent envoys to the Aedui, whose supremacy they recognised, to ask for help. The Aedui, acting on the advice of Caesar's generals, sent a force of infantry and cavalry to their assistance. The force marched to the banks of the Loire, which separated the two peoples, halted there for a few days, and then returned. They excused themselves to the Roman generals, on the plea that they had had reason to fear that, if they crossed the river, the Bituriges would combine with the Arverni to surround them. Caesar could never find out whether their plea was true or false. Directly after they had turned their backs the Bituriges threw in their lot with Vercingetorix.

Caesar returns with recruits to the Province.

By the time that the news of the rebellion reached Italy, Rome, in the strong hands of Pompey, was quieting down; and Caesar was able to start for Gaul without delay. He took with him a number of recruits, whom he had raised in Cisalpine Gaul, to repair the losses of the late campaigns.

How shall he rejoin his legions?

His first difficulty, on arriving in the Province, was to rejoin his army. The legions were quartered at Agedincum, on the plateau of Langres, and in the neighbourhood of Trèves, two hundred miles and more to the north. If he were to send for them, they would be compelled to fight a battle as they marched southwards; and he was unwilling to trust the issue

to his lieutenants. On the other hand, it would be foolhardy <sup>52 B.C.</sup> for him, with only a slender escort, to attempt to make his way to them. Even the Aedui were believed to be untrustworthy; while Lucterius had just won over the tribes [The Ruteni, Nitiobriges, and Gabali.] between the Garonne, the Dordogne and the Cevennes, and, having raised fresh levies, was threatening to cross the Tarn and descend upon the opulent city of Narbo. Caesar saw [Narbonne.] that before all things it was necessary to safeguard the Province. Hastening to Narbo, he assured the anxious provincials that there was no cause for alarm, and posted detachments, drawn from the troops who garrisoned the Province, in the surrounding country and also in the districts round Toulouse, Albi and Nîmes. Having thus checkmated Lucterius, he went to join his new levies, which had been ordered to concentrate in the country of the Helvii, a Provincial tribe who dwelt in the Vivarais, on the eastern side of the Cevennes. He now saw his way to reach the army. Beyond the Cevennes lay the country of Vercingetorix,—undefended, for Vercingetorix was in the Berri, a hundred miles away. But the mountain track was buried beneath snow; and no one had ever before attempted the journey under such conditions. Nevertheless Caesar advanced. Moving up the valley of the Ardèche, he made for the watershed between the sources of the Allier and the Loire.<sup>1</sup> By prodigious efforts the men shovelled aside the snow; and the Arverni, who had never dreamed that any one would venture to cross their mountain barrier, were astounded to see the Romans descending into the plains. Caesar's horsemen swept over the country in small parties, carrying fire and sword. The news soon spread; and Vercingetorix, yielding to the entreaties of his tribesmen, hurried to the rescue. This was just what Caesar had anticipated. Now that the rebel army was out of the way, he might, with comparative safety, travel northward to join his legions; and so confident was he in the soundness of his forecast that, before he learned that Vercingetorix had commenced his march, he acted as though he had done so. He left Decimus Brutus, who had commanded in the sea fight

He rescues the Province from a threatened invasion:

crosses the Cevennes, invades Auvergne, and forces Vercingetorix to come to its relief:

<sup>1</sup> See *Archæological Journal*, xviii., 1861, p. 369, and Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 244.

52 B.C.

then seizes  
the oppor-  
tunity to  
rejoin his  
legions.

[Early in  
March ?]

Vercinge-  
torix  
besieges  
Gorgobina  
[St. Parize-  
le-Châtel ?]

Caesar  
marches  
from  
Agedincum  
(Sena) to  
relieve  
Gorgobina :

with the Veneti, to occupy the enemy's attention ; and for fear his design might get abroad, he announced that he was only going to procure reinforcements, and would be back in three days. Then, recrossing the Cevennes, he hastened to Vienna on the Rhône ; picked up there a body of cavalry, which he had sent on from the Province to wait for him ; pushed on up the valley of the Saône as swiftly as horses could carry him, hoping to elude the Aedui, in case they were hostile ; rejoined the legions which he had left near Langres ; and, before Vercingetorix knew where he was, concentrated the whole army in the neighbourhood of Agedincum.<sup>1</sup>

Vercingetorix, however, quickly recovered from this surprise. In the south of Nièvre, near the confluence of the Allier and the Loire,<sup>2</sup> there was a town called Gorgobina, belonging to the Boii, whom, it will be remembered, Caesar had placed in dependence upon the Aedui. To strike at Caesar's allies would be equivalent to striking at Caesar himself. Vercingetorix accordingly prepared to besiege the stronghold. Again Caesar was in a dilemma. If he left Gorgobina to its fate, the tribes that still remained loyal would conclude that he could not be relied upon to protect his friends, and would therefore probably join the rebels. If, on the other hand, he undertook a campaign so early in the year, the army would be in danger of starving ; for, owing to the severity of the weather, it was very difficult to transport supplies. But anything was better than to lose the confidence of his allies. He must trust to the Aedui to supply him with corn. Leaving two legions at Agedincum to guard his heavy baggage,<sup>3</sup> and sending messengers to tell the Boii that he was coming and encourage them to hold out, he marched for Gorgobina. Instead, however, of taking

<sup>1</sup> Caesar does not tell us what became of Brutus after he had fulfilled his mission. Probably he retreated to the Province. He took part in the operations at Alesia,—the closing scene of the campaign.

<sup>2</sup> See note on GORGOBINA, pp. 426-32, *infra*.

<sup>3</sup> The recruits, who had been temporarily left behind with Brutus in the country of the Arverni, were ordered to march to Agedincum, though Caesar does not say so, doubtless to learn their drill ; for Labienus left them there when he started on his campaign against the Parisii and the Senones. See p. 128, and *B. G.*, vii. 57, § 1.

the direct route southward, he intended to go round by way <sup>52 B.C.</sup> of Cenabum; for, although time was precious, it was of paramount importance to punish, first of all, the people who had been the first to rebel, and who, by the massacre of Roman citizens, had outraged the majesty of Rome.<sup>1</sup> He had reinforced his Gallic and Spanish cavalry by four hundred Germans, whose value he had doubtless recognised in the campaign against the Usipetes and Tencteri. At the close of the second day's march he laid siege to Vellaunodunum, a stronghold of the Senones, probably on the site of the modern Montargis, in order to avoid leaving an enemy in his rear, and to facilitate the transport of his supplies. In three days the place surrendered, and, leaving Trebonius to disarm the inhabitants and take hostages for their good behaviour, he pushed on for Cenabum. The road crossed the great forest of Orléans; and Caesar accomplished the distance in two long marches. It was evening when he arrived,—too late to begin the siege: but the troops at once began to make the necessary preparations. The Loire was spanned by a bridge, the northern end of which could only be reached from within the town. The Carnutes, who had expected that Vellaunodunum would hold out longer, were not prepared for resistance, and tried to escape in the night over the bridge: but Caesar, foreseeing their attempt, had kept two legions under arms: the gates were instantly fired, and the town seized; and, as the thronging masses were struggling forward through the narrow streets, the legions fell upon them, and almost all were taken prisoners. The booty was given up to the soldiers: the town was set ablaze; and the army passed over the bridge, and pushed on to relieve Gorgobina. Noviodunum, which lay on their line of march, promptly surrendered. The cavalry of Vercingetorix, who had hurriedly raised the siege of Gorgobina, appeared in time to risk a battle for its recovery: but they scattered before the charge of the German squadron; and Caesar marched southward for Avaricum, the capital of the

captures  
Vellauno-  
dunum :

captures  
and  
punishes  
Cenabum :

crosses the  
Loire, and  
captures  
Novio-  
dunum  
[Villate,  
near  
Neuvy-sur-  
Baran-  
geon ?] :

<sup>1</sup> This seems a sufficient explanation of Caesar's having made a *détour* (see my note on CENABUM, pp. 406-7). But it is also possible that, if there were any bridges over the Loire above Cenabum, Vercingetorix had destroyed them.

52 B.C. Bituriges, now occupied by the famous cathedral city of  
and Bourges.

marches to So far Vercingetorix had met with a succession of disasters.  
besiege But his spirit was indomitable, and he knew how to learn  
Avaricum. from experience. He saw that the war must be conducted  
on a totally different principle. Nothing was to be gained  
Vercinge- by defending towns which could offer no resistance; and it  
torix per- was hopeless to encounter the Romans in the open field.  
suades the But he had thousands of light horse who could scour the  
Bituriges country and cut off their supplies. The grass was not yet  
and other grown, nor the corn ripe; and Caesar could only replenish his  
tribes to stores by sending out detached parties to rifle the granaries.  
burn their Vercingetorix called his officers together, and told them his  
towns and plans. They must hunt down the Roman foragers wherever  
granaries. they could find them, and attack the baggage train. They  
must make up their minds to sacrifice their own interests  
for the national weal. Every hamlet, every barn where the  
enemy could find provender must be burned to the ground.  
Even the towns must be destroyed, save those which were  
impregnable, lest they should tempt men who ought to be in  
the field to go to them for shelter, and lest the Romans  
should plunder their stores. This might sound very hard:  
but it would be far harder for them to be slain while their  
wives and children were sold into slavery; and, if they were  
beaten, this would inevitably be their doom. This uncom-  
promising speech was greeted with unanimous applause.  
For such a leader men would consent to any sacrifice.  
Within a single day more than twenty villages in the Berri  
were burned down. All round the great plain, wherever  
the Romans looked, the sky was aglow. The wretched in-  
habitants told each other that they were going to win, and  
would soon recover what they had lost. But Vercingetorix  
could only govern by character and tact. He had not the  
powers belonging to the general of an established common-  
wealth. He might venture to be severe: but he could not  
afford to lose his popularity. The question was raised,  
whether Avaricum should be defended, or destroyed like the  
lesser towns. The Bituriges were not restrained by the  
sense of discipline. Their spokesmen eloquently pleaded

The Bitu-  
riges, con-  
trary to  
his advice.  
resolve to  
defend  
Avaricum.

their cause. Their capital was the finest town almost in the <sup>52 B.C.</sup> whole of Gaul. Besides, its position was so strong that they could easily defend it. Vercingetorix strongly opposed their appeal: but they pleaded so pathetically, and their brother chiefs showed such sympathy with them, that he was obliged to give way. Following Caesar by easy stages, he finally halted about fourteen miles from Avaricum, on a strong position, from which he could communicate with the garrison and harass the besiegers.

Avaricum was surrounded, on every side except the <sup>Siege of Avaricum.</sup> south, by marshes intersected by sluggish streams. On the south it was approached by a natural causeway, which, about a hundred yards from the wall, suddenly shelved down so as to form a kind of huge moat.<sup>1</sup> Behind this neck of land Caesar pitched his camp. As the marshes rendered it impossible to invest the town, he proceeded to construct a terrace, by which picked troops were ultimately to advance to the assault. The flanking parts were to serve as viaducts, to carry the towers in which artillery were placed; and it is probable that the platform intended for the columns of assault occupied only the front portion of the intervening space. First of all, in order to provide a secure foundation, the ground was cleared of obstructions and levelled as far as possible by men working under stout huts.<sup>2</sup> The sides of each viaduct were constructed of parallel tiers of logs, the interstices between which were probably packed with earth and rubble. The workmen brought up the material through lines of sheds, which, being contiguous to one another and open at both ends, formed covered galleries; and they were further protected in front by a fence of high wooden shields moving on rollers. Between the walls of timber, which served as lateral supports, they built up the core of the viaduct, which was composed of earth, stones and timber. The artillerymen who manned the tower kept their catapults playing upon the defenders of the wall. As the structure rose daily higher, the elevation of the tower was correspond-

<sup>1</sup> See Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 255, and Planche 20.

<sup>2</sup> See Stoffel, *Hist. de Jules César. — Guerre civile*, ii. 357, and Caesar, *B. C.*, ii. 2, § 4.



52 B.C.

ingly augmented.<sup>1</sup> When the viaduct was completed, the tower could be moved backwards or forwards along the surface; while the sheds were ranged on either side, and served as a means of safe communication. The central mound was probably raised higher than the other two,<sup>2</sup> in order to facilitate the assault; and sheds were placed upon it also, to screen the assailants from observation and attack.

Meanwhile the new policy of Vercingetorix was beginning to make itself felt. His scouts kept him informed of Caesar's movements, and conveyed his instructions to the garrison. Whenever the Romans went out to forage or procure corn, his horsemen kept them in sight, and handled them severely if they ever ventured to disperse. Caesar did all that ingenuity could suggest to baffle him, sending the men out at odd times and in varying directions: but the enemy seemed ubiquitous. Supplies were running short, and Caesar called upon the Aedui and the Boii for corn; but the Aedui were half-hearted; and the Boii, though they did their best, had little to give. For several days the soldiers had no bread, and were obliged to kill the cattle, driven in from distant villages, in order to subsist at all. Yet, as Caesar proudly related, not one of them uttered a word that was unworthy of their own victorious record or of the majesty of the Roman people. Caesar went among them as they worked, and did all he could to keep up their spirits. He would abandon the siege, he told them, if they found the pangs of hunger too hard to bear. But they would not hear of such a thing. They proudly reminded him that they had fought under his command for six years with untarnished honour; and they would cheerfully endure any hardship if only they could avenge the massacre at Cenabum.

Vercingetorix, when his provender was consumed, moved some miles nearer the town. It was reported that he had left his infantry in their new encampment, and gone with his cavalry to lie in wait for the Roman foragers in the place

<sup>1</sup> See p. 600.

<sup>2</sup> Forming what is technically called a "cavalier." See my note on "The Agger," pp. 597-600.

where he expected that they would be found on the following <sup>52 B.C.</sup> day. Caesar saw his opportunity, and marched at midnight to attack the encampment. But the enemy were well served by their scouts. They removed their waggons and baggage out of harm's way into the recesses of a wood; and in the early morning Caesar found them securely posted on a hill surrounded by a belt of morass, not more than fifty feet wide. They had broken down the causeways which spanned the morass, and posted piquets opposite the places where it was fordable. The legionaries clamoured for the signal to advance: but Caesar told them that victory could only be purchased by the slaughter of many gallant men, and that their lives were more precious to him than his own reputation.

Vercingetorix, on returning to the encampment, was accused of treachery. His officers told him to his face that he would never have left them without a leader, exposed to that well timed attack, if he had not intended to betray them. He ought never to have moved from his original position. It was plain enough that he wanted to reign as Caesar's creature, not by the choice of his countrymen. Vercingetorix was at no loss for an answer. He had moved, he reminded them, at their own request, simply in order to get forage. They had not been in the slightest danger; for the position in which he had left them was impregnable. He had purposely refrained from delegating his command to any one, for fear they should worry his substitute into risking a battle; for he knew that they had not resolution enough to adhere to a system of warfare which required patient toil. They ought to be thankful that the Romans had tried to attack them, because they could now see for themselves what cowards the Romans were. He had no need to beg Caesar for a kingdom which he could win for himself by the sword; and they might take back their gift if they imagined that they were doing him a favour, and not indebted to him for their safety. "And now," he said, "that you may satisfy yourselves that I'm speaking the truth, listen to what the Romans themselves say." Some camp-followers, whom he had captured a few days before, stepped forward. They had been carefully drilled in the part they were to play. Questioned

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by Vercingetorix, they stated that they were Roman soldiers, and had secretly left the camp in the hope of finding something to eat; that their comrades, one and all, were half-starved, and too weak to get through their work; and that Caesar had made up his mind, unless 'within three days he had achieved some tangible results, to abandon the siege. "You see," said Vercingetorix, "I,—I whom you call a traitor, —have brought this mighty army, without the loss of a drop of your blood, to the verge of starvation. No course is open to them but an ignominious retreat; and I have arranged that not a single tribe shall give them refuge." Clashing their weapons, as their custom was, the tribesmen swore that Vercingetorix was the greatest of generals and that they would trust him through thick and thin. They realised how much was staked upon the safety of Avaricum; and ten thousand picked men were sent into the town. But jealousy had much to do with this decision. If the Bituriges succeeded in holding the fortress unaided, the glory of the triumph would be theirs.

In devising expedients to baffle the operations of the besiegers, the Gauls showed astonishing ingenuity. The wall, compacted with transverse balks and longitudinal beams of timber, was too tough, so to speak, to be breached by the battering ram; and, being also largely composed of stone and rubble, it was proof against fire.<sup>1</sup> The Roman engineers used powerful hooks, riveted to stout poles, to loosen and drag down the stones. These hooks the garrison seized with nooses; and then, by means of windlasses, pulled them up over the wall. They made daily sorties, fired the woodwork of the terrace, and harassed the workers by frequent attacks. They erected towers along the wall, in imitation of those of the besiegers, and filled them with archers and slingers. They drove galleries under the terrace, and dragged away the timber of which it was composed; and, assailing the Roman sappers with sharp stakes, heavy stones and boiling pitch, they stopped the galleries by which they were approaching to undermine the wall.<sup>2</sup>

The siege had lasted twenty-five days; and, in spite of

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 729-31.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 595-7.

numbing cold and drenching rains and harassing opposition, 52 B.C. the indefatigable Romans had built up the terrace, three hundred and thirty feet wide and eighty feet high,<sup>1</sup> till it almost reached the wall. To complete the final section of the work was always a difficult and troublesome operation. It was no longer possible to rear a compact and uniform structure, as the enemy, standing right above on the wall, could pitch heavy stones and other missiles on to the workmen. Huts of extraordinary strength, the sloping roofs of which were protected against fire by bricks, clay and raw hides, were therefore placed near the edge of the terrace; and, screened by them, the men shot earth, timber and fascines into the vacant space until the mass reached the necessary height.<sup>2</sup> About midnight, when the men were putting the finishing touches to the work, a cloud of smoke was seen rising above it. Some miners had burrowed underneath, and set the woodwork on fire. A yell of exultation rang from the town. Flaming brands shot down from the wall and illumined the figures standing above: pitch and logs were flung on to the fire; and the enemy's masses came streaming through the gates. If the Romans were confused, it was only for a moment. Caesar himself was on the spot; for he had been personally superintending the workmen. Two legions were always kept under arms in front of the camp, ready for emergencies; and while some cohorts threw themselves upon the enemy, others drew back the towers out of reach of the flames or dragged asunder the woodwork of the terrace to save the hinder part of it from catching fire; others again ran to extinguish the flames. The small hours dragged by; and in the grey dawn the battle was still raging. The mantlets that screened the workmen who moved the towers had been burned; and it was therefore hazardous to wheel the towers to the front.<sup>3</sup> More than once it seemed that the Gauls were winning; and Caesar himself was moved to admiration by their stubborn valour. He saw a man taking lumps of fat and pitch from his comrades, and flinging

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 731-2.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 600 and 602-4, and Stoffel, *Hist. de Jules César,—Guerre civile*, ii. 359.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 605.

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them into the flames. A missile struck him; and he fell dead. Another man stepped across his prostrate body, and took his place. He too was struck: but in a moment a third was doing his work, and presently a fourth; and, though others had to die, the post was never deserted until the Romans finally extinguished the flames, and the Gauls, beaten at every point, were forced back into the town.

Vercingetorix knew that it was useless now to prolong the defence. He therefore sent word to the garrison to slip out in the dark and come to his camp. They were confident that the marshes would prevent the Romans from getting at them. Night came on; and the men, gathered in the streets and open places, were just starting. Suddenly there was a rush of women: weeping, they flung themselves at their husbands' feet, and besought them not to abandon them and the children who belonged to father and mother alike to the vengeance of the Romans. Deaf to their entreaties, the men pressed on. Frantic with terror, the women screamed and gesticulated, to put the besiegers on their guard; and the men were obliged to give way.

Storming of  
Avaricum.

Next day Caesar completed the repair of the terrace, and moved forward one of the towers. Rain fell in torrents; and noticing that the sentries on the wall were posted carelessly, he determined to deliver the assault. The workmen were told to loiter, in order to put the garrison off their guard. The troops were concealed within and in the rear of the sheds which stood upon the terrace.<sup>1</sup> Caesar harangued them, and promised rewards to those who should be the first to mount the wall. The artillerymen in the tower made play with their engines, to give their comrades every chance.<sup>2</sup> The signal was given. Instantly the columns, darting forth from their cover, streamed over the front of the terrace and swarmed up the ladders; and, panic-stricken and confounded, the defenders were overborne and driven down on to the space below. Quickly rallying, they formed up in compact wedge-shaped masses, resolute to fight it out if they should be

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 732-3.

<sup>2</sup> See *B. G.*, vii. 27, § 1; Stoffel, *Hist. de Jules César.—Guerre civile*, ii. 361; and Guischart, *Mém. mil. sur les Grecs et les Romains*, ii. 7.

attacked. But the Romans were too wary to attack them. <sup>52 B.C.</sup> They lined the wall all round; and not a man of them would come down. Throwing away their weapons, the Gauls ran for their lives through the town to its furthest extremity; and there many, jostling one another in the narrow gateways, were slaughtered, while others, who shouldered their way out, were cut down by the cavalry. Plunder was forgotten. Exasperated by the long weariness of the siege, burning to avenge the massacre at Cenabum, the Romans slew the aged, they slew women and infants, and spared none. Some forty thousand human beings,—all but eight hundred who made their way to the camp of Vercingetorix,—perished on that day.

Indiscrimi-  
nate mas-  
sacre.

It was late at night when the fugitives approached the camp. Vercingetorix had a turbulent host to control. They were not a regular army, but an aggregate of tribal levies, each commanded by their tribal chiefs. He had reason to fear that the pitiable plight of the fugitives might excite their emotions, and lead to disturbance and subversion of discipline. He therefore sent out his trusted friends and the leading men of the several tribes to which the fugitives belonged, who waited for them on the road, and conducted them in separate groups to their several quarters in the camp.

Next day Vercingetorix called the remnant of his people together, and made them a speech. The Romans, he said, had not beaten them in fair fight. They had merely stolen an advantage over them by superior science. As they all knew, he had never approved of defending Avaricum. But he would soon repair the loss. He would gain over all the dissentient tribes to the cause; and against an united Gaul the whole world could not stand in arms. Meanwhile he had a right to expect that in future they should adopt the Roman custom of regularly fortifying their camps.

Vercinge-  
torix con-  
soles his  
troops.

This speech made an excellent impression. The multitude could not but admire the cheery courage of their leader: they could not but admit that the event had proved his foresight. They respected him too because he had had the courage to confront them in the hour of defeat, when another leader might not have dared to show his face. So

52 B.C. far then from lessening, the disaster only increased the estimation in which he was held.

He raises  
fresh levies.

He immediately set to work to fulfil his promise. Agents, chosen for their eloquence and tact, bore lavish bribes and still more lavish promises to the dissentient chiefs. New weapons and new clothing were provided for the survivors of the siege. New levies, including large numbers of bowmen, were speedily raised; and Teutomatus, king of the Nitiobriges, who occupied the country round Agen, hastened to join Vercingetorix with his own cavalry and with others whom he had hired from the Aquitanians. Thus the losses which had been incurred at Avaricum were made good; while those who had already fought under Vercingetorix had learned a salutary lesson, and, in spite of their natural laziness and impatience of discipline, were in the humour to do or to suffer whatever he might command.

Caesar, at  
the request  
of the  
Aedui,  
decides be-  
tween rival  
claimants  
for the  
office of  
Vergobret.

The hungry Romans found an abundance of corn in Avaricum; and Caesar remained there a few days to recruit their strength. Winter was just over: and he was about to open his campaign in earnest. The Gauls, in their new-born zeal, had entrenched their camp; and he was too prudent to attack their strong position: but he hoped either to lure them into the open or else to blockade and force them to surrender. Suddenly his attention was distracted by serious news from the Aedui. Two chiefs, Cotus and Convictolitavis, were contending for the first magistracy, each insisting that he had been legally elected: their retainers were up in arms; and a civil war was imminent. A deputation of leading men begged Caesar to arbitrate. He saw that it was of vital importance to prevent the weaker side from appealing for aid to Vercingetorix. Accordingly, though he was most reluctant to delay his operations, he summoned the rivals and the council to meet him at Decetia, or Décize, on the Loire. This town was in Aeduan territory, and nearly sixty miles from Avaricum: but it was illegal for the Vergobret to cross the frontier; and Caesar was too wise to offer a needless slight to native custom. He was informed that Cotus had been nominated by his brother, the late Vergobret, in defiance of an Aeduan law which prescribed that no man should hold office or even sit







in the senate while any member of his family who had done <sup>52 B.C.</sup> so survived. He accordingly settled the dispute in favour of Convictolitavis, who, as was the custom when the outgoing Vergobret failed to nominate an eligible successor, had been appointed by the Druids.<sup>1</sup> Before dismissing the council, he urged them to forget their differences, and told them that, if they wanted to share in the spoils of victory, they must honestly help to put down the rebellion. He should require ten thousand foot to guard his convoys, and all their cavalry. He then divided the army into two parts. Labienus was sent northward with four legions, including the two that had been left at Agedincum, to restore order in the upper valley of the Seine; while Caesar himself, with the remaining six, marched southward, up the eastern bank of the Allier, to strike a blow at Gergovia,—the heart of the rebellion.

He sends Labienus to suppress rebellion in the basin of the Seine, and marches himself to attack Gergovia.

On the hill now crowned by the cathedral of Nevers, which rises above the Loire, in the peninsula formed by its confluence with the Nièvre, was an Aeduan town called Noviodunum. Caesar had marked the strength of the position; and here he established his chief magazine.

He establishes a magazine at Noviodunum (Nevers):

Vercingetorix was still on the western bank of the Allier. As soon as he heard of Caesar's advance he broke down all the bridges. The two armies moved in full view of one another, with the river between them. The Gallic scouts were so vigilant that Caesar found it impossible to repair any of the bridges; and he began to fear that he might be barred by the river during the entire summer. But Vercingetorix had not learned the necessity of watching his rear. One evening, Caesar encamped on a wooded spot, opposite one of the bridges. Next morning he took forty out of the sixty cohorts composing his force; arrayed them in six divisions, so that, seen from a distance, they would look like the six legions;<sup>2</sup> and ordered them to make a long march on. Vercingetorix suspected nothing. Caesar remained behind with the rest of the force, waiting for the hour when, as he

crosses the Allier by a stratum;

<sup>1</sup> The question whether the influence of the Druids was generally exerted on Caesar's side is discussed on p. 534.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 733-6.

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calculated, the four legions and the enemy should have encamped for the night. Then he set the men whom he had kept behind, to work at the repair of the bridge. When it was finished, he made them cross over, and sent for the other cohorts. Vercingetorix, finding that he had been outwitted, and unwilling to risk a battle, hurried on southward by prodigious marches.

Caesar followed more leisurely; and moving across the level expanse of the Limagne, found himself, early on the fifth day, approaching the mountain of Gergovia. Rising on his right front, fully twelve hundred feet above the plain, the northern face, with its upper terraces broken here and there by sheer precipices, manifestly defied attack; and, as he moved on past the long spurs, he saw that the eastern side, steep, rugged and scored by deep ravines, was equally unassailable. Presently, observing on his left front a suitable spot for a camp, he halted near the foot of the south-eastern slope. His cavalry were soon engaged in a skirmish; and in the afternoon he reconnoitred the stronghold from the south. The town stood on an oblong plateau, which formed the summit, extending about seven furlongs from east to west, and six hundred yards wide. The higher terraces, and also the outlying heights of Risolles, linked by a col or saddle to the south-western angle of the plateau, were bristling with the tents of the Gauls; and the encampment was protected by a wall of loose stones, which, about half way up the slope, ran along the whole southern side. From the very foot of the mountain, below the central point of the wall, rose a low but steep hill, now called *La Roche Blanche*, which projected southward at right angles, and terminated in an almost sheer precipice. A small stream, the *Auzon*, flowed eastward through the meadows which extended past the base of the hill; and two miles beyond the valley, on the left as one looked up the stream, the view was closed by a long ridge, the *Montagne de la Serre*. Beyond the heights of Risolles was the high pass of *Opme*, which at one point gave access to them by a comparatively easy slope, and separated them from the distant *Puy Giroux*.

The result of the reconnaissance was not encouraging.

The ascent to the stronghold appeared less difficult on the south than on the other sides: but even on the south the ascent was not easy. Moreover, the Gauls held the whole space between the outer wall and the town; and their appearance, as Caesar remarked, was truly formidable. Even if the Romans could gain the col on the south-west, they would still be confronted by a steep though short incline. All round the plateau ran a natural glacis, to climb which, in the face of a determined enemy, would have been impossible. To assault the town was therefore evidently out of the question; and Caesar resolved to make sure of his supplies before proceeding even to invest it. Meanwhile he pitched his camp on a low plateau north of the Auzon, about half a mile north-west of the modern village of Orcet and three thousand yards from the south-eastern corner of the town. and encamps before Gergovia.

For some days no event occurred more important than a cavalry combat. Vercingetorix kept his troopers busy; and frequent skirmishes took place in the plain between the south-eastern spurs and the Roman camp. He made the tribal chiefs repair daily to his quarters before sunrise, to furnish their reports and receive his instructions. But one detail escaped his vigilance. Caesar had detected a weak point in the enemy's position. The Roche Blanche, which commanded the only descent from the town to the rich meadows of the Auzon, was inadequately garrisoned. If only he could get possession of this hill, he would cut off the Gauls from the chief source of their supplies. The ascent on the eastern side was practicable. In the dead of night Caesar stole out of camp with two legions, drove out the startled garrison, and occupied the hill. There he constructed a small camp, and connected it with the larger one by a pair of parallel trenches, so that men might pass unobserved from camp to camp under cover of the ramparts formed by the excavated earth.<sup>1</sup> First operations at Gergovia.

<sup>1</sup> Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 271. "Si l'on s'étonnait," says Napoleon, "que les Romains eussent creusé deux petits fossés de 6 pieds de largeur chacun et de 4 pieds de profondeur, au lieu d'en faire un seul de 8 de largeur sur 6 de profondeur, ce qui aurait donné le même déblai, on répondrait que les deux petits fossés étaient bien plus vite faits qu'un seul grand fossé."

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Defection  
of the  
Aeduan  
Vergobret.

Just at this time the alarming news arrived that the Aedui were on the brink of revolt. They had not embraced the cause of Rome with the same unanimity, the same resolution as the astute and far-seeing Remi. Divitiacus had been Caesar's best friend: but he had not been able to silence the anti-Roman party; and even the Caesarians were no longer staunch. If they adhered to Caesar, they would no doubt be rewarded,—if Caesar gained the day. But was it certain that he would? Vercingetorix was a formidable antagonist. He might perhaps succeed after all; and then their old rivals, the Arverni, would supplant them. If, on the other hand, they threw in their lot with him, their strength would surely turn the scale. To them would belong the glory of liberating Gaul from the invader; and then they would hold sway, not as his servile nominees, but as the champions of a great and independent confederation. Caesar had suspected them from the outset of the revolt: but the story which he now heard must have taken him by surprise. The ringleader was no other than Convictolitavis, the Vergobret, whose election he had himself secured. Vercingetorix had offered him a bribe; and he promptly responded to that most potent spur of Gallic patriotism. He in turn talked over some of the younger chiefs, and gave them part of the money. But the senate would certainly think twice before venturing to turn upon their powerful patron. The chiefs took counsel together. The infantry contingent, which Caesar had demanded, was just starting for Gergovia. A chief named Litaviccus was placed in command of it; and his brothers were sent on ahead to join Caesar. About half way to Gergovia, near the site of the modern village of Serbannes,<sup>1</sup> Litaviccus halted the column, and delivered an inflammatory harangue. The troops were horrified to hear that all the Aeduan cavalry with Caesar, and among them two chiefs named Eporedorix and Viridomarus, had been massacred on a trumped up charge of treachery. Some men, who were in the secret, came forward and swore that the story was true: they themselves, they declared, were the sole survivors of the massacre. The thoughtless Aeduans drank in the lying tale and put them-

An Aeduan  
contingent,  
marching  
to join  
Caesar,  
persuaded  
by its  
leader to  
declare for  
Vercinge-  
torix.<sup>1</sup> See pp. 748-9.

selves in the hands of their leader. It was settled that as <sup>52 B.C.</sup> soon as they reached Gergovia, they should join Vercingetorix and avenge the slaughter of their countrymen. Some Roman citizens were travelling under the Aeduan escort with grain and stores for Caesar. Litaviccus had them tortured and killed; and, before resuming his march, he sent off messengers to spread the news of the pretended massacre among the Aedui, and urge them to arm.

Rumour flew fast. The intrigue was soon known at Gergovia. Eporedorix himself came to Caesar in the middle of the night, and told the whole story. He entreated him not to allow a few wrong-headed men to drag a friendly people into revolt: if Litaviccus and the ten thousand succeeded in joining Vercingetorix, the Aeduan authorities would have no choice but to throw in their lot with them. Caesar was intensely anxious; but he did not hesitate. He determined to go and intercept the deluded infantry at once, though he knew that the large camp would, in his absence, be exposed to a most serious risk. The camp on the Roche Blanche, in the hands of a few resolute men, would be virtually impregnable.<sup>1</sup> Before starting, Caesar ordered the arrest of Litaviccus's brothers: but they had already fled. He took with him all the cavalry and four legions, leaving two only to hold the camps. The defence was entrusted to Fabius, who, two years before, had joined in the relief of Cicero. Caesar told his men that he must call upon them to make a most trying effort: but, he added, the occasion was urgent, and they would not grumble. They were in the best of spirits and ready for anything. They had marched twenty-three miles down the valley of the Allier when the Aeduan column was descried. Caesar sent on the cavalry to stop them, but warned them to do violence to no man. At the same time he made Eporedorix and Viridomarus show themselves. The Aedui were overawed; and they saw that they had been duped. They grounded their arms and begged for mercy: but Litaviccus managed to escape with his retainers, and made his way to Gergovia. Caesar knew that his action was sure to be misrepresented. He therefore took the pre-

Caesar makes a forced march, overawes the contingent, and returns just in time to rescue his camp.

<sup>1</sup> See p. 740.

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caution of sending messengers to give the Aeduan authorities a true account of what had passed, and to impress upon them that he had treated the mutinous contingent with forbearance. Darkness was now closing in. Caesar allowed three hours for rest; and then the Aedui went back quietly with the legions. On the march a party of horsemen came to meet the column, and reported that Vercingetorix had been attacking the large camp with desperate fury. The artillery had alone enabled the little garrison to hold out; and Fabius was busily erecting breastworks upon the rampart, in view of a renewed attack. The news stimulated the tired men to do their utmost. Pressing on all through the small hours, Caesar reached the camp before sunrise, having accomplished the extraordinary march of forty-six miles in little more than twenty-four hours, just in time to avert the destruction of his exhausted legions.

Outrages of  
the Aedui  
against  
Roman  
citizens.

For the moment the danger was over. But there were unmistakable signs that the Aedui would soon go over to the rebels. The ignorant populace took for granted the truth of the news about the massacre of the cavalry. Some were exasperated; others simply rapacious. They burst open the dwellings of Roman residents, robbed them, murdered them, sold them as slaves. Convictolitavis worked upon their passions. Once they had committed themselves, he saw, they would feel that Caesar would never forgive them, and that they had everything to gain and nothing to lose by taking up arms. The Aedui took care of course to send apologies and explanations to Caesar, as soon as they heard that their contingent was in his power. The Government, they said, had not sanctioned the outrages which had been committed: the property of Litavicus had been confiscated; and full restitution should be made. But they had tasted the sweets of plunder: they had little hope of being forgiven; and they secretly commenced preparations for war. Caesar received their envoys with all possible politeness; but he was not for a moment deceived. He doubtless wished to leave the door of repentance open for his old allies. There was perhaps just a chance that, if he affected to believe that the authorities were not responsible for the excesses of the rabble, they

Anxiety of  
Caesar.

might be wise enough to draw back. Meanwhile he would <sup>52 B.C.</sup> prepare for the worst. The defection of so powerful a state would inevitably give a fresh stimulus to the rebellion; and it seemed probable that, if he delayed where he was any longer, he might find himself hemmed in. Yet, besides the humiliation of failure, to abandon the siege would of itself encourage waverers to turn against him. How was he to get away and rejoin Labienus without leaving the fatal impression that he was obliged to flee?

While he was considering this problem, he ascended the Roche Blanche in order to inspect the works of the camp. Standing upon the plateau, he noticed with astonishment that a hill forming part of the mass of Risolles was abandoned. What could this mean? Some deserters explained the mystery. Vercingetorix was greatly alarmed for the safety of the saddle which connected Risolles with Gergovia. If the Romans captured this place as well as the hill on the south which they already occupied, it would be hardly possible for foragers to get out; and the garrison would be starved into surrender. Every available man therefore had been called away to fortify the western approach to Risolles, where alone the ascent was practicable.

Caesar immediately devised a stratagem. About mid-<sup>He at-</sup>night he sent several squadrons of cavalry up the valley of <sup>tempts to</sup> the Auzon, whence they struck off to the left and moved <sup>take Ger-</sup> along the slopes of the Montagne de la Serre, as though they <sup>govia by a</sup> intended to make for the pass of Opme. In obedience to <sup>coup-de-</sup>orders they moved with a show of excitement and made a <sup>main.</sup> noise, in order to attract attention. At daybreak a number of baggage-drivers, equipped to look like troopers, rode after them. One of the legions followed, and, after advancing a short distance, moved down towards the Auzon, and concealed itself in a wood. Vercingetorix, who, from his commanding position, could discern these movements, became thoroughly alarmed, and sent the rest of his forces to push on the work of fortification. Now was Caesar's opportunity. He made the soldiers move in small parties, so that they might not be observed, from the larger camp to



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the foot of the Roche Blanche.<sup>1</sup> Some cohorts of the 13th legion were detailed for the protection of the smaller camp; while the 10th was to remain as a reserve under Caesar's personal command. When all was ready, he explained his plans to his generals. The ground, he said, being so unfavourable, he did not want to fight a battle, but to effect a surprise: their one chance of success was to ascend with all possible speed; and he particularly warned them not to allow the men, in their eagerness for plunder, to get out of hand. Once in possession of the camps, he doubtless hoped that they would have time to cut off the Gallic troops from the town.

The legions were formed up on nearly level ground, on the right of the Roche Blanche. Their path ascended a hollow or gentle depression. From where they stood the actual distance to the town was rather more than two thousand yards; while the place which the Gauls were fortifying was barely five furlongs from the nearest gate. The legionaries advanced rapidly until they came to the outer wall: over it they clambered, and took possession of three of the camps. The few men who had been left in them fled up the hill. The king of the Nitobriges, roused from his siesta, had but just time to spring up half naked, scramble on to his horse and gallop away. Caesar was with the 10th legion on the hill side, on the right of the valley by which the column had ascended. Perhaps he had reason to believe that it would be impossible to follow up his advantage: possibly he intended to re-form the scattered legionaries, retain possession of the camps, and force Vercingetorix to fight: anyhow he made his trumpeter sound the recall.<sup>2</sup> Separated from him by the valley, the troops did not hear the blast of the trumpet, and, heedless of the commands of their officers, pressed on still higher up the slope, close to the southern gate of the town. A centurion, named Lucius Fabius, had reminded his comrades of the rewards which Caesar had offered before the assault of

<sup>1</sup> Though Caesar does not say so, I suppose that a sufficient force was left to hold the large camp and protect the baggage.

<sup>2</sup> See my essay on "The Credibility of Caesar's Narrative," pp. 211-14.

Avaricum, and boasted that no one should get into Gergovia <sup>52 B.C.</sup> before him. He was hoisted on to the wall by three of his men, and then hauled them up in turn. A cry of terror rose from the town. The women threw down money and clothes to satisfy the soldiers, and, craning over with bare breasts and outstretched hands, besought them not to treat them as they had treated the women and children at Avaricum; while many in the distant parts of the town, fancying that the Romans were inside, ran for their lives. Now, however, the men who had been engaged in fortifying Risolles, hearing the uproar and stimulated by a succession of messengers, came hurrying back and formed up at the foot of the wall. The women held up their little ones in their arms and screamed to their menfolk to fight for them. Standing high above them, these dense and ever growing masses were too much for the tired legionaries; and they had to fight desperately to hold their ground. Anxiously watching the struggle, Caesar sent an order to Sextius, the officer whom he had left in command of the smaller camp, to lead out his cohorts and form them up at the foot of Gergovia, so that, in case the legions were repulsed, he might fall upon the right flank of their pursuers. He himself moved with the 10th a little nearer to the outer wall. Meanwhile the panic in the town had subsided. The centurion and the soldiers who had got in first were killed, and their bodies pitched over the wall. Another centurion, Marcus Petronius, while attempting to hew down one of the gates, was surrounded and severely wounded. The men of his company had followed him. "I cannot save myself and you too," he cried: "but I led you into danger, and so help me Heaven, I'll save you. You have your chance: use it!" With these words, he flung himself into the thick of the enemy, killed two of them, and beat off the rest from the gate. His men rallied round him. "It's useless," he cried: "I am dying: you cannot help me. Go while you can, and return to your legion." Fighting to the last, Petronius fell: but he saved his men.

The battle was still raging when the Romans caught sight of a column moving over the shoulder of the hill on their

52 B.C. right flank. It was the Aedui, whom Caesar had sent up  
 The attack repulsed with heavy loss. the eastern slope, in support of the attack: but the Romans, deceived by their armour, took them for enemies: the Gauls were closing in upon them on every side; and now thoroughly unnerved, they were hurled back, and fled headlong down the valley. Blindly pursuing them, the Gauls were roughly checked, on right and left, by the cohorts of Sextius, and by the 10th, who had moved lower down the hill. As soon as they reached level ground, the runaways halted and faced the enemy, who then moved off: but forty-six centurions and nearly seven hundred privates lay dead upon the hill.<sup>1</sup>

Caesar  
 marches  
 to rejoin  
 Labienus.

Next day Caesar assembled the troops, and lectured them severely for their disobedience. He admired their spirit, he told them: but discipline was as necessary to a soldier as courage; and it was the height of presumption in them to imagine that they knew how to gain a victory better than their general. At the same time they must not be disheartened; for they had only been beaten because they had been rash enough to fight on unfavourable ground. To give effect to his words, he formed them up in line of battle on the most advantageous ground which he could select: but Vercingetorix naturally refused to walk into the trap. On that day, however, and the next, there were slight cavalry skirmishes, in which the Romans had the advantage. Then, feeling that he had done enough to abate the exultation of the enemy and restore the confidence of his men, Caesar abandoned the siege, and marched once more down the valley of the Allier.

His critical  
 position.

The situation was serious indeed. The Gauls had found out that he was not invincible. For the first time in all these years he had been beaten; and his defeat would inevitably weaken his prestige and act like a tonic upon the spirits of his enemies. Fortunately Vercingetorix did not venture to pursue him. On the third day of his retreat he repaired one of the bridges over the Allier. He had only just recrossed the river when Eporedorix and Viridomarus told him that Litaviccus had left Gergovia with the Gallic cavalry, and gone to recruit for Vercingetorix among the Aedui. Might

<sup>1</sup> Regarding the operations at Gergovia, see pp. 738-48.

they go too? It was of the last importance that they should <sup>52 B.C.</sup> reach home first, so that they might persuade their brother chiefs to return to their allegiance while there was yet time. Caesar was convinced that the Aedui were lost irretrievably, and he believed that the departure of the chiefs would precipitate the rupture: still he thought it best to let them go, as it would be wiser not to betray any anxiety or give the slightest ground for saying that he had treated his allies as enemies. When they took their leave, he reminded them of all that he had done for their people, and made a last earnest appeal to their loyalty. It is just possible that they may have meant what they said: but when they reached Noviodunum, and found that the Vergobret and the council had definitely declared for Vercingetorix, they saw their opportunity. Two or three days after their departure, Caesar learned that they had seized Noviodunum, where all his hostages, a quantity of his baggage, his stores, treasure and cavalry remounts were collected, plundered and burned it to the ground, sent off all his hostages to Bibracte, thrown into the river all the corn which they could not carry away, and massacred the slender garrison and the Italian traders who had settled in the town.<sup>1</sup> Cavalry were scouring the country to cut off his supplies, and infantry threatening to prevent him from crossing the Loire. The water, swollen by the melting of the mountain snows, was rushing like a torrent. Caesar saw that the crisis of the war had come. The Aeduan infantry had deserted him. The Arverni, elated by their victory, were on his rear: on his left the Bituriges, exasperated by the bitter memory of Avaricum: the perfidious Aedui barred the road in front. His chief magazine was destroyed; and his supplies were fast running out. The Province itself was insufficiently protected. The object of the Aedui was to hem

Eporedorix  
and Viridomarus seize  
Noviodunum, and  
try to prevent Caesar  
from crossing the  
Loire.

<sup>1</sup> Merivale's narrative of this episode (*History of the Romans under the Empire*, ii. 57 [cabinet ed.]) is remarkable. He says that Caesar "arrived in front of Noviodunum in time to hear the last crash of the sinking bridge, and to see the devouring flames rise triumphantly behind it." Now after Caesar heard that Noviodunum had been burned, he made a series of forced marches in order to reach the Loire. Yet, when he reached it, according to Merivale, he found the fire still blazing and the bridge still falling! There is not a word in the *Commentaries* about a bridge at Noviodunum; and there is no evidence that Caesar went to Noviodunum at all after its destruction. See p. 755.

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him in between the Allier and the Loire, and there starve him into surrender; or if, in desperation, he should make a dash for the Province, to cut him off from the easier way over the Loire, and drive him back towards the Cevennes into the clutches of Vergingetorix. Retreat, however, was not to be thought of: with the mountains barring the way, it would be very difficult as well as disgraceful; and above all, he could not leave Labienus and his four legions to perish.<sup>1</sup> At all costs, he must reach the Loire before the Aedui had had time to assemble in strength. They had not burned their granaries in accordance with Vergingetorix's plan; and he might perhaps get supplies in their country. Night and day he marched till he reached the river a few miles south of Nevers.<sup>2</sup> Some troopers rode to look for a ford, and found one which was just practicable, the water being breast-high. The cavalry rode into the river, and formed a line from bank to bank, to break the force of the current:<sup>3</sup> then the infantry, holding their weapons above their heads, waded across the stream. Once more Caesar was saved by his marvellous speed. The Aedui were so confounded by his unexpected arrival that they fled without attempting to hinder the passage: the soldiers took all the grain and all the cattle that they needed; and the army marched on towards the valley of the Yonne to succour Labienus.

He saves himself by a series of extraordinary marches.

Labienus's campaign against the Parisii.

That officer meanwhile was in great peril. Leaving the heavy baggage at Agedincum in charge of the recruits who had accompanied Caesar from Italy, he had marched with his four legions down the left bank of the Yonne and of the Seine, for Lutetia, the capital of the Parisii. Master of this central position, he would be able to overawe those old offenders, the Senones and the Carnutes. A large force assembled to oppose him. Their leader was Camulogenus, an Aulercan from the neighbourhood of Evreux, who, though weighed down by extreme old age, was looked up to as a soldier of extraordinary skill. On the approach

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 750-55.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 755.

<sup>3</sup> I am inclined to infer from a passage in the *Civil War* (*B. G.*, i. 64, §§ 5-6) that the cavalry may have been formed in two lines, one above the infantry, the other below, to rescue any soldiers who might be carried off their feet.





of the Romans, he encamped on the edge of a far-reaching <sup>52 B.C.</sup> morass, about twenty miles south of Paris, through which the Essonne crept sluggishly to join the Seine. Labienus tried to construct a causeway across the slush: but finding this impossible in the face of the enemy, he silently quitted his camp in the night; marched back as far as Metiosedum, or Melun, a town standing on an island in the Seine; seized some fifty barges and rapidly lashed them together; threw a detachment across; chased away the panic-stricken inhabitants; repaired the bridge, which they had demolished; transported his army to the opposite bank; and then moved down the valley in the direction whence he had come. The townsmen who had fled from Metiosedum hurried with the news to Camulogenus. He at once sent messengers to order the destruction of Lutetia, and then moved northward from the marsh. The barges accompanied the Roman column; and with their aid Labienus crossed the Marne. Lutetia was built upon the island in the Seine on which now stands the cathedral of Nôtre Dame. When Labienus arrived, the bridges had been broken down and the town burned to the ground. He encamped just opposite the island; and the enemy established themselves over against his army on the southern bank.

Just at this time the news arrived that Caesar had been forced to retreat from Gergovia, and that the Aedui had joined the rebellion. The story lost nothing in the telling. Labienus was dependent on Gallic peasants for his information; and their statements were positive. Caesar had tried to cross the Loire and had failed. He could get no supplies. He was in full retreat for the Province. The Bellovaci immediately rose in arms. Labienus found himself threatened by this warlike people on the north-east: on the south the Parisii and their allies confronted him; while the broad flood of the Seine separated him from his base at Agedincum. Back to that town he must somehow find his way; for he saw that, in his altered circumstances, it would be folly to think of an offensive campaign. But how to return? That was a problem that would tax all the force of his mind; and, as Caesar said, who so appreciated his worth, he knew



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that he must rely upon the force of his own mind alone. He might have gone, as he had come, by the right bank of the Seine: but he had never yet tied before the face of an enemy; and to flee at such a crisis would shatter the enfeebled prestige of the Roman arms. Besides, to reach Agedincum, he must, sooner or later, recross the river; and, hurry as he might, cross where he would, the enemy would be there to dispute his passage. There was nothing for it but to cross there and then by some skilful stratagem; and, if he must fight, to clear the way by victory.

In the evening he assembled his officers, and urged them to carry out his instructions to the letter. The barges were lying under the bank, ready for use. A number of small boats were also collected. Labienus placed each of the barges under the charge of an officer, and ordered them to drop down the stream about ten o'clock for a distance of four miles, and there await his arrival. He left half a legion to protect the camp; sent the other half with the baggage-train up the bank; and ordered the boats to be rowed alongside of them with a loud splashing of oars. Soon after midnight he moved stealthily in the opposite direction with his remaining legions, till he came to the spot where the barges were waiting, near the southern end of the Bois de Boulogne. A furious storm was sweeping over the valley; and in the rush and roar of wind and rain the enemy's outposts were surprised and cut down; and the troops were ferried across the river. The stratagem, however, only partially succeeded. About day-break messengers hurried one after another into the Gallic encampment, and reported that there was a great uproar in the Roman camp, soldiers tramping and oars splashing up the stream, barges crossing below. Camulogenus was perplexed. He fancied that the Romans were crossing the river in three places, and would soon be in full retreat. Sending a small detachment in the direction of Metiosedum, and leaving another to watch the Roman camp, he marched in person against Labienus.

It was about half an hour before sunrise. The Roman general harangued his troops. He reminded them of the glorious victories which they had won in the past, and told

them that he expected them to fight as they would have fought if Caesar had been there to command them. The Gallic left broke before the first charge: but the right fought with extraordinary resolution; and for a long time the issue was doubtful. The aged Camulogenus was in the forefront of the battle, cheering on his men. At length, however, the victorious Roman right fell upon their rear. Even then not a man would give way: but all were surrounded and slain. Camulogenus shared their fate. The troops which had been detached to watch the Roman camp hurried to the rescue, and established themselves on the hill of Mont Parnasse: but they were speedily dislodged. The runaways from the left wing who failed to reach the woods were cut to pieces by the horse. The road to Agedincum was again open. Labienus returned thither to take up the heavy baggage; and thence marched southward to rejoin Caesar.<sup>1</sup>

Still the rebellion was rapidly gaining ground. The defection of the Aedui was a turning-point in the war. Other tribes were won over by their influence and their gold. Waverers they terrified by threatening to put to death the hostages whom Caesar had left at Noviodunum. But discord and jealousy even now made themselves felt. The Aedui asked Vercingetorix to come to them and concert operations; and he readily consented. Forthwith they claimed the right of directing the campaign: but their demand was disputed; and a general assembly was convened at Bibracte to settle the question. The Remi and the Lingones, who steadily adhered to the stronger side, and the Treveri, who were themselves hard pressed by the Germans, alone failed to appear. All the other tribes, even the most distant, sent their representatives to the mountain city. It was the supreme moment in the life of Vercingetorix. A few weeks before, while they were still smarting under defeat, he had told his men that he would win over the rest of Gaul to the cause, and that against an united Gaul the whole world could not stand in arms. And now his promise seemed about to be fulfilled. With a fraction of the people he had vanquished the invincible conqueror; and the whole people was rallying

He extricates himself from a perilous position by victory;

and marches to rejoin Caesar.

The rebellion stimulated by the adhesion of the Aedui.

They claim the direction of the war.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 753-66.

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Vercingetorix re-elected Com-mander-in-Chief by a general council.

His plan of campaign.

to his side. The question was put to the vote; and, without one dissentient, the representatives of the Gallic nation chose Vercingetorix as their General. Bitterly chagrined, the Aedui repented the rashness with which they had flung aside the friendship of the Romans: but it was too late now to draw back.

Vercingetorix determined to adhere to his original plan of campaign. His infantry were sufficient for a guerilla warfare; and he contented himself with levying fifteen thousand horse from his new allies. Relying on his superiority in this arm, he intended simply to cut off his enemy's supplies; and once more he appealed to his countrymen to destroy their crops and burn their granaries that they might achieve their liberty. He forced the peoples who had just joined the movement to give hostages for their fidelity. That he might have a stronghold to retreat to in case of necessity, he fortified and provisioned Alesia, a town belonging to the Mandubii, which covered the plateau of Mont Auxois, in the highlands of Côte-d'Or. But he intended also to carry the war into the enemy's country. The Roman Province was a tempting prize. If he could seize it or could seduce the Provincials to join him, would not the triumph of his cause be assured?

He hounds on the neighbours of the Provincial tribes to attack them.

He hounded on the neighbours<sup>1</sup> of the Helvii and the Volcae Arecomici to attack them; and, believing that the Allobroges were still smarting under the punishment which Rome had inflicted upon them a few years before, he sent envoys to bribe the chiefs and to hold out to the government the prospect of supremacy over the Province, and raised a levy of ten thousand Aeduians to coerce them if persuasion should fail.

It was a master-stroke; and Caesar knew that, if it succeeded, he would be in extreme peril. Everything depended upon the Allobroges. They had been badly treated by former Governors; and before Caesar entered Gaul they had been the most disaffected subjects of Rome. But Caesar had rescued them from the Helvetii: he had distinguished two of their leading men, who had rendered him signal services, by special marks of favour;<sup>2</sup> and, doubtless by the

<sup>1</sup> The Gabali, Arverni, Ruteni and Cadurci.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, ii. 59, § 3.

exercise of his unerring tact, he had taught them to believe <sup>52 B.C.</sup> that his cause was theirs.<sup>1</sup> The Province was fairly satisfied with Roman rule. The Allobroges guarded the fords of the Rhône and presented an impenetrable front to the enemy;<sup>2</sup> while ten thousand men, raised in the Province itself and commanded by Lucius Caesar, a kinsman of the Governor, were posted at various points along the threatened frontier. The Helvii, however, who risked a battle, were defeated with heavy loss and driven into their strongholds. Meanwhile Caesar contrived a plan for counteracting the enemy's superiority in cavalry. No reinforcements could be expected from the Province; for the roads were blocked. He therefore sent across the Rhine to the tribes which he had reduced to submission,<sup>3</sup> and procured from them numbers of horsemen Caesar enlists German cavalry. with their attendant light infantry, who eagerly welcomed the chance of sharing in the plunder of Gaul. But the German horses, though hardy, were small and light: and Caesar saw that his new allies would be at a disadvantage when they encountered Vercingetorix's well-mounted troopers in the shock of battle. He therefore remounted them on the horses of his tribunes and body-guard and of the time-expired centurions and legionaries who, on his invitation, had volunteered for service, and were accordingly privileged to ride on the march.

Some weeks had passed since Caesar had rejoined Labienus. Hemarches to succour the Province. The meeting had taken place on the south of Agedincum, near the confluence of the Armançon and the Yonne; and, as Agedincum itself had been abandoned, the united army took

<sup>1</sup> Mr. W. H. Hall (*The Romans on the Riviera and the Rhône*, 1898, pp. 132-4) does well to emphasise the importance of the loyalty of the Allobroges, if he somewhat exaggerates the evils that would have resulted from their disaffection: but, trusting to the authority of a Monsieur J. J. Pitot (*Recherches sur les antiquités dauphinoises*, 1833), he makes certain statements as to the steps which Caesar had taken to safeguard the Province, for which there is no evidence.

<sup>2</sup> Merivale, setting Caesar's testimony at defiance and yet appealing to it in a footnote, says that the Allobroges "took measures to defend the points at which the upper Rhône could be crossed, so as to anticipate any attempt the proconsul might make to regain the Province in that direction."—*History of the Romans under the Empire*, vol. ii., 1850, pp. 27-8.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 215.

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up its quarters not far from Troyes, among the friendly Lingones.<sup>1</sup> It was the most convenient breathing-place that Caesar could have found. The Remi, steadily loyal to him and steadily false to their countrymen, were close by on the north, to support him and to receive his support: the Aedui were on the south; and, while he was near enough to watch their movements, he could collect fresh stores and rest his troops in comparative security. But the Province was still threatened; and he saw that he must march to its relief. Probably he intended also to reinforce his troops there, and then to return and make an end of the rebellion. Accordingly he moved down the valley of the Tille, intending to cross the Saône near St. Jean-de-Losne, and take the road through the country of the Sequani. Vercingetorix with his infantry and his fresh hosts of horsemen moved off from Alesia to intercept him, and took up a position behind a stream, not far from Dijon,<sup>2</sup> about ten miles south of the spot where the Romans were encamped. He made up his mind to risk an action. It would be rash, however, to affirm that he departed from his original resolution.<sup>3</sup> He did not contemplate a regular engagement. He was proud of his own cavalry; and he was perhaps ignorant that Caesar had been reinforced by those doughty squadrons from beyond the Rhine. The legions were of course too strong to be attacked: but they were hampered by an immense baggage-train; and they must either lose precious time in defending it, or abandon it at the cost of their honour, nay, of their means of subsistence. He would draw up his infantry in front of his encampment, to encourage his cavalry and overawe the Romans. If he allowed Caesar to reach the Province, he would soon come back stronger than ever: and then all hope of liberating Gaul would be at an end. Such, we are told, were the arguments by which he tried to animate his officers. With one voice they cried, in an outburst of enthusiasm, that every man must be sworn, by a solemn oath, to ride twice through

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 766-70.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 771-81. The exact position of the battle-field cannot be ascertained. In the note referred to I have, I think, proved that it was in the neighbourhood of Dijon.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 771.





the enemy's ranks, or never again be admitted to hearth and home, never again be suffered to come nigh unto father or mother or wife or child. Vercingetorix assented; and the oath was taken. Next morning the Roman column was discerned. Vercingetorix ranged his infantry in front of his encampment, in an imposing array; while the cavalry swept down upon the Roman vanguard and on either flank. Caesar was surprised as completely as in the battle on the Sambre. The lie of the ground had prevented him from discerning the approach of the Gauls; and, marching securely through a friendly country, he had neglected to send out scouts. He made his dispositions, however, with his usual calmness. He sent his cavalry, in three divisions, to repel the triple attack; and the legions formed a hollow square outside the baggage, ready to support them if they were hard pressed.<sup>1</sup> For a time the Gauls had a slight advantage: but the legions prevented them from following it up. At length from a hill on the Roman right the German horse came thundering down on their flank; and the battle was won. The Gauls galloped for their lives: the infantry, passive spectators of the slaughter, fell back upon their camps; and Vercingetorix, ordering his baggage-drivers to follow him, hastened westward towards Alesia. With his beaten force he could not keep the field, lest his disheartened followers should fall away and disperse.<sup>2</sup> Either he must submit to the fate of Ambiorix, or he must again plant himself in a stronghold and defy his enemy to dislodge him. But Caesar was pressing upon his rear; and at nightfall, when the pursuit ceased, three thousand of the fugitives were slain.

Vercingetorix attacks Caesar's cavalry,

and retreats beaten to Alesia (Mont Auxois).

Next day the Romans arrived at Alesia, where Vercingetorix was preparing to make his final stand. The column

<sup>1</sup> To effect this formation, if, as Napoleon infers from *B. G.*, ii. 17, § 2, each legion was separated on the march from the one that followed it by a baggage-train (see p. 53, *supra*), would of course have required a considerable time; and M. Masquelez may perhaps be right in inferring that the army was marching "en plusieurs colonnes séparées par des intervalles dans lesquels Jules César fit entrer les bagages." *Spectateur militaire*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. xlv., 1864, p. 54. Caesar's statement (*Consistit agmen; impedimenta intra legiones recipiuntur* [*B. G.*, vii. 67, § 3]) leaves it doubtful whether one square was formed, or more.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 781-2.



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descended a valley closed on the right and the left by the hills of Bussy and Pevenel. On their left front, connected with Pevenel by a broad neck of land, rose a hill, much lower than Gergovia, but still too steep to be taken by assault. The Gauls were swarming on the eastern slope, beneath the scarped rocks of the plateau, on which stood the town; and Vercingetorix had made them build a wall and dig a ditch to protect their encampment. Just at their feet the legions saw a stream, the Oze, winding like a steely thread through the greenery that fringed the north of the hill; and beyond its southern side, parallel to the Oze, but invisible, flowed the little river Ozerain. Moving down past the hill of Réa, the soldiers came to a miniature plain, which extended, three miles in length, beneath the western slope of Alesia, and was bounded on its further side by a range of heights: the river Brenne, which received the waters of the Oze and the Ozerain, meandered through it from south to north; and beyond the Ozerain the steep declivities of Flayigny completed the zone of hills.

Caesar  
invests  
Alesia.

Caesar harangued his troops and encouraged them to brace themselves for a toilsome effort. As it was evident that the place could not be taken except by a blockade, he drew a line of investment, fully ten miles in length, along which a ring of camps was constructed. Those intended for the cavalry were on low ground,—three in the plain and one in the valley of the Rabutin, which entered the Oze from the north. The rest were strongly placed upon the slopes of the outlying hills. Close to the camps redoubts or block-houses, twenty-three in all, were thrown up; and strong piquets were placed in them, to guard against any sudden sortie.

The Gallic  
cavalry  
make a  
sortie, but  
are beaten.

Soon after the commencement of the works, Vercingetorix sent all his cavalry down the hill; and a desperate combat was fought in the western plain. Caesar's Gallic and Spanish horse were soon in trouble; and he sent his Germans to reinforce them. The legions were drawn up in front of their camps, to deter the enemy's foot from attempting a sortie. The Gauls were beaten, and galloped back along the valleys of the Oze and the Ozerain, hotly pursued by the Germans:

but the gates of the camp being too narrow, many of the <sup>52 B.C.</sup> thronging fugitives were cut down; while others threw themselves off their horses and tried to scramble over the wall. The legions, by Caesar's order, moved forward a little. The Gauls inside the wall were smitten with panic: "To arms," they cried, "to arms": many of them fled helter-skelter up the hill side; and Vercingetorix was obliged to shut the gates of the town, for fear the camp should be left unprotected.

He saw with dismay that the toils were closing around him. He had never expected that Caesar, who had failed so ignominiously at Gergovia, would be strong enough to attempt a systematic blockade. But there were now ten legions instead of six;<sup>1</sup> and wherever he looked, over the plain or down in the valleys, there were soldiers at work with axe or spade. There was nothing for it but to appeal to the whole Gallic people to extricate him from the trap in which he was caught. The ring of redoubts was not yet complete: the Romans were far too few to blockade the whole circuit of the mountain; and the cavalry might perhaps steal out in the dark without attracting notice. He charged them to go, each to his own country, and bring back with them every man who could wield a sword. He reminded them of all that he had done for the good cause, and adjured them not to abandon him to the vengeance of the Romans. Everything depended on their using all speed: if they left him to perish, the whole garrison would perish with him. By reducing the rations, he reckoned that he might make the provisions last a little over a month. Silently up each river valley sped the shadowy cavalcade, until it was lost to view.

Caesar learned the whole story from some deserters. Its only effect was to stimulate his inventive genius. If he could keep the army of Vercingetorix from breaking out, he could also keep the relieving force from breaking in. The most vulnerable part of his position was the open meadow on the western side of the mountain. Across this expanse, from the Oze to the Ozerain, a trench was dug, twenty feet

Vercingetorix sends them out to fetch succour.

Caesar constructs lines of contravallation and circumvallation.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 782-3.

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wide with perpendicular sides, to prevent the enemy from attacking the troops while they were constructing the proper works. About four hundred yards behind the ends of this trench, but bending outwards, was traced the line of contravallation, which was prolonged so as to surround Alesia, and ran along the lower slopes of the encircling hills and across the valley of the Rabutin. First of all, two parallel trenches were dug, each fifteen feet wide and eight feet deep, the outer of which extended only across the plain, while the inner, embracing the whole circuit of the hill, was filled, where the level permitted, with water drawn from the Ozerain and the Rabutin. Just behind the outer trench, and also behind that portion of the other which encompassed the rest of the position, a rampart was erected, surmounted by a palisade, with an embattled fence of wattle-work in front, from the bottom of which projected stout forked branches. The combined height of rampart and palisade was twelve feet. Wooden towers were erected upon the western section of the rampart at intervals of eighty feet, and also at certain points along the rest of the contravallation.

To repel the reinforcements for which Vercingetorix had sent, a line of works somewhat similar to these, forming the circumvallation, was traced along the heights of Flavigny, Pevenel and Bussy, and across the intervening valleys and the plain. The circuit of this line was fully ten miles.

But even these works were not deemed sufficient. The Gauls made frequent and furious sallies. Comparatively few of the Romans were available as combatants; for many had to go in quest of corn and timber, while others were labouring on the works. Caesar therefore invented various subsidiary defences. Ditches, five feet deep, were dug just inside the large moat that was filled with water; and five rows of strong boughs were fixed in each, with one end protruding above ground, sharpened and with the branches projecting so as to form a kind of abatis. In front of them and rising a few inches above the ground, but purposely concealed by brushwood, were sharp pointed logs embedded in small pits. In front of these again, concealed, but barely concealed, beneath the turf, were barbed spikes fixed in pieces of wood.

Fringed by these formidable defences, Caesar expected that con- 52 B.C.  
travallation and circumvallation would be alike impregnable.

Nevertheless, the struggle was likely to be prolonged. and it would certainly tax to the utmost the endurance and the fighting power of the men. As soon as the relieving army should arrive, the Romans would be hemmed in between two desperate enemies. Every moment for preparation was precious. Flying parties scoured the country for corn and provender: but they could not collect a sufficient supply: and the rations had to be reduced.<sup>1</sup> Every day,—even by night, when the moon was up, or in the glow of the watch-fires,—the besieged could see the indefatigable legionaries labouring to finish their works before the time for the great hazard should arrive.

Meanwhile Vercingetorix had abandoned his camp, and withdrawn the troops who occupied it into the town. He took every precaution to husband his scanty resources. He ordered the whole of the grain to be thrown into one common stock and brought to him for safe keeping; and he let it be known that disobedience would be punished with death. From time to time each man received his scanty ration. Meat was tolerably abundant; for the Mandubii had driven large numbers of cattle into the stronghold.

The appeal of Vercingetorix had meanwhile been answered. A council of chieftains met to consider the situation. Ver-  
cingetorix, in his great need, had asked for an universal levy: but the cooler judgement of the council rejected his demand. So vast a multitude would become unmanageable; and it would be impossible to find food for so many mouths.<sup>2</sup> It was resolved, therefore, to call upon each tribe for a limited contingent. The summons was obeyed with alacrity; and from north and south and east and west, from the Seine, the Loire and the Garonne, from the marshes of the Scheldt and the Sambre and the mountains of the Vosges and the Cevennes, from the Channel and the Atlantic Ocean, horse and foot came swarming to save the hero of Gaul. But even in this supreme moment, in one instance, tribal jealousy prevailed over patriotism. The Bellovaci peremptorily refused

Organisa-  
tion of an  
army of  
relief.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Caes.*, *B. C.*, iii. 47, § 6.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 800.

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to send a single man. They intended, they said, to attack Caesar on their own account, and had no intention of being dictated to by any one. They consented<sup>4</sup>, however, as a personal favour to Commius, king of the Atrebates, who had great influence with them, to despatch a small contingent. Four generals were chosen; for, except Vercingetorix himself, there was no one leader of sufficient eminence to command universal confidence. And, as if this weakening of authority were not enough, the generals were fettered by civil commissioners, whose instructions they were to follow in the conduct of the campaign. One of the four was Commius, who had, in former years, rendered good service to Caesar, but was now swept away on the wave of patriotic enthusiasm. He had indeed good reason to abhor the Roman name. Just before the outbreak of the rebellion, Labienus had discovered that he was conspiring against Caesar, and had sent the tribune Volusenus to assassinate him. He escaped with a wound; and now he saw a prospect of taking his revenge. His brother generals were Eporedorix and Viridomarus, representing the Aedui, and Vercassivellaunus, a cousin of Vercingetorix. The vast host mustered in the country of the Aedui, eight thousand horsemen and nearly two hundred and fifty thousand foot, and marched for Alesia in the certain confidence of victory.

Famine in  
Alesia.

By this time the garrison were in great straits. Their grain was all consumed.<sup>1</sup> Day after day they strained their eyes, trying to catch a glimpse of the relieving army: but there was never a sign. At length the chieftains called a council of war. Some advised surrender: others were clamorous for a grand sortie: but one proposal equalled in atrocity the worst that has been told of Jerusalem or Samaria.

Critognatus  
proposes can-  
nibalism.

An Arvernian chieftain, called Critognatus, reminded his hearers that their fathers, when driven into their fastnesses by the Cimbri and Teutoni, had sustained life by feeding upon the flesh of those who were useless for warfare; and he urged that, to give the garrison strength to hold out to

<sup>1</sup> According to Napoleon I. (*Précis des guerres de César*, 1836, p. 110), more than 50 days must have elapsed between the departure of Vercingetorix's cavalry and the arrival of the relieving army.

the last against the tyrants who made war only to enslave, <sup>52 B.C.</sup> this glorious precedent should be followed. Finally it was decided that all who were too old, too young, or too feeble to fight should be expelled from the town; that those who remained should try every expedient before having recourse to the desperate remedy of Critognatus; but that, if the relieving army failed to arrive in time, they should even follow his counsel rather than surrender. Accordingly the Mandubii, to whom the town belonged, were compelled to depart, with their wives and children. They presented themselves before the Roman lines. Many of them were weeping. They piteously begged the soldiers to receive them as slaves, —only give them something to eat. To grant their prayer was impossible; and a line of guards, whom Caesar posted on the rampart, forbade any attempt to escape.

The fate  
of the  
Mandubii.

But suspense was nearly at an end. It was just after the expulsion of the Mandubii when the anxious watchers on the hill saw, moving over the plain, a multitude of cavalry. The infantry were on the heights of Mussy-la-Fosse behind. In a fever of exultation men ran to and fro, exchanging congratulations. The garrison descended the hill, prepared for a sortie. Vercingetorix had forgotten nothing. His men were provided with fascines for filling up the trenches, and movable huts to protect their approach. Soon a fierce combat of horse was raging over the plain. The legionaries were posted, ready for emergencies, along the outer and the inner lines. Archers were scattered among the Gallic ranks; and the arrows fell so thick and fast that scores of wounded horsemen were seen riding off the field. Every man fought like a hero; for they knew that from the heights around friends and enemies alike were anxiously watching. The numbers of the Gauls began to tell; and their countrymen, behind and before, encouraged them by loud yells. All through the afternoon the battle raged uncertain. But towards sunset the ever-victorious Germans charged in a compact body, and threw the division opposed to them into disorder: the archers were exposed and killed: the rout was general; and the besieged who had sallied forth turned in despair, and reascended the hill.

Arrival of  
the army  
of relief.

The final  
struggle.

52 B.C.

But Commius and his brother generals were still hopeful. Next day their men were hard at work, making fascines and scaling ladders for a grand assault on the Roman lines. About midnight they quitted their camp, and moved in silence across the plain. As they approached the works, they raised a simultaneous shout, to put the besieged on the alert; and, as they flung their fascines into the ditch, the trumpet was heard, calling the garrison to arms. Stones flew from slings: arrows whizzed through the air; and, though the Romans too plied their slings, and supports hurried from the neighbouring redoubts to the relief of any point that was too hardly pressed, the enemy were too many for them, and they suffered heavily: but when those ghost-like companies rushed in to storm the rampart, they trod upon the spikes, or, stumbling into the holes, impaled themselves on the pointed logs, while heavy pikes were hurled down from the towers into the seething multitude. The Roman artillery made great havoc. The losses on either side were very heavy; for they were fighting in the dark, and shields were of little use. Towards dawn the Gauls retreated, fearing an attack in flank; and the besieged, who had lost much valuable time in attempting to cross the inner trench, went back before they could strike a blow.

One more chance remained. The leaders of the relieving army questioned the rustics about the lie of the ground on the north and the nature of the Roman defences. Mont Réa, which bounded the plain and rose above the further bank of the Oze, extended so far to the north that Caesar had not been able to enclose it in his line of circumvallation.<sup>1</sup> On the southern slope, close to the stream, stood one of the Roman camps. It was held by two legions,—perhaps about eight thousand men,—under Reginus and Caninius. In order to avoid observation, it would be necessary to approach the camp by a wide détour. The Gauls sent scouts to reconnoitre. It appeared that Mont Réa was connected by a ridge with a further group of heights. Just after dark sixty thousand picked men, under the command of Vercassivellaunus, left the Gallic camp, and, passing right round the

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 373-4.

sweep of the northern hills, halted at daybreak for a rest in <sup>52 B.C.</sup> a hollow north-east of Mont Réa. About noon, just as they were moving down on the camp, the cavalry, by a preconcerted arrangement, streamed over the plain towards the Roman lines: the rest of the infantry showed themselves in front of their encampment; and Vercingetorix, observing these movements from the citadel, descended the hill and moved towards the plain.

This time there was no delay. The inner trench was filled up, where necessary, with earth and fascines: stout sappers' huts, destined to protect the men when they should approach to storm the lines, long poles fitted with hooks for tearing down the rampart, and other implements which Vercingetorix had provided, were carried across; and the besieged moved on to make their last effort.

A desperate struggle then began. Wherever there was a weak spot in the defences, the Gauls threw themselves upon it; and the Romans, comparatively few in numbers, and scattered owing to the vast extent of their lines, found great difficulty in massing themselves upon the exposed points. Moreover, they were painfully distracted by the roar of battle in their rear; for both on the inner and the outer line men felt, as they fought, that they must perish if their comrades behind suffered the enemy to break through. Yet, agitated as they were, they combated with a nervous eager energy; and the besieged struggled as desperately as they; for both knew that that day's fight would decide all:—the Gauls were lost unless they could break the line; the Romans, if they could but hold that line, saw their long toil at an end. From the slope of Flavigny, south of the Ozerain, the view from which embraced the whole plain, Caesar directed the battle, and sent supports to every point where he saw his men hard pressed. The attack on the circumvallation in the plain was comparatively feeble; for the bulk of the relieving force was formidable only in numbers. Nor were those numbers wisely directed. The Aedui may have been treacherous: the generals may have disagreed, or they may have been fettered by the civil commissioners; anyhow the Gauls made no attempt upon the circumvallation,



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except on Mont Réa and in the plain. The fighting was fiercest on Mont Réa. The Gauls were so numerous that Vercassivellaunus could always send fresh men to relieve their comrades. Coming down on the camp from a higher level, the assailants hurled their missiles with fatal momentum: they shot earth in heaps over the pointed logs and the spikes, and, locking their shields over their heads, passed unscathed to the rampart; and then their numbers began to tell. Suddenly a galloper rode up and told Caesar that the garrison were worn out, and their stock of missiles failing.<sup>1</sup> He immediately sent Labienus with six cohorts to the rescue, telling him to hold on as long as he could, and, when he could hold on no longer, to sally forth, and fight it out in the open. Then, riding down between the lines on to the plain, he harangued his weary soldiers and adjured them not to give in: just one short hour, and the prize was won. At last the besieged abandoned in despair the attempt to break through, and, wheeling to the left, crossed the Ozerain, and flung themselves against the works at the foot of Flavigny. They drove the artillerymen from the towers with volleys of missiles: they shot earth and fascines into the ditch, and made their way across: they tore down the palisading of the rampart: six cohorts, then seven more were sent down to help, and still they pressed on,—till Caesar himself hurried to the spot with fresh reinforcements, and drove them away. Everywhere, except at Mont Réa, the victory was won. Caesar called out four cohorts from the nearest redoubt, told his cavalry to follow him, and sent a horseman galloping to the northern cavalry camp to send another detachment down upon the enemy's rear.<sup>2</sup> They were now swarming over the rampart; and, as a last resource, Labienus summoned every available man from the neighbouring redoubts to his aid. By good luck these reinforcements amounted to eleven cohorts,—perhaps four thousand men. And now, conspicuous in his crimson cloak, Caesar was descried, hurrying across the plain. The enemy made a supreme effort. Labienus and his men took heart, and rushed into the thick of the stormers. As Caesar approached, he heard the shouts of the

<sup>1</sup> See p. 798.<sup>2</sup> See pp. 797-8.

combatants: he saw the camp abandoned and the short <sup>52 B.C.</sup> swords flashing over the slopes beyond. Suddenly the cavalry appeared on the heights above the enemy's rear: Caesar's reserves came up to attack them in front; and they fled in bewilderment,—into the midst of the hostile squadrons. Vercassivellaunus himself was captured, and seventy-four standards; and of the sixty thousand chosen men who had marched out of camp the night before only a remnant returned. The whole scene was visible from the town; and in despair the officers left in command sent to recall their comrades from below. The vast host without vanished in the gathering darkness. The legions were too tired to follow, or all might have been destroyed: but at midnight the cavalry were sent in pursuit; and when day broke, they were still hunting the fugitives and capturing or slaying them in scores.<sup>1</sup>

All was lost: so Vercingetorix clearly saw. In the night he formed his resolve. Next morning he gathered the tribal chiefs around him. He told them that he had fought, not for himself but for his countrymen; and, since they must needs all bow to fortune, he was ready to place himself at their disposal,—to die, if they wished to appease the Romans by his death, or to yield himself up as a prisoner of war. They accepted his offer, and consented to purchase life by sacrificing the leader of their own choice. Ambassadors were sent to learn the pleasure of the conqueror. He ordered the chiefs of the garrison to be brought out, and all the arms to be surrendered. The chiefs were led forth; and Caesar, seated on his tribunal, received their submission. Vercingetorix, mounted on a gaily caparisoned charger, rode round the tribunal, and then, leaping to the ground, took off his armour, laid down his sword, and bowed himself at Caesar's feet.<sup>2</sup> He was sent to Rome, and imprisoned in a dungeon. Six years later he was brought out, to adorn Caesar's triumph; and then he was put to death.<sup>3</sup>

The self-sacrifice of Vercingetorix.

Surrender of the garrison.

Two thousand years have passed away; and still the

<sup>1</sup> All questions relating to the operations at Alesia are discussed on pp. 788-99.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 799.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 799.

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Vercingetorix and his place in history.

name of Vercingetorix retains its hold upon the imagination. Our neighbours think of him as the Germans think of Arminius and the Scots of Bruce; and the traveller who stands upon the wind-swept plateau of Gergovia and looks down upon the vineyards that cover the slopes over which he drove Caesar's legions, or, speeding on his way to the Swiss mountains, looks out, as the train whirls him past the station of Les Laumes, upon the colossal statue which marks the western promontory of Mont Auxois, must be dull indeed if he does not sympathise with the nation's veneration for the great Gaul. Looking back across that vast gulf of time, we behold him, as he appears by the testimony of his conqueror, not only a chivalrous patriot, but also a born leader of men. In this character he is the equal of Caesar himself. The Gauls and their descendants have sometimes mistaken a charlatan for a hero: but the hero to whom they are loyal while they are still smarting under a defeat, must be a hero indeed. When Vercingetorix at Avaricum regained his ascendancy over the fickle Celtic multitude, he showed a knowledge of human nature as profound as Caesar when he quelled the mutiny of the Tenth Legion. If he knew how to use flattery as an instrument for fortifying self-respect, he never condescended to the arts of the demagogue: he could tell wholesome truths, however unpalatable; and with the most winning persuasiveness he possessed a capacity for being terribly severe. He recognised the softness of moral fibre, the *mollities animi*, which in the Gauls coexisted with personal bravery; and with springing energy he stimulated them to transmute that weakness into strength, to undergo toils from which they had ever shrunk, and to sacrifice their particular interests for the national weal. Who shall imagine the intensity with which he lived?—within that year the youth became a veteran. Those only who have some knowledge of affairs can appreciate the genius for organisation, the unremitting toil, the sleepless vigilance, that were needed to force those diverse levies into the field, to arm and clothe and feed them, to direct their operations, to procure information, to raise money, to negotiate, to bribe, to persuade. It must moreover be remembered that his

power depended upon sheer unaided force of character: he <sup>52 B.C.</sup> might control only so long as he could please: his commission was held, at the pleasure, nay the caprice, of the most inconstant of the races of men. Yet, alone among the Gallic leaders, he united the discordant elements of the greater part of Celtican Gaul; and, by his tact in gaining over the dissentient tribes, he drove one of the greatest generals of the world, whose army was in all but numbers far superior to his, to the point of withdrawing from the theatre of war. But Caesar vanquished him; and with Caesar he may not be compared. His generalship was not equal to his mastery of men. He knew indeed how to choose a position. He had the good sense to learn from his enemy. He had the courage to confess the inferiority of his army upon the open battle-field, and the wisdom to originate a guerilla warfare. We cannot tell whether circumstances would have allowed him to work out his conception with the thoroughness which might have forced his adversary to retreat or to starve. But the fact remains that he lost golden opportunities and committed irreparable errors; and therefore, whatever his capacity may have been, it is impossible to affirm that he approved himself a great general.

But after all, if Vercingetorix had been a weaker man, his place in history would still be assured. For the heart of the reader is always tender to the hero of a lost cause. He cares for Hannibal more than for Scipio, for Mary more than for Elizabeth, for Charles more than for Cromwell. And so, while reason tells him that it was well that Caesar should conquer, his sympathies are still with Vercingetorix.

Caesar determined, instead of going to Italy, to spend the winter in the Aeduan capital. The Aedui were only too ready to return to their allegiance. The Arverni, who had given no trouble in former years, were quite cowed, and promised implicit obedience for the future. Caesar was too politic to bear hard upon either. He therefore restored to them the prisoners whom he had made, though he demanded a large number of hostages. But the soldiers had to be rewarded for their protracted labours; and every man re-

Caesar dis-  
tributes his  
legions for  
the winter.

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ceived, by way of booty, a prisoner, whom he might sell as a slave. Caesar was generous as well as politic; and doubtless his officers were not overlooked. For himself, there was no law of prize to limit the general's share. When he came to Gaul, he was poor and in debt: when he quitted Gaul, he was rich enough to lend and to bribe.<sup>1</sup> The legions were quartered for the winter among the Remi, the Sequani, the Aedui, the Ambivareti, the Bituriges and the Ruteni, that is to say, around Reims, Besançon, Mont Beuvray, Chalon and Mâcon, Bourges and Rodez.<sup>2</sup> By this arrangement the friendly Remi would be protected from the vengeance of the Bellovaci: the submission of the Aedui was assured: the legions quartered among them could easily communicate, on the east, through the territory of the friendly Lingones, with their comrades in Sequania, on the north-east, with those quartered among the Remi; the Arverni were hemmed in on the north by the legion which menaced the Bituriges, on the south by that which watched the Ruteni: and this last was on the borders of the Province, whence it could, if necessary, summon aid. Thus the troops were distributed in such a way as to safeguard the loyal, to overawe the disaffected, to cover the Province, and to be ready for mutual support.

<sup>1</sup> See Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 475, and Suetonius, *Divus Iulius*, 54.

<sup>2</sup> The habitat of the Ambivareti is uncertain. See p. 378.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE END OF THE STRUGGLE

THE victory at Alesia was decisive. Their great leader gone, 52 B.C. their entire host shattered, like a billow surging against a rock, by the little army which it had marched to destroy, the confederacy was dissolved as quickly as it had been formed.

Nevertheless some of the more resolute patriots were preparing to renew the struggle. They knew, indeed, that all the men whom they could muster had no chance of standing against Caesar in a pitched battle: but they allowed themselves to hope that, if they all rose simultaneously, his forces would not be strong enough to engage them all at once in detail. Such is the account, based probably upon the reports of Caesar's spies, which Aulus Hirtius<sup>1</sup> has given us. But it may perhaps be doubted whether the rebellious tribes had any such definite and concerted plan. It is probable that they were actuated, not jointly but severally, by sheer abhorrence of a foreign yoke, by sullen despair, by desire for plunder, perhaps by the vague hope that when Caesar was gone, his successor would leave such obstinate rebels to themselves.

The Bituriges, who had not forgotten the slaughter at Avaricum, were the first to stir. The single legion which had been quartered in their country was powerless to restrain them. Caesar was anxious to give a long rest to his soldiers, who were tired out by the extraordinary duration and severity of the late campaign: but before the year was out he took

<sup>1</sup> The last book of the *Commentaries on the Gallic War* was written, not by Caesar, but by his friend Aulus Hirtius.

51 B.C.

the field; and while the chiefs were still talking over their plans, another legion was upon them. Thousands of peasants were captured, while they were working in the fields: others had just time to flee: but hurry where they might, Caesar was too quick for them; and his swiftness so impressed men's minds that the friendly tribes saw that it was their interest to remain loyal to a Governor who was strong enough both to protect and to punish, while waverers hastened to sue for peace. Caesar sent the legions back to quarters with the promise of a substantial present for every officer and man; while he himself returned to his civil work at Bibracte. But in little more than a fortnight his rest was interrupted. When the humbled Bituriges begged for his aid against the Carnutes, who had turned upon them, he put two fresh legions in motion; and, on the mere rumour of his coming, the Carnutes fled in every direction. Chased from place to place by cavalry and auxiliary infantry, numbed by the cold and drenched by the rains, they finally dispersed among the neighbouring tribes; and their pursuers returned, laden with plunder. The lesson sufficed for the time: but the legions were left at Cenabum, to keep the unruly tribesmen in awe.

Campaign  
against the  
Bellovaci.

Still, there was another tribe to be reckoned with, the warlike Bellovaci, who, six years before, had headed the Belgic league. They had some grudge against the Suessiones, whom Caesar had placed in dependence upon his steady allies, the Remi, and were mustering their forces and those of the neighbouring tribes to attack them. The confederacy comprised the Atrebates, the Ambiani, the Vellocasses, the Caleti and the Eburonices, who inhabited the districts round Arras, Amiens, Rouen, Lillebonne and Evreux. The leaders were a Bellovacan chief called Correus, and Commius, whose spirit was not subdued by his defeat at Alesia. On Caesar's approach they established themselves in the forest of Compiègne, on Mont St. Marc, a hill protected by a marshy watercourse, which oozed northward into the river Aisne.<sup>1</sup> Caesar's force consisted of four legions, which, without reckoning auxiliaries, probably numbered about fifteen thousand men. He was very anxious to bring on a battle: but

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 803-8.

the enemy were too wary to quit their vantage ground: their <sup>51 B.C.</sup> numbers were great; and the hill, rising abruptly above the further side of the deep valley, was hard to ascend. Accordingly he encamped on Mont St. Pierre, the height just opposite theirs. The fortifications which he constructed were of extraordinary strength; for he hoped that the enemy would be emboldened by his caution to attack him, and, as his foragers were obliged to go long distances, it was necessary that the camp should be defensible by a comparatively small force. During the next four days frequent skirmishes took place: but nothing would induce the enemy to come out and hazard a general action. It was impossible to storm their camp without fearful bloodshed; and, as a large force was needed to invest it, Caesar sent for the three legions which he had left at Cenabum and in the country of the Bituriges.

When the rebel leaders heard of their approach, they remembered the dismal fate of Alesia, and determined to send off their non-combatants and baggage in the night. The long line of waggons was barely in motion when day broke, and the Romans caught sight of them. The enemy formed up in front of their camp to cover the retreat, intending to follow as soon as possible. Caesar was too wary to attempt to fight his way up that steep ascent: but he determined not to let the enemy move off unscathed. On their left and separated from their camp only by a narrow depression, was a plateau with gently sloping sides. Caesar rapidly bridged the marsh, led his troops across, ascended the plateau, and just on its edge placed engines to throw missiles against the enemy's masses. They dared not send off their troops, for fear they might become confused as they broke into detachments, and fall victims to the Roman cavalry. For some hours, therefore, they remained under arms. Caesar made a new camp on the plateau, formed up the legions in front of it, and kept the troop-horses bridled, ready to charge at a moment's notice. Towards nightfall, as the enemy could not remain where they were any longer without food, they had recourse to a stratagem. Bundles of straw and sticks were laid in front of the line and set ablaze. In a moment a vast wall of flame hid the entire multitude,



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and they instantly fled. Suspecting, though he could not see what they had done, Caesar made the legions advance cautiously, and sent his cavalry up the hill in pursuit. But the cavalry were afraid to ride through the fiery barrier; and a few bold troopers who spurred in, could hardly see their horses' heads for the smoke. Meanwhile the enemy were well on their way up the valley of the Aisne; and having crossed the Oise, of which it is a tributary, they encamped on Mont Ganelon in the plain beyond.

On the southern bank of the Aisne, in the angle formed by its confluence with the Oise, there was a large meadow, the luxuriance of which, Correus expected, would attract the Roman foragers. In the woods which encompassed this meadow he posted a strong force of horse and foot. Having learned his design from a prisoner, Caesar sent his cavalry and light-armed auxiliaries up the valley of the Aisne, and followed himself in support with the legions. Discerning the cavalry as they approached, the Gauls rode out from the wood and charged: but the disciplined squadrons sustained the shock with admirable coolness: supported by the auxiliaries, they baffled every effort to out-flank them; and they had already won the day when the infantry appeared. The flying Gauls, caught in their own trap, were hunted down and slaughtered in the woods and by the banks of the Oise. But Correus would neither yield nor fly. Standing alone upon the field, refusing to accept quarter, he struck fiercely at his opponents and wounded numbers of them, until, infuriated by his obstinacy, they hurled a volley of javelins into his body, and he fell dead.

This was the expiring effort of the Bellovaci. Commius escaped to wage a guerilla warfare, but ultimately made his peace with the conqueror, stipulating only that, as a concession to his fears, he might never again look upon the face of a Roman. Those who had remained in camp appealed to Caesar's clemency, and obtained a contemptuous forgiveness. •Their excuse was that Correus had stirred up the populace to rebel, in defiance of the senate. Caesar reminded them that they had borne arms against him before: it was easy to blame the dead, but no single man could raise a revolt





with the support of a mere rabble if the friends of order <sup>51 B.C.</sup> were determined to prevent him. From many parts people were actually emigrating, so intense was their reluctance to submit to the authority of Rome: but Caesar distributed his legions in such a way as to bar their escape. He himself marched against the Eburones, whom he had already so ruthlessly punished, and sent out flying columns everywhere to ravage, burn and slay. Ambiorix evidently was not to be captured: but Caesar resolved that the wretched man should never dare to show his face again among the people upon whom he had brought such a terrible doom.

The end was at hand. The most warlike states were subdued or overawed: only some tribes in the west were still restless. A rebel chief named Dumnacus, with a motley force from Brittany and the country round Orléans and Chartres, was besieging Lemonum, on the site of the modern Poitiers, in which an adherent of Caesar's had taken refuge. Two of Caesar's generals, Caninius and Fabius, compelled him to raise the siege; and while he was hurrying to escape across the Loire, Fabius pounced upon him and defeated him with heavy loss. The fugitives, rallied by an adventurer called Drappes and Lucterius, the chief who had so ably supported Vercingetorix, went off to plunder the Province: but, finding themselves hotly pursued by Caninius, threw themselves into the fortress of Uxellodunum, the modern Puy d'Issolu,<sup>1</sup> of which, before the great rebellion, Lucterius had been the over-lord.

They had hardly shut the gates before their pursuers arrived. The hill overlooked the left bank of the river Tourmente, which, about two miles to the south-west, emptied itself into the Dordogne. It rose fully six hundred feet above the valley; and steep rocks on every side forbade any attempt to ascend. Caninius, therefore, proceeded to invest the town. On the west, rising above the valley of the Tourmente, and on the north-east, linked to the stronghold by a broad neck of land, there were hills of considerable height. Caninius made two camps on the former and one on the latter, and began to connect them by a line of con-

Caninius  
and Fabius  
compel  
Dumnacus  
to raise the  
siege of  
Lemonum.

Drappes  
and Lucter-  
ius take  
refuge in  
Uxello-  
dunum.

Blockade  
of Uxello-  
dunum.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 493-504.

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travallation. Watching the progress of the works, the garrison remembered the story of Alesia: Lucterius had been there, and knew how Vercingetorix and his people had suffered; unless his own men bestirred themselves at once, they too would be starved into surrender. It was agreed that Lucterius and Drappes should make an attempt to procure supplies. On the following night, leaving two thousand men to hold the town, they stole out with the rest of the force. For several days they scoured the surrounding country, collecting corn. During this time they occasionally attacked the Romans by night with such vigour that Caninius was obliged to suspend the construction of his lines. One morning, in the early twilight, the Roman sentries heard an unusual noise: scouts were sent out, and returned with the news that a string of pack-horses was moving up a narrow path leading to the town. The troops instantly turned out: the drivers rushed helter-skelter down the hill; and the escort were slaughtered almost to a man. Lucterius with a few followers escaped. Within a few hours another division under Drappes, encamped a few miles off, was surprised; and every man who escaped the sword was made prisoner.

Next day Caninius was reinforced by the legions of Fabius, who had just concluded a most successful expedition along the valley of the Loire. Promptly following up his victory over Dumnacus, he had fallen upon the Carnutes, who, having suffered severely in that battle, were ill prepared to resist. This warlike people, who had never been thoroughly subdued, were now completely cowed and forced to give hostages; and the maritime states of Brittany, which, like them, had supported Dumnacus, hastened to follow their example. Caesar, who had been making a political progress, and trying to conciliate the humbled chiefs, was now at Cenabum. The Carnutes were still uneasy at the remembrance of the provocation which they had given *in the great revolt*; and it seemed likely that despair might drive them to fresh excesses. Caesar saw that the only way to restore their confidence was to make an example of the chief who had led them astray, and frankly forgive the rest.

He therefore demanded that Gutuatrus, who had been the <sup>51 B.C.</sup> author of the massacre at Cenabum in the preceding year, should be delivered up to him for punishment; and the people, eager to purchase the favour of the conqueror, hunted him down and brought him a prisoner into the Roman camp. Caesar, if Hirtius is to be believed, was unwilling to order his execution, but could not afford to disregard the clamours of the soldiery. But Caesar knew how to silence any clamour; and, if he had told the story himself, he would have told it without excuse. The wretched man was flogged till he was insensible; and his head was cut off. Execution of Gutuatrus.

Caesar now received a series of despatches informing him of the obstinate resistance of Uxellodunum. Contemptible as were the numbers of the rebels, their example might encourage other states to renew the wearing struggle. Only one more summer had to pass, as the malcontents had doubtless reckoned, and his government would be at an end.<sup>1</sup> But Caesar determined that, before that time, they should be forever subdued. Taking his cavalry with him, he hurried southward, followed by two legions, for Uxellodunum. Caesar marches for Uxellodunum.

He instantly detected the weak point in the enemy's position. His lieutenants had merely intended a blockade. But the garrison were amply provisioned;<sup>2</sup> and the only effectual way of reducing them was to cut off their supply of water. Archers, slingers and artillery were posted on the western bank of the Tourmente, so as to command every approach to the stream. Thus menaced, the enemy were afraid to descend; and thenceforward they could get no water except from a spring on the western slope of the hill. Opposite this spring, Caesar proceeded to construct a terrace. From the heights above, the enemy hurled down missiles; and many of the Romans were struck: but the rest toiled doggedly on; and the terrace was built up nearer and nearer still. A tower was erected upon it, of the extraordinary height of ten stories, high enough to overtop the spring; and He cuts off the garrison from their supply of water.

<sup>1</sup> See p. 809.

<sup>2</sup> It must be remembered that, although the attempt to procure fresh supplies had failed, the numbers of the garrison had been greatly reduced, and therefore there were far fewer people to feed.

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the garrison dared not approach under the shower of stones and arrows which its engines rained down. Men and cattle alike were parched by thirst. Torture and death stared them in the face. But there was the spring still gushing forth. As a last resource, the garrison set fire to a number of barrels, filled with pitch, grease and shavings, and rolled them on to the terrace. The woodwork and the sheds were presently in a blaze. The garrison with desperate energy flung down missiles to deter the Romans from advancing to put out the fire. But right up against the roaring flames, undaunted by the missiles, unheeding the sight of their falling comrades, the Roman soldiers pressed steadily on: with a mighty shout they answered their enemy's yells; and each man, eager that his valour should be observed, fought as he had never fought before. Still the flames shot up; and precious lives were sacrificed in vain. In this extremity, Caesar sent a number of cohorts to climb the hill and feign an assault upon the town. Panic-stricken, the garrison recalled their comrades from below; and the moment they had turned their backs, the Romans ran forward and extinguished the flames. Still the Gauls held out; for the spring itself was still untouched. At length, however, a party of sappers crept through a gallery which had been secretly driven into the hill-side to the source of the spring, and diverted its flow. Then at last, feeling that Heaven was fighting against them, the garrison surrendered.

Surrender  
of the  
garrison.

Their pun-  
ishment.

Caesar saw that, if these rebellions were to break forth again and again, his work would never be at an end. He determined, therefore, to inflict upon the garrison a punishment so appalling that all malcontents should in future remain quiet. He would not put his prisoners to death, because, if he did, their fate, though it might be talked of for a time, would soon be forgotten. They were to remain as a living warning to intending rebels. He ordered their hands to be cut off, and sent them forth to exist as they best might.

One notable survivor of the great rebellion was still at large. Lucterius, the lieutenant of Vercingetorix, a man who, as Caesar said, was ready to dare anything, had wandered far from Uxellodunum. He knew that for him there was no

forgiveness; and he went from place to place in fear of <sup>51 B.C.</sup> betrayal. At length he fell into the hands of a renegade Aeduan, who brought him in chains to Caesar; and what was his fate we can only guess.

But Caesar knew that conquest can never be complete until coercion has been followed by conciliation. In little more than a year he would be leaving the country; and he must contrive to leave it at peace. The time had not come, nor had he the authority to organise a government: it would be enough if his successors could enter upon that task without encountering opposition. He had no wish to oppress the Gauls, or to hurt their national pride: on the contrary, he desired that they should learn to feel themselves really citizens of Rome. He fixed their tribute at a moderate amount.<sup>1</sup> He did not interfere with their institutions, though he doubtless used his influence to promote his own adherents to power. He distinguished certain tribes, in which the party that adhered to Roman interests appeared sufficiently strong, by the bestowal of a comparatively free constitution. He loaded the chiefs with presents: he won their hearts by the charm of his address; and when he quitted Gaul, and threw down the gauntlet, on a wider arena, to a mightier foe, they sent their bravest warriors to fight under his flag.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 40,000,000 sesterces or about £400,000. See Suetonius, *Divus Iulius*, 25, and Mommsen's *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 283.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, viii. 49; Cicero, *Ep. ad Att.*, ix. 13; *B. C.*, i. 39, § 2; Suetonius, *Divus Iulius*, 25; F. de Coulanges, *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France,—la Gaule rom.*, 1891, 66, n. 1, 84, n. 1; Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, iii. 48-9.



## CHAPTER IX

### CONCLUSION

THE conquest of Gaul, fraught with illimitable issues, was at last complete.<sup>1</sup> Destiny had decided that Gaul was to be either German or Roman; and Caesar did not hesitate to grasp the gift of destiny for Rome. The Gallic warriors were perhaps as brave, man for man, as the Roman legionaries; and their numbers were far greater. But, whatever may have been their political capacity, when Caesar came among them they were only feeling after political union: they did not combine to expel him until it was too late, and not with a whole heart even then. With all their dash and nervous enthusiasm, they lacked the tenacity of the Roman: rushing vehemently to the attack, they fell away at the first reverse. This weakness, which Caesar so often notices, may have been inherent in the race: it may have been wholly or in part the result of a want of mutual confidence: but whatever the cause, the fact remained. Nor, for the most part, were the heterogeneous levies who opposed Caesar the equals of the purer Gauls who had routed a Roman army on

<sup>1</sup> This statement will naturally be taken in a general sense. The subjugation of the north-western part of the country was doubtless, as Mommsen says (*Hist. of Rome,—The Provinces*, i. 79), comparatively superficial: there was fighting in Aquitania in 38 and 28-27 B.C.; and there was a partial insurrection in the reign of Tiberius. Still, the thoroughness with which Caesar had done his work was demonstrated, first by the peace which prevailed during the civil war, when Gaul was almost entirely denuded of troops, and secondly by the fact that, during the long reign of Augustus, notwithstanding the disturbances in Germany, Gaul remained submissive, and that, as Monmsen puts it (*Ib.*, pp. 80-81), Vercingetorix found no successor. See also F. de Coulanges, *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France,—la Gaule rom.*, pp. 71-84, and Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, iii. 49-50.

the banks of the Allia. The Helvetii, the Parisii, the Senones and a few of the Belgic tribes alone maintained the ancient renown of the Celtic infantry. The Gauls had no regular army: they had no science: they had no discipline; and, until Vercingetorix arose, they had no great leader. Their conqueror, on the other hand, was master of a compact, disciplined and well-equipped army, the finest in the world:<sup>1</sup> he was free to pursue a definite aim in opposition to the sporadic efforts of his enemies; and, while he became a general only to achieve higher ends, he was one of the greatest generals that have ever lived. He knew that a well-organised commissariat is the foundation of success in war; and the truth of this maxim is borne in at every turn upon the reader of his memoirs. While his enemies were more than once obliged to strike prematurely or to disperse because they had not secured their means of subsistence, he was always able to keep his army together and to choose his own time. For a few days' raid the legionaries could carry their food on their backs: but whenever his operations were likely to be protracted, he stored his grain in magazines and provided for its transport and protection. He knew both how to govern and how to fascinate his soldiers, so that they would strain every nerve to win his praise,—all the more because they saw that he was more careful of their lives than of his own. Emergencies the most sudden and confounding, even when they resulted from his own mistakes, seemed only to make him more calm. He was not only master of all the science of his time, but he showed an inexhaustible fertility in inventing expedients. He concentrated his strength upon the decisive point: he was always ready to put everything to the hazard for a great end. He knew the rashness of his enemy, and lured him on by an affectation of fear. He confounded him by the swift-

<sup>1</sup> It has been asserted that the legionaries with whom Caesar conquered Gaul were themselves Gauls. No one could make a statement so misleading who had any knowledge of ethnology, or who had noted the emphasis with which Caesar marks the distinction, in regard to stature, between the Gauls and his legionaries (*B. G.*, *iii.* 30, § 4). All the legions which he raised during the Gallic war, with one possible exception (see p. 783, n. 2), were levied from the mixed population, composed of Italian, Gallic, Ligurian, and doubtless also Etruscan and aboriginal elements, which inhabited Piedmont and the Plain of Lombardy.

ness of his marches: he seized the best of the ground before he attacked; and when he had won the victory, he followed it up with an energy that overwhelmed.

Nor would it be just to forget the support which the general received from his lieutenants. Few of them failed to do what was required; and one may fairly rank among the great marshals of the world. The genius of Labienus has not been adequately appreciated: but it needs little insight to see that Caesar placed him in a class by himself. Caesar trusted him to the full; and, so long as his engagement lasted, that faithless man was true. The most difficult enterprises were imposed upon him; and he accomplished them all. He fulfilled his instructions to the letter: he assumed responsibilities without fear. Beset by dangers the most appalling, his judgement was unerring, his decision unfaltering. In the crisis of the most critical campaign he avenged his chief's defeat by victory: in the crisis of Alesia he repelled the fiercest onslaught, and struck the decisive blow; and throughout those eight years, from first to last, he never made a single mistake.

But Caesar's was the directing mind. And Caesar was much more than a great general. He was a far-seeing statesman and withal a dexterous politician. With cool calculation he took advantage of the fears, the necessities, the jealousies, the intestine broils, the spasmodic revolutions, the petty ambitions of those incoherent multitudes. For it must never be forgotten that, as we conquered India with the aid of Indians, Caesar conquered Gaul with the aid of Gauls. At first indeed he was welcomed as a deliverer; and when he had expelled the Helvetii and the Germans, it is doubtful whether he was generally feared as a conqueror. It was only when the presence of his legions was felt as a burden, and when ambitious adventurers saw reason to fear that he would blast their schemes, that he awakened partial opposition. The Gauls were not devoid of patriotism: but it was choked by the tares of jealousy; and when Vercingetorix was fighting for the fatherland, it is probable that there were many who had as much to fear from his success as from his failure. Those who courted Caesar's friendship and adhered to his cause,

were distinguished by every mark of favour, and might reckon with certainty upon his support. The Aedui adhered to him for six years, and when they changed their minds they found that they had served his turn: the Remi saw from the first that he was going to win, and, having made their choice, they abided by it to the end. The Aquitanians cared nothing for the Gauls, and their isolated resistance was paralysed in a single campaign. The Celticans, with the exception of the maritime tribes, submitting, for the most part, without an effort, looked on, with folded hands,<sup>1</sup> until, at the eleventh hour, Vercingetorix roused them to a convulsive resistance; and then the Belgæ, who had hitherto borne the brunt of the struggle, held aloof until it was too late.

It has been said that it is impossible to conquer a people who are determined to be free. Perhaps, in our modern age; and doubtless in every age, when the people dwell in a country which nature has fortified, and when they are brave, numerous, and of one mind. But Caesar succeeded, as William the Conqueror succeeded, not merely because the people with whom he had to deal were disunited, but also because he was prepared to go any lengths rather than fail. The Gauls were willing to sacrifice myriads of lives, so they might preserve their liberty? Then he would slay a million, aye and slay women and children, and ravage their lands, and burn their houses over their heads, and lop off their limbs, so he might at last subdue them! And, though he was ruthless, he was also merciful.<sup>2</sup> When he had beaten down opposition, he held out his hand in friendship; and the Gauls took it, and bore him no grudge.

And when he had gone, what motive had they to rebel? Many of the states retained administrative independence; and none had exchanged independence for servitude. National independence they had never had; for they had never been a united nation. As a nation, they could make no effort to throw off the Roman yoke; for there was none among them who could command the confidence of the nation, or weld it

<sup>1</sup> Unless the Treveri are to be counted as Celtæ (see pp. 384-5).

<sup>2</sup> *In Caesare hæc sunt: mitis clemensque natura.* So wrote Cicero in 46 B.C. (*Ep. ad Fam.*, vi. 6, § 8).

into a coherent whole. Many of the smaller peoples had already been in subjection to powerful neighbours; and it was less humiliating to obey an alien master than one of their own race. Rome was distant; and her glory wrought upon the imagination. Rome was the resistless power which, for centuries, had been bringing, one after another, the nations of the earth within her empire. Jealousies were hushed beneath her sway. Her yoke was easy; and her rule brought peace, security and prosperity. If adventurers in Gaul, as in India, regretted the good old days when they could win thrones by their wits and their swords, the many gained more than they had lost; and so it happened that the few spasmodic outbreaks which followed Caesar's departure were foredoomed to failure, and that his conquest was effected once for all.

## PART II

QUESTIONS OF GALLIC AND GALLO-ROMAN HISTORY  
RELATING TO THE FOREGOING NARRATIVE



## PART II

### QUESTIONS OF GALLIC AND GALLO-ROMAN HISTORY RELATING TO THE FOREGOING NARRATIVE

#### SECTION I.—FUNDAMENTAL

#### THE MSS. AND THE EDITIONS OF THE *COMMENTARIES* ON THE *GALLIC WAR*

FOR my own satisfaction I have studied the correlation and the value of the various MSS.: but, as I am not editing the *Commentaries*, I should be wasting time and space if I were to discuss the question in detail. For the number of passages in which, for historical purposes, textual criticism is important, is small; and all those passages will be found fully discussed in subsequent articles. It is sufficient to say that the MSS. which are alone worth considering are generally divided into two classes known as  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ , derived from a common original or archetype, not now extant, called  $\lambda$ . The  $\beta$  MSS. were rated very low by C. Nipperdey in his *Questiones Cæsarianae* (pp. 37-46), which form the introduction to his famous edition of the *Commentaries*: but in framing his text he himself was often compelled to have recourse to them; and the best modern critics, including H. J. Heller, H. Walther, R. Richter, Rudolf Schneider, B. Kubler and H. Meusel, agree that Nipperdey greatly under-estimated their value.<sup>1</sup> That those critics are right no one who reads Richter's *Kritische Bemerkungen zu Cæsars Comm. de b. G.* (1889) will deny.

In referring to the MSS., I generally use the symbols adopted by Meusel, namely

$\lambda$  = codex Bongarsianus (or Amstelodamensis 81) of the 9th or 10th century.

$\beta$  = Parisinus I (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, 5763, 9th or 10th century).

$\mu$  = Vaticanus (Vatican, 3864, 10th century).

$Q$  = Moysiacensis (Paris, Bibl. nat., 5056, 12th century).

$S$  = Ashburnhamianus (Bibl. Laurent. R. 33, 10th century).

$\alpha$  = Parisinus II or Thuanus (Paris, Bibl. nat., 5764, 11th century).

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<sup>1</sup> None of the extant  $\beta$  MSS. were written before the eleventh century; but it is certain that Orosius, who wrote in the early part of the fifth century, used a MS. of this class. See R. Schneider in *Jahresberichte des philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xi. 1885, p. 164.




*f* = Vindobonensis I (Bibl. Vindob. [Vienna], 95, 12th century).

*h* = Ursinianus (Vatican, 3324, 11th century).

*l* = Riccardianus (Bibl. Riccard. [Florence], 541, 11th or 12th century).

Meusel traces the pedigree of these MSS. as follows:—



I have myself collated with Meusel's edition, for the whole of the first *Commentary*, and for every passage in the remaining seven of which it appeared necessary, from a historical standpoint, to determine the text, the two best MSS. in the British Museum,—Add. MSS. 10,084, of the eleven<sup>th</sup> century, which agrees generally, though not invariably with  $\alpha$ , and Add. MSS. 17,440, which nearly always agrees with the former in those passages in which it differs from  $\alpha$ .

The editions which I have principally used are those of J. Davis (1706), F. Oudendorp (1737), N. L. Achaintre (1820), C. E. C. Schneider (1840-55), C. Nipperdey (1847), G. Long (1880 [1859]), A. Frigell (1861), F. Dubner (1867), C. E. Moberly (1884 [1870]), A. Holder (1882), A. G. Peskett (1879-85), F. Kraner and W. Dittenberger (1890), B. Kübler (1893), and H. Meusel (1894). Others, which I have had occasion to consult, are referred to in various notes in Part II. H. Meusel's great *Lexicon Cæsarianum* (1887-93) I have found absolutely invaluable.

Those who wish to study the problems presented by the MSS. should read Schneider's edition (vol. i. pp. xxxvi.-lii.), Nipperdey's edition (pp. 37-49), Kübler's edition (pp. iii.-x.), Meusel's edition (pp. v.-ix.), the prefaces to vols. i. and ii. of Meusel's *Lexicon, Philologus*, xvii., 1861, pp. 492-509, H. Walther (*De Cæsaris codicibus interpolatis*, 1885), R. Richter (*Kritische Bemerkungen zu Cæsars Comm. vii. de b. G.*, 1889), and two articles by H. Meusel in *Jahresberichte des philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xi., 1885, pp. 173-204, xii., 1886, pp. 262-93. Regarding the principles of textual criticism in general, I do not know a better guide than the essay of Westcott and Hort (*The New Testament in the original Greek*, 1885, pp. 542-7, 562-5).

## WHEN DID CAESAR WRITE THE *COMMENTARIES ON THE GALLIC WAR*, AND WHEN WERE THEY PUBLISHED?

The common view is that Caesar wrote the *Commentaries on the Gallic War* after the conclusion of his Seventh Campaign, which took place in 52 B.C. There are varieties of opinion as to the exact time: but on the main point almost all Caesarian scholars are now of one mind.<sup>1</sup> It is certain that the book was published not later than 46 B.C.; for it is noticed in Cicero's *Brutus* (75, § 262), which appeared in that year.

<sup>1</sup> See *Jahresberichte d. philol. Vereins*, xvii., 1891, p. 258.

## WHEN DID CAESAR WRITE *COMMENTARIES*? 167

There is no direct evidence that it was either written or published earlier: but it is most unlikely that Caesar would have had time or inclination to write it during the intense labour and distraction of the civil war; and it may be that, as Mommsen says,<sup>1</sup> it was intended "to justify . . . before the public the formally unconstitutional enterprise of Caesar in conquering a great country and constantly increasing his army for that object without instructions."<sup>2</sup>

Schneider argues<sup>3</sup> that if Caesar had been writing his *Commentaries* during the successive years of the Gallic war, Cicero, whose brother, Quintus, and whose intimate friend, Trebatius, were serving on Caesar's staff, and who himself corresponded with Caesar, could not have been kept in ignorance of the fact; and that, if Cicero had been aware of it, he would certainly not have kept it to himself. To which I answer that Caesar knew how to keep his own counsel.

Schneider also argues that Caesar probably published his book in the spring of 51 B.C., as a counter-stroke to the attack of M. Marcellus, who had just brought forward a motion in the Senate that he should be superseded before the expiration of his term of office. I agree with Nipperdey that this argument is weak. Schneider concludes that the book was written in the latter part of 52 and the early part of 51.<sup>4</sup>

M. P. Fabia<sup>5</sup> holds with Schneider that the *Commentaries* were written after the Seventh Campaign, in the winter of 52-51 B.C. first, because Caesar then had abundant leisure; secondly, because his enemies at Rome were then very active, and he would have been anxious to counteract their machinations; and thirdly, because, on this hypothesis, we can understand why he omitted to describe the Eighth Campaign. None of these reasons is conclusive. From the very beginning of the year 51, Caesar was hard at work, campaigning against the Bituriges, the Carnutes, the Bellovaci and the Cadurci. In the last two or three months of 52 he was comparatively at leisure: but the winter must have been one of the busiest that he spent during the whole war. Secondly, if his enemies were active then, they were also active before and afterwards. Thirdly, to account for his not having described the Eighth Campaign, we need only suppose that he was called away to more pressing duties when he had only just finished his narrative of the Seventh.

Nipperdey<sup>6</sup> believes that the book was written after the war, in the leisure of winter-quarters, and, so to speak, in one heat; and in support of this opinion, he quotes Hirtius, who writes *ceteri enim quam bene atque emendate, nos etiam quam facile atque celeriter eos perfecere, scimus*.<sup>7</sup> But Hirtius only says that the *Commentaries* were written "easily and

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 604-5.

<sup>2</sup> See, however, my essay on "The Credibility of Caesar's Narrative," pp. 194-5.

<sup>3</sup> Wachler's *Philomathie von Freunden der Wissenschaft und Kunst*, i., 1818. pp. 180-82.

<sup>4</sup> Schneider says 50 in his article in Wachler's *Philomathie*, and 51 in his edition of the *Commentaries*, vol. i. p. xxxi.

<sup>5</sup> *De orationibus quae sunt in Comm. Caesaris de B. G.*, 1889, pp. 19-20.

<sup>6</sup> *Caesar*, pp. 3-5.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, viii., Praef. § 6.

rapidly," which is not necessarily inconsistent with the view that each book was written during the comparative leisure of the winter following the campaign which it described.

Nipperdey<sup>1</sup> goes on to say that, even during the winter of 52-51 B.C., which followed the rebellion of Vercingetorix, Caesar had his hands full;<sup>2</sup> but that in the year 50 he had nothing to disturb him. He concludes that the first seven books were written during the year that preceded the outbreak of the civil war; and, believing that Caesar would certainly have finished his narrative if he had had time, he argues that he was interrupted by the outbreak of hostilities, and published the book in the first stage of the war.

Dr. Georg Mezger, who agrees, in the main, with Schneider, remarks that Caesar, in his account of the campaign in the Valais, judiciously minimised Galba's culpability, with the view of securing his fidelity during the coming struggle with Pompey; and he infers that the account in question could not have been written before the end of the Seventh Campaign.<sup>3</sup> It must be obvious, I think, that this argument rests upon a very unsubstantial foundation. Besides, Caesar's account<sup>4</sup> enables us to see what Galba's mistakes were.

Schneider<sup>5</sup> maintains that no one who has read the remarks which Caesar made about Pompey in his *Commentaries on the Civil War* can believe that he would have had the magnanimity to praise him, as he did, in his *Seventh Commentary on the Gallic War*,<sup>6</sup> if he had written the latter after his breach with Pompey. I confess that I have a higher opinion of Caesar's magnanimity than Schneider.<sup>7</sup> But the true reasons for deciding that the *Commentaries on the Gallic War* were written before the outbreak of the civil war are, first that Caesar would not have had time to write them during that war, and secondly that it was to his interest to bring them out before the war began.

Professor E. G. Sihler<sup>8</sup> argues that the book could not have been written before the winter of 52-51 B.C., because nearly all the speeches

<sup>1</sup> *Caesar*, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup> I am not convinced of the truth of this view. Throughout the autumn of 1842 and the first six months of 1843 Sir Charles Napier was occupied in Sind with political and military work of the most engrossing kind. He was an old man, and he often complained that his power of work was not what it had been. Yet, over and above the anxious and heavy labour of negotiation and campaigning, which, for some months, was carried on in a most trying climate, over and above the task of writing frequent despatches to Lord Ellenborough, he found time to write up an exhaustive journal and long letters to his brother William. Caesar was in the prime of life: his power of work was enormous: he had at all events some weeks of comparative leisure at Bibracte; and therefore I doubt whether Nipperdey is justified in saying that he could not have found time to write his book in the winter of 52-51.

<sup>3</sup> *Ueber die Abfassungszeit von Cäsar's Comm. über den gall. Krieg*, 1874-5, pp. 4, 11-12.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 3, § 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Caesar*, ii. 342.

<sup>6</sup> *Ch. 6*, § 1.

<sup>7</sup> So also, I find, has Nipperdey. See pp. 3-4 of his *Quaestiones*. Caesar does not abuse Pompey in the *Civil War*: he simply narrates.

<sup>8</sup> *Classical Review*, May, 1890, p. 199.

are thrown into the form of *Oratio Obliqua*,—"a literary peculiarity utterly at variance with the literary habit of Greece and Rome and with the culture and training of the day." The one important exception, he continues,—the speech of Critognatus,—was a "recent matter when Caesar wrote." This is a very weak argument. Caesar was no more able to report Critognatus's speech accurately *verbatim* than those of any of the other persons the gist of whose utterances he professed to give. Does Professor Sihler suppose that he had a special correspondent, who could write short-hand, in Alesia; or that he could by any possibility have learned more from prisoners than the drift of what Critognatus said? He wrote this speech in *Oratio Recta* not because he remembered or had ever known what Critognatus said, but because he thought fit, once in a way, to study rhetorical effect. As to the other speeches, he could easily have thrown them into the form of *Oratio Recta*, if he had cared to do so.<sup>1</sup>

Long,<sup>2</sup> on the other hand, believes that Caesar wrote his *Commentaries* during his campaigns. "There are inconsistencies in the work," he says, "which are not inconsistencies if the books were written as the events happened. There is a brevity, sometimes an incompleteness in the narrative, which I have observed in many writers, who are writing of things before them, which are plain enough to them then, but would not seem so plain to them if they wrote afterwards. They would feel certain difficulties themselves and try to remove them for others. It is impossible to understand the attack on Gergovia, unless a man has seen the place or has a perfect map of it." Nor is this his only argument. Speaking of the three chapters<sup>3</sup> which Caesar devotes to the geography of Britain and the manners and customs of its inhabitants, he says, "It has been remarked that this digression would have been just as appropriate in the fourth book as here; and so it would if Caesar had been writing a history. But he wrote his *Commentarii* as the events occurred, and according to the plan of his work it would have been absurd to insert in the fourth book what he did not know when he wrote it. If we compare the little that he could learn about Britain before he sailed on his first expedition (iv. 20) with what he tells us here, it is plain that in his fourth book he wrote down what he knew at the time; and in this, his fifth, he wrote down what he learned in his second expedition."<sup>4</sup> Alluding to Caesar's report of the exaggerated statement of the Nervian old men regarding the losses which their people had suffered in the battle on the Sambre, Long says, "In ii. 23 it is said that nearly all the fighting men of the nation were destroyed. Schneider thinks that what is said in the second book could hardly have been written by a man who knew the fact of this fresh rising of the Nervii and remembered it. But the evidence that the same man wrote both is the same as the evidence that he wrote

<sup>1</sup> See my essay on "The Credibility of Caesar's Narrative," pp. 175-6. There are brief speeches in *Oratio Recta* in *B. G.*, vi. 35, §§ 8-9; vii. 20, §§ 8, 12, 38, §§ 7-8, 50, §§ 4, 6.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, p. xiii.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, v. 12-14.

<sup>4</sup> Long's *Caesar*, pp. 229-30.

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either, or any other part of these *Commentarii*. The true conclusion is, that he wrote both at the time of the events. In the second book he wrote that he had nearly destroyed the Nervii, and he might suppose so."<sup>1</sup> Finally, commenting on a passage which occurs in Caesar's description of his decisive movement at Alesia,—“*Eius adventu ex colore vestitus cognito . . . turmisque equitum et cohortibus visis, quas se sequi iusserat, ut de locis superioribus haec declivia et dereza cernebantur, hostes proelium committunt,*”—Long observes that the phrase *haec declivia*, etc. “is the true expression of a man who writes with the facts fresh in his recollection: he speaks of these movements along the descent to the level ground being seen by the enemy from the higher ground.”<sup>2</sup>

Long's arguments are always interesting: but I do not think that these are conclusive. Caesar does not say himself in his Second Book that the Nervian militia had been reduced from 60,000 to 500; he only says that their representatives said so. It is true that he says that the Nervian people had been well-nigh exterminated (*prope ad interuiccionem gente ac nomine Nerviorum redacto*): but perhaps this was only a flourish.<sup>3</sup> Again, whether he wrote his *Commentaries* year by year, or all at once, he did not profess to write a regular history; and it does not seem to me at all incredible that, if he wrote them rapidly in one heat, he should have described the manners and customs of the Britons in his Fifth instead of in his Fourth Book. And, with regard to the passage in the Seventh Book, on which Long lays so much stress, it must be remembered that, even if Caesar wrote all the *Commentaries* at once, the facts connected with the siege of Alesia, which took place in 52 B.C., must have been fresh in his memory.

De Belloguet<sup>4</sup> takes the same view as Long. He asserts that various statements which Caesar makes about Britain<sup>5</sup> are inconsistent. I can only discover one instance of inconsistency; and that one is, I think, more apparent than real. In *B. G.* iv. 20, § 3, Caesar says that none of the Gauls readily undertook a journey to Britain, except merchants (*neque . . . temere praefer mercatores illo adit quisquam*). In vi. 13, § 11, he says that those who desired to make a special study of Druidical lore generally went to Britain for the purpose (*disciplina in Britannia reperta atque inde in Galliam translata esse existimatur, et nunc qui diligentius eam rem cognoscere volunt plerumque illo discendi causa proficiscuntur*). But there is no real inconsistency between these statements. No one undertook the journey readily (*temere*) or as an ordinary affair except the merchants. Students did undertake the journey, but not *temere*: they had a serious object in view. Besides, even if there were any inconsistency between the two statements, that would only prove that in the former, Caesar, writing rapidly, as he did, made a slip.

<sup>1</sup> Long's *Caesar*, p. 254.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, p. 405.

<sup>3</sup> It must be remembered that many of the Nervians who fought at the end of 54 B.C. were doubtless too young to fight at the beginning of 54.

<sup>4</sup> *Ethnogenie gauloise*, 1858-68, iii. 157-8.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 4, § 7; iii. 8, § 1; iv. 20-21; v. 12; vi. 13, § 11.

Again, in support of the theory of intermittent authorship, de Belloquet says that Caesar's narrative does not bear out the statement which he makes, in his opening chapter, regarding the difference between the Celtæ and the Belgæ; and therefore that we may conclude that, when he made that statement, he was ill informed. But it may be replied, first, that we have no right to expect that Caesar should furnish instances in detail of the difference which he states as a broad fact; and secondly that, in regard to some at least of the Belgic tribes,—the Nervii, the Morini, the Menapii, the Treveri and the Eburones,—his narrative *does* bear out that statement.

A. Köhler<sup>1</sup> has lately revived the theory of intermittent authorship, in a modified form. Caesar, he says, in the Fourth Book, describes as peculiar to the Suevi manners and customs which, in the Sixth, he describes as common to the Germans generally. As, moreover, there are inconsistencies, regarding the Nervii, between the Second Book and the Fifth and Sixth, Köhler concludes that the *Commentaries* were written in two instalments, the former comprising the first four books, and the latter the last three.

The argument relating to the Nervii has been already noticed. There is certainly a general resemblance between Caesar's descriptions of the Suevi and of the Germans generally: but the description in the Sixth Book omits statements which are contained in the Fourth, and adds others which are not contained in it.

I do not believe that the question can ever be decisively settled; for the opposing arguments are nearly equally balanced. Long is right when he says<sup>2</sup> that "the best way of judging is to read the book rapidly, but carefully, when a man has mastered it as well as he can." Setting aside the statement of Hirtius, the strongest argument in support of the prevalent theory is to be found in a statement which Caesar makes in *B. G.*, i. 28, § 5. He says that the Aedui assigned lands to the Boii, and afterwards admitted them to equal rights. If the *First Commentary* was written immediately after the first campaign, this passage, it should seem, must have been added at some later time. Personally, I cannot see any difficulty in supposing that it was. On the other hand, the words of Hirtius<sup>3</sup> appear to suggest that, having been on intimate terms with Caesar, he had himself witnessed the rapidity with which he wrote his *Commentaries*; and if so, it seems probable that they were written at one time; for the other theory would oblige us to assume that Hirtius regularly spent his winters with Caesar in Cisalpine Gaul. Therefore, although the truth may be that Caesar wrote his narrative of each campaign from his notes in the following winter, and made alterations and additions at various times, I am rather inclined to accept the orthodox view. However, to quote Long once more, "if he did

<sup>1</sup> *Blätter f. d. bayerische Gym.*, xxvii., 710-15, reviewed by R. Schneider in *Jahresberichte d. philol. Vereins*, xvii., 1891, pp. 257-9.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, p. xii.

<sup>3</sup> *Cuius tamen rei maior nostra quam reliquorum est admiratio; ceteri enim quam bene atque emendate, nos etiam quam facile atque celeriter eos perfecere scimus.*

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write them at the end of the war, he had ample memoranda to help him." <sup>1</sup>

Mommsen <sup>2</sup> argues that the work must have been not only written but published before the end of 51 B.C., because, in *B. G.*, vii. 6, § 1, Caesar "approves the exceptional laws of 702 (B.C. 52). This he might and could not but do, so long as he sought to bring about a peaceful accommodation with Pompeius, but not after the rupture, when he reversed the condemnations that took place on the basis of those laws injurious to him." But why should not the publication have taken place in 50 B.C.? Even in 49 Caesar tried to bring about a peaceful accommodation. <sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Caesar*, p. 423.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 605, note.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, i. 9-10. 24. §§ 5 6 etc.

## THE CREDIBILITY OF CAESAR'S NARRATIVE

### I

FOR the history of the first seven years of Caesar's conquest of Gaul our principal authority is Caesar himself. It is, of course, as I have shown in the Preface, impossible to grasp the full meaning of his narrative unless one has studied the works of the modern scholars who have contributed so much to the task of solving the various problems which the *Commentaries* present. It is true, moreover, as I have also remarked, that later writers, such as Suetonius, Plutarch and Dion Cassius, make certain statements, true or false, which are not to be found in Caesar. But Caesar is the authority; and if he is a bad one, all the commentators in the world can do little to mend his work. It becomes necessary, then, to inquire how far Caesar's narrative is worthy of credit. From this point of view, the earliest extant criticism is that of Asinius Pollio, who died A.D. 4. According to Suetonius,<sup>1</sup> Asinius Pollio thought that the *Commentaries* were written carelessly and with little regard for truth; that Caesar accepted, without due inquiry, the accounts of his lieutenants; and that, either intentionally or from failure of memory, he was inaccurate in describing what he had done himself.

The Duc d'Aumale, whose essay on Alesia in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of May, 1858, is one of the best of the countless monographs which the study of Caesar has produced, remarks<sup>2</sup> that Pollio was at heart a republican, and that his judgement, in this case, was hard and perhaps unjust. The opinion of Long is also worth quoting; for his admiration of Caesar was by no means unqualified; he had great knowledge of men and was gifted with shrewdness and strong sense; and, if he was dogmatic in maintaining his own opinion, he was keen to detect weak spots in the testimony of others. "A man of his talent and wonderful diligence," he writes,<sup>3</sup> "must have been accurate; and a man of his fearless, generous, and proud character could hardly be a liar. His work was published very soon after the Gallic war was ended, and there were plenty of people who could tell whether it was true or false. . . . After the fashion of Roman commanders, Caesar sent despatches to the Senate, which existed even in the time of Suetonius. He could not

<sup>1</sup> *Divus Iulius*, ch. 56.—Pollio Asinius parum diligenter parumque integra veritate compositos putat, cum Caesar pleraque et quae per alios erant gesta temere crediderit et quae per se vel consulto vel etiam memoria lapsus perperam ediderit.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2<sup>e</sup> période, t. xv., 1858, p. 118.

<sup>3</sup> *Caesar*, pp. xiii.-xiv.



well write in his *Commentarii* anything that contradicted his despatches; and I do not see why we should doubt the truth of his despatches without any evidence." Of course it is impossible to say with certainty how far Pollio was right:<sup>1</sup> but one who has had considerable experience in writing contemporary history from original sources may perhaps form a tolerably just idea of the significance of his opinion. When Sir William Napier published his *History of the Peninsular War*, officers who had taken part in the events which he described hastened to point out mistakes in his narrative; and he himself, half humorously, half despairingly remarked that, after all the care which he had taken, his book was "full of lies."<sup>2</sup> Many of his brother-officers, however, bore testimony to his general accuracy. Sir John Kaye, Mr. Kinglake, all in fact who have written history which was open to the criticisms of the actors, must have had a similar experience. Possibly the opinion of Pollio, who took no part himself in the Gallic war, was founded upon criticisms like these. Caesar inevitably made mistakes; and Pollio may have conversed with eye-witnesses who pointed out these mistakes, who were perhaps aggrieved by them, and who, exaggerating their significance, as men devoid of the sense of historical proportion will always do, shrugged their shoulders and exclaimed, "Such is history." It may even be true, as Dr. Georg Mezger<sup>3</sup> thinks, that Pollio's criticism was only directed against the *Commentaries on the Civil War*, the history of which Pollio himself wrote. Anyhow, as Mezger goes on to observe,<sup>4</sup> the only other contemporary criticisms of the *Gallic War* that we possess,—those of Cicero and Hirtius,—are favourable; and if Caesar had been a dishonest or grossly inaccurate writer, it would be remarkable that there should be absolutely no evidence that any of his statements was ever expressly contradicted. His accuracy, as a narrator of details, has been confirmed, on various points, by modern investigations. When he is writing military history, pure and simple, for example chapters 39 to 84 of the First Book of the *Civil War*, his general trustworthiness, to a critical reader, is as self-evident as his skill. No one who reads his book can deny that he was gifted, in an extraordinary degree, with the faculty of observation. Most of the operations which he describes were performed under his own eye: he had opportunities for observing what took place in a battle or a siege which a modern general, whose view is obscured by smoke, cannot have; and it is important to notice that he rarely indulges in that sort of detailed description which gives rise to most of the mistakes that occur in modern military history. This is a point which I could not make perfectly clear to a "general reader" unless he would bear with me

<sup>1</sup> F. Seck (*De C. J. Caesaris comm. fide*, part ii., 1864, pp. 8-10) maintains that Pollio's criticisms on Livy and Sallust (for which see C. L. Roth's edition of Suetonius, 1893, pp. 261-2) were fair, and argues that we may therefore accept his criticism of Caesar. But the two former judgements refer only to style; and we do not even know whether the criticism of Caesar was directed against the *Gallic War*. See the next note but one.

<sup>2</sup> *Life of Gen. Sir William Napier*, edited by H. A. Bruce, 1864, i. 448.

<sup>3</sup> *Ueber die Abfassungszeit von Cäsar's Comm. über den gall. Krieg*, 1874-75, p. 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.* See Cicero, *Brutus*, 75, 262, and *B. G.*, viii., Praef. § 5.

while I explained to him the labour which I have myself undergone in writing an account of a modern battle, and the process by which I have been enabled to correct mistakes which had crept into my original draft. But all who have tried their hands at writing military history from original sources will understand what I mean. As a rule, Caesar gives us only the outline of a battle,—he tells us just so much as may enable us to understand the moves, to differentiate his account from his accounts of other battles, and no more.

It may perhaps be impertinent to remark that lapse of time does not breed mistakes in a historical narrative. But nothing would be more natural than for the general reader, especially if he had been taught to believe that history is a "Mississippi of falsehood," to say in his haste, How can we know anything about the details of battles that happened 2000 years ago? Well, if Caesar was an honest writer, when we are reading his *Commentaries*, we are in much the same position as we should be if, for our knowledge of the Peninsular war, we depended mainly upon a volume of Memoirs by the Duke of Wellington. Caesar sent despatches to the Senate, and it may be assumed that he kept copies of them: his generals sent despatches to him; and if he did not write his commentary on each campaign as he fought it, he certainly finished the whole work within two years after the close of the war.<sup>1</sup> His account, therefore, was strictly a contemporary account by the eye-witness who had the best eyes and the most favourable point of view; and it remains as accurate to-day as when it was first penned.

## II

But one may accept his narrative as generally trustworthy without claiming for him immunity from error. The speeches which he puts into the mouths of Vercingetorix and others may have been composed from information supplied by Vercingetorix himself or by prisoners: but when one remembers the license which was assumed by ancient historians in this respect, one naturally asks whether all his speeches are even substantially true. M. P. Fabia<sup>2</sup> argues that, as Caesar undoubtedly drew upon his imagination in writing some of his speeches, for instance the speech which he put into the mouth of Critognatus,<sup>3</sup> we are justified in believing that he did not always tell the simple truth even when he knew it. But there is no proof that he drew upon his imagination for the outline even in writing the speech of Critognatus. The words in which he clothed it being, contrary to his custom, cast in the form of *Oratio Recta*, were of course his own. But the substance is another matter. M. Fabia says that Caesar could not have known anything of what Critognatus said, except his proposal to kill the non-combatants for food.<sup>4</sup> But, if he was informed of this, why should he not also have been informed of the drift of the orator's arguments? As M.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 166-72, *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> *De orationibus quæ sunt in Comm. Caesaris de B. G.*, 1889, pp. 91-2.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 77.

<sup>4</sup> *De orationibus*, etc., pp. 23-4.

Fabia himself admits, it was not Caesar's manner to set down anything merely for literary effect;<sup>1</sup> and his critic forgets that he could have questioned Vercingetorix, who had been in Alesia with Critognatus, and who would doubtless have been glad, after his surrender, to talk over the events of the war. Still I can conceive that, on this occasion, Caesar did give the rein to his imagination. He was conscious of his own oratorical powers; and very likely he was tempted to show, for once, that he could do something in the style of Thucydides, which even Cicero might read with admiration.

Again, M. Fabia contends that Caesar, in writing his speeches, must have trusted almost entirely to his memory, because, if he had caused any memoranda to be made, they were certainly very brief.<sup>2</sup> This is a pure assumption; and are not the speeches themselves very brief?

At the same time, M. Fabia remarks with justice that, in composing his speeches, Caesar was far more careful of truth than any other ancient historian, as may be inferred from the fact that most of the speeches were very brief, and were written in *Oratio Obliqua*, which proves that he only professed to give the drift of what was said.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, M. Fabia observes, Caesar had less temptation to invent than other historians: for he inserted speeches in his narrative not for literary effect, but simply in order to serve a political purpose.<sup>4</sup>

What was this political purpose? To put his own actions, says M. Fabia, in the most favourable, that of his enemies in the most unfavourable light. He was eager, proceeds the critic, to make his readers believe that he was devoted to the interests of Rome; that he held the Senate in high respect; that he treated his soldiers well, and was beloved by them; that he was most careful to protect the allies of Rome; and that his enemies were perfidious.<sup>5</sup> Very likely! But what if all this was true? What is more certain than that he did treat his soldiers well, and was beloved by them? Why should it be harder to believe that he was devoted to the interests of Rome than that Warren Hastings was devoted to the interests of England,—both, *bien entendu*, being also devoted to the interests of self? As for the Senate, he simply used its name to conjure with in negotiating with Ariovistus, just as Warren Hastings may have used the names of his masters in Leadenhall Street. No unbiassed critic could find a word in the passages which M. Fabia quotes to show that he was anxious to impress *his readers* with the belief that he personally revered his nominal masters. Of course he was careful to protect the allies of Rome, because that was the best way to protect himself. Finally, I can see no reason to distrust what he tells us about the perfidy of certain of his enemies, nor can I discover any traces of indignation, real or simulated, in what he says of them,—always excepting Ambiorix.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *De orationibus*, etc., pp. 13, 39.    <sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, p. 21.    <sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, p. 92.    <sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, p. 93.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 36-7, 39, 44, 63. M. Fabia refers to *B. G.*, i. 43, 11, 14, 17-18, 30-36, 43-5; iv. 6; v. 3, 6, 27, 55; vii. 17, 19, 32, 37, 43, 52, 54.

<sup>6</sup> See *B. G.*, vi. 34, § 5, and Long's note (*Caesar*, p. 317) on this passage. Even the treachery of Ariovistus and of the cavalry of the Usipetes and Tencteri is simply recorded.

## III

So much for the speeches. More serious charges have been brought against the general tone of his narrative. It has been alleged that he wrote with a political purpose; and that he was consequently led to omit facts which would have told against himself, to invent plausible motives for his more questionable actions, and to bring false charges against his enemies. The popular judgement at Rome, argues the Duc d'Aumale, whose criticism is singularly fair and on the whole highly favourable, was sure to be indulgent to and not over critical of an account of victory over Rome's ancient enemies; while Caesar's lieutenants, even those who opposed him in the civil war, "étaient intéressés à ne pas diminuer la valeur d'un livre qui était pour eux aussi un monument de gloire."<sup>1</sup> The critic, I may remark in passing, fails to notice that, if the popular judgement was sure to be so favourable, that was the very reason why Caesar could afford to tell the truth. When and why Caesar wrote his book,—these are questions which have a literature of their own, to which I have myself ventured to add.<sup>2</sup> For my present purpose, however, it is unnecessary to discuss either question. I am quite ready to believe that *one* of Caesar's motives was to conciliate public opinion in view of the civil war. But I believe that this object was to be attained by a truthful just as well as by a distorted narrative.

I know only one way of testing the credibility of Caesar's memoirs; and that is to take every charge, at all colourable, of inaccuracy or of mendacity which has been brought against him, and has been supported by argument, and to examine it as impartially as I can. Having studied every line of the *Commentaries* with the closest attention, having read them through a dozen times or more, I venture to affirm that not even German ingenuity can bring any fresh charge against their credibility, that every conceivable opening for attack has already been seized. The method which I shall adopt may be tedious: but it is the only one which can lead to a final result. It would be useless to select a few charges and dismiss the rest, on the ground that the names of their authors carried no weight. Hardly one of the assailants of Caesar's veracity has a European or even a national reputation:<sup>3</sup> but their united assaults have made an impression. I do not flatter myself that all my conclusions will command general assent: but at all events I shall have gone over the whole ground.<sup>4</sup>

Readers who take an interest in the question will of course not rest satisfied with merely examining the charges of untrustworthiness. They

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, xv., 1858, p. 120.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 166-72, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> If my memory serves me. only Ihne and Drumann.

<sup>4</sup> In order that readers may appreciate the nature of the destructive criticism of the *Commentaries*, I shall even examine certain charges which involve the violation of the principle emphasised by Professor W. M. Ramsay (*Was Christ born at Bethlehem?* 1898, p. 269),—"that no conjecture which is not founded on clear evidence has any right even to be propounded, if it contradicts the direct statement of an ancient authority."

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will read Caesar's *Commentaries* and his letters for themselves, read the letters that Cicero wrote to and about him, and form at first hand an opinion of the character of the man. They will of course discriminate between the narrative which he composed from personal knowledge and those chapters which were based upon the reports of his marshals. But their judgement will be liable to error unless they have some knowledge of the operations of war. Not even a trained historian, unless he is also a soldier, or unless his training has included diligent study of military history, fortified by intimate converse with military men, can appreciate, unaided, the military sections of Caesar's narrative.<sup>1</sup>

The charges which have been brought against Caesar's good faith might be grouped in two classes, according to the motives which his accusers impute to him. These motives are, first, the desire to put the best construction upon unconstitutional or unrighteous acts, and secondly, the desire to magnify his own exploits, to take to himself the credit of the exploits of his lieutenants, and to conceal everything that might have injuriously affected his reputation as a general. But it will be convenient, for reasons which will afterwards commend themselves to the reader, to examine in separate classes certain charges which have been brought by Herr Max Eichheim, by a writer who has adopted the *nom-de-guerre* of "An Ex Light Dragoon," and by General Warnery.

### IV

The assailants of Caesar's credibility, for the most part, attach a high value to the authority of Plutarch, Appian, Florus, Orosius, Eutropius, and above all Dion Cassius, whenever they differ from or supplement Caesar. Their theory is that these later writers used other sources of information besides the *Commentaries*. About the first five there is very little to be said. Anybody who prefers the authority of Plutarch to that of Caesar must be so credulous or so wrong-headed that it would be useless to argue with him. Plutarch is a delightful writer, who is read not because he was a critical historian, but because he is readable. But, like some other readable biographers, he was a romancer; and, as F. Eysenhardt,<sup>2</sup> one of Caesar's sternest critics, admits, his *Lives* abound with monstrous blunders.

Florus dismissed the whole Gallic war in a single rhetorical chapter filling about two pages octavo; and the value of that scrap may be gauged from the fact that he confounded Gergovia with Alesia.<sup>3</sup>

The epitome of Appian's narrative of the Gallic war<sup>4</sup> is shorter even than that of Florus; and although it is not so pretentious, it is a wretched blundering piece of work. For example, Appian says that the Nervii were descended from the Cimbri and Teutoni; that Caesar defeated the Allobroges; and that the Sugambri with 500 routed

<sup>1</sup> If you read the *Commentaries on the Civil War*, you cannot do better than read along with them Colonel Stoffel's *Histoire de Jules César,—Guerre civile*.

<sup>2</sup> *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, etc., lxxv., 1862, pp. 760-61.

<sup>3</sup> *Epitoma* (ed. C. Halma), i. 45 (iii. 10).

<sup>4</sup> *De rebus gallicis*, ed. Didot, 1840, i. 2-5.

Caesar's 5000 Gallic troopers. It is unnecessary to tell readers of the *Commentaries* how the first and the third of these blunders arose : but the second seems inexplicable. The point on which Appian's authority has been appealed to against Caesar will be noticed in its proper place ; but, having regard to his monstrous blunders, I cannot regard him as an authority at all.

Orosius was a Spanish presbyter of the fifth century, who compiled a history of the world from the creation, in defence of Christianity. That part of it which deals with the Gallic war is contained in the seventh and the four following chapters of the Sixth Book. In this small space Orosius makes several gross blunders. Immediately after reproducing from the *Commentaries* the list of the Belgic contingents which Caesar encountered in 57 B.C., he says that they emerged from ambush in a wood and threw Caesar's army into confusion, but were subsequently defeated and all but annihilated.<sup>1</sup> Here he is evidently confounding the entire Belgic host with the Nervii.<sup>2</sup> Speaking of the leaders of the Veneti, he says, with a Proudhian embellishment, that Caesar tortured them to death.<sup>3</sup> Caesar's object, he says, in crossing the Rhine was to relieve the Sugambri,—the very people whom he marched to attack,—from blockade.<sup>4</sup> Lastly, he confounds Cenabum with Avaricum.<sup>5</sup> But Orosius is not an irritating liar like Dion Cassius. Excepting that one little flourish about the Veneti, he does not try to dress up and embellish Caesar's narrative. In general, he follows the *Commentaries* closely enough ; and there is only one passage in which I can discover any trace of his having consulted an authority who differed from or attempted to correct Caesar. This passage, which deals with the numbers of the Helvetii, will be referred to later on.

Eutropius's account of the Gallic war is comprised in one paragraph,—seventeen lines in Teubner's edition, 1883,—of his epitome of Roman history (*Breviarium Hist. Rom.*, vi. 17 [14]). As a specimen of his accuracy, I will quote one sentence ("Caesar attacked the Germans on the further side of the Rhine, and defeated them in a series of bloody battles"),—*Germanos trans Rhenum aggressus immanissimis proeliis vicit*. Caesar himself never claimed to have defeated the Transrhene Germans at all.<sup>6</sup>

Dion Cassius was rated at his true value by George Long.<sup>7</sup> He was nearly as great a romancer, in his way, as Plutarch : but his way was dull. Whether he used other authorities besides Caesar for his narrative of the Gallic war, we shall never know : but at all events Caesar was his chief authority. In following him he gave as free play to his

<sup>1</sup> His repente silva erumpentibus, exercitus Caesaris perturbatus atque in fugam actus, plurimis suorum amissis, tandem hortatu ducis restitit, victoresque aggressus usque ad internecionem paene delevit, vi. 7. § 16.

<sup>2</sup> See *B. G.*, ii. 19-28.

<sup>3</sup> Cunctis principibus per tormenta interfectis, vi. 8, § 17.

<sup>4</sup> vi. 9, § 1.

<sup>5</sup> vi. 11, §§ 3-4.

<sup>6</sup> Eutropius also inaccurately says, *Decreta est ei Gallia et Illyricum cum legionibus decem*. See p. 561.

<sup>7</sup> *Caesar*, p. xi. n. 5.

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imagination as Mr. Froude, but with this difference: Mr. Froude's was the imagination of an artist, who had a sense for the fitness of things, Dion's of a tasteless newspaper reporter: Dion wrote bad Greek, and Mr. Froude wrote good English. As I shall often have occasion in this book to examine Dion's statements, I shall give a few specimens of his work. First, instead of summarising or reproducing the vigorous little speech with which Caesar<sup>1</sup> quieted the panic that seized his army before their campaign against Ariovistus, Dion puts into Caesar's mouth a sermon which fills eleven chapters of his book,<sup>2</sup> which would have had no effect in reassuring his hearers, and which Long<sup>3</sup> aptly characterised as "a rambling and unmeaning piece of fustian, worthy of Dion's age." It is quite certain that none of Caesar's hearers took down a report of his speech at this length; and it is therefore clear that Dion invented the whole thing. Secondly, Dion, describing the attack which Viridovix made upon the camp of Sabinus, says that the Gauls "took firewood and other wood, some on their shoulders, and some dragging (it) after them, in order to burn the Romans."<sup>4</sup> Caesar says simply that the Gauls "collected faggots and brushwood in order to fill up the Roman trenches."<sup>5</sup> Thirdly, Dion, by way of embellishing his account of Caesar's campaign against the Morini, says that there were "great mountains"<sup>6</sup> in their country,—that is, great mountains in the neighbourhood of Calais! Fourthly, whereas Caesar<sup>7</sup> tells us that Sabinus and Cotta quitted Aduatua at dawn, Dion<sup>8</sup> changes dawn into evening. Fifthly, Dion says that when Caesar heard the news of the fate of Sabinus and Cotta, he was on his way to Italy.<sup>9</sup> But Caesar's narrative<sup>10</sup> shows that he was at Amiens (Samarobriua); and Dion's blunder was evidently the outcome of a vague reminiscence of the words which Caesar puts into the mouth of Sabinus:—"My belief is that Caesar has started for Italy" (*Caesarem arbitror profectum in Italiam*).<sup>11</sup> Sixthly, Dion says that Caesar crossed the Allier (Elaver) on rafts;<sup>12</sup> whereas we know that he crossed by a bridge, which he had repaired.<sup>13</sup> These instances,—and the list might be considerably extended,—are sufficient to justify the opinion which I have expressed of Dion's work. Of the value of the remainder of his history I know nothing: but his account of the Gallic war would hardly be worth reading even if the *Commentaries* were lost. A dull accurate historian and an interesting inaccurate historian both have their uses: but a dull liar is a public enemy.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 40.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xxxviii. 36-46.

<sup>3</sup> *Caesar*, p. 85.

<sup>4</sup> φρόγαρα καὶ ξύλα τὰ μὲν ἀράμενοι, τὰ δὲ ἐφελεδόμενοι, ὡς καὶ καταπρήσονται αὐτοὺς . . . προσέβαλον, xxxix. 15, § 4. See Long's *Caesar*, p. 165.

<sup>5</sup> Sarmenis virgultisque collectis, quibus fossas Romanorum compleant. *B. G.*, iii. 18, § 8.

<sup>6</sup> ἐπεχείρησε μὲν γὰρ ὁ Καῖσαρ καὶ ἐς αὐτὰ τὰ ὄρη τὴν ἕλην τέμνων προχωρήσαι· ἰππεῖών δέ, διὰ τε τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν . . . ἀπανέστη. *Hist. Rom.*, xxxix. 44, § 2.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, v. 31, § 6.

<sup>8</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xl. 6.

<sup>9</sup> *Ib.*, xl. 9, § 1.

<sup>10</sup> *B. G.*, v. 46-7. Cf. Long's *Caesar*, p. 261.

<sup>11</sup> *B. G.*, v. 29, § 2.

<sup>12</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xl. 35, § 3.

<sup>13</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 35, §§ 5-6.

<sup>14</sup> See, in confirmation of my estimate of Dion, Heller in *Philologus*, xxii., 1865, pp. 108-11.

To sum up, it is clear that Plutarch, Appian, Florus, Orosius, Eutropius and Dion Cassius followed Caesar, more or less inaccurately, as their authority. It is possible that some of them may have referred, on certain points which will be noted in the course of this essay, to some other authority or authorities as well. But if they did, there is not the slightest reason for preferring those unknown authorities to Caesar. To appeal to Orosius or Plutarch against Caesar is much the same thing as it would be to appeal against Wellington's despatches to Mr. John Richard Green.<sup>1</sup> If Caesar is to be arraigned for mendacity, the appeal must be to internal evidence alone.<sup>2</sup>

## V

The principal accusations which fall within what I have called the first group<sup>3</sup> are (1) that Caesar misrepresented the motives which prompted the Helvetii to emigrate: (2) that he invented the story of the attempt of the Helvetii to cross the Rhône: (3) that, in relating the intention of the Helvetii to settle in the country of the Santones, he minimised the distance between the frontier of that tribe and the frontier of the Tolosates, in order to make the danger to the Province appear greater than it really was: (4) that he "makes no mention of the manifold provocations which the Helvetii received from Roman marauding parties even in time of peace": (5) that he does not think it necessary to dwell on the fact that the Romans, in view of the Helvetian invasion, had made an alliance with Ariovistus, and thus guaranteed to him the tranquil possession of his conquests in Gaul: (6) that he concocted a sensational account of the tyranny of Ariovistus: (7) that his account of the surrender by the Aduatuci of their fortress and of their subsequent attack on the Roman lines is dishonest: (8) that, in describing his negotiations with the Usipetes and Tencteri, "he tries to make the most of a bad case by charging the Germans with every perfidy, whereas by his own account naive truthfulness is made patent enough": (9) that he invented the story of the attack of the Usipetes and Tencteri on his Gallic cavalry: (10) that he misrepresented his reasons for having invaded Britain: (11) that "when we see that no hint is given in the history of the fate reserved for the gallant Vercingetorix on the day of Caesar's triumph . . . we feel an apprehension that the great conqueror's daily life in Gaul would have supplied many exceptions to the 'clementia' of which he so often speaks as marking his own conduct"; and (12) that "the whole drift of his own report is that he was continually *forced* to enter upon new enterprises and campaigns against his own wish and expectation."

1. H. Rauchenstein affirms that Caesar's account of the causes of the Helvetian emigration differs from the accounts of Dion Cassius, Florus

<sup>1</sup> See Gen. J. F. Maurice's *War*, 1891, p. 93.

<sup>2</sup> I am not speaking here of the *Commentaries on the Civil War*, from which we can appeal, on certain points, to Cicero's *Letters*.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 178, *supra*.



and the epitomator of Livy ; and he insists that Dion's account is much more natural and credible than Caesar's.<sup>1</sup> Caesar says that the Helvetii emigrated because they were persuaded by Orgetorix that they could make themselves masters of Gaul ; because, owing to the barriers with which nature had hemmed in their country, they were prevented from wandering as far as they wished and found it difficult to attack their neighbours ; and because they deemed their territory too small for a people of their numbers and military renown.<sup>2</sup> Dion Cassius<sup>3</sup> merely says that they emigrated because their country was not large enough for their numerous population ; and Florus<sup>4</sup> and the epitomator of Livy<sup>5</sup> say much the same. Upon which Rauchenstein, remarking that Caesar alone speaks of the aggressiveness of the Helvetii, concludes that he invented this trait in order to justify his own campaign. But has Rauchenstein considered the scale on which Dion Cassius, Florus and the epitomator wrote ? Dion wrote much less tersely than Caesar ; but he necessarily compressed his narrative of the Gallic war into a much smaller compass than that of the *Commentaries*. Florus and the epitomator were still more concise. Besides, Caesar had no need to tell lies in order to justify his conduct. In the eyes of his countrymen the fact that the Helvetii had invaded Gaul was a sufficient reason for his driving them out of it.

J. G. Cuno, who believes that the reasons which Caesar assigns for the Helvetian emigration are inadequate, asks how it is that the Helvetii do not appear to have "come to an understanding with the Romans . . . who were their natural allies against the Germans." He believes that they had done so, but that Caesar did not care to mention the fact, for fear of representing himself as a treacherous aggressor. "Had Caesar," he asks, "given them a promise of territory in central Gaul, where, thanks to the previous ravages of the Cimbri and Teutoni, there must have been a space much more thinly peopled ?"<sup>6</sup>

These suggestions are purely gratuitous. Whether the Helvetii were or were not the natural allies of the Romans, the Romans did not regard them as such : on the contrary, their movements had, for some time before Caesar opened his campaign, given rise to anxiety in Rome.<sup>7</sup> If Caesar promised them territory in Gaul, he can only have done so in order to lure them on to their doom ; whereas he did his best to prevent them from setting foot in Gaul. That they began their emigration earlier than he expected, is proved by the fact that, when he first marched to encounter them, he only had one legion ready to take the field and was obliged to return to Italy for reinforcements.<sup>8</sup> If the Helvetii were the natural allies of the Romans, why did Caesar attack

<sup>1</sup> *Die Feldzug Cäsars gegen die Helvetier*, 1882, pp. 39-40.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, i. 2, 3, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xxxviii. 31, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Epitoma*, i. 45 (ii. 10).

<sup>5</sup> *ch.* 103.

<sup>6</sup> *Vorgeschichte Roms*, 1878, i. 26.

<sup>7</sup> "Helvetii," writes Cicero (*Ad Att.*, i. 19, § 2) in 60 B.C., "sine dubio sunt in armis excursioneseque in provinciam faciunt."

<sup>8</sup> *B. G.*, i. 7-10.

them? Simply because their alliance was not worth having at the price of his allowing them to settle in Gaul. If they were to be allies, their alliance would only be useful so long as they remained in their own country as a barrier against German invasion; and, as we may gather from *B. G.*, i. 31, § 14, their principal motive for emigrating was to escape the incursions of the Germans.

2. Caesar tells us that the date fixed for the muster of the Helvetii on the right bank of the Rhône was the 28th of March, 58 B.C., according to the unreformed calendar. When he reached the neighbourhood of Geneva, Helvetian envoys came to him and asked him to allow the host to march through the Province. Wishing to gain time, he told them that he would take a few days to consider their request, and would give them an answer on the 13th of April. Meanwhile he constructed entrenchments along the left bank of the Rhône between Geneva and the Pas de l'Écluse. On the 13th of April the envoys returned; and he told them that he could not allow the host to pass through the Province.<sup>1</sup>

Now, observes Rauchenstein, according to Caesar's narrative, the Helvetii were fools. They must have seen Caesar's entrenchments in process of construction. Yet they were so simple as to wait patiently for the date which he had fixed. He lies when he says that they tried to storm his entrenchments. Dion Cassius does not mention anything of the kind; and the Helvetii would not have needlessly exasperated the Romans and endangered the success of their enterprise by defying Caesar. The truth is that he invented the story of their attempt to cross the Rhône in order to excuse himself for having afterwards attacked them.<sup>2</sup>

I reply that, on Rauchenstein's theory, Caesar was a fool; and, whether he was a knave or not, he was assuredly no fool. He did not construct his lines in order to amuse himself. He would not have constructed them unless he had had good reason to believe that he could either do so unobserved or in spite of detection, and good reason to fear that otherwise the Helvetii might succeed in forcing a passage. Napoleon III. has shown that the lines could have been made in two or three days. Rauchenstein assumes that the Helvetii assembled on the 28th of March,—the date which their leaders had fixed. But this is not proved: nor is it proved that, even if they did, they were aware that the lines were in process of construction; for, as Colonel Stoffel has shown,<sup>3</sup> the banks of the Rhône, in the first nine miles<sup>4</sup> of its course below Geneva, were so steep that no lines were there required. Dion Cassius does not, it is true, expressly say that the Helvetii attacked the lines: but his narrative<sup>5</sup> implies either that they did attack them or that they did not know of their existence until they saw them with their own eyes; and either alternative is fatal to Rauchenstein's theory. If the Helvetii had shrunk from offending the Romans, they would not have emigrated at all; and, as I have already shown, it was quite

• <sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 6, § 4, 7, §§ 3-6, 8, §§ 1-3.

<sup>2</sup> *Die Feldzug Cæsars gegen die Helvetier*, pp. 51-4.

<sup>3</sup> Napoléon III., *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 49-53, note.

<sup>4</sup> 14 kilometres, or 8½ miles nearly.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xxxviii. 32, § 1.

unnecessary for Caesar to resort to fiction in order to justify his attack upon them.

Caesar's account of the construction of his lines, on the Rhône and of the attempt of the Helvetii to force them, the substance of which I have given on page 27, is contained in *B. G.*, i. 8. In Allen and Greenough's *Gallie War* (pp. xxvii.-xxix.), which appeared in 1886, there is a note, the aim of which is to prove that the alleged lines were never constructed at all, and that Caesar's account is a fiction. The gist of the writer's argument is that in the summer of 1881 he spent a few days at Geneva; that he examined the course of the Rhône for 5 miles below Geneva; that he came to the conclusion that it would have been impossible for the Helvetii to cross the river at any point in this part of its course; that the alleged lines would therefore have been superfluous; that Napoleon's alleged discovery of traces of them is a delusion; and that accordingly Caesar's account of their construction, as well as of the efforts which the Helvetii made to storm them, is untrue.

The editor might have spent that afternoon at Geneva more profitably; for he has added nothing to what Napoleon had said already, except the inference that Caesar was a liar. Napoleon, or rather Colonel Stoffel, through the medium of Napoleon, had already told us that for 5 miles and more below Geneva the Helvetii could not have crossed the Rhône. But Napoleon does not leap to the conclusion that Caesar was a liar. He simply infers from Colonel Stoffel's report that, when Caesar wrote that he had made a line of entrenchments along the Rhône from the lake of Geneva to the Jura, he used a loose expression, the purport of which was that he had fortified those parts of the left bank where it would have been possible for the Helvetii to land. Dion Cassius is certainly not generally an authority for the interpretation of Caesar; but he evidently understood the description of the entrenchments in this sense; for he says that Caesar fortified the most important points.<sup>1</sup> "As to the remaining dozen or fifteen miles," says the editor, "of course I do not pretend to say." Is not this delicious? He wastes a fine afternoon in laboriously examining the five miles which, as Colonel Stoffel had told him, it was useless to examine; and "the remaining dozen or fifteen miles" he airily dismisses. At the end of his note he admits that "there may have been fortified spots here and there along the bank, as the French engineers assert,—probably for purposes of observation, not defence." For the purpose of observing,—what? What would have been the use of *fortifying* a series of posts for the mere purpose of "observing,"—that is to say, staring at an enemy who had no intention of attacking them?

Caesar's statement that the Rhône was fordable in some places<sup>2</sup> (between the Lake of Geneva and the Pas de l'Écluse) has also been challenged by other commentators. There is no ground for this scepticism.<sup>3</sup> As Napoleon says, "The bed of the Rhône has changed at several

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xxxviii. 31, § 4.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, i. 6, § 2, 8, § 4.

<sup>3</sup> See Long's *Caesar*, p. 47.

points since the time of Caesar: at present, according to the report of those who live on its banks, there are no fords except between Russin on the right bank and the mill of Vert on the left bank."<sup>1</sup> If Caesar had had to tell the same story not of the Rhône, but of the Loire, a hasty commentator, making holiday in Touraine, might have fancied that he had found him out in a lie, and yet might only have succeeded in making himself ridiculous. I have stood on the stone bridge over the Loire at Tours, and watched the waters below rushing and swirling in full flood through the arches, like a huge mill-race. I remember standing evening after evening on the same bridge in the intensely hot summer of 1876, when a thin, clear, narrow stream was threading its way through the central channel of the bed; and once I saw a donkey lying on its back basking in the sun, fully 60 yards from the right bank; and it might have walked out as far again without wetting its hoofs. Again, M. A. Olleris remarks that the Allier, which, in Caesar's time, was not fordable in the summer, is now, during the greater part of the year, forded by herdsmen with their flocks.<sup>2</sup> Caesar made mistakes no doubt, like every one else: but he was not demented; and no one in his senses, even if he had been absolutely unscrupulous and absolutely careless of his literary reputation, would have ventured to tell such colossal falsehoods, even for "political effect." And for what political effect? What purpose, political or non-political, what conceivable purpose, except to gratify an insane whim, and see how much the Roman public would swallow, could have been served by saying that entrenchments had been thrown up along the banks of the Rhône, to prevent a horde of invaders from crossing; that the invaders had tried to cross and been repulsed,—if the statement had been false? Lies which are certain to be exposed on the instant, are not the form of untruth to which a great statesman is tempted, even when he is writing a self-justificatory memoir.<sup>3</sup>

3. With regard to the third charge, what Caesar wrote was, *Caesari renuntiatur, Helvetiis esse in animo, per agrum Sequanorum et Aeduarum iter in Santonium fines facere, qui non longe a Tolosatium finibus absunt, quae civitas est in provincia. Id si fieret, intellegebat magno cum periculo provinciae futurum, ut homines bellicosos, populi Romani inimicos, locis patentibus maximeque frumentariis finitimos haberet* ("Caesar was informed

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 47, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Examen des diverses opinions émises sur le siège de Gergovia*, 1861, p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Replying by anticipation to the objection that Caesar would not have been so foolish as to tell lies which could have been exposed, Schneider says (*Wachler's Philomathie von Freunden der Wissenschaft und Kunst*, Band i., 1818, pp. 186-8), "The very audacity which represents the contrary of well-known facts, without proof and in disregard of contradiction, and the contemptuous spirit which . . . appears sometimes as irony, sometimes as satire, are closely related phases of one and the same mind." Whereupon he proceeds to give instances of Caesar's irony and, as he calls it, cynical frankness. I have myself noticed the frankness (call it cynical or humorous) with which Caesar sometimes makes out a good case for his enemies: but I cannot see the connexion between this trait and the "audacity" (which I should call insanity) that would lead a statesman whose name was on everybody's lips, to tell lies, without any object, that were sure to be promptly exposed.

that the Helvetii intended to march through the territory of the Sequani and the Aedui, and make for the country of the Santones, which is at no great distance from that of the Tolosates. The last-named state is in the Province. He saw that, if this purpose were carried out, it would be very dangerous to the Province to have a warlike people, hostile to the Romans, in the near neighbourhood of its rich exposed cornfields".<sup>1</sup> "*Non longe*, indeed!" says Professor Sihler. "About 200 miles."<sup>2</sup> The map shows that the distance from the nearest frontier of the Santones to Tolosa (Toulouse) is 210 kilometres, or 130 miles.<sup>3</sup> But let that pass. The point is that, as Long says,<sup>4</sup> "there is no obstacle to an army marching from Saintes to Toulouse; the road is open; and the Helvetii would have been dangerous neighbours to the Provincia, if they had planted themselves on the lower Garonne." The Gauls had, for centuries, been the dreaded enemies of Rome. To say nothing of the probability that Caesar may have been misinformed as to the distance in question, the Senate had just done its best, by diplomatic means, to compass the exclusion of the Helvetii, the most formidable of the Celtic Gauls, from Transalpine Gaul.<sup>5</sup> Can any one honestly argue, on the bare evidence of the words *non longe*, that Caesar was so afraid lest public opinion at Rome should condemn him for immorality or for unconstitutional action, if he repelled the invasion of these dreaded Helvetii, that he thought it necessary to tell a lie in order to smooth over his iniquity? Had he not already as good as told his readers that he did not intend to let the Helvetii settle in Gaul at all?<sup>6</sup> But to refute so absurd a charge as this is almost to insult the reader's understanding.

4. Why should Caesar have mentioned "the manifold provocations which the Helvetii received from Roman marauding parties even in time of peace"?<sup>7</sup> What had he to do with those "provocations"? He did not profess to be a philosophical historian, but a writer of military memoirs. His business was simply to tell why and how he had driven the Helvetii out of Gaul. Will any one argue that, because the Helvetii had received provocations from the Romans, therefore Caesar was to commit political suicide and allow the Helvetii to endanger the tranquillity of Rome by settling in Gaul? And if not, why should he have encumbered his pages with irrelevant disquisitions on the past misdeeds of his countrymen?

5. Why should Caesar have "dwelt on the fact that the Romans had made an alliance with Ariovistus"<sup>8</sup> unless he regarded that fact as binding him to leave Ariovistus at liberty to push his conquests in Gaul at the expense of Rome?

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 10, §§ 1, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Classical Review*, April, 1890, p. 154.

<sup>3</sup> See Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 603, n. 2, and Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 55, n. 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Caesar*, p. 49.

<sup>5</sup> Cicero, *Ad Att.*, i. 19, § 2.

<sup>6</sup> *Negat se more et exemplo populi Romani posse iter ulli per provinciam dare, et si vim facere contentur prohibebiturum ostendit.* • *B. G.*, i. 8, § 3.

<sup>7</sup> C. E. Moberly's *Caesar*, 1884, p. x.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*

6. H. Baumann remarks that Caesar's account of the negotiations of Orgetorix with the Sequanian chief, Casticus, and the Aeduan, Dumnorix; his statement that the Sequani were in a position to grant a safe-conduct to the Helvetii; and his statement that Dumnorix hoped, in case the Helvetii defeated Caesar, to acquire sovereignty over the Aedui, prove that, in the early part of 58 B.C., both the Aedui and the Sequani were politically independent. But, continues Baumann, the reader of the *First Commentary*, after coming to this conclusion, learns with astonishment that Ariovistus was virtually master of Gaul, and had made himself feared and detested by his tyranny. How then could the Sequani have been in a position to grant a safe-conduct to the Helvetii? Many other considerations, Baumann adds, throw doubt upon the trustworthiness of this part of Caesar's narrative. If the Helvetii had ravaged Aeduan territory, the Aedui would surely have appealed for aid against the Helvetii not to Caesar, but to Ariovistus. With what truth could Caesar make Dumnorix say that the Aedui would prefer the rule of the Helvetii to the rule of the Romans,—as if forsooth the Helvetii, even if they had beaten Caesar, could have ousted Ariovistus from his supremacy? Or how could Dumnorix entertain any hopes of acquiring sovereignty over the Aedui, when the Aedui were already subject to Ariovistus? Finally, how can we believe that Ariovistus would have looked quietly on while the Aedui were supplying Caesar with cavalry and corn? Baumann concludes that both the Aedui and the Sequani probably *did* retain a large share of political independence, in spite of the overlordship of Ariovistus; and that Caesar's account of his interview with the Gallic deputies and of the tyranny to which the Gauls were subjected was a piece of inflated rhetoric intended to justify his campaign against Ariovistus. But Baumann winds up his argument with a curious admission. After the Gallic war, he says, when Caesar had covered himself with glory, he had no need to resort to any misrepresentation in order to justify his aggression; for his countrymen were habitually unscrupulous in dealing with foreigners, and hated and feared the natives of the north. How then does Baumann contrive to maintain his charges? Simply by suggesting that Caesar wrote and published his *First Commentary* immediately after his first campaign, in order to counteract the rumour, which Baumann assumes to have gained currency in Rome, that he had undertaken a dangerous war from motives of ambition.<sup>1</sup>

Now to begin with, it must be borne in mind that Caesar does not guarantee the accuracy of the statements which Divitiacus made to him about Ariovistus. He merely reports what Divitiacus said, adding as a comment the general statement that Ariovistus was behaving with intolerable arrogance;<sup>2</sup> and nothing is more probable than that Divitiacus, who was certainly anxious to secure Caesar's aid against the Germans, should have exaggerated the tyranny of Ariovistus. Now

<sup>1</sup> Über das erste Buch der Comm. Cæsars zum gall. Kriege (*Elfter Jahresbericht über das K.K. Franz-Joseph-Gymnasium*, Wien, 1885, pp. 30-38.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, i. 31-2, 33, § 5.

let us see exactly what Divitiacus said. He merely said that Ariovistus, as the interested ally of the Sequani, had inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Aedui; that he had compelled them to give hostages to the Sequani; that he had taken possession of one third and intended to take possession of another third of the territory of the Sequani; that he had compelled the "Galli," by whom apparently both the Aedui and the Sequani were meant, to give him hostages; that he was master of all the strongholds of the Sequani; that the Sequanian deputies who had come to Caesar were dreadfully afraid of Ariovistus; and that there was no doubt but that, if Caesar did not come to the rescue, the Gauls would all have to leave their country in order to escape Ariovistus's tyranny.<sup>1</sup> The statement that Ariovistus was master of *all* the strongholds of the Sequani was, on the face of it, an exaggeration; for he had not seized their principal stronghold, Vesontio (Besançon); and the prophecy that all the Gauls would have to emigrate was obviously a flourish. But it does not appear, even from Divitiacus's speech, that Ariovistus interfered in the internal affairs of either the Aedui or the Sequani; and we may infer from what Caesar makes Ariovistus himself say that he did not care what they did, provided they paid him tribute punctually.<sup>2</sup> Therefore I cannot see that Divitiacus's statement was inconsistent with the fact that the Sequani granted a safe-conduct to the Helvetii. There is no proof that the negotiations of Orgetorix with Casticus and Dumnorix were known to Ariovistus, or that, if they were, he could have punished either the Sequanian or the Aeduan chief. The Aedui would hardly have appealed for aid against the Helvetii to Ariovistus; for they were probably wise enough to see that Caesar was the rising star. Dumnorix might well hope that, if the Helvetii defeated Caesar, he would be able, in alliance with the Helvetii, who were more numerous than the Germans,<sup>3</sup> to defy Ariovistus; and, for the same reason, he might reasonably hope to acquire sovereignty over his own tribe. Moreover, it would make no difference to Ariovistus whether Dumnorix or Divitiacus controlled the fortunes of the Aedui, provided he could enforce the payment of his tribute. Finally, the Aedui did *not* supply Caesar with corn;<sup>4</sup> and it is absurd to suppose that Ariovistus was then strong enough to resent actively their supplying Caesar with cavalry. In order to do so, he would have been obliged to march out of his own territory into the basin of the Saône, and attack Caesar's powerful force!

To sum up. The essential part, at any rate, of the speech which Caesar puts into the mouth of Divitiacus is undoubtedly true. The Aedui and the Sequani were so far inconvenienced by the presence of Ariovistus in Gaul that they were anxious to secure the aid of Caesar against him. Indeed it is obvious that, if Caesar could not have counted upon their support, he would not have ventured, at that early stage of his career in Gaul, to undertake a campaign against Ariovistus. On the other hand, the story which Divitiacus told to Caesar, if Caesar has

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 31.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 29, §§ 2-3, 31, § 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 36, § 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 16, §§ 1-5, 23, § 1.

reported it correctly, was undoubtedly an exaggeration. It may be that Caesar was so anxious to impress upon his readers the necessity of the campaign which he had undertaken that he embellished the speech of Divitiacus. But such an assumption is not necessary.<sup>1</sup> Baumann has offered a conclusive refutation of his own charge. The necessity for curbing the ambition of Ariovistus was, from a Roman point of view, self-evident; and no fiction was required to make Romans realise it. They must have become strangely scrupulous if Caesar felt any anxiety about their verdict.

7. The next charge, coming, as it does, from an historian of repute, furnishes one of the most amazing instances that I know of the perverted ingenuity that delights to exercise itself in inventing instances of clumsy dishonesty and attributing them to Caesar. This time it is Professor Ihne who has discovered the mare's nest.<sup>2</sup> The version of the surrender of the Aduatuci which he proposes to substitute for Caesar's<sup>3</sup> is as follows: "The Aduatuci gave themselves up and their weapons; but when they remarked that preparations had been made to sell them as slaves, they sought to escape. They were driven back, and were then compelled to submit to the fate which they had hoped to escape. Caesar, who wished to reward his soldiers for their efforts, and who found little other booty for them, had previously determined to sell the prisoners, and, in order to justify himself, invented the pretext of the nocturnal treacherous attack." Well may one of Ihne's German reviewers remark, "The confidence with which Ihne makes use of absolutely groundless assumptions in order to convict Caesar of falsehood is truly astonishing."<sup>4</sup> As the reviewer goes on to say, "The change of mind on the part of the Aduatuci is not surprising, and has often happened in war." He might have added that, if Caesar "had previously determined to sell the prisoners," and had allowed them to find out his intention, he would not have been such a fool as to with-

<sup>1</sup> In support of the theory that Caesar exaggerated the tyranny with which Ariovistus had treated the Aedui and the Sequani, M. P. L. Lemièrre asserts (*Études sur les Celtes et les Gaulois*, 1881, p. 549) that Ariovistus had not resented the mission of Divitiacus to Rome. Caesar offers, in *B. G.* i. 33, §§ 2-5, a sound justification of his conduct, which did not require to be fortified by any exaggeration. He could not suffer Ariovistus to oppress the Aedui, those old allies of Rome; and he was bound to prevent Ariovistus from following the example of the Cimbri and Teutoni and invading the Province and Italy. M. Lemièrre would hardly deny that Ariovistus had, at all events, defeated the Aedui and the Sequani, and compelled them to give hostages. The only exaggeration, then, besides that which I have mentioned in the text, of which Caesar or the Gallic envoys can have been guilty was the statement that Ariovistus had maltreated some of the hostages. What could be more likely? Moreover, if the complaints of the Gallic envoys were well founded, it should seem that Ariovistus had resented the mission of Divitiacus.

There is a significant reference in the *History* of Tacitus (iv. 73) to the deep impression which had been made upon the Romans by the incursion of Ariovistus: —*Nec ideo Rhenum insedimus, ut Italiam tueremur; sed ne quis alius Ariovistus regno Galliarum potiretur.*

<sup>2</sup> *Römische Geschichte*, vi. 415, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 31-3.

<sup>4</sup> *Jahresberichte d. philol. Vereins*, xiv., 1888, pp. 340-41.



draw his troops from the town ; that, if he had been ashamed of his intention, he need not have mentioned the sale at all ; and that, however great a liar he may have been, he would, being a man of sense, have lied artistically, instead of inventing a monstrous tale which was sure to be detected immediately after the publication of his book. Finally, Thne charges Caesar not only with the clumsiest falsehood but also with the most infamous breach of faith ; and, even if he had had no sense of honour, the motive of self-interest would have prevented him from committing a crime which would have ruined his reputation in Gaul as well as in Italy, and would have driven his Gallic allies into the arms of his enemies.

8. Caesar does not charge the Usipetes and Tencteri with "every perfidy."<sup>1</sup> The only perfidy with which he charges them is that of having attacked his cavalry during the truce which he granted them.<sup>2</sup> It is true that he states his belief that they tried, by diplomatic pretexts, to gain time for the return of their cavalry :<sup>3</sup> but, being a man of the world, not a doctrinaire, he does not stigmatise this as perfidy, he only mentions it as a reason for his having declined to grant their requests. Whether he had "a bad case" or not, is irrelevant to the present discussion : but, assuming that his robust conscience was ill at ease, I do not believe that it ever occurred to him to gloze over his misdeeds ; for if so, why did he make the following almost brutally candid avowal :—"reliqua multitudo puerorum mulierumque (nam cum omnibus suis domo excesserant Rhenumque transierant) passim fugere coepit ; ad quos consecrandos Caesar equitatum misit."<sup>4</sup> ("The rest, a multitude of women and children . . . fled in all directions ; and Caesar sent his cavalry to hunt them down.")

9. M. Keelhoff asserts that Caesar invented the story of the treacherous attack of the Usipetes and Tencteri on his Gallic cavalry, in order to excuse himself for having arrested the deputies who came to apologise for that attack. The Germans, says M. Keelhoff, would not have been so rash as to attack 5000 men with only 800. And, he adds, if the Germans "avaient l'intention d'attaquer immédiatement . . . que devient alors l'hypothèse de César . . . à savoir que les Germains cherchaient à gagner du temps pour attendre le retour des leurs et commencer ensuite les hostilités ? . . . Et de quelle utilité pouvait être ce combat ? Les Germains pouvaient-ils s'imaginer que tailler en pièces l'avant-garde de César, c'était de débarrasser de l'armée romaine ? . . . Quel aurait pu être le but des négociations des Germains, si, peu sincères dans leurs démarches, ils avaient eu l'intention d'attaquer immédiatement les Romains même dans les conditions aussi défavorables ? Et si le combat eût été livré, pourrait-on admettre que les députés Germains fussent

<sup>1</sup> See *Classical Review*, May, 1890, p. 199.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 13, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 11, § 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 14, § 5. Bresemer (*Über den Werth und die Glaubwürdigkeit der Comm. Caesar's*, 1855, pp. 11-16) observes that Caesar's narrative is confirmed by the other historians : but that proves nothing, except that "the other historians" used Caesar as their authority.

allés se mettre le lendemain à la discrétion d'un ennemi, outré et de leur perfidie et de la défaite subie? Et César lui-même, eût-il attendu jusqu'au lendemain pour marcher vers eux?"<sup>1</sup>

I freely admit that Caesar would probably have garbled his narrative, as far as he could do so without making himself ridiculous, if he had had a solid object to gain. But if he had invented the story of a battle which never occurred, he would have made himself ridiculous. And he had no object to gain. Before writing the chapter in which he described the rout of his cavalry, he had already written a passage which, as he must have known, would make it evident to any one who was not an absolute simpleton that he intended, by hook or by crook, to get the German chiefs, or as many of them as would walk into the trap, into his power:—"huc postero die *quam frequentissimi* convenirent, ut de eorum postulatis cognosceret"<sup>2</sup> (on the morrow they were to come to his halting-place *in full force*, so that he might take cognisance of their requests). The circumstantial account which he gives of the death of the Aquitanian chief, Piso,<sup>3</sup> goes to prove that his narrative of the rout of his cavalry was true. The German cavalry again and again proved themselves superior to the Gallic: they took them, on this occasion, by surprise; and therefore I can see nothing improbable in the statement that 800 of them should have attacked 5000. If Caesar had intended to lie, surely he could have protected himself from any cavil on this score by substituting for 800 some higher number. The German deputies were excessively foolish to go to Caesar in large numbers (*frequentes*): but their object in going was reasonable enough; they hoped, if it were possible, by excusing themselves to avert his wrath. Caesar would have been a fool if he had marched against the Germans *immediately* after the rout of his cavalry; for he knew that, if he waited a little, their chiefs might put themselves in his power. The rest of M. Keelhoff's arguments will deceive nobody who remembers that barbarians often act on impulse, and that the attack of the German cavalry was very likely, as their chiefs pleaded, unauthorised.

10. Ihne believes that Caesar lied in stating as one of his reasons for invading Britain that the Britons had aided the Gauls to resist him. No details, he argues, of such aid are given by Caesar. He tells us that the Veneti asked the Britons for aid, but not that they gave it.<sup>4</sup>

This is as gratuitous as Ihne's other charges. Why should Caesar have encumbered his pages with irrelevant details? He says distinctly that the Veneti obtained aid from Britain. What else is the meaning of this,—"*auxilia ex Britannia, quae contra eas regiones posita est, (Veneti) arcessunt*"?<sup>5</sup> And what is there incredible in the statement that the Britons aided the Gauls?

11. Why, in the name of common sense, should Caesar have given us any hint "of the fate which was reserved for the gallant Vercinge-

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. de l'instruction publique en Belgique*, xxxiii., 1890, pp. 289-90.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 11, § 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Id.*, 12, §§ 3-6.

<sup>4</sup> *Röm. Gesch.*, vi. 423, n. 1.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 9, § 10. See *Mewes's Lex. Caes.*, i. 299-300, and Forcellini, *Totius Latinitatis Lexicon*, 1858, i. 363.

torix" ?<sup>1</sup> To do so would have been utterly irrelevant to the purpose of his narrative ; nor is there a tittle of evidence to show that, when he wrote, the "fate" had occurred to his mind. Very possibly "the great conqueror's daily life in Gaul would have supplied many exceptions to the *clementia* of which he so often speaks,"<sup>2</sup>—twice, if one is to be accurate and not rhetorical,<sup>3</sup>—or rather many instances of severity. But what would his censor have thought of him as a literary artist if he had related in detail every punishment which he thought it necessary to inflict ? One thing is certain ; and that is that it was not fear of public opinion which prevented him from making these disclosures, if there were any to make, but only a sense of proportion. He has told us quite enough to let us see that he did not believe in the possibility of making revolutions with rose-water. What he understood by *clementia*, is plain enough. He allowed free play to his natural instinct for clemency<sup>4</sup> whenever he could safely do so : but when it was necessary to make an example, he made it with a vengeance. That the man who, in his calm way, has told us of the punishment of the 6000 Helvetian fugitives, of the execution of the Venetian senate, of the massacre of the Usipetes and Tencteri, of the annihilation of the Eburones, of the pitiless repulse of the Mandubii,—that he should have concealed from us any rigours that would have been worth the telling, is an idea too absurd to call for refutation.

12. Finally, we are told that "the whole drift of his own report . . . is that he was continually *forced* to enter upon new enterprises and campaigns against his own wish and expectation."<sup>5</sup> This criticism has no point unless it means that "his own report" was so far false, and that he hypocritically endeavoured to disguise the fact that his purpose from first to last was to conquer Gaul. Whether, when he first crossed the Alps in the spring of 58 B.C., he had definitely made up his mind to undertake the conquest, we cannot tell. But that, before the end of the same year, he saw his way clear to doing so, he has left us in no doubt. Has he not told us that he quartered his legions, for the winter of 58-57 B.C., at Vesontio (Besançon), outside the Roman Province ? Has he not frankly avowed,—or rather related as a matter of course,—that, in 57 B.C., he sent one of his lieutenants to receive the submission of a group of tribes which had offered him no opposition, but which, as Gauls, policy required him to subdue ? In *B. G.*, ii. 34 I read, *Eodem tempore a P. Crasso, quem cum legione una miserat ad Venetos, Unellos, Osismos, Curiosolitas, Esvivos, Aulercos, Redones, quae sunt maritimae civitates Oceanumque attingunt, certior factus est omnes eas civitates in dicionem potestatemque populi Romani esse redactas* ("At the same time he was informed by P. Crassus, whom he had sent with a single legion to the territories of the Veneti, Unelli, Osismi, Curiosolites, Esvii, Aulerci and Redones, maritime peoples, whose country reaches

<sup>1</sup> See C. E. Moberly's *Caesar*, p. xi.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 14, § 5, 31, § 4. See Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i. 561.

<sup>4</sup> *In Caesare haec sunt : mitis clemensque natura.* So wrote Cicero (*Ad Fam.*, vi. 6, § 8) in 46 B.C.

<sup>5</sup> *Classical Review*, May, 1890, p. 198.

the Atlantic, that all of them had been brought beneath the dominion and power of the Roman people"). Could anything be plainer? Is there the least attempt, in this part of his "report," to make us believe that "he was forced, to enter upon a new enterprise against his own wish and expectation"? Therefore, when he tells us, as he sometimes does, that he *was* forced to undertake a campaign against his own expectation, it seems natural to conclude, not that he is lying, but that he is showing us how much more arduous the conquest of Gaul turned out than might have been expected. Having made up his mind to conquer the country, he naturally desired to do so at the least possible expenditure of valuable lives. Why then should we suspect him of hypocrisy when he tells us that, after the whole country had apparently submitted, he was again forced to take the field? Does his accuser mean to argue that he was *not* forced to "enter upon fresh campaigns" at all, in other words, that his descriptions of the circumstances which led to the campaigns are fictitious or distorted? If so, the charge is simply gratuitous. Or does he, without impugning the accuracy of Caesar's narrative, simply mean that he intended, whether he were "forced" or not, to conquer Gaul? If so, he has told us no more than Caesar has enabled us all to see for ourselves. Supposing that Caesar had directly avowed his design, instead of leaving us to infer it, would there be anything surprising in his having told us that he was forced to undertake fresh campaigns against his wish and expectation? Let me give a brief analysis, which any one can verify for himself, of the causes which he assigns for his successive campaigns. He tells us that the Helvetii invaded Gaul and refused to give hostages for their good behaviour; and he implies that he thereupon determined to eject them. He tells us that Ariovistus intended to settle permanently in Gaul, and refused to give hostages, to give satisfaction to the Aedui, or to pledge himself to bring no more Germans across the Rhine. He tells us that the Belgae conspired against him because they were afraid that he intended to conquer their country, and because they were egged on to fight by influential Gauls who objected to the Roman legions' wintering in Gaul, and by others who feared that the establishment of Roman rule would put a stop to their plans for seizing supreme power in their respective states. He frankly avows, as I have already remarked, that he sent Publius Crassus to reduce the maritime tribes to submission; and he does not pretend that those tribes had given him any provocation. He goes on to relate that they revolted; that he suppressed their revolt without mercy; that he sent Crassus to prevent the Aquitanians from helping, if they intended to help, the tribes of Gaul; that the Aquitanians combined to resist Crassus; and that Crassus defeated them.<sup>1</sup> In the Fourth Book he relates that the Usipetes and Tencteri,

<sup>1</sup> Mommsen remarks, *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 604, note, that Caesar's attempt to justify Crassus's invasion "as a defensive measure which the state of things had rendered inevitable" breaks down. Read Caesar's statement (*B. G.*, iii. 11, § 3) of his reason for having sent Crassus on this errand:—*P. Crassum . . . in Aquitaniam proficisci iubet ne ex his nationibus auxilia in Galliam mittantur ac tantae nationes coniungantur* ("P. Crassus . . . was directed to march for Aquitania, in order to

expelled from their own country, crossed the Rhine with the intention of settling in Gaul; that he warned them to recross the Rhine; and that, in consequence of their having violated a truce, he attacked and destroyed them. The remainder of his work, in so far as it relates to Gaul, is devoted to a narrative of the insurrection of the Eburones and their allies in 54-53 B.C., and of the great rebellion of 52 B.C.

This is a fair summary of the reasons which Caesar gives for having undertaken his successive campaigns. Those reasons appear to me perfectly natural and perfectly consistent with the theory that what he intended from first to last was the conquest of Gaul. I can hardly believe that those who have impugned his good faith imagine that the moral sense of Roman society was likely to be shocked by the conquest, and that therefore it was necessary for him to veil it as decently as he could. There are Little Englanders: but if there were Little Romans, I never heard of them. The conquest awoke the deepest enthusiasm in Italy. If Caesar had a political object in writing the *Commentaries*, that object was not to apologise for his conquest, but to celebrate it. Possibly Cato and his followers may have been genuinely indignant at such acts as the slaughter of the Usipetes and the Tencteri: but it was precisely his most appalling acts of severity which Caesar related with the greatest emphasis and the greatest precision. I am willing to believe that, if he had had a great political purpose to serve by making the worse appear the better cause, he would have done so without hesitation. But I am at a loss to understand what his temptation could have been. The *Commentaries* were an *apologia*: they were not an apology.

It must be remembered moreover that Caesar had already taken care, by his negotiations with Pompey and Crassus at Luca, to secure absolution from the Senate even while the war was going on. Mommsen<sup>1</sup> thinks that the *Commentaries* were designed partly "to justify as well as possible before the public the formally unconstitutional enterprise of . . . conquering a great country and constantly increasing his army . . . without instructions." This may be true: but in the conference at Luca Caesar had played his cards so well that the Senate had easily been induced to vote pay for the legions which he had raised on his own responsibility,<sup>2</sup> and Cicero, in his speech *De Provinciis Consularibus*, had celebrated the glories of Caesar's exploits in

prevent the despatch of reinforcements to Gaul from the peoples of that country, and to frustrate any intended alliance between the two powerful races"). It is generally assumed that the danger which Caesar professed to fear did not exist, because the Aquitani had apparently no political connexion with the Celtae or the Belgae, and were perhaps ethnologically distinct from both: but is it quite certain that the alleged danger, which, as may be gathered from *B. G.*, vii. 31, § 5, did exist, was not removed by the severe lesson which Crassus gave the Aquitani? and, if the danger was really imaginary, is it certain that Caesar knew it to be so? Mommsen may be right: but if so, why did Caesar take no pains to apologise for having sent Crassus to reduce the maritime tribes, who had offered him no provocation, to submission? Why did he simply record the fact? Surely because it never occurred to him that his conduct required an apology.

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 605.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero, *Ad Fam.*, i. 7, § 10.

Gaul. Too much has been made even of Caesar's anxiety to defend himself in his Memoirs on purely constitutional grounds. His book was not likely to win him many new adherents. He relied principally upon other means,—gold and the powerful advocates whom gold kept on his side. When Mommsen insists upon the necessity under which Caesar found himself of arguing that he had been justified in acting without the sanction of the Senate, does he not forget that the Senate, by the repeated "thanksgivings" which it had decreed in honour of his victories,<sup>1</sup> had virtually sanctioned his action in advance? Does he not also forget that, according to Suetonius,<sup>2</sup> the Senate had given Caesar not only Illyricum and Gallia Cisalpina, but also Gallia Comata, —the whole of Transalpine Gaul,—for his sphere of action, and that, as Long<sup>3</sup> puts it, "the grant of Gallia Comata in general terms was equivalent to a commission to make war in that country."

## VI

Now to deal with the critics who complain that Caesar lied from motives of vanity. The Duc d'Aumale observes that Caesar was not as candid as Turenne, who frankly told an indiscreet questioner that he had lost the battles of Mariendal and Rethel by his own fault.<sup>4</sup> I freely admit it. Caesar did not think it necessary to anticipate the censure of military critics; and he was quite right. He made mistakes, like every other general; and if he does not call our attention to them, neither does he conceal them. He tells us quite enough to enable us, if we know our business, to see where he went astray.

The charges which I propose now to examine are—(1) that Caesar concealed certain reverses which he had sustained; (2) that he took to himself the credit, which really belonged to Labienus, of having defeated the Tigurini; (3) that the reasons which he gave for not having punished Dumnorix in 58 B.C. are false; (4) that he unjustly charged Considius with having caused the failure of his attempt to surprise the Helvetii; (5) that his account of the later stage of his battle with the Helvetii is incredible; (6) that he suppressed important facts in his account of the sea-fight with the Veneti; (7) that the reasons which he gave for having returned so hastily from his two Transrhenane expeditions are false; (8) that he pretended to have been at Samarobriva (Amiens) when the news that Quintus Cicero was in danger reached that place, whereas he had really started for Italy; (9) that he exaggerated the numbers of the Nervii, the Aduatuci and the Eburones,

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 35, § 3; iv. 38, § 5; vii. 90, § 8.

<sup>2</sup> *Divus Iulius*, 22.

<sup>3</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iii. 433. In this passage Long clearly explains the meaning of the word *Provincia*. See also Mommsen's *Hist. of Rome*, iii. 382, note (ed. 1894).

<sup>4</sup> *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, xv., 1858, p. 119. If Caesar was ever questioned by Balbus about the battle with the Nervii, I dare say that he was as candid as Turenne: but Turenne pointed out the error which he had committed at Mariendal in his own *Memoirs*. See *The History of . . . Viscount de Turenne*, 1735, ii. 22, by A. M. Ramsay.

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and of the Aquitani who encountered Crassus; (10) that his account of the predatory expedition of the Sugambri in 53 B.C. is garbled; (11) that he falsely claimed credit for having out-manceuvred Vercingetorix at the outset of his Seventh Campaign; (12) that he disguised the defeat which he had sustained at Gergovia; (13) that he concealed the fact that, after retreating from Gergovia, he was pursued by Vercingetorix; (14) that he pretended to have subdued several German peoples, whereas only the Ubii had in fact submitted; (15) that his narrative of the blockade of Alesia is partly fictitious; and finally, that he was unjust and ungenerous in his notices of the services of his lieutenants.

1. Rauchenstein contrasts the story which Caesar tells in *B. G.*, i. 48-51 of the operations which preceded the defeat of Ariovistus and of the outset of the battle itself with Dion Cassius's narrative. Caesar says that, for five days after Ariovistus made the flank march by which he hoped to cut off the Romans from their supplies, he daily offered battle to Ariovistus; but that Ariovistus remained shut up in his camp and only ventured upon cavalry skirmishes; that afterwards, when he himself had regained communication with his convoys by constructing a smaller camp, Ariovistus made an unsuccessful attempt to storm it, in which both sides suffered heavy loss; and that he himself, having learned that Ariovistus had been warned by his "wise women" not to fight a pitched battle before the new moon, forced Ariovistus's hand by attacking him on the very next day. Dion Cassius, on the contrary, says Rauchenstein, tells us that the Romans were defeated in minor engagements by Ariovistus, and that, setting at naught the warnings of his wise women, he attacked them when they were drawn up in battle array.<sup>1</sup> What Dion Cassius really says is that Ariovistus greatly harassed (*ἰσχυρῶς ἐλίπει*) the Romans with his cavalry; that he nearly took Caesar's smaller camp; and that, emboldened by this success, he paid little attention to the warnings of the wise women, and on the next day, when the Romans moved out of camp and formed in line of battle, he made his troops do the same.<sup>2</sup> Having regard to the general character of Dion's narrative, which is throughout, for the most part, obviously a condensed paraphrase of Caesar's, to his love of rhetorical embellishment and to the monstrous blunders into which this taste occasionally hurries him, I see no reason to believe that, in the present instance, he used any independent authority. The phrase *ἰσχυρῶς ἐλίπει* and the statement that Ariovistus nearly took Caesar's smaller camp I regard as mere flourishes or hasty inferences.

Rauchenstein says that Caesar's narrative of the commencement of his battle with Ariovistus is not only improbable but impossible. Caesar tells us that he marched right up to the German camp (*usque ad castra hostium accessit*); and that the Germans then perforce (*necessario*) led their troops out of camp, and formed them up in groups composed of their several tribes.<sup>3</sup> Upon which Rauchenstein remarks, "Caesar is so

<sup>1</sup> *Der Feldzug Cäsars gegen die Helvetier*, pp. 26-7.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xxxviii. 48-9.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, i. 51, § 2.

polite as to wait until his opponents form up. I cannot see why the Germans were *obliged* to come out and attack Caesar. Why could not Ariovistus have waited securely in his camp and left the initiative to Caesar?"<sup>1</sup>

Now all this is mere quibbling. Rauchenstein lays undue stress on the words *usque ad* (castra). Caesar does not mean that the Germans waited until the Romans were near enough to be able to touch the waggons. When they saw the Romans advancing with the evident intention of forcing on a battle, they were compelled to defend themselves. Being brave, in spite of their superstition, and seeing that they could no longer defer the battle, as their wise women had advised, they determined, as fight they must, to put themselves between the Romans and their helpless women and children, to fight manfully in the open, and not merely to defend themselves but to beat the Romans.

Colonel Stoffel,<sup>2</sup> following an indication in Plutarch's narrative, says that Caesar made his light-armed troops climb the slope on which the German camp stood and throw stones and other missiles into it; and that, exasperated by this provocation, the Germans descended into the plain to attack the main body of the Roman army. If this is true, the difficulty, if there is one, in Caesar's narrative disappears.

According to Rauchenstein, Caesar's account of his operations against the Aduatuci is equally disingenuous. Caesar says that when his army first encamped before their stronghold, they made frequent sorties (*crebras excursiones*) and had skirmishes (*parvulis proeliis*) with his troops; but that afterwards, when he had regularly invested the place, they did not venture out any more.<sup>3</sup> Dion Cassius says that they repulsed Caesar's attacks for many days until he had recourse to the construction of regular siege works.<sup>4</sup> Dion's account, says Rauchenstein, is the more credible of the two, because it was only natural that Caesar should try to storm the town before he undertook a regular siege.<sup>5</sup>

Here is a cobbler who flings his last out of window, and must needs set up for a professor of the art of war. The idea that Caesar should have tried to storm out of hand a town strongly situated upon a rocky height and defended, in the only place where it was open to attack, by two high walls, is so delicious that it almost ceases to be absurd. Caligula would not have done such a thing! And Rauchenstein asks us to believe that Caesar, not content with making one attempt and getting badly beaten, tried again day after day! Now let us turn to Dion Cassius. Any one who is familiar with the Greek's book can see that here, as usual, he is simply paraphrasing and trying to embellish Caesar's plain narrative. He infers from Caesar's expression *crebras excursiones* that "many days" passed before Caesar was ready to begin the siege: he infers from *parvulis proeliis* that he tried to take the town anyhow; and he puts in, as a touch of his own, that he was repulsed.

<sup>1</sup> *Der Feldzug*, etc., pp. 26-7.

<sup>2</sup> *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 68.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 30, §§ 1-2.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xxxix. 4, § 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Der Feldzug*, etc., p. 28.



F. Eyssenhardt<sup>1</sup> complains that Caesar's account, in his *Third Commentary*, of his campaign against the Morini is very different from Dion's ; and he insists that Dion's is the true one. Caesar says that when his troops were engaged in fortifying their camp on the outskirts of a forest, into which the Morini had retreated, the Morini surprised them ; that the troops beat off the attack ; and that, while pursuing the Morini into the forest, they killed a good many of them, but lost a few men themselves.<sup>2</sup> Dion says that the Morini inflicted greater loss upon the Romans than they suffered at their hands.<sup>3</sup> The reader will now judge for himself whether Dion was blundering or romancing. He tells us, as I have pointed out in an earlier part of this essay, that the Morini had retreated to "great mountains," beset with dense forests ; that Caesar intended to get to the mountains, but that he had to abandon his intention on account of their great size and of the approach of winter. Now the reader knows as well as I do that there are no "great mountains" in the country of the Morini, that is to say, in the country between Boulogne and the mouth of the Scheldt. Therefore either Dion invented the mountains in order to embellish his narrative, or else one of his "excellent authorities" invented them. In either case, his statement gives us the measure of the value of his book as material for history.

M. J. Maissiat<sup>4</sup> and MM. E. Bosc and L. Bonnemère<sup>5</sup> say that, according to Eutropius, Avaricum was not captured until after the Romans had sustained many reverses (*post multas Romanorum clades*). As a matter of fact, Eutropius said nothing of the kind. The words which I have quoted were written not by him but by Orosius.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, such a statement, made by a mere epitomiser, who, as I have shown, made gross blunders, and in this very passage confounds Avaricum with Cenabum, is worthless as evidence: *multas clades* is simply a rhetorical embellishment of Caesar's account of the fighting which took place on the night when the Gauls made their sortie.<sup>7</sup>

2. According to Appian<sup>8</sup> and Plutarch,<sup>9</sup> it was not Caesar who defeated the Tigurini, but Labienus ; and Rauchenstein argues that Plutarch's words,—οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀλλὰ Λαβιηνός,—show that he intended to correct Caesar. Caesar, says Rauchenstein, according to his own account, acted like a fool. His object was to prevent the Helvetii from reaching the country of the Santones. On his return from Italy he encamped in the neighbourhood of Lyons. The vanguard of the Helvetii was much further south ; for, 20 days previously, it had crossed the Saône about 9 miles north of Lyons ; and the column must in that time have marched a considerable distance in a south-westerly direction. Yet Caesar, according to his own account, now marched northward,

<sup>1</sup> *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, etc., lxxxv., 1862, p. 761.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 28, § 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, cxxix. 44, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Jules César en Gaule*, ii. 195, n. 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. nationale des Gaulois sous Vercingétorix*, 1882, p. 266, n. 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist.*, vi. 11, § 3.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 24-5.

<sup>8</sup> *De rebus gallicis*, i. 3.

<sup>9</sup> *Caesar*, 18.

destroyed the Tigurini, crossed the Saône, and then made a flank march of at least two days in order to force the Helvetii to turn towards the north. This would have been a strategical absurdity. What really happened was this. While Caesar remained encamped on the right bank of the Rhône in the neighbourhood of Vienne, Labienus attacked and defeated the Tigurini, crossed the Saône, and marched on in pursuit of the Helvetii. Caesar barred the south-western route towards the country of the Santones; and the Helvetii, finding themselves out-manceuvred, sent Divico to negotiate.<sup>1</sup>

I do not believe that Caesar would have been mean enough, and I do not believe that he would have been mad enough to take to himself the credit of an action which belonged to Labienus. He gave all his lieutenants, and especially Labienus, full credit for their exploits. Even if he had been minded to rob Labienus of his due, he must have known that every officer who had served under him would detect his lie, and would make the truth known privately if not publicly: in short that he would gain no credit and lose much.

Rauchenstein's argument is based upon erroneous assumptions. First there is no evidence that Caesar encamped near Vienne or at any point on the right bank of the Rhône, below its confluence with the Saône; and on pp. 610-13 I show that he encamped, probably on the heights of Sathonay and certainly in the angle formed by the confluence of the Saône with the Rhône. Napoleon conjectures that he posted a detachment on the right bank of the Saône, at or near Lyons, to intercept the road which led into the Province. But it is more than doubtful whether the Helvetii would have taken this road in any case;<sup>2</sup> and Napoleon observes that "at an epoch very near to our own, before the construction of the railways, the public conveyances, to go from Lyons to La Rochelle . . . took the direction to the north-west, to Autun, and thence to Nevers, in the valley of the Loire."<sup>3</sup>

I believe that Plutarch and Appian either drew hasty inferences from the fact that Labienus had been left by Caesar on the east of the Saône,<sup>4</sup> or that, like Rauchenstein, they made the mistake of assuming that Caesar was encamped on the west of that river. Blunders far more gross than theirs are to be found in Mr. Froude's *Caesar*.<sup>5</sup> At all events on this point, Dion Cassius,<sup>6</sup> to whom Rauchenstein so often appeals against Caesar, confirms him; and, as Rauchenstein maintains that Dion used other authorities besides Caesar for his narrative of the Gallic war, one would think that, if Caesar falsified this part of his narrative, Dion would have been able and eager to correct him.<sup>7</sup> More-

<sup>1</sup> *Der Feldzug*, etc., pp. 65-70.

<sup>2</sup> See Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 11.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 61.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, i. 10, § 3.

<sup>5</sup> See my article on "Mr. Froude and his Critics" (*Westminster Review*, Aug. 1892, pp. 174-89).

<sup>6</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xxxviii. 32, § 4.

<sup>7</sup> The defeat of the Tigurini is mentioned not only in the epitome of Appian's narrative of the Gallic war, but also in an excerpt from Appian (*De rebus gallicis*, 15). In this passage Appian says that the Helvetii and the Tigurini were two

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over, it must be remembered that Labienus had been left with only one legion, whereas the attack on the Tigurini was made with three. . . Therefore on Rauchenstein's theory, Caesar must have sent two legions from the right to the left bank of the Saône to co-operate with Labienus. In order to cross the river, they must have made a bridge. Then why did they make another in order to return? Rauchenstein's theory refutes itself.<sup>1</sup>

Rauchenstein assumes that because the head of the Helvetian column had crossed the Saône 20 days before the defeat of the Tigurini, therefore the vanguard must by that time have moved far away to the south-west. But, as Long and Napoleon have shown, the south-western way was far more difficult than the north-western route, by which the Helvetii marched when Caesar was pursuing them. Moreover, during the whole of those 20 days, successive sections of the Helvetian column were crossing the river; and it is very unlikely that the vanguard would have endangered its own safety by moving away from the neighbourhood of the river before the whole column had got safely across.

3. Caesar tells us that he forbore to punish Dumnorix for intriguing against him during the campaign against the Helvetii, because Dumnorix's brother, Divitiacus, represented that the Gauls would believe that he had prompted the punishment, and that public opinion would brand him as a monster.<sup>2</sup> Rauchenstein does not believe this. It was the duty, he says, of a prudent general "to put Dumnorix out of the way"; and Caesar would not have allowed himself to be influenced by sentimental considerations. He did not punish Dumnorix simply because Dumnorix was too strong to be touched.<sup>3</sup>

With all his scepticism Rauchenstein is amusingly innocent. Caesar does not say and does not imply that he was influenced by sentimental considerations to spare Dumnorix. What he does say is that he wished to have Dumnorix punished, but feared that by doing so he might offend Divitiacus, who had proved himself a good friend to Rome; that he asked Divitiacus to consent to the punishment of his brother; that Divitiacus admitted his brother's guilt, but begged Caesar not to be hard upon him, as the Gauls would take for granted that he himself had pressed for severity; that he assured Divitiacus that his regard for him was so great that he would overlook Dumnorix's misconduct; and that he contented himself with severely reprimanding and warning Dumnorix, and putting him under surveillance. Caesar, being a man of the world and a diplomatist, and also having a sincere regard for Divitiacus, naturally took care to make himself as agreeable to him as possible; and if he does not expressly say, he lets us see that he forbore to press for the punishment of Dumnorix because he could not afford to

distinct nations, whereas we know that the Tigurini were only one of the four Helvetian tribes; and he says that the attack on the Tigurini took place after and in consequence of the failure of Caesar's negotiations with the Helvetii. These two gross blunders do not dispose one to believe Appian when he contradicts Caesar.

<sup>1</sup> See *B. G.*, i. 8, § 1, 10, § 3, 12, § 2, 13, § 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 20, §§ 3, 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Der Feldzug, etc.*, p. 74.

offend a valuable ally and to make himself unpopular, at the outset of his government, with the Gauls.

4. Caesar relates that, when he was following the Helvetii, he was informed that they had encamped, 8 miles from his own camp, at the foot of a mountain; that he sent Labienus soon after midnight, with two legions, to occupy the top of the mountain, and marched himself against the Helvetii about two hours later, intending to take them between two fires; that he sent on Considius, an officer of experience and high reputation, in advance of his own column, to reconnoitre; that at daybreak, when the hill was actually in the possession of Labienus and he himself was only a mile and a half from the Helvetian camp, Considius came galloping back and told him that he had seen the Helvetii encamped on the mountain; that, misled by this false intelligence, he formed up his troops on a neighbouring hill to repel any attack; and that, when the day was far advanced, he learned that Considius had been the dupe of his own fears and that the Helvetii had moved off.<sup>1</sup>

Rauchenstein regards this story as incredible, for the following reasons. First, he says, the Helvetii would not have been so foolish as to encamp at the foot of a hill without securing themselves against attack: they would have occupied the hill themselves. Secondly, Caesar would not have believed Considius's report without further evidence. Thirdly, Caesar did not learn the truth, according to his own account, until late in the day: but he must have known that if Labienus had really found the hill occupied by the enemy, he would have informed him of the fact long before. Rauchenstein rewrites the story as follows. The (assumed) Helvetian outposts remained in possession of the hill until about five o'clock in the morning, by which time the Helvetian column had commenced its march. Labienus, on arriving at the hill, found it in possession of the enemy, and at once sent back word to Caesar. Between five and six o'clock, after the departure of the Helvetii, he ascended the hill and waited for Caesar. Caesar, on receiving the reports of Labienus and Considius, drew up his army in battle array, because he feared that the Helvetii would attack him. He only had to keep silence about Labienus's report and excuse his failure by laying the blame on Considius.<sup>2</sup>

I cannot remember having ever read greater nonsense even in a "programme." If Rauchenstein's imaginary narrative of the incident were correct, Caesar would not have had any occasion to blame anybody except his scouts; nor would he have been so foolish as to concoct a false account in order to excuse a failure for which nobody would have dreamed of holding him responsible. If the Helvetii had occupied the hill themselves, how could Caesar have been led to believe that he could attack them at a disadvantage; and why should it be incredible that they encamped at the foot of a hill, when Hirtius expressly says that it was the foolish custom of the Gauls to encamp lazily on low, instead of on rising ground?<sup>3</sup> Caesar *did* require further evidence after receiving

<sup>1</sup> B. G., i. 21-2.

<sup>2</sup> *Der Feldzug*, etc., pp. 77-8.

<sup>3</sup> B. G., viii. 36, § 3.

Considius's report; for he tells us that he learned the truth later in the day from scouts. (*Multo denique die per exploratores Caesar cognovit et montem a suis teneri*, etc.) Finally, it is not certain that he "did not learn the truth, according to his own account, until late in the day." The expression *multo die* is vague. It may mean, as C. Schneider says,<sup>1</sup> "when a good part of the day had passed," which is not necessarily the same thing as "late in the day"; or it may mean, as Long suggests,<sup>2</sup> "not more than full complete day,"—say about nine o'clock in the forenoon. I am inclined to believe that this is what it does mean. For Caesar says that, after the fall of Avaricum, the fugitives reached Vercingetorix's camp *multa nocte*. The camp was not far from Avaricum, certainly a good deal less than 16 Roman miles: Avaricum was taken rapidly by assault in the day-time; and therefore it is unlikely that the night was far spent when the fugitives reached the camp.<sup>3</sup> But admit that Schneider's interpretation is right. What then? Why should Labienus have sent a report to Caesar, why should Caesar have expected a report from Labienus when Caesar had sent Considius expressly to procure information? Finally, if, as Rauchenstein imagines, the Helvetii had already gone off, I am unable to conceive what object Labienus could have had in ascending the hill at all.

5. Caesar's account of the later stages of the battle with the Helvetii<sup>4</sup> Rauchenstein regards as purely fictitious. He says that, according to von Göler and Napoleon, Caesar's auxiliaries probably numbered not less than 30,000 men,<sup>5</sup> while the two legions which were detached with them to defend the Roman baggage must have numbered about 10,000. If Caesar is to be believed, says Rauchenstein, these 40,000 men did not stir hand or foot to help their comrades, the four veteran legions, in their hard-fought struggle. Caesar tells us that the Helvetii, after the repulse of their attack on the four veteran legions, retreated to a hill about a mile from the scene of their original attack, and there renewed the battle. This second episode, says Rauchenstein, Caesar dismisses in a few words. He does not say that the Helvetii were driven from their position; and from his own statement that, throughout the whole battle, not one of the enemy turned his back upon the Romans, we may infer that they were not. It therefore appears that they looked quietly on while Caesar's third line was destroying the Boii and Tulingi, who had taken refuge behind the laager of waggons. Of course, says Rauchenstein, with fine sarcasm, this was their way of showing their gratitude for the forbearance with which they had been treated by Caesar's auxiliaries and his two newly-raised legions! As, Rauchenstein continues, Caesar's account of the retreat of the Helvetii to the hill is questionable, it follows that his account of the capture of the laager is incredible. According to that account, the Romans surrounded and stormed the laager. Yet, although surrounded, 130,000 persons managed to escape. No prisoners were made, except two of Orgetorix's children. The

<sup>1</sup> *Caesar*, i. 47.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, p. 62.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 16, § 1, 18, § 1, 27-8.

<sup>4</sup> See *B. G.*, i. 24-6.

<sup>5</sup> Napoleon (*Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 73, n. 1) really says 20,000,—on the evidence of Appian!

Romans were so obliging as to open their ranks, and let all the rest pass through !

Finally, Rauchenstein offers us a narrative of his own in place of Caesar's fiction. (Has the worthy man no sense of humour ?) Caesar's auxiliaries, he tells us, as soon as they saw the attack of the Boii and Tulingi, assumed that the battle was lost, and ran for their lives. Thereupon Caesar retreated to his camp on the hill. The Helvetii returned to the attack, but failed to storm the camp, and accordingly marched for Bibracte. Subsequently the Verbigeni thoughtlessly separated themselves from the main body of the Helvetii ; and Caesar destroyed them. But why did the Helvetii, in spite of the fair measure of success which they had gained, return home ? Rauchenstein finds no difficulty in devising an explanation. They had already become sick of wandering in Gaul. They had consumed all their provisions ; and, although they had not been defeated, they had suffered heavy losses in the battle. They were afraid that Caesar would get reinforcements and revenge himself for his failure ; and therefore they decided that their wisest course would be to abandon their expedition. Finally Rauchenstein assures us that Caesar's officers and legionaries would not have contradicted his account of the campaign, because they would have been delighted at the cleverness with which he managed, by a few dexterous phrases, to transform a drawn battle into a brilliant victory.<sup>1</sup>

It might be a sufficient answer to Rauchenstein to say that if Caesar had really sustained a severe check at the hands of the Helvetii and had concocted a false account of the battle, the facts must, in spite of his cleverness, have leaked out. Surely Dion Cassius, by whom Rauchenstein sets such store, would not have failed to give us the true version ! But I will examine Rauchenstein's arguments. There is no evidence, and it is to the last degree improbable that Caesar's auxiliaries numbered 30,000 men : but that point is quite immaterial. If they merely protected the baggage, the reason was that Caesar did not think it wise to expose them in his first battle, or that he felt able to win the battle without their help, and simply held them in reserve. Rauchenstein's explanation of their (assumed) inaction is simply an idle guess. Secondly, Caesar implies, if he does not expressly say that the Helvetii were driven from the hill. He describes the last stage of the action in a few vivid sentences. Two battles, he says, went on simultaneously,—one upon the hill, the other at the laager. The Helvetii were forced further and further up the hill : the Boii and Tulingi were at last driven from the waggons ; and about 130,000 souls in all survived the battle. These 130,000 were not all in the laager, as Rauchenstein absurdly pretends : they included the Helvetii. Otherwise, what became of the Helvetii ? The statement of Caesar, to which Rauchenstein refers, that throughout the whole battle not one of the enemy turned his back upon the Romans, interpreted as he perversely chooses to interpret it, would prove too much : it would prove that neither the Helvetii nor the Boii nor the Tulingi ever retreated, from the battle-field at all ! Obviously Caesar

<sup>1</sup> *Der Feldzug*, etc., pp. 92-101.

means that, while the battle lasted, the Gauls all fought like men: he does not mean that, when they were at last overpowered, they even then refused to retreat; for he says that they did retreat. He does not say that the Romans surrounded the laager: he merely says that they stormed it; and therefore Rauchenstein's sarcasm falls flat. Nor does he say that no prisoners were taken, except Orgetorix's children. He simply mentions those two, because they were worthy of mention.<sup>1</sup> According to Rauchenstein's estimate, Caesar's force equalled, if it did not outnumber the force of the Gauls: it was better armed and better disciplined; and it was commanded by one of the great generals of the world. Is it incredible that, after a hard-fought battle, it should have gained a decisive victory?

It is hardly necessary to point out the absurdity of Rauchenstein's guess about the Verbigeni. Why should they have separated themselves from the main body of the Helvetii, if they had not intended, as Caesar says, to make a dash for liberty, after the main body had surrendered? If Caesar destroyed the Verbigeni,—and Rauchenstein admits that he did,—it is obvious that he pursued the Helvetii. Is it credible that he would have pursued a host which had virtually beaten him?

Caesar alleges, as his reason for not having pursued the Helvetii at once, that he was obliged to remain three days on the field of battle, in order to bury the dead and to allow his wounded time to recover.<sup>2</sup> Rauchenstein refuses to accept this reason. It was Caesar's custom, he says, to follow up a victory; and a single legion would have sufficed to bury the dead. He remained on the battle-field although, according to his own statement, he had only enough food for a single day; and if he had found stores in the deserted Helvetian encampment, he would have said so. Evidently therefore he must have feared that the Helvetii would rally and, finding themselves unpursued, would march to Bibracte and there lay in fresh stores of provisions.<sup>3</sup>

Now Caesar frankly avows that he suffered heavy loss in the battle: his cavalry were weak and untrustworthy;<sup>4</sup> and, as Colonel Stoffel points out, he was in the country of his allies, the Aedui, and was therefore bound, out of consideration for them, to bury the vast heaps of dead, in order to avoid a pestilence.<sup>5</sup> These appear to me sufficient reasons for his inaction. He unquestionably remained master of the field of battle: to say that the Helvetii captured the impregnable stronghold of Bibracte after the battle is a wild invention: they could not have taken it without the consent of the Aedui: the bulk of the Aedui were opposed to them; and, if they had taken it, why should they have forthwith abandoned it? Caesar knew that he could overtake the unwieldy and shattered host whenever he pleased. It is quite possible that, during his three days' stay on the battle-field, he obtained stores from Bibracte; and, if he had found stores in the deserted Helvetian encampment, it would have been quite in accordance with his laconic manner

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 24-6.

<sup>3</sup> *Der Feldzug*, etc., pp. 92-4.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 26, § 5.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, i. 15, § 1, 18, § 10, 26, § 5.

<sup>5</sup> *Guerre civile*, ii. 452.

to omit all mention of the fact. Anyhow that he did get stores somewhere and somehow needs no demonstration. Finally, the causes which Rauchenstein invents for the return of the Helvetii are totally inadequate.

6. Caesar says that the Roman ships had no advantage over those of the Veneti, except in speed and in the use of oars.<sup>1</sup> I quote from my own description of the battle, which embodies all the essential facts recorded in the *Commentaries*.<sup>2</sup>—"Clustering on the cliffs, the legionaries had a good view of the two fleets as they approached one another. Brutus and his officers were at their wits' ends to know what to do. The rams of the light galleys would fail to make any impression on those huge hulls. The deck-turrets were run up: but even then the Romans were overtopped by the lofty poops, and could not throw their javelins with effect. But the Roman engineers had prepared an ingenious contrivance. Two or more galleys closed round one of the enemies' ships. Then, with sharp hooks fixed to the ends of long poles, the Romans caught hold of the halyards, and pulled them taut: the rowers plied their oars with might and main; and the sudden strain snapped the ropes. Down fell the yards: the troops clambered on to the helpless hulk; and the struggle was soon ended by the short sword. When several ships had been thus captured, the rest prepared to escape. But they had hardly been put before the wind when there was a dead calm; and, as they had no oars, they could not stir. The swift little galleys ran in and out among them, and captured them one after another, etc."

M. Le Moyne de la Borderie<sup>3</sup> objects that, in order to cut the halyards, the Romans would have had to use hooks fastened to poles of prodigious length; and that so long as the wind lasted, other Venetian ships could easily have come to the rescue of those which were attacked, and rammed Caesar's small galleys. Evidently, he concludes, the account of Dion Cassius is the true one. Dion's account<sup>4</sup> is much longer than Caesar's. The part which is relevant to the present discussion may be summarised as follows:—Brutus came ἐκ τῆς ἑνδοθεν θαλάσσης, that is to say from the Mediterranean, with "the swift ships." The Veneti were confident that they would be able to sink these ships τοῖς κοντοῖς,—“with the boat-hooks.” As long as the wind lasted, Brutus dared not attack: in fact he intended to abandon his ships and repel the enemy's onslaught on land. Suddenly, however, the wind dropped. Thereupon Brutus proceeded to attack the Venetian fleet in detail. In some cases he surrounded one of the hostile ships with several of his own: in others he attacked several ships with an equal or even a less number. Some of the Venetian ships were rammed, shattered and sunk: others were burnt; and some of the Veneti committed suicide. Finally, the Romans cut the rigging of the Venetian ships “from a distance” (πύρρῳθεν) with hooks fixed to long poles.

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 13, § 7.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 14-15.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. de Bretagne*, i. 1896, pp. 74-6.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xxxix. 40-43.



Now the reader will have observed that the very statement of Caesar which M. de la Borderie refuses to accept is repeated by Dion! The Romans, according to both writers, did cut the rigging of the Venetian ships. Is it likely that Brutus, who had sailed from the mouth of the Loire for the very purpose of attacking the Veneti, would have determined, as soon as he sighted them, to abandon his own ships because the wind was still blowing? Is it conceivable that the Veneti would have been mad enough to believe that they could sink the Roman galleys with boat-hooks? Is it credible that the light galleys would have been able to ram, shatter and sink the Venetian ships, which, as Dion, following Caesar, himself admits, were far superior to them both in size and strength? If M. de la Borderie had known anything about the rigging of ancient<sup>1</sup> or modern ships, he would not have committed himself to the statement that it was impossible for the Romans to reach the Venetian rigging with their hooks. As Mr. Froude, a practical yachtsman, remarks, "It was not difficult to do if, as is probable, the halyards were made fast, not to the mast, but to the gunwale;"<sup>2</sup> and Lieut. K. Foote, late R.N., in conversation with me, has endorsed Mr. Froude's statement. When M. de la Borderie asserts that other Venetian ships could have come to the rescue of those which were attacked, he forgets that the Roman ships had the advantage of the enemy in speed, and, as they had oars while the enemy had none, could attack them from whichever side they pleased. It is certain, and M. de la Borderie admits, that Caesar won the battle. What conceivable motive could he have had for telling a lie about the manœuvre by which he gained the victory?

7. F. Eyssenhardt refuses to accept Caesar's statement of his reasons for having returned so hastily from his two Transrhene expeditions; and he believes that, on the second occasion, he suffered something like a disaster, and, in order to prevent his readers from suspecting the truth, inserted his description of the manners and customs of the Gauls and Germans between his account of his expedition and his account of his precipitate return.<sup>3</sup>

Caesar returned from his first expedition, as he himself tells us, because he had gained the objects for which he had undertaken it, and, as he implies, because he was too prudent to march into the heart of the forests of Germany in order to attack the Suevi.<sup>4</sup> He undertook his second expedition, as he implies, in order to punish the Germans, if possible, for having sent reinforcements to the Treveri, and, as he says, in order to prevent Ambiorix from finding an asylum in Germany. He returned, as he says, because he was afraid that if he marched into the forests against the Suevi, he would be unable to feed his army.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See C. Torr's *Ancient Ships*, 1894, pp. 78, 81, 94.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar: a Sketch*, ed. 1886, p. 290.

<sup>3</sup> *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie, etc.*, lxxxv., 1862, p. 762. Eyssenhardt's view is shared by Drumann, *Geschichte Roms*, iii. 329, and Ihne, *Röm. Gesch.*, vi. 500, n. 2.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 19, §§ 2-4.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, vi. 9, §§ 1-2, 29, § 1.

Surely a very credible reason ! If he had suffered a disaster, he could have done no more than keep silence about it ; and writing a dissertation about the manners and customs of the Gauls and Germans could avail nothing to confirm the effect of silence. But there is not the slightest reason to suspect that he suffered any disaster. If he did, how came it that Dion Cassius and the other minor historians, although, according to Caesar's critics, they had access to "excellent independent authorities," knew nothing about it ?

8. O. Sumpff argues that the news of the disaster which befell Sabinus and Cotta at Aduatua must have reached Samarobriua (Amiens) a week earlier than the time which Caesar mentions ; as Labienus, who was informed of it by fugitives, would certainly have sent a message to warn Caesar. The fact is, says Sumpff, that Caesar had left Samarobriua on his way to Italy, and had to be recalled. Sabinus hit upon the truth when he said, in his speech at Aduatua, *Caesarem (se) arbitrari profectum in Italiam*.<sup>1</sup>

Sumpff's slander is purely gratuitous.<sup>2</sup> Assuming that Labienus did send a message to Caesar, it is very likely that his messengers were stopped, as we know that Quintus Cicero's were ;<sup>3</sup> and Sumpff forgets that if the news had reached Samarobriua in Caesar's absence, Trebonius and Crassus, good officers both, would not have sat helplessly waiting for Caesar's return, but would have organised a relieving expedition on their own responsibility.

Caesar says that, before he set out from Samarobriua to the relief of Cicero, he wrote to Labienus, directing him to march with his legion into the country of the Nervii ; and he seems to imply that he received Labienus's answer while he was himself marching through the country of the Atrebatas and before he had reached the Nervian frontier.<sup>4</sup> On this Sumpff remarks that Labienus was 20 German miles from Samarobriua, and that Caesar could not have received his answer within 24 hours from the moment when he sent his own despatch.<sup>5</sup> To this I reply, first, that Labienus's message certainly did not reach Caesar until the day,—very likely not until late in the day,—after he left Samarobriua ; and that there is nothing in the *Commentaries* which proves that it did reach him even on that day : that he wrote to Labienus in the evening of the day before he left Samarobriua ; and therefore that "24 hours" is simply a product of Sumpff's imagination : secondly, that Archibald Forbes rode, during the Zulu war of 1879, 110 miles in 20 hours ;<sup>6</sup> and thirdly, that Caesar could have had no motive for falsification.

<sup>1</sup> *Caesars Beurteilung seiner Offiziere in den Comm. vom gall. Kriege*, 1893, p. 30.

<sup>2</sup> If there is a shadow of foundation for it, it is that Caesar says that he determined to remain in Gaul until he should have learned that the winter camps were fortified, and that he did receive this information. But Cicero's camp was not completely fortified when the siege began. See *B. G.*, v. 24, § 8, 25, § 5, 40, §§ 1-2.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, v. 40, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 46, § 4 ; 47, §§ 4-5.

<sup>5</sup> *Caesars Beurteilung*, etc., p. 23.

<sup>6</sup> *Daily News*, Aug. 21, 1879, p. 5, col. 3.

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9. General Lamarque<sup>1</sup> denies that the country of the Nervii, Aduatuci and Eburones, covered as it was with dense forests, could have supported a population of half a million, which, he argues, is implied by Caesar's statement that the camp of Quintus Cicero was beleaguered by 60,000 men of those tribes;<sup>2</sup> and he thinks it equally incredible that such an army would have fled before Caesar's seven thousand. He also denies<sup>3</sup> that the barren country of Les Landes could have sustained 50,000 warriors,—the host which, according to Caesar,<sup>4</sup> was encountered in the Third Campaign by Crassus.

In the case of half-barbarous tribes, the raising of a host of 60,000 men does not necessarily imply the existence of a population of half a million; and the expression "covered with forests" is a gross exaggeration. The host which Crassus encountered came from many other places besides Les Landes.<sup>5</sup> Still I have little doubt that the numbers, in both cases, are far in excess of the truth. Caesar must have derived them from the reports of Cicero and of Crassus respectively; and even if Cicero and Crassus were not anxious to magnify their own exploits, they probably got their information from hearsay; for it is not likely that their enemies kept muster-rolls.

Commenting on the implied statement of Caesar<sup>6</sup> that nearly 430,000 persons, exclusive of the cavalry who took refuge with the Sugambri, perished in the rout of the Usipetes and Tencteri, Desjardins<sup>7</sup> observes "toujours la même exagération et la même invraisemblance dans les chiffres des *Commentaires*. A moins que les manuscrits, au lieu de XXXXIII, ne portent par erreur CCCXXX."

Perhaps Desjardins would have been wiser if he had confined himself to scepticism, and not attempted conjectural emendation.

10. Ilne<sup>8</sup> argues that Caesar's account of the predatory expedition of the Sugambri in 53 B.C. is a perversion of the truth. "Caesar," he says, "represents that the invitation to the neighbouring peoples to lay waste the land of the Eburones had reached the other side of the Rhine. Thereupon two thousand Sugambri crossed the Rhine in boats and took part in the plundering, and were then informed by an Eburonian prisoner that the Roman camp contained much richer booty; and this it was that caused them to make the attack. This account is highly improbable for the following reasons. If Caesar needed seven days for the raid,"—in the direction of the Scheldt,— "and the invitation to the neighbours of the Eburones preceded the march of the Romans by one or two days, yet this time is not sufficient to organise and carry out so

<sup>1</sup> *Spectateur militaire*, iii., 1827, pp. 263-4.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, v. 49, §§ 1-2.

<sup>3</sup> *Spectateur militaire*, iii., 1827, p. 267.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 26, § 6.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, and 27.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 15, §§ 1-3, 16, § 2. It is not, however, inconsistent with Caesar's narrative to assume that the number of women and children who escaped was considerable; and all the cavalry, except 800, recrossed the Rhine.

<sup>7</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 652.

<sup>8</sup> *Röm. Gesch.*, vi. 503, n. 1.

considerable a campaign from the east of the Rhine to the west of the Meuse. It must be assumed that the Sugambri were already on the left bank of the Rhine when Caesar made his raid into the land of the Eburones. From this it follows that their intention was some other than to plunder the Eburones. Their attack on the camp and on the five cohorts outside the camp, from which no booty was to be expected,<sup>1</sup> has much rather the appearance that it was made in secret understanding with the Eburones than with the view of injuring them. If this was the case, it is a proof that the Germans had been in no way intimidated by Caesar's inroad into their land, in other words that the campaign beyond the Rhine had been without result. Caesar wished to hush this up, and hence the misrepresentation."

I reply that the Sugambri, who, as Caesar says,<sup>2</sup> were born freebooters, no more needed a considerable time to organise a border raid than did the moss-troopers of the Middle Ages ;<sup>3</sup> and, as I shall show, in my note on *ADUATUCA*, Cicero's camp was not on the west of the Meuse at all, but on the east, much nearer to the country of the Sugambri. Secondly, to assume that 2000 undisciplined horsemen would have deliberately crossed the Rhine with the purpose of attacking a Roman legion entrenched within a fortified camp, is to make not merely a groundless but an absurd assumption. Thirdly, if the Sugambri had come to help the Eburones, Caesar would have detailed a force to destroy them. Fourthly, nobody, except Ihne himself, ever suggested that the attack on Cicero's camp was made with "the view of injuring" the Eburones : it was made with the view of enriching the Sugambri.<sup>4</sup> Fifthly, all the evidence we have goes to prove that the German encroachments were "emphatically checked by the terror which" Caesar's punishment of the Usipetes and Tencteri inspired.<sup>5</sup> Sixthly, if, as Ihne maintains, Caesar had failed to terrorise the Germans and had wished to "hush up" his failure, surely his wisest course would have been to say nothing.

11. Every student of Caesar has heard of Napoleon's *Histoire de Jules César* : but I am inclined to think that there are even learned editors, to say nothing of picturesque historians, who have never heard of Jacques Maissiat. Yet, since the appearance of Napoleon's book, Maissiat has produced an elaborate work on the conquest of Gaul, which cost him apparently more than sixteen years of toil, and required three bulky volumes. Its main object is to prove, first that Alesia was in Savoy ; secondly that, rightly understood, the narrative of Caesar means, not that Caesar besieged Vercingetorix in Alesia, but that Vercingetorix in Alesia besieged Caesar ; and generally that Caesar was, from motives not of policy, but of vanity, a mean and contemptible, but

<sup>1</sup> To say nothing of the corn, there were several hundred horses to be taken. See *B. G.*, vi. 36, § 3, 39, § 1.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 35, § 7.

<sup>3</sup> The rapidity with which the Boers mustered to repel Jameson's raid will be fresh in the recollection of readers.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 35, §§ 4-5.

<sup>5</sup> Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 256.

withal marvellously adroit and subtle liar,—subtle and adroit enough to deceive his ignorant contemporaries and fifty generations of subsequent readers, but not to deceive Maissiat.

Maissiat tries to prove that the sixth and the four following chapters of the Seventh Book were designed by Caesar to mislead his readers. Speaking of the manœuvre by which Caesar tells us that he compelled Vercingetorix to return from the country of the Bituriges into that of the Arverni, and thus leave the way open for him to rejoin his army, Maissiat asks, “quel intérêt César pouvait-il avoir à lui faire quitter cette place, où le chef gaulois ne pouvait nullement l'empêcher de franchir la frontière de la Gaule celtique ?”<sup>1</sup> A very absurd question. Caesar does not say that Vercingetorix or anybody else wanted to prevent him from crossing the frontier of Celtic Gaul. He says that he had reason to fear that the rebels would try to prevent him from rejoining his legions, which were quartered on the plateau of Langres, in the neighbourhood of Trèves, and in the neighbourhood of Sens.<sup>2</sup> In order to reach them, he had to march northward through the country of the Aedui. One need only glance at the map to see that, so long as Vercingetorix remained in the country of the Bituriges, Caesar could not safely attempt this journey ; for Vercingetorix had only to make a short march eastward to intercept him. But when, by the manœuvre which he so clearly describes, Caesar had compelled Vercingetorix to return southward to his own country, the road northward was open.<sup>3</sup> Maissiat cannot mean to imply that Caesar did not cross the Cevennes at all, and that Vercingetorix did not return from the Berri to defend Auvergne ; for Caesar would not have been mad enough to tell such monstrous lies ; and besides, Maissiat himself tells us that he managed to deceive readers who had not served under him, without telling any actual falsehood which would have been detected by those who had.<sup>4</sup> But, if Caesar did cross the Cevennes, if Vercingetorix did return to defend his own country, what object, what result could the manœuvre have had, if not the object and the result which Caesar describes ?

Maissiat goes on to say that Vercingetorix could have had no motive for attacking Gorgobina, because the Boii, to whom it belonged, were clients of the Aedui, with whom he had a secret understanding. “La présence,” he says, “de Vercingétorix avec son armée sur le territoire des Éduens,”—that is to say, at Gorgobina,—“sans qu'il y ait bataille, prouve qu'il y a entente mutuelle.”<sup>5</sup> It proves nothing of the kind. Vercingetorix may have had an understanding with the anti-Roman party,—*ea pars*, as Caesar says, *quae minus sibi confideret*,<sup>6</sup>—though of

<sup>1</sup> *Jules César en Gaule*, ii. 135.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 44, § 3 ; vii. 6, §§ 2-3.

<sup>3</sup> On frémit,” writes the Duc d'Aumale (*Rev. des Deux Mondes*, xv., 1858, p. 68), “en voyant Brutus rester seul au milieu des Arvernes avec une poignée d'hommes : Vercingétorix va l'écraser ; mais en allant rallier ses légions vers Langres, César a prévu qu'accablé de nouvelles contradictoires, le chef gaulois promènerait son armée du nord au midi et du midi au nord sans être à temps sur aucun point, et l'événement donne raison à cette audacieuse sagacité.”

<sup>4</sup> *Jules César en Gaule*, t. i. p. xxxii.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, ii. 148, 150-51.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 33, § 1.

this there is no evidence. But, supposing that none of the Aedui were as yet prepared to join Vercingetorix, that was no reason why they should attack him for invading the territory of their clients. Caesar was close by with his army. Why should they be at the pains to fight when Caesar was ready to fight for them? The fact is that the Aedui were lukewarm; and it is because Maissiat has failed to notice this that he has gratuitously accused Caesar of misrepresentation.

12. It is the fashion to say that Caesar endeavoured to disguise his repulse at Gergovia.<sup>1</sup> I have described this episode in detail on pages 123-6 of this book. It is enough to say here that Caesar, having learned that Vercingetorix had sent a large body of Gauls to fortify the western approach to the heights of Risolles, which were linked by a col to the south-western angle of the plateau of Gergovia, succeeded in making him believe that he intended to attempt an attack on that side; and when the Gallic encampment on the southern slope of Gergovia was practically deserted, sent a column up that slope "to effect a surprise." At the same time the Aeduan auxiliary infantry were sent up the eastern slope, to create a diversion. The point from which the Roman column started was rather less than 2000 yards, in a direct line, from the wall of the town; and the position which the Gauls were fortifying was about 5 furlongs from the col. The column ascended the hill; crossed a wall which Vercingetorix had erected along the hill-side about half way up; and captured three of the Gallic camps. Thereupon Caesar, who was with the 10th legion on the right of the line of ascent, on the site of the village of Gergovia, sounded the recall (or retreat?): but the troops, not hearing the sound of the trumpet and disregarding the orders of their officers, pressed, in pursuit of the few Gauls who had been left in the camps, right up to the wall, from which, after a fierce struggle, they were driven with heavy loss by the Gauls who had hurried back from Risolles.

Referring to the last sentence of *B. G.*, vii. 43,—*ipse, maiorem Galliarum motum exspectans, ne ab omnibus civitatibus circumstingeretur, consilia inibat, quemadmodum ab Gergovia discederet ac rursus omnem exercitum contraheret, ne profectio nata ab timore defectionis similis fugae videretur*,—Mr. Compton says, "to make his failure appear part of a preconceived plan, he (Caesar) draws a fine distinction between *profectio* and *fuga*," etc. There is nothing to find fault with in Caesar's phraseology; and Mr. Compton ought to have known that he uses a similar phrase in three other passages.<sup>2</sup> He tells us frankly that the fear of a general insurrection made him resolve to abandon the siege of Gergovia, and that he racked his brains to discover some way of doing so which would prevent the enemy from thinking that he was running away. He did not wish his compulsory departure (*profectio*) to look like a precipitate flight (*fuga*),—that is all. What attempt is there here to impose upon the reader?

At the beginning of chapter 47, Caesar, having described the capture of the three camps, writes, *Consecutus id quod animo proposuerat, Caesar*

<sup>1</sup> See Napoleon's *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 281-2; W. C. Compton's *Caesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul*, pp. 89, 92-5, 97; Drumann's *Geschichte Roms*, iii. 349, etc.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 11, § 1; v. 47, § 4; vi. 7, § 8.

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*receptui cani iussit.* Whereupon Mr. Compton says, "it cannot be seriously believed that Caesar never intended to do more than capture three empty encampments . . . is it to be credited that the retreat was sounded before Caesar saw the hopelessness of his undertaking? If the signal was really given at this juncture, it must have been because he already knew that the alarm would be given and his attempt frustrated." This criticism is substantially identical with that of Napoleon<sup>1</sup> and Drumann,<sup>2</sup> both of whom have been answered by Long.<sup>3</sup> Let us examine Long's arguments. If, he says, Caesar's "design was only to surprise the camps . . . he knew better than his critic whether he gained any advantage by doing so." Well, possibly he may have thought that it would look less undignified to retreat even after having only surprised three half-empty camps than to retreat without having done anything.<sup>4</sup> But Long himself admits, in another passage,<sup>5</sup> that "Caesar's ultimate object was to take the place." "It seems probable," he suggests, "that he had a further design . . . to plant his troops on the high ground immediately west of Gergovia, and the first thing necessary was to disperse the enemy who were below the walls on the south side of the city. . . . When Caesar had got possession of the site of the Gallic camps, he was very near to the ridge at the west end of Gergovia, and there was, as far as we can judge, a possibility that he might have seized this place, and kept it against any attack."<sup>6</sup> Not, surely, unless he pushed on without delay; for, as he himself says, the difficulty presented by the unfavourable nature of the ground could only be overcome by speed, and it was certain that the Gauls would hurry back to seize the col: not, certainly, if, as Long says, he gave the signal for the legions who had occupied the camps *to return*, and thus withdrew them to a considerable distance from the ridge.

Let us examine Caesar's narrative dispassionately, and provisionally accept his statements. (i) As he sent the Aedui to climb the mountain by a different path on the right, in order to effect a diversion, it seems clear that he intended to do something more than capture the three camps: if that had been his only object, the services of the Aedui would not have been required.<sup>7</sup> We may perhaps conclude that he hoped either to take the town by a *coup-de-main*, or to plant his troops on the col, and thus to cut off the Gauls from the town. The only possible alternative seems to be that he knew that it would be impossible to seize either the town or the col before the Gauls came to the rescue, and

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 281-2.

<sup>2</sup> *Geschichte Roms*, iii. 349.

<sup>3</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 319-21.

<sup>4</sup> Mr. Stock writes (*Caesar*, p. 244), "This appearance of victory,"—i.e. the capture of the camps,—"was exactly what Caesar wanted to give a certain *éclat* to his departure." Evidently people's ideas of *éclat* differ. The reader must form his own opinion.

<sup>5</sup> *Caesar*, p. 371.

<sup>6</sup> See pp. 123-4 of my narrative.

<sup>7</sup> Caesar says that the mission of the Aedui was to compel the enemy's force to divide (*manus distinendae causa*, *B. G.*, vii. 50, § 1). He must, I think, have meant the force on Risolles. There were so few men in the camps that he called them "empty" (*vacua*); and there is no evidence that any armed force had been left in the town.

merely intended to engage Vercingetorix, while the Aedui distracted his attention, on the upper hill-side. (b) As he instructed his officers beforehand not to let the men advance too far from over-eagerness for fighting or love of plunder, it is clear that he did not wish them to advance, at least in the first instance, as far as the town or the col: doubtless he intended that, as soon as they had captured the encampment, they should push on at once if there were then reason to believe that they were likely to succeed. (c) As he gave the signal for recall when the troops had only captured the three camps, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that he saw that it would be impossible to capture the town by a *coup-de-main* or to seize the col before the Gauls returned thither; for surely the only chance of gaining either of these objects would have been to push on with all possible speed.<sup>1</sup> But on the other hand, by the capture of the three camps he had gained a solid advantage, if only he could follow it up: it would perhaps have been impossible for the Gauls to dislodge him from this position: it is possible that, as Long maintains, he intended, when he sounded the recall, to form his men again in order; and, if he had then thought it advisable to advance higher up the slope, it would be rash to deny that he might have worsted Vercingetorix in a fight under the wall of the town.

The truth is that everything turns upon the meaning of the words *Consecutus id quod animo proposuerat* and *receptui cani iussit*. If the former expression means "having accomplished the whole of his purpose," and the latter "ordered a retreat to be sounded," then Caesar did attempt to deceive his readers. But the idea that he should have expected any one to believe that he had accomplished the whole of his purpose when he had only captured three half-empty camps, is not easy to accept. All he says is that when the legions had captured the camps, he had effected his purpose (*consecutus id quod animo proposuerat*). This may only mean that he had achieved the first step towards the accomplishment of his real object, gained a *point d'appui* for further operations. At all events, he then *receptui cani iussit*. I do not think that these words necessarily mean "ordered a retreat to be sounded." They may perhaps only mean "ordered a recall to be sounded,"<sup>2</sup> Caesar's object being to re-form the legionaries, who had scattered over the camps. If the other interpretation is the true one,—and I admit that it is the more natural,—I should say that Caesar, considering the capture of the camps better than nothing, and perhaps never having had more than a bare hope of capturing the town, chose disingenuously to say that he had effected his purpose. Napoleon indeed assumes that he sounded the retreat too late,—when it was no longer possible for the troops to retreat in good order. But this assumption is purely gratuitous.

I do not, of course, wish to argue that Caesar's narrative is above

<sup>1</sup> Unless the Gauls in the town kept a very bad look out, they must have sent warning to their comrades the moment they saw the legions ascending the hill.

<sup>2</sup> See Mr. C. E. Moberly's note (*Caesar*, pp. 321-2). It has been asserted that the words mean "ordered a halt to be sounded" (Long's *Caesar*, p. 371; and W. Smith's *Lat. Eng. Dict.*, 1888, p. 932): but this interpretation is inconsistent with the meaning of *receptus*. See *B. C.*, iii. 45, §§ 4-5, 46, §§ 1-4.



suspicion. Honest or not, it is certainly unsatisfactory; and it is a pity that he did not think fit to tell us exactly what he intended to do.

Mr. Compton goes on to assert, or at least imply, that the legions were only 100 yards from Caesar's trumpeter at the moment when he sounded the retreat (or recall). "If," he says, "the advanced part of the army failed to hear the trumpet call from so short a distance, they must have been out of sight in the hollow, not beyond it. Either 'intercedebat' is not accurate, or the signal was not actually sounded as stated." Apparently Mr. Compton forgets that, whether the troops were "out of sight in the hollow" or "beyond it," they were on the farther side of the wall which bounded the Gallic camps on the south, and, according to his own map, von Kampen<sup>1</sup> and Napoleon's, at least *four hundred yards* from Caesar's legion. . . . cat

Finally, Mr. Compton insinuates that Caesar deliberately understated his losses. "The number of officers killed," he says, "(one out of every four) would be quite out of proportion to the whole loss given below at 700." But in the first place it is incredible that Caesar, having stated the losses of his officers truly, should tell us, by a pitiful half-lie, have minimised the casualties among the rank and file; and secondly, as every student of military history knows, the loss of officers in a hard-fought battle is often out of all proportion to the loss of privates.<sup>1</sup>

13. Maissiat has constructed an original theory regarding the operations of Caesar in the interval between his retreat from Gergovia and his junction with Labienus. The theory is briefly this. Caesar was in reality hotly pursued by Vercingetorix and Litaviccus. After recrossing the Allier, in the neighbourhood of Lapalisse, he struck off to the east, instead of marching northward to rejoin Labienus; crossed the Loire above its principal affluents; crossed the chain of Le Forez by a pass between St. Etienne and Charolles; recruited and revictualled his army in the country of the Sequani; and then, marching northward, rejoined Labienus between Beaune, Dijon and St-Jean-de-Losne.<sup>2</sup> I shall not examine the arguments by which Maissiat struggles to support this astounding theory; for he virtually admits that, unless he can prove the identity of Alesia and Iternore, they cannot stand;<sup>3</sup> and, as I show in my note on ALESIA, that identification is absolutely inadmissible.<sup>4</sup>

According to Maissiat,<sup>5</sup> when Caesar wrote that, before the battle which preceded the siege of Alesia, he was marching to succour the Province,<sup>6</sup> he lied; for, Maissiat argues, the Province, as Caesar himself tells us,<sup>7</sup> was protected by 22 cohorts, and had no need of succour. He

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Compton ought to have remembered that in the battle of Pharsalus Caesar lost not more than 200 privates and yet about 30 centurions, and that he is careful to emphasise the disproportion. *B. C.*, iii. 99, § 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Jules César en Gaule*, ii. 193-213, 246-7.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 247-8.

<sup>4</sup> As M. A. de Barthélemy sensibly remarks, it is incredible that Caesar should have had any motive for wishing to mislead his readers regarding the route by which he marched to a place where he gained a victory. *Revue des questions historiques*, iii. 1867, p. 48.

<sup>5</sup> *Jules César en Gaule*, ii. 289-94, 298-9.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 66, § 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 65, § 1.

was really retreating to the Province; and, skilful liar that he was, in order to make his readers disbelieve that he was retreating, he put into the mouth of Vercingetorix<sup>1</sup> the statement that he was retreating.

It is the old familiar argument. Caesar was skilful enough to deceive his contemporaries: but Maissiat can always see through him! Maissiat forgets that, as the Helvetii had just been beaten and driven to take refuge in their strongholds,<sup>2</sup> the Province had every need of succour. But I am quite willing to allow that Caesar may not have directly told us all the motives which induced him to set out for the Province. As Long says,<sup>3</sup> "We may believe that the intentions which the Gallic chief is supposed to have imputed to Caesar,—*maioribus coactis copiis (Romanos) reuersuros neque finem bellandi facturos*,—were his real intentions: he was only retreating in order to return in greater force."

14. Caesar says that, before the blockade of Alesia, he raised cavalry from the German tribes "which he had reduced to submission in former years."<sup>4</sup> Numerous critics have insisted that this is an intentional exaggeration; for, they say, Caesar tells us himself in another passage<sup>5</sup> that of all the Transrhenane peoples the Ubii alone had submitted to him. But the critics forget that in a subsequent chapter<sup>6</sup> Caesar states that, when he was marching to punish the Sugambri, several tribes made their submission.

15. According to a speech<sup>7</sup> which Caesar puts into the mouth of Vercingetorix, 80,000 men, exclusive of the Mandubii, remained in Alesia after the departure of the Gallic cavalry. Now the numbers given in ancient manuscripts must of course often be viewed with suspicion. Copyists sometimes blundered in transcribing numerals, which were often written in Roman letters. But the number LXXX (*milia*) is repeated in chapter 77; and, if it is not correct, I believe that Caesar, and not the copyists, was responsible for the error. The great Napoleon, who, if he is not foully calumniated, lied so systematically himself that he was not likely to give Caesar credit for disinterested accuracy, gives professional reasons for rejecting his figures; and his opinion counts for a great deal. He says that if Vercingetorix's force had been so strong, he would have sent out 60,000 men along with his cavalry, as the remaining 20,000 would have been able to hold the fortress. The 60,000, he says, could have harassed the besiegers; and the provisions of the garrison would have been virtually multiplied fourfold.<sup>8</sup>

It looks presumptuous to question the opinion of such an authority: but is it certain that the 60,000 would have been able to get out? The Duc d'Aumale remarks that Vercingetorix could not have foreseen that even the cavalry would escape unobserved, although he might reasonably hope that, if they encountered one of the Roman piquets, their speed

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 66, § 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 65, § 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 333.

<sup>4</sup> *Quas superioribus annis pacaverat. B. G.*, vii. 65, § 4.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, iv. 16, § 5.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.* 18, § 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, vii. 71, § 3.

<sup>8</sup> *Précis des guerres de César*, pp. 109-10.

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would enable them to get away. But the Duc d'Aumale himself gives reasons for believing that Caesar exaggerated the forces of his enemy. He finds it hard to believe that Vercingetorix could have collected enough corn to feed 80,000 men, as well as the Mandubii, for nearly two months. He also remarks that, if he had had so large a force, he would have harassed the besieging army far more than he did, and that, after the arrival of the relieving army, he would not have been so foolish as to concentrate the whole of his available force along that small section of the contravallation which crossed the plain, but would have made simultaneous sorties on various points. He concludes that, after the manner of conquerors, Caesar exaggerated the numbers of his enemy.<sup>1</sup>

The first of the duke's objections does not appear to be conclusive. Vercingetorix had plenty of time to collect stores, and abundant resources to draw upon. He did make frequent and furious sallies:<sup>2</sup> but Roman discipline and Roman science kept him at bay. On the other hand, I am inclined to believe with the Duc d'Aumale that, if Vercingetorix had had 80,000 men, he would have made more use of them during the last days of the siege.

It has also been argued that the plateau of Alesia was too small to accommodate so large a number. The area of the plateau was 97 hectares, or about 240 acres; of the plateau and outlying terraces and spurs 140 hectares, or about 346 acres;<sup>3</sup> and, according to modern ideas, this space would be much too small. It must be remembered that besides the garrison there was a large number of cattle. But General Creuly argues that it would be illogical to conclude that an ancient army of 80,000 men could not have found room on the mountain. "Les troupes modernes," he says, "ne campent pas en masse, comme les armées anciennes." And he points out that, according to the dimensions of a camp minutely described by Hyginus, the plateau of Mont Auxois could have held 192,000 men.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, M. A. de Barthélemy reminds us that, when Jerusalem was besieged by Titus, several hundred thousands of human beings were shut up in a space hardly so large as that of the plateau of Mont Auxois.<sup>5</sup>

I incline to think that the number 80,000 is in excess of the truth: but the problem is insoluble.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, t. xv., 1858, pp. 110-17.

<sup>2</sup> Nonnunquam opera nostra Galli temptare atque eruptionem ex oppido pluribus portis summa vi facere conabantur. *B. G.*, vii. 73, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> Napoléon III., *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 300.

<sup>4</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, pp. 507-8. See p. 588.

<sup>5</sup> *Rev. des questions hist.*, iii., 1867, p. 54.

<sup>6</sup> MM. Bosc and Bonnemère (*Hist. nationale des Gaulois sous Vercingetorix*, p. 405) insist that Vercingetorix had less than 15,000 infantry in Alesia. Here is their argument. Caesar says that at the outset of the siege the Gauls were panic-stricken by the defeat of their cavalry, which formed their principal force (*equitatu, qua maxima parte exercitus confidebant*). If the cavalry, which numbered only 15,000, formed the principal force of the Gallic army, the infantry must have been

Berlinghieri<sup>1</sup> appears to think that Caesar's narrative of the last day's fighting at Alesia is largely fictitious. He is astonished that the Gallic cavalry did not perceive the final movement of Caesar's cavalry; and that, if they did perceive it, they did not stop it. But if, as is generally believed, the Roman cavalry which Caesar ordered to ride round the circumvallation<sup>2</sup> started from the camp in the valley of the Rabutin, the Gallic cavalry, who were in the plain of Les Laumes, on the west of Alesia, could not have attempted to stop it. Berlinghieri remarks that, even after the failure of Vercassivellaunus, Commius with his vast host might still have forced the Roman lines; and, he says, if Caesar's narrative is accurate, the Gauls ought to have exterminated the Romans. No doubt! if they had not been half-hearted; if they had not been an undisciplined rabble; if they had been properly led; and if their commissariat had been properly organised. But these essential conditions were wanting. Berlinghieri stultifies his own criticism by admitting, or rather asserting, in another place<sup>3</sup> that the Gauls were a rabble.

16. M. d'Arbois de Jubainville is very angry with Caesar for not having mentioned in his *Commentaries* the name of Mamurra. Speaking of the various engineering works which the Roman army executed in Gaul, the distinguished Celtic scholar says, "Quand on lit les *Commentaires*, il semble que c'est à César que revient l'honneur d'avoir dirigé ces travaux si bien conçus . . . Mais nous savons par Pline le nom de l'ingénieur dont César a eu soin de taire le nom et auquel il doit en grande partie ses succès."<sup>4</sup> What a fuss about nothing! Whatever Caesar's sins may have been, he was not ungenerous to those who served under him. If he did not mention Mamurra, assuredly the motive of his silence was not jealousy; and it is impossible to say whether Mamurra was a Vauban, or merely an ordinarily skilful officer who faithfully carried out instructions. Moreover, there is no proof that Mamurra was Caesar's Chief Engineer. We only know that he was *praefectus fabrum*, an officer of engineers.<sup>5</sup> Pompey, in the first year of the civil war, had at least two *praefecti fabrum*:<sup>6</sup> why should Caesar have had only one?

According to Catullus,<sup>7</sup> whose accuracy I neither question nor guarantee, Caesar was on even too intimate terms with Mamurra.

But a recent critic has gone further than M. d'Arbois de Jubainville. In a long-winded and carping Programme,<sup>8</sup> the tediousness of which is

"peu nombreuse." Unfortunately for MM. Bosc and Bonnemère, Caesar wrote not *maxima* but *maxime*. *Maxime* is found in good MSS.: but so is *maxime* (Meusel's *Caesar*, p. 202); and all the modern editors of course adopt it.

<sup>1</sup> *Examen des opérations et des travaux de César autour d'Alesia*, pp. 165, 168-73.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 87, § 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Examen*, etc., p. 176.

<sup>4</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. Nat. des Antiquaires de France*, 1888, p. 102.

<sup>5</sup> Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xxxvi. 6, § 7.

<sup>6</sup> Cicero, *Ad Att.*, ix. 7c, § 2.

<sup>7</sup> 29, 3.

<sup>8</sup> *Caesars Beurteilung seiner Offiziere in den Commentarien vom gallischen Kriege*, zweiter Teil, 1893. I have not been able to obtain the first part, which I do not regret.

only relieved by one passage in which, Phormio-like, he takes Caesar to task for bad generalship, a German headmaster, Otto Sumpff, accuses him of having treated the services of his *legati*, in the *Commentaries*, in a manner equally ungenerous and unjust. He could not afford to give them due credit, for fear of diminishing his own glory. I reply that he could not afford to refuse them due credit, for fear of alienating their support. Sumpff does not deny that Caesar tells us what his lieutenants did; and if he does not bespatter them with superfluous praise, it is open to Sumpff to supply the omission. As Sumpff, for the most part, only accuses Caesar of having omitted to praise his *legati*, I shall not inflict upon the reader more than one specimen of these accusations: but I shall carefully examine the one charge which he makes of positive misrepresentation.

In the account of the battle with the Helvetii, says Sumpff, the *legati* are not mentioned at all: in the account of the battle with the Nervii Labienus alone figures prominently; and even his share in the victory, the despatch of the 10th legion, at the critical moment, to the rescue of the 7th and 12th, is so told as to give the chief credit to the private soldiers. Caesar carefully omits to mention that each legate must have harangued his own legion before the battle.<sup>1</sup>

Yes! and he also carefully omits to mention that each legate had breakfasted on the morning of the battle. If the *legati* are not mentioned in the account of the battle with the Helvetii, Caesar himself is only mentioned in two sentences,<sup>2</sup> where the mention is essential to the lucidity of the narrative. The remark about Labienus requires no answer: it is enough to refer readers to Caesar's account.<sup>3</sup> Sumpff's real quarrel with Caesar is that he was master of the most difficult art of the historian,—the art of seeing what is superfluous and ignoring it.

Sumpff complains<sup>4</sup> that Caesar's criticism of Sabinus's conduct at Aduatuca is grossly unjust. Sabinus, he insists, deserved no blame for having decided to abandon his position; for, as Quintus Cicero had to wait a long time for relief, it is unlikely that Sabinus would have fared better than he did if he had acted on Cotta's advice and remained where he was. On the other hand, Caesar bestows exaggerated praise upon Cicero, in order to vilify Sabinus by contrast. Caesar himself lets us see that he enormously exaggerated Cicero's danger by naively telling us that only one man in every ten in Cicero's legion was wounded (*nur der zehnte Mann ist verwundet*).

If any of Sumpff's pupils read his Programme, they must have been amused by this last statement of their headmaster. What Caesar says is that only one man in ten, or rather not one man in ten was unwounded (*cognoscit non decimum quemque esse relictum militem sine vulnere*).<sup>5</sup> Cicero certainly had to wait more than a week for relief: but I should have thought it would have been better for Sabinus to

<sup>1</sup> *Caesars Beurteilung*, etc., pp. 10-12, 22.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, i. 24, § 1, 25, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Caesars Beurteilung*, etc., pp. 26-9.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, ii. 20-27.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, v. 52, § 2.

stay where he was and be relieved, however late, than to abandon his position and be killed, along with 6000 men.

In short, concludes Sumpff, the only generals whom Caesar does not blame are the two who died during the war,<sup>1</sup> young Crassus and Cotta. The former was no longer to be feared as a rival: the latter was praised simply in order to heighten the discredit which Caesar fastened upon his unfortunate colleague, Sabinus.<sup>2</sup>

Sumpff's inaccuracy is astounding. I challenge him to produce a single passage in which Caesar blames Antony or Basilus or Decimus Brutus or Lucius Caesar or Fabius or Pedius or Plancus or Rebilus or Reginus or Roscius or Sextius or Trebonius or finally Labienus. Two of the lieutenants and two only<sup>3</sup> are blamed; and one of the two is let off with a reproof so gentle that it can hardly be called blame. For while the facts show that Cicero wholly failed in his duty at Aduatua, Caesar merely tells him that he ought not to have let any troops leave the camp, and does his best to exonerate him by throwing the larger share of the blame upon fortune.<sup>4</sup> Sabinus is certainly blamed for his conduct at Aduatua; and if he did not deserve blame, the word ought to be expunged from the language. But no lieutenant who was responsible for a great disaster was ever less harshly spoken of by his chief. Caesar's actual comment upon his behaviour limits itself to this,—that he was wanting in foresight; that he lost his head and showed nervous trepidation in the action; and that the disaster was caused by his rashness.<sup>5</sup> The bare recital of the facts was his sufficient condemnation: and in Caesar's language there is not a trace of resentment. It must be remembered, moreover, that when Caesar was describing Sabinus's earlier campaign in Normandy, he was careful to imply his approval of the cautious tactics which he had adopted,<sup>6</sup> and thereby to supply an antidote, as it were, to any prejudiced judgement which might arise in the mind of the reader. If Caesar deviated from the line of strict impartiality in narrating the actions of his lieutenants, it was on the side of lenity. But of all those who served under him, the one to whom the greatest compliment is paid is Labienus. Even Dr. Georg Mezger, one of the sanest critics of the *Commentaries*, cannot forgive Caesar for the "cold and businesslike" tone of the narrative of Labienus's campaign against the Parisii.<sup>7</sup> If by "cold" Dr. Mezger means restrained and free from "gush,"—I know no more expressive word,—I accept the epithet. Caesar never suffers his enthusiasm to

<sup>1</sup> Die zwei Offiziere ohne Tadel und zwei Tote, etc. *Caesars Beurteilung*, etc., p. 33.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>3</sup> Or three, if it was blaming Galba to say that he had not made sufficient provision for his commissariat because, as the tribes of the Valais had surrendered and given hostages, he did not expect that they would fight. *B. G.*, iii. 3, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, vi. 42, §§ 1-2.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, v. 33, § 1, 52, § 6.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, iii. 17, § 7.

<sup>7</sup> *Ueber die Abfassungszeit von Cäsar's Comm. über den gallischen Krieg*, 1874-5, p. 18.

escape him: but it communicates its force to us, if our minds are attuned to his. Whenever he mentions Labienus, he makes us feel that Labienus stood in a class by himself,—the greatest of his lieutenants and one of the great marshals of history. But it is precisely in his narrative of this campaign that he impresses the features of the man's character most deeply upon the imagination. In four terse sentences he puts before us the difficulties, all but overwhelming, by which Labienus was beset. And then he says, "With these formidable difficulties suddenly confronting him, he saw that he must look for aid to the force of his own character" (*tantis subito difficultatibus obiectis, ab animi virtute auxilium petendum videbat*).<sup>1</sup> We are made to feel that the character will be equal to the strain; and the next three chapters show us that it was. Could any finer compliment be desired by a soldier from his chief,—the more telling because it is conveyed not by fulsome praise but by delicate suggestion?<sup>2</sup>

## VII

I place Eichheim's charges in a class by themselves because they are in fact *sui generis*.<sup>3</sup> According to Eichheim, Caesar was a "politico-military Munchausen," an "hysterical romancer," "the first liar of his time," a liar who lied "like an impudent schoolboy": in short, his *Commentaries*, from the first page to the last, literally bristle with lies and inventions, designed to mislead "the dolts on the Tiber" (*den Tölpeln am Tiber*).<sup>4</sup>

To begin with, I give one instance of the freedom with which Eichheim handles the *Commentaries*. In order to convince his readers that Ariovistus had only a few horsemen instead of the 6000 whom Caesar assigns to him, he asserts that the Usipetes and Tencteri, who, he says, were celebrated for their cavalry, had only 800.<sup>5</sup> The evidence which he offers for this assertion is Caesar's statement that 800 horsemen belonging to the Usipetes and Tencteri made an attack upon his Gallic cavalry. But in the very same sentence in which Caesar tells us this, he says that the enemy had not more than 800, because the

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 59, § 6.

<sup>2</sup> I wish Sumpff would read the words in which a great scholar, whom the Germans, if not his own countrymen, appreciate, has described the most striking characteristic of one of the historians of antiquity:—"Acts is a mere uncoloured recital of the important facts in the briefest possible terms. The narrator's individuality and his personal feelings and preferences are almost wholly suppressed. He is entirely absorbed in his work; and he writes with the single aim to state the facts as he has learned them. It would be difficult in the whole range of literature to find a work where there is less attempt at pointing a moral or drawing a lesson from the facts. The narrator is persuaded that the facts themselves in their barest form are a perfect lesson and a complete instruction." Prof. W. M. Ramsay's *St. Paul the Traveller and the Roman Citizen*, 1895, pp. 20-21.

<sup>3</sup> Major Jahn's (*Beilage zum Militär-Wochenblatt*, 1883, p. 363) speaks of Eichheim's earlier work, *Die Kämpfe der Helvetier, Sueben und Belgier gegen C. J. Cäsar*, 1866, as "this noteworthy publication" (*diese merkwürdige Schrift*). So it is, in one sense.

<sup>4</sup> *Die Kämpfe der Helvetier und Sueben gegen C. J. Cäsar*, 1876, p. 98.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, p. 73.

main body of their cavalry, which had crossed the Meuse to plunder, had not yet rejoined them.<sup>1</sup>

1. Caesar, according to Eichheim, desired to deceive his countrymen into the belief that war with the Helvetii had been forced upon him. He therefore began his narrative with a threefold lie :—he exaggerated the extent of Helvetia ; he trebled the real number of the Helvetian emigrants ; and he pretended that before their departure they had burned their towns and villages.<sup>2</sup>

The second of the alleged lies I shall deal with presently ;<sup>3</sup> as to the third, the allegation is simply gratuitous.<sup>4</sup> Caesar says that Helvetia was 240 (Roman) miles long and 180 broad. Walckenaer shows that, if the breadth is reckoned from the Pas de l'Écluse to the junction of the Aar and the Rhine, Caesar's estimate is exactly correct ; and that, if the length is reckoned from the Pas de l'Écluse to the southern extremity of the Lake of Constance, his estimate is only 10 Roman miles in excess of the truth ;<sup>5</sup> and Long remarks<sup>6</sup> that "this is a fair way of measurement, for it follows the boundaries of the Helvetii as Caesar describes them : on the west the Jura, on the south the Lake of Geneva and the Rhône, on the east and on the north the Rhine." Very likely : but it is quite unnecessary to attempt any defence of Caesar's accuracy ; for the question of his accuracy, on the matter of measurements, has nothing to do with the question of his veracity. He did not survey Helvetia : he got his information about its dimensions from hearsay ; and the hearsay was not based upon accurate calculation. He exaggerated the extent of the Ardennes ;<sup>7</sup> and if he exaggerated the extent of Helvetia, he simply made a mistake, for he could have had no motive for telling a lie. In fact, as he said that the Helvetii emigrated because they considered their country too small, he was more likely to be tempted to underestimate than to exaggerate its size.

2. Caesar lied, says Eichheim, when he said that Orgetorix planned the subjugation of Gaul. Orgetorix would not have dared to place himself "between the Hammer and the Anvil,"—Caesar and Ariovistus ; and Caesar invented this tale in order to disguise from his countrymen the fact that he had made an unprovoked attack upon the Helvetii.<sup>8</sup>

Caesar states plainly the motives which prompted him to attack the Helvetii.<sup>9</sup> In the first place, he was determined not to allow them, in any circumstances, to pass through the Roman Province. Secondly, after they had entered Gaul, he told them that he would not make peace with them unless they would give hostages for their good behaviour

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 12, § 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Die Kämpfe*, etc., note 1.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 222-5, *infra*.

<sup>4</sup> It should be noted that large numbers of the lake-dwellings, the remains of which have been discovered in Switzerland, had been destroyed by fire. See *Anzeiger für schweizerische Alterthumskunde*, 1884, p. 112.

<sup>5</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 307-9.

<sup>6</sup> *Caesar*, p. 40.

<sup>7</sup> *Die Kämpfe*, etc., 1826, p. 18.

<sup>8</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 29, § 4.

<sup>9</sup> *B. G.*, i. 7, §§ 1, 4-5, 10, §§ 1-2, 14.



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and make restitution to the Aedui and the Allobroges for the wrong which they had done them. His determination, then, was quite independent of Orgetorix's schemes; and Orgetorix was dead before the Helvetii started on their expedition. What Caesar objected to and what his countrymen equally objected to was the presence of the Helvetii in Gaul.

3. Orgetorix, says Eichheim, had merely carried into effect the resolve of the Helvetian Government: it is therefore incredible that his countrymen should have treated him as a traitor. Caesar's mendacity is proved by the express statement of Dion Cassius that the Helvetii started on their expedition under the leadership of Orgetorix.<sup>1</sup>

I reply that Dion was so inaccurate a writer that his testimony proves nothing. Besides, his statement means nothing more than that Orgetorix was the prime mover of the Helvetian emigration. The Helvetii, he says, acting under the leadership of Orgetorix, *resolved* to cross the Rhône and to settle in some district near the Alps.<sup>2</sup> Not until he has written three more sentences does he proceed to describe the actual emigration of the Helvetii;<sup>3</sup> and then he says nothing about Orgetorix. Moreover, it is not true that Orgetorix had merely carried into effect the resolve of his Government. His offence, in the eyes of the Helvetii, was that he had exceeded his instructions and had plotted to make himself king.<sup>4</sup>

4. Eichheim insists that Caesar's estimate of the numbers of the Helvetii and their allies is grossly exaggerated. The length of a column numbering 368,000 persons would have been 36 "Stunden" or about 99 miles!<sup>5</sup> they could not have found provender for their cattle; and they could not have quitted their encampment, as Caesar says in *B. G.*, i. 22 that they did, in the short space of three hours. Again, Caesar says that, when the decisive battle was fought, *all* the Helvetian waggons were parked in one place,—an obvious lie, because, on his estimate of the numbers of the host, the waggons would have numbered 36,000, which could not have assembled on one spot in less than three days!<sup>6</sup> Rauchenstein, who, in the main, agrees with Eichheim, calculates that, if two waggons had moved abreast, the length of the column would have been 165 kilometres or about 103 miles. Caesar, he says, could easily have attacked such a column in flank, and broken it up before the enemy could come to the rescue. According to Plutarch, the emigrants numbered 300,000; according to Appian, 200,000; according to Strabo, 480,000;<sup>7</sup> according to Orosius, 157,000. Rauchenstein concludes that Orosius's estimate is the most credible.<sup>8</sup> He also argues

<sup>1</sup> *Die Kämpfe*, etc., 1876, n. 3. Eichheim's theory is that Caesar murdered Orgetorix!

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xxxviii. 31, § 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Ih.*, 32, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, i. 3, §§ 4-8, 4, § 1.

<sup>5</sup> 161 kilometres.

<sup>6</sup> *Die Kämpfe*, etc., 1876, p. 31, note 13, note 20.

<sup>7</sup> This is a mistake. See Strabo, ii. 3, § 3.

<sup>8</sup> Orosius generally follows Caesar's numbers with scrupulous accuracy; and it is curious that his statement (vi. 7, § 5) of the number of the Helvetii who returned home,—110,000,—agrees exactly with Caesar's. I suspect that the copyists have made some mistake in transcribing either his figures or Caesar's.

that, if the Helvetii had emigrated *en masse*, they must have known that hordes of Germans would promptly occupy their country; and, as Caesar does not say that they had to reconquer it when they were sent back, he concludes that a large number never emigrated at all.<sup>1</sup>

I admit that there is some force both in Rauchenstein's and in Eichheim's arguments. It is difficult to believe that the Helvetii left their country absolutely deserted. Still, it must be remembered that other ancient writers besides Caesar describe universal migrations;<sup>2</sup> nor does Caesar's narrative compel us to assume that the Helvetii were the only inhabitants of Helvetia. He may conceivably have left out of account conquered tribes with which they had not coalesced.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, even if the ordinary interpretation of his narrative is correct, it is not certain that the German neighbours of the Helvetii would or could have taken possession of their territory in the few months that elapsed between their departure and their return. If the Helvetii required two years to complete the preparations for their emigration, is it likely that the Germans could have transferred themselves, their women and children, their cattle and their goods from one country to another in three months? If Caesar's narrative was incorrect, either he intended to mislead his readers, or he was led astray by false information, or he used the word *omnibus*,<sup>4</sup> as he often did, loosely. I cannot see what motive he could have had for trying to deceive. On the other hand, nothing is more likely than that he should have been misled by the rhetorical or blundering statements of his spies. I have myself, in former researches, worked through many reports embodying the information which had been furnished to Intelligence Officers in India by spies; and, on the faith of such reports, erroneous statements were frequently made by British officers, for example by Sir Charles Napier. We do not accuse them of mendacity because they were misled.

According to Napoleon's careful calculations,<sup>5</sup> based on the reasoned conjecture that the Helvetii had 8500 waggons, the length of such a column as Caesar describes would have been 128 kilometres, *when the waggons were moving in single file*. But it was not necessary for the waggons to move in single file, except when they were threading the Pas de l'Écluse.<sup>6</sup> After the Helvetii emerged from the country of the Sequani, they provided for their cattle by plunder:<sup>7</sup> while they were in the country of the Sequani, we must assume that they arranged with that people for a supply. In *B. G.*, i. 21, § 1, Caesar says that the Helvetii encamped at the foot of a hill. Eichheim, in his comment on the passage, absurdly attributes to Caesar the statement that the Helvetian

<sup>1</sup> *Der Feldzug Cäsars gegen die Helvetier*, pp. 44-5, 47.

<sup>2</sup> See, for instance, Strabo, ii. 3, § 6. "Ces émigrations en masses," says the writer of the article *Helvetii* in *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, ii. 15, "entraient évidemment dans les habitudes traditionnelles des Gaulois." The writer refers to Polybius, ii. 17.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, ii. 15.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, i. 2, § 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 59, note.

<sup>6</sup> See Lord Wolseley's *The Soldier's Pocket-Book*, 5th ed., p. 408.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, i. 15, § 4.

waggons were all parked there. If he had known anything of military movements, he would have understood that most of the waggons were in front, and that only the fighting men, who formed the rearguard, were encamped at the foot of the hill.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, Caesar says nothing about "three hours": he only says that "late in the day," or "when it was broad day"<sup>2</sup> (*multo die*) he learned that the Helvetii had struck their camp. His narrative of the decisive battle certainly presents a difficulty,—to those who are determined to make difficulties. What he says is that the Helvetian infantry "with all their waggons" (*cum omnibus suis curris*<sup>3</sup>) followed their cavalry, and parked their baggage in one spot. But this is not the same thing as saying that all the waggons were parked in one spot. Waggons were of course coming up all through the day; and doubtless many waggons had not come up when the battle was over.<sup>4</sup> Caesar wrote for sensible readers. They know that thousands of waggons cannot arrive at one spot simultaneously; and, when the sense is clear, they do not demand rigid precision of statement in every line.

To return to Rauchenstein. For the sake of argument I will accept his figures. He holds that the entire host, after the defeat of the Tigurini, numbered only 100,000 souls. On his own showing, the length of the column would then have been at least 43 kilometres, or about 27 miles. Is he really prepared to argue that Caesar could have broken up a column 103 miles long, but could not have broken up a column 27 miles long? The truth is, as Napoleon has pointed out,<sup>5</sup> that Caesar could not venture to attack the column at all, because the country through which it was moving was too broken and confined to admit of his attempting any offensive operation; and because, as Rauchenstein has failed to see, before he could have struck a single blow at the wagon-train, he would have had to reckon with the tens of thousands of fighting men who composed its rear-guard. It is idle for Rauchenstein to appeal to Orosius; for it requires no critical acumen to see that, where Plutarch and Appian and Strabo and Orosius differ so widely, one would not be justified in accepting Orosius's estimate merely because it is the lowest. Rauchenstein's estimate, based upon the absurd assumption that the waggons moved in single file, of the length to which a column composed of 368,000 persons must have extended, is a gross exaggeration. Colonel Stoffel, who knows what he is writing about, estimates the length of the column, after the loss of one fourth of its number by the defeat of the Tigurini, at not less than 30 kilometres, or about 19 miles; and he accepts Caesar's figures.<sup>6</sup> Therefore the reasons which Eichheim and Rauchenstein have adduced are not sufficient to prove that Caesar's figures are incorrect.

Caesar tells us that the host which he sent back to Helvetia numbered

<sup>1</sup> See Stoffel, *Guerre civile*, ii. 445, and *B. G.*, i. 15, § 3, 25, § 6.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 202, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, i. 24, § 4.

<sup>4</sup> See Stoffel, *Guerre civile*, ii. 451.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 63, note.

<sup>6</sup> *Guerre de César et d'Arrioviste*, p. 36.

110,000.<sup>1</sup> Let us provisionally accept his figures. Assuming that the Tigurini amounted to one fourth of the entire host, the number of the remainder would have been 276,000. The rate of mortality in a vast multitude travelling under such conditions would, I suppose, have been high; and we may safely assume that, in the two months which elapsed between their departure from Switzerland and the battle, at least 2000 died. The Verbigeni, numbering 6000, were killed or sold as slaves after the battle.<sup>2</sup> The Boii, who originally numbered 32,000, were allowed to settle in the country of the Aedui.<sup>3</sup> 126,000 remain to be accounted for;<sup>4</sup> and, if Caesar's figures are correct, this number must have perished in the battle or have dispersed, besides those of the Boii who were slain. This is an enormous number. Colonel Stoffel finds no difficulty in believing that 143,000, including old men, women and children, were killed in the battle.<sup>5</sup> I can hardly share his faith; and, if Caesar's figures are correct, I can only assume that large numbers must have dispersed on the march before the battle was fought.

There remains the possibility that the documents which, according to Caesar, were found in the Helvetian encampment after the battle, and from which he professes to have derived his information, were inaccurate; or that some part of the host whose numbers were therein recorded had, at the eleventh hour, resolved to remain in Helvetia. At all events, the number of the emigrants must have been very large: for with all his advantages in generalship, discipline and superiority of weapons, it was all that Caesar could do to win the battle. I cannot believe, without convincing evidence, that, from the mere desire of enhancing his own glory, he fabricated an exaggerated estimate of their numbers.

5. Caesar, says Eichheim,<sup>6</sup> omits to mention that when he was returning in the spring of 58 B.C. from Italy to Gaul, he attempted to make his way through the land of the Salassi into that of the Veragri, but was driven back with heavy loss. Strabo, however, lets us into the secret.

Caesar certainly omits to mention this incident, for the sufficient reason that it never occurred. Strabo made a mistake, as he often did. Nor does Strabo say that the Salassi repulsed Caesar. He merely says that they robbed him of some money.<sup>7</sup> The most conclusive proof that Strabo blundered is the fact that Caesar, whose aim was to intercept the Helvetii on their march through Gaul, would as soon have thought of marching towards Russia as into the country of the Salassi. Rauchenstein himself refutes Eichheim by a similar argument.<sup>8</sup>

6. According to Eichheim, Caesar's account of his victory over the Tigurini is a ridiculous exaggeration: he merely had "a little skirmish." He could not have surprised the whole tribe of the Tigurini, as he

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 29, § 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 28, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 28, § 5, 29, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> Caesar himself says (*B. G.*, i. 26, § 5) that about 130,000 survived the battle, which would leave 144,000 to be accounted for. But of course a good many of the Boii perished in the battle.

<sup>5</sup> *Guerre de César et d'Arminius*, p. 77.

<sup>6</sup> *Die Kämpfe*, etc., 1876, p. 23.

<sup>7</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 6, § 7.

<sup>8</sup> *Der Feldzug*, etc., pp. 60-61.

asserts, because (a) his army could not have crossed the Saône without their knowledge; (b) according to his own statement, news was transmitted in Gaul with great rapidity from man to man; and "on the sudden appearance of the Roman army, these shrieking throats would have redoubled their exertions on behalf of the Helvetii"; (c) Dumnorix would have taken care to give them warning; (d) if the action had been on the scale which Caesar describes, he would have driven the Tigurini into the Saône and cut off their retreat into the woods; (e) as he only made his attack with infantry, the lightly armed Tigurini could have run away; and (f) there is no trace in his narrative of the disastrous effect which the loss of one fourth of their number would have had upon the Helvetian host.<sup>1</sup>

One and all, these reasons are absurd. (a) Caesar's army did not cross the Saône at all before attacking the Tigurini. Both his army and the Tigurini were encamped on the left bank at the moment when he was about to march against them: he had only a few miles to march; and he marched in the night.<sup>2</sup> The statement of Caesar,<sup>3</sup> to which Eichheim refers, has no bearing upon the question. The peasants certainly did not inform the Tigurini of Caesar's approach, first because they were hostile to the Tigurini,<sup>4</sup> and secondly because they were in bed when Caesar was marching. Besides, if warning had been given, the "few skirmishers" of Eichheim's imagination would have taken advantage of it. (c) Dumnorix did not inform the Tigurini of Caesar's approach, because Dumnorix knew nothing about Caesar's intention. Caesar was not such a fool as to take Dumnorix into his confidence. (d) Eichheim's fourth argument is diametrically opposed by the one that follows it;<sup>5</sup> but we may be sure that Caesar did cut off the retreat of the Tigurini as effectually as possible, for he slew a great number of them. (e) A great many of the Tigurini did, as Caesar tells us, run away. The rest did not and could not, because Caesar attacked them when they were off their guard and busily engaged in preparing to cross the Saône.<sup>6</sup> (f) The rest of the Helvetii doubtless were dismayed by the fate of the Tigurini; and if there is no record of their discouragement in Caesar's narrative, Caesar was a laconic writer and did not dwell upon the obvious. But the fact of their having sustained a reverse was no reason why they should abandon themselves to despair. Did the French never venture to attack the Germans after Sedan?

7. I have already stated and refuted Rauchenstein's objections to Caesar's account of his battle with the Helvetii.<sup>7</sup> Eichheim goes further. Caesar, he says, "was completely beaten, and the Helvetii remained masters of the battle-field."<sup>8</sup> Now Rauchenstein has himself demolished this insane assertion; and it will be enough for me to refer the curious to the arguments with which the less unreasonable of Caesar's calumniators refutes his impetuous colleague.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Die Kämpfe*, etc., 1876, p. 26.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 610-13.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 3, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, i. 11, §§ 2-4.

<sup>5</sup> I am glad to find that, on this point, Rauchenstein, p. 64, is of my opinion.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, i. 12, §§ 2-3.

<sup>7</sup> See pp. 202-4, *supra*.

<sup>8</sup> *Die Kämpfe*, etc., 1876, p. 43.

<sup>9</sup> *Der Feldzug*, etc., p. 97, n. 52.

8. Caesar's account of his reasons for having marched against Ariovistus is a fable, designed to justify an unrighteous war of aggression. For this purpose he pretends that 100 *pagi* of the Suevi suddenly encamped on the Rhine, and that the territory of the Aedui, in which he himself was encamped, was devastated by the Harudes.<sup>1</sup>

Eichheim is not accurate. Caesar was not encamped in the country of the Aedui, but in that of the Lingones.<sup>2</sup> Long<sup>3</sup> thinks that Caesar's statement regarding the 100 *pagi* must not be taken literally; for the Suevi had only 100 *pagi* in all, and Ariovistus had had some of the Suevi with him before the time to which Caesar refers. The *pagi* which encamped on the Rhine were, Long thinks, only "detachments from the hundred 'pagi.'" Very likely: but it is not certain that Ariovistus had any of the Suevi with him when the *pagi* encamped on the Rhine. There was a contingent of Suevi in his host when he was defeated by Caesar: but his defeat did not take place until some weeks after the appearance of the *pagi* on the Rhine; and although Caesar says that the Suevi who had reached the Rhine returned home on hearing of Ariovistus's defeat,<sup>4</sup> it is possible that their advanced guard had already joined him.<sup>5</sup> Also, it must be remembered that Caesar was simply reporting information which he had received from the Treveri.<sup>6</sup> The assertion that Caesar was obliged to invent reasons to "justify an unrighteous war of aggression" I have already dealt with.<sup>7</sup>

9. Eichheim has grave doubts whether Ariovistus commanded in the battle against Caesar at all! It appears that the story which Caesar tells of the mission of Procillus and Mettius<sup>8</sup> was, from beginning to end, an invention. They were really sent to perpetrate "a dark deed" (*eine dunkle That*). They insinuated themselves as friends into the German camp, and there found a favourable opportunity for murdering Ariovistus. Whether they murdered him before the battle or during the battle, Eichheim modestly professes himself unable to tell. But that they succeeded in accomplishing their nefarious purpose is clear (*a*) from Caesar's having rejoiced over their escape, and (*b*) from the remark of his lieutenant, Sabinus, that Ariovistus's death had exasperated the Germans.<sup>9</sup>

What is the evidence for these startling assertions? Simply the remark which Caesar puts into the mouth of Sabinus! Certainly that remark points to the conclusion that Ariovistus was killed by Roman hands.<sup>10</sup> But more than this no one has any right to say. If any Roman was capable of compassing the assassination of Ariovistus, it was Labienus.<sup>11</sup> But we do not know how or in what

<sup>1</sup> *Die Kämpfe*, etc., 1876, p. 52.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, i. 26-37.

<sup>3</sup> *Caesar*, p. 78.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, i. 54, § 1.

<sup>5</sup> But see Stoffel, *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 82, 91.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, i. 37, §§ 1-3.

<sup>7</sup> See pp. 182, 194, *supra*.

<sup>8</sup> *B. G.*, i. 47.

<sup>9</sup> *Die Kämpfe*, etc., 1876, pp. 69-72, 79-84, and n. 35.

<sup>10</sup> *Magno esse Germanis dolori Ariovisti mortem et superiores nostras victorias.*

*B. G.*, v. 29, § 3.

<sup>11</sup> *Ib.*, viii. 23, §§ 3-6.

circumstances Ariovistus met his death.<sup>1</sup> If Caesar had ordered his assassination, he would never have mentioned his death; and to say, as Eichheim says, that Caesar's memory was bad, and that, when he composed the speech which he puts into the mouth of Sabinus, he unwittingly let out the truth, is simply trifling. Caesar was unscrupulous; but he was not a fool.

10. Caesar estimates the numbers of the confederate Belgae, whom he encountered in 57 B.C., at 296,000. This, says Eichheim, is a gross exaggeration. A wooded and merely cattle-rearing country could not have sustained such a huge population; and Caesar's own statements in *B. G.*, vii. 75, where the Nervian army falls from 50,000 to 5000 and the contingents of other Belgic tribes are proportionally reduced, sufficiently refute the story which he invented in order to make himself out a rival of Alexander the Great. The Bellovaci remained neutral throughout the campaign, thanks to the skilful diplomacy of Divitiacus, Caesar's Aeduan tool. It is incredible that the pretended 100,000 fighting men of his tribe with their wives and children could have found refuge, as Caesar says, in "the little town of Bratuspantium." Therefore Caesar's narrative is a string of falsehoods.<sup>2</sup>

Now it is not true that Caesar offers any estimate of the numbers of the confederates: he merely reports the estimate that was furnished to him by the Remi;<sup>3</sup> and he does not say that the numbers which actually took the field were equal to the numbers which the confederate states had promised to furnish. It is not true that the country of the Belgae was "merely cattle-rearing"; and it is certain that the population of Gaul, considering the condition of the country, was large.<sup>4</sup> The statements which Caesar makes in *B. G.*, vii. 75 lend no support to Eichheim's argument; for, before the rebellion of Vercingetorix, the Nervii and the other Belgic tribes had suffered heavy and repeated losses;<sup>5</sup> and Caesar expressly says that the contingents which were levied for the relief of Vercingetorix were purposely limited.<sup>6</sup> The alleged neutrality of the Bellovaci and the alleged diplomacy of Divitiacus are mere products of Eichheim's imagination. There is nothing to show whether Bratuspantium was big or little; and Caesar does not say, nor does he imply that 100,000 fighting men took refuge therein. He merely says that "the Bellovaci" took refuge with all their belongings in the stronghold of Bratuspantium.<sup>7</sup> It did not occur to him that any one would be so silly or so perverse as to imagine that the entire population crammed itself into the place; and therefore he wrote "the

<sup>1</sup> J. C. Spener (*Notitia Germaniae antiquae*, 1717, p. 166) suggests that Ariovistus may have died from the effects of a wound which he received in the battle.

<sup>2</sup> *Die Kämpfe*, etc., 1866, pp. 71, 72, n. 1; 1876, p. 88.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 4.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 325-7.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 27, §§ 3-4, 33, §§ 5-7; v. 51, § 5; vi. 6, § 1, 8, § 7, etc.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 75, § 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Exercitum in Bellovacos ducit, qui cum se suorum omnia in oppidum Bratuspantium contulissent*, etc. *Ib.*, 13, §§ 1-2.

Bellovaci" loosely, meaning of course that so many took refuge in the place as could find room there.<sup>1</sup>

11. Caesar was really defeated in his great battle with the Nervii and their allies; and it was only the advent of night that saved him from utter destruction. Here are the proofs of the mendacity of his narrative:—(a) The Roman cavalry and light infantry, which had been repulsed just before the battle, had re-formed behind the Roman fighting line, and therefore could not, as he pretends, have fallen in with the Nervii during the heat of the fighting; (b) the men whom he calls *calones* (soldiers' servants) were really his auxiliaries, for the *calones* invariably remained with the baggage; (c) he says that the Nervii *saw* the two legions that composed his rearguard coming down on the brow of the hill on which the Roman camp stood, to take part in the action: but he forgets that the hedges which intersected the country must have intercepted their view; (d) Labienus could not have captured the camp of the Atrebatas, as Caesar says; for the Belgae had no camps (*castra*), only bivouacs; and the bivouac of the Atrebatas was of course in the forest, within which they had been ambushed before the battle, and into which Labienus could not have followed them without great risk; (e) the account which Caesar himself gives, in his *Fifth Commentary*, of the resistance which he encountered from the Nervii in 54 B.C., and Pliny's statement that they were a self-governing people<sup>2</sup> prove that Caesar did not defeat them in 57 B.C., but that they defeated him.<sup>3</sup>

Now when Eichheim penned the first (a) of these arguments, he must have been dreaming; for there is no evidence that the cavalry and light infantry re-formed behind the Roman line; (b) it is not true

<sup>1</sup> Ihne (*Röm. Gesch.*, vi. 414, n. 2) remarks that if the 296,000 Belgae had been in earnest, the light-armed troops whom Caesar sent to the relief of Bibrax (*B. G.* ii. 7, §§ 1-2) could not have succeeded in their mission. He means of course to imply that the Roman estimate of the Belgic force was very much in excess of the truth. No doubt. I have said the same myself; but Caesar was not responsible for the exaggeration. Moreover, it may be inferred from Caesar's narrative that from the 296,000 must be subtracted 89,000,—the sum of the contingents of the Nervii, the Aduatuci, the Atrebatas and the Viromandui; for these tribes evidently took no part in the first stage of the campaign. Still, the great size of the Belgic encampment and the elaborate precautions which Caesar took to render his position on the Aisne impregnable, prove that the Belgae were very numerous. How then was Bibrax relieved? The explanation is not difficult. Napoleon points out that it would have been easy for the relieving force to enter the stronghold on the south; as on this side the Belgae could not have attacked it with any hope of success. The archers and slingers could have effectively replied to the Belgic fire of missiles. The Belgae had no scientific methods of besieging a fortress; and unless they could succeed in driving the garrison from the wall by their missiles, they were helpless. They were undisciplined and impatient to move on against Caesar: their commissariat was ill organised; and therefore they abandoned the attempt to take the town. A modern historian would have explained these facts. Caesar left them to the intelligence of his readers; and whoever likes to find fault with his laconic style is welcome to do so.

<sup>2</sup> Pliny simply records the bare fact that, in his time, the Nervii were "*liberi*." *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 17 (31), § 106.

<sup>3</sup> *Die Kämpfe*, etc., 1866, pp. 85, notes 1 and 2, 86; 1876, pp. 89-90.



that the *calones* invariably remained with the baggage,<sup>1</sup> and Caesar could have had no motive for trying to mislead his readers by speaking of his auxiliaries as *calones*; (c) Caesar only says that the hedges interrupted *his* view of the fighting that was going on in distant parts of the field.<sup>2</sup> This does not prove that the two legions which came to his relief in the last stage of the battle could not be seen approaching by the Nervii; for at the moment when they are said to have been seen they were on the *brow* of the hill on the slopes of which the Nervii were fighting; and there is no evidence that between them and the Nervii there was any hedge; (d) it is true that the Belgae had no fortified camp; but, like every other army, they had an encampment, in which they had doubtless left their baggage; and the only word that Caesar could use to describe this encampment was *castra*. Moreover, there is no evidence that the encampment of the Atrebatas was actually in the wood: Probably it was in an open space or clearing behind that portion of the wood in which the Nervii and their allies had been ambushed before the battle. The Atrebatas had been soundly beaten and put to flight; and therefore it is not easy to see what risk Labienus would have incurred by capturing their encampment; (e) the fact that the Nervii took the field again in 54 B.C. no more proves that they had defeated Caesar in 57 B.C. than the fact that Scipio won the battle of Zama proves that Hannibal was beaten at Cannae.

And now what does the reader think of Eichheim and his arguments? Is such cavilling worthy of a serious critic? If the Nervii had beaten Caesar, the fact would assuredly have leaked out, however skilfully he had lied. He tells us frankly that he was in sore straits: he gives the highest praise to his enemies; and his narrative, from first to last, is as credible as it is clear.

12. Caesar's narrative of the siege and capture of the principal stronghold of the Aduatuci is dishonest; for the researches of Major Locqueyssie have proved that the only place which corresponds with Caesar's description of the stronghold is Sautour, near Philippeville; and the extent of the plateau of Sautour is only 3 hectares, or about  $7\frac{1}{2}$  acres, which could not have accommodated more than a small fraction of the 57,000 Aduatuci whom Caesar claimed to have overcome.<sup>3</sup>

Eichheim is clutching at a straw. What the researches of Major Locqueyssie proved was that Sautour corresponds with Caesar's description in every respect, *except that of size*.<sup>4</sup> It is absurd to suppose that any body of Aduatuci which it would have been worth Caesar's while to attack would have taken refuge in so diminutive a stronghold; and it happens that Mont Falhize corresponds *completely* with Caesar's description.<sup>5</sup>

13. Caesar says that Indutiomarus surrendered *all* his relations to

<sup>1</sup> Eichheim confounds the *calones* with the baggage-drivers, from whom Caesar (*B. G.*, ii. 24, §§ 2-3) carefully distinguishes them.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 22, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Die Kämpfe*, etc., 1876, p. 91.

<sup>4</sup> Napoléon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 116, n. 1.

<sup>5</sup> See pp. 353-8.

him as hostages.<sup>1</sup> The falseness of this statement, says Eichheim,<sup>2</sup> is proved by the fact that, after the death of Indutiomarus, his command was put in commission and transferred to his relations.<sup>3</sup>

Schneider,<sup>4</sup> arguing that Indutiomarus would not have made war upon the Romans so long as the hostages remained in Caesar's hands, suggests that Caesar may have given them back after his return from Britain. This explanation may possibly be true; or Indutiomarus may have deceived Caesar; or Caesar may have used the word *omnes* loosely, as he sometimes does; or he may have made a mistake. Anyhow this was not a point on which he could have had any motive for misrepresenting the facts.

14. How, asks Eichheim, did Caesar learn that an Eburonian captive guided the Sugambrian freebooters to Aduatua, since not one of the Sugambri fell into his hands, and "the guide could scarcely have come back to him for a tip"?<sup>5</sup>

There is no proof that none of the Sugambri or of their captives fell into Caesar's hands: but Eichheim's joke is not so bad; and it may be that here, for once, he has hit a nail on the head. Caesar may have assumed that the Sugambri must have been guided to Aduatua by some one, and if so, surely by a captive; and the little speech<sup>6</sup> which he puts into the mouth of the guide may have been an invention. But if it was, such a trifle does not affect the general trustworthiness of his narrative. Ancient writers were not scrupulous about inventing speeches: but Caesar, as one of his assailants admits,<sup>7</sup> allowed himself far less latitude in this respect than his predecessors.

Eichheim makes various other charges against Caesar, which I shall not inflict upon my readers, because they are unsupported even by the flimsiest arguments. Those which I have selected for examination are the most damaging,—or would be if they were true,—and the least suggestive of insanity on the part of their author. His charges are of such a kind that, if one half of them could be substantiated, the historian would be driven to confess that, for his purpose, the *Commentaries* are simply a blank, and that all the labour which has been spent in trying to elucidate them has been spent in vain. Eichheim, indeed, professes to be able to disentangle the false from the true and to reconstruct the entire narrative. But if he can succeed in persuading the learned world that Caesar's *Commentaries* were a tissue of lies, he will hardly win acceptance for his own. We shall simply content ourselves with compressing the history of the conquest of Gaul into a single sentence:—"In 58 B.C. Julius Caesar became Governor of Gaul; and although in every pitched battle which he fought he was disastrously beaten, he nevertheless contrived in eight campaigns, by some mysterious means, to conquer the whole country."<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, v. 4, §§ 1-2.

<sup>2</sup> *Die Kämpfe*, etc., 1866, p. 116, note.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 2, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Caesar*, ii. 190.

<sup>5</sup> *Die Kämpfe*, etc., 1866, p. 145, n. 1.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 35, § 8.

<sup>7</sup> See p. 176, *supra*.

<sup>8</sup> H. Kloeveborn repeats some of Eichheim's and Rauchenstein's charges in *Die*

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But I must say a good word for Eichheim before I take leave of him. Unlike Caesar's other assailants, the fellow has a sense of humour; and for this much may be forgiven him. Caesar, he says, "must have had more hostages than soldiers" (überhaupt müsste Cäsar mehr Geiseln als Soldaten gehabt haben).<sup>f</sup> Well, he certainly had a good many, though it was not his habit to carry them about with him;<sup>2</sup> and he could have had no conceivable motive for exaggerating their number.

### VIII

Just as I have placed Eichheim in a class by himself on account of his eccentricity and virulence, so I place the "ex-Light Dragoon" in a class by himself on account of his silliness and ignorance of Latin. The papers which he contributed to Colburn's *United Service Magazine*,<sup>3</sup> under the title of "The Commentaries of Cæsar considered as Apocryphal," would never have been accepted by an editor who was also a scholar unless the editor had had a grudge against the author and desired to bring him into contempt. Eichheim, at all events, had not forgotten what he had learned at school: but there is abundant evidence that the "ex-Light Dragoon" could not be trusted to construe a simple Latin sentence. Nothing, indeed, but the arrogance which is begotten of ignorance could have tempted him to handle such a subject at all. If it is necessary for a scholar who writes upon ancient military history to have some tincture of military knowledge, it is equally necessary for a soldier to have some tincture of scholarship. For want of this the "ex-Light Dragoon" has made many ridiculous blunders. He lacks that acquaintance with the elements of Roman history and literature without which no sensible man would venture to pass judgement upon the *Commentaries*. His method is simply this. He misunderstands passage after passage so simple that a bright lad in the Fourth Form could hardly fail to seize their drift, and, as a result of each misunderstanding, he ascribes to the author of the *Commentaries* some statement so monstrous that no sane man, I do not say soldier, could have committed himself to it. He triumphantly refutes the monstrosity, and concludes, with a great display of logic, that the author could not have been Caesar. Having proved this to his own satisfaction, whenever he comes across a statement which he does understand, and which presents to his mind a difficulty that a little patience, a little thought, and a little collateral knowledge would have enabled him to solve, he dismisses the statement

*Kämpfe Caesars gegen die Helvetier im Jahre 58 v. Chr.*, a work which is noticed by R. Schneider in seven politely contemptuous lines (*Jahresberichte d. philol. Vereins*, xvi. 1890, p. 109).

<sup>1</sup> *Die Kämpfe*, etc., 1866, p. 113, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> See *B. G.*, v. 47, § 2; vii. 55, § 2. Caesar only five times specifies the number of hostages which he demanded. He took 600 from the Bellovac, 100 from the Senones, 200 from Indutiomarus, 40 from the Trinobantes and 600 from Vellannodunum. *Ib.*, ii. 15, § 1; v. 4, § 1, 20, § 4; vi. 4, § 4; vii. 11, § 2.

<sup>3</sup> 1850, Part 1, pp. 512-33, Part 2, pp. 123-33, 437-54.

as incredible, because, as he imagines, Caesar was not responsible for it. The real author of the *Commentaries*, he tells us, was some scribbler who flourished after Caesar's death and had an eye to imperial patronage.<sup>1</sup> One wonders whether he had forgotten Cicero's criticism on these same *Commentaries*, or whether he had ever heard of it. Any of his readers who had a little Latin must have detected his manifold blunders. But it is probable that many of the gallant officers and gentlemen who read his articles were deluded by them into the belief that the memoirs which Cicero described as unapproachable in their kind, and which the great Napoleon recommended to military aspirants as a text-book, were only fit for dominies and little boys. A German officer, in a valuable study of the bibliography of the *Commentaries*,<sup>2</sup> mentions the articles in such a way as to suggest that they are not unworthy of refutation; and, as I am dealing with the assailants of Caesar's veracity, I may as well despatch the whole crew and leave no room for further cavil.

At the outset of his first article<sup>3</sup> the author reproduces one of the most monstrous blunders of his revered master, General Warnery,—that Caesar made his line of entrenchments against the Helvetii on the right bank of the Rhône,—and from this blunder he draws the conclusion that the statement in the *Commentaries* that Caesar caused the bridge at Geneva to be broken down, is a fiction. "The bridge," he says, "could be of no use to the Helvetians since the erection of the wall . . . in advance of it, and all who know anything of the locality . . . will immediately perceive that the bridge was the only means of communication for Caesar's own troops . . . with the Roman province in their rear. All these things tend to raise a strong impression that the writer had never seen the country. Such also was the opinion of General Warnery, who justly questions how the Helvetians could get to the bank of the Rhône. . . . To have got to the Rhône they must have first forced the entrenchment which barred access to it."

I have transcribed this farrago of rubbish in order that the reader may gauge once for all the critical impotence of Warnery and his disciple. One would have thought that their own arguments would have suggested to this pair of wiseacres what every schoolboy who has brought an average intelligence to the reading of the *Commentaries* has always seen,—that Caesar's entrenchment was on the left bank of the Rhône.

The author would have been well advised if he had provided himself with a translation of the *Commentaries* before sneering at them. When he comes to deal with the account of Caesar's first landing in Britain, he sees a fine opportunity for exercising his wit. Caesar tells us that his infantry could not pursue the enemy far, because his cavalry, who had crossed the Channel in a separate division of the fleet, could not keep on their right course or effect a landing on the island.<sup>4</sup> But,

<sup>1</sup> Colburn's *United Service Magazine*, 1850, p. 454.

<sup>2</sup> *Beilage zum Militär-Wochenblatt*, 1883, pp. 343-86.

<sup>3</sup> p. 524.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 26, § 5.

according to our author, *insulam capere* means "take (that is to say, capture) the island!" Observe what a hash he makes of the whole passage. "The text," he remarks, "tells us that the Romans could not pursue them (the Britons) for want of cavalry, *nor take the island*. This was the only thing wanting to Caesar's good fortune."<sup>1</sup> Which, as he justly observes, is nonsense. Only the nonsense is his, not Caesar's.

With these samples of the author's scholarship before him, the reader will not expect me to refute the rest of his charges. But I will take one or two of the least absurd.

1. Running atilt against Caesar's statement that Galba was attacked at Octodurus (Martigny) by 30,000 men, the writer says, "It is a notorious . . . fact, that the terrain . . . would scarce allow of 500 . . . men to form in. . . . How did they (the Romans) defile out of all the gates at once? an evolution in which they exposed themselves to certain annihilation by mere numbers . . . while the enemy were left free access over the rampart into the camp to attack them simultaneously in the rear?"<sup>2</sup>

Now about the notoriety of the alleged fact I know nothing. But I have been at Martigny, and have most carefully examined the surrounding "terrain"; and if any one who has not been there will examine Sheet 526 of the *Topographischer Atlas der Schweiz* (1 : 50,000) he will find the features of the country portrayed with such fidelity as to render a visit superfluous. I assert, without fear of contradiction, that the "terrain" affords ample room for fifty times 500 men "to form in."<sup>3</sup> At the same time I do not deny that Caesar's figures are exaggerated: indeed I have tried elsewhere to prove that they are.<sup>4</sup> What difficulty the Romans could have found in moving out of all four gates at once, I cannot see. As to their having "exposed themselves," who has ever denied it? Of course they exposed themselves. But it was a forlorn hope: they chose the less of two evils: they reckoned on confounding their undisciplined enemies; and the result proved that they were right. If the writer's charge were true, it would prove too much. For Galba and his legion must have saved themselves somehow; and if not by a sortie, how? Caesar may have knowingly exaggerated their prowess; or he may have been misled by Galba's report: but he would hardly have been mad enough to invent the whole incident.

2. Caesar's passage of the Thames, as described in the *Commentaries*, is incredible. "How the Roman infantry, up to their necks in the water, and encumbered with their arms . . . surmounted the difficulty of the piles driven into the bed of the river, we are not told. They could not turn them on either flank, for they would have been carried out of their depth, and while occupied in the difficult task of tearing up and breaking the piles, the cavalry could not have remained stationary as it were in the current, swimming, to break its force for them. That the cavalry could not have removed or passed over the piles is obvious."<sup>5</sup>

See pp. 661-2. *infra*.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 662.

<sup>5</sup> pp. 451-2.

Now I freely admit that Caesar's narrative presents a difficulty: but incredible it is not, except to a crotcheteer who has persuaded himself that it was written by an impostor. Caesar says that he led his army into the territory of Cassiyellaunus to the bank of the Thames, "which," he says, "can only be forded in one place and there with difficulty."<sup>1</sup> On reaching this ford, he observed that the enemy were posted in force on the opposite bank, which was strongly palisaded; and he learned from prisoners and deserters that sharp stakes were fixed in the bed of the river. Sending his cavalry on in front (*praemisso equitatu*), he ordered the infantry to follow them immediately. The infantry, he concludes, "advanced with such speed and dash, though they only had their heads above water, that the enemy, unable to withstand the onset of the legions and the cavalry, abandoned the bank and fled."<sup>2</sup> Not a word to tell us how the difficulty of the stakes and the palisade was overcome! Caesar had the defect of his literary quality. Like our own Landor, he would not help his readers. He states the fact that he crossed the river, and does not think it necessary to explain how. He leaves us to believe it or not, as we please. I believe it; and I will explain why. It is absolutely certain that Caesar narrated it. It is equally certain that Caesar, being a man of superlative good sense, though he may have distorted truth when he had an object to gain, though he may have exaggerated his own exploits, though he must have made mistakes, yet did not waste his time and make a fool of himself by inventing incredible incidents. Either, then, the stakes were cut down or removed, or they were turned. Dittenberger insists that "in spite of the staking, the crossing certainly took place at the spot mentioned in § 1,<sup>3</sup> which is expressly described as the only ford." But to cut down or remove the stakes under the shower of missiles which the enemy would certainly have kept up, would have involved great sacrifice of life: the words of Caesar seem to imply that the legionaries forded the river with one continuous rush; and it is hardly credible that the enemy would have fled without attempting to defend the palisade on the bank. Caesar's statement that the river "can only be forded at one place, and there with difficulty," is not, I believe, inconsistent with my view. The words "at one place" do not necessarily mean at a place exactly coextensive with the line of stakes. My suggestion is that the enemy had only staked that part of the river bed over which they thought it likely that the Romans would attempt to cross; that just above or below this space Caesar made the cavalry break the force of the stream, as he did when he crossed the Loire in the Seventh Campaign;<sup>4</sup> and that by their assistance the infantry managed to keep their heads above water and get across. If it is objected that the words "and there with difficulty" prove that even opposite the stakes the

<sup>1</sup> quod flumen uno omnino loco pedibus, atque hoc aegre, transiri potest.

<sup>2</sup> Sed ea celeritate atque eo impetu milites ierunt, cum capite solo ex aqua exstarent, ut hostes impetum legionum atque equitum sustinere non possent ripasque dimitterent ac se fugae mandarent. *B. G.*, v. 18, § 5.

<sup>3</sup> See *Caesar*, ed. Kraner-Dittenberger, 15th ed., p. 206.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.* vii. 56, § 4.

infantry could only just have kept their heads above water, I reply that the enemy may have neglected to make their line of stakes long enough ; and that, even if the water at the ford had not reached up to the men's necks, Caesar might have described the ford as difficult, seeing that he describes the ford over the Loire as difficult though the men had their shoulders and arms above water. Napoleon says that Caesar "sent the cavalry forward (probably to a certain distance above or below), in order to turn the enemy's position and occupy his attention, while the infantry destroyed the obstacles and crossed the ford."<sup>1</sup> But if Caesar had done this, he would not have said that he ordered the infantry to follow the cavalry. My explanation may be wrong ; but this much is certain :—the Romans did cross the Thames.

General Warnery says that as, according to Caesar, the infantry were up to their necks in the water, the horses of the cavalry would have been obliged to swim, "in which case the current would have carried them on to the infantry."<sup>2</sup> Not necessarily: the force of the current would have to be taken into consideration. Besides, it is certain that the cavalry would not have been obliged to swim. The legionaries were little men : it would be an exaggeration to say that their average height was 5 feet 6 inches ;<sup>3</sup> and even the smallest of them had their chins above water. The depth of the water, then, could hardly have been more than 4 feet 3 inches. If the average height of the horses was 15 hands<sup>4</sup> (or 5 feet), their withers would have been well above the water, and they need not have swum.

## IX

To read General Warnery's book<sup>5</sup> after having read the "ex-Light Dragoon's" articles is amusing ; for one finds that the Englishman has borrowed most of his arguments and many of his blunders from the Swiss, making the former still weaker and the latter still more absurd in the process of paraphrase. Warnery remarks in his Preface<sup>6</sup> that he has not used any of the French translations of the *Commentaries*, because he has found them inaccurate. Let us see what measure of intelligence he has himself brought to the interpretation of the text. Speaking of Caesar's account of the attack of the Alpine tribes upon Galba's camp at Octodurus, he says, "on lit que les Romains lançoient leurs traits d'en haut . . . Ceci me paroît assez contradictoire. Il ne faut pas

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 191-2.

<sup>2</sup> *Mélange de remarques, surtout sur César*, 1782, p. 107.

<sup>3</sup> Caesar tells us that the Gauls despised his legionaries for their small stature (*plerumque omnibus Gallis prae magnitudine corporum suorum brevis nostra contempni est*. *B. G.*, ii. 30, § 4).

<sup>4</sup> "The average height of cavalry horses," says Lord Wolseley (*Soldiers' Pocket-Book*, 5th ed., p. 14) "is 15½ hands." An Australian, who has had great experience in swimming horses, tells me that they do not begin to swim till the water is over their backs ; and this statement is confirmed by a friend of mine, who worked on a ranch for some years and has frequently swum horses across rivers.

<sup>5</sup> *Mélange de remarques, surtout sur César*, 1782.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 14-15.

oublier que le Camp étoit au pied de la Montagne."<sup>1</sup> Certainly: but Caesar merely says that the Roman javelins did great execution because they were thrown from a commanding position (*neque ullum frustra telum ex loco superiore mittere*). The *locus superior* was the rampart of the Roman camp.<sup>2</sup> If General Warnery had been standing on the ground beneath, and a javelin had struck him, he would have realised that the rampart of a camp might be a commanding position.<sup>3</sup>

So much for Warnery's power of construing easy Latin. As Long says,<sup>4</sup> "the foundation of nearly all his comment is a misunderstanding of the text." I have virtually dealt with some of his allegations in dealing with those of the ex-Light Dragoon. Of the rest I shall now deal with those that are supported by some shred of argument.

1. Caesar's account of the outset of his battle with Ariovistus is, according to Warnery, absolutely incredible. "César," he says, "campé à 2000 pas des Germains, met son Armée en bataille devant son Camp, ce qui demande . . . un terrain de plus de mille pas de profondeur. Il en avance, je suppose, 400 autres, de sorte qu'il n'étoit plus qu'à 600, mettons le double, du Camp des Germains. Cela étant, pourquoi leur permettre d'en sortir en défilant, et de former à sa barbe?"<sup>5</sup>

Caesar's account<sup>6</sup> presents no difficulty to any one who is not determined to make difficulties. To begin with, it is certain that Caesar defeated Ariovistus. If then Warnery's objections are valid, we must assume that Caesar did not attack the Germans, but that the Germans attacked Caesar. Now it is quite inconceivable that Caesar should have had any motive for perverting the truth in such a matter as this. He tells us that the Helvetii attacked him; that the Nervii and their allies attacked him; that the Eburones and their allies attacked him when he was marching to relieve Quintus Cicero; and that Vercingetorix attacked him before the blockade of Alesia. Why then, if Ariovistus also had taken the initiative, should Caesar have told a lie? What did it matter, so long as he gained the victory? Now to examine his narrative. First, to say that the depth of his army, from the front rank of the first line to the rearmost rank of the third, or even to the camp itself, was a Roman mile, is ridiculous. Put it at 130 yards,<sup>7</sup> and you will go nearer the mark. On this estimate, Caesar's first line was more than 3000 yards from the German camp, when it began its march. When Ariovistus saw the Roman army in motion, he must have known what he had to expect; and his tribal contingents had ample time to mass themselves in their phalanxes before the Romans could come to swords' point with them.

2. When Warnery comes to Caesar's description of the battle with the Nervii, he calls up all his powers of sarcasm:—"Je crois que c'est la seule occasion où l'on ait vu des Armées faire leur champ de bataille

<sup>1</sup> *Mélange de remarques, surtout sur César*, p. 58.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 4, § 2.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *B. G.*, iii. 25, § 1, where Caesar, describing the attack of Crassus on the Aquitanian camp, says *cum item ab hostibus constanter ac non timide pugnaretur telaque ex loco superiore missa non frustra acciderent*, etc.

<sup>4</sup> *Caesar*, p. xiv.

<sup>5</sup> *Mélange*, etc., pp. 37-8.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, i. 51-2.

<sup>7</sup> Or 119 metres. See Stoffel, *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 119.



d'une pareille rivière, qu'on nous donne d'abord comme facile à passer, et ensuite encaissée, avec des bords si escarpés, qu'il ait fallu les escalader." No doubt, he concludes, Caesar's cavalry used scaling-ladders, "dont nous avons perdu le modèle."<sup>1</sup>

If the general had taken the trouble to examine the course of the Sambre near the spot where the battle took place, he would have found that the nature of the banks varied greatly within a short space, and that it was not necessary for the cavalry to cross the stream at any point where the banks were high. The bank, where the Nervii swarmed up it, was high, but not higher than active men could scale. As Long observes,<sup>2</sup> "the banks . . . opposite to the enemy's left,"—that is to say, to the Nervii,—“were, as Caesar describes them, very high, a statement which is the strongest proof that the site of this battle has been truly determined. The heights of Neuf-Mesnil . . . descend to the river with a uniform slope; but at Boussières, a little farther up the stream, the heights which are connected with Neuf-Mesnil terminate on the river in escarpments from sixteen to about fifty feet high, which are not accessible at Boussières, but may be scaled lower down.

3. Warnery denies that 120 towers could have been required for the defence of Cicero's camp when it was beleaguered by the Nervii and their allies.<sup>3</sup> I believe that this objection is valid. Assuming that the towers were 80 feet apart, as at Alesia, the perimeter of the camp, exclusive of the space required by the towers themselves, would have been 119 × 80 or 9520 feet; and allowing for the space occupied by the towers, it could not have been less than 2 miles. The camp then would have covered an area of 160 acres, which is much too large for a single legion. But I see no reason to question Caesar's good faith. To exaggerate the number of the towers which the legionaries erected could hardly have enhanced the glory of the defence. I suspect then that the error, if there is one, is due to a copyist or to Cicero.

# X

A writer who undertakes to measure the credibility of the *Commentaries on the Gallic War* is bound to ask himself whether the *Commentaries on the Civil War* do not throw light upon his subject. Now German critics, followed respectfully by one or two in this country, have for some years been busy picking holes in Caesar's later work.

1. In *B. C.*, i. 6, §§ 7-8 Caesar says that, in 49 B.C., the newly appointed provincial governors, after performing the usual religious ceremonies in the Capitol, left Rome, wearing the dress of a military commander, although the legal form of giving them the power to command troops had been omitted; and that, contrary to all precedent, the consuls left the city although, being without this power, they were really only private individuals. (*Neque expectant [quod superioribus annis*

<sup>1</sup> *Mélange*, etc., p. 52.

<sup>2</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 59.

<sup>3</sup> *Mélange*, etc., pp. 112-13.

*acciderat,] ut de eorum imperio ad populum feratur, paludatique votis nuncupatis exeunt. Consules [, quod ante id tempus accidit nunquam,] ex urbe proficiscuntur, lictoresque habent in urbe et Capitolio privati contra omnia vetustatis exempla.* I follow the reading of the MSS.: but the words enclosed in square brackets are rejected by Nipperdey<sup>1</sup> as spurious. Mr. Peskett,<sup>2</sup> following a foolish conjecture of Davis, but omitting to say that it is a conjecture, prints *quod . . . nunquam* in the first sentence, immediately after *exeunt*; and at the same time he only half follows Davis, for Davis, without any authority changed *exeunt* into the subjunctive *exceant*. Mr. Peskett says that the statement *quod ante id tempus accidit nunquam* "is so demonstrably and even ludicrously untrue that Voss, Nipperdey and others would eject the words altogether. But Caesar . . . no doubt relied on his readers having short memories, and I do not see why he should be less likely to make a false statement, if it suited his purpose to do so, than a modern Christian statesman." Nor do I: but I find it difficult to believe that a marvellously adroit and worldly-wise statesman would have made a statement which was "*ludicrously untrue*." "Before the time of Sulla," continues Mr. Peskett, "it had been the regular thing for the consuls to leave the city during their term of office, and although in 81 the *lex Cornelia de provinciis* enacted that they should not leave it till the expiration of their year, yet between that date and 49 there had been five or six instances of the rule being contravened. Caesar, however, for his own purposes chooses to ignore these." To these remarks Dr. J. S. Reid appends this little note: <sup>3</sup>—"It was the going in and out of the city and yet retaining the *imperium* which Caesar declared unparalleled. He would never have said that breaking a usage which had only existed since Sulla was *contra omnia vetustatis exempla*. By this recrossing of the *pomerium*, after leaving it in military array, they became *privati*."

The truth is that Mr. Peskett has discovered a mare's nest. The text of the *Civil War* is, as he himself remarks (p. 47) in many places corrupt. Nipperdey<sup>4</sup> points out that the words *quod ante id tempus acciderat nunquam* can only apply to *consules ex urbe proficiscuntur*, not, as Voss thought possible, to *lictorsque habent in urbe et Capitolio privati*; and Caesar could never have written such obvious nonsense as this. Besides, if *quod . . . nunquam* were placed after *privati, contra omnia vetustatis exempla* would be a mere repetition. If, on the other hand, *quod . . . nunquam* is arbitrarily inserted in the preceding sentence, after *exeunt*, Caesar is made to write like a madman, unless the words are taken as referring to his charge that the magistrates had not had the *imperium* conferred upon them, or unless, as B. Kübler,<sup>5</sup> with great prob-

<sup>1</sup> *Caesar*, pp. 132-3.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, i., ed. A. G. Peskett, 1890, p. 60.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, i., ed. A. G. Peskett, 1890, p. 60.

<sup>4</sup> *Caesar*, p. 132.

<sup>5</sup> *Philologus*, lv., 1896, pp. 157-8. Oudendorp, as Kübler remarks, had anticipated this conjecture. Kübler quotes a parallel passage from Cicero, *Phil.*, v. 9. § 24,—*Post autem, neque sacrificiis solennibus factis, neque votis nuncupatis, non profectus est, sed profugit paludatus*. It needs little acumen to see that *non* is required. Caesar's complaint would have lacked point, if he had said that the magistrates had fulfilled their religious obligations.

ability, conjectures, Caesar wrote *non nuncupatis*; and in either of these cases the charge against him disappears. He had a right to say that, by going in and out of the city without having had the *imperium* conferred upon them, or without the observance of the usual religious rites, the consuls were acting contrary to all precedent.<sup>1</sup>

2. O. Schmidt<sup>2</sup> accuses Caesar of having distorted the sequence of the events which he narrates in *B. C.*, i. 8-11, in order to make it appear that he did not resort to force until Pompey had made it perfectly clear that he would not consent to any reasonable accommodation. In chapter 10 we read that Caesar's envoy, Roscius, delivered his ultimatum to Pompey and the consuls, and brought back Pompey's answer to Caesar, who was at Ariminum. In chapter 11 Caesar states his objections to Pompey's proposed terms, and goes on to say that he sent Mark Antony to occupy Arretium, and three cohorts to occupy Pisaurum, Fenum and Ancona respectively. Now Pompey's letter did not reach Caesar before January 29, 49 B.C.; and we know from letters of Cicero<sup>3</sup> that the news of the capture of Arretium, Pisaurum, Fanum and Ancona had reached Rome on or before January 18. The facts are certain. Either Caesar made a mistake from haste or lapse of memory, as Colonel Stoffel assumes,<sup>4</sup> or he lied; the latter, like told "a monstrous lie" (*ungeheuerliche Lüge*), as Schmidt thinks it. The more indulgent supposition is possibly allowable. None can the advocates of Caesar, like Mommsen, Froude and Mr. Ward & Paver, but Schmidt himself<sup>5</sup> lays stress upon Caesar's moderation. No doubt this moderation proceeded partly from shrewd calculation. But that is nothing to the purpose. Those who hold with Colonel Stoffel that Caesar would have amended this portion of his work if he had had time to revise it, might argue that his case was too strong in itself to require embellishment. But it may be that anxiety to exhibit his own conduct in the most favourable light led him to distort the sequence of events, and to represent the occupation of Arretium and the other towns as the consequence of Pompey's stubbornness, whereas it was really a justifiable measure of precaution.

3. Caesar says that when he was at Brundisium, he was greatly astonished that a certain Magius, whom he had sent to Pompey with overtures for peace, was not sent back to him; that he accordingly sent Caninius Rebilus to Scribonius Libo on a similar errand; but that Libo sent back word that Pompey could not entertain any proposals for peace in the absence of the consuls.<sup>6</sup> But a letter of Caesar's to

<sup>1</sup> See Nipperdey, pp. 131-4. Kubler, in his edition of the *Civil War* (p. xvi.), abandons the passage in despair as "miserably corrupt." Mommsen, he says, has communicated to him the following conjecture, which perhaps substantially represents what Caesar wrote:—*Consules, quod ante id tempus accidit nunquam, antequam ex urbe proficiscuntur, lictores habent in urbe et Capitolio paludatos, contra omnia vetustatis exempla.*

<sup>2</sup> *Rheinisches Museum*, xlvii., 1892, p. 263, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Ad Att.*, vii. 14, § 1; ix. 10, § 4; *Ad Fam.*, xvi. 12, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Guerre civile*, i. 213.

<sup>5</sup> *Rheinisches Museum*, xlvii., 1892, pp. 262-4.

<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, i. 25, §§ 2-6.

Cicero is extant, in which he says, "I reached Brundisium on the 9th of March. Pompey is at Brundisium. He has sent N. Magius to me to treat of peace. I have replied as I thought fit. . . . As soon as I see a chance of being able to come to a settlement, I will let you know at once."<sup>1</sup> F. Eysselhardt regards this letter, as a proof that, in the *Civil War*, Caesar told a deliberate falsehood with the intention of persuading his readers that he had been honestly anxious to avoid bloodshed, but that his efforts had been frustrated by the obstinacy of Pompey.<sup>2</sup>

Long has written a note on this question, which is worth considering. "Caesar," he says, "arrived before Brundisium on the 9th of March, and Pompeius then sent Magius to him. Caesar, as he says in the letter, returned an answer to Pompeius by Magius. Now when Caesar (*B. C.*, i. 24) let Magius go and gave him a message to Pompeius, he was on his march to Brundisium, and, as far as we are told, he received no answer until he had pitched his camp before Brundisium, when Magius came with the message to which C. alludes in his letter. C. gave his answer to this message, but he had no reply. This may be the true explanation, and there is no contradiction."<sup>3</sup>

Schmidt, who finds no fault with Caesar's narrative on this point, says "A few days after Caesar's arrival at Brundisium, about March 12, Pompey sent Magius to Caesar, plainly only to gain time for his preparation for sailing. . . . Probably Caesar required a personal interview, but his opponent was too proud to grant it."<sup>4</sup>

I am prepared to admit, for the sake of argument, that Caesar's narrative of the civil war may be in certain respects disingenuous. If it is, we are justified in saying that Caesar did not love truth with entire devotion,—which I, for one, have never for a moment supposed that he did: but we are not justified in throwing doubt upon the honesty of his narrative of the Gallic war, unless it can be shown that he had an adequate motive for misrepresentation. Furthermore, I believe that any competent critic who reads the *Civil War* rapidly through,—for it is impossible to judge it fairly piecemeal,—will form a high opinion not only of the power and the magnanimity, but also of the general trustworthiness of the writer.

# XI

There is one thing which Rauchenstein and Eichheim and their like forget. They are continually appealing from Caesar to Dion Cassius or Plutarch or some other minor historian. Now I have shown that in many cases the discrepancy between the statements of Caesar and those of later historians is either trivial or easily to be accounted for by the hypothesis that the later historians used the *Commentaries* in the same way that an inaccurate rhetorical modern historian uses his authorities ;

<sup>1</sup> Cic., *Ad Att.*, ix. 13A, § 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, etc., lxxxv., 1862, pp. 763-4.

<sup>3</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 33, n. 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Rheinisches Museum*, xlvii., 1892, p. 267.

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and that in the very few cases in which Caesar is implicitly contradicted by those who came after him it is not Caesar who is unworthy of credit. But the point to mark is that, according to Caesar's censors, Dion Cassius and the other minor historians followed other and independent authorities besides Caesar. How, then, do Eichheim and Rauchenstein propose to explain away the fact that their graver charges find absolutely no confirmation in the works of the minor historians? Neither Dion Cassius nor any of his fellows says or implies that Caesar murdered Ariovistus, or that he was defeated by the Helvetii, by Ariovistus, or by the Nervii, or that he tried by misrepresentation to justify unjust wars. The inevitable conclusion is that if Dion Cassius and the rest used other original authorities besides Caesar, those authorities confirmed Caesar, and that if Caesar is to be convicted of falsehood, he must be convicted out of his own mouth.<sup>1</sup>

And there is one fact in the history of Caesarian criticism which appears to me not without significance. So far as I am aware, no great writer, no great historian, no great statesman or general has ever thrown serious discredit upon the *Commentaries*. It is one thing to say that Caesar exaggerated the numbers of his enemies, that his narrative was not so impartial as that of a disinterested historian, and that he may have concealed facts which he thought it imprudent to disclose: it is quite another thing to charge him with a systematic mendacity that would deprive his memoirs of all historic value. To do this has been reserved for the Ihnes, the Eichheims and the Rauchensteins: the Montaignes, the Mommsens, the Napoleons are satisfied of Caesar's veracity.

But after all, if we may believe,—with the necessary reservation on occasional points of detail which we must make, in a greater or less degree, in reading every historian,—the particular statements of definite fact which he makes, as distinguished from his statements of motives and from the general tendency of his narrative, Caesar's standard of literary ethics is, for the present discussion, a matter of indifference. If, in narrating his campaigns against the Helvetii and Ariovistus, he has omitted to mention facts which, for his purpose, were irrelevant, we can supply the omission from other sources. If the gentle critic is dissatisfied with the element of bloodshed which he has introduced into his narrative, and likes to fancy that he could, as he would, have given us a more plentiful feast of horrors, the field of conjecture is open. If any one believes that he made a clumsy effort to delude us into the belief that he was reluctant to conquer Gaul, we are not deluded; and, whatever we may think of his sincerity, the cause of history does not suffer. If he meant to suggest what was false, he did it so clumsily

<sup>1</sup> After writing this paragraph I find that R. Schneider, in a review of Petsch's *Die historische Glaubwürdigkeit der Comm. Cæsars vom gall. Kriege*, 1885-6 (which I have tried in vain to procure) remarks that Petsch has rightly pointed out that the later historians, with various deviations, arrive at the same results as the *Commentaries*, which tends to show that where they differed from Caesar, they misunderstood or perverted his statements. See *Jahresberichte d. philol. Vereins*, xiii., 1887, pp. 386-7.

that, even if he succeeded in deceiving his contemporaries, he has utterly failed, so they tell us, to deceive his modern critics. If, without saying what was untrue, he suppressed what was true, the suppression could hardly have been of such a kind as to affect our estimate of his conduct ; for he said quite enough to shock modern humanitarians and modern professors of political morality ; and he said it without a blush.

But I have tried the reader's patience too long. I have examined carefully and with entire honesty of purpose every specific charge of the least importance which, so far as I have been able to discover, has been brought against Caesar's veracity ; and I believe that, with the two or three exceptions which I have noted, I have refuted them all. But the reader must not run away with the idea that I am so simple as to regard the *Commentaries* as absolutely true. No history is absolutely true ; and Caesar assuredly made mistakes. He is often laconic to a fault : he often writes with a looseness of expression which was natural in a busy man who did not write for cavillers, who made large demands upon the intelligence of his readers, and who, moreover, had not the fear of modern critics before his mind : he was sometimes either uncritical or careless in reproducing the statements of his lieutenants ; writing as a politician, not as a historian, he may have thought it discreet to withhold valuable and interesting information : he doubtless exaggerated, consciously or unconsciously, the numbers of his enemies and the losses which he or his lieutenants had inflicted upon them : he may have glossed over a mistake or two ; he may have concocted a partial narrative of the one defeat which he himself sustained ; and I am willing to believe that his memoirs leave upon the mind an impression of his prowess, if not of his character, more favourable than would have been produced by the narrative of an impartial and well-informed historian. I am also willing to believe that, if he had had a solid political object to gain, he would have had recourse, as we are told that Bismarck had recourse, to brazen mendacity. Mendacity is a weapon which, in this wicked world, no statesman can afford to despise. I do not claim for Caesar that he had the passion for truth that inspires Mr. Rawson Gardiner. Even Mr. Baring Gould would hardly maintain that if Caesar could have armed himself for his duel with Pompey by garbling the history of the Gallic war, he would have resisted the temptation. Only the temptation was not there. On the whole, Caesar could afford to tell the truth. He did full justice to his lieutenants : he wrote generously of his enemies ; and I see no reason for believing that he was ashamed of anything that he had done. But, as it is quite certain that my criticism is imperfect, I will quote the words with which a large-minded scholar, a man of arms, of affairs and of the world, concludes a brief discussion of the same subject. " Nous n'avons cherché," says the Duc d'Aumale, " à établir qu'une chose, c'est que, sans être nullement détracteur de César, en restant admirateur déclaré, non seulement de ses grandes actions, mais de la façon dont il les raconte, il était permis de soumettre à l'analyse certains passages de ses *Commentaires* et de discuter quelques-unes de ses assertions, alors qu'il avait un intérêt

évident à dissimuler ou à exagérer la vérité ;\* mais nous ne croyons pas que cette faculté puisse s'étendre jusqu'à changer le caractère de l'interprétation rigoureuse du texte dans tout ce qui regarde les descriptions de lieux, d'ouvrages, de mouvemens." <sup>1</sup> "On ne peut contester," affirms the same critic, "que ses récits respirent la sincérité." <sup>2</sup>

Finally Montaigne, in a note written on the margin of his copy of the *Commentaries*, calls the author "le plus net, le plus disert, et le plus sincère historien qui fut jamais." <sup>3</sup> Perhaps we shall hit the exact truth if we add the comment of the Duc d'Aumale,—“le plus sincère de ceux qui ont écrit leur propre histoire.” <sup>4</sup>

NOTE.—The foregoing essay has dealt simply with the credibility of Caesar's *narrative*. The credibility of some of his statements about Druidism and the status of the Gallic *plebs*, in regard to which it has been alleged that he erred from defective information, will be dealt with in subsequent articles. See pp. 532-47.

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, t. XL., 1858, p. 121.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, p. 119.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, p. 118.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*

## SECTION II.—THE PEOPLE

### THE ETHNOLOGY OF GAUL

#### I

#### INTRODUCTION

"GAUL, taken as a whole, is divided into three parts, one of which is inhabited by the Belgae, another by the Aquitani, and the third by a people who call themselves 'Celtae,' and whom we call 'Galli.' These peoples differ from one another in language, institutions and laws. The Galli are separated from the Aquitani by the Garonne, and from the Belgae by the Marne and the Seine." With these words Caesar begins his narrative of the Gallic war; and every schoolboy, not only in Macaulay's but in a literal sense, is familiar with them. But Caesar was not an ethnologist. It was not his business to ask himself or to inform his readers whether the Belgae, the Celtae and the Aquitani were homogeneous groups, or whether each group was an aggregate or a mixture of different races. It was enough for him that there were three groups, and that they were, for all practical purposes, distinct. We all know that the populations of England and Scotland, Ireland and Wales, are each composed of various races, not one of which has remained pure: but for the purposes of daily life we speak of Englishmen and Scotchmen and Irish and Welsh.

Nevertheless, the problems which Caesar, as a writer of military memoirs, had no call to solve, and indeed no means of solving, are full of interest; and a modern historian of the conquest of Gaul is bound to grapple with them.

At the very outset of our enquiry we are confronted by a difficulty. Caesar tells us that the Gauls,—and by the Gauls he means the Belgae and the Celtae,—were big men.<sup>1</sup> Every other ancient writer who describes the physical features of the Gauls says the same; and some add that they had fair hair and blue eyes. But when we travel in France, we find that tall fair-haired men, though not uncommon in the north and north-east, are everywhere in a minority; and that, in certain districts, nearly every one is short and dark. Anthropologists assure us that the contrast between the physical features which we see

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 30, § 4.



and those of which we read cannot be ascribed, except in a limited sense, to the influence of climate or of physical environment.<sup>1</sup> History tells us that, since Caesar's time, the majority of the invaders and immigrants who have settled in those parts of France which were inhabited by the Belgae and the Celtae have belonged to the Teutonic race, that is to say to a race of which the prevailing type was, like that of the Gauls of history, tall and fair. The conclusion is irresistible. Besides the Gallic warriors, who seemed so tall to the sturdy little legionaries, and whose red hair and fair skins attracted the attention of travellers who belonged to a swarthier race, there must have been a short dark people, who passed comparatively unnoticed; and a third type had doubtless already developed itself from intermarriage between the two. These main conclusions, as we shall presently see, history, archæology and anthropology alike confirm.

Nevertheless, it is certain that, in Caesar's time, the tall fair men were more numerous in proportion to the whole population than they are at present. No modern invader could possibly describe the population of France as he and other ancient writers described the population of Gaul. We should expect, then, to find not only that the tall fair inhabitants were proportionally more numerous than they are now, but that, instead of being scattered among people of different types, they were, so to speak, grouped in masses, so as to leave a sharper impression upon the mind. Now, it is probable that the people of whom Caesar took special note, and whose physical features he described, were those with whom he was chiefly thrown in contact, that is to say the warrior class; and we may therefore conclude that the tall fair race formed originally a conquering caste. On the other hand, it is not necessary to suppose that the armies which he encountered were composed exclusively, or even principally, of tall fair men; for the experience of anthropologists has shown that, when untrained observers enter a strange country, they take special note of the individuals whose physical features leave the deepest impression upon their minds, and ignore the rest.<sup>2</sup> Thus a modern English traveller hastily remarks that Frenchmen are dark, that Germans are fair, and that Scotsmen have high cheek bones and red beards; while a trained observer, having carefully written down all the observations that he has been able to make, reports that a considerable proportion of Frenchmen are fair, that the fair Germans

<sup>1</sup> M. Topinard holds that, generally speaking, "les grandes tailles sont la conséquence d'une hérédité de race, qui peut être légèrement modifiée par les milieux." Stature is, as M. Mondière has shown, undoubtedly influenced to some extent by social conditions: the average height of males of the well-to-do classes in America was said, in 1883, to be 5 feet 9½ inches, of the proletariat 5 feet 6½ inches. *Dict. des sciences anthropologiques*, 1883, p. 1035. See also *Mém. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, ii., 1865, pp. 232-3; *Ib.*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. i., 1895, p. 89; and *Rev. mensuelle de l'École d'anthr. de Paris*, 1896, pp. 51-6.

<sup>2</sup> "Worsae," says Dr. Beidoe, "coming from Denmark, where black hair is rare, talks of the dark hair of the southern English, while Frenchmen almost always think and speak of us as a blond-haired people." *Journal of the Anthr. Inst. of Great Britain*, etc., ii., 1873, p. 19. See also Beidoe's *The Races of Britain*, 1885, p. 244, and Thurnam and Davis, *Crania Britannica*, 1856, pp. 163, 207.

are in a minority,<sup>1</sup> and that in certain districts the majority of Scotsmen are dark. Again, to the eye of the ordinary European observer all Chinamen are alike; whereas they really differ from one another as much as Englishmen. Considerations like these explain the inaccuracy of Caesar's rough report. But how are we to account for the fact, if it is a fact, that the proportion of tall fair men among the population of ancient Gaul was greater than the proportion of tall fair men among the population of modern France? First of all, it must be remembered that a great many Gauls perished in Caesar's wars or were sold into slavery; and it is probable that of those who were thus lost to the country a number disproportionately large belonged to the race by whose great stature he was so impressed. Secondly, it is certain that, except in cold and comparatively cold climates, the tall fair type is less successful in the struggle for existence than the dark. Thirdly, it is believed by Dr. Beddoe that the tall fair type is less able to resist the unsanitary conditions of crowded cities than the dark. Fourthly, it is suggested by the same authority that the proportion of fair men in France, as well as in other countries of Europe, may have been diminished by the influence of what he calls conjugal selection; in other words, his researches have led him to believe that the proportion of dark women who are married is greater than the proportion of fair women. Fifthly, in families of which one parent is dark and the other fair, the proportion of dark children is generally greater than the proportion of fair.<sup>2</sup> In a word, there can be little doubt that, since the time of Caesar, the dark type in the country which was once called Gaul has been steadily gaining ground upon the fair.

The questions which I propose to ask myself are these:—First, what were the ethnic elements of the prehistoric population of Gaul? Secondly, whether the Iberians were, in any sense of the word, a race: if so, whether they are now represented by the Basques; and what portion of Gaul they occupied? Thirdly, what was the physical type of the Ligurians, and what portion of Gaul did they occupy? Fourthly, who were the Aquitani? Fifthly, who were the Celtae? Sixthly, who were the Belgae? Lastly, were the Gauls, properly so called, whether Belgic or Celtic,—the tall fair conquerors, whose physical features are described by ancient historians and geographers,—ethnically identical with or akin to the Germans?

It would be interesting also to attempt to trace the evolution of culture among the peoples who inhabited Gaul from the dawn of the enormously remote paleolithic age, and perhaps even earlier, down to the commencement of the historical period. But to do this would be irrelevant to my purpose, which is and ought to be simply to ascertain what were the constituent parts of the heterogeneous population which

<sup>1</sup> Virchow reports that of 5,000,000 German school children, 33 % were found to be blond, 13 % brunets, and 54 % of mixed type. *Congrès international d'anthr. et d'arch. préhistoriques*, 1876 (1877), p. 579.

<sup>2</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, ii., 1861, p. 408; *Anthropological Review*, i., 1863, pp. 311-12; *Diet. encyclopédique des sciences médicales*, xiii., 1873, p. 766; *Scottish Review*, xix., 1892, p. 418.

inhabited Gaul in Caesar's time; and I need only recommend those who desire information upon the subject to which I have referred, to read, in a critical spirit, the series of volumes which M. Alexandre Bertrand has published under the common title of *Nos origines*.

The subject of the ethnology of Gaul is one of great difficulty. The literature is vast in amount, and the greater portion is scattered in the periodical publications of learned societies. In spite of the enormous labour which has been expended in collecting facts, the facts are insufficient; and regarding the conclusions which are to be drawn from them, there is much difference of opinion. But this is not all. The student is constantly encountering the word "Celt"; and this word is used in so many different senses that he is obliged to exercise unflagging vigilance to avoid being misled. Before he began his studies, he had taken for granted that Irishmen and Welshmen and Scottish Highlanders were Celts. As his reading becomes more extensive, he learns that Celtic dialects are spoken by peoples of divers physical types; that the word "Celt," as used by certain ancient writers, was hardly less vague than "American" or "Indian"; that Polybius and others used it as a synonym for "Gaul"; that Caesar, while remarking that the people of Transalpine Gaul who called themselves "Celts" were called by the Romans "Gauls," applied the former term only to a section of the population of Gaul, and not to the Belgae, who also spoke a Celtic language, and whom he also called Gauls; and that, even after his time, a Greek historian<sup>1</sup> spoke of the Germans as Celts. Next he finds that, according to certain French ethnologists, there have never been any Celts in the British Isles; that the word "Celtic," as applied to the dialects in question, is a misnomer; and that Caesar's *Celtae*, the people who lived between the Seine and the Garonne and were not a pure race at all, were the only true Celts. Finally, he is warned to purge his mind of the notion that there has ever been, at least within historic times, a pure Celtic race, in the biological sense of the word "race," or indeed any other pure race at all; and he is solemnly assured, by a respectable authority,<sup>2</sup> that "the word 'Kelt' has long ceased to have any ethnical significance." But if the perplexed student has the patience to reconsider these theories without bias, he will gradually discover that there is more of agreement among them than he had at first supposed, and that the disagreement is about words as much as about things; and if he has the courage to collect and sift all the facts that have been discovered, he will find that the data, though not sufficient for the solution of all the problems which confront him, are yet sufficient to establish important conclusions.

But the problems cannot even be approached until one has collated evidence drawn from every available source. Historians have marshalled every ancient text which bears upon the subject, and have offered solutions which Celtic scholars and anthropologists have contemptuously rejected. Celtic scholars have propounded theories which other Celtic

<sup>1</sup> Dion Cassius.

<sup>2</sup> A. H. Keane, *Ethnology*, 2nd ed., 1896, p. 397.

scholars have refused to accept. Anthropologists, travelling, notebook in hand, from department to department and from town to town, climbing mountains and descending into plains, have jotted down and tabulated the physical characteristics of the unheeding individuals whom they passed: others have explored caves and groped in barrows, collected skulls, measured them, and referred them to various types; others again have recorded the stature and examined the heads of groups of living men;<sup>1</sup> and all these observers have been told that their data are insufficient and their generalisations premature. The enquirer who is resolved to succeed will press into his service every science that bears upon his subject. He will bear in mind that the historians and geographers of antiquity were fallible; that some of them wrote at second-hand; and that they were not trained in the exact methods of a scientific age: that the philological conclusions of one decade are often questioned, if not disproved, in the next; and that anthropology is a science which has hardly outgrown its infancy. On the other hand, he will remember that scepticism has its dangers as well as credulity: he will find that, side by side with much that is uncertain, there are masses of facts established as securely as the conclusions of Kepler and Newton; and he will gather in the testimony of geographer, historian, philologist and craniologist with an open and yet guarded mind.

Anthropologists are obliged to make use of technical terms, more or less uncouth; and they are guided in their observations by very precise and minute rules, framed with the object of eliminating, as far as possible, the chance of error. But it is unnecessary for my purpose to trouble the reader with more than a few of these things. What I shall have to say about stature, complexion, hair and eyes, will need no explanation; and in regard to the skull I shall, as a rule, only have to deal with that measurement which fixes the proportion between its length and its breadth. In this measurement the length is represented by 100; and the proportion which the breadth bears to the length is called the cephalic index. Thus, if the breadth is four-fifths of the length, the index is 80. According to the system formulated by the great French anthropologist, Paul Broca,<sup>2</sup> skulls are grouped, according to their cephalic index, in five classes. Skulls whose index exceeds 83·33 are brachycephalic; those whose index falls between 83·33 and 80 are sub-brachycephalic; those between 80 and 77·77 mesocephalic; those between 77·77 and 75 sub-dolichocephalic; and those below 75 dolichocephalic. It will be understood that a head which is actually long may be brachycephalic, if it is broad in proportion to its length; and that a head which is actually short may be dolichocephalic, if it is long in proportion to its breadth. Moreover, it is necessary to bear in mind that measurements of living heads invariably yield a higher cephalic index,—the average difference being as much as 2,—than

<sup>1</sup> It has been proved that, among all races, the shape of the head, the colour and texture of the hair, and, in a less degree, stature are persistent characters. See Keane, *Ethnology*, pp. 174, 5, 178.

<sup>2</sup> *Mém. d'anthropologie*, iv., 1883, p. 243.

those of skulls.<sup>1</sup> Another important character of the skull or head is *gnathism*, that is to say, the degree of projection of the upper jaw. The word *orthognathous* denotes that this projection is comparatively slight ; for, as Professor A. H. Keane observes,<sup>2</sup> "absolute orthognathism does not exist. All races are more or less prognathous." The remaining technical terms which it is necessary for general readers to understand are those which describe the structure of the nasal skeleton. *Platyrrhinian* means that it is wide, *mesorrhinian* intermediate, and *leptorrhinian* narrow.

## II

### THE PREHISTORIC RACES

Some ethnologists believe that man existed in Gaul in the tertiary period : but of this there is no conclusive evidence, although de Quatrefages remarked of certain implements which were discovered at Puy-Courny, near Aurillac, that "had they been found in quaternary beds, no one would have hesitated to regard them as intentionally carved."<sup>3</sup> What is certain is that there were men in Gaul in the quaternary epoch ; and even that is incalculably remote. The oldest skulls of which we have any knowledge are called after a specimen which was discovered more than 40 years ago, in the valley of the Neander, in Rhenish Prussia. They are dolichocephalic ; and the people to whom they belonged had low foreheads and huge frowning brows. This people, which lived in the palæolithic age, appears to have occupied a tract extending from the Upper Danube and the valley of the Rhine as far westward as Auvergne.<sup>4</sup> A skull belonging to a later period has been found at Cro-Magnon in Perigord. The skulls of this type too are dolichocephalic : but the foreheads are well developed and quite distinct from those of the Neanderthal type. The skeletons found with these skulls show that the Cro-Magnon race were tall. Their habitat comprised the valleys of the Vézère, the Tarn, the Aveyron, the Saône and the Meuse, and also the coasts of Pas-de-Calais.<sup>5</sup> They are now generally believed to have

<sup>1</sup> Professor W. Z. Ripley, however, thinks that the difference is nearer 1·5 than 2. *L'Anthropologie*, vii., 1896, pp. 516-19.

<sup>2</sup> *Ethnology*, p. 182.

<sup>3</sup> See de Quatrefages, *Hist. gén. des races humaines*, 1887, p. 93 ; *La France préhistorique*, 1889, pp. 35-7, by E. Cartailhac ; *Dict. des sciences anthropologiques*, p. 499 ; A. Bertrand, *La Gaule avant les Gaulois*, 1891, pp. 31-52 ; and A. H. Keane, *Ethnology*, pp. 32, 91-2.

<sup>4</sup> *Dict. des sc. anthr.*, p. 501. "Les caractères si tranchés," says M. P. Salmon, "du crâne de Néanderthal se retrouvent sur tous ceux de l'époque quaternaire, mais ils vont en s'atténuant graduellement, de telle sorte que le dernier d'entre eux, le crâne de Laugerie-Basse, qui est magdalénien, présente une forme manifeste de transition entre le type des premiers temps du quaternaire et ceux de Cro-Magnon." *L'Age de la Pierre*, 1889, p. 62.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.* ; Cartailhac, *La France préhist.*, p. 331.

entered Gaul at the beginning of the neolithic age: but some ethnologists still regard them as a late palæolithic race.<sup>1</sup>

In the cavern of l'Homme Mort, in the department of Lozère, 15 skeletons have been discovered, which belonged to a small, long-headed, neolithic people, with oval faces and weak features. The tallest of the 15 measured only a little more than 5 feet 5 inches, while the average height was 5 feet 3½ inches. The mean cephalic index was 73·22, only ·12 more than that of the Cro-Magnon skull, and, like it and the well-known skulls of the British long barrows, orthognathous. These people were more dolichocephalic than any other people, ancient or modern, in France, except those of Cro-Magnon. In the same district mixed skulls, dolichocephalic, mesocephalic, and sub-brachycephalic, have been found in dolmens, along with implements of bronze. De Quatrefages infers from this that the small long-headed people were conquered by a broad-headed race, who mingled with them. He and Broca also hold that the people of l'Homme Mort, notwithstanding their great inferiority of stature, were akin to those of Cro-Magnon, and belonged to a race which once occupied northern Africa, and thence spread over southern Europe, France and Great Britain. Men of the same small long-headed type dwelt as far north as in the department of Oise. In fact, the great majority of the older skulls of the neolithic age which have been found in France are dolichocephalic.<sup>2</sup>

Dr. Thurnam also identifies a dolichocephalic people whose skulls have been found in a chambered *tumulus* at Fontenay with the Long-Barrow race of Britain: but the greatest height of the former was 5 feet 1 inch, and the average height of the latter 5 feet 5 inches; and Thurnam himself insists on the marked difference between the average height of the Long-Barrow race and that of the Round-Barrow race, which was 5 feet 8½ inches.<sup>3</sup> Long skulls of the so-called Iberian type, that is to say resembling those of l'Homme Mort, have been found in Belgium, along with flint implements and pottery.<sup>4</sup>

By the time when the great quaternary animals had disappeared, races, both in France and Belgium, were already largely mixed, and new races had appeared. At Grenelle, near Paris, above skulls of the Cro-Magnon type, a series of skeletons has been discovered, which show a mean stature of 5 feet 3½ inches and a mean cephalic index of 83·6, that is to say virtually brachycephalic. These skulls are likened by de Quatrefages and Hamy to those found in the round barrows at Stonehenge, although the latter belonged to a people at least 5 inches taller.<sup>5</sup> In a cave called the Trou-Rosette near Furfooz, in the valley

<sup>1</sup> Keane's *Ethnology*, p. 149.

<sup>2</sup> *Congrès international d'anthr. et d'arch. préhist.*, 1867 (1868), p. 375; *Ib.*, 1872 (1873), p. 196; *Ib.*, 1880 (1884), pp. 204-5; *Rev. d'anthr.*, ii., 1873, pp. 1-53; *Crania Ethnica*, pp. 93-4; *Fortnightly Review*, xvi., 1874, pp. 335-6; Keane's *Ethnology*, pp. 149-50; *L'Anthropologie*, vii., 1896, pp. 349-50; and G. Sergi in *Centralblatt für Anthropologie, Ethnologie und Urgeschichte*, i., 1896, pp. 5-8.

<sup>3</sup> *Memoirs read before the Anthr. Soc. of London*, i., 1865, p. 160.

<sup>4</sup> *Fortnightly Review*, xvi., 1874, p. 336.

<sup>5</sup> *Crania Ethnica*, p. 144; *L'Anthropologie*, t. v., 1894, p. 63.

of the Lesse, which flows into the Meuse near Belgium, skulls have been found with an index of 86·1; and in a neighbouring cave called the Trou de Frontal others with a mean index of 80·35. The mean stature of the former group was 5 feet 2 inches; of the latter only 5 feet. The Trou-Rosette skulls resemble those of the Lapps; the Trou de Frontal those of the Finns. In a cave at Sclaigneaux, near Namur, a number of mesocephalic and brachycephalic skulls have been found, with indices ranging between 81 and 88. They were accompanied by implements belonging to the late period of the neolithic age, and have some resemblance to our own Round-Barrow skulls. The Grenelle, Trou-Rosette, Trou de Frontal and Sclaigneaux races are regarded by M. Hervé as one. That is to say, he holds that, strictly speaking, there was but one neolithic broad-headed race, and that the various sub-brachycephalic and mesocephalic skulls, which are often assigned to distinct races, were the result of crossing. On the other hand, M. de Baye is said to have found "three quite distinct types" in the neolithic caves of the Marne basin.<sup>1</sup>

In a tumulus, apparently of the neolithic age, on Cape Blanc Nez, at Escalles, in the department of Pas de Calais, a dolichocephalic skull has been found of a type widely different from the skulls of l'Homme Mort. The index is only 71·9; the skull has a strongly-marked occipital protuberance, a projecting chin, and prominent supraciliary ridges.<sup>2</sup> In fact, tall dolichocephalic people undoubtedly existed in northern France in the neolithic age; and long skulls have been found in French dolmens, which are generally believed to have belonged to an early wave of blond conquerors like the Tamahn,<sup>3</sup>—the fair dolichocephalic race, whose features are portrayed on the Egyptian wall-paintings which were executed about 1500 B.C. Dr. Lagneau, however, appears to think that these invaders were the earliest immigrants of the Gallic race, properly so called.<sup>4</sup>

Setting aside the dolmen-builders and the denizen of Cape Blanc Nez, the peoples of whom I have just spoken are classed by the well-known archaeologist, M. Alexander Bertrand,<sup>5</sup> as "les troglodytes,"—the dwellers in caves. The people who buried their dead in dolmens appeared in Gaul at a later date. It is true that most of the implements which the dolmens contained are of stone: but in some few bronze was found as well. M. Bertrand has published a map,<sup>6</sup> showing the distribution of the dolmens of northern and central Europe. They are scattered over the greater part of Gaul, and are also found in Scandinavia, Denmark, northern Germany and the British Isles: but it is important to note that in Gaul none are found on the east of the line formed by the Jura and the Vosges. The impression, says M. Bertrand, left on

<sup>1</sup> *Crania Ethnica*, pp. 105, 129; *Congrès international d'anthr. et d'arch. préhist.*, 1872 (1873), pp. 567-8; Beddoe, *The Races of Britain*, p. 42; de Quatrefages, *Hist. gén. des races humaines*, 1889, p. 441; Keane's *Ethnology*, p. 377; *Dict. des sc. anthr.*, pp. 501-2; *Rev. mensuelle de l'École d'anthr. de Paris*, 1896, p. 99.

<sup>2</sup> *Congrès intern. d'anthr. et d'arch. préhist.*, 1872 (1873), p. 308; *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. xi., 1876, pp. 140-41.

<sup>3</sup> Beddoe, *The Races of Britain*, p. 14.

<sup>4</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, xi., 1876, pp. 140-41; *Ib.*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. i., 1878, p. 393.

<sup>5</sup> *Rev. d'anthropologie*, t. ii., 1873, pp. 631-7.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, facing p. 631.

our minds by their distribution is that the people who built them came from the north; and accordingly he concludes that they contain the remains of a people of whom *history* tells us nothing.<sup>1</sup> That they did not come from the east is certain, for there are no dolmens in central Germany: but some writers, pointing to the dolmens which have been found in northern Africa and in Portugal, infer that those which exist in Gaul were erected by the Tamahu.<sup>2</sup> The truth would appear to be that no one dolmen-building race ever existed. Skeletons of widely different types have been found in the dolmens of France; and it is probable that some of the people who erected them came from northern Europe, and others from Africa.<sup>3</sup>

In Switzerland skulls of various types have been found. MM. His and Rutimeyer reckoned four. Two, the Hohberg and Belair, are Germanic, of a date later than Caesar's conquest, and may therefore be set aside. The well-known Sion type, which is believed by His and Rutimeyer to be that of Caesar's Helvetii,<sup>4</sup> resembles that of the British round barrows. The fourth, the Disentis type, is very short and broad, having a mean index of 86·5. Dr. Beddoe regards it as a variety of the brachycephalic type, which, as we shall afterwards see, is still prevalent in central France.<sup>5</sup>

What we know about the prehistoric races of Gaul amounts to this. There is evidence, which cannot be ignored, but which has not won general acceptance, that beings sufficiently intelligent to fashion rude stone implements existed in the tertiary epoch. The races whose existence is certain fall into at least three main groups,—the palæolithic people of the Neanderthal type, the short dolichocephalic people of l'Homme Mort, and the short brachycephalic people of the later neolithic age. Such discoveries as that which has been made on Cape Blanc Nez appear to suggest that there may have been another. Throughout the whole of the palæolithic, and the earlier part of the neolithic age<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. d'anthropologie*, t. ii., 1873, p. 630. See also the same writer's *La religion des Gaulois*, 1897, p. 6, where he conjecturally identifies the dolmen-builders with the Ligurians.

<sup>2</sup> Broca, who believed that the Tamahu were akin to the tall fair Gauls and were the first to introduce the Celtic language into Gaul, insisted that no anthropologist would allow that they came from Africa. "L'usage," he affirmed, "des sépultures mégalithiques et le type blond ont été l'un et l'autre importé d'Europe en Afrique" (*Rev. d'anthr.*, ii., 1873, pp. 593-5). It may, I think, be said that, if he had lived a few years longer, he would have seen reason to modify his views. Professor Keane and others have shown good grounds for believing that "after the last ice-age Europe was re-settled from two different quarters, the east and the south or south-east." See Keane's *Ethnology*, pp. 113-5, 125-6, 135-6, 374-6, 381-5.

<sup>3</sup> See Keane's *Ethnology*, pp. 135-6; *Congrès international d'anthr. et d'arch. préhist.*, 1874 (1876), pp. 252-9; *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. xxix., 1875, pp. 52-7; and *Dict. des sc. anthr.*, pp. 387-8. Steenstrup (*L'Anthropologie*, v., 1894, p. 63) identifies the brachycephalic people whose remains have been found in French dolmens with the Lapps.

<sup>4</sup> See, however, pp. 296, 308, *infra*. <sup>5</sup> *Scottish Review*, xxi., 1893, pp. 168-9.

<sup>6</sup> Of course it is quite probable that, while Gaul was still in the palæolithic age, more favoured countries had reached a higher standard of culture; and even in Gaul it is not unlikely that, in different tracts, the palæolithic and the early neolithic age were synchronous. See Keane's *Ethnology*, p. 117.



dolichocephaly was universal: but afterwards, in certain districts, broad skulls were far more numerous than narrow.<sup>1</sup> Whether the race of l'Homme Mort was really affiliated to that of Cro-Magnon; whether the latter was identical with the Tamahu; whether the Sclaigneaux skulls belonged to a separate race, identical with the Round-Barrow people of our own island; whether the various brachycephalic and mesocephalic types of skull represent distinct races, or only varieties due to miscegenation,—these are questions which may never be settled, and which do not greatly matter. But that the three, or, if we distinguish the l'Homme Mort from the Cro-Magnon, four genuine races to which I have alluded, were all represented, more or less, in the peoples whom Caesar called "Galli," is a conclusion not only suggested by common sense, but proved by irrefragable evidence. The proof, in so far as the neolithic races are concerned, will be given in the subsequent sections of this essay. As to the palæolithic race, unless it died out or was exterminated, it must have left descendants;<sup>2</sup> and Dr. Beddoe<sup>3</sup> has borne witness, from personal observation, to the survival, in our own day, of the type of Neanderthal.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Keane's *Ethnology*, pp. 149-50. M. G. de Lapouge (*L'Anthropologie*, iv., 1893, pp. 759-60) affirms that no genuine brachycephalic skulls,—that is to say skulls whose indices exceed 83.33,—belonging to the neolithic age have been found in the south of France.

<sup>2</sup> M. Ph. Salmon (*Dict. des sc. anthr.*, p. 805) believes that there was no hiatus between the palæolithic and neolithic races in Gaul; and his conclusion has recently been confirmed. See *Athenæum*, Jan. 14, 1899.

<sup>3</sup> *Scottish Review*, xx., 1892, pp. 148, 152-3.

<sup>4</sup> Canon Isaac Taylor, after remarking that "in Caesar's time there were in Gaul three races,—the Aquitanians, the Celts and the Belgæ,"—goes on to say that "in the neolithic tombs of Europe the remains of these races can be traced." He assumes that the Aquitanians belonged to the "Iberian type,—that of the race de l'Homme Mort"; that the Celtæ belonged to the Fuffooz type; and that the Belgæ belonged to the Sclaigneaux type. Then, giving reasons for believing that "the people of the Lesse were unable to pass the line of the Sambre and Meuse," he argues that "in the early neolithic age the Auvergnat race (by which he means that of the Celtæ) was pressed back by a more powerful northern people who, we may conjecture, were the ancestors of the Belgic Gauls" (*The Origin of the Aryans*, pp. 66, 113, 115, 118-9).

Canon Taylor's assertions are misleading where they are not positively questionable. He speaks as though the Aquitanians, the Celtæ and the Belgæ were each identical with one of three races whose remains have been found in neolithic tombs. He knows of course as well as any one else that the Aquitanians, the Celtæ and the Belgæ were not races at all in the anthropological sense but mixtures of races; and, as I shall hereafter show, it is certain that a minority only of the Aquitanians belonged to what ethnologists call the Iberian type. As to the Belgæ, there is no certainty, there is no evidence, that the conquering race of that name, when they arrived in Gaul, were in the neolithic age at all, much less that they belonged to the Sclaigneaux type. Most French anthropologists differ absolutely from Canon Taylor, and identify them with "the Hallstadt race," whose remains have been found in *tumuli* and cemeteries of the iron age in various parts of France. Canon Taylor makes the astounding assertion (*ib.*, p. 70) that "the broad-headed neolithic race of Belgium and north-eastern France, who undoubtedly spoke a Celtic language . . . are designated by Broca as the Kymry." The truth is that Broca (see pp. 287-9, *infra*) identifies the "Kymry" not with a broad-headed, but with a narrow-headed race; nor is there any evidence that any neolithic people, either of Belgium or of France, spoke Celtic in any form. Moreover, Canon Taylor

## III

## THE IBERIANS

1. The "Iberian Question" is the most complicated and difficult of all the problems of Gallic ethnology. The word "Iberian" is used by different writers in different senses; and unless one can rely upon being followed with close attention as well as quick intelligence, one is occasionally obliged to pause and explain which of these senses is meant.

2. According to Festus Avienus,<sup>1</sup> whose *Ora maritima* was based upon a Greek *Periplus*, or "description of a coasting voyage" of the sixth century B.C., compiled from the reports of Phœnician sailors who had visited Spain,<sup>2</sup> the Iberians occupied the north-eastern part of the peninsula and the coast of the Mediterranean between the Pyrenees and the Rhône. Herodorus of Heraclea, who wrote in the fifth century B.C., appears to regard the Cynetes, who lived near Cape St. Vincent, as the most remote of the Iberian peoples; and he too makes their territory extend eastward as far as the Rhône.<sup>3</sup> Scylax, whose *Periplus* is generally referred to the middle of the fourth century B.C.,<sup>4</sup> gives them the country between the Rhône and the Straits of Gibraltar, though he tells us that, along the coast of Gaul, west of the Rhône, Ligurians were mingled with Iberians.<sup>5</sup> Scymnus of Chios, who wrote about 90 B.C., locates the Iberians between the Rhône and the country of the Tartessi, which was north of Gibraltar and in the lower valley of the Guadalquivir.<sup>6</sup> Priscian also apparently distinguishes the Iberians from the Tartessi;<sup>7</sup> while Herodorus includes the latter among the Iberian tribes. Eratosthenes, whose views on geography are severely criticised by Strabo, describes the Spanish peninsula as "the Ligurian" (Λιγυρική), and in another place as "that to which Iberia belongs."<sup>8</sup> Strabo tells us that the writers of his day (about 19 B.C.) restricted the name *Iberia* to the Spanish peninsula, but that it had formerly been applied also to the country between the Pyrenees and the Rhône; and he appears to affirm that the name was once confined to the eastern part of the peninsula, north of the Ebro.<sup>9</sup> He also remarks<sup>10</sup> that the people of Aquitania spoke a language akin to that of the Iberians, and resembled them rather than the Gauls in appearance. Finally Tacitus<sup>11</sup> remarks that the Silurians ignore the striking difference, to which he elsewhere (pp. 116-7) himself calls attention, between the Trou-Rosette and Trou-de-Frontal skulls, and assumes that the races from which he asserts that the Aquitanians, the Celtae and the Belgae were descended, were three and three only.

<sup>1</sup> *Ora maritima*, 249-53, 608-10.

<sup>2</sup> E. Hübner, *Monumenta linguae ibericae*, 1893, p. xxvi.; H. d'A. de Jubainville, *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, i., 1889, p. 28.

<sup>3</sup> *Fragm. hist. graec.*, ed. Didot, ii. 34, fragm. 20.

<sup>4</sup> See Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 31, and Müller, *Prolegomena to Geogr. graec. min.*, Didot, pp. xxx.-li.

<sup>5</sup> *Geogr. graec. min.*, ed. Didot, i. 15-17.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, i. 203-4, vv. 198-202.

<sup>7</sup> Strabo, *Geogr.*, ii. 1, § 40, 4, § 8.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, iii. 1, § 6.

<sup>9</sup> *Ib.*, i. 193.

<sup>10</sup> *Ib.*, iii. 4, § 19.

<sup>11</sup> *Agricola*, 11.

of South Wales, who were dark and had curly hair, resembled the Iberians.

The conclusions which I draw from the foregoing items of evidence are these. The name "Iberian" was probably applied, in the first instance, only to the people who dwelt between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, though other people of the same race dwelt elsewhere. The Iberians once occupied the seaboard of Gaul between the Rhône and the Pyrenees: but Ligurians afterwards encroached upon this part of their territory. They also probably occupied the greater part of the Spanish peninsula, before it was invaded by the Celts, the Ligurians and other peoples; for, if some writers make Gibraltar their limit, and another Cape St. Vincent, those writers had little or no knowledge of the interior or of the remoter coast.

3. In spite of the coldness or positive hostility with which it has been received by Basque scholars, the theory regarding the Iberians which still dominates the popular imagination is that with which Humboldt,<sup>1</sup> three-quarters of a century ago, electrified the learned world. The great German scholar collected from the itineraries and the works of the ancient geographers all the names of towns, mountains and the like belonging to the Spanish peninsula and southern France: he succeeded, as he thought, in proving that many of these names can be explained from the Basque language, and that some of them are analogous to modern names of places in the districts in which Basque is spoken; and he concluded that the whole peninsula, except those tracts in which Celts settled, and the adjacent part of France had formerly been occupied by a people who spoke one language or various closely allied dialects, the modern representative of which is Basque, and that this was the language of the Iberians.

Now some of those writers who accept Humboldt's theory are either ignorant of or ignore the severe criticisms which modern scholars have directed against it. The author of the article *Iberia*, for instance, in Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography*, the last edition of which was published after MM. Grashin and Bladé had brought out their attempted refutations of Humboldt's theory, after MM. Vinson and Van Eys had written various articles bearing upon the same subject, and after Broca and other anthropologists had pointed out the great physical differences between the French and the Spanish Basques, committed himself to the assertion that "the Basques are now admitted on all hands to be the lineal descendants of the old Iberians." All modern scholars are agreed that Humboldt's knowledge of Basque was inadequate,<sup>2</sup> and that many of the etymological explanations which he gave were forced. M. Vinson, in 1870, admitted, on the other hand, that many of those explanations were convincing, and that it was possible, though not proved, that the Basque country "is the last refuge of the Euskarian peoples."<sup>3</sup> M. Van Eys also, in 1874, admitted that Basque

<sup>1</sup> *Prüfung der Untersuchungen über die Urbewohner Hispaniens mittelst vaskischen Sprache*, 1821.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. de linguistique*, t. iv., 1870, p. 58.

<sup>3</sup> *Id.*, pp. 58, 62.

might possibly be descended, more or less directly from Iberian.<sup>1</sup> But both M. Vinson and M. Van Eys now hold that "it is impossible to explain the ancient Iberian,"—by which they mean the language whose remains are preserved in the so-called Iberian inscriptions and the legends on the so-called Iberian coins,—“by means of Basque”;<sup>2</sup> and it is certain that neither the legends on the coins nor the inscriptions have yet been deciphered.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, an Austrian scholar, G. Phillips, Broca, M. Luchaire, Emile Desjardins and the great German epigraphist, Emil Hübner, accept the essential part of Humboldt's theory; that is to say, while admitting that Humboldt made mistakes in detail, they all hold that Basque is descended from the language, of which there were doubtless several dialects, spoken by the Iberians of Spain and southern France. “On the whole,” says Hübner,<sup>4</sup> “Humboldt succeeded, by a most lucid train of reasoning, in establishing what he had set himself to prove, that is to say that names of places and of men which are undoubtedly Iberian are to be explained from the language of the Basques.” I shall examine, in due course, the arguments upon which these conclusions are based. Before doing so, however, it will be necessary to advert to the theory to which M. J. F. Bladé, one of Humboldt's principal opponents, devoted a large part of his work on the origin of the Basques.<sup>5</sup>

M. Bladé's view was that the word “Iberia,” as applied to Spain, was “only a geographical term,” and that “no proper Iberian race ever existed.”<sup>6</sup> After reading M. Bladé's work, I was for some time in doubt as to whether it would not be irrelevant to the purpose of this essay to take cognisance of his theory; for, warning his readers not to strain his meaning, he says,<sup>7</sup> “J'admets, pour les temps antéhistoriques et pour l'antiquité, la prédominance en Espagne et dans la Gaule méridionale de la race brune, de médiocre stature, et aux cheveux frisés ou ondes, à laquelle les ethnologues donnent le nom d'ibérienne. . . . A cette race s'appliquent la plupart des indications fournies par les auteurs classiques sur les populations de l'Espagne et de Ligurie.” But, he goes on to say, the classical writers also applied the name of Iberians to people of a different physical type. Now the questions to which I want to find an answer are these. First, were the Iberians, in any accepted sense of the word, a race,—for instance, in the sense in which the term is applied to the Welsh,—or were they merely a heterogeneous aggregate of individuals, occupying a certain area? Secondly, what, if any, was their physical type? Thirdly, what was the area in Gaul which they occupied? In order to answer the first question, it will, I think, be necessary to take account of M. Bladé's work.

<sup>1</sup> *Ass" française pour l'avancement des sciences*, Lille, 1874, pp. 544-5.

<sup>2</sup> I. Taylor, *Origin of the Aryans*, p. 219.

<sup>3</sup> *Rev. de linguistique*, xxvii., 1894, pp. 252-3. Even E. Hübner, the learned editor of *Monumenta linguæ ibericæ*, “does not confess to even an inkling of the meaning of more than some half-a-dozen words.” See *Classical Review*, viii., 1894, pp. 357-9.

<sup>4</sup> *Monumenta linguæ ibericæ*, pp. xxiv.-xxv.

<sup>5</sup> *Études sur l'origine des Basques*, 1869. His criticism of Humboldt is contained in pp. 369-96.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, pp. ii. 156-7, 184.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, p. 155, n. 1.

4. M. Bladé's arguments may be thus summarised :—(α) speaking of the author of the *Periplus*, which is generally alluded to as that of Scylax, he observes that, in treating of Spain, he only mentions the Iberians, the river Iberus (Ebro), the Pillars of Hercules, Gades and Emporium. We may conclude, says M. Bladé, that the traveller from whom the author got his information only visited those four points in the peninsula. The author says that Emporium was a Massilian colony; and it is certain that Phoenicians had, before the publication of the *Periplus*, been settled for a long time at Gades and near the Pillars of Hercules. It follows that the traveller could only have seen the alleged Iberians at the mouth of the Iberus. "Everything," continues M. Bladé, "leads to the conclusion that the author of the *Periplus*, finding there people who were neither Phoenicians nor Greeks, believed himself to be face to face with the aborigines, and that, following the usage of the Greek writers, he called them Iberians, simply because they had settled on the banks of the Iberus." Probability becomes certainty when we find that the same writer called the people who dwelt near Il-Iberis (I copy M. Bladé's method of printing the word) Iberians, although Polybius, Diodorus Siculus and Strabo called them Celts.<sup>1</sup>

M. Bladé's notions of probability and certainty are remarkable. Granting that the traveller may only have visited the four places which are mentioned in the *Periplus*, the fact that Emporium was a Massilian colony and that Phoenicians had been settled at Gades and near the Pillars of Hercules does not prove that the surrounding districts were not occupied by Iberians. If a Chinese traveller sailing along the coast of Spain only visited the English settlement at Gibraltar, it would not be necessary to disbelieve him if he reported that in the neighbourhood of that settlement there lived a people called Spaniards. Very likely the name of the Iberians was derived from the river Iberus,<sup>2</sup> just as the name of the English is derived from the German tribe called Angles: but what then? Every name has a derivation of some sort; and the alleged derivation of the name "Iberian" does not prove that the people whom the Greeks called by that name were not practically homogeneous. The author of the *Periplus* did not invent that name; and doubtless he derived his information as to the habitat of that people from the Greek colonists of Emporium or from the Phoenician colonists of Gades or from both. If he called the people who lived near Illiberris Iberians, he was quite right; and if Polybius called them Celts, he was not wrong. For when Polybius wrote, Celts, as the evidence of nomenclature independently shows, had settled among the Iberians; and Polybius had as good a right to say that Celts occupied this part of Gaul as we have to say that Saxons occupied Britain in the fifth and

<sup>1</sup> *Études*, etc., pp. 131-8.

<sup>2</sup> M. d'Arbois de Jubainville (*Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, t. i., 1869, p. 58) remarks that the name "Iberians" was first borne by the people of the Iberian race who lived near the Ebro, just as those who lived near the Tartessus (Guadalquivir) were called Tartessi. "Quand," he adds, "le besoin s'est fait sentir d'un terme ethnographique pour désigner l'ensemble de la race, c'est celui d'Ibère qui a été adopté par les savants gens."

sixth centuries of our era, though they settled among a more numerous native population.

(b) The ancient geographers located in Spain three Iberias, "qui s'excluent réciproquement,"—those of Scylax and Polybius, Strabo and Festus Avienus. The Iberia of Scylax was confined to the southern and eastern parts of Spain. Polybius, who had himself travelled through Spain, distinctly says<sup>1</sup> that when the Romans first entered the country, the name "Iberia" was no longer given to the whole peninsula, but was confined to the part which extended along the Mediterranean as far as the Pillars of Hercules. Strabo says that in his time the whole peninsula was called Iberia; but the fact that he says that the country between the Ebro and the Pyrenees was inhabited by the Igetae, proves that it was not inhabited by the Iberians.<sup>2</sup>

Now, to begin with, it is not true that the Iberias of Scylax and Polybius, of Strabo and of Festus Avienus "s'excluent réciproquement," if we bear in mind the distinction which Strabo noted between the original and the later use of the word. The Iberias of Scylax and Polybius coincide: the tract which Strabo indicates as that which was, in the first instance, called Iberia, coincides with the Iberia of Festus Avienus.<sup>3</sup> If it comprised only the northern part of the Iberia of Scylax, that merely proves that the name "Iberia" was not, *in the first instance*, given to the whole country occupied by the people who belonged to the same race as those who were first designated as Iberians. Moreover, M. Bladé makes the mistake of confusing between the words *Iberia* and *Iberi*.<sup>4</sup> It is true that Strabo called the whole peninsula Iberia: but that does not prove that, among the peoples which inhabited the peninsula, one was not Iberian, properly so called. The argument which M. Bladé bases upon Strabo's mention of the Igetae is valueless, because, as Herodorus pointed out, the Iberians comprised various tribes, each of which had its own name. The fact that Caesar says that Alesia was inhabited by the Mandubii does not prove that the Mandubii were not Celtae.

(c) Festus Avienus distinctly says that, according to many authorities, the Iberians derived their name from the river Iberus.<sup>5</sup>

Undoubtedly: but, as I have already shown, the fact lends no support to M. Bladé's argument.

(d) Spain was occupied by more than 500 peoples, each having a name of its own, many of whom were of Phoenician, Celtic or Greek origin, while not one "est connu sous le nom d'Ibères." "What more," asks M. Bladé, "is required to prove that Iberia, as a national denomination, does not correspond with any part of the Spanish territory?"<sup>6</sup>

The fact needs no proof. "Iberia" was not a national, but a terri-

<sup>1</sup> iii. 37.

<sup>2</sup> *Études*, etc., pp. 135-7.

<sup>3</sup> See H. d'A. de Jubainville, *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, i., 1889, p. 28.

<sup>4</sup> "On doit distinguer," says M. Desjardins, "avec le plus grand soin, surtout chez les écrivains grecs, le mot *Ibérie*, employé pour désigner simplement l'Espagne, du nom ethnographique *Iberi*, *Iberes*, servant à désigner les peuples de la race ibérienne." *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 46.

<sup>5</sup> *Ora maritima*, 249-53; *Études*, etc., p. 137.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 137-8.

torial denomination. Admit that Spain was "occupied by more than 500 peoples," not one of which "est connu sous le nom d'Ibères." But what if it was? Aquitania was occupied by a good many peoples, not one of which was called Aquitani: but they were all collectively called Aquitani; and though they were not of course homogeneous, they were differentiated by certain features from the Celtae and from the Belgae, each of which peoples was also split up into many groups. Herodorus,<sup>1</sup> as I have already remarked, expressly says that the Iberians were split up into different groups, each having its own name: but they were collectively known as Iberians.

(e) The true primitive name of Spain was not Iberia, but Hispania.<sup>2</sup>

Was it? I cannot say; and it does not matter. The Greek geographers and historians called it Iberia: but whatever its primitive name may have been, a large part of it was inhabited by a people whom Greeks and Romans alike called Iberians.

(f) Strabo implies that the Turdetani were Iberians, but he also affirms that they were of Celtic origin: "voilà une preuve nouvelle que le nom d'Ibères n'était qu'une expression géographique."<sup>3</sup>

Strabo nowhere, as far as I can discover, affirms that the Turdetani were of Celtic origin;<sup>4</sup> and if he does, the fact lends no support to M. Bladé's argument. Although,<sup>5</sup> in two passages at least, he distinguishes the Celts of Spain from the Iberians, his practice, as I have already remarked, is to use the term "Iberians" loosely to designate the inhabitants of the peninsula generally, just as we use the word "British" and sometimes "English" to designate the inhabitants of the British Isles.

(g) If, says M. Bladé,<sup>6</sup> it is objected that the names *Celtiberia* and *Celtiberi* militate against my argument, I reply that the system which regards the so-called Celtiberians as a medley of Celts and Iberians rests only upon a passage in Diodorus Siculus,<sup>7</sup> a writer whose credulity and want of critical acumen are generally admitted. Diodorus, moreover, is refuted by Strabo, whose statement,---ὑστερον δὲ καὶ τῶν πρὸς ἐσπέραν γνωσθέντων Κελτοὶ καὶ Ἰβηρες ἢ μικτῶς Κελτίβηρες . . . προσηγορεύοντο, ὑφ' ἐν ὀνομα τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα ἐθνῶν ταπτομένων διὰ τὴν ἀγνοίαν,<sup>8</sup>—proves that the name *Celtiberi* was not the result of a real union of Celts and Iberians, and who also speaks of Κελτοῖς, οἱ νῦν Κελτίβηρες . . . καλοῦνται. Again, the ancient writers are not unanimous regarding the extent of Celtiberia, from which we may conclude that the name *Celtiberi* "résulte de la simple réunion de deux termes géographiques," and that it was first applied to a confederation of Celtic tribes established on the banks of the Iberus. Pomponius Mela<sup>9</sup> says that Lusitania, from the mouth of the Tagus to the *Pro-montorium Artabrum*, was entirely inhabited by Celts; and this proves

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. graec. fragm.*, ed. Didot, ii. 34, fragm. 20.

<sup>2</sup> *Études*, etc., pp. 154-7.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, p. 156, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> In *Geogr.*, iii. 2, § 15, he appears to imply that they were not.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, i. 2, § 27; iii. 4, § 19.

<sup>6</sup> *Études*, etc., pp. 158. 163-5. 167.

<sup>7</sup> v. 33, § 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Geogr.*, i. 2, § 27.

<sup>9</sup> *Chorographia*, iii. 1, § 10.

that the so-called Celtiberians of Pliny<sup>1</sup> were really Celts. But, says M. Bladé, I do not deny the mixture of the Iberian race (so called by ethnologists) with the Celtic. "My whole argument is directed against the tradition, reported by Diodorus, which treats that mixture as a precise and definite fact, and insists that it took place suddenly at a given moment."

I reply that "the system which regards the (so-called) Celtiberians as a medley of Celts and Iberians" does *not* rest only upon the authority of Diodorus. It rests also upon the authority of Polybius<sup>2</sup> and of Lucan.<sup>3</sup> As the writer of the article *Iberia* in Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography* points out, even after the coalescence which produced the Celtiberi, "pure Iberian and pure Celtic tribes were still to be found in various parts of the peninsula." But it is unnecessary to argue further on this point. We know that there were Celts in Spain, who settled in the northern and western parts of the peninsula:<sup>4</sup> we know that there were people whom the ancients called Iberians, who lived in the northern, eastern and southern parts. What more likely than that they should have mixed? M. Bladé admits that they did so; and, as the statement which he wrongly ascribes to Diodorus, that the mixture "took place suddenly at a given moment," is not advocated by anybody, M. Bladé is tilting at a windmill. As it happens, Celtiberia, the central plateau of Spain, "which divides the basin of the Ebro from the rivers flowing to the west,"<sup>5</sup> was just that part of the peninsula in which we should have expected that a fusion between Celts and Iberians would have taken place.

To conclude:—I freely admit that M. Bladé has succeeded in proving that "*Iberia* was simply a geographical expression": but this fact required no proof: it was not worth proving; and it was a sad waste of time and labour to expend half a volume in establishing it. But no fair critic will allow that this really learned scholar has succeeded in proving that "no proper Iberian race ever existed," or that those inhabitants of southern Gaul whom the ancient geographers called Iberians were Celts or some other people. Reasoning as M. Bladé does, it would not be difficult to make out a plausible case in favour of the theory that no Ligurian race, no Celtic race, ever existed. M. Bladé himself admits, as we have seen, "the predominance in Spain and in southern Gaul of the race which ethnologists call Iberian." The only danger then is that we may be mistaken in assuming that the people whom the ancient geographers called Iberians were identical with this race. Now, as regards Gaul at all events, M. Bladé has wholly failed to prove that this danger exists. Those parts of Spain and of Gaul in which most of the ancient geographers place the Iberians are precisely those parts of Spain and of Gaul in which are found names that cannot be explained by Celtic or any other language, except Basque. They are

<sup>1</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iii. 3 (4), §§ 19, 27.

<sup>2</sup> iii. 17.

<sup>3</sup> iv. 9.

<sup>4</sup> E. Hubner, *Monumenta lingue ibericæ*, pp. xxvi., cix.

<sup>5</sup> *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geogr.*, i. 581-2.



also those parts in which the so-called Iberian coins, the legends on which certainly do not belong to the Celtic or any other known language, have alone been found.<sup>1</sup> The ancient geographers made mistakes; and from the standpoint of modern science, the best of them was no doubt sadly deficient. But they were not fools.

But I must try to make my meaning perfectly clear. When I follow the ancient geographers and say that the southern seaboard of Gaul stretching westward from the mouths of the Rhône was inhabited by Iberians, I by no means wish to imply that the Iberians were a homogeneous people. There is no such thing as a homogeneous people; and if there ever was, the time was very remote. When we say that England is inhabited by the English and France by the French, we do not mean that the English and the French are homogeneous peoples. Nevertheless the English and the French, mongrel though they both are, are each characterised by certain features which differentiate them, for the most part, from all other peoples. Still, although I do not think that M. Bladé has made out his case, there is perhaps a sense in which he is right. The facts which tell most powerfully against his theory are that "Iberians" undoubtedly existed outside the limits of "Iberia," that is to say along the Mediterranean seaboard of Gaul; and that the Iberians were differentiated by the ancient geographers from the Ligurians, who were their neighbours. These facts his arguments do not touch. On the other hand, there is evidence, as we shall presently see, that two different languages,—Basque and the language of the "Iberian" inscriptions,—were spoken in ancient times both in this tract and in Spain. It is therefore possible, though not certain, that both the peoples who spoke these languages were included by the ancient geographers under the common designation of Iberians. Let us now try to find out what amount of truth there was in the theory of Humboldt.

5. I will begin by quoting a sagacious remark of Mr. Wentworth Webster, which bears out what I have just been saying. "A great deal of the opposition to Humboldt's conclusions," he says, "arises from not observing the difference of the conditions of two very different problems,"—(1) whether certain names, for example *Iliberris*, in Spain and southern France, which we find in a Greek and Latin dress in classical itineraries, &c., are Basque; and (2) what is the language of the so-called Iberian inscriptions. "The two questions are often confounded, as if they must stand or fall together; whereas they are wholly distinct."<sup>2</sup>

We have already seen that various scholars, including Emil Hübner, while admitting that Humboldt made many errors in detail, agree in endorsing the view which he tried to prove. Humboldt, says Hübner,<sup>3</sup> did certainly often confuse Iberian and Celtic names: but he nevertheless proved that names which are undoubtedly Iberian are to be explained from Basque sources. Let us see what these scholars have to say in support of his theory. First of all, they contend that, before Caesar's

<sup>1</sup> Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 44; Hübner, *Monumenta linguarum ibericarum*, pp. xxvi.-xxvii., lviii.-lix.

<sup>2</sup> *Academy*, 1874, p. 588.

<sup>3</sup> *Monumenta linguarum ibericarum*, pp. xxiv.-xxv.

day, Basque or a language closely akin to Basque was spoken in part, at all events, of Caesar's Aquitania and in most parts of the Iberian peninsula. M. Desjardins<sup>1</sup> points out the similarity between *Ausk-i* (spelt by Caesar *Ausci*), the name of one of the Aquitanian peoples, and *Euskara*, the name by which the Basques call themselves. Other Aquitanian tribal names, moreover, namely *Tarbelli*, *Lactorates*, *Elusates*, *Bigerriones*, *Beneharnenses*, *Iluronenses* (which is obviously connected with *Iluro*, the name of an ancient town in Spain) and especially *Oskidates*, have "une physionomie ibéro-euskarienne qu'on ne retrouve nulle part dans la Gaule chevelue": but, adds M. Desjardins,<sup>2</sup> who is always on his guard against hasty generalisation, they have not been identified with Basque words; and M. Luchaire<sup>3</sup> refuses to regard *Tarbelli* as a word of Basque origin. These words therefore do not amount to proof; and proof is what the sceptics, MM. Van Eys and Vinson, very properly require. Now it is certain, as M. Luchaire points out,<sup>4</sup> that there was an admixture of Celtic-speaking people among the Aquitani. The names of kings, for instance, on some of the coins of the Sotiates, such as Kraccus and Contoulos, are apparently Celtic, and certainly have no connexion with Basque.<sup>5</sup> But there is a word which occurs, under various forms (for, as Hübner remarks,<sup>6</sup> the names of peoples and places in Spain and southern Gaul, the sound of which was uncouth to Roman ears, were often inaccurately reproduced by ancient geographers, and Strabo himself tells us that he shrank from the effort of reproducing these names in a Greek form<sup>7</sup>) nearly as frequently in Spain and southern Gaul as *Noviodunum* in Celtic and Belgic Gaul. This word is *Iliberis*. The word *iri* in Basque means "town"; and *berri* means new.<sup>8</sup> The letter *r* is often changed into *l*. The obvious meaning of *Iliberis* is "New Town" or, in Gallic, *Noviodunon*, which Caesar italicised into *Noviodunum*. There was an *Iliberis* in Roussillon, an *Elimberis* in Auch, and an *Iliberri* in Grenada (the ancient Baetica). "Ces trois noms," says M. Luchaire,<sup>9</sup> "suffiraient à eux seuls pour établir que le basque fut parlé jadis dans l'Andalousie, en Gascogne et en Roussillon. Mais, si l'ancien nom *Iliberis* . . . représente exactement le nom euskarien moderne *Iriberrri*, il devait signifier la même chose (villeneuve)." Moreover, the root *ili* or *iri* is found in many other geographical names scattered over the map of the Iberian peninsula.<sup>10</sup>

I am bound, however, to point out that even this solitary example, —*Iliberis*,—is rejected by M. Van Eys. "Il est vrai," he remarks,<sup>11</sup> "que *l* est quelquefois pour *r*; mais *ili* ne se trouve jamais, autant que

<sup>1</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 403.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, p. 404.

<sup>3</sup> *De lingua aquitanica*, p. 10.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, p. 5.

<sup>5</sup> See *Rev. de Numismatique*, 1851, p. 11.

<sup>6</sup> *Mon. ling. ib.*, pp. xxiv.-xxv.

<sup>7</sup> Strabo, iii. 3, § 7: *ὁκνῶ δὲ τοῖς ὀνόμασι πλεονάζειν, φεύγων τὸ ἀηδὲς τῆς γράφης.*

<sup>8</sup> W. J. Van Eys, *Dict. basque-français*, p. 208.

<sup>9</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. des sciences, lettres et arts de Pau*, 1875, quoted by Desjardins, ii. 38-9.

<sup>10</sup> See Desjardins, ii. 49-50, and G. Phillips, *Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akad. der Wissenschaften*, lxvii., 1871, pp. 345-400.

<sup>11</sup> *Rev. de ling.*, 1874, p. 7.

nous sachions, pour *iri*." On which Mr. Webster very sensibly comments,<sup>1</sup> "Perhaps not in Basque phonetics, but that is not the question, but whether the Greek or Latin authors would have represented the Basque *Iri* by the Greek and Latin Ἰλλι, Ἰλλι . . . We have . . . no right to expect a much greater amount of literal accuracy in the Greek and Latin transcription of Basque names than we find in the French, German and English transcription of Oriental names. Even a word like Punjab . . . is written Punjab, Pendjab and Pandschab, in English, French and German atlases, besides innumerable variations." And I would ask M. Van Eys this question. Would he deny that in the word *Iliberris* the element *berris* is Basque? And if it is Basque, as it assuredly is, what does *Ili* mean if it does not mean the same as *iri*? It will hardly be maintained that *Iliberris* is compounded of a Basque word and one which is not Basque. If it is admitted that *berris* is Basque, all that MM. Desjardins and Luchaire contend for is proved.<sup>2</sup>

I will now enquire whether it is true that the Iberian language,—assuming that the people whom the ancients called Iberians spoke one language or various dialects of one language,—was the ancestor of modern Basque. But, as I have already warned the reader, this assumption is not proved.

Canon Isaac Taylor remarks that Vinson "holds that the legends on the Iberian coins are inexplicable from the Basque language;"<sup>3</sup> and that "he considers that they point to the existence in Spain of a race which spoke a wholly different tongue." "This tongue," the Canon affirms, "belonged probably to the Hamitic family," with which "Basque has no recognisable affinity."<sup>4</sup> In a note written some years later,<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Academy*, vi., 1874, pp. 588-9.

<sup>2</sup> It is unnecessary to frame a complete list of the names in Spain and the south of France which Humboldt explains from Basque sources. Two or three specimens, however, may be given. *Acha* and *aitza*, he says, mean "rock"; and *asta* is a form of the same word. Livy (xxviii. 22) mentions Astapa in Baetica, and (xxxix. 21) Asta in the country of the Turdetani. (See Humboldt, pp. 23-4). Humboldt also regards Calaguris in Aquitania, which is mentioned in the *Itinerary of Antonine* p. 457) as obviously a Basque word. Desjardins (*Héogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 38) agrees with him in regarding the termination of this word as akin to *ili* (*iri*) in *Iliberris*: but M. Luchaire, while he has no doubt that Calaguris is a Basque word, prefers to associate the termination *guris* with the Basque word *gor* (= "high"). It should be noted that there was a town called Calagurris in Spain as well as in Aquitania. On the whole, it is sufficient to say that, while admitting the paucity of such words in Portugal, Humboldt infers from toponymy that Basque was once spoken over the whole Iberian peninsula (Marrast, *Recherches sur les habitants primitifs de l'Espagne* [a translation of Humboldt's work], 1866, pp. 112-14). Hübner also argues (pp. lviii.-lix.) from the similarity between geographical names which have a Basque-like physiognomy and are certainly not Celtic, that one language,—split up, it may be, into various dialects,—was spoken over the length and breadth of the peninsula; and, he says, if Artemidorus, as reported by Strabo (iii. 1, § 6) appears to say the contrary, Artemidorus was thinking of the Phœnician, Greek, and perhaps Celtic languages, which were also spoken in the same area; and perhaps he may have mistaken dialects for distinct languages.

<sup>3</sup> Canon Taylor apparently takes for granted that the "Iberian" coins belonged to the Iberian race, and that the Iberian race spoke one language.

<sup>4</sup> *The Origin of the Aryans*, p. 217.

<sup>5</sup> *Academy*, xlv., 1893, p. 93.

however, Canon Taylor allows that "Basque and Berber agree in certain phonetic tendencies, and they have a few culture words in common." This last fact confirms him in the belief that the Iberians, whose skulls, he says, resemble those of the Berbers, were conquered by a Basque-speaking race; and this race he believes to have been the Ligurians. In support of this conclusion he points out<sup>1</sup> that Professor Sayce "considers that 'Basque is probably to be added' to the Ural-Altaic family"; that "the skulls of the Auvergnats, with whom the French Basques must be classed, belong to the Finnic or Lapp type";<sup>2</sup> that "the Ligurians ethnologically belong to the same race as the Auvergnats"; and that *asia*, meaning grain of some kind, the "one undoubted Ligurian word" which we have, "has as yet been only explained from Basque sources."<sup>3</sup>

M. Vinson's opinion shall be dealt with presently. If Canon Taylor thinks that Basque has no recognisable affinity with Berber, G. von der Gabelentz<sup>4</sup> and M. de Charencey hold that there is an intimate connexion between the two languages;<sup>5</sup> while, although the latter admits that "il ne serait pas impossible qu'une partie de la grammaire euskarienne ait subi l'influence des dialectes finnois," he affirms that the theory which regarded Basque as akin to the Ugro-Finnic dialects of eastern Europe has, "après un examen approfondi," been abandoned.<sup>6</sup> Which are we to believe? In one of his most recent utterances on the subject,<sup>7</sup> M. de Charencey admits the existence of "d'étroites affinités entre le système grammatical de l'euskarien et celui des dialectes ongro-altaïques": but he goes on to say that nevertheless "leurs pronoms, qui constituent la partie la plus inaltérable d'un idiome, et la mécanique de leur conjugaison se ressemblent si peu, que l'on ne saurait songer à les faire dériver d'une souche commune." Canon Taylor's statement that the skulls of the French Basques must be classed with those of the Auvergnats, is flatly contradicted by Dr. Collignon,<sup>8</sup> whose study of the subject is by far the most exhaustive which we possess; and, as I shall presently show, it is impossible to *prove* that "the Ligurians ethnologically belong to the same race as the Auvergnats." If *asia* is a Ligurian word, and if it "has as yet been only explained from Basque sources," that does not prove that the Ligurians spoke Basque. Ligurians were at one time in geographical contact with Iberians, and mixed or intermarried with them. Is Canon Taylor prepared to prove that they did not borrow the word *asia* from Iberians?

But I am not trying to disprove Canon Taylor's theory. Ligurians penetrated into Spain: Ligurians were mingled with Iberians in the south of France; and as Humboldt pointed out, geographical names

<sup>1</sup> *The Origin of the Aryans*, p. 219.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, p. 221.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, p. 222.

<sup>4</sup> *Die Verwandtschaft des Baskischen mit den Berbersprachen Nord-Afrikas nachgewiesen*, 1894.

<sup>5</sup> *Mém. de l'Acad. Nat. des sciences, arts et belles-lettres de Caen*, 1893, pp. 241-311.

<sup>6</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. de Géogr.*, viii<sup>e</sup> sér., t. x., 1889, pp. 454, 449.

<sup>7</sup> *Rev. de linguistique*, xxvi., 1893, pp. 120, 216, 237.

<sup>8</sup> See p. 271, *infra*.

with "a Basque-like physiognomy," such as *Iria* and *Asta*, which are found in Spain, are also found in Italian Liguria. In Aquitania, where the ancient geographical or tribal names included Basque names or names with "a Basque-like physiognomy," there is, as we shall see, evidence that, in Caesar's time, the majority of the population were, like the Auvergnats, dark and brachycephalic, and that the dark dolichocephalic people had been forced back into the south and the hilly districts. These facts, I freely admit, lend some support to the Canon's theory.<sup>1</sup> My only contention is that the evidence which he adduces is not sufficient to establish it. And there is one question which I should like to see cleared up. Is the termination *ili(s)*, which occurs in *Bilbilis*, the name of an ancient Spanish town, identical with the *ili* in the Basque name *Iliberris*, *Ilipula* and many other geographical names belonging to the Iberian peninsula? If so, how would Canon Taylor reconcile the view that the Iberians learned Basque from Ligurian conquerors with the fact that this termination appears in the names of two ancient towns of Mauretania,—*Volubilis* and *Igilgili*?

Still, even if Basque was not the language of the Ligurians, it does not follow that it was the language of the Iberians. The arguments for the identity of Basque with the Iberian language I take to be this,—that Basque was once undoubtedly spoken in those countries in which Iberians are known to have lived; and that a considerable resemblance is believed by Humboldt, Nissen and Hubner to exist between certain place-names in Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, where there is some reason for believing Iberians to have lived, and others in the Iberian peninsula.<sup>2</sup>

As I have already remarked, the existence, in ancient times, of places whose names were unquestionably of Basque origin in Roussillon and in the south as well as in the north of Spain is proof enough that Basque was then spoken in those parts; and if the argument needed support, it would be found in the words of a writer who asked whether it was conceivable that "le basque ait pu naître, vivre, se développer isolément dans un coin de l'Europe sans qu'aucune langue voisine ait eu d'affinité avec lui."<sup>3</sup> Humboldt has a similar argument. There are at present eight main dialects of Basque, which fall into three groups: indeed there are probably no two villages where it is spoken exactly alike.<sup>4</sup> "This infinite variety," says Humboldt, "would be inexplicable if the Basque nation had not been composed of numerous tribes, dispersed over a vast area."<sup>5</sup> And if it is true that names of Basque origin are to be found within the country which we know to have been occupied by Iberians, it is also true that the "Iberian" coins which we possess come only from the eastern, the southern and the northern parts of the Spanish peninsula, and from the neighbourhood of Narbonne, that is to say from those districts in which the Basque geographical names occur, and that most of the "Iberian" inscriptions come from the same places; while in Spain Celtic geographical names and Celtic names of men are

<sup>1</sup> See, however, pp. 279-81.

<sup>2</sup> *Monumenta linguae ibericae*, p. lxxxv.

<sup>3</sup> *Ass. franç. pour l'avancement des sciences*, etc., Lille, 1874, p. 548.

<sup>4</sup> Chambers's *Encyclopaedia*, i., 1895, p. 778. <sup>5</sup> Marrast, p. 113.

only to be found in those districts which we know to have been inhabited by Celts and Celtiberians.<sup>1</sup>

In 1874 neither M. Vinson nor M. Van Eys was prepared to deny that Iberian might have been the ancestor of Basque: they contented themselves with affirming that while the fact was probable, it was not proved.<sup>2</sup> Hübner is more positive. He claims to have proved that the Iberian language, though doubtless split into various dialects, was really one; that it was spoken all over the peninsula and in the adjacent parts of southern Gaul which were once inhabited by Iberians; that it was not an Indo-European language; and that it was the ancestor of modern Basque (*restat una quae de linguae Ibericae vetustae origine et indole quaestionem absolvere possit lingua Vasconum hodierna*).<sup>3</sup>

But in a review<sup>4</sup> of Hübner's book M. Vinson has directly challenged this conclusion. Speaking of the most famous of the Iberian inscriptions,—that of Castellon,—he says that “none of the readings which have been proposed allow one to discover in the inscription either Basque or any other known idiom.” Again, “when I study the Iberian language thus partially restored,”—by Hübner's collection of inscriptions,—“I am unable, with the best will in the world, to discover therein a trace of Basque.” Hübner himself does not attempt to demonstrate by philological reasoning a connexion between the two; and in the teeth of expert evidence like that of M. Vinson, who confidently appeals to all Basque scholars to bear him out, I do not see how one is justified in maintaining that the theory which identifies Basque with the language of the Iberian inscriptions is true.<sup>5</sup>

In the theory of Humboldt there was this much truth. He proved that in the Spanish peninsula and the south of France, which were once inhabited by Iberians, Basque was once spoken far more extensively than it is now: but that Basque was the only language of the Iberians (exclusive of the Celts and Celtiberians, who by Strabo were loosely called Iberians), he failed to prove. The conclusion at which M. Vinson arrives is as follows:—“Before the arrival of the Phoenicians, the Celts and the Romans in Spain, there was a number of indigenous peoples, each with a language of its own. One of these languages is still represented by Basque: another by the Iberian inscriptions.”

<sup>1</sup> Hübner, pp. xxvi., lviii.-lix., cxvii.-cxxi.; *Congrès scientifique de France*, ii., 1873, pp. 362, 365.

<sup>2</sup> *Ass. franç. pour l'avancement des sc.*, etc., 1874, pp. 544-5.

<sup>3</sup> *Monumenta linguae ibericae*, pp. cxli., lviii.-lix.

<sup>4</sup> *Rev. de linguistique*, xxvii., 1894, pp. 248-53.

<sup>5</sup> The inscription of Castellon, like most of the Iberian inscriptions, is in peculiar characters, which the Spaniards call *desconocidas*,—“des adaptations,” as M. Vinson says, “de l'alphabet phénicien.” According to the reading of Hübner (*Monumenta linguae ibericae*, pp. 155-6), the inscription of Castellon is as follows:—(z)irtaism. airieimth. sinektn. urcecerere. aurunikiceaiasthkkiceaie. ecariv. aduniv. kdvei. ihsm. eosu. shsinpuru. krkrhniiv. qshiu. iithgm. kricarsense. ulththeraicaie. argtco. aicag. ilcepurates. iithsjnicarse. M. V. Stempf, devising a totally different reading from that of Hübner, has attempted to prove that the inscription is Basque (*Rev. de linguistique*, xxx., 1897, pp. 97-111): but M. Vinson (*Id.*, pp. 112-25) has demolished his argument; and, as he says, Hübner, one of the greatest of epigraphists, is our best guide.

The central facts of this mysterious Iberian question are these :—on the one hand, there is the undeniable fact that, scattered over the length and breadth of the territory which belonged to the Iberians were towns whose ancient names can only be explained from Basque sources. On the other hand, there is the fact, equally undeniable, that scattered over the length and breadth of the same territory there have been discovered coins and inscriptions, preserving traces of a language which so far has baffled every attempt to decipher it, which, like Basque, did not belong to the Indo-European family, but which, so the experts assure us, can certainly not be interpreted by the aid of Basque, and shows no trace of kinship with Basque. These facts may appear inconsistent. They cannot be so, unless the experts are wrong. Perhaps a myriad years hence ethnologists will be busy theorising about the races which inhabit our own island. Scattered over its length and breadth they will find coins and inscriptions in the English language, and names of towns and rivers both English and Celtic. They will conclude perhaps that English and Celtic were both spoken throughout the length and breadth of the island. But will they be able to tell that in the nineteenth century Celtic was spoken only in certain districts of the north and west, and that English was spoken in many towns whose names were of Celtic origin?

Meanwhile, I confess that it seems to me impossible, in the present state of knowledge, to decide whether, assuming, with Humboldt, that there was once an Iberian race, inhabiting the greater part of the Spanish peninsula and the south of Gaul, which spoke one language or dialects of one language, that language was Basque or the language of the inscriptions. And since, as I have already remarked, this assumption is not proved, it may be that among those peoples of the peninsula and Gaul whom the ancient geographers called Iberians both Basque and the language of the inscriptions were spoken as native languages side by side.

6. The characteristics of the Iberian type, according to most ethnologists, were and are short stature, dark hair, eyes and complexion, orthognathism and a dolichocephalic skull. But ethnologists often use the word "Iberian" in a loose sense. "Iberian" is for them simply a term by which they find it convenient to designate a particular type of man. Were these the characteristics of the Iberians who, as the ancient writers tell us, lived in southern Gaul?

The ancient writers have told us very little about the physical characteristics of the Iberians. Tacitus implies that they were short and dark. Jornandes says the same. Strabo implies that their physical type differed from that of the Gauls, who were tall and fair. No other ancient writer says anything about the matter. And when these writers spoke of the Iberians, they meant the mass of the inhabitants of "Iberia,"—the Spanish peninsula.

Let us now see what is the physical type of the modern inhabitants of the Gallic territory which was once inhabited by Iberians. This territory, it must be remembered, was also inhabited by Ligurians: it was invaded by Celts, who, it should seem, were relatively few; and,

since Caesar's day, there have settled in it, in small numbers, Saracens, Visigoths and Jews.<sup>1</sup> Excluding, for the present, Caesar's Aquitania, the Iberian departments of France are Bouches-du-Rhône, Gard, Hérault, Aude, Pyrénées-Orientales, Ariège and Haute-Garonne. Speaking generally, the inhabitants of all these departments are very dark; those of all, except perhaps Bouches-du-Rhône, are short; and those of all, except Pyrénées-Orientales, which has the lowest cephalic index of any department in France, are mesocephalic or sub-brachycephalic: but their index is considerably lower than that of many departments in the region which belonged to the Celts.<sup>2</sup> In respect of stature and colouring, these departments correspond with what the ancient writers tell us about the Iberians: their comparatively high index,—high as compared with that of Spain,—is possibly to be accounted for by the fact that they were inhabited by Ligurians as well as Iberians.<sup>3</sup> The question is whether their comparatively low index,—low as compared with that of central France,—is to be accounted for by the fact that they were inhabited by Iberians as well as Ligurians. In the department of Pyrénées-Orientales the prevailing type of skull is said to resemble that of Cro-Magnon. On the whole, the facts would seem to suggest that the Iberian type of skull was narrow; and it may be that, as Professor Boyd Dawkins suggests, the Iberian population was partly displaced in Caesar's time, and that, if this displacement had not taken place, the indices would be still lower than they are.

I have come to the conclusion that Basque was spoken in certain parts, at all events, of Caesar's Aquitania; and I will assume provisionally that either Basque was the true Iberian tongue, or it was one of the languages spoken by the Iberians. The departments which correspond with Caesar's Aquitania are Landes, Basses-Pyrénées, Hautes-Pyrénées, Gers and the western part of Lot-et-Garonne. Speaking generally, the inhabitants of all these departments are short, very dark and brachycephalic or sub-brachycephalic, the average index, as shown by M. Collignon's measurements of living heads, being 84·80, which is much higher than that of the Iberian departments of the Mediterranean. M. Collignon has, however, lately published an article<sup>4</sup> on Aquitania, which gives fuller details than his general table. While he emphasises the fact that the majority of the inhabitants hardly differ from those of central France, he shows that in the mountainous districts the index falls below 82. He concludes that the small dolichocephalic inhabitants were driven by brachycephalic invaders to take refuge in the mountains; and he points out that the districts which show evident traces of having been inhabited by peoples of the type which ethnologists call "Iberian" are those which were occupied by the Tarbelli, the Cocosates, the Iluroenses and the Oscidates. Now there is no historical evidence that there were Iberians in Aquitania at all, except Strabo's statement that the Aquitanians resembled the Iberians rather than the Gauls. Anyhow

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. d'anthr.*, ii., 1879, p. 465. <sup>2</sup> See pp. 320-22. <sup>3</sup> See, however, pp. 279-81.

<sup>4</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. i., 1895, pp. 67-129. See especially pp. 73-4, 78-80, 83, 110-11.



it is clear that, if the Iberians, properly so called, were dolichocephalic, they were largely mixed in Aquitania with the dark brachycephalic people of the so-called Auvergnat type; for, since Caesar's time, there has been no brachycephalic immigration into Aquitania.<sup>1</sup> M. Collignon's measurements would seem to suggest that the dolichocephalic people in Aquitania were really Iberians, if they did not belong to the "race de l'Homme Mort," which, if not strictly Iberian, was probably Iberian in its affinities; for Strabo was perhaps thinking of the Iberians properly so called, and certainly not of the Celts of Spain.

The modern inhabitants of Spain are, in general, short, dark and genuinely dolichocephalic.<sup>2</sup> The race is found at its purest in Sardinia, where, as Dr. Beddoe says,<sup>3</sup> "the skull-breadth averages 72·8 and varies little." "Nine ancient Sards," remarks the same authority, "gave one of 72·5, practically identical. The hair of the Sards is said to be almost always black."

It remains to examine the type of the French and the Spanish Basques. The well-known researches of Broca on this subject have recently been supplemented by Dr. Collignon. From a measurement of 60 skulls found in a cemetery at Zaraus in Guipuzcoa, the most brachycephalic of which showed an index of 83·24, while the average index was 77·67, Broca concluded that the typical Spanish Basque skull was dolichocephalic. These skulls exactly resembled six others taken from three different places in Bilbao and measured by Virchow.<sup>4</sup> These results are confirmed by the measurements made by A. d'Abbadie and others of the heads of living Spanish Basques.<sup>5</sup> M. Collignon, though he insists that Zaraus was "une ville cosmopolite par excellence depuis plusieurs siècles,"<sup>6</sup> affirms, like Broca, that the Spanish Basques are dolichocephalic and differ, in respect of head-form, from all other European peoples.<sup>7</sup> The dolichocephaly is due, Broca points out, to the development of the posterior portion of the skull, the front part being but slightly developed.

Dr. Telesforo de Aranzadi y Unamuno has recently written a monograph on the ethnology of the Spanish Basques. He finds that their average cephalic index (corrected) is 77·1; that their average stature is from 5 feet 3 to 5 feet 6 inches; that 19·2 per cent have blue eyes, 2·8 grey, 17·6 green, 18 greenish hazel, 0·8 bluish hazel and 41·6 brown; and that 23 per cent have blonde hair, 13 medium, 40 dark brown and 24 black.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The only immigrants have been Spanish Basques, Saracens, gypsies, Jews, Irish, English, and a very few Dutch and Flemings. *Rev. d'anthr.*, i., 1872, pp. 603-4.

<sup>2</sup> *Scottish Review*, xxi., 1893, p. 352, n. †.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 353-4.

<sup>4</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, iii., 1862, pp. 579-82; *Congrès intern. d'anthr. et d'arch. préhist.*, 1867 (1868), p. 374.

<sup>5</sup> *Dict. des sciences anthr.*, p. 165.

<sup>6</sup> The Rev. W. Webster says much the same both of Zaraus and of Bilbao. *Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, v., 1876, p. 10.

<sup>7</sup> *L'Anthropologie*, v., 1894, pp. 286-7.

<sup>8</sup> *El pueblo euskalduna*, 1889, pp. 27-30. See also *Scottish Review*, xxi., 1893, p. 351.

The French Basques, on the other hand, are for the most part sub-brachycephalic, and their cranial capacity is considerably less than that of their Spanish brethren.<sup>1</sup> From an examination of 732 recruits in the French Basque-speaking cantons M. Collignon<sup>2</sup> found a cephalic index of 83.02,—“sur le vivant.” This comparative brachycephaly, however, he regarded as factitious and accidental, due to the head being “prodigieusement gonflé au-dessus des tempes, précisément au niveau du point où se prend le diamètre transversal maxillaire,—caractère absolument propre à cette race.” The type of face was very long and narrow, resembling an inverted triangle, the forehead being narrow at the lower part and broad above. The hair of these recruits was, for the most part, brown and wavy. Their striking characteristics, which M. Collignon regards as “de véritables caractères ethniques,” were “le renflement de crâne au niveau des tempes et le prodigieux rétrécissement de la face vers la menton.” In the heart of the Basque country the pure type was found in 41 per cent of the recruits examined: outside the linguistic frontier, says M. Collignon, the race does not exist. M. Collignon remarks further that both French and Spanish Basques differ, in certain respects, from all other European peoples; and that those features in regard to which the Spanish Basques differ from the French are precisely those in regard to which they resemble the Spaniards generally. Finally, M. Collignon is inclined to assimilate the Basques to the Berber type.<sup>3</sup>

Mr. Wentworth Webster gives some interesting particulars regarding the French Basques. He points out that even at St-Jean de Luz, where the infusion of French, Gascon and gipsy blood must have tended to darken the original tint, M. Argelliés found 22 out of 47 persons who had blue, green or grey eyes; that “Arthur Yarn, and Sir William Napier, who have no scientific theory to support, call (the Basques) a fair race”; that, according to his own observations, carried on all over the French Pays Basque, “the fair type,—especially with blue or grey or very light-brown eyes, with somewhat darkish hair,—is the distinctive Basque type . . . and that it will be found more numerous in proportion to the distance from the neighbourhood of the sea and the great roads, where the chances of admixture are the greatest”; that the French Basques generally are taller “than the average Frenchman and than the inhabitants of the surrounding plains”; and that even the dark Basques of Spain “are not so dark as their Spanish neighbours.” “If,” he concludes, “the Basques had been originally a dark people, whence could they have obtained their present fairness? The infusion of . . . English blood is manifestly inadequate to account for it.”<sup>4</sup> Mr. Webster’s observations, combined with those which have established the existence of a large blond element in the Spanish Basques, support M. Collignon’s assimilation of the Basque to

<sup>1</sup> *Dict. des sciences anthr.*, p. 165.

<sup>2</sup> *L'Anthropologie*, v., 1894, pp. 276-87.

<sup>3</sup> See *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 4<sup>e</sup> sér., t. vii., 1896, pp. 666-71.

<sup>4</sup> *Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, vol. ii., 1873, pp. 154-5; vol. v., 1876, pp. 12, 14-15.

the Berber type ; for, as Dr. Beddoe says,<sup>1</sup> fairness "has been recognised among the inhabitants of northern Africa for more than 3000 years." But the question still remains whether the ancestors of the modern Basques, if they were akin to the Berbers, had not learned Basque from the Ligurians.

Do the French Basques, as described by M. Collignon, represent the Iberian type ? To this question only one answer can be given. If the French Basque type is nowhere to be found outside the limits of the French Basque-speaking country, it can hardly represent the type of a people who formed the bulk of the population in the eastern half, at all events, of Spain and a large part of the population in southern France ; and, as we have seen, there is sufficient evidence that the mass of that population belonged to a quite different type. But if M. Collignon is right in thinking that the type which he describes is the original Basque type,<sup>2</sup>—and I do not see how this can be proved,—it may have characterised a considerable number of the people whom the ancients called Iberians. This is the view of M. Collignon himself : but he denies that the Basques have any claim to be regarded "comme le prototype de l'Ibère."<sup>3</sup> The type which he describes is obviously different from that which ethnologists call "Iberian." How it arose,—whether from a fusion of dolichocephalic aborigines with brachycephalic invaders, or from some other cause,—it would be idle to conjecture.

Dr. Beddoe<sup>4</sup> and others have pointed out the close resemblance which exists between the physiognomy of many of the dark inhabitants of South Wales and that of the Spanish Basques. If we accept the statement of Tacitus regarding the resemblance between the Silures and the Iberians, this similarity may perhaps lend some support to the view that the Spanish Basques represent, approximately, the type of the ancient Iberians. But it must not be forgotten that, according to Dr. Collignon as well as Broca, the Spanish as well as the French Basques differ, in certain respects, from all other European peoples. Nor must it be forgotten that a minority only of the Spanish Basques are dark.

Again, an attempt has been made to determine the Iberian type in this way. M. de Charencey tells us that certain Basque words are to be found in the old Egyptian and kindred dialects : von der Gabelentz claims to have established a connexion between the Basque and Berber linguistic groups ;<sup>5</sup> and Hubner remarks<sup>6</sup> that G. Phillips was right

<sup>1</sup> *Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, v., 1876, p. 24.

<sup>2</sup> M. Vinson, remarking justly that there are great analogies between the French and the Spanish Basque types, says that it is impossible to decide which of the two is really Basque (*Dict. des sc. anthr.*, p. 165). Is either ?

<sup>3</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. i., 1895, p. 74. It should perhaps be mentioned that M. Collignon, noting the absence of the French Basque type in Béarn and Gascony, argues that the ancestors of the French Basques did not dwell in Aquitania in Caesar's time, but that they were identical with the Vascones, who, coming from the north of Spain, invaded Aquitania in the sixth century of our era. If so, the fact is of course no proof that Basque was not spoken in Aquitania long before. See A. Luchaire, *De lingua aquitanica*, 1877, pp. 63-4, and *Rev. d'anthr.*, iv., 1875, pp. 20-21.

<sup>4</sup> *The Races of Britain*, pp. 25-6.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 265, *supra*.

<sup>6</sup> *Monumenta linguæ ibericæ*, p. xxvii.

when he pointed out a close resemblance between certain names of towns in Spain and in northern Africa. Now there is a close resemblance between the skulls of the Berbers, which show an average index of 74·63,<sup>1</sup> those of the Spanish Basques and a skull from a cave near Gibraltar which Busk found to have an index of 74·8.<sup>2</sup> All these skulls, and especially Busk's, closely resemble the dolichocephalic skulls of the British long barrows, which are believed to belong to a people who resembled or were physically identical with the Silures; and Dr. Thurnam pointed out a close similarity between the long-barrow skulls and those of Guipuzcoa, which I have already mentioned. This argument does not seem to carry us much further. It tends to show that some of the ancient inhabitants of Spain and the ancient Berbers belonged to the same dolichocephalic race: but it leaves undetermined the question whether the former were Iberians properly so called, and, if so, whether their type was the prevailing type of the whole Iberian people.

Reviewing the evidence collected by philologists and by craniologists, it seems to me probable that the Iberians comprised both people who spoke Basque and people who spoke the language of the "Iberian" inscriptions; that to observers who had not learned to measure skulls and knew nothing of modern scientific methods, they appeared to be homogeneous; that the prevailing type was that which is now called Iberian and is seen at its purest in Sardinia, Corsica and Sicily; but that a certain proportion of the whole population may have been characterised by physical features more or less closely resembling those which the modern Basques,—French and Spanish,—possess in common, and which, as MM. Broca and Collignon tell us, distinguish them from all other European peoples. Finally, it seems possible that, if the Iberian inscriptions are ever deciphered, it will eventually be proved that the true Iberians were the people who spoke the language of the inscriptions, and that Basque was spoken by the Ligurians, who, as we know, mingled with the Iberians in southern Gaul, penetrated into Spain, and may have invaded Aquitania, and perhaps also by Iberians who learned it from them. But unless and until the key to those appalling inscriptions is found, the problem will never be solved.

7. We have next to enquire whether the Iberians occupied any other part of Gaul besides that which the ancient writers assigned to them. And first of all, let us consider the evidence of toponymy. Evidence of this kind there is none, except in that part of France which corresponds with Caesar's Aquitania,<sup>3</sup> and it must be remembered that even this evidence goes for nothing unless it is granted that the Basque-speaking peoples, who were the authors of the names in question, were Iberians. Mr. Wentworth Webster concludes that "Basque or Iberian tribes did not extend greatly beyond the parallel of the Adour; and that the groups or families to the north, though they may have been allied . . .

<sup>1</sup> Taylor's *Origin of the Aryans*, pp. 68-9, 97.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, p. 96.

<sup>3</sup> See Desjardius, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 44; Hübner, p. xxvii.; and *Academy*, xl, 1891, p. 268:

yet belonged to different branches." Professor Boyd Dawkins,<sup>1</sup> however, argues that "an ethnological connexion between Aquitaine and Brittany may be inferred from the remark of Pliny, '*Aquitania Armorica ante dicta.*'" An "*ethnological connexion*" of some sort there may have been: but Pliny's authority is worthless.<sup>2</sup> If the primitive name of Aquitania had been Armorica,—a Celtic word,—the fact would tend to prove that the primitive inhabitants of Aquitania had been Celts, which the Professor certainly would not admit; and as, in Caesar's time, the name was certainly Aquitania, we should be driven, on the Professor's theory, to conclude that the primitive Celts had been conquered by Iberians! The only safe conclusion is that there is no evidence to show that Iberians, properly so called, ever occupied any part of Gaul except the Mediterranean coast and perhaps Aquitania.

8. But was there elsewhere a people *ethnologically* akin to the Iberians? This question has been answered already by implication. If the Iberian type was long-headed and orthognathous as well as short, there were in the neolithic age,—we cannot tell what proportion of them survived in Caesar's time,—people physically allied to the Iberians in many parts of Gaul. Even now there are traces of the same population.<sup>3</sup> The departments of Charente, Dordogne and Haute-Vienne, between the Cher and the Gironde, are inhabited by a people who are among the shortest in France, dark, though not extremely dark, and relatively dolichocephalic, their indices being as low as 80·93, 79·17 and 79·70. Dr. Beddoe conjectures that they represent the primitive dolichocephali, moderately crossed by "Celtae" and by the blond Gauls from the north. Professor Boyd Dawkins goes further, and argues that the reason why Augustus added the district between the Garonne and the Loire to Aquitania was that the population were more akin to the Aquitani than to the Celtae. Twenty out of these twenty-five departments, says Professor Boyd Dawkins, were very dark. But the Professor had only Broca's researches to guide him; for he wrote before MM. Collignon and Topinard had published their maps. His conclusion is not borne out by modern statistics. As far as skull-form, stature and colour go, the bulk of the modern inhabitants of Caesar's Aquitania differ but little from the descendants of the Celtae. The Aquitania of Augustus comprised not twenty-five but twenty-four departments. When Professor Dawkins says that the population of twenty out of the twenty-four were more akin to the Aquitani than to the Celtae, I hardly know what he means. Speaking generally, the Aquitani were short and dark; and so were the Celtae. Does the Professor mean that the Aquitani were darker than the Celtae, or more dolichocephalic, or both? If he means any of these things, the facts do not support his conclusion. The Aquitani of Caesar's Aquitania, if we may judge from the indices of their modern descendants, were, as I have shown, for the most part, brachycephalic or sub-brachycephalic. They were darker than the inhabitants of some of the "Celtic" depart-

<sup>1</sup> *Early Man in Britain*, p. 320.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 382, *infra*.

<sup>3</sup> See *Rev. d'anthr.*, ii., 1879, p. 462.

ments which are not included in Augustus's Aquitania, and not darker than others: more brachycephalic than some, and less brachycephalic than others. The twenty-four departments show such various results that it is idle to group them together. Their cephalic indices range from 79·70 to 87·87; and their colouring varies as much. Some are very dark, others dark, and three are relatively fair. The Professor's argument therefore collapses.<sup>1</sup>

But enough of the Iberian question. If my conclusions are wrong, I have stated the essential facts correctly; and some critical reader may discern their true bearing.

## IV

## THE LIGURIANS

1. From the statements of the ancient geographers and historians it appears that the Ligurians in Transalpine Gaul inhabited a tract between the Maritime Alps and the Rhône; that they were intermingled with the Iberians on the west of the Rhône: and that their country was invaded by Gauls.

In the time of Hesiod the islands of Hyères were called *Λιγυρτίδες*.<sup>2</sup> Hecataeus,<sup>3</sup> who lived before Aeschylus, says that the Elisyces, who dwelt in the neighbourhood of Narbonne, were Ligurians. Festus Avienus<sup>4</sup> places the Ligurians on the east of the Rhône; while Scylax<sup>5</sup> says that they inhabited the country east of the Rhône as far as Antium (in Italy), and that the country west of the Rhône was occupied by Ligurians mixed with Iberians. Scymnus of Chios<sup>6</sup> says that Massilia was in Liguria, and that the easternmost town of Liguria in Gaul was Antipolis, or Antibes. Strabo<sup>7</sup> implies that in this part of Gaul Celts were mingled with Ligurians; and this is also proved by the discovery of Celtic inscriptions at Nîmes and St-Remy.<sup>8</sup> According to an inscription quoted by Gruter,<sup>9</sup> the Vocontii, who dwelt in the department of Drôme, were Ligurians: but the names of the towns in their territory were Celtic; Strabo<sup>10</sup> clearly implies that they were not Ligurians; and, if there was a Ligurian stratum in the population, the

<sup>1</sup> It would be interesting to learn how he reconciles his theory with the fact, revealed by the famous inscription of Hasparren, that the *Novem Populi* of Caesar's Aquitania sought and obtained in the third century imperial recognition of their existence as a group distinct from the rest of Gaul. See Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 164; iii. 157, n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Argonautica*, ed. Didot, Bk. iv., 554-5.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. graec. fragm.*, ed. Didot, t. i., p. 2, fr. 20.

<sup>4</sup> *Ora maritima*, 608-10.

<sup>5</sup> *Geogr. graec. min.*, ed. Didot, i. 15-17.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, i. 204, vv. 211, 216.

<sup>7</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 5, § 28; iv. 6, § 3. Cf. J. C. Zeuss, *Die Deutschen*, p. 163.

<sup>8</sup> *Rev. celt.*, xviii., 1897, p. 320.

<sup>9</sup> *Corpus inscr.*, ed. Graevius, t. i., pars 2, p. ccxcviii.

<sup>10</sup> *Ib.*, i. 6, § 4.

Celts were indisputably predominant. Strabo<sup>1</sup> says that the Salluvii, in whose country Marseilles is situated, were called Ligurians by the old Greek writers; and Pliny<sup>2</sup> calls them by the same name. Livy,<sup>3</sup> not troubling himself about ethnological distinctions, speaks of them as Gauls; and Strabo<sup>4</sup> says that, in later times, they were known as Celto-Ligurians. Similarly Plutarch<sup>5</sup> says that the Ligurians were intermixed with Gauls and Iberians. Strabo<sup>6</sup> also says that the Taurini and the inhabitants of the kingdom of Cottius, that is to say the Alpine country between Embrun and Drubiaglio, were Ligurians. Finally, Diodorus Siculus<sup>7</sup> describes the Ligurians as small and lean, but robust.

2. M. d'Arbois de Jubainville<sup>8</sup> endeavours to prove, from the evidence of toponymy, that the dominion of the Ligurians extended much further than is generally believed. Remarking the frequency with which the suffixes *-usco*, *-usca*, *usco*, *usca*, *-osco* and *-osca* are found in the province of Cuneo in Piedmont, which was undoubtedly inhabited by Ligurians, he infers that these suffixes were Ligurian; and, after a further search, he finds that they occur also in the departments of Alpes-Maritimes, Var, Bouches-du-Rhône, Gard, Hérault, Basses-Alpes, Vaucluse, Hautes-Alpes, Drôme, Ardèche, Savoie, Isère, Ain, Rhône, Jura, Saône-et-Loire, Côte-d'Or, Doubs, Haute-Saône, Yonne, Aube, Marne, Haute-Loire, Aveyron and Ariège.<sup>9</sup>

M. d'Arbois<sup>10</sup> draws a further argument from the name *Rhodanus* (Rhône), which, like K. Mullenhoff,<sup>11</sup> he regards as Ligurian. The name, he remarks, was borrowed by the Greeks from their countrymen, the colonists of Massilia, who, as late as the fourth century B.C., had only Ligurians for neighbours.<sup>12</sup> If it were objected that *Rhodanus* might have been the name of the Rhône before the Ligurians entered Gaul, he would reply that the word comes from the root *Rot* or *Rod*, which is found also in *Rodumnus*, a word undoubtedly Ligurian. M. d'Arbois then points to the existence of "des Rhodanus" near Trèves, Cahors and Le Mans, and infers that, at some time or other, the districts which surround those towns were inhabited by Ligurians. *Sequana*, the Gallic

<sup>1</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 6, § 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iii. 5 (7), § 47.

<sup>3</sup> xxvi. 10.

<sup>4</sup> iv. 6, § 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Emilius Paulus*, 6.

<sup>6</sup> iv. 6, § 6. Dr. Lagneau says that, according to Strabo, the Salassi, the Veragri and the Nantuates were Ligurians: but, as Desjardins points out (*Étude de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 92-3, n. 5) Strabo nowhere makes this statement; and Polybius (ii. 16) calls these peoples Celts.

<sup>7</sup> iv. 20, § 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Rev. celt.*, xi. 1890, p. 156; *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, t. ii., 1891, p. 115.

<sup>9</sup> M. Maximin Deloche (*Rev. celt.*, xviii., 1897, pp. 366-71) argues in a similar strain. He says that in the department of Basses-Pyrénées there is a hill called *Legorre*; that two forests in the basin of the Dordogne and the department of Aisne were respectively called, in the Middle Ages, *silva de Ligurio* and *Ligurium*, and so on; and he agrees with M. d'A. de Jubainville (*Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, ii. 207) in regarding the word *Liger* (the Loire) as probably of Ligurian origin. But, as one of his reviewers sensibly remarks (*Rev. arch.*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. xxx., 1897, p. 424), the fact that the site of the ancient Epidauros is now called *Ligourio* warns us to view such arguments with suspicion.

<sup>10</sup> *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, pp. 124-5.

<sup>11</sup> *Deutsche Alterthumskunde*, i. 193-4.

<sup>12</sup> Scylax, § 4, in *Geogr. graeci minores*, ed. Müller, i. 17-18.

name of the Seine, is also, he maintains, a Ligurian word ; for if it were Celtic, we may be sure, from our knowledge of a phonetic law which influenced the development of Celtic speech, that the *q* would have been replaced by a *p* at a date anterior to the commencement of Celtic history.<sup>1</sup> The Ligurians, unlike the Celts, did not change *q* into *p*: witness *Quadiates*,<sup>2</sup> the name of a Ligurian tribe who dwelt in the Cottian Alps.<sup>3</sup>

The truth is that the linguistic data are insufficient. "We have," says Canon Isaac Taylor,<sup>4</sup> following Diefenbach,<sup>5</sup> "only one undoubted Ligurian word, *asia*, which, as we learn from Pliny,<sup>6</sup> denoted, in the speech of the Taurini, grain of some kind . . . and this word has as yet been only explained from Basque sources." On the other hand, M. d'Arbois and Müllenhoff agree that *Rhodanus* is a Ligurian word ; and the former affirms with the utmost confidence that Ligurian was an Indo-European language.<sup>7</sup> Whatever may be thought of his theory,<sup>8</sup> it is worth noting that the suffixes which he regards as Ligurian have not been explained either from Celtic or from Basque sources. Moreover, his view regarding the wide extension of the Ligurians is not absolutely without historical confirmation ; for Festus Avienus<sup>9</sup> implies that the

<sup>1</sup> *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, ii. 124-5, 132.

<sup>2</sup> *Corpus Inscr. Lat.*, v. 7231, § 14.

<sup>3</sup> According to Artemidorus, cited by Stephanus of Byzantium (i. 416, ed. A. Meineke) and Eustathius (*Comm. sur Denys le Périgète*, ed. Didot, p. 231), the Ligurians were so called from the river *Αργήρος* (Loire) ; and M. Lagneau (*Mém. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. i., 1873, p. 262) endorses this etymology, and infers that Ligurians once dwelt in the valley of the Loire. M. d'Arbois de Jubainville, however, rejects the etymology. Artemidorus, he says (*Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. xxxi., 1876, pp. 379-88), wrote toward the end of the second century B.C., about 200 years after the year 312, in which the censor Appius Claudius introduced into Latin orthography the usage of substituting *r* for the primitive *s*, which, when it came between two vowels, was pronounced like *r*. It is therefore natural, concludes M. d'Arbois, that Artemidorus should have connected with *Liger* (Loire) *Lugures*,—the Latin name of the Ligurians. But *Liguses*, the primitive Latin name of the Ligurians, could not have come from *Liger*. Another obstacle, says M. d'Arbois, to the proposed etymology is the *e* in *Liger*, which must be changed into *u*, if we are to recognise the Loire in the form *Αργήρος*, which was invented by Artemidorus. Nevertheless, as I have already remarked, M. d'Arbois is disposed to regard *Liger* as a word of Ligurian origin.

<sup>4</sup> *The Origin of the Aryans*, p. 222.

<sup>5</sup> *Origines Europæacæ*, p. 235.

<sup>6</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, xviii. 40.

<sup>7</sup> Müllenhoff (*Deutsche Alterthumskunde*, i. 86) is equally certain that it was not ! M. Alfred Maury (*Comptes rendus des séances de l'Acad. des inscr. et belles-lettres*, 4<sup>e</sup> sér., t. v., 1877, pp. 208-11) argues that the proper language of the Ligurians was a dialect of Celtic ! His reasons are that *Bodincus*, the Ligurian name of the Po (Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, iii. 16, § 122), resembles *Agedincum* ; and that the names of various Ligurian tribes, mentioned by Pliny and on the triumphal arch of Susa, "affectent une physionomie celtique." This is rather vague : but the obvious answer is that Celts had settled in Ligurian territory ; and indeed M. Maury virtually acknowledges this, for he says (pp. 210-11), "il nous paraît hors de doute que les Ligyens étaient une population celtique ou tout au moins qui avait été celtisée." As to *Bodincus*, Pliny made his statement on the authority of a Greek, who said that the word meant "bottomless" ; and, if this is true, it is hard to see how *Bodincus* and *Agedincum* can have anything in common.

<sup>8</sup> See pp. 264-6, *supra*.

<sup>9</sup> *Ora maritima*, 129-34., M. A. Bertrand, who formerly opposed M. d'Arbois's view (*La Gaule avant les Gaulois*, pp. 233-48), is now disposed to agree with it.



northern part of Gaul was once occupied by Ligurians, who were dispossessed by Celtic invaders.

3. We have next to inquire, with a view to solving the problem which we have just been considering, what were the physical characters of the Ligurians. Diodorus Siculus, as we have seen, says that they were small and lean, but strong. Most of the skeletons which have been found in north-western Italy, which was certainly inhabited by Ligurians, are characterised by small stature, brachycephaly and small cranial capacity.<sup>1</sup> M. A. Hovelacque has measured 70 skulls found in the mountains of Savoy, which he believes to have been inhabited by Ligurians, and in which he maintains that the inhabitants have been free from all admixture of foreign blood.<sup>2</sup> The average cephalic index of these skulls was 85·41,<sup>3</sup>—that is to say, they were more brachycephalic than 88 Auvergnat skulls taken from St-Nectaire-le-Haut, which Broca examined.<sup>4</sup> There are other differences between the two series. The Savoyard skulls are mesorrhinian, those of Auvergne leptorrhinian.<sup>5</sup> The orbital index<sup>6</sup> of the Savoyard skulls is 89·41: that of the Auvergnat 86·5; and the cranial capacity of the former is considerably less than that of the latter. The hair of the modern inhabitants of Liguria, adds M. Zaborowski,<sup>7</sup> is very dark brown, darker than that of the inhabitants of central France, and so are their eyes. In fine, says this writer, they are a type of the small, dark, brachycephalic race at its purest.

All this is the hastiest generalisation. There is no evidence that the mountains of Savoy were ever inhabited by Ligurians.<sup>8</sup> It is impossible to tell how much or how little mixture of foreign blood there may have been in certain inhabitants of Italian Liguria,—only eight<sup>9</sup> in all,—whose skulls have been measured by MM. Nicolucci and Vogt; and even admitting that they were pure Ligurians, it is impossible to tell

He believes that the Ligurians were of northern origin, and tentatively identifies them with the dolmen-builders. See p. 253, n. 1, *supra*.

<sup>1</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. i., 1873, pp. 285-6.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. d'anthr.*, vi., 1877, pp. 226-52.

<sup>3</sup> It has been said that the mean cephalic index of a number of skulls, taken from the maritime districts of north-western Italy and south-eastern France and examined by MM. Nicolucci, Vogt and Pruner-Bey was 85·3. I have mislaid the reference: but that does not matter. Nicolucci's "Ligurian" skulls were three in number! (*Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, vi., 1865, pp. 259-61): Vogt (*ib.*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. i., 1866, p. 84) collected only seven, two of which came from the island of Elba; and their indices ranged between 76 (!) and 82·7. Pruner-Bey's are noticed in n. 8 *infra*.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 288.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 250.

<sup>6</sup> The "orbital index" denotes the proportion between the length and the breadth of the eye orbit.

<sup>7</sup> *Dict. des sciences anthr.*, p. 247.

<sup>8</sup> Pruner-Bey has written at great length about three "Ligurian" skulls, found in the neighbourhood of Hyères. But even supposing that they did belong to Ligurians, there is nothing to be learned from them. The index of one was 84·60; of another 80; and the measurements of the third are not stated. See *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, vi., 1865, pp. 458-74; *ib.*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. i., 1866, pp. 442-67.

<sup>9</sup> Or fifteen, if Dr. Beddoe is right in saying that Nicolucci found an average index of 86·7 in ten old skulls from Liguria. *The Races of Britain*, p. 28, note.

what was the exact shade of their colouring. For information on that point we can only turn to the statistics which have been published regarding the physical characters of the *modern* inhabitants of Liguria; and the results which they yield by no means bear out the glib generalisations which we find in text-books on ethnology. Look at the three tables, giving particulars of the stature, cephalic index and colouring of the inhabitants of the French departments, which have been prepared by MM. Broca, Collignon and Topinard. Taking the departments which were undoubtedly inhabited by Ligurians,<sup>1</sup> we find that the department of Alpes-Maritimes has a cephalic index of 82·85; Var 82·77; and Bouches-du-Rhône 81·43. The measurements on which these figures are based were all, it must be remembered, taken from the heads of living men: none of the figures represents a genuinely brachycephalic, and two only a sub-brachycephalic type of skull. All these Ligurian departments are less brachycephalic than many of the departments of central France. Puy-de-Dôme, the department in which Broca found his Auvergnat skulls, has an index of 85·53, and Allier, which adjoins it on the north, 83·33. The three Ligurian departments are, indeed, marked by M. Topinard as "very dark": but the table of stature lends little support to the popular theory. The inhabitants of the Ligurian departments ought to be shorter than those of the Celtic. They are taller. Var is 39th,—comparatively high,—and Bouches-du-Rhône 19th; while Allier is 78th and Puy-de-Dôme 84th. Taking Savoy, in which M. Hovelacque found his so-called Ligurian skulls, we obtain results more surprising still. Both Haute-Savoie and Savoie have indeed very high cephalic indices,—the former 86·25, the latter 87·39: but both of these departments stand in the 22 *fairest* of M. Topinard's list. In the district of France which was once Ligurian there have settled, at different times and in different proportions, Greeks, Gauls, Italians, Jews, Phoenicians, Saracens and other peoples.<sup>2</sup> I do not doubt that the mass of the population have Ligurian blood in their veins; and, speaking roughly and roundly, it is true that they are short, dark and, compared with the inhabitants of some other departments, *moderately* brachycephalic. But to say more would be to mislead.

Recently, indeed, attempts have been made to prove that the Ligurians were a dolichocephalic people. M. Pompéo Castelfranco affirms that 2 dolichocephalic skulls of the Cro-Magnon type have been found in the Pollera cavern in the commune of Finale, and 20 similar skulls in the cavern "des Arene Candide."<sup>3</sup> Both of these caverns are in Italian Liguria; and M. Castelfranco quotes M. Morelli, the discoverer of the Pollera skulls, who argues that the whole collection probably belonged to genuine Ligurians, because, according to Florus<sup>4</sup> and Diodorus Siculus,<sup>5</sup> the Ligurians, in the second century B.C. and in

<sup>1</sup> I have already spoken (p. 269) of the departments which were inhabited by Iberians mixed with Ligurians.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. d'anthr.*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. ii., 1879, p. 484.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 4<sup>e</sup> sér., t. i., 1890, pp. 593-9. Cf. *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 4<sup>e</sup> sér., t. i., 1890, p. 749.

<sup>4</sup> ii. 3.

<sup>5</sup> v. 39, § 5.

the time of Caesar, dwelt partly in caverns. Moreover, the well-known Italian anthropologist, G. Sergi, has exhumed 59 skulls, all dolichocephalic, in the valley of the Po; and he argues that "If it is true that prehistoric Italy was occupied by the Mediterranean race and by two branches,—Ligurian and Pelasgian,—of that race, the ancient inhabitants of the Po valley, now exhumed in those 59 skulls, were Ligurian."<sup>1</sup> Professor Keane unhesitatingly endorses this conclusion, and commits himself to the positive assertion that "the true Ligurians were not brachy- but dolichocephalic."<sup>2</sup>

I am bound to say that I do not think that the evidence warrants this confident conclusion. For the evidence that the Ligurians were dolichocephalic is, in kind, precisely the same as the evidence that they were brachycephalic. The 8 (or possibly 15) brachycephalic skulls of Nicolucci and Vogt are confronted with the 22 dolichocephalic skulls of Morelli and the 59 skulls of Sergi. Wherein lies the proof that any one of the three series was really and truly Ligurian? The advantage of numbers is on Sergi's side; and perhaps the argument drawn from the statements of Florus and Diodorus may have some weight: but the only reasonable verdict appears to be Not Proven.<sup>3</sup>

4. And now, who were the Ligurians? According to Broca, the descendants of the Ligurians are more brachycephalic than any of the palæolithic or neolithic peoples; and he accordingly concludes that the Ligurian invaders did not appear in Gaul until towards the 'close of the neolithic age.'<sup>4</sup> I do not question the conclusion: but Broca's arguments do not prove it. They depend upon the hypothesis that the skulls measured by MM. Hovelacque, Nicolucci, Vogt and Pruner-Bey were really Ligurian, and upon the fact that the *modern* inhabitants of Italian Liguria have an index of more than 86. MM. Hervé, A. Maury and Broca himself class the Ligurians as a branch of the so-called "Celtic" race, which peopled and still peoples Roumania, southern Germany, Austria and central France.<sup>5</sup> Broca and Maury have indeed been taken to task for assimilating the Ligurians to the Celts, when Strabo evidently distinguishes between the two people.<sup>6</sup> But there is a confusion of thought here. When Strabo spoke of the Celts, he was thinking of the tall fair race who formed the dominant group in Caesar's Celtic Gaul, and perhaps the bulk of the population in Belgium; or, if he was referring to the inhabitants of Gaul as a whole, the tall fair men were for him the most conspicuous representatives.<sup>7</sup> No one would now dream of identifying the Ligurians with the Gauls.<sup>8</sup> Broca was not thinking of the fair

<sup>1</sup> *Arii e Italici*, p. 60, quoted by A. H. Keane, *Man, Past and Present*, 1899, p. 464.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 463-4.

<sup>3</sup> See M. A. Lefèvre's remarks in *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 4<sup>e</sup> sér., t. vi., 1895, p. 342.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. ix., 1874, p. 713; *Rev. d'anthr.*, ii., 1873, pp. 597-8.

<sup>5</sup> *Dict. des sciences anthr.*, p. 679.

<sup>6</sup> *Rev. d'anthr.*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. iii., 1880, p. 454.

<sup>7</sup> See pp. 282-3, *infra*.

<sup>8</sup> See Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 51, 106-7. If we find Celtic names in Ligurian territory, that only shows that Gauls settled among a Ligurian population (Strabo, ii. 5, § 28).

race who had imposed their name and their language upon the original inhabitants of Gallia Celtica, and whom, following Caesar, he grouped with them under the common designation of "les Celtes": he was perhaps not even thinking of this aggregate or medley of "Celtae" as a whole: he really referred to the original population, whose type, he thought, owing to their numerical superiority, prevailed after the amalgamation had taken place. But to say that the Ligurians were physically akin to the dark people of Gallia Celtica,—and even that is very doubtful,—is not tantamount to saying that those people were Ligurians, or that, even before they were Celticised by the Gallic invaders, they spoke the same language as the Ligurians. On the other hand, Sergi and Keane dogmatically affirm that the Ligurians were simply a branch of the same "Mediterranean" stock from which the Iberians sprang. Their confidence may one day be justified; but I venture to say that it is premature.<sup>1</sup>

My general conclusions are these:—Ligurians undoubtedly lived in the departments of Alpes-Maritimes, Var and Bouches-du-Rhône; and, mingled more or less with Iberians, in those of Gard, Hérault, Aude and Pyrénées-Orientales. If the linguistic evidence collected by M. d'Arbois de Jubainville is correct, which is doubtful, Ligurians also once occupied a large part of eastern and central, and even of north-western France; and this view is confirmed by the testimony, whatever it may be worth, of Festus Avienus. Finally, although I do not think that the evidence is sufficient to *demonstrate* Sergi's conclusion, I am inclined to believe that the Ligurians and the Iberians sprang from the same stock.

#### THE CELTAE

1. Caesar says that that part of Gaul which lay between the Garonne on the south-west and the Marne and the Seine on the north-east was inhabited by a people "who call themselves Celts and whom we call Gauls." He further defines the area inhabited by the Celtae by telling us that it included the territories of the Sequani and the Helvetii;<sup>2</sup> and he either excludes or ignores the Roman Province. The Treveri and the

<sup>1</sup> Professor Boyd Dawkins (*Fortnightly Review*, xvi., 1874, pp. 325, 331) holds that the Ligurians were as closely akin to the Iberians as the Franks were to the Goths; for, he says, the two peoples were intimately associated by ancient writers, and the inhabitants of Hautes-Alpes and Basses-Alpes are "not distinguishable from the rest of the small dark French peoples." Now the Professor holds that the Iberians were dolichocephalic. The peoples of Hautes-Alpes and Basses-Alpes have cephalic indices of 84·37 and 83·67 respectively; and the people of Pyrénées Orientales have an index of 78·24. The Ligurians were unmistakably differentiated by the ancient writers from the Iberians. See *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. xxx., 1875, pp. 211-23, 309-21, 373-82, and Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 32, n. 2, 49-51.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, i. 1, §§ 2, 5. See map facing p. 1.

Mediomatrici who inhabited the country round Trèves, Metz and Verdun are also generally believed to have been Celtae: but it is not absolutely certain in which group Caesar included them.<sup>1</sup>

In *B. G.*, ii. 30, § 4, Caesar remarks that the Gauls in general were tall men.<sup>2</sup> I shall afterwards examine the value of this statement: for the present it is enough to say that by *omnibus Gallis* he evidently meant the Celtae as well as the Belgae; for first, if he had been speaking of the Belgae only, he would certainly have said *omnibus Belgis*; and secondly, while he sometimes uses the word *Galli* in an extended sense, which includes Belgae, the people whom, in his opening chapter, he expressly designates as Galli are the Celtae.

Diodorus Siculus, who lived in the time of Augustus, says, in the chapter of his history in which he describes the manners and customs of the Gauls,<sup>3</sup> "It may be well to emphasise a fact of which many people are ignorant. The Celts are the peoples who live beyond Massilia, in the interior of the country, near the Alps and on the north of the Pyrenees. The peoples settled on the north of Celtica and those who inhabit all the countries extending along the ocean and the Hercynian forest as far as Scythia, are termed Gauls." This passage, as I shall afterwards show, has given rise to much misapprehension.

Pausanias<sup>4</sup> says that the Gauls were originally called Celts by themselves and by their neighbours, and that the name of Gauls did not become general till later.

Strabo frequently speaks of the whole of Gaul as "Celtica" (ἡ Κελτική): but, like Diodorus, he also uses the word "Celtae" in a limited sense. "The inhabitants of Gallia Narbonensis," he says, "were formerly called Celts; and I believe that the name was transferred by the Greeks from them to the Gauls in general."<sup>5</sup> In another chapter<sup>6</sup> he says, quoting Caesar as his authority, that the Celtae were separated from the Aquitani by the Garonne and the Cevennes, which were at right angles with the Pyrenees, and that they inhabited the country on the east of the Cevennes as far as the sea in the neighbourhood of Massilia and Narbo, and as far as the Alps. All the other inhabitants of Gaul, he says, appealing to the same authority, were Belgae! In two other passages, however, ignoring the population of central Gaul, he says that the Belgae inhabited the country between the Rhine, the Loire and the Ocean. Needless to say, scholars generally recognise that, in his distribution of the Celtae and the Belgae, he blundered grossly. It is important to notice that, while he distinguishes the Belgae from the Celtae, he says that all the inhabitants of Gaul, except the Aquitani, have a Gallic exterior, though they do not all speak the same language.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 384-5.

<sup>2</sup> Plerumque omnibus Gallis prae magnitudini corporum suorum brevis nostris contemptui est.

<sup>3</sup> v. 32, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> i. 4, § 1.

<sup>5</sup> ταῦτα μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν νεμομένων τὴν Ναρβωνίτιν ἐπικράτειαν λέγωμεν, οὗς οἱ πρότερον Κέλτας ὀνόμαζον· ἀπὸ τούτων δ' οἶμαι καὶ τοὺς συμπάντας Γαλάτας Κελτοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων προσαγορευθῆναι. *Geogr.*, iv. 1, § 14.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, iv. 1, § 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*

Polybius,<sup>1</sup> like Caesar, describes the Gauls as tall: Virgil,<sup>2</sup> Manilius,<sup>3</sup> Silius Italicus<sup>4</sup> and Claudian<sup>5</sup> describe them as fair or red-haired; and Livy,<sup>6</sup> Ammianus Marcellinus,<sup>7</sup> Diodorus Siculus<sup>8</sup> and Strabo<sup>9</sup> describe them both as tall and as fair. Strabo, however, says that they were less tall and less fair than the Germans; and Manilius that they were less red. Polybius and Livy were only describing the Gallic invaders of Italy: but Diodorus Siculus, Strabo and Ammianus referred to the Gauls of Transalpine Gaul. The qualifying remarks of Strabo and Manilius only mean, if I am not mistaken, that fairness and tall stature were less common among the people of Gaul than among the people of Germany.

2. The observations of MM. Broca, Houdin, Collignon and Topinard on the stature, skull-form and colouring of modern Frenchmen have thrown great light on the ethnology of Gallia Celtica: but it would be misleading to examine the results of their observations without first inquiring what admixture of foreign blood the population of that country has received since Caesar's day.

Franks settled "in a thin stratum," as Dr. Beddoe puts it,<sup>10</sup> over most of the country north of Burgundy and of the Loire, except Brittany. Colonies of the Alani, who, according to Ammianus Marcellinus,<sup>11</sup> were tall and moderately fair, settled near the mouth of the Sèvre. Saxons settled in large numbers in the country round Bayeux and Caen, between the rivers Orne and Dive, and in the peninsula of Batz. Burgundians occupied the department of Jura, the country on the east of the Saône, the districts of Geneva and Lyons, the western part of Switzerland and the country to which they gave their name. Britons invaded Brittany in the fifth century. Alemanni, who were tall and dolichocephalic, accompanied by Swabians, who were short and brachycephalic, invaded the eastern part of Switzerland. Normans, described as tall, whose chiefs had red hair, settled in large numbers in Normandy, and in less proportions in the north-eastern part of Brittany and on the southern bank of the middle Loire. Saracens settled near Chatelus in the department of Creuse.<sup>12</sup> Italians of course settled in the principal Gallic towns. The influence of Jews and other foreigners who have settled in France in modern times may

<sup>1</sup> ii. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Aen., viii. 659.

<sup>3</sup> *Astronomica*, iv. 710-11.

<sup>4</sup> iv. 200.

<sup>5</sup> xxii. 241.

<sup>6</sup> xxxviii. 17, 21.

<sup>7</sup> xv. 12, § 1.

<sup>8</sup> v. 28, § 1.

<sup>9</sup> iv. 5, § 2; vii. 1, § 2. I see that M. Bertrand (*Les Celtes et les Gaulois dans les vallées du Pô et du Danube*, p. 36) has given one or two more references: but I have given enough.

<sup>10</sup> *Scottish Review*, xxi., 1893, pp. 177-8.

<sup>11</sup> xxxi. 2, § 21.

<sup>12</sup> *Ib.*; Beddoe, *The Races of Britain*, pp. 73-4, 78; *Dict. des sciences anthr.*, p. 504; *Rev. d'anthr.*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. ii., 1879, pp. 478, 481-3, 485; *Mém. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. i., 1895, pp. 113, 115-6; Sidonius Apollinaris, lib. viii., epist. ix., p. 316; *Notitia dignitatum*, ed. Böcking, pp. 80, 106, 108; Gregory of Tours (*Hist. Franc.*, ii. 272, lib. v., cap. xxvii., ed. Guadet and Taranne); *Capitularia Regum Francorum*, ii. 69 (tit. xiv.), ed. Baluze; Bouquet, *Recueil des hist. des Gauls*, vi. 50-51; Wace, *Le roman de Rou*, i. 126-7, vv. 2509-10, ed. F. Pluquet.\*

safely be neglected: but it must not be forgotten that, early in the imperial epoch, the Ubii, the Vangiones, the Nemetes and the Triboci, —German tribes which may, however, have been mixed with Celts,<sup>1</sup> were settled on the left bank of the Rhine from the neighbourhood of Cologne to that of Strasbourg.

3. I will now state the evidence which has been accumulated by the discovery of human remains and by the observations of modern ethnologists on living persons.

I have already spoken of the prehistoric races who inhabited this part of Gaul, and have shown that those of the neolithic age, at all events, were still represented among the Celtae in Caesar's time. As far as I have been able to discover, the few skeletons, unearthed on French soil, that have been generally identified as the remains of Gallic warriors of the Celtic-speaking conquering race, were all found in the basin of the Marne, either in Belgic territory or close to the common frontier of the Belgae and the Celtae. They belonged to tall dolichocephalic men;<sup>2</sup> and two of them may be seen in Salles ix. and x. of the Musée de St-Germain, the former having been buried with his war-chariot, iron helmet and long iron sword. But it should be noted that *tumuli* and cemeteries of the iron age, similar to those in which these skeletons were discovered, are quite as numerous in the territory of the Celtae as in that of the Belgae. They have been found on the left bank of the Rhine, between a point a little north of Coblenz and the neighbourhood of Basle, at Alaise and various other places between the Rhône and the Saône, in the upper valley of the Seine, and in the valley of the Loire, round Ste-Solange.<sup>3</sup>

I now come to the observations which anthropologists have made upon the population of that part of modern France which was inhabited by the Celtae.<sup>4</sup> For the purpose of comparison, I shall also refer to the departments which lie within the tracts that correspond respectively with Belgic Gaul, Aquitania and the Roman Province.

Roughly speaking, the inhabitants of the country on the north of a line drawn from Savoy to the extremity of Finistère are blond or relatively blond; those on the south of the same line are brown or relatively brown. This general statement is subject to two exceptions: the inhabitants of Côte-d'Or are brown; those of Charente-Inférieure fair.

Roughly speaking, again, the average height of the population is certainly greatest in the northern and eastern departments and least in those of the centre, the south and the west. In no department, however, is the average height of the whole adult population known, the state-

<sup>1</sup> See p. 314.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 289, *infra*.

<sup>3</sup> See M. A. Bertrand's *Arch. celt. et gauloise*, 2nd ed., 1889, map facing p. 264; *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. xi., 1876, pp. 263-71; *Bull. de la Soc. scientifique de Semur*, 1876, pp. 61-72.

<sup>4</sup> Broca's article on stature will be found in *Mém. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, iii., 1868, pp. 147-209; Boudin's on the same subject in another volume of the same periodical (ii., 1865, pp. 221-59); Topinard's on colouring in *Rev. d'anthr.*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. iv., 1889, pp. 513-30; and Collignon's on head-form in *L'Anthropologie*, i., 1890, pp. 201-24. A table, giving a summary of the results, will be found on pp. 320-22, *infra*.

ments which I have made are based upon the returns for 30 years (1831-60) of the number of males in every department who were exempted from serving in the army on the ground that their stature was below the minimum height of 1<sup>m</sup> 56, or about 5 feet 1½ inches; and the assumption is that, roughly speaking, the average height of the whole population varied according to the number of exemptions. Returns have also been published for the years 1836-40 of the number of recruits in every department whose height exceeded 1<sup>m</sup> 732, or about 5 feet 7½ inches. These returns correspond up to a certain point with the others: but there are striking discrepancies here and there. Thus Doubs, the department which has the least percentage of exemptions, has also proportionally the greatest number of recruits above 1<sup>m</sup> 732; and Haute-Vienne, the department which has the greatest percentage of exemptions, has also the smallest number of recruits above 1<sup>m</sup> 732: but, on the other hand, Côte-d'Or, which is 2nd in the former list, is only 25th in the latter; Loiret, which is as low as 55th in the former, is actually 14th in the latter; and, more remarkable still, Meurthe and Vaucluse, which are respectively 26th and 27th in the former, are 5th and 54th in the latter! It must also be noted, as an exception to the general law of distribution, that the two northern departments of Finistère and Ille-et-Vilaine stand very low in both lists,—79th and 68th respectively in the former, and 84th and 83rd in the latter; from which it may be inferred with tolerable certainty that the average stature of their populations is very low.

As regards cephalic index, not a single department in the whole of France is, strictly speaking, dolichocephalic: but the adjacent departments of Haute-Vienne and Dordogne are sub-dolichocephalic, with indices of 79·70 and 79·17 respectively, and Charente, which is conterminous with both of them, is mesocephalic, showing the only slightly higher index of 80·93;<sup>1</sup> while the adjacent departments of Calvados (81·62) and Eure (81·34) in Normandy, and of Seine-et-Oise (81·57) and Seine (81·59), Charente (80·93), and, in central France, Cher (81·77) and Indre-et-Loire (81·40) are also mesocephalic. No less than thirty-two Celtic departments are sub-brachycephalic. The remaining Celtic departments are all brachycephalic in the strict sense of the word, having indices which range between 85·50 and 88·20. They may be described as the southern central and the eastern groups. Each of them covers a large tract of country, and is absolutely unbroken; and they are separated from one another by the sub-brachycephalic department of Loiret. The southern central group comprises the departments of Haute-Loire (87·57), Lot (86·92), Lot-et-Garonne (86·66), Lozère (87·87), Puy-de-Dôme (85·53), Aveyron (85·50) and Cantal (87·08): the eastern group comprises Meurthe-et-Moselle (85·64), Vosges (86·68), Haute-Saône (87·37), Doubs (86·05), Jura (88·20), Rhône (86·01), Saône-et-Loire (87·11) and Ain (86·72).

<sup>1</sup> It must be remembered that M. Collignon's measurements were made "sur les vivants," and therefore that all the figures which I am about to extract from his table must be reduced by 2. See pp. 249-50, *supra*.



Let us now enquire what relation subsists between the tables of MM. Broca, Collignon and Topinard. It is generally assumed that, except in certain departments of the east, the comparatively tall people of Gallia Celtica are also comparatively fair and comparatively dolichocephalic, and that the comparatively short people are dark and brachycephalic or comparatively brachycephalic. There is some truth in this view: but it is generally stated too broadly. Taken in the mass, the people of Ain, Aube, Doubs, Jura, Haute-Marne, Orne and Haute-Saône are comparatively tall and fair, and brachycephalic or sub-brachycephalic; while tall, fair and relatively dolichocephalic or, strictly speaking, mesocephalic people are found in Calvados and Eure. The familiar combination of short stature, dark hair and complexion and brachycephaly is found in Aveyron, Cantal, Haute-Loire, Lot, Lot-et-Garonne, Lozère and Puy-de-Dôme,—in other words, in a continuous tract of south-central Gaul. Medium or short stature, dark hair and complexion and mesocephalic or sub-brachycephalic skulls characterise the inhabitants of Charente, Deux-Sèvres, Gironde, Indre, Indre-et-Loire, Vienne and Haute-Vienne. But various cross-divisions have to be noted. The tall groups are not always fair; for instance, the coast between St. Malo and St. Brieuc is inhabited by tall dark men with sub-brachycephalic skulls. Nor are the short groups always dark. Short stature is found in union with a mesocephalic or sub-brachycephalic type of skull and fair or relatively fair hair and skin in Charente-Inférieure, Cher, Côtes-du-Nord, Creuse, Eure-et-Loir, Finistère and Morbihan, Loiret, Manche, Nièvre, Seine and Yonne. Even the statement, generally true, that the short round-skulled people of central France are generally dark, must not be taken too literally; for, if their hair is dark, their eyes are often gray or green;<sup>1</sup> and on the whole their darkness is much less intense than that of the less brachycephalic people of the Mediterranean.<sup>2</sup> Finally, it must be borne in mind that, as M. Topinard remarks, types are found in every district which do not properly belong to them; and everywhere individuals are to be seen who combine in their own persons the characteristics of different types:—thus the tall stature of the so-called “Kymric” type is to be found associated with the features of the short sturdy Auvergnat and the black hair of the southerner; and the fair hair and complexion of the Norman with the aquiline nose of the Jew or the round skull of the Savoyard. In the towns especially, as might be expected, the characters of different types are inextricably confused, and the most various characters are exemplified within single families. Of two brothers one will have black eyes, and the other blue: one will have a long, and the other a round skull; the father and mother will be tall, and the children short.<sup>3</sup>

Is it then impossible to construct a theory out of the available data,

<sup>1</sup> V. de St. Martin, *Nouv. Dict. de Géogr. univ.*, ii, 1884, p. 345; *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. v., 1882, p. 151.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. d'anthr.*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. ii., 1879, p. 195.

<sup>3</sup> *Nouv. Dict. de Géogr. univ.*, ii, 346.

which shall satisfy the reason? I do not think so. Broca made the attempt; and the explanation which he offered convinced the majority of students.

Broca's theory has been so often misrepresented,<sup>1</sup> or at least stated in a way which was sure to mislead those who had not studied his writings, that it is necessary to be very careful in pointing out exactly what he said. In a paper called "*Qu'est-ce que les Celtes?*"<sup>2</sup> he began by remarking that he aimed at putting a stop to the continual confusion which had been caused by the manifold senses in which the word "Celt" had been used both by ancient and modern writers. The true Celts, the Celts of history, he concluded, were the mixed race whom Caesar called *Celtae*,—the people who inhabited that part of France which lies between the Roman Province and the Garonne on the south, the Rhine, the Seine and the Marne on the east and north-east, and the sea on the north and west.

Broca's theory regarding the *Celtae* and their relation with the *Belgae* may be put briefly as follows. He remarks, referring to the official returns for 1831-60, which I have already quoted, that the height of recruits is greatest in the departments of the north and east, including parts of the country inhabited by the *Belgae*, and least in the departments of the centre, the south and the west; while between these two groups there is a zone inhabited by men of middle height.<sup>3</sup> "On the maps," he says, "on which I have noted the variations in stature by departments, the line of demarcation between tall men and short men reproduces exactly the line of demarcation fixed by Caesar between *Belgae* and *Celtae*. Consequently the two peoples so clearly distinguished by Caesar differed in respect of stature. The *Celtae* were short, and the *Belgae* were tall ( . . . observation teaches us that blonds predominate in the country once inhabited by the *Belgae* and brunets in the country once inhabited by the *Celtae*").<sup>4</sup> But of course this division between big and little men is not to be taken too literally. Broca himself corrects it<sup>5</sup> by pointing out that between the two groups there is a zone inhabited by men of middle height; and this fact, he remarks, is naturally to be explained by a mixture of the two races.<sup>6</sup> In support of this explanation, he argues that, whereas in the *Belgic* departments of *Seine-et-Oise*, *Oise*, *Aisne*, *Somme* and *Marne*, the prevalent form of skull is sub-dolichocephalic, and in the *Celtic* departments of *Puy-de-Dôme*, *Cantal*, *Lozère*, *Côtes-du-Nord* and *Finistère* brachycephalic or sub-brachycephalic, *Paris* in the intermediate zone is characterised by a mesocephalic type.<sup>7</sup> He freely admits indeed that there are districts in *Celtic Gaul* in which, owing to a "*Kymric*" ad-

<sup>1</sup> I find that what I have said is confirmed by M. Collignon, *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, vi., 1895, p. 342.

<sup>2</sup> *Mém. d'anthr.*, t. i., 1871, pp. 370-76.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 391-2.

<sup>4</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. viii., 1873, pp. 247-8.

<sup>5</sup> *Mém. d'anthr.*, i. 392.

<sup>6</sup> *Rev. d'anthr.*, ii. 1873, pp. 589, 689.

<sup>7</sup> These statements are not strictly accurate. According to Broca's own standard. *Seine-et-Oise*, *Aisne* and *Somme* are mesocephalic, and *Marne* and *Oise* sub-brachycephalic.

mixture or to the survival of some prehistoric race, a dolichocephalic (or, strictly speaking, sub-dolichocephalic) type predominates; but, he insists, "dans la plus grande partie de cette région c'est le type brachycéphalique qui a prévalu, et il est d'autant plus prononcé, que les populations celtiques ont reçu . . . moins d'éléments étrangers."<sup>1</sup>

To illustrate and enforce his theory, Broca examines four groups of skulls, taken from Auvergne, from Brittany, from Paris and from the department of the Marne respectively. The Auvergnat skulls, 125 in number, came from the village of St-Nectaire-le-Haut in the department of Puy-de-Dôme; and from the isolated situation of this village Broca concluded that its population had received practically no foreign admixture since the Gallic epoch. The average index of the whole number was 84·07, and of the male skulls 84·45. The Auvergnats, says Broca, are the purest, because they are the most brachycephalic, of the living representatives of the Celts.<sup>2</sup> The purest they may be: but I must remark that, according to the measurements of M. Collignon, which had not been made public when Broca wrote, they are not the most brachycephalic; as the departments of Lozère (87·87) and Jura (88·20) show higher indices than any of the departments of Auvergne.

The Breton skulls, numbering 136, were collected by Dr. Guibert from the department of Côtes-du-Nord. A line, running from north to south about 20 kilometres west of St-Brieuc, divides the Celtic-speaking from the French-speaking inhabitants of the department. The average index of all the skulls taken from the former district, which is in Basse-Bretagne, was 81·34, of those of males 81·71; while in the French district, which is in Haute-Bretagne, the figures were 82·9 and 82·54 respectively.<sup>3</sup> In these results Broca sees a confirmation of his theory. Haute-Bretagne, he remarks, was indeed successively invaded by Alani, Visigoths, Frisians, Saxons and Normans: but it is probable that the influence of these successive infusions of foreign blood upon the original population was weaker than that of the British invasion of Basse-Bretagne, because "l'intensité des effets du croisement dépend avant tout du nombre relatif des étrangers qui viennent, à un certain moment, contracter des alliances,"<sup>4</sup> etc. Therefore, Broca thinks, it is natural that the average index of the skulls taken from Basse-Bretagne, which was invaded, "à un certain moment," by dolichocephalic Britons, should be lower than that of the skulls taken from Haute-Bretagne,

<sup>1</sup> *Rec. d'anthr.*, ii., 1873, p. 590.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 598, 608.

<sup>3</sup> In the group taken from Basse-Bretagne there were at least 20 almost pure "Auvergnat" skulls. *Rec. d'anthr.*, ii., 1873, pp. 619-20.

<sup>4</sup> The canton of Marans, near the mouth of the Sèvre, which was colonised by a group of Alani, will serve to illustrate the effect which may, in certain circumstances, be produced by the immigration of an alien people. Marans, though 25 per cent of its population is blond, is one of the most brachycephalic cantons of Saintonge. Yet the Alani were certainly a dolichocephalic people. M. Collignon concludes that, not having been accompanied by women, they would soon have been absorbed by the original population. In his opinion, what has modified the "Auvergnat" type in this canton is the tall, fair, "Gallic" type. See *Mém. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. i., 1895, pp. 115-16, 122.

which was invaded, at five successive periods, by dolichocephalic Saxons and other "Germanic peoples."

The Parisian skulls, numbering 125, which were taken from the "cimetière de l'Ouest," showed an average index of 79; and, as the same number, taken from a Parisian cemetery of the twelfth century, yielded an almost identical average (79·18), Broca inferred that 79 was approximately the index which would have been yielded by any group of Parisian skulls in the time of Caesar. While, he concludes, the Auvergnat group represents the "Celtic" race almost at its purest, and that of Côtes-du-Nord displays the characters of a mixed population, in which the "Celtic" element predominated, but the "Kymric" formed a considerable minority, the Parisian series shows the results of a fusion in which the two elements were almost equally represented.

The "Kymric" skulls were only 38 in number, 27 being male and 11 female. The mean index of the former is 78·49, of the latter 77·02; but Broca assumes that the index of skulls of the purest "Kymric" type would have been considerably lower; for, he argues, as the Gauls of the Marne lived very near the frontier of the Celtae, they must have been "fortement croisés de Celtes brachycéphales." He does not offer any evidence to show that these skulls belonged to Gauls properly so called: but I have no doubt that they belonged to the same race as the tall dolichocephalic warrior, already mentioned,<sup>1</sup> whose skeleton, interred with his car and long sword, is preserved in the Musée de St-Germain; and it is certain that this warrior was a genuine Gaul.

Finally, Broca is careful to explain the sense in which he applies the term "race" to the Celtae and the Belgae. These two peoples, he warns his readers, were not "des races primitives et pures": on the contrary, "sous le rapport ethnologique, elles étaient affiliées par le sang"; and "la race celtique est le résultat du mélange des races indigènes avec les immigrants."<sup>2</sup> What happened, he believes, was this. The tall, fair, "Kymric" race took possession of the whole of Gaul, except the country between the Garonne, the Pyrenees and the Gulf of Gascony,—the Aquitania of Caesar.<sup>3</sup> Between the Seine, the Marne and the Scheldt, that is to say in the western part of the country of the Belgae, the Kymri remained almost entirely pure until the Merovingian epoch, when they received an infusion of German blood:<sup>4</sup> the Celtae were a mixed race resulting from the crossing of the "Kymri" with the small, dark, aboriginal peoples.

M. Hovelacque,<sup>5</sup> Dr. Lagneau,<sup>6</sup> and others have endeavoured to

<sup>1</sup> See p. 284, *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> *Mém. d'anthr.*, i. 394-6; *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. ix., 1874, p. 713.

<sup>3</sup> *Mém. d'anthr.*, i. 395. Broca believes that the fair invaders came in two hordes, the second of which entered Gaul more than 1000 years after the first.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 394-6. Elsewhere Broca says that "la race celtique . . . avait très probablement autrefois occupée au moins la partie méridionale de la Gaule belge, où la race Kymrique . . . avait fini par la supplanter en l'absorbant dans un mélange inégal."

<sup>5</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. ix., 1874, p. 705.

<sup>6</sup> *Rev. d'anthr.*, i., 1872, pp. 613-4; *Dict. encycl. des sciences médicales*, xiii., 1873, pp. 704-5.

support Broca's theory by referring to ancient writers. Diodorus Siculus, they argue, distinguished the Gauls from the Celts: he described the former as tall and fair; the inference is obvious that the latter were short and dark. And, says Dr. Lagneau, if Caesar tells us that the people who dwelt between the Belgae and the Aquitani called themselves Celts, while the Romans called them Gauls, the explanation is easy:—"il semble que les Celtes, confondus sous la dénomination de leurs vainqueurs Gaëls, aient cherché à protester encore contre cette dénomination en persistant à se donner encore à eux-mêmes le nom de Celtes."

Neither of these arguments has any force. I have already quoted the passage in which Diodorus distinguishes between the Celts and the Gauls.<sup>1</sup> Now anybody who carefully reads through the chapters in which he describes the inhabitants of Gaul will see that he habitually uses the word Γαλάται not in the restricted but in the general sense, including both Γαλάται and Κελτοί. Therefore when he describes the Gauls as tall and fair, he meant that description to apply both to the people whom he calls Celts and to the people whom he calls Gauls. If I am wrong in this conclusion, he does not describe the Celts at all; for in describing the people of Gaul he invariably speaks of them as Gauls. But it is certain that my conclusion is right; for, after describing<sup>2</sup> the manners and customs of the Gauls, as he calls them, he says "I have now spoken enough about the Celts and will proceed to describe the Celtiberians" (ἡμεῖς δ' ἀρκοῖντως περὶ τῶν Κελτῶν εἰρηκότες μεταβιβάζομεν τὴν ἱστορίαν ἐπὶ τοὺς Κελτιβήρας). In fact, though he thinks it necessary to warn his readers that the *Celtae* were geographically distinct from the *Galli*, he draws no physical distinction between them;<sup>3</sup> and, in conformity with ancient usage, he as a rule uses the two terms indifferently. It is hardly necessary to add that he was an uncritical writer, and that the territory to which he restricts the *Celtae* is not coextensive with that which Caesar assigns them. The argument that the *Celtae* called themselves by this name in order to mark their protest against the domination of their Gallic masters, is almost too fanciful to require an answer. When Caesar tells us that the people whom the Romans called *Galli* called themselves *Celtae*, he is not speaking of the conquered people only but of the entire population of the great central division of Gaul, including the conquerors, who, by the admission of Broca and his disciples, were Gauls properly so called. As the late distinguished historian, H. Martin, remarked, there is every reason to believe that, in the mixture of the two races, it was the conquerors who imposed their name upon the conquered.<sup>4</sup> So the conquering Franks, although they were comparatively few in number, gave their name to the whole country.

<sup>1</sup> See p. 282, *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> v. 25-32.

<sup>3</sup> Since I wrote these words I have found that Prichard said much the same:—"it is plain," he remarked, "that this distinction laid down by Diodorus is founded on no ethnographical limitation." *Physical History of Mankind*, vol. iii., 1841, p. 49, note.

<sup>4</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. ix., 1874, pp. 663-7.

The radical errors in Broca's definition of "the Celts of history" are these:—first, he calmly assumes that no classical writer's testimony, except Caesar's, is of any value; and secondly, he fails to see that Caesar, by saying that the people who called themselves "Celts" were called by the Romans "Gauls," makes it as clear as noon-day that for him and for his countrymen, as for Polybius and Pausanias, the words "Celt" and "Gaul" were synonymous. Broca admits that the older population of Gallia Celtica was conquered by men of the same race as the Gauls or Celts who captured Rome. Therefore it is absolutely certain that the Celtae of Transalpine Gaul were called after their conquerors. The truth is that Broca, while he aimed at putting an end to confusion, only made confusion worse confounded. Moreover, throughout his discussion, he simply ignores the *Helvetii*, who, according to Caesar, were included among the *Celtae*.

But these points are of minor importance; and I have only touched upon them in order to clear away the misconceptions to which Broca's theory has given birth. The real question is whether his account of the ethnology of Gallia Celtica is accurate,—in other words, whether the bulk of the population in Caesar's time were short, dark and brachycephalic, as they are at the present day. I believe that there is a solid substratum of truth in Broca's theory, but that, partly perhaps from the characteristically French love of logical precision, partly from the want of sufficient data, he pushed it too far. In his time the supplementary tables of MM. Collignon and Topinard had not been published.

There are several departments the returns for which appear to clash with or, at all events, are not to be explained by Broca's theory. Thus Finistère and Morbihan are both in the lowest class as regards stature; and yet the former ranks as comparatively fair, the latter as very fair in M. Topinard's list. In the department of Seine the prevailing type is comparatively fair and mesocephalic. This is what we might expect to find, according to Broca's theory, in a district situated near the common frontier of the Belgae and the Celtae: but the department stands only 49th in the table of stature, lower than the departments of Vendée, Deux-Sèvres, Gironde and several others in which the prevailing type is comparatively or extremely dark.<sup>1</sup> I do not believe, however, that any valuable conclusion can be drawn from the modern population of Seine, that is to say, of Paris and its environs; for this population is nearly as mixed as that of London. Moreover, the eastern group of departments presents features which neither Broca nor any other ethnologist has satisfactorily explained. The people of Doubs, Jura, Haute-Marne and Haute-Saône are respectively 1st, 3rd, 4th and 9th in the table of stature: the first three appear in the group which Topinard styles "les plus blonds," and the fourth is comparatively fair;

<sup>1</sup> It is true that Broca warns us that, as a result of crossing, "les plus grands pourront être bruns et les plus petits pourront être blonds" (*Rev. d'anthr.*, ii., 1873, p. 590). One can understand that this should be the case here and there: but when we find the same results in entire departments, the fact seems to require explanation.

yet all four are extraordinarily brachycephalic. Dr. Collignon<sup>1</sup> and others explain this combination as the result of a cross between the tall fair Burgundians and the short, dark, brachycephalic people whom they conquered; and Dr. Collignon remarks that the modern Lorrainers are much shorter than genuine blonds like the Scandinavians. But the Burgundians were extremely dolichocephalic; and it is difficult to see how a cross between a dolichocephalic and a brachycephalic race should result in a population even more brachycephalic than the most brachycephalic of their ancestors. I can only suggest that, if Dr. Collignon had measured a relatively large number of skulls in the Burgundian departments, their indices might have turned out lower.

Broca paid special attention to the ethnology of Brittany.<sup>2</sup> The arguments which he based upon a collection of skulls taken from the department of Côtes-du-Nord have been already noticed. In the department of Finistère, he says, on the north of the mountains of Arrée, tall fair people are in the majority; and the prevalent type of skull is long, the nose being also long and the chin pointed: south of the same line the people are short, stout, dark and round-headed. The former, he says, are "Kymric,"—the descendants of the British invaders who settled in Brittany in the sixth century, and who, since Caesar's time, have been the sole disturbing element in the population of Basse-Bretagne; the latter are "des Celtes proprement dits."<sup>3</sup>

Dr. Guibert also has made an elaborate investigation<sup>4</sup> into the ethnology of the Armorican peninsula.<sup>4</sup> The Breton language, he points out, is spoken in Basse-Bretagne,—the departments of Finistère and Morbihan, and the western part of the department of Côtes-du-Nord. As we should expect from what history teaches us of the British settlement in Brittany, men of tall stature are found principally in the districts near the sea. The department of Côtes-du-Nord is divided into a Breton-speaking and a French-speaking portion by a line running from north to south. Now it happens that the average stature is greatest in the maritime districts not of the Breton-speaking but of the French-speaking portion; and it is in these very districts that the proportion of blue eyes and fair hair is lowest. These facts, as Dr. Guibert insists, clash with Broca's theory, so far as it relates to Brittany; and, as he also remarks, Broca has exaggerated the extent of "Kymric" influence on the population of the Breton littoral, forgetting that the British invaders were doubtless themselves not pure "Kymric," but as mixed as the people among whom they settled. The fact, emphasised by Dr. Guibert, that in the Breton-speaking maritime district, in combination with relatively low stature, blue eyes, fair hair and relatively long skulls are found more frequently than in the other portion of the department, would seem to point to such a medley of races as must

<sup>1</sup> *L'Anthropologie*, i., 1890, p. 213. See also *Rev. mensuelle de l'École d'anthr. de Paris*, 1896, p. 218, where it is pointed out that "les croisements ethniques ont souvent pour résultat non pas la fusion, mais l'échange des caractères."

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. d'anthr.*, ii., 1873, pp. 600-604.

<sup>3</sup> *Mém. d'anthr.*, i., 1871, pp. 297-8.

<sup>4</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. v., 1870, pp. 252-65.

make it impossible to draw any inference from the ethnology of the Armorican peninsula regarding that of Gallia Celtica as a whole.

At all events, it would seem that Broca did not sufficiently allow for the influence which the various Germanic conquerors of Gaul must have exercised in modifying the physical characters of the people among whom they settled.<sup>1</sup> It is probable that those conquerors were, generally speaking, tall, fair and dolichocephalic; and it is precisely in those parts of France in which they settled,—always excepting the inadequately explained brachycephaly of Burgundy, Franche-Comté and Lorraine,—that the closest approximation to those characteristics is found among modern Frenchmen. Who shall decide what proportion of the result is to be ascribed to these Germanic peoples,—Franks, Saxons, Northmen and the rest,—and what to the tall fair Gauls of Caesar's time? When Broca and his disciples maintain that the *Celtae* were, for the most part, markedly different in physical characters from the *Belgae*, they forget or disregard the evidence of Strabo,<sup>2</sup> who says that the *Belgae* and the *Celtae* “participated in the same Gaulish exterior,”—that is to say that they were both alike tall and fair,—and the evidence of Caesar, who says that *omnes Galli*, that is to say *Belgae* and *Celtae* alike, were tall. On the other hand, if we attempt to use this evidence against Broca, we are confronted by the fact that a large proportion of the *Celtae* and some certainly of the *Belgae* were demonstrably short and dark, and by the fact that we cannot tell whether Strabo was only repeating what he had heard or read, and whether Caesar did not exaggerate, like many unscientific travellers, the prevalence of those characters by which he was most impressed. Furthermore, in the well-known passage<sup>3</sup> in which he tells us that the inhabitants of Vesontio (Besançon) frightened the legionaries by telling them of the huge stature of the Germans, he certainly seems to imply that tallness was much less common among the people of Gaul than among the people on the east of the Rhine.

I will now try to use the data which I have collected in this section. First, it is undeniable, and is admitted by every one who has studied the question, that a large proportion of the people whom Caesar called *Celtae* were short, dark and brachycephalic or sub-brachycephalic; that is to say that they differed essentially in physical characters from the Gauls or Celts whom the ancient writers with one voice describe as tall, and whom nearly all of them describe as fair. It is also probable that a considerable portion of them, in certain districts, were short, dark and relatively dolichocephalic. Furthermore, M. Collignon has remarked that “la brachycéphalie semble croître avec

<sup>1</sup> In one of his articles, however (*Mém. d'anthr.*, i. 287) he lays great stress upon that influence:—“nous voyons . . . entre la Meuse et le Rhin . . . les Kymris presque entièrement germanisés par suite de la prédominance de la population franke . . . entre la Seine, la Meuse et l'Escaut, les mêmes Kymris, restés à peu près purs jusqu'à l'époque mérovingienne, et mêlés depuis lors, en proportion notable, aux conquérants germaniques,” etc.

<sup>2</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 1, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, i. 39, § 1.



l'altitude du lieu, et que ses maxima répondent aux massifs montagneux les plus élevés,"<sup>1</sup> from which he concludes that the older inhabitants were, in some measure, driven out of the more fertile tracts by blond dolichocephalic invaders. So much modern research has added to the knowledge which we derive from the ancients. The question that remains is why the existing traces of the tall fair Gauls in the country (exclusive of Helvetia) that was once occupied by the Celtæ are so slight. M. d'Arbois de Jubainville offers a peculiar explanation.<sup>2</sup> The Gauls, he says, were very few; and even those few were almost annihilated in the Gallic war. The true Gauls, he insists, were merely the aristocratic caste whom Caesar describes<sup>3</sup> as *equites*; and a passage in *B. G.*, vii. 64, § 1, proves that they only numbered 15,000 fighting men, from which it may be inferred that the whole population, including women and children, was not more than 60,000! There is no force in this argument. First, it entirely ignores the statement of Caesar that the Gauls generally, including the Celtæ (*omnes Galli*) were tall, as well as the statements of Strabo and Diodorus, to which I have already referred. Secondly, it assumes that Caesar always uses the word *equites* in the same sense,—that the Gallic *cavalry* were entirely composed of the "knights" or nobles whom Caesar describes in his general account of the manners and customs of the Gauls; whereas he expressly says that Dumnorix maintained a large number of *equites*, who could not have been "knights," at his own expense.<sup>4</sup> Thirdly, it leaves out of account the fact that, even in the last year of the Gallic war, there were, at the very least, 8000 *equites*<sup>5</sup> besides those mentioned in *B. G.*, vii. 64, § 1. Fourthly, it assumes that these same "knights" had for centuries preserved their organisation as a close corporation, and that none of the *plebs* belonged to the tall fair race,—an assumption which is contrary to all reason. Moreover, there is no evidence that the *equites* were "almost annihilated" in the Gallic war; and it is hard to understand why the cavalry should have been annihilated any more than the infantry.

By way of explaining the existing rarity of blonds in Celtic Gaul, Dr. Beddoe remarks<sup>6</sup> that we do not know exactly what ancient writers meant by certain shades of colour, nor can we estimate the personal equation of those of them who wrote from personal observation. "What is darkish brown," he remarks, "to most Englishmen would be chestnut in the nomenclature of most Parisians . . . an ancient Roman might . . . have called it . . . even *flavus*." This argument is to my mind invalidated by three facts,—(a) that the meaning of *flavus* and *rutilus* is fixed by numerous passages;<sup>7</sup> (b) that the ancients described the Germans, whom Dr. Beddoe admits to have been genuine blonds, by practically the same epithets as the Gauls; and (c) that Diodorus<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A. Bertrand, *La Gaule avant les Gaulois*, pp. 323-4.

<sup>2</sup> *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, ii., 1894, pp. 7, 10.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 13, § 3, 15, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, i. 18, § 5.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, vii., 76, § 3.

<sup>6</sup> *The Races of Britain*, p. 3.

<sup>7</sup> See Forcellini, *Totius latinitatis lexicon*, t. iii., 1865, pp. 98-9, t. v., 1871, pp. 279-80.

<sup>8</sup> v. 3£, § 2.

describes the extreme fairness of Gallic children and the gradual darkening of their hair as they grow older in terms which would be applicable to Norwegian children in the present day:<sup>1</sup>—τὰ δὲ παῖδιά παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐκ γενεῆς ὑπάρχει πολλὰ κατὰ τὸ πλείωτον· προβαίνοντα δὲ ταῖς ἡλικίαις εἰς τὸ τῶν πατέρων χρῶμα ταῖς χρόαις μετασχηματίζεται.

Without resorting to M. d'Arbois's explanation or to Dr. Beddoe's, it is not difficult to account satisfactorily for the general disappearance from Gallia Celtica of the type which Caesar, Strabo and Diodorus describe. Men of this type were, there can be little doubt, less numerous, even in Caesar's time, than the dark races; and even then intermarriage had probably been going on for generations between them and the peoples whom their forefathers had conquered. The losses which they suffered during the Gallic war were no doubt disproportionately heavy: it is, as Broca has pointed out, the constant tendency of a mixed race to revert to the type which was, at the outset, numerically in the ascendant;<sup>2</sup> and, as Penka<sup>3</sup> has shown, the tall blond races have, owing to climatic reasons, never been able to maintain their original proportion in central or southern Europe. When we consider all these things, and bear in mind further that, since Caesar wrote, racial amalgamation has been going on for nearly 2000 years, it is not to be wondered at that so few specimens of the classical Gallic type are to be found now in the country which corresponds with Celtic Gaul.

But we must beware of exaggerating the rarity of the type. The three tables published by MM. Broca, Topinard and Collignon are apt to suggest to an unwary reader that the people of this or that department are *uniformly* short, dark and brachycephalic. Any traveller who kept his eyes open would soon find out that this was a mistake. The tables only profess to give general results; and the numbers of individuals on which those of MM. Topinard and Collignon were based were comparatively small. The well-known traveller, William Edwards,<sup>4</sup> saw numerous examples of what he called the "Kymric" type between Geneva and Mâcon, in Burgundy, and between the mouths of the Somme and the Seine. The characteristics of this

<sup>1</sup> In the public gardens of Clermont-Ferrand, which is in the typically "Celtic" department of Puy-de-Dôme, almost every child whom I saw was fair, and many had flaxen hair. H. Martin remarks (*Rev. d'anthr.*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. ii., 1879, pp. 194-5) that immense numbers of children are born blond, and darken, which, he argues, proves that the "Gallic" element among the Celts was larger than is commonly supposed.

<sup>2</sup> Broca lays it down as an axiom that when two races, numerically very unequal, mix, the less numerous is rapidly absorbed, and that hybrids tend to revert to the type of the more numerous. See *Rev. d'anthr.*, ii., 1873, p. 619. Again, Dr. Beddoe remarks that tall fair children cannot stand the insanitary conditions of urban life as well as short dark ones. *Scottish Review*, xix., 1892, p. 416. See also L. Vanderkindere, *Recherches sur l'ethnologie de la Belgique*, 1872, p. 62.

<sup>3</sup> See *The New Princeton Review*, v., 1888, pp. 12-13.

<sup>4</sup> *Les caractères physiologiques des races humaines*, 1829, pp. 58, 61, 66-7.

type he described as "la tête longue, le front large et élevé, le nez recourbé, la pointe en bas, et les ailes du nez relevées, le menton fortement prononcé et saillant, la stature haute." I saw it myself three years ago, in combination with fair hair and complexion, in two carters, near Royat, in the department of Puy-de-Dôme. What is the exact proportion which it bears to the whole population of France, we can never tell, unless and until the Government undertakes a systematic investigation.<sup>1</sup>

We must not overlook the Helvetii. Caesar, it will be remembered, includes them among the Celtae. Now, although, as we have seen,<sup>2</sup> the older inhabitants of Helvetia, like the mass of the older inhabitants of the rest of Gallia Celtica, were brachycephalic and doubtless, for the most part, dark, there is strong evidence that the Helvetii, properly so called, were tall powerful Gauls. Mr. Munro<sup>3</sup> argues that the earlier inhabitants of the lake-dwellings of Switzerland were conquered by a tall race, who understood the working of iron. He remarks that 100 weapons, similar to the Gallic weapons found near Alise-Ste-Reine (Alesia) and on Mont Beuvray (Bibracte), have been discovered near the village of Port, and that antiquities, which may with certainty be referred to the period between the beginning of the second century B.C. and the introduction of Christianity, and which resemble those found at the famous station of La Tène, have been discovered in Britain. The Celtic character of these antiquities is certain. One of them,—a shield found in the river Witham,—was decorated with coral, with which, according to Pliny,<sup>4</sup> the Gauls ornamented their shields. Chain-mail, which, according to Diodorus Siculus,<sup>5</sup> was used by the Gauls, has been found with similar antiquities at Stanwick in Yorkshire and at Tiefenau, near Berne. At Tiefenau, moreover, along with these remains, 30 Gallic coins have been found.

4. It is universally admitted that a certain proportion, great or small, of the people whom Caesar called Celtae were tall and fair, and were ethnically identical with or akin to the Gauls who captured Rome. Were these men identical in race with the tall fair Belgae?

Perhaps the evidence of language may help us. Of the language or languages that were spoken in Gaul nothing remains except names of men and of peoples, geographical names, a few names of things which passed into Latin, and a few inscriptions.<sup>6</sup>

J. C. Prichard and M. d'Arbois de Jubainville maintain that the Celtic and Belgic tongues were closely akin. The former gives lists,

<sup>1</sup> According to M. Topinard (V. de St. Martin, *Nour. Dict. de Géogr. univ.*, ii., 1884, p. 345), men with fair or red hair, blue or gray eyes, sub-dolichocephalic skulls and prominent noses are often to be seen in the north of France. Their average height he estimates at 1<sup>m</sup> 70, or rather less than 5 feet 7 inches. See also *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 2<sup>e</sup> ser., t. xii., 1877, p. 94.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 253.

<sup>3</sup> *The Lake-Dwellings of Europe*, 1890, pp. 537-8, 545-8, 551. See also A. Bertrand, *Les Celtes dans les vallées du Pô et du Danube*, 1894, pp. 142, 144, 212.

<sup>4</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, xxxii. 11.

<sup>5</sup> v. 30, § 3.

<sup>6</sup> See Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 580.

which any one might construct for himself, showing the frequency with which geographical names ending in *dunum*, *durum* or *durus*, *magus*, *acus* and *iacum* occur both in Belgic and in Celtic Gaul, and concludes that "we cannot admit that any diversity existed between the speech of the Belgic and Celtic Gauls which can bear analogy to the difference between the Welsh and Irish languages."<sup>1</sup> He also quotes the statement of Tacitus<sup>2</sup> that there is not much difference between the languages of the Gauls and the Britons, and infers that "according to the opinion of Tacitus, the Gaulish nations, at least the great mass of them, had one language." From the statement of Strabo<sup>3</sup> that the Belgae and the Celtae "differ a little" in language, he draws the same conclusion; for, he argues, "had the Belgae spoken a language which the Celts could not understand, the affinity of the two idioms would never have been discovered by people as incurious of such matters as were the Romans and Greeks." By Ulpian,<sup>4</sup> he remarks, and other post-classical writers "the Gallic idiom is always mentioned as one particular language" (*lingua Gallicana*). But "had a totally different speech prevailed in so great a portion of Gaul as the Belgic countries formed . . . we should either find the Gallic languages mentioned in the plural or the Belgic distinguished from the Gallic."<sup>5</sup>

A well-known and often-quoted observation of St. Jerome<sup>6</sup> points, says Prichard, to the same conclusion. "Unum est," wrote Jerome. "quod inferimus,—Galatas . . . propriam linguam eandem paene habere quam Treveros." Now, argues Prichard, the Galatians were Celtae and the Treveri were Belgae: therefore there was but little difference between the Belgic and Celtic tongues. The objection to this argument is that it is now generally believed that the Treveri were reckoned by Caesar not among the Belgae but among the Celtae.<sup>7</sup>

Prichard then examines a number of Gallic compound words, and concludes that "a greater number of the elements are discoverable in Welsh than in Erse"; and, in order to show that Gallic is more nearly akin to Welsh than to Gaelic, he gives a list of "a few authentic Gaulish words, preserved by classical authors," e.g., *petorritum*, a four-wheeled carriage (*petor*=four, *rhod*=a wheel), *pempetula*, cinquefoil (*pemp*=five, *deilea*=a leaf) etc. "It is probable," he concludes, "that the difference between their dialects (those of the Celtae and the Belgae) was nearly parallel with that which subsisted between Welsh and Cornish at the time when both these idioms were spoken in southern Britain. The Welsh, which is the relic of the language of the inland Britons or Caesar's aborigines, is most probably akin to the dialect of Gallia

<sup>1</sup> *Physical History of Mankind*, iii., 1841, pp. 108-10, 113-20.

<sup>2</sup> *Agricola*, 11.

<sup>3</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 1, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Digest.*, xxxii. 11 (*Corpus iuris civilis*, ed. Krueger and Mommsen, 1839, vol. i. p. 443).

<sup>5</sup> *Physical History of Mankind*, iii. 111-12.

<sup>6</sup> "The conclusion at which we arrive is that the Galatians speak virtually the same language as the Treveri." *Comm. in epist. ad Galatas*, lib. ii., cap. iii., 429-30, ed. Migne (*Patrologiae cursus completus*, xxvi. 357).

<sup>7</sup> See pp. 384-5.

Celtica, and the Cornish to the idiom of the Belgae, who overran the southern district of England, and probably sought refuge in the west when the Saxons were extending themselves from the eastern part of the island."<sup>1</sup>

Professor Rhys, on the contrary, holds that two distinct, though kindred dialects were spoken in Gaul. Names like *Sequana*, he remarks, "seem to suggest that there was at one time a Celtic people on the Continent whose language resembled the dialect of the Goidelic group." This people he calls the "Q group" of Celts, or the "Celticans"; while he designates the Brythonic Celts as the "P group." Again, "the use of the two names *Celtae* and *Galli* would seem to point to the same inference—namely, the existence in Gaul of two Celtic peoples, the one probably superimposed on the other, as a vanquished population,<sup>2</sup> or driving it towards the south and west . . . in the eastern portions of Gaul they (the *Galli*) may have formed the bulk of the population, but in the rest . . . they probably only constituted a ruling class of comparatively small importance in point of numbers. Such a state of things would adequately explain the great dearth of linguistic remains belonging to the older and subjugated people. . . . A somewhat similar conclusion . . . has been arrived at by studying the burials and megalithic monuments of France and the neighbouring lands to the east of it. In Central and Western France menhirs, dolmens and cromlechs prevail, while the Eastern side of France shows the prevalence of mounds and barrows, which are here and there found penetrating into the other domain, giving a sort of rude sketch, as it were, of an invasion advancing irregularly towards the west."<sup>3</sup>

The Professor draws the same inference from the often-quoted words of Sulpicius Severus,<sup>4</sup> who lived in the fourth and fifth centuries of our era (A.D. 365-425). Gallus, a character in one of his dialogues, having been asked to give an account of St. Martin, replied that, as a Gaul, he was afraid to offend by his uncouth speech the cultivated ears of his questioner,—an Aquitanian. *Tu vero*, replied Postumianus (the Aquitanian), *vel Celtice, aut, si mavis, Gallice loquar, dummodo Martinum loquaris*. Professor Rhys understands these words as meaning "Speak Celtic or Gallic, if you prefer it," etc. "It is natural," he argues, "to infer that two languages, called respectively Celtic and Gallic were still in use in Sulpicius's time."<sup>5</sup> But the Professor entirely misunderstands the Latin. *Celtice, aut, si mavis, Gallice* simply means "in the Celtic, or, if you prefer to call it so, the Gallic tongue."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Physical History of Mankind*, iii. 129, 133-4.

<sup>2</sup> The Professor does not, of course, believe that "the vanquished population" was exclusively Celtic. The "enslaved subjects," he says, "in so far as they were Celts, were the Celticans."

<sup>3</sup> *Scottish Review*, xv., 1890, pp. 238-41; Chambers's *Encyclopædia*, iii., 1895, pp. 57-8.

<sup>4</sup> Sulpicii Severi *Dialogus*, i. 27 (ed. C. Halm, 1866).

<sup>5</sup> *Scottish Review*, xv., 1890, p. 239.

<sup>6</sup> M. F. de Coulanges, who believes that the Gauls no longer spoke Celtic at this time, says, "il serait puéril de prendre ces mots à la lettre. Postumus (*sic*) ne savait pas le celtique, et il est douteux que Gallus lui-même le sût . . .

The Professor's other arguments are not more convincing. The distribution of dolmens on the maps of Europe and Africa proves conclusively, as is now generally admitted, that they were not built by a Celtic-speaking people at all. As to the use of the two names, "Celtae" and "Galli," Caesar distinctly says that they denoted the same people. Moreover, M. d'Arbois de Jubainville, who is not less renowned as a Celtic scholar than Professor Rhys, denies the existence of the alleged fact on which Professor Rhys's theory mainly rests. The word *Sequana*, he contends, does not prove that the Celtae belonged to the Q group of Celtic-speaking peoples; for *Sequana* is a pre-Celtic (and, as M. d'Arbois believes, Ligurian) word: "des noms de peuples comme *Parisii*, *Petruorii* et des noms d'hommes<sup>1</sup> l'établissent péremptoirement."<sup>2</sup>

Broca argues that the dialect spoken by the Celtae was Kymric; for, he remarks, the British invaders who colonised Brittany only occupied the sea-board, and a Kymric dialect is spoken to this day in the other Celtic-speaking districts of the Armorican peninsula.<sup>3</sup> Dr. Guest<sup>4</sup> maintains that the Celtae spoke a Kymric and the Belgae a Gaelic dialect: but, as his knowledge of Celtic was very inadequate, it would be waste of time to examine his arguments.

It is certain that the conquering people among the Belgae and the conquering people among the Celtae were, ethnically, one and the same.<sup>5</sup> They spoke the same language or dialects of the same language: their physical features are described by the ancient writers in terms which are virtually identical: the *tumuli* and cemeteries which contained the remains of their dead are found in the territories of both peoples. The chief reason for raising the question which I have been discussing is that, according to the Roman envoys who visited Caesar in 57 B.C., the Belgae were "descended from the Germans" (*ortos ab Germanis*);<sup>6</sup> and we shall presently see that this statement does not shake the orthodox

L'auteur . . . a seulement voulu dire que les Gaulois du Centre avaient un Latin moins pur que ceux du Midi" (*Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France,—la Gaule rom.,* 1891, p. 128). See also J. Loth, *L'Émigration bretonne en Armorique*, 1883, pp. 82-3.

In the well-known "formularies" of Marcellus, physician to Theodosius the Great, certain Gaulish names of plants, etc., are mentioned. Zeuss, in the Preface (dated 1853) to his *Grammatica Celtica* (pp. xxxii.-xxxiii., ed. 1871), denied that there were any Celtic words in the formularies: but, according to Professor W. K. Sullivan (E. O'Curry's *The Manners and Customs of the Ancient Irish*, i., 1873, p. lx.), he afterwards "fully admitted the Celtic character of the Marcellian formulæ in a letter to Jacob Grimm"; and Pietet thought that they belonged to the Goidelic, not, like the other linguistic remains of Gaul, to the Brythonic branch of the Celtic tongue.

<sup>1</sup> *E.g.*, Eporedorix.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. celt.*, xi., 1890, p. 377. See also M. d'A. de Jubainville's *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, ii., 1894, pp. 282-3, 292, 294.

<sup>3</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, 2<sup>e</sup> ser., t. viii., 1873, p. 251.

<sup>4</sup> *Origines Celtique*, i., 1883, pp. 363, 380-84.

<sup>5</sup> Of course I do not mean to affirm that either the conquering Belgae or the conquering Celtae were homogeneous; or to deny that the prevailing types of the two groups, of whom the Belgae were the later comers, may, from various causes, have become more or less differentiated: I only mean that the purer Belgae and the purer Celtae sprang from the same stock.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 4, § 1.

conclusion, that the Belgae, or rather the Belgic conquerors, were, for the most part at all events, a Gallic and Celtic-speaking people.

M. Alexandre Bertrand has formulated a theory regarding the Celts and the Gauls, which has sometimes been assimilated to that of Broca, though it is really distinct from it.<sup>1</sup> He maintains that the Gauls, properly so called,—“les Gaulois” or “les Galates,” as he terms them,—formed a group apart from the Celts, and distinct from them in manners and customs: nevertheless he holds that the two groups were, in physical characters, identical, and spoke dialects of the same language; and he is never tired of insisting, on the authority of Plutarch, that “the Gauls” belonged to “the Celtic race.” The invaders of Italy who captured Rome were, he maintains, Gauls, properly so called: but, long before they threaded the passes of the Alps, a peaceful “Celtic” population had been settled in the Plain of Lombardy. Similarly, he argues that “Celtic” immigrants had established themselves in Transalpine Gaul five or six centuries before the true Gauls entered that country; and these latter he identifies with the people who built the *tumuli* of the iron age. The reader will perceive that M. Bertrand’s tall fair “Celts” were not identical with the mixed population whom Caesar called *Celtae*; and he will also note, on referring to the map of the *tumuli* and cemeteries of the iron age,<sup>2</sup> that M. Bertrand’s “Gauls” were to be found among the *Celtae* as well as among the Belgae.<sup>3</sup> M. Bertrand points, in support of his theory, to various archaeological discoveries, which have been made in the Plain of Lombardy and in the basin of the Danube as well as in France, Switzerland and Belgium. I need hardly say that the sense in which he uses the words “Celt” and “Gaul” is not sanctioned by Caesar: but he labours, at prodigious length, to prove that it has the support of Polybius.<sup>4</sup> It would be irrelevant to the purpose of this essay to discuss his theory in detail; for he affirms, as I have already remarked, that between the “Celts” and the “Gauls” there was no physical distinction. It may, however, be as well to point out that, although there may have been differences in culture, such as those which he describes, between successive groups of Celtic invaders of Gaul, it has been demonstrated by M. d’Arbois de Jubainville that the terms *Celtae* and *Galli*, as used by the ancient writers, including Polybius, were, generally speaking, synonymous.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. d’anthr.*, ii., 1873, pp. 235-50, 422-35, 629-43; *Rev. arch.*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. i., 1876, pp. 1-24, 73-98, 153-61; *Archéologie celtique et gauloise*, 2<sup>e</sup> éd., 1889: *Les Celtes et les Gaulois dans les vallées du Pô et du Danube*, 1894, especially pp. 1-63, 124-5, 132-3, 142, 149-51, 156-7, 177-8; *La religion des Gaulois*, 1897, pp. 8, 10-13, 213 etc.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 284, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> He regards the Helvetii as “Galates” (*La religion des Gaulois*, 1897, p. 13).

<sup>4</sup> See *Rev. arch.*, i. 1876, pp. 1-24, 73-98, 153-61. In *Rev. d’anthr.*, ii., 1873, p. 426, M. Bertrand admits that Polybius uses the words *Γαλάται* and *Κέλται* almost indifferently: but, he says, that only proves “le caractère banal . . . de ce term *Κέλται*.” He remarks (*Ib.*, pp. 242-3) that in the east all European nations are called “Franks”: but, as he admits that “les Celtes” and “les Gaulois” belonged, anthropologically, to the same race, his illustration loses its point.

<sup>5</sup> *Les premiers habitants de l’Europe*, ii., 1894, pp. 394-409; *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. xxx., 1875, pp. 8-9, 13.

One word more, and I bid adieu to the *Celtae*. It has been asserted that "the word 'Kelt' has long ceased to have any ethnical significance."<sup>1</sup> If so, the reason is that writers on ethnology have not kept their heads clear. Broca, as we have seen, laid it down that "the Celts of history" were the mixed population of *Gallia Celtica* whom Caesar called *Celtae*; and if for "the Celts of history" we substitute "the Celts of history as written by Caesar," his definition is a truism. But one important point Broca overlooked. Just as the French are called after one conquering people, the Franks; just as the English are called after one conquering people, the Angles; so the heterogeneous *Celtae* of Transalpine Gaul were called after one conquering people; and that people were the Celts, or rather a branch of the Celts, in the true sense of the word. The Celts, in short, were the conquering race, who introduced the Celtic language into Gaul, into Asia Minor, and into Britain; the race which included the victors of the *Allia*, the conquerors of *Gallia Celtica* and the conquerors of *Gallia Belgica*; the people whom Polybius called indifferently Gauls and Celts; the people who, as Pausanias said, were originally called Celts and afterwards called Gauls. If certain ancient writers confounded the tall fair Celts who spoke Celtic with the tall fair Germans who spoke German, the ancient writers who were better informed avoided such a mistake. The popular instinct in this matter has been right. Let us therefore restore to the word "Celt" the ethnical significance which of right belongs to it.

## VI

## THE BELGAE

1. What Caesar, Strabo, and Diodorus Siculus tell us about the physical characters of the Belgae, I have virtually stated already. They were tall, and, according to the two later writers, fair; and they did not differ noticeably from the *Celtae*. Caesar, as everybody knows, tells us that the Belgae, according to his Roman informants, were, for the most part, of German origin, and that the *Condrusi*, *Eburones*, *Caerوسي* and *Paemani* were designated, in his time, as Germans<sup>2</sup>; and, in one passage,<sup>3</sup> he himself describes the *Segni* and *Condrusi* as Germans by race. The significance of these statements I shall presently discuss.

2. The great majority of the people who have settled in Belgic Gaul since Caesar wrote have belonged to the German or kindred races. Franks settled in large numbers in Flanders and Brabant and also in the neighbourhood of Laon and Soissons: afterwards Saxons and Frisians completely Germanised Flanders and Brabant.<sup>4</sup>

3. Of the neolithic skulls which have been found in Belgic territory, I have already spoken.<sup>5</sup>

The evidence collected by MM. Broca, Collignon and Topinard is available only for the western and southern portions of the Belgic

<sup>1</sup> Keane, *Ethnology*, p. 397.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 4, §§ 1, 10.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, vi. 32, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Scottish Review*, xxi., 1893, pp. 177-8.

<sup>5</sup> See pp. 251-2.



territory, which comprise the departments of Aisne, Ardennes, Marne, Nord, Oise, Pas-de-Calais, Seine-Inférieure, Seine-et-Marne and Somme. In every one of these departments the mass of the people are fair or relatively fair: in all, except Seine-Inférieure, where the average height is medium, they are relatively tall; while in Aisne, Nord, Pas-de-Calais, Seine-Inférieure and Somme, they are mesocephalic, and in the remainder sub-brachycephalic. The department of Marne, combining as it does fairness and relatively high stature with a high cephalic index, appears to belong, ethnologically, to that Celtic group which comprises Ain, Doubs, Jura, Haute-Marne and Haute-Saône; while Aisne, Nord, Pas-de-Calais, Seine-Inférieure and Somme, evidently have much in common with the neighbouring Celtic departments of Seine, Seine-et-Oise and Calvados.

With regard to that part of the Belgic territory which is included in modern Belgium, we are dependent upon the researches of M. L. Vanderkindere<sup>1</sup> and Dr. Beddoe.<sup>2</sup> The line which marks the separation between the Flemish and Walloon languages also marks the separation between two physical types, the Flemings, whose territory was conquered, and has often been re-peopled by Germans, being taller and fairer than the Walloons. The Walloons, however, in the strip of territory which extends along the valley of the Lys in western Flanders, are taller than the Flemings in the basin of the Yser. The inhabitants of the Flemish provinces are also more dolichocephalic than those of the Walloon, the cephalic index of the former ranging between 76·7 and 78·31, that of the latter between 78·51 and 81·17.<sup>3</sup> Although the Walloons, generally speaking, are dark, the purest, according to M. Vanderkindere,—for example, those of Namur,—are fair. Very short, stout women, with black or dark brown hair and eyes, are often seen in the valley of the Meuse and in Hainault.<sup>4</sup>

4. I have already, in speaking of the Celtae, mentioned the view which Broca took of the Belgae. He believed that the great mass of the people, in Caesar's time, were "Kymric,"—that is to say tall fair Gauls of the classical type,—intermixed with or living among a minority of the short, dark, brachycephalic type which he called Celtic. But when he came to this conclusion, he was apparently not aware that a considerable proportion of the modern population of the Belgic country are sub-brachycephalic; and his conclusion was not warranted even by the incomplete evidence upon which it was based. For it is certain that the comparatively high stature, the comparatively low cephalic index, and the fairness of the existing population are largely due to the German immigrants who have settled in the country since Caesar's time: but how largely, it is impossible to say. Again, it is possible, as Dr.

<sup>1</sup> *Recherches sur l'ethnologie de la Belgique*, 1872, pp. 21-2, 59, 63, 65, 68; *Nouvelles recherches sur l'ethnologie de la Belgique*, 1879, pp. 41, 44-5.

<sup>2</sup> *The Races of Britain*, pp. 16, 21, 72-3, 94; *Scottish Review*, xxi., 1893, pp. 178-9.

<sup>3</sup> According to M. E. Houzé (*Rev. d'anthr.*, 2<sup>e</sup> ser., t. v., 1882, pp. 527-30), the average cephalic index of 166 Flemings was 76·84, of 75 Walloons 81·10.

<sup>4</sup> E. Reclus, *Nouv. géogr. univ.*, iv. 78.

Beddoe<sup>1</sup> suggests, that the relatively low cephalic index which characterises a large section of the population, may be due not only to "Kymric" and German elements, but also to the presence, in ancient times, of the small, dark, dolichocephalic people who are generally called Iberian. That Broca's "Celtic" element existed in considerable force among the Belgæ, is proved not only by the continued existence, in certain parts of the country, of peoples of the "Celtic" or "Auvergnat" type, but also by the fact that so large a proportion of the population are now relatively brachycephalic: at least this argument holds good if Broca was right in his belief that the tall fair Gauls, as well as the Germans, were dolichocephalic. Again, it is impossible to say how far the comparative fairness and tallness of the modern Belgian population may be due to the influence of blond immigrants of the neolithic age. Nevertheless I believe that Broca's view, if it was pushed too far, contained a considerable element of truth, and that in the northern, western, and relatively dolichocephalic districts, at all events, the tall, blond, Gallic element was proportionately stronger, in Caesar's time, among the Belgæ than among the Celtae. For it is certain, and indeed obvious that the dark brachycephalic element is proportionately much smaller now in Belgic than in Celtic Gaul; and moreover a large number of the taller modern inhabitants, especially among the Walloons and in the neighbourhood of Reims, present a type which is markedly non-Germanic, and which, as I shall show in the proper place, there is strong reason to regard as a modified form of the true Gallic type. Before I come to this question, it will be well to examine the view which Dr. Beddoe has published regarding the composition of the Belgæ.<sup>2</sup>

Besides the short, dark, brachycephalic people, the so-called Iberians, and other representatives of prehistoric races, Dr. Beddoe holds, as I understand, that the bulk of the Belgæ proper consisted of a large proportion of tall dark people, and a small proportion of tall fair people, who formed the dominant caste. He arrives at this conclusion by the following reasoning. The purest representatives of the Belgæ are, he believes, the Walloons, who, as Dr. Thurnam remarks,<sup>3</sup> "pride themselves upon being of the most ancient Gaulish lineage."<sup>4</sup> Doubtless, Dr. Beddoe admits, the Walloons are not, strictly speaking, a pure race. There is probably a Germanic and an Iberian element in their composition. Still, their type is markedly different from that of the true Germans and the blond Flemings. They and the inhabitants of Reims and Epervanay, who closely resemble them, have the "tall frames, square foreheads and long sharply drawn features which constitute W. Edwards's Kymric type." This type prevails throughout the country extending north-eastward from the neighbourhood of Reims through the Ardennes

<sup>1</sup> *The Races of Britain*, p. 94.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 21-2; *Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain*, etc., ii., 1873, pp. 18-20.

<sup>3</sup> *Crania Britannica*, pp. 164-5.

<sup>4</sup> According to M. Vanderkindere (*Recherches*, etc., p. 66) the Walloons of Namur and Luxembourg are ethnically identical with the people of north-eastern France, and especially of Champagne.

to Liège and Verviers. But the moment we cross the Walloon frontier, we find ourselves among a totally different people, whose features and complexions are German. People of the Walloon type are found in other districts, where Gauls or Celtic-speaking peoples have lived. They are found everywhere in Brittany, and especially in the district of Léonais, where the British immigrants of the fifth century are believed to have landed: they abound in Normandy, in northern Italy, and in Cornwall; and the type "seems to constitute an element of more or less importance in the population of most parts of the British isles." "This hatchet-faced Walloon type," says Dr. Beddoe, "is the same which . . . Broca . . . connects with tall stature and fair hair." But the point upon which the doctor, speaking from personal observation and with the authority of an expert whose reputation among anthropologists is European, lays special stress, is that in the country of the Belgæ the type is not connected with fair, but with dark hair. All the 14 Flemish arrondissements of Belgium, he insists, show more blonds and fewer brunets than any of the 12 Walloon; and his conclusion is that "though the chiefs, the true Galatæ, were fair, the mass of the old Belgæ was of old something like what it is now."

M. Vanderkindere<sup>1</sup> is of a different opinion. He admits that the Walloons in general are dark, but he holds that Dr. Beddoe is wrong in concluding from this fact that the mass of the Belgæ resembled them in colouring. The darkness of the Walloons is due, he thinks, to the crossing of their ancestors with the prehistoric dark population; and the proof is that the purest Walloons, for example those of Namur, are fair.

It is impossible to decide the question. Dr. Beddoe himself infers from the skull-form of the Walloons that their ancestors were largely crossed by the dark "Iberians." M. Vanderkindere thinks that their comparatively high cephalic index is due to admixture with the dark brachycephalic people,<sup>2</sup> and Dr. Beddoe himself<sup>3</sup> ascribes it to partial descent from the Sclaigneaux people of the neolithic age. Possibly both may be right. It is impossible to say whether the coalescence of races had already proceeded so far before Caesar's time that even then, as Dr. Beddoe thinks, the mass of the Belgæ were dark, or whether it was mainly deferred till a later time. Anthropologists generally appear to assume that no tall dark European race has ever existed: but the tallest men in Dalmatia are the darkest;<sup>4</sup> and the tallest representatives of the tallest population in Great Britain and probably in Europe,—the men of Upper Galloway, whose average height is nearly 5 feet 10½ inches, or 1<sup>m</sup> 79, are also the darkest;<sup>5</sup> though the fact that their dark brown hair often shows a substratum of red, and is generally accompanied by gray eyes, seems to show that they had fair as well as dark ancestors. But, considering the implied statements of the ancient writers regarding

<sup>1</sup> *Recherches sur l'ethnologie de la Belgique*, p. 65.

<sup>2</sup> So also M. Houzé. See *Rev. d'anthr.*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. v., 1882, p. 530.

<sup>3</sup> *The Races of Britain*, p. 42.

<sup>4</sup> *Scottish Review*, xx., 1892, p. 378.

<sup>5</sup> Beddoe, *The Races of Britain*, p. 249.

the prevalent fairness of the Belgæ, I find it difficult to believe that this attribute was virtually confined to a few chiefs.

## VII

## WHO WERE THE TRUE GAULS OR "KYMRI"?

I have now to grapple with one of the most difficult problems of Gallic ethnology,—who were the tall fair conquerors of Gaul, the Gauls properly so called, or, as MM. Broca and Edwards called them, the Kymri? Are we to identify them, as Dr. Thurnham, Canon Isaac Taylor and others maintain, with the race whose remains have been found in our own round barrows, or, as Houzé<sup>1</sup> and Dr. Lagneau believe, with the ancient Germans, or did they constitute a distinct group?

It ought not now to be necessary to warn the reader that, when I speak of "the tall fair conquerors of Gaul, the Gauls properly so called," I do *not* mean to imply that any group of Gauls, even the Gauls who captured Rome, all belonged to one type. On the contrary, if anything in ethnology is certain, we may be sure that even they were more or less mixed. So, Dr. Beddoe warns us not to believe that there was ever a period when, for example, all the Caledonians were red-haired.<sup>2</sup> I only mean to imply that, among the conquerors of Gaul, tallness and fairness were the prevailing characteristics.

The ancient writers, who are unanimous in describing the physical type of the Gauls, tell us nothing about the shape of their skulls. Broca, as I have already observed, believes that it was dolichocephalic, although he admits that the authentic Gallic skulls which we possess are too few to generalise from. These are the 38 skulls found in the department of the Marne, to which I have already alluded,<sup>3</sup> and of which the mean index is about 77·75. The same conclusion might perhaps be drawn from an observation of the prevalent form of skull in those countries in which Celtic languages are still spoken; although, as the Celtic-speaking peoples are of mixed races, great caution would of course be required in observing their characters. Of 42 ancient Irish skulls in Barnard Davis's collection only two were brachycephalic. From a number of measurements of the heads of living Highlanders Dr. Beddoe<sup>4</sup> estimates their average cephalic index to be 76·27, which, he says, would be about 74 on the bare skull. Daniel Wilson<sup>5</sup> arrived by an ingenious process of reasoning, at the conclusion that the typical Celtic skull was dolichocephalic. He drew up the following tables:—

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. d'anthr.*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. v., 1882, p. 527.

<sup>2</sup> *The Races of Britain*, p. 245.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 289, *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> *The Races of Britain*, p. 244.

<sup>5</sup> *Anthropological Review*, iii., 1865, pp. 52-84.

## BRETON HEAD FORM.

Pre-Celtic, Turanian or Finnic element . . . . .	Brachy? <sup>1</sup>
Germanic elements . . . . .	Dolicho
Native Celtic element . . . . .	_____?
Modern head :—	Dolicho? <sup>2</sup>

## NORMANDY HEAD FORM.

Pre-Celtic elements . . . . .	Brachy <sup>1</sup>
Germanic . . . . .	Dolicho
Scandinavian : Norse . . . . .	Dolicho
Finnic . . . . .	Brachy
Native Gaulish . . . . .	_____?
Modern head :—	Brachy. <sup>3</sup>

## ENGLISH HEAD FORM.

Pre-Celtic element : Megalithic race . . . . .	Kumbe <sup>4</sup>
Pre-Celtic(?) element: Barrow race . . . . .	Brachy
Germanic elements . . . . .	Dolicho
Scandinavian elements . . . . .	Dolicho
Native British elements . . . . .	_____?
Modern head :—	Dolicho.

## SCOTTISH HEAD FORM.

Pre-Celtic element : Megalithic race . . . . .	Kumbe <sup>4</sup>
Pre-Celtic(?) element: Barrow race . . . . .	Brachy
Germanic element . . . . .	Dolicho
Scandinavian element . . . . .	Dolicho
Celtic element . . . . .	_____?
Modern head-form :—	Dolicho.

He also lays stress upon a fact which Dr. Beddoe<sup>5</sup> has noticed, namely that the absolute length of the Highlander's head is very great. I believe that Wilson was right in his conclusion : but it is impossible to say how far the dolichocephalic character of the British "Celtic" skull is due to fusion between the Celtic invaders and the extremely dolichocephalic aborigines.

A number of skulls, the mean cephalic index of which is 73,<sup>6</sup> have been discovered near Hallstadt, in the Austrian Alps, about 17 miles south-east of Salzburg. From the character of the antiquities found with them, these skulls are generally believed to have been Celtic : a bronze fibula, for instance, found at the well-known settlement of La Tène in Switzerland, closely resembles one of the Hallstadt type found at Hradisch, in Moravia.

The skeletons which have been found in the British round barrows have been so often described that their characteristics are probably familiar to all who take even the most superficial interest in ethnology. Broadly speaking, they belonged, we are told, to one and the same race. Their average stature was high, that of the men being 5 feet 8½ inches, or 1<sup>m</sup> 737.<sup>7</sup> They are usually described as brachycephalic : but strictly speaking the prevailing type was mesocephalic, although among the skulls which have been discovered there are specimens of every class. Of the 25 skulls found in round barrows in all parts of Great Britain which are described in *Crania Britannica*, 16 show a cephalic index above 80, 5 show indices varying between 79 and 77, and 4 between 76 and 74. The indices of 41 skulls discovered in

<sup>1</sup> The pre-Celtic elements were probably both "brachy" and "dolicho." See Section II. of this essay.

<sup>2</sup> This is not accurate. The indices of all the Breton departments are sub-brachycephalic :—Ille-et-Vilaine, 84·02 ; Loire-Inférieure, 83·77 ; Morbihan, 82·62 ; Finistère, 82·83 ; Côtes-du-Nord, 83·72.

<sup>3</sup> Inaccurate again. For "brachy" read "mesocephalic" and "sub-brachycephalic" :—Calvados, 81·62 ; Manche, 83·10 ; Orne, 83·33 ; Eure, 81·34 ; Seine-Inférieure, 81·10.

<sup>5</sup> *Scottish Review*, XLII., 1893, p. 88.

<sup>4</sup> *I.e.* boat-shaped.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, xxi., 1893, p. 171.

<sup>7</sup> *Memoirs read before the Anthropological Society of London*, iii., 1870, pp. 72-3.

Derbyshire and Staffordshire, which are described in Table II. of the same book, range between 74 and 89, while the mean is 80·7.<sup>1</sup> There is a close resemblance between the Round Barrow skulls generally and those of the Maories; and they also resemble the mesocephalic and brachycephalic skulls found in a neolithic tumulus at Borreby, in the Danish island of Falster.<sup>2</sup> Some of them are characterised by short square chins and well-developed supraciliary ridges, which, as Canon Taylor remarks,<sup>3</sup> "must have given a fierce and beetling aspect to the face."

It has been argued that the Round Barrow race must have been identical with the Gauls, because (1) Britain was peopled by Celtic-speaking immigrants from Belgic Gaul, and if the Round Barrow skeletons do not belong to representatives of this race, it is impossible to point to any tombs of theirs in the British Isles; (2) Dr. Thurnam's investigations are believed to have shown that "Gaulish skulls" were round, and had beetling brows;<sup>4</sup> (3) the Round Barrow people generally burned their dead, and Caesar says that the Gauls did the same;<sup>5</sup> (4) according to Professor Boyd Dawkins, the Round Barrow race must have been Belgic immigrants, and not Finns or Slaves, because the latter would not have subsequently retreated eastward "against the current of the Celtic, Belgian and German invasions";<sup>6</sup> (5) skulls similar to those of the round barrows, with cephalic indices of 81·1 and 81·6, have been found along with neolithic implements in a cave at Sclaigneaux, fourteen miles from Namur;<sup>7</sup> (6) the skulls of the well-known Sion type, found near the town of that name in the Valais, which are believed to have belonged to the Helvetii, resemble those of the round barrows;<sup>8</sup> and (7) Professor Rhys thinks that the Round Barrow race belonged to the (assumed) later group which he calls the "P" Celts, who, being comparatively broad-headed, were less pure than the earlier "Q" group.<sup>9</sup>

On the other hand, Dr. Beddoe points out that the Round Barrow race had doubtless themselves mixed to some extent with their dolichocephalic predecessors, and therefore that the average index of pure skulls of this type would probably have been not less than 81. The Belgae, he thinks, were more dolichocephalic than this, and their features more aquiline than those of the Round Barrow men. He remarks, moreover, that it has been proved that a large section of the population of a country may be, during long periods, "almost entirely unrepresented in the ordinary burial grounds."<sup>10</sup> I may remark also that the features of the Round Barrow race were totally unlike those of the Belgae depicted on the monument of Jovinus at

<sup>1</sup> *Memoirs*, etc., p. 48.

<sup>2</sup> Taylor, *The Origin of the Aryans*, pp. 82, 104-5.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, p. 73.

<sup>4</sup> *Fortnightly Review*, xvi., 1874, p. 328.

<sup>5</sup> *Memoirs read before the Anthr. Soc. of London*, iii., 1870, p. 76.

<sup>6</sup> *Fortnightly Review*, xvi., 1874, p. 336.

<sup>7</sup> Taylor, *The Origin of the Aryans*, p. 81.

<sup>8</sup> *Scottish Review*, xxi., 1893, p. 162.

<sup>9</sup> *Ib.*, xv., 1890, p. 251.

<sup>10</sup> *The Races of Britain*, p. 13.

Reims,<sup>1</sup> between which and the Walloon type there is a striking resemblance. (2) I cannot find any evidence that the skulls which Thurnam discovered in "Gaulish tombs" (so-called) were those of genuine Gauls; and the same remark applies to the skulls of Sclaigneaux. Indeed, the fact that the latter were accompanied by stone implements only is strong evidence that they did not belong to Gauls. Moreover, the authentic Gallic skulls which have been found, interred with war-chariots and long iron swords, are, as I have already shown, sub-dolichocephalic. (3) If the Gauls as well as the Round Barrow people burned their dead, that is no evidence that the two races were identical; and, as Professor Rolleston has observed, "we know on irrefragable evidence (*Archæologia*, xliii. 434) that . . . inhumation and cremation have been practised contemporaneously, and by the same people, on the same area."<sup>2</sup> (4) Even if the Round Barrow race were not Finns or Slaves, the fact is no proof that they were Belgæ; and if men of Gallic race were found both in Gaul and in Asia Minor, it is difficult to see why Slaves should not have been found both in Britain and in Russia. It is amusing to find that Canon Taylor, who, like Professor Boyd Dawkins, identifies the Round Barrow race with the Belgæ, identifies them also with the Slaves.<sup>3</sup> (6) There is no proof that the Sion type of skull was that of the Helvetii: and, if it really was common among them, we may reasonably infer from the fact that the only authentic skulls of genuine Gauls which have been discovered are sub-dolichocephalic,<sup>4</sup> either that the Helvetii had amalgamated with people of the Sion type before they entered Switzerland, or that they found them there on their arrival.<sup>5</sup> (7) Professor Rhys's opinion is simply a guess: and, as I have already pointed out, M. d'Arbois de Jubainville, a Celtic scholar of equal authority, denies that the Gauls of Caesar's time were divided into a "P" group and a "Q" group at all.

Mr. Pike<sup>6</sup> holds that the Round Barrow skulls on which Thurnam based his theory were too few to generalise from; and, when one remembers that their indices ranged between 74 and 89, one is disposed to endorse his objection. Again it should be noted that in certain round barrows the only implements discovered were of stone;<sup>7</sup> that iron implements have not been found in any of them; and that it is extremely improbable that any Belgæ invaded Britain until after they had emerged from the neolithic age. Finally, it seems to me doubtful whether the average height, 5 feet 8 $\frac{1}{2}$  inches, of the Round Barrow people was enough to justify us in identifying them with the Belgæ and the Gauls, of whom Caesar said that "in comparison with their

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. ii., 1860. Pl. vi.

<sup>2</sup> *Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, v., 1876, pp. 128-9.

<sup>3</sup> *The Origin of the Aryans*, p. 90.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 289.

<sup>5</sup> The "Sion" skulls were found in lake-dwellings (Taylor, *Origin of the Aryans*, pp. 58-9, 86); and, as I have pointed out (p. 296), Mr. Munro has proved that the lake-dwellers, who had been in Switzerland for thousands of years before the Helvetian invasion, were conquered by a Celtic race, armed with iron weapons. This race was doubtless the Helvetii.

<sup>6</sup> *Anthropological Review*, v., 1867, pp. cxxvii.-viii.

<sup>7</sup> *Memoirs read before the Anthr. Soc. of London*, i., 1865, p. 120.

own great height, our shortness of stature appears to them contemptible." It is true that there is no evidence to show what was the average height of Caesar's troops: but a law of Valentinian<sup>1</sup> fixed the height of recruits for the Roman army at *quinque pedibus et septem uncis usualibus*, or about 5 feet 5 inches (1<sup>m</sup>. 665). I am inclined to think that the Gauls were as tall as the modern men of Upper Galloway, who average nearly 5 feet 11 inches.

To sum up, there is no evidence and it is most improbable that the Round Barrow "race" were the Belgic immigrants of whom Caesar speaks. They were probably a blond people;<sup>2</sup> and they, as well as some of the Sclaigheaux cave-dwellers, may possibly have been remotely connected with the stock from which the Belgae, properly so called, sprang: but there is no warrant for saying more.<sup>3</sup> And even if Thurnam's theory could be proved, we should not know what the pure Gallic type was; for the Round Barrow type was obviously mixed, and it is tolerably certain that the Belgic immigrants were mixed also.<sup>4</sup>

Some 40 years ago a Belgian general, M. J. B. Renard, published a treatise<sup>5</sup> to prove that the Gauls and the Germans were, anthropologically, the same people. Many of his arguments are now completely out of date; and M. Vanderkindere<sup>6</sup> speaks of his theory as one which it is no longer worth while to refute: but there are still eminent authorities who hold it, at all events in a modified form. Broca<sup>7</sup> held that the Gallic conquerors and the Germans were closely akin, if not identical: Dr. Lagneau<sup>8</sup> groups them along with the Germans, the Franks, the Normans, the Goths and the Burgundians, under the common designation of "*la race germanique septentrionale*"; and Huxley<sup>9</sup> affirms that the typical Gauls were "the close allies, by blood, customs and language, of the ancient Germans."

The testimony of the ancient writers has been quoted so often that it is unnecessary to repeat it. With absolute unanimity they describe the Germans in terms which are virtually identical with those which

<sup>1</sup> *Codex Theodosius*, ed. G. Haenel, 1842, p. 650 (Lib. viii. tit. xiii. 3).

<sup>2</sup> Beddoe, *The Races of Britain*, p. 80.

<sup>3</sup> Dr. Beddoe (*Ib.*, pp. 16-17), adverting to the resemblance between some of the Round Barrow skulls and those of the Borreby type, says, "Looking at these facts in the light of the statements of the classical authors respecting the Cimabri, their original location in or about Jutland, and their south-westerly movement into Belgic Gaul, one is disposed to think the Borreby skulls may have belonged to a race, if not identical, yet nearly allied to the Cimabri, which may have been partly subdued, partly expelled by a long-headed race of conquerors, Danish or Anglian, and which may have found its way across the Rhineland and Northern Gaul, acquiring the bronze civilisation on the way, into the British Islands." It should be noted, however, that the movement of the Cimabri into Belgic Gaul was not south-westerly.

<sup>4</sup> M. Zaborowski (*Dict. des sciences anthr.*, p. 246) actually identifies the Round Barrow people with the short, dark, brachycephalic race of France!

<sup>5</sup> *De l'identité de race des Gaulois et des Germains*, 1856.

<sup>6</sup> *Recherches sur l'ethnologie de la Belgique*, p. 11.

<sup>7</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, iv., 1893, p. 51.

<sup>8</sup> *Dict. encyclopédique des sciences médicales*, xiii., 1863, p. 767.

<sup>9</sup> *Critiques and Addresses*, 1873, p. 180. See also F. Delisle's article in *Dict. des sciences anthr.*, p. 503.



they use in describing the Gauls. The Germans, like the Gauls, were tall and fair: that is the sum and substance of their evidence.<sup>1</sup> Attempts have been made to show that they draw distinctions in detail between the two peoples, but without much success. Thus Suetonius<sup>2</sup> tells us that Caligula tried to palm off Gauls for Germans by picking out the tallest and dyeing their hair red, the inference being that the Gauls generally were shorter and darker than the Germans:<sup>3</sup> but this does not prove that the pure Germans were redder than the pure Gauls; for in Caligula's time the Gauls were very much mixed. Again, Tacitus, after saying that the Caledonians had the huge stature and the red hair of Germans, goes on to say that the people of southern Britain were more like the Gauls.<sup>4</sup> Assuming the accuracy of Tacitus's statement, it should seem that the Gauls, or rather the inhabitants of Gaul generally in his time, were less fair than the Germans whom the Romans knew: but this does not prove that the purest Gauls were less fair. Strabo<sup>5</sup> also says that the Germans, though like the Gauls, were taller and fairer: but the only inference which can fairly be made from his statement, as from those of Tacitus and Suetonius, is that, in the first century of our era, tall stature and fair hair were less common among the Gauls than among the Germans. When the ancients speak of the pure Gauls, they are unanimous in describing them as tall fair men. Still, this does not prove that the Gauls and the Germans were anthropologically identical. They may have been different in other respects, just as the short, dark, brachycephalic people of central France are different from the short, dark, dolichocephalic people of Sardinia and Corsica.

So much for the testimony of the ancients. We may also learn something from antiquarian research. Although in southern Germany, as in Gaul, the older population was brachycephalic, it is certain that the Germans whose physical features the Romans described were a dolichocephalic race. This statement is true of all the races who are generally known as Germanic. The average index of 81 Merovingian Frankish skulls measured by Broca was 76.36. Numerous skulls, which are known as the Row Grave (Reihen Graber) skulls, have been found in south-western Germany, and are "assigned to Frankish and Alemannic warriors of the fourth and following centuries." Their average index is 71.3; and skulls of the same type have been found over the whole area which was conquered by the Goths, the Franks, the Burgundians and the Saxons.<sup>6</sup> Modern Germans with skulls of this type are nearly always fair; and, as Dr. Beddoe observes, this fact is a further proof that the Row Grave type of skull was that of the Germans of classical times. Again, Dr. Beddoe tells us that 70 Anglo-Saxon

<sup>1</sup> See *Crania Britannica*, p. 181, and Prichard, *Physical History of Mankind*, iii. 391-2. The latter give all the references.

<sup>2</sup> *Caligula*, 47.

<sup>3</sup> Huxley observes (*Critiques and Addresses*, p. 171) that the Germans were in the habit of artificially reddening their hair. But so were the Gauls. (See Diodorus Siculus, v. 28, § 1.)

<sup>4</sup> *Agricola*, 11.

<sup>5</sup> *Geogr.*, vii. 1, § 2.

<sup>6</sup> De Quatrefages, *Hist. gén. des races humaines*, 1889, pp. 492-4; Taylor, *The Origin of the Aryans*, pp. 102-3.

skulls discovered in Britain show a mean index of 74.59; and these skulls resemble the well-known Hohberg type, which has been proved to be that of the Burgundians.<sup>1</sup>

It may be taken as proved, then, that the typical Gaul and the typical German were alike tall and fair; and it is highly probable that the Gaul, like the German, was dolichocephalic. But was their fairness of the same kind? For instance, were the Gauls like the fair red-bearded Highlanders of Perthshire, and the Germans like the yellow-haired and yellow-bearded Scandinavians? Were there any other features which differentiated them? Judging by the testimony of the ancient writers, who did not draw nice distinctions, we should say that there was practically no difference between the two peoples. Let us, then, turn to the other sources of information.

It is important to decide what people introduced the Celtic language into Gaul; for if it can be proved that the Gallic conquerors imposed that language upon the races which they found in possession of the country, it can hardly be doubted that they had branched off from the Germans at such a remote date that, however outwardly alike, they had become virtually distinct from them: but if on the other hand, as some maintain, the language which they brought with them was German, the opposite theory is certainly true. The prevailing view, which indeed is taken for granted by some writers, is that the Gauls did impose their language upon the peoples whom they conquered: but M. A. Hovelacque, who assumes the ethnic identity of the Gauls and the Germans, has tried to prove that the language of the Gallic conquerors was German.<sup>2</sup> His argument is substantially this:—wherever the Gauls pushed their conquests, they found a Celtic population,—using the word “Celtic” in the sense of the dark brachycephalic people,—in possession: but the Gauls did not penetrate into every country which was occupied by “Celts.” It is clear that the Gauls did not impose their language upon peoples among whom they never settled; while on the other hand it is easy to understand that in the countries in which they did settle they adopted the language of the inhabitants. “En somme,” triumphantly concludes M. Hovelacque, “1° tous les blonds de haute taille . . . parlaient jadis des idiomes teutoniques; 2° la partie de cette race (Galates) qui pénétra sur le territoire occupé par des Celtes perdit la propre langue et parla celtique.”

I must say that this argument is one of the most amazing instances of sheer confusion of thought that I have ever come across. Of two things one. By “les Celtes” M. Hovelacque either means Celts in the sense in which French ethnologists use the word, that is to say, the dark brachycephalic “Auvergnat” race, or he means Celtic-speaking peoples. As far as I can see, he means the former. If so, there is no evidence that the Gauls, wherever they pushed their conquests, found a “Celtic” people in possession; and there is evidence that in some

<sup>1</sup> Taylor, *The Origin of the Aryans*, p. 103; *Scottish Review*, xxi., 1893, pp. 167-8; *L'Anthropologie*, v., 1894, p. 518.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. de linguistique*, xviii., 1885, pp. 194-5.

countries they did not. It is certain that the people whom the Belgic immigrants found in possession when they settled in the British Isles were ethnologically distinct from the dark brachycephalic race whom the Gallic conquerors found in Gaul; nor is there any evidence that the Gallic conquerors of Galatia found in possession a people of this race. If, on the other hand, M. Hovelacque means by "les Celtes" Celtic-speaking peoples, he begs the whole question!

That the Gauls imposed the Celtic language upon the peoples whom they found in possession of Gaul, can be proved to demonstration. Assuming, what is not proved, that the Gallic conquerors were greatly inferior in numbers to the people whom they conquered, there is abundant evidence that a conquering minority may and frequently has imposed its language upon a subject population. As Canon Taylor remarks,<sup>1</sup> "The negroes in Haiti and the Mauritius speak French; in Cuba, Spanish; in Jamaica, English; in Brazil, Portuguese. In Mexico the pure-blooded Aztecs, who form the larger part of the population, speak Spanish." It is quite true that there are plenty of instances on the other side; the Normans who conquered England, the Goths and the Burgundians learned the languages of their subjects. But in these cases the conquerors, besides being numerically inferior, were also either less civilised or not more civilised than the peoples whom they conquered. The inhabitants of Gaul were far superior in numbers to the Roman conquerors who settled among them: but their language is a Romance language. But what I have said only shows that the Gauls might have imposed their language upon their subjects. There is abundant evidence that they did. Putting aside certain geographical names, such as *Sequana*, which may be Ligurian, the vast majority of the names of places and people in Gaul are Celtic. Is it credible that the chiefs of the conquering race should have been called by names which were not their own but those of their subjects? Is it credible that the great towns, which they built, should have been called by Celtic names, if Celtic was not the language which they brought with them? Wherever history tells us that the Gauls or the Celts (I use the word not in M. Hovelacque's sense but in the sense of Polybius) conquered or settled, there we find traces of the Celtic tongue. The Gauls who invaded Lombardy had perhaps not come from Gaul at all, but from the basin of the Danube: yet their names were Celtic. The Gauls conquered Gaul, and people and places bore Celtic names: they made conquests in Germany and Switzerland, and there we find abundant linguistic traces of their occupation. The Celts settled in certain parts of Spain; and names like Segobriga and Nemetobriga bear witness to their presence.<sup>2</sup> They settled in Asia Minor; and they spoke Celtic and their chiefs bore Celtic names. Belgic Gauls settled in Britain; and Celtic is still spoken in the British Isles. Yet, if Broca is to be believed, there never were any Celts, in the sense in which he uses the

<sup>1</sup> *The Origin of the Aryans*, p. 208.

<sup>2</sup> See M. d'Arbois de Jubainville's *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, ii. 260, 65-6.

word, in Britain; there is not a single brachycephalic district in the country.<sup>1</sup> As M. Zaborowski remarks,<sup>2</sup> Celtic names exist in places where "notre type celtique, celui des anthropologistes, n'a jamais existé"; the Baltic was known as *Morimarusa*.

I regard it, then, as certain that when the Gallic conquerors entered Gaul, they brought the Celtic language with them; and, inasmuch as Celtic is more closely akin to Latin than to German, it is clear that the tall fair Gauls, if they had been originally one with the tall fair Germans, had long since branched off from them; and it is therefore probable that the physical types of the two peoples had become to some degree differentiated. N. Fréret<sup>3</sup> remarks that Celts and Germans must have become greatly intermixed during the long sojourn of the former in Germany; and the same thought had often presented itself to my own mind before I read Fréret's book. But is it absolutely certain that when the Celts began to migrate from Germany into Gaul, the tall fair Germans had long established themselves in Germany? Is it certain that the pressure of their invasion was not the motive of the Celtic emigration?<sup>4</sup>

Neither Caesar nor Tacitus appears to have believed that the Belgæ generally were of German origin. Caesar merely records the statement which the Roman envoys made to that effect, without endorsing it;<sup>5</sup> and the fact that he himself, rightly or wrongly, specifies four Belgic peoples,—the Eburones, the Segni, the Condrusi and the Paemani,—as German,<sup>6</sup> would seem to imply that he had reason to believe that the rest of the Belgæ were not.<sup>7</sup> Tacitus, who, as Dr. Beddoe observes,<sup>8</sup> "evidently aimed at accuracy in the matter, allows only the Triboci, the Nemetes and the Vangiones . . . to be 'haud dubie Germanos'";<sup>9</sup> and none of the three were Belgæ at all. The Treveri and the Nervii, according to Tacitus,<sup>10</sup> wished to be thought Germans: but, if Tacitus was rightly informed, this very fact would appear to show that they were not what they professed to be. Strabo says that the Nervii were Germans:<sup>11</sup> but his unsupported statement does not count for much;

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. d'anthr.*, ii., 1873, p. 625. It is perhaps just possible that some of the Round Barrow people may have belonged to the dark brachycephalic race of Gaul: but if so, they were certainly not numerous. Moreover, in Spain, as in Britain, not a single district is brachycephalic.

<sup>2</sup> *Dictionnaire des sciences anthr.*, pp. 246-7.

<sup>3</sup> *Œuvres complètes*, v., 1896, pp. 7-8.

<sup>4</sup> M. d'A. de Jubainville gives linguistic reasons for believing that the Germans had lived for some centuries in subjection to the Celts, and hemmed in between them, the Slaves and the North Sea. He points to the word *Teutoni*,—"mot germanique conservé intact par les Celtes, qui n'en ont celtisé que la destination,"—and to various military and other words "qui sont communs aux Celtes et aux Germains," and which he affirms, were borrowed by the latter from the former (*Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, ii., 1894, pp. 325-73). Is the evidence sufficient to sustain the theory? M. d'Arbois argues further that "une opposition religieuse chez les Germains empêche leur absorption par les Celtes" (*Ib.*, pp. 373-83); whereas Professor Rhys (*Celtic Heathendom*, p. 41) is impressed by "the striking similarity between the ancient theologies of Celts and Teutons."

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 4, §§ 1-2.

<sup>7</sup> See pp. 323-5, *infra*.

<sup>9</sup> *Germania*, 23.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, ii. 4, § 10; vi. 32, § 1.

<sup>8</sup> *The Races of Britain*, pp. 20-21.

<sup>10</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>11</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 3, § 4.

and the names of Nervian and Treveran individuals, as well as the geographical names of both peoples,<sup>1</sup> were Celtic. So also were the names of the two kings of the Eburones,—Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. Hirtius, while noting the resemblance of the Treveri to the Germans in manners and customs, says that it was due simply to geographical proximity;<sup>2</sup> and M. Vanderkindere points out<sup>3</sup> that Caesar draws a distinction between the Menapii and the Germans.<sup>4</sup> The truth is that, unless we know what the Roman envoys meant by the word *Germani*, their statement that the Belgæ “were descended from the Germans” proves nothing. The word *Germanus*, which the Romans borrowed from the Gauls, may or may not have been a Celtic word: but there is no proof that the Gauls meant by *Germani*, as is too hastily assumed, a Teutonic people who spoke a Teutonic language; and it has been argued, from the evidence of nomenclature, that even among the followers of Ariovistus, whom Caesar called *Germani*, there was a considerable proportion of Celtic blood.<sup>5</sup> My own conviction is that when the Roman envoys told Caesar that the Belgæ were “descended from the Germans” they spoke the truth; but that they only meant that the Belgæ were the descendants of a race who had once dwelt on the east of the Rhine. And it is needless to say that on the east of the Rhine the Celts had, for centuries, been predominant.

Assuming that, notwithstanding their general similarity, there was a physical distinction of some sort between the pure Gauls who conquered Gaul and the pure Germans, it may be that an observation of the Celtic-speaking peoples of the British Isles will help us to form an approximately just idea of the Gallic type. This inquiry will of course demand great care, for the purest specimens of the Scottish Highlanders and the Irish Celts are greatly mixed: but I do not think that the difficulties are insuperable. The Gaels in Ireland and Scotland, says Dr. Beddoe,<sup>6</sup> are probably “Iberians,” crossed with a “long-faced, harsh-featured, red-haired race, who contributed the language and much of the character.” The “dolichocephalous Celt” of the Scottish Highlands, says the same writer, comprehends both Galatic and Iberian elements, if not others. Some of the leading points of this type, he goes on to say, are prevalent wherever Gaelic is known to have been spoken. Now, what are the physical characteristics of the “dolichocephalous Celt”? Taking colour first, Dr. Beddoe found that of 48 individuals 5 had red hair, 4 fair, 3 lightish brown, 11 brown, 17 dark brown, 3 brown-black and 3 coal-black, but that the eyes were generally light. And, he adds, the figures for the Highlands generally are much the same.<sup>7</sup> According to Hector Maclean, “the dolichocephalous Celt,”—the truly Celtic type,

<sup>1</sup> See p. 312, *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, viii. 25, § 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Recherches sur l'ethnologie de la Belgique*, p. 16, n. 3. Dr. Beddoe (*The Races of Britain*, p. 21) argues that, as the modern population of the country which was once occupied by the Nervii are generally Walloon in language and in physical type, although the country was invaded by Franks, the Nervii were not of German origin.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 4.

<sup>5</sup> *Journ. of the Anthr. Inst.*, vii., 1878, pp. 227, 229.

<sup>6</sup> *The Races of Britain*, pp. 270-71.

<sup>7</sup> *Id.*, pp. 244-5.

as he regards it, "to which belonged the Galli of the old Roman writers and the Celtae of Caesar,"—"is often tall; he is of various complexion . . . ranging from a ruddy white to a swarthy hue. . . . The face is frequently long . . . the lips are usually full . . . cheek bones large and prominent; eyes most frequently gray or blueish gray . . . hair reddish yellow, yellowish red, but more frequently of various shades of brown, of which yellow ('I,' notes Dr. Beddoe, 'should read here red or reddish yellow') is the ground colour."

Dr. Beddoe remarks further that the Strathelyde Brythons and many Cornishmen have a considerable resemblance to the Walloons; that the attendants of Jovinus<sup>1</sup> were not unlike modern Gaels; and that the people of the Aran Isles in Galway Bay have "much the same long-headed long-featured type which is common in the Belgic districts of north-eastern France."<sup>2</sup>

Now, making every allowance for the admixture of other blood which must have considerably modified the type of the original Celtic or Gallic invaders of these islands, we are struck by the fact that among all our Celtic-speaking fellow-subjects there are to be found numerous specimens of a type which also exists in those parts of Brittany which were colonised by British invaders and in those parts of Gaul in which the Gallic invaders appear to have settled most thickly, as well as in northern Italy, where the Celtic invaders were once dominant; and also by the fact that this type, *even among the most blond representatives of it, is strikingly different, to the casual as well as to the scientific observer, from that of the purest representatives of the ancient Germans.*<sup>3</sup> The well-known picture by Sir David Wilkie,—*Reading of the Waterloo Gazette*,—illustrates, as Daniel Wilson remarked, the difference between the two types. Put a Perthshire Highlander side by side with a Sussex farmer. Both will be fair: but the red hair and beard of the Scot will be in marked contrast with the fair hair of the Englishman; and their features will differ still more markedly. I remember seeing two game-keepers in a railway carriage running from Inverness to Lairg. They were tall, athletic, fair men, evidently belonging to the Scandinavian type, which, as Dr. Beddoe says, is so common in the extreme north of Scotland: but both in colouring and in general aspect they were utterly different from the tall fair Highlanders whom I had seen in Perthshire. There was not a trace of red in their hair, their long beards being absolutely yellow. The prevalence of red among the Celtic-speaking peoples is, it seems to me, a most striking characteristic.<sup>4</sup> Not only do we find 11 men in every 100, whose hair is absolutely red, but underlying the blacks and the dark browns the same tint is to be dis-

<sup>1</sup> See p. 307, *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> *The Races of Britain*, pp. 21, 25, 28, 245.

<sup>3</sup> It cannot, argues W. Edwards (*Les caractères physiologiques des races humaines*, pp. 66-7), have been either Burgundian or Norman, because it is found in places where neither Burgundians nor Normans have ever existed.

<sup>4</sup> So Dr. Beddoe, I find, regards the high proportion of red hair in the Burgundian cantons of Switzerland as "a legacy of the Helvetii rather than of the Burgundians" (*The Races of Britain*, p. 78). He also remarks that the people of central Wales resemble the Scottish Highlanders in the frequency of red hair.

cerned. In France again the proportion of red-haired individuals is greatest (5·32 per 100) not in Normandy or the north-eastern departments, where the proportion of Germanic immigrants was greatest, but in Finistère,<sup>1</sup> where many of the "Kymric" invaders from Britain landed. It is true that M. Topinard regards red hair as a mere variety of blond, without racial significance: but if so, it is difficult to understand why it is so frequent,—judging from my own observations,—among Jews, and comparatively so rare among the modern Germans<sup>2</sup> and the English. My investigations lead me to believe that red-haired people, living in England, would, in nearly all cases, prove to be of Scotch, Irish, Welsh or Jewish origin.<sup>3</sup> I know well that it is impossible to break up the Highland type and the Anglo-Saxon into their component parts, and then to isolate the Celtic element in the one and the German in the other, and compare or contrast them: but, considering that, wherever the Celtic language is spoken, alike in countries where the Celts mingled with "Ligurians" and in countries where they mingled with "Iberians," we find the same "Kymric" type, I think that what I have said is enough to establish at least a probability that the Celtic element and the German, notwithstanding their general resemblance, differed one from the other. The "Kymric" type of face may be due to crossing between Gaul and Iberian: but at all events the striking difference in colouring between the red Highlanders of Perthshire and the blond North German or Scandinavian is not to be explained by any intermixture in the blood of the former.

Vague as it may seem to be, I am inclined to think that the comparison of mental and moral characteristics will point to the same conclusion, though we must never forget that national character is a subject on which it is difficult to generalise without going astray. Every one knows the terms in which Caesar describes the Gauls. They appear in his pages as a quick-witted, emotional, eager, impulsive race, passionately fond of change, quick to form plans and as quick to repent of them, impetuous in attack and easily disheartened by a reverse. Other ancient writers speak to the same effect. "Boldness, levity and fickleness," says Prichard,<sup>4</sup> "a want of firmness and self-command are by the old writers universally ascribed to the Gauls. . . . Dion Cassius says that their leading faults are expressed in these words,—τὸ κοῦφον, τὸ δειλὸν καὶ τὸ θρασύ. Strabo says, 'the Gauls in general are irascible and always ready to fight.'" If it be objected that it is impossible to say how much of the character which these writers ascribe to the Gauls was Gallic, how much was due to the peoples among whom the

<sup>1</sup> *L'Anthropologie*, t. iv., 1893, pp. 584, 590-91.

<sup>2</sup> *Scottish Review*, xix., 1892, p. 418.

<sup>3</sup> Some years ago I found that 34 out of about 620 boys in one of the great public schools had red hair of various shades. I ascertained the nationality of 31. Of these 10 were either wholly or partly Scotch, 8 (including one of the previous group) wholly or partly Irish, 7 (including one of the last-named group) wholly or partly Welsh, 1 Lancastrian, 1 Salopian and 3 Jewish. Of the 3 whose nationality I omitted to enquire, 2 had names which are common in Scotland and Ireland.

<sup>4</sup> *Physical History of Mankind*, iii. 178.

Gauls had settled in Transalpine Gaul, the answer is that Polybius,<sup>1</sup> speaking of pure or comparatively pure Gallic invaders, who perhaps had never been in Transalpine Gaul, in so far as he describes their character, describes it in like terms; and, roughly speaking, it is the character which we recognise in the Celtic-speaking peoples of to-day. Hector Maclean describes the dolichocephalic Gaelic Celt of Scotland as "quick in temper and very emotional . . . more quick than accurate in observation . . . wanting in deliberation . . . sympathetic with the weak, patriotic, chivalrous."<sup>2</sup> Mackintosh describes the Gaels of the Highlands, Ireland, North Devon and Dorset as "*quick in perception*, but deficient in depth of reasoning power; headstrong, excitable . . . at one time lively, soon after sad; vivid in imagination . . . deficient in application,"<sup>3</sup> etc. Similarly Dr. R. Knox says of the British Celt, "Jealous on the point of honour, his self-respect is extreme; admitting of no practical jokes. . . . Inventive, imaginative . . . of to-morrow they take no thought; regular labour . . . they hold in absolute horror and contempt. Irascible, warm-hearted, full of deep sympathies, dreamers on the past, uncertain. . . . They are not more courageous than other races, but they are more warlike."<sup>4</sup> It is needless to point out the contrast between the type of character here described and that of the Englishman and the North German. Maclean describes Scotsmen of the Scandinavian type as "deliberative and cool . . . very accurate observers; being never biased in their observations by emotion or prejudice . . . immense firmness and self-reliance."<sup>5</sup> I think that the notices of Caesar and Tacitus leave upon one's mind the impression that the character of the ancient Germans differed from that of the ancient Gauls. It is hardly necessary to point out the contrast between the social and political institutions of the Gauls as described by Caesar and those of the Germans. *Germani*, he writes, *n. ultum ab hac consuetudine differunt*.<sup>6</sup> It is true that, before the Gauls crossed the Rhine, the difference was probably much less, and that great dissimilarity in institutions might be compatible with identity in physical type: but if the Gauls and the Germans had ever been physically one, they may have been so long separate when they came under the observation of the ancient writers, that a physical distinction of some sort might have arisen.

But these last few paragraphs have only been written by way of suggestion. The theory that red hair was characteristic of the Gauls rather than of the Germans is, I freely admit, unsupported by the ancient writers. The tall Gaul and the tall German were doubtless descended from a common "xanthochroid" stock. Nor is there anything surprising in the fact that, notwithstanding the differences which existed between them, they were physically akin. For it is certain that even among the Greeks the conquering race was distinguished by the familiar characteristics,—dolichocephaly and fair hair.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> ii. 32-3; *ib.* 70, 79.

<sup>2</sup> *ib.*, p. 16.

<sup>3</sup> *Anthr. Rev.*, iv., 1866, p. 222.

<sup>4</sup> *Anthr. Rev.*, iv., 1866, pp. 219-20.

<sup>5</sup> *The Races of Men*, 1850, p. 319.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 21, § 1.

<sup>7</sup> See de Quatrefages, *Hist. gén. des races humaines*, 1889, p. 494; *Scottish*



I will now briefly recapitulate the results at which I have arrived. It is probable, though not proved to the satisfaction of all ethnologists, that man, or the immediate precursor of man, existed in Gaul even in the immeasurably remote tertiary epoch. The palæolithic peoples, who undoubtedly lived there in the quaternary epoch, were all, as far as is known, dolichocephalic; and some of them, at all events, belonged to the Neanderthal type. Of the neolithic races the Cro-Magnon and the Homme Mort were also dolichocephalic; and the latter, notwithstanding their inferiority in stature, may have been descended from the former. The later neolithic peoples were, for the most part, brachycephalic or sub-brachycephalic; and those who belonged to this type entered Gaul from the east. It is certain that descendants of the neolithic, and morally certain that descendants of the palæolithic races survived in Gaul in Caesar's time.<sup>1</sup> The dolmen-builders, some of whom appear to have been acquainted with the working of bronze, belonged to various races, one of which was probably an offshoot from the Tamahu and came to Gaul, by way of Gibraltar and Portugal, from northern Africa. The Iberians, when they first came under the notice of the Greek geographers, dwelt between the Rhône and the Pyrenees, and probably also in the hilly parts of Aquitania. Between the Rhône and the Pyrenees, they were, in the fourth century B.C., and doubtless later, mingled with the Ligurians, whose proper habitat in Gaul was between the Rhône, the Durance and the Maritime Alps. It is probable that, before Caesar entered Gaul, the Iberians had been to some degree expelled from their original abodes, in Aquitania by short, dark, brachycephalic invaders, in the Mediterranean tracts by Ligurians. It is impossible to decide whether the ancient geographers, when they spoke of the Iberians who dwelt in Gaul, applied the term loosely to heterogeneous groups, speaking divers tongues, who occupied a certain tract, or whether they applied it to one people, practically homogeneous, who spoke one language: it may be that people who spoke Basque and people who spoke the language of the Iberian inscriptions were alike called Iberians; or it may be that the Iberians spoke the language of the inscriptions, and that Basque was the language of the Ligurians. At all events, it is morally certain that the Iberians were, for the most part, short, dark and dolichocephalic. There is no evidence that, in Gaul, any Iberians, so called, dwelt outside the limits which the ancient writers assigned to that people: but it is certain that men who physically resembled them dwelt in various other parts of Gaul,—in considerable numbers in the neolithic age, here and there at a later time. The type of the Ligurians cannot be certainly defined: but they were undoubtedly both short and dark; and there is some reason to believe that they were dolichocephalic, and were a branch of the "Mediterranean" stock from which the Iberians sprang. When Caesar entered Gaul, Celtic-speaking immi-

*Review*, xx., 1892, p. 155; and *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. viii., 1873, p. 259.

<sup>1</sup> It is not improbable that, in Caesar's time, stone implements were still used in certain parts of the country.

grants had long been settled both in the country of the Iberians and in that of the Ligurians. The people who called themselves "Celtæ" were very much mixed. They comprised descendants of palæolithic and neolithic races and of the dolmen-builders of the bronze age; and the latest comers, the conquering Celtic-speaking Gauls, were those who had given their name to the entire group. These conquerors, who doubtless intermarried, to some extent, with the peoples whom they subdued, were, for the most part, tall and fair: but, although the proportion of men of this type must have been far greater among the Celtæ than it is among the modern inhabitants of the same country, the majority of the Celtæ were, even in Caesar's time, brachycephalic, short and dark. The conquerors of Belgic Gaul belonged, in a large measure, at all events, to the same race as the conquerors among the Celtæ: but they were, it should seem, proportionately more numerous; and, like the Celtæ, the entire group of peoples whom Caesar called Belgæ included descendants of neolithic, if not palæolithic races. There is perhaps some reason to believe that the Celtic-speaking conquerors of Belgic Gaul included tall dark men: but this is uncertain. Probably the latest groups of the conquerors of Belgic and of Celtic Gaul were identical with the people who built the *tumuli* and cemeteries of the iron age which have been found in the former departments of Haut-Rhin and Bas-Rhin, Vosges, Côte-d'Or, Doubs, Jura and Ain, in the valley of the Loire and in the neighbourhood of Tarbes. The Gauls, properly so called,—the Celtic-speaking conquerors of Belgic and of Celtic Gaul,—like their kinsmen, who conquered Lombardy and Piedmont, closely resembled the Germans both in stature and in colouring, and were probably also, like them, dolichocephalic or sub-dolichocephalic. But, as the Gauls differed from the Germans in custom, and as their language was more nearly related to Latin than to German, it is certain that, although the two peoples had sprung from the same stock, they had branched off into two races, practically distinct. There is, I would suggest, some reason to believe that red hair was a common characteristic of the purer Gauls, yellow or flaxen hair of the Germans. When the Roman delegates told Caesar that the Belgæ were "descended from the Germans," they probably meant only that the ancestors of the Belgic conquerors had formerly dwelt in Germany, and this is equally true of the ancestors of the Gauls who gave their name to the Celtæ: but, on the other hand, it is quite possible that, in the veins of some of the Belgæ, there flowed the blood of genuine German forefathers.

And now I have done. To me the writing of this essay and the long study upon which it is based have been deeply interesting: but I fear that it will be interesting to hardly any one else, except perhaps the few professed students of ethnology who will be quick to detect its many faults. And I do not wonder. For the main interest of these studies is the *certaminis gaudium*,—the interest that belongs to every attempt to solve a difficult problem, the interest that Adams and Le Verrier felt when they were fighting their way through the long calculations, which tasked all their powers to the utmost, that led to

the discovery of the planet Neptune. And to deal successfully with the problems of ethnology requires powers hardly less than theirs,—such a combination of moral and mental qualities as is hardly to be found in any one man,—enthusiasm, indefatigable zest for research, sagacity, judgement, common sense, perfect clearness of head, lucidity in exposition. Even if all these qualities could be brought to bear upon the investigation of the problems which I have set myself, some of those problems would, for want of evidence, remain, in a scientific sense, insoluble. And even if they could all be solved, if we could describe exactly the physical type of the Iberians, the Ligurians and the Gauls, if we could tell exactly the proportion which each bore in the population of ancient Gaul, the scoffer would still say, what then? Of what value are your conclusions? What do I care whether the Iberians were or were not the ancestors of the Basques, whether the Ligurians were or were not the same as the brachycephalic “Celtae,” whether this people had broad skulls and dark hair, and that people long skulls and fair hair? And I am not prepared to say that the scoffer would have no reason on his side.<sup>1</sup>

TABLE SHOWING THE CEPHALIC INDICES, THE COLOURING AND THE COMPARATIVE STATURE OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE FRENCH DEPARTMENTS (See p. 281, n. 4, *supra*).

[V.F. denotes “very fair,” F. “fair,” D. “dark,” and V.D. “very dark.” It will be understood that “very fair” and “very dark” are purely relative terms, the twenty-two fairest departments being classed as “very fair,” and so on. Though the number of heads measured by M. Collignon was small, the indices are approximately correct: for in each department he compared the mean index of the whole number of heads with that of the ten which he had measured first; and, in every instance, the difference was less than 1. For colour, M. Topinard examined between 2000 and 3000 individuals in each department.]

Department.	Order in Stature.	Colour.	Cephalic Index.	Number Heads Meas.
Ain . . . . .	17	V.F.	86.72	23
Aisne . . . . .	14	F.	80.88	62
Allier . . . . .	78	D.	83.33	33
Basses-Alpes . . . . .	71	D.	83.67	32
Hautes-Alpes . . . . .	81	D.	84.37	5
Alpes-Maritimes . . . . .	No data	V.D.	82.85	53
Ardennes . . . . .	8	V.F.	83.24	91
Ardèche . . . . .	80	V.D.	85.24	23
Ariège . . . . .	60	V.D.	82.89	23
Aube . . . . .	16	V.F.	83.07	23
Aude . . . . .	57	V.D.	81.05	30
Aveyron . . . . .	65	D.	85.50	332
Bouches-du-Rhône . . . . .	19	V.D.	81.43	221
Cantal . . . . .	66	V.D.	87.08	81

<sup>1</sup> To discuss ethnical questions in so far as they bear upon national character,—and there is no subject upon which so much clap-trap has been written by glib paragraphists, ignorant of the rudiments of ethnology,—might be interesting to many: but the discussion would be irrelevant to the purpose of this book.

Departments.	Order in Stature.	Colour.	Cephalic Index.	Number of Heads Measured.
Calvados . . . . .	21	V. F.	81·62	191
Charente . . . . .	82	D.	80·93	21
Charente-Inférieure . . . . .	33	F.	82·06	29
Cher . . . . .	69	F.	81·77	47
Côte-d'Or . . . . .	2	D.	84·01	26
Côtes-du-Nord . . . . .	76	F.	83·72	2023
Corrèze . . . . .	85	D.	83·98	24
Creuse . . . . .	63	F.	82·83	20
Deux-Sèvres . . . . .	31	V. D.	82·83	53
Dordogne . . . . .	83	D.	79·17	21
Doubs . . . . .	1	V. F.	86·05	22
Drôme . . . . .	40	F.	84·89	21
Eure . . . . .	23	V. F.	81·34	109
Eure-et-Loir . . . . .	30	V. F.	82·27	20
Finistère . . . . .	79	F.	82·83	238
Gard . . . . .	38	V. D.	83·12	30
Haute-Garonne . . . . .	45	V. D.	83·43	30
Gers . . . . .	48	V. D.	85·71	24
Gironde . . . . .	44	V. D.	82·60	62
Hérault . . . . .	42	V. D.	82·50	21
Ille-et-Vilaine . . . . .	68	D.	84·02	329
Indre . . . . .	70	D.	82·66	19
Indre-et-Loire . . . . .	75	D.	81·40	29
Isère . . . . .	28	F.	85·32	20
Jura . . . . .	3	V. F.	88·20	24
Landes . . . . .	73	V. D.	84·50	20
Loire . . . . .	61	D.	84·04	43
Haute-Loire . . . . .	67	D.	87·52	27
Loire-Inférieure . . . . .	41	D.	83·77	160
Loir-et-Cher . . . . .	64	D.	83·30	22
Loiret . . . . .	55	F.	83·08	41
Lot . . . . .	77	V. D.	85·92	20
Lot-et-Garonne . . . . .	46	V. D.	86·66,	21
Lozère . . . . .	74	D.	87·87	14
Maine-et-Loire . . . . .	36	D.	83·16	62
Manche . . . . .	29	V. F.	83·10	919
Marne . . . . .	15	V. F.	84·11	25
Haute-Marne . . . . .	4	V. F.	86·83	20
Mayenne . . . . .	58	F.	84·10	100
Meurthe . . . . .	26	F.	85·64	50
Meuse . . . . .	18	V. F.	85·00	62
Morbihan . . . . .	62	V. F.	82·62	173
Moselle . . . . .	11	F.	83·97	41
Nièvre . . . . .	59	F.	83·14	41
Nord . . . . .	13	V. F.	80·38	171
Oise . . . . .	7	V. F.	82·60	52
Orne . . . . .	24	V. F.	83·33	120
Pas-de-Calais . . . . .	5	V. F.	80·36	183
Puy-de-Dôme . . . . .	84	V. D.	85·53	55
Basses-Pyrénées . . . . .	51	V. D.	83·45	62
Hautes-Pyrénées . . . . .	37	V. D.	83·67	21
Pyrénées-Orientales . . . . .	50	V. D.	78·24	35
Bas-Rhin . . . . .	10	V. F.	83·64	26
Haut-Rhin . . . . .	32	V. F.	83·80	26
Rhône . . . . .	22	D.	86·01	51
Haute-Saône . . . . .	9	F.	87·37	22
Saône-et-Loire . . . . .	43	F.	87·11	41
Sarthe . . . . .	54	F.	83·84	44

Departments.	Order in Stature.	Colour.	Cephalic Index.	Number of Heads Measured.
Savoie . . . .	No data	F.	87·39	191
Haute-Savoie . .	No data	F.	86·25	25
Seine . . . .	49	F.	81·57	100
Seine-Inférieure .	34	V.F.	81·10	283
Seine-et-Marne . .	12	F.	82·86	106
Seine-et-Oise . .	20	F.	81·57	161
Somme . . . .	6	V.F.	81·88	51
Tarn . . . .	72	D.	83·72	22
Tarn-et-Garonne .	56	D.	85·80	18
Var . . . .	39	V.D.	82·77	51
Vaucluse . . . .	27	F.	81·53	47
Vendée . . . .	47	V.D.	84·47	32
Vienne . . . .	53	D.	82·94	30
Haute-Vienne . .	86	D.	79·70	20
Vosges . . . .	25	V.F.	86·68	44
Yonne . . . .	35	F.	82·51	31
Corse . . . .	No data	V.D.	76·93	237

[NOTE.—Professor Keane affirms (*Man, Past and Present*, 1899, p. 523) that “the peoples of Keltic speech can never be shown to be true Aryans of the Teutonic type, but only tribes probably of the Alpine type,”—that is, Broca’s Celtic type,—“Aryanised in speech in very remote times, and apparently before their appearance in Europe.” “This,” he says, “may almost be inferred from the consideration that, as far back as they can be traced, they are found split into two linguistic sections . . . the P and the Q Kelts.” He assumes (p. 521) that Celtic speech was introduced into Gaul by the latest group of brachycephalic invaders, and (p. 528, n. 3) that the Belgæ were “originally of Teutonic speech.” That a large proportion of the people who spoke Celtic were not “true Aryans” is certain: but the inference from Professor Keane’s statements would seem to be that, in his opinion, the tall fair “Aryans” who overran Celtic as well as Belgic Gaul, and the tall fair Gauls who captured Rome, were Teutons, who learned to speak Celtic from peoples whom they had subdued! Professor Rhys’s theory about “P” Celts and “Q” Celts is, as I have shown (pp. 277, 299), combated by M. d’Arbois de Jubainville: but even if the two “linguistic sections” existed side by side, there is no proof that Celtic was spoken by round-heads before their appearance in Europe: and the view that the Belgæ were originally of Teutonic speech is opposed not only by many French ethnologists, but also by Professor Rhys himself (*Celtic Britain*, p. 280), and, as I show on pp. 313-14 and 323-5, by Mullenhoff.

It is possible that Celtic speech was *first* introduced into Gaul by round-heads: but that their tall fair conquerors learned it from them, there is no evidence at all.]

## THE NATIONALITY OF THE EBURONES, CAEROESI, PAEMANI, SEGNI AND CONDRUSI.

THE nationality of the Eburones, Caeroesi, Paemani, Segni and Condrusi is a separate question. Among the Belgic tribes that contributed their contingents to the confederate army which Caesar dispersed in 57 B.C., the Roman envoys, he says, enumerated *Condrusos, Eburones, Cueroesos, Paemanos, qui uno nomine Germani appellantur*.<sup>1</sup> Caesar himself, in another passage,<sup>2</sup> calls the Segni and Condrusi Germans. Mullenhoff,<sup>3</sup> however, insists that all these tribes were Celts. The fact, he says, that the bulk of the Belgae were descended,—according to the Roman envoys,—from the people whom Caesar called the *Transrhenane* “Germani,” and were therefore of different origin from the rest of the Belgae, although they formed one “race” with them, only leads to the conclusion that the *Cisrhenane* Germans, that is to say the Condrusi, Eburones, Caeroesi and Paemani, whose collective name, “Germani,” permitted, on the one hand, the distinction from the Belgae and, on the other, the connexion with the Transrhenani, were really Belgae, and therefore Gauls. Caesar, himself, adds Mullenhoff, includes them among the Belgae (*B. G.*, i. 1, § 2), and, according to *B. G.*, v. 27, §§ 4-6, they allowed themselves to be classed as Gauls. All their racial and individual names, all ancient names of rivers and places within their territory, are Celtic; <sup>4</sup> and whoever classes them among the Germans proper must also class the Walloons, who dwell in the western part of their territory, among peoples of Germanic descent, whereas they are really Romanised Gauls. Again, pointing out that, according to the testimony of Caesar (*B. G.*, vi. 32-4), the customs of the Eburones were more primitive than those of the rest of the Gauls, Mullenhoff observes that this persistent conservatism may account for the fact that the more civilised Belgae of the south-west distinguished their neighbours and kinsmen from themselves by the surname “Germani.”

Mullenhoff's is a great name: but I do not think that his arguments establish his theory. The mere fact that the racial and one or two individual names of the peoples in question and the ancient names of rivers and places within their territory are Celtic, does not prove that

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 4, § 10.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, vi. 32, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Deutsche Alterthumskunde*, ii. 196-204.

<sup>4</sup> See also *Rev. hist.*, t. xxx., 1886, p. 39.

they themselves were not partly Germanic. Granted that Ambiorix is a Celtic name: so is Boiorix, the name of a leader of the Cimbri; yet Mullenhoff, with nearly every modern scholar, believes that the Cimbri were Germans. The prevalence of Celtic local names might possibly be accounted for by the fact that the Eburones and their neighbours had intermingled with an older Celtic population.<sup>1</sup> Celtic local names were current in Germany long after the time of Caesar, from which fact it is inferred that in Germany the Celts were once predominant: but Mullenhoff knew as well as anybody else that their predominance had ceased before the conquest of Gaul. *Kent* is a Celtic name: but the fact does not prove that the present inhabitants of Kent are Celts.

Mullenhoff quotes *B. G.*, v. 27, § 6, to prove that the Eburones allowed themselves to be classed as Gauls. Admitting that Ambiorix really made the statement which Caesar puts into his mouth, that statement proves nothing. The Eburones, whether Gauls or not, had thrown in their lot with the Gauls; and Ambiorix might speak of them as Gauls in the same sense that a Dutch broker, living in Fifth Avenue, would call himself an American, or a Jewish alderman of the city of London an Englishman.

Now, let us see exactly what Caesar says. He certainly classes the Eburones, the Condrusi, the Caerocesi and the Paemani among the Belgae. But in *B. G.*, ii. 3, § 10, he calls them *Germani*: in v. 2, § 3, he describes them by the same name; and in vi. 32, § 1, he says that the envoys of the Segni and Condrusi begged him not to conclude that all the Cisrhenane Germans,—including themselves,—were of the same way of thinking:—*Segni Condrusique, ex gente et numero Germanorum, qui sunt inter Eburones Treverosque, legatos ad Caesarem miserunt oratum, ne se in hostium numero duceret neve omnium Germanorum, qui essent citra Rhenum, unam esse causam judicaret.* It appears, then, that not only did the Roman envoys in 57 B.C. describe the Condrusi as Germans, but the envoys of the Condrusi called themselves by the same name. It is also clear that Caesar believed them. He emphasises the distinction between the Germans and the Gauls both in regard to religion and manners (*B. G.*, vi. 21-4) and in regard to language (i. 47, § 4). His informants had probably, his interpreters had certainly both seen and conversed with Germans about whose nationality there could be no dispute.<sup>1</sup>

But I am not trying to prove that these tribes were German; only to show that there are objections, which Mullenhoff has not fairly met, to the theory that they were Celtic. Indeed, I believe that he was, in the main, right. For the truth is, as I have remarked in the preceding article,<sup>2</sup> that we do not know what meaning Caesar's Belgic informants attached to the word *Germanus*. They may only have meant that the "Cisrhenane Germans" were descended from people who had dwelt on

<sup>1</sup> I do not attach any importance to the argument of M. Piot, that the conversation which Caesar records (*B. G.*, vi. 35, §§ 8-9) between the German Sugambri and their Eburonian captives proves that the Eburones spoke German; for the leaders of the Sugambri might have learned, like Ariovistus (i. 47, § 4), to speak the Gallic tongue.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 314.

the east of the Rhine ; and over a large tract of what we call Germany the Celts had, for a long period, held supremacy. If the Eburones and their neighbours were called by Caesar *Germani* in a special sense, as distinct from the rest of the Belgae, who also claimed to be of German origin, the explanation may be that the former were the latest immigrants. It may be that a certain proportion of the Eburones and the other "Cisrhenane Germans" were descendants of German-speaking ancestors of genuine Teutonic blood : but if so, they had certainly been absorbed, as the evidence of nomenclature shows, by a more numerous Celtic population.

### THE POPULATION OF GAUL

Napoleon III., Mommsen and others have attempted to estimate approximately the population of Gaul in Caesar's time. The data are as follows. Caesar tells us that from certain tablets which fell into his hands after the Helvetian war he ascertained that the Helvetii, who apparently had emigrated *en masse*, numbered 263,000, and, along with their allies, 368,000 souls ; and that of the latter number 92,000, or exactly one fourth, were fighting men.<sup>1</sup> He also tells us, on the authority of the Remi, that when he marched against the Belgae, the Belgic tribes, exclusive of the Remi, had undertaken to put 296,000 men into the field ; and he implies that this force was considerably less than their full fighting strength, for he remarks that the Bellovaci only contributed 60,000 out of an available 100,000.<sup>2</sup> Finally he says that the army which was despatched to the relief of Vercingetorix, and to which every Gallic tribe, except the Aduatuci, Ambarri, Ambiliati, Ambivariti, Caeroesi, Condrusi, Eburones, Esuvii, Latobrigi, Leuci, Lingones, Meldi, Menapii, Paemani, Segni, Suessiones, Treveri and Viromandui, the Aquitani generally, and possibly the Diablintes and Namnetes, contributed, amounted to about 258,000.<sup>3</sup> It is obvious that the statements regarding the Belgic army and the army of relief are useless for our purpose ; for in neither of the two cases have we any means of knowing what proportion the army bore to the male population who remained at home. If we might assume that the Helvetian territory was peopled with exactly or nearly the same density as the rest of Gaul, we might form an approximate estimate of the whole Gallic population. But of course we have no right to make any such assumption. Nor indeed can we be at all sure that Caesar's statement that the Helvetii emigrated *en masse* is literally correct. I agree, therefore, with Desjardins<sup>4</sup> that to calculate the population of Gaul even approximately is impossible.

Mommsen, according to the authorised English translation<sup>5</sup> by Professor W. P. Dickson, says "Certain statements lead us to infer that

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 29, §§ 2-3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, ii. 4, §§ 5-10.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, vii. 76, § 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 552-3.

• <sup>5</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 216-17.



in the Belgic districts there were some 200 persons to the square mile—a proportion such as nearly holds good at present for Wales . . . —in the Helvetic canton about 245; it is probable that in the districts which were more cultivated than the Belgic and less mountainous than the Helvetian, as among the Bituriges, Arverni, Haedui, the number rose still higher"; and in a note he remarks that "the first levy of the Belgic cantons exclusive of the Remi, that is, of the country between the Seine and the Scheldt and eastward as far as the vicinity of Reims and Andernach, from 9000 to 10,000 square miles, is reckoned at about 300,000 men; in accordance with which, if we regard the proportion of the first levy to the whole number capable of bearing arms specified for the Bellovaci as holding good generally, the number of the Belgæ capable of bearing arms would amount to 500,000 and the whole population accordingly to at least two millions. The Helvetii with the adjoining peoples numbered before their migration 336,000; if we assume that they were at that time already dislodged from the right bank of the Rhine, their territory may be estimated at nearly 1350 square miles." It is hardly necessary to say that these calculations are erroneous. The population of France, in 1891, was only 187 to the square mile;<sup>1</sup> and Mommsen would hardly maintain that the population of ancient Gaul exceeded that of modern France.

But I do not lay the blame upon Mommsen. When I saw that Professor Dickson put into his mouth the astounding statements that the territory of the Helvetii was only 1350 square miles<sup>2</sup> and that the area of the Belgic cantons was only "from 9000 to 10,000 square miles," I felt sure that the translation was inaccurate and turned to the original. What Mommsen really says is that in the territory of the Belgæ there were about 900 souls to the *German* square mile and in the territory of the Helvetii about 1100 (in den belgischen Districten etwa 900 Kopfe auf die Quadratmeile kamen—ein Verhältniss wie es heutzutage etwa für Wallis und für Liefland gibt—in dem helvetischen etwa 1100);<sup>3</sup> and in a footnote he estimates the Belgic territory at "2000-2200 Quadratmeilen," and that of the Helvetii at 300. Now the length of a German "Meile" varies in different states of Germany between 4·222 English miles (Saxony) and 6·133 (Oldenburg): a Prussian mile is 4·68, and a German geographical mile 4·61 English miles.<sup>4</sup> I do not know which standard Mommsen adopted: but square the lowest of these numbers, and you will find that he estimates the areas of the Belgic and Helvetian territories respectively at nearly four times the amount stated by his translator.

Again, Professor Dickson is certainly wrong in translating "Wallis" by Wales; for the population of Wales is 68 per square kilometre,

<sup>1</sup> Whitaker's *Almanack*, 1896, pp. 542-3.

<sup>2</sup> The area of modern Switzerland is 15,469 square miles. The territory of the Helvetii was smaller: but they possessed very much more than one eleventh of Switzerland!

<sup>3</sup> *Röm. Gesch.*, ed. 1881, iii. 228.

<sup>4</sup> Wolsley's *The Soldiers' Pocket-Book*, 5th ed., pp. 514-15; Whitaker's *Almanack*, 1896, p. 420.

and the population of Livonia 24.<sup>1</sup> Is it credible that Mommsen would have spoken of Wales and Livonia as having about the same density of population? When he spoke of Wallis, he must have meant the canton of Valais, the population of which is 19 per square kilometre.<sup>2</sup>

J. Beloch, basing his calculations on the Roman estimate, as reported by Caesar, of the Belgic levies, and assuming that the territory of the Belgae was less thickly peopled than the rest of Gaul, estimates the whole population, exclusive of that of the Roman Province, at 3,390,000.<sup>3</sup>

J. Levasseur<sup>4</sup> remarks that, according to Diodorus Siculus,<sup>5</sup> the chief Gallic tribes numbered each about 200,000 and the smallest 50,000 souls. It is probable, Levasseur argues, that the average was 100,000: accordingly he estimates the whole population at 8,000,000,—"pas comme un fait certain, ni même comme un fait probable, mais comme une simple hypothèse." This caution is certainly justified: but to make such hypotheses at all is futile.

<sup>1</sup> Vivien de St-Martin, *Nouveau Dict. de Géogr. univ.*, ii. 419; iii. 390.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, vii. 9.

<sup>3</sup> *Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt*, 1886, pp. 453-60.

<sup>4</sup> *La population française*, t. i., 1889, pp. 99-102. See also H. Mollière, *Recherches sur l'évolution de la population des Gaules*, etc., 1892, pp. 22-3.

<sup>5</sup> *Bibl. Hist.*, v. 25.

### SECTION III.—PURELY GEOGRAPHICAL

#### CAESAR'S WANT OF PRECISION IN GEOGRAPHICAL STATEMENTS

THE French Commission<sup>1</sup> remark that Caesar must have known that the Bituriges Vivisci occupied both banks of the Garonne. It is clear, then, they argue, that when he spoke of the Garonne as the common frontier of Aquitania and Gallia Celtica,<sup>2</sup> he did not intend to speak with literal accuracy. Again, part of the territory of the Vellocasses, who were a Belgic people, was on the left bank of the Seine; and the Seine and the Marne, according to Caesar,<sup>3</sup> formed the boundary between the Celtae and the Belgae. These inaccuracies are worth noting, because some critics have gone astray by basing investigations on the assumption that every geographical statement in Caesar must necessarily be regarded as rigidly precise. But the *Commentaries* are quite accurate enough for every practical purpose, if we exercise a little common sense in interpreting them.

#### THE TERRITORIES OF CLIENT TRIBES

It is necessary, in order to define the territories of certain Gallic tribes, to ascertain whether Caesar included within their limits the territories occupied by tribes which he calls *clientes*. Deloche<sup>4</sup> takes Walckenaer and B. Guérard to task for reckoning client tribes as *pagi*, or mere cantons of the tribes whose overlordship they recognised. This view, he argues, finds no support in the *Commentaries*; for Caesar does not apply the word *pagus* to any of the tribes which he calls *clientes*; and the Carnutes and other client peoples are expressly designated by him as *civitates*. Now there can be no doubt that, as a general rule, Caesar distinguishes the territories of client tribes from the territories of their overlords. Thus he says that the Usipetes and Tencteri "made their way into the territories of the Eburones and the Condrusi, who are clients of the Treveri" (*in fines Eburonum et Condrusorum, qui sunt Treverorum clientes, pervenerant*);<sup>5</sup> and he says that the Carnutes were clients of the Remi,<sup>6</sup> from whom they were

<sup>1</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 71.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, i. 1, § 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>4</sup> *Mém. présentés par divers savants à l'Acad. des inscr.*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. iv., 1860, pp. 365-70.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 6, § 4.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, vi. 4, § 5.

separated by the Suessiones, the Meldi and the Parisii. On the other hand, the passage<sup>1</sup> in which he remarks that the Cevennes separates the Helvii from the Arverni can only be explained on the assumption that he loosely included in the territory of the Arverni that of their clients, the Vellavi;<sup>2</sup> and M. d'Arbois de Jubainville may perhaps be right when he distinguishes the "États clients,"—the client tribes which Caesar calls *civitates*,—from the "clients de second ordre," such as the Auleri Brannovices (*q.v.*), whose territories Caesar appears to have included in the area assigned by him to their overlords, the Aedui.

## THE MAP OF GAUL

I. I warn those who may read the articles in my Geographical Index or those which deal with the geography of Caesar's campaigns that it is absolutely impossible to make this book self-sufficient in the matter of maps. For in the course of the articles I have often been obliged to mention streams, hills and villages which are not marked in any maps except the sheets of the *Carte de l'État-Major*, the *Topographische Atlas der Schweiz*, or the *Carte topographique de la Belgique*. My own maps are intended merely to illustrate the narrative; not to illustrate the arguments by which I have arrived at the results which the narrative records. Those who may wish to control the statements in my articles must buy or borrow the various sheets to which I refer therein for themselves. The scale of the *Carte de l'État-Major* is  $\frac{1}{300000}$ , or about one mile and a quarter to an inch. Based upon it, is a map drawn on the scale of  $\frac{1}{320000}$ ; and the Service géographique de l'armée has also issued a third map on the scale of  $\frac{1}{250000}$ . The scale of the *Topographische Atlas der Schweiz* is  $\frac{1}{300000}$ : that of the *Carte topographique de la Belgique*  $\frac{1}{200000}$ . All these maps are beautifully executed. An admirable little book, called *La Carte de l'État-Major: Guide pour sa lecture*, has been written by Captain J. Molard. It only costs 4d., and enables any one who masters it to read the map perfectly.

II. The map of Gaul in this book will fail to satisfy minds which are intolerant of an avowal of ignorance. Readers of this kind will find what they want in the maps of Napoleon, von Güler, von Kampen, Kiepert and others; and if they find discrepancies between the conclusions of those authorities, they will have no cause to complain that any of them is an agnostic. But any one who has the patience to read my geographical notes will find that even Kiepert has marked on his maps towns, camps and battle-fields, the sites of which it is impossible, with our present materials, to determine; and that he has marked them without warning the reader that his identifications are purely conjectural. It is simply impossible to construct a complete map to illustrate the *Gaulic War* which shall not be misleading. A map which, like Kiepert's and von Güler's, traces the whole network of

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 8, § 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, ii. 17.

Caesar's lines of march certainly looks much prettier than one which omits many of them : but it is not scientific.

III. Generally speaking, it is impossible to determine the frontiers of the Gallic states with certainty. With one or two exceptions, one may indicate their position on the map : one may determine approximately the extent of country which they occupied ; and in a few cases some portion of the actual frontier can be traced with precision. But if the reader finds that maps which, like those of Napoleon III.,<sup>1</sup> have the boundaries of the states marked, help him to realise the story more vividly, he should distinctly understand that those maps are so far for the most part conjectural. I am aware that the Abbé Belley, whose conclusions were endorsed by d'Anville, believed that it was possible to reconstruct the map of Gaul even in this detail. "En général," he affirmed, "le gouvernement Ecclésiastique en France a été réglé sur le gouvernement Civil, tel qu'il étoit lors de l'établissement du Christianisme dans les provinces de la Gaule : en sorte que les anciens Diocèses répondent aux territoires des anciens peuples."<sup>2</sup> By way of proving his thesis, he says that there is a town called Feins on the confines of the dioceses of Orléans and Blois ; another town of the same name on the confines of the dioceses of Orléans and Chartres ; and a third on the confines of the dioceses of Sens and Auxerre ; that each of these towns stands upon the site of one of the numerous Gallo-Roman frontier-stations called *Fines* ; and that consequently "les limites de ces Diocèses sont les mêmes que les *Fines* des Cités de Chartres, d'Orléans, de Sens et d'Auxerre sous l'Empire Romain." He also says that between Alise-Sainte-Reine and Montbard there is a town called Fins, situated on the confines of the dioceses of Autun and Langres,—“a sure proof that the Aedui and the Lingones had the same limits under the Roman Empire” ; and that the *Fines* of the *Table*, near Aquis-Segeste, is on the confines of the dioceses of Orléans and Sens, which proves that “the boundaries of those dioceses are identical with the boundaries of the Carnutes and Senones.”<sup>3</sup> Belley's conclusion is certainly very plausible : but it would be rash to conclude that because the territories of certain Gallo-Roman peoples coincided with certain ancient French dioceses, therefore the territories of all the Gallo-Roman peoples might be similarly defined. It would be still more rash to assume that all the Gallo-Roman provinces exactly coincided with the territories of the Gallic states that preceded them. It is true that the stations called *Fines* were frontier-stations :<sup>4</sup> but, says a French writer, “Malheureusement l'emplacement de ces *Fines* n'est pas toujours facile à déterminer, et, quand on parvient à le faire, il ne coïncide pas toujours avec les limites des anciens diocèses.”<sup>5</sup>

Desjardins admits that, in principle, the boundaries of the Gallic

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, Atlas, Planche 2.

<sup>2</sup> D'Anville, *Éclaircissements sur l'ancienne Gaule*. 1741. pp. 234-5. See also A. Longnon, *Atlas hist. de la France*, 1884. p. iii.

<sup>3</sup> *Eclaircissements*, pp. 191, 453.

<sup>4</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 397.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, and 399, No. viii. The italics are mine.

peoples whom Caesar subdued served to define the territories of the sixty *civitates* of Augustus; and that subsequently the boundaries of those *civitates* served, in principle, to define the areas of episcopal jurisdiction. "Mais," he proceeds, "dans le passage de l'état autonome de la Gaule à l'organisation romaine . . . il faut se garder de croire que les délimitations des Soixante cités de l'époque romaine correspondent exactement à celles des peuples, dont les frontières politiques étaient souvent vagues et indéterminées: des peuplades entières avaient été exterminées comme celles des Éburons et des Aduatuques; d'autres, sensiblement diminuées par la guerre, se trouvèrent fondues, sur différents points, dans les cités voisines; on en voit surgir d'autres qui proviennent d'un dédoublement opéré, sinon par Auguste, du moins par ses successeurs, afin de proportionner à peu près les territoires entre eux; le pays des Eduens et de leurs sujets étant jugé beaucoup trop vaste pour former une seule cité, on dut en détacher celui des *Segusiavi* . . . leurs anciens clients. C'est pour les mêmes causes sans doute que la cité des *Tricasses* . . . fut créée plus tard dans une portion détachée des *Senones* . . . ou des *Remi*."<sup>1</sup> In another place Desjardins speaks of the difficulty occasioned by "ces liens de patronage et de clientèle si répandus dans la Gaule, liens qui empêchent d'isoler ces peuples et parfois même de les distinguer entre eux."<sup>2</sup> • Thus the Aulerci Braumovices were "clients" of the Aedui, and, as clients, possessed, in Caesar's time, a territory of their own. But this territory was afterwards merged in one of the dioceses which are generally assigned to the Aedui; and it is impossible to say how much of that diocese belonged to the Aedui, how much to the Aulerci. Again, Caesar makes no mention of certain peoples, for example the Silvanectes and the Tricasses, whose territories afterwards formed separate dioceses; and it is impossible to decide whether these were client peoples or *pagi*,<sup>3</sup> and to which, if to any of the better known states their territories belonged. Moreover, it is certain that several of the states mentioned in the *Notitia provinciarum* were not formed into dioceses, and that several dioceses even of the fifth century do not figure as states in the *Notitia*.<sup>4</sup> Finally, M. Deloche points out that bishops sometimes encroached upon the dioceses of their neighbours.<sup>5</sup>

Nevertheless, it would be a great mistake to jump to the conclusion that our knowledge of the boundaries of the ancient dioceses is of no use to the student of Gallic geography. Those dioceses do probably often correspond exactly or nearly with the territories of Gallic states; for there is no reason to suppose that, except in certain cases, which will be mentioned in the proper places, the areas of the Gallo-Roman differed materially from those of the Gallic territories. The cases in which the evidence of the dioceses fails us<sup>6</sup> will also be duly noted in

<sup>1</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 428-9.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, ii. 217.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 328, *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> See J. Loth, *L'Émigration bretonne en Armorique*, 1883, p. 49.

<sup>5</sup> *Mém. présentés par divers savants à l'Acad. des inscr.*, iv., 1860, pp. 326-7.

<sup>6</sup> See K. Thumann's *Der französische Atlas zu Cäsars gall. Kriege*, 1868, pp. 3-4, and *Rev. du Lyonnais*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. i., 1866, p. 191.

the Geographical Index. To the student of Caesar the matter is of no practical importance, except in so far as it affects the search for the sites of places which are mentioned in Caesar's narrative. Only it is not always safe, in that search, to place absolute reliance upon arguments drawn from the areas of the ancient dioceses.

IV. One more point demands consideration. If, in drawing a map of Gaul, one traces the coast-line as it appears in the map of contemporary France, the map will be so far misleading; for the coast has undergone great changes. Accordingly Desjardins, Kiepert and A. Longnon have attempted to trace the coast-line as it existed in the time of Caesar. But even their maps cannot but be misleading to a certain extent; for although it has been proved that the sea has in many places gained upon the land, and that certain tracts of land have been won from the sea, it is, generally speaking, impossible to say exactly what was the dividing line between sea and land *in the time of Caesar*; and Desjardins himself admitted that his maps were largely conjectural. Nevertheless, even a conjectural map, based upon a study of the numerous monographs that have appeared upon the subject, should be more trustworthy than a mere reproduction of the modern map. Moreover, the tracing of the coast-line, for the most part, has no interest except for physical geographers: in three instances only, which will be duly mentioned in the notes, has it any bearing upon the study of Caesar's campaigns.<sup>1</sup>

### THE ITINERARY OF ANTONINE AND THE TABLE OF PEUTINGER

I shall often have occasion, in the following notes, to refer to the *Itinerary of Antonine* and the *Table of Peutinger*. The compilation of the former was probably begun in the reign of Antoninus (Caracalla): but, as it mentions Diocletianopolis and Constantinopolis, it can hardly have been completed before the middle of the fourth century. The figures contained in that part of it which relates to Gaul are usually followed by the letters M P M (*milia plus minus*), except in two routes, —from Fines Helvetiorum to Argentoratum (Strasbourg) and from Lugdunum (Lyons) to Gessoriacum (Boulogne),—where the distances are indicated both in Roman miles and in Gallic leagues; and in three others,—from Colonia Agrippina (Cologne) to Birten, from Durocortorum (Reims) to Treveri (Trèves) and from Trèves to Cologne,—where they

<sup>1</sup> Any one who may wish to study the question should refer to A. E. E. Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule romaine*, i. 138-398; A. Longnon, *Atlas hist. de la France*, pp. i.-ii.; *Mém. couronnés par l'Acad. Roy. des sciences et belles-lettres de Bruxelles*, vi. 1827, pp. 23-4, 26, 74-7, 149-50, 171; A. Belpaire, *Étude sur la formation de la plaine maritime depuis Boulogne jusqu'au Danemark*, 1855, pp. 197, 200-201; A. de Laveleye, *Affaiblissement du sol et envasement des fleuves*, 1859, p. 8; *Bull. de la Soc. de géogr. d'Anvers*, i. 1877, pp. 155-88; A. Joanne, *Dict. des communes de la France*, 1864, pp. li.-lxi.; *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2<sup>e</sup> pér., t. lxxix., 1869, pp. 429-53; *Mém. du congrès scientifique de France*, ii. 1872, pp. 451-60; and *Bull. de la Soc. de géogr.*, 6<sup>e</sup> sér., t. x., 1875, pp. 225-41.

are indicated in Gallic leagues only. Nevertheless, it is universally admitted that, except in the case of the Province, the figures actually denote Gallic leagues.<sup>1</sup> The edition which I have habitually used is that of Wesseling; but the edition of Parthey and Pinder (1848) may also be consulted.

The so-called *Table of Peutinger*, in the form in which it has come down to us, was the work of an anonymous writer, "the monk of Colmar," who was living in 1265. It was discovered at Worms in 1494, and in 1508 passed into the hands of Conrad Peutinger. The original document upon which the monk worked belonged to the imperial epoch: but its date cannot be ascertained. The best edition is that of Desjardins. See *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, iv. 72-3, and Desjardins's *La Table de Peutinger*, p. 76 ff.

## THE GALLIC LEAGUE AND THE ROMAN MILE

I. It is universally admitted, on the strength of certain statements of Ammianus Marcellinus<sup>2</sup> and Jornandes<sup>3</sup> and of certain passages in the *Itinerary of Antonine*,<sup>4</sup> that the Gallic league,—in one sense of the word,—was equivalent to 2222 metres, or one Roman mile and a half; and the orthodox view is that, whenever in the *Itinerary* or the *Table* distances are computed in leagues, a league of this length is meant. But according to MM. Aurès and T. Pistollet de St-Ferjeux, this league was only the Gallic league as officially recognised by the Romans: the true Gallic league, according to the former, was 2436 metres, according to the latter, 2415.<sup>5</sup> Aurès proved that the Gallic foot was different from the Roman, and was equivalent to "le pied-de-roi français," or 0<sup>m</sup>, 3248. So far so good. But Aurès then assumed that because the official league of Ammianus Marcellinus and Jornandes was equivalent to 7500 Roman feet, therefore the true Gallic league was equivalent to 7500 Gallic feet or 2436 metres.<sup>6</sup> Pistollet reasoned thus.<sup>7</sup> He measured on the *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000) eleven distances on

<sup>1</sup> Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, iv. 37-8. See also E. Guest's *Origines Celticae*, 1883, ii. 104.

<sup>2</sup> xv. 11, § 17; xvi. 12, § 8.

<sup>3</sup> *Gética*, xxvi. 192 (*Monumenta Germaniae hist.*, *Auctores antiquissimi*, t. v., 1882, p. 108).

<sup>4</sup> Ed. Wesseling, pp. 359-63.

<sup>5</sup> *Mém. sur l'ancienne lieue gauloise*, by T. P. de St-Ferjeux, pp. 18-20.

<sup>6</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. xv., 1867, pp. 444-6; *Mém. de l'Acad. du Gard*, 1863-64, pp. 110-20; 1866-67, pp. 109-19. Aurès does not, as far as I can discover, affirm in any of his writings that the Gallic league was equivalent to 2436 metres: on the contrary, he frequently affirms his agreement with Pistollet's estimate: but the former number results, as a simple sum will show, from his theory that the Gallic league was equivalent to 7500 Gallic feet. See Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, iv. 25. In *Rev. arch.*, xiv., 1866, pp. 194-7, however, Aurès says that "une lieue de 7500 pieds me semble maintenant difficile à introduire dans le système métrique gaulois."

<sup>7</sup> *Mém. sur l'ancienne lieue gauloise*, pp. 9-13. See also *Rev. des Soc. savantes*, ii., 1863, p. 187.



the routes, mentioned in the *Itinerary of Antonine* and the *Table*, from Andematunnum (Langres) to Cabillonum (Chalon-sur-Saône), Vesontio (Besançon), Tullum (Toul) and Durocortum (Reims), and found that eight were too short,—that is to say that the actual distances exceeded those indicated, according to the received estimate of the Gallic league, by the *Itinerary* and the *Table*. His experiments convinced him that the excess was in proportion to the length of the distances. The unit of measurement which he had adopted being the Gallic league of 2222 metres, it appeared to him that, if this unit were slightly increased, the discrepancies would disappear. "It then occurred to me," he says, "to divide one of the distances the two extremities of which were known, into as many parts as the map indicated leagues. I then applied the measure which I had obtained by this means to the other sections of the route; and I noticed that it agreed perfectly with the distances indicated by the *Table*. I made the same experiment on the other routes, and obtained the same result in the case of two of them with extraordinary exactness." Aurès and Pistollet de St-Ferjeux both held that the Romans, when they had conquered Gaul, tried to find out what Gallic standard of measurement was nearest to their own mile, and approximately fixed the Gallic league at one Roman mile and a half; and Pistollet believed that in the *Itinerary* and the *Table* as well as in the famous mile-stone of Tongres, distances were reckoned some times in Gallic and sometimes in Roman leagues. Aurès finally expressed his complete agreement with Pistollet's conclusions.<sup>1</sup>

If I were writing a treatise upon Gallic geography, it would be my duty to discuss Pistollet's theory as carefully as I have studied it: but, as I am only concerned with Gallic geography in so far as it is related to the history of Caesar's conquest and of the events which led up thereto, I may leave it alone. For Pistollet does not dispute any of the identifications that have been proposed of the towns which are mentioned in Caesar's narrative. His theory has, however, been assailed by M. A. Bertrand and by Desjardins:<sup>2</sup> but neither of them has succeeded in refuting it; and Quicherat<sup>3</sup> has pointed out numerous flaws in M. Bertrand's argument.

II. The Roman mile was 1617 yards, or 1479 metres nearly. In W. Smith's *Dictionary of Antiquities*, ii. 159-60, will be found a full account of the various methods by which the length of the Roman foot has been computed: it was 2957 metre. From this result the length of the Roman mile has been determined.

<sup>1</sup> See *Rev. des Sav. sav.*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. iv., 1864, p. 449.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. vii., 1863, pp. 344-9: *Table de Pentanget*, pp. 10, col. 2; 24, col. 3; 25, col. 3; 33, col. 2-3; *Mémoires de la Société rom.*, iv. 23-5.

<sup>3</sup> *Rev. des Soc. sav.*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. ii., 1863, pp. 186-91.

## GEOGRAPHICAL INDEX <sup>1</sup>

**Admagetobriga.** *See* MAGETOBRIGA.

**Aduatuca** (and the winter camps of 54-53 B.C.).—"The researches," says Napoleon, "which Major Cohausen kindly made for me, and those of MM. Stoffel and Locqueyssie have enabled me to determine approximately the winter-quarters."<sup>2</sup> But Napoleon vouchsafes not a word to tell us what these researches were, or where or how they were carried on; and, as neither Caesar nor any other ancient writer gives us the least help towards determining any of the sites, except those of Aduatuca and the camps of Labienus, Cicero and Trebonius, and only the least possible help towards determining the first three, no researches could, except in regard to these four places, be of any use.

I. The first question is how to interpret the famous passage,—*varum tamen omnium legionum hiberna, præter eam quam L. Roscio in pacatissimam et quietissimam partem ducendam dederat, milibus passuum continuebantur.*<sup>3</sup> This must mean that no two camps were more than 100 Roman miles apart; and, as the camp at Aduatuca, wherever Aduatuca may have been, was confessedly much more than 100 miles from Samarobriga (Amiens), where the camp of Trebonius was placed,<sup>4</sup> it

<sup>1</sup> I shall pass over places which, like Avaricum and Lutetia, have been finally and certainly identified; and, in speaking of the territories of Gallic peoples about the geographical position and the extent of which there is no dispute, I shall simply state the facts and give the necessary references.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 200, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, v. 24, § 7.

<sup>4</sup> Schneider (*Caesar*, ii. 156-8) holds that Caesar, after he had despatched messengers to order Crassus, Fabius and Labienus to join him in marching to relieve Cicero, moved himself from Samarobriga (Amiens) to the camp of Trebonius; returned thence to Samarobriga with Trebonius's legion; and, leaving it there under the command of Crassus, marched with Crassus's legion to the rescue of Cicero. Schneider completely misunderstands Caesar's narrative (*B. G.*, v. 46-7), the meaning of which a clear-headed child could hardly fail to grasp. Caesar says that when he received Cicero's request for help, about four o'clock in the afternoon, he sent a messenger to order Crassus to come to join him; that he sent a messenger to order Fabius to lead his legion into the country of the Atrebatæ, through which he would himself have to march to Cicero's camp; and that he wrote to order Labienus to march, if he could safely do so, into the country of the Nervii. The rest of the army, that is to say, the legions of Plancus and Roscius, were, he says, too far off to be able to help him. About ten o'clock next morning he was informed that Crassus was approaching. Thereupon he placed Crassus in command of Samarobriga; assigned him a legion for its defence, because he was leaving there the heavy baggage of the army, his hostages and state-papers and the winter's supply

follows that either there is an error in the text or Caesar made a mistake. Schneider,<sup>1</sup> Long<sup>2</sup> and Desjardins<sup>3</sup> interpret the Latin as I have done; and Long observes that "Caesar could not know the distance accurately, and we can never trust the numerals in the manuscripts."<sup>4</sup> But it is hard to believe that Caesar<sup>5</sup> could have made so gross a mistake; and therefore it seems possible that he wrote *CC*, and that a *U* has dropped out. Still, it is unlikely that he would have told us that the greatest distance between any two camps was two hundred miles, since he evidently means that the camps were not so very far apart, after all. Napoleon,<sup>6</sup> apparently determined to make the MS. reading square with the facts, says "these different winter-quarters were all included within a circle of 100 miles' radius." But this meaning cannot be got out of the Latin. Von Goler<sup>6</sup> remarks that the camps formed two groups, an eastern group and a western group, which is, in a sense, true; and he holds that between the most easterly camp of the western group and the most westerly camp of the eastern group there was an interval of 100 miles. But of all this Caesar says nothing. However, the difficulty presented by the numerals of the MSS. is unimportant; for, whatever Caesar wrote, it is beyond question that Aduatua was very much more than 100 Roman miles from Amiens.

II. Let us see first of all what Caesar has to say about Aduatua. (1) He says that the camp of Sabinus and Cotta, which, as we learn from *B. G.*, vi. 32, §§ 3-4, was at Aduatua, was situated in the country of the Eburones, "the greater part of which is between the Meuse and the Rhine" (*quorum pars maxima est inter Mosam ac Rhenum*); (2) he says (according to the usual interpretation of the Latin) that Aduatua was "nearly in the centre of the country of the Eburones" (*fere in mediis Eburonum finibus*);<sup>8</sup> (3) he gives particulars, for which I may refer to pp. 81, 83 and '97-98 of my own narrative, regarding the country in the immediate vicinity of Aduatua; (4) he implies that, when Sabinus

of corn; marched himself with one legion to join Fabius; and advanced 20 Roman miles on the same day. The only reasonable conclusion is that the camp of Trebonius was at or in the immediate neighbourhood of Samarobriua, and that, as soon as Caesar knew that Crassus had approached sufficiently near Samarobriua to secure it, he left the place with Trebonius's legion. For (1) if Schneider was right, Samarobriua, the importance of which was so great that Caesar was obliged to detail an entire legion for its protection even when he required all the troops that he could get for the relief of Cicero, was absolutely defenceless before Caesar received Cicero's despatch; and (2) if Trebonius had been, as Schneider maintains, 20 miles from Samarobriua, Caesar would not have made a useless journey from Samarobriua to Trebonius's camp and back, but would have summoned Trebonius to join him; nor (3) would he have said that all the legions, except those of Crassus, Fabius and Labienus, were too far off to be able to help him. He only said this because Trebonius's legion was with him at Samarobriua. See Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 212-13, Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 227, and his edition of Caesar, pp. 261, 263.

<sup>1</sup> *Caesar*, ii. 97. <sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, p. 243. <sup>3</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 658, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 216.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 202.

<sup>6</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, pp. 168-71 and p. 169, n. 1.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, v. 24, § 4. See Schneider's *Caesar*, ii. 96, note.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, vi. 32, § 4.

quitted Aduatuca, he marched in the direction of Cicero's camp, which was in the country of the Nervii; for he makes Ambiorix say that the camp of Cicero was nearer to Aduatuca than the camp of Labienus;<sup>1</sup> and he makes Sabinus say that the best plan would be to march to the nearer camp.<sup>2</sup>

1. D'Anville, Walckenaer, Mommsen, Long, Napoleon, the French Commission, Desjardins, Kiepert, and most of the modern editors identify Aduatuca with Tongres, in the valley of the Geer, which flows into the Meuse on its left or western bank. Desjardins affirms that the identification is proved by the itineraries. The Atuaca of the *Table*,<sup>3</sup>—the *Ατουάτουκον* of Ptolemy,<sup>4</sup>—was indisputably upon the site of Tongres, and was the chief town of the Tungri. The Tungri are mentioned for the first time by Pliny,<sup>5</sup> and afterwards by Tacitus;<sup>6</sup> and it is inferred that they succeeded to the territory of the Eburones, who appear to have been virtually exterminated, as a people, by Caesar. General Creuly remarks that it is unlikely that in the country of the Eburones there were two places of the same name; and accordingly he concludes that the Atuaca of the *Table* was identical with the Aduatuca of Caesar.<sup>7</sup> But the General forgets that he has himself argued in another place that there were probably several towns called Uxellodunum in the country of the Cadurci.<sup>8</sup>

T. Fuss<sup>9</sup> remarks that Aduatuca must have been, like Tongres, in a plain and on a low-lying site, since the cavalry of the Sugambri rode up at a rapid pace from the neighbouring woods to attack the decuman gate of the camp.<sup>10</sup> This fact may prove that the decuman gate was very little, if at all higher than the level of the woods: but it does not prove that the camp did not stand on ground which shelved down in other directions; and, if it did, it would not prove that Aduatuca stood upon the site of Tongres:—it would merely remove one of the many objections which are fatal to the choice of that site.

First, when Caesar, after mentioning that the camp of Sabinus and

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, v. 27, § 9.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 29, § 6, 30, § 3. M. A. de Vlaminck, on the contrary (*Messenger des sciences hist. de Belgique*, 1887, p. 396) argues that Sabinus must have marched in the direction of Labienus's camp, because "pas un seul des légionnaires échappés au massacre n'arriva jusqu'à Cicéron." I do not think that this argument will prevail against the one which I have drawn from Caesar's narrative; nor do I think that it is intrinsically strong. The few legionaries who escaped the massacre may have found that retreat in the direction of Cicero's camp would be cut off by the army of Ambiorix; and, as they were not an organised body, they may have shrunk from the prospect of having to cross the Meuse, if, as I believe, Aduatuca was between the Meuse and the Rhine. Anyhow, when the battle was over, Ambiorix moved back towards Aduatuca; and, by going towards the camp of Labienus, that is to say in the opposite direction, the survivors were at all events safe from immediate pursuit.

<sup>3</sup> *La Table de Peutinger*, ed. Desjardins, p. 12, col. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 9, § 5.

<sup>5</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 17 (31), § 106.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist.*, iv. 55, 79.

<sup>7</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, p. 138.

<sup>8</sup> *Excamen hist. et topographique des lieux proposés pour représenter Uxellodunum*, 1860, pp. 15-16, 27.

<sup>9</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. scientifique et litt. du Limbourg*, ii., 1854, p. 175.

<sup>10</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 37, § 1.

Cotta was in the country of the Eburones, says, in the same breath, that the greater part of that country lay between the Meuse and the Rhine, one is naturally inclined to infer that the camp was somewhere between those two rivers. Otherwise, Caesar's remark would be pointless and out of place. But Tongres is on the left bank of the Meuse. And the inference from Caesar's statement is no less obvious even if he meant, as has been argued, not that the greater part of the territory was situated, but only that the greater part of the population dwelt between the two rivers. Fuss struggles to get over this difficulty by suggesting that Caesar, not having previously mentioned the whereabouts of the Eburones, took this opportunity of doing so. If, he pleads, Caesar had intended to indicate the site of the camp of Sabinus and Cotta, he would have done so with more precision.<sup>1</sup> But what if Caesar did "take this opportunity" of mentioning the whereabouts of the Eburones? The point is that, in the same breath in which he mentioned that the greater part of the territory of the Eburones was between the Meuse and the Rhine, he said that the camp of Sabinus was in their territory. And, as Fuss ought to have known, Caesar does not, except very rarely, describe sites with precision. In a later passage he does "intend to indicate the site of the camp of Sabinus," and says that it was *ferè in mediis Eburonum finibus*.

Secondly, it has been objected that it is useless to try to reconcile the actual position of Tongres with Caesar's statement that Aduatuca was *ferè in mediis Eburonum finibus*, if that statement means, "nearly in the centre of the country of the Eburones." Attempts have, however, been made to explain away the difficulty. "Tongres est situé," says Napoleon,<sup>2</sup> "*in mediis finibus Eburonum*, ce qui signifie en plein pays des Éburons et non au centre du pays." I cannot see how this meaning is to be got out of the Latin: if Caesar had meant what Napoleon says, he would simply have written *in finibus Eburonum*; for the word *ferè* would have had no point. Mr. C. E. Moberly<sup>3</sup> offers a curious explanation. "A military man," he says, "would take his idea of a central position more from the roads than from the general country which he occupies. Thus Tongres would be a *medius locus*, as lying on the great arterial road of the Meuse, by which alone the baggage of the army could be transported." It is not proved that there was no other road through the territory of the Eburones by which baggage could be transported: but let us assume the truth of Mr. Moberly's assertion. On his theory, if an invading army, having effected a landing at Brighton, were to march direct on London, Redhill would be *in mediis Anglorum finibus*! On his theory, too, the word *ferè* in Caesar's statement would be superfluous. Lastly it has been argued that the country of the Eburones extended westward as far as the Scheldt, and therefore that Tongres *is* in the centre of that country. "D'après le récit même des Commentaires," says a

<sup>1</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. sc. et litt. du Limbourg*, ii., 1854, p. 169.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 201.

<sup>3</sup> *Caesar*, p. 301.

member of the French Commission,<sup>1</sup> "les Éburons s'étendaient à gauche jusqu'à l'Escaut." The passage on which the argument is based is in *B. G.*, vi. 33, § 3. Describing the measures which he took in 53 B.C., after returning from Germany, to apprehend Ambiorix, Caesar says that he determined to march in the direction of the Scheldt and the most distant parts of the Ardennes, whither he heard that Ambiorix had gone (*ipse cum reliquis tribus (legionibus) ad flumen Scaldim, quod influit in Mosam, extremasque Arduennae partes ire constituit, quo . . . profectum Ambiorigem audiebat*). This passage proves nothing as to the extent of the Eburonian country; for Caesar does not say that Ambiorix was in that country: he may, for aught we know, have escaped beyond his own frontier, as Caesar expressly says that many of his subjects did.<sup>2</sup> General Creuly<sup>3</sup> says that 210 kilometres, or 130 miles, the distance from Tongres to the nearest point of the Scheldt and back, is just what Caesar would have accomplished in seven ordinary marches. But, to say nothing of the fact that 30 kilometres is considered by most authorities too much for an ordinary march,<sup>4</sup> Caesar does not say that he went all the way to the Scheldt; and when he told Cicero that he would return from his expedition in seven days, he may not have known how far off the Scheldt was. Moreover, even if he did march as far as the Scheldt, even if the Scheldt bounded the territory of the Eburones, Tongres was not in the centre of that territory; for it was certainly close to their southern boundary.

I do not, however, myself think that this particular objection to the identification of Aduatuca with Tongres is serious, for the simple reason that no site which can be identified with Aduatuca is anywhere near the middle of the country of the Eburones. It follows either that Caesar made a mistake, or that when he wrote *finibus* he meant "frontier," or that he meant something else, which I shall presently explain. It is not true, as Napoleon asserts, that *finis* in Caesar always means "territory." There are at least three passages<sup>5</sup> in the *Gallie War* where it obviously means "frontier"; and one of these passages certainly suggests that Aduatuca was on the southern frontier of the Eburones. In the passage to which I refer<sup>6</sup> Caesar says that Ambiorix and Catuvolcus met Sabinus and Cotta on the frontier of their kingdom, and brought their quota of corn to the Roman camp:—"initium repentini tumultus ac defectionis ortum est ab Ambiorige et Catuvolco; qui, cum ad fines regni sui Sabinus Cottueque praesto fuissent frumentumque in hiberna comportavissent, etc. But I do not believe that *fines*, in Caesar, ever means frontier, except where that meaning is unmistakably indicated by the context; and if "frontier" is the meaning here, it would seem that the words "*hoc fere est in mediis Eburonum finibus*" are

<sup>1</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Multi ex suis finibus egressi, se suaque omnia alienissimis crediderunt. *B. G.*, vi. 31, § 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. vii., 1863, p. 386.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, v. 26, § 2, 54, § 2; vi. 44, § 3.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 626-7.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, v. 26, § 2.

meaningless; for a frontier, considered as a whole, has no centre. Pondering over this, it occurred to me some time ago that Caesar may have written *meridientis*, not *mediis*; and von Güler<sup>1</sup> makes the same suggestion. But the longer I study the *Commentaries* the more convinced I become that in nine cases out of ten the passages which it is sought to amend require no emendation. Caesar tells us that Ambiorix was king of one half of the country of the Eburones, and Catuvolcus of the other.<sup>2</sup> I am inclined to believe that what he meant (though he expressed his meaning rather loosely) was, not that Aduatuca was nearly in the centre of the whole Eburonian territory, but that it was nearly in the middle of that territory, in the sense that it was near the common frontier of the two kingdoms of which the whole territory was composed.

There are several other passages in Caesar which point to the conclusion that Aduatuca was between the Meuse and the Rhine. He tells us that Ambiorix, in his colloquy with Gaius Arpineius and Quintus Junius, stated that a body of Germans, who were coming to the assistance of the Gallic insurgents, had crossed the Rhine, and would be at Aduatuca in a couple of days.<sup>3</sup> Sabinus, in the council of war which was called to discuss the statements of Ambiorix, remarked that the Rhine was comparatively near (*Rhenum subesse*<sup>4</sup>), a phrase which he would hardly have used if the Meuse had intervened between the Rhine and Aduatuca. When the Sugambri invaded the country of the Eburones, we are told that they crossed the Rhine:<sup>5</sup> but we are not told that, in order to reach Aduatuca, they crossed the Meuse. When they left Aduatuca, we are told that they retreated across the Rhine (*trans Rhenum se receperunt*<sup>6</sup>); and this phrase would certainly be misleading if they had first had to cross so important a river as the Meuse. Again Dewez has pointed out that their small force would hardly have dared to wander so far as Aduatuca if Aduatuca had been on the left bank of the Meuse.<sup>7</sup> Finally, M. S. P. Ernst points out<sup>8</sup> that it is most unlikely that Caesar would have left the vast tract between the Rhine and the Meuse without a force to control it.

But even if the geographical position of Tongres were not irreconcilable with Caesar's indications as to the geographical position of Aduatuca, we should have no right to identify the two, for the sufficient reason that there is no place in the neighbourhood of Tongres which satisfies the requirements of Caesar's narrative.<sup>9</sup> I am aware that Driesen, whose supposed discovery was accepted by Napoleon, laboured to prove the contrary:<sup>10</sup> but Driesen's theory was shaken, if not demolished, by

<sup>1</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 175.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, v. 24, § 4; vi. 31, § 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 27, § 8.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 29, § 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, vi. 35, § 6.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 41, § 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Nouvelles Mém. de l'Acad. Roy. des sciences et belles-lettres de Bruxelles*, ii., 1822, p. 267.

<sup>8</sup> *Hist. de Limbourg*, 1837, t. i., p. 178, note. See also p. 184, n. 2.

<sup>9</sup> See Feuille xxxiii., Planchette 8 and Feuille xxxiv., Planchette 5 of the *Carte topographique de la Belgique* (1:20,000).

<sup>10</sup> *Bull. de l'Acad. Roy. de Bruxelles*, xv., 1863, pp. 472-83. See also Fuss (*Bull. de la Soc. scientifique et litt. du Limbourg*, ii., 1854, p. 175, n. 4), who asserts that, in the neighbourhood of Tongres, more than one valley corresponds with Caesar's description, but does not attempt to prove his assertion.

Grandgagnage. According to Driesen, the *magna convallis* in which Sabinus's force was destroyed is the "vallon de Lowaige." The direction of this valley is south-westward; its nearest point is about three kilometres, or a mile and seven furlongs, from Tongres; a stream, the Geer, runs through it; it is about 2750 yards long; its average breadth is about 570 yards;<sup>1</sup> and its lowest point is about 125 feet below the highest point of the "heights" which surround it. Now, although conjecture had long pointed to Tongres as the site of Aduatuca, no one had ever thought of identifying the "vallon de Lowaige" with the *magna convallis* until Driesen made his discovery; and Driesen himself had previously selected another site,—the "fond de Frère,"—but had abandoned it as irreconcilable with Caesar's description.<sup>2</sup> The chief objections which Grandgagnage brings against the "vallon de Lowaige" are these:—(1) its depth is so slight in comparison with its width that Caesar would hardly have described it as a *magna convallis*. "Il n'y a point de gorge," says Grandgagnage, "d'étroit défilé, mais une dépression de terrain, très largement évasée."<sup>3</sup> (2) Caesar does not say that any river flowed through the valley. Yet if the "vallon de Lowaige" was the *magna convallis*, the river Geer must have played an important part in the battle. Either the right or the left wing of the ambushed army of Ambiorix would have been obliged to cross it. But to do so would have been very difficult, if not impossible; for, even in 1863, its banks were very marshy.<sup>4</sup> (3) Assuming that Sabinus intended to march to Cicero's camp in the country of the Nervii, he would, if he had entered Lowaige, have gone entirely out of his way; and he would also have gone out of his way, if he intended to march to the camp of Labienus, in the country of the Remi, close to the western frontier of the Treveri. Driesen, indeed, insists that, in the latter case, he would have been compelled to make the détour, in order to avoid the woods of Russon and Herstappe: but Grandgagnage ridicules this argument. "L'auteur," he says, "fait commencer les bois juste au point où sa thèse en a besoin pour son fond de Lowaige, et il les fait finir juste au point où sa thèse n'en a plus besoin. C'est encore par les besoins de sa thèse qu'après avoir placé les bois sur la hauteur, il s'abstient, on ne sait trop pourquoi, d'en placer dans le fond et sur les versants. J'avoue que j'ai peine à trouver tout cela sérieux, et je doute fort que Sabinus et Cotta se soient entendus avec Ambiorix pour aller se faire exterminer dans un fond qui n'était pas sur leur route. Je pense aussi que, si les soldats de César avaient eu peur de traverser un bois, ils n'auraient pas fait beaucoup de chemin sur l'ancien territoire des Belges."<sup>5</sup> Moreover, a Roman road ran past Russon and Herstappe: what right, then, has Driesen to deny that Sabinus could have followed the line of this road

<sup>1</sup> So says Driesen (p. 477). It is difficult to say what he means by the breadth of the valley. If the valley of Lowaige be measured across that part of its expanse which is fairly level, between the lines which mark the commencement of a decided slope in the enclosing hills, its breadth is much less than 570 yards. See Feuille xxxiii., Planchette 8, of the *Carte topographique de la Belgique*.

<sup>2</sup> *Bull. de l'Acad. Roy. de Bruxelles*, xv., 1863, p. 460.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, p. 461.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 461-2.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 462-4.



or that of the modern road which leads from Tongres to Liège? (4) Napoleon, after the publication of his *History*, sent Major de Locqueyssie to study the environs of Tongres; and this officer told M. Grandgagnage that his opinion was against identifying Tongres with Aduatuca.<sup>1</sup>

Now I do not commit myself to absolute agreement with Grandgagnage. General Creuly has, I think, shown that he misunderstands the words *magna convallis*. The word *convallis*, says the General,<sup>2</sup> is applied in *Bellum Africae*, 7, to a slight depression in a country even more level than the neighbourhood of Tongres. But the other arguments of Grandgagnage are harder to answer. If no one of them is, in itself, conclusive, they are, in the aggregate, very strong. Even if the river Geer would not have interfered with the formation of the *orbis*<sup>3</sup> and the tactics of the Eburones; even if the woods extended just so far as, and no further than was necessary for Driesen's theory, there remains the difficulty of believing that Sabinus would have taken the road through the vale of Lowaige in order to reach Cicero's camp, or in order to reach the camp of Labienus. M. Harroy also maintains that it would have been impossible for the Romans to form in a circle or hollow square (*orbis*) at any point between Russon and Lowaige, for want of room.<sup>4</sup> I am inclined to agree with him; for, at its widest, the level part of the valley between these points is not more than 380 metres, or about 420 yards wide. The only place where it appears sufficiently wide is close to Koninxheim, at the end nearest to Tongres. Heller, who believes, as I do, that Sabinus took the road leading to Cicero's camp, says that he would not have attempted to cross the Meuse, as he must have intended to do, in order to reach Cicero's camp, if Aduatuca had been on the right bank of the Meuse.<sup>5</sup> It is amusing to find that Heller himself points out that the Sugambri, in order to reach Tongres, which he identifies with Aduatuca, could easily have forded the Meuse at Lixhe and Maestricht. If the Sugambri, why not Sabinus and his cohorts? And why should Sabinus have hesitated to cross the Meuse when he did not fear opposition? Besides, on Heller's theory, the handful of fugitives who escaped to Labienus's camp must have crossed the Meuse.

General Creuly observes that the "Atuaca" which stood upon the site of Tongres is described on the famous mile-stone of that town as a *castellum*, and adds that "it is worthy of remark that Caesar designates Aduatuca as a *castellum*, while everywhere else he calls the strongholds of the Gauls *oppida*."<sup>6</sup> I admire the ingenuity of this argument: but it avails nothing against those on the other side. And ingenuity is its

<sup>1</sup> *Bull. de l'Acad. Roy. de Belgique*, xxxvii., 1874, p. 118. See also t. xiv., 1862, pp. 393-407, for another article on the same subject by M. Grandgagnage.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, pp. 141-4.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, v. 33, § 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Les Eburons à Limbourg*, 1889, pp. 69-70.

<sup>5</sup> *Philologus*, xxii., 1865, pp. 139-40.

<sup>6</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. iii., 1861, pp. 412-13. It is not true that Caesar "everywhere else calls the strongholds of the Gauls *oppida*"; for he says that the Aduatuci and the Nantuates had *castella*. *B. G.*, ii. 29, § 2; iii. 1, § 4. Von Goler (*Gall. Krieg*, p. 3) says that a *castellum* was a stronghold intended for military purposes only, whereas an *oppidum* was permanently inhabited; and I believe he is right.

only merit. When Caesar says of Aduatuca "Id castelli nomen est," he only means, I believe, that the word Aduatuca designates a *castellum*.<sup>1</sup>

The conclusion of the matter is this. For the assumed identity of Aduatuca with Tongres there is only one strong argument,—the fact that a Gallo-Roman town, which stood upon the site of Tongres, was called Atuaca. The arguments on the other side are many and strong. M. Wauters<sup>2</sup> warns us that, unless we accept Tongres, we must remain in complete uncertainty as to the site. No doubt! But what then? It is unpleasant to be forced to confess that, after prolonged research, one has completely failed to identify the scene of one of the most famous episodes in the Gallic war: but even M. Wauters would probably admit that it is better to be uncertain than to deceive oneself and one's readers.

Nevertheless, of the numerous other sites that have been proposed there are two or three which have found advocates of sufficient repute to make it worth while to examine their claims. I agree with M. de Vlaminck<sup>3</sup> that Aduatuca was somewhere between the Meuse and the Roer. It could not have been far to the east of the Meuse, if it was not more than 50 Roman miles from Cicero's camp in the country of the Nervii.<sup>4</sup> 2. The plateau of Embourg or Embour, near Liège and between the Ourthe and the Vesdre, answers, it is said, to all the requirements of Caesar's narrative, except the statement that Aduatuca was *ferè in mediis Eburonum finibus*. Von Cohausen, Thomann, Grandgagnage, and von Kampen agree in adopting it. A place called La Hasette on the plateau is, in their opinion, the site of the *castellum*.<sup>5</sup> On three points it is protected by rocks, thus answering, as Grandgagnage argues, to Caesar's description<sup>6</sup> of the natural strength of the position. On the north it touches a plain; and it was here, Grandgagnage believes, that the Sugambri attacked it. Woods still exist in the neighbourhood: a Roman road leads to La Hasette: on the north and south there are two hills, either of which might have been the *collis* to which Caesar alludes in his description of the attack on Cicero's camp;<sup>7</sup> and there is more than one *magna convallis* in the neighbourhood.

These arguments are not conclusive. The suggestion that the name "Embourg" is derived from *Eburones* is hardly convincing. Moreover, there is one objection to Embourg which is absolutely fatal. The *magna convallis* is assumed to have been a part of the valley of the Mosbeux, a rivulet which flows into the Vesdre, which is itself a tributary of the Ourthe. This valley is not 2 but 5 miles from Embourg. Von Kampen naively admits that "the words *in silvis opportuno atque occulto loco a milibus passuum circiter duobus* can only apply if (as I have indicated in the map) the forests extended to within that distance of the camp, which is not unlikely in itself, if only we assume further, that the hostile army lying in ambush there, first allowed the Romans to

<sup>1</sup> See von Goler, *Gall. Krieg*, pp. 220-21.

<sup>2</sup> *Bull. de l'Acad. Roy. de Bruxelles*, xv., 1863, p. 286.

<sup>3</sup> *Messager des sc. hist. de Belgique*, 1887 p. 398.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, v. 27, § 9.

<sup>5</sup> See A. Von Kampen's *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. comm. tabulae*, viii.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 37, § 5.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 36, § 2.

pass them, in order to pursue and fall upon them with more chance of success in the *magna convallis* some four miles farther."<sup>1</sup> In other words, "if only we assume" what flatly contradicts Caesar's narrative!

3. Von Goler<sup>2</sup> finds the camp of Labienus in the neighbourhood of Chiny, on the river Semoy. This place, he says, is 100 miles from the most easterly of the western group of camps, which he places at Soissons, and was connected with Reims by a Roman road. The camp of Cicero he places at Namur, which he regards as the best place that Caesar could have selected, both because of its strength and because it would have afforded easy communication, on the one side by the valley of the Meuse with the (assumed) camp of Labienus and on the other by the valley of the Sambre with Caesar's camp at Samarobriga, which he identifies not with Amiens, but with Bray.<sup>3</sup> Fifty miles eastward of Namur, he finds in Limbourg a site which he regards as conforming to Caesar's description of Aduatuca.<sup>4</sup>

This is a fair specimen of von Goler's laborious and ingenious, but futile method. Labienus's camp *may* have been near Chiny: but if von Goler was really convinced that he had found the site, he must have been sadly deficient in the sense of humour. Caesar's camp was not at Bray, but at Amiens.<sup>5</sup> There is no evidence that the camp of Plancus was at Soissons; and if it was, there is no evidence that it was 100 miles from the camp of Labienus.

Since von Goler wrote, Limbourg has found new advocates, General von Veith<sup>6</sup> and M. E. Harroy,<sup>7</sup> the latter of whom has said everything that can be said in its favour. Limbourg, which stands upon a high rock, about 270 feet above the river Vesdre, is some 15 miles, as the crow flies, east of Liège. The *magna convallis*, in which the disaster occurred, is identified by M. Harroy with the valley of Dolhain, the nearest entrance to which is about one mile, measured along the winding road which leads to it, from Limbourg itself. This valley is about 1640 yards<sup>8</sup> long, and its average breadth is from a quarter of a mile to 550 yards.<sup>9</sup> It forms a plain, hemmed in on the north by an escarpment, which rises fully 300 feet above it, and on the south by wooded heights of lower elevation and more gentle slope. At its western, as at its eastern entrance, the valley narrows into a gorge. The point at which the Roman advanced guard was checked would have been opposite the gorge of Bilstain, which opens into the valley from the north; and the doomed cohorts would have made their last stand on the Pavé du Diable,—the widest part of the valley. The field to which Cicero's foragers were sent would be on the north-east of Limbourg, between Baelen and Honthem, and separated from it, as Caesar's narrative requires,<sup>10</sup> by a hill; and the Sugambri would have

<sup>1</sup> *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. comm. tabulae*, viii.

<sup>2</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 173.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 172-5.

<sup>5</sup> See pp. 477-9.

<sup>6</sup> Pick's *Monatsschrift f. d. Gesch. Westdeutsche*, 1878, pp. 419-27.

<sup>7</sup> *Les Ebourens à Limbourg*, 1889.

<sup>8</sup> 1500 metres.

<sup>9</sup> 400 to 500 metres.

<sup>10</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 36, § 2.

approached the rocky height of Limbourg from the south-east by the slope which leads past Eupen, Membach and Goé.<sup>1</sup> To the possible objection that the Vesdre flows through the valley of Dolhain, and that Caesar, in his description of the disaster, says nothing about a river, M. Harroy replies that within his own recollection the Vesdre, in that part of its course, was a rivulet,—a mere thread of water,—which one could cross without wetting one's feet;<sup>2</sup> and that, as Caesar tells us, the summer had been characterised by extraordinary drought.<sup>3</sup> M. Harroy also insists that Limbourg and its environs correspond, in every detail, with Caesar's narrative. I can find no fault with the field to which he sends Cicero's foragers nor with the valley of Dolhain, except that it seems to me too short to have held a column which could hardly have numbered less than 5000 fighting men, besides cavalry and servants and a long baggage train,—a column the formation of which Caesar condemns because of its extreme length.<sup>4</sup> But be this as it may, I have two objections to make to M. Harroy's theory. Caesar says that the Eburones lay in wait for the Romans, in two divisions, at a distance of about 2 Roman miles from the Roman camp (*collocatis insidiis in silvis opportuno atque occulto loco a milibus passuum circiter duobus*).<sup>5</sup> This is not perfectly clear: but, as Long justly remarks, "the simplest explanation is this, that *a* points out the termination of 2000 paces from the camp as the place where the ambushade began. Thus it was from or after the space of 2000 paces that the ambushade was seen and felt."<sup>6</sup> Now M. Harroy is only able to bring his theory into a show of harmony with Caesar's statement by reckoning the distance of 2 miles from the farthest extremity of the valley of Dolhain.<sup>7</sup> I press this objection because Caesar saw Aduatuca himself,<sup>8</sup> and we cannot doubt that he visited the scene of a disaster which he never allowed himself to forget. Secondly, although Aduatuca was undoubtedly a place of natural strength, I find it difficult to believe that it stood upon a high and almost impregnable rock like Limbourg.<sup>9</sup> Caesar would hardly have failed to inform us of so remarkable a circumstance; and it is difficult to understand how the Sugambri, with their inadequate force, could have had the temerity to attack so formidable a position. I fear, therefore, that M. Harroy's interesting *brochure* must be pronounced unconvincing.

<sup>1</sup> *Les Éburons à Limbourg*, pp. 17, 64, 71, 74.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, p. 80.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, v. 21, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 31, § 6. According to a calculation in the New York *Evening Post*, quoted by Mr. Judson (*Caesar's Army*, p. 50), the length of a marching column of four regiments, which would be about equal to one legion, without baggage, is 1350 yards. Sir E. Hamley (*Operations of War*, 4th ed., p. 26) says that 30,000 infantry on the march, without baggage, extend over about 5 miles of road. Sabinus's force, all told, could hardly have numbered less than 6000, even if he had no auxiliaries except cavalry; and as his column was unduly long and had a great quantity of baggage, it must, I should think, have extended over at least a mile and a half of road.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, v. 32, § 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Caesar*, p. 250.

<sup>7</sup> *Les Éburons à Limbourg*, p. 65.

<sup>8</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 32, §§ 2-5, 41, § 4.

<sup>9</sup> See *Carte topographique de la Belgique*, Feuille 43, Planchette 5.

4. Colonel P. Henrard,<sup>1</sup> of the Belgian army, identifies Aduatuca with Vieux-Virton, which is in Luxembourg, 27 kilometres or 17 miles south-west of Arlon, and about 80 miles due south of Liège! His argument is not worth summarising. It failed to convince any member of the Commission<sup>1</sup> which the Royal Academy of Belgium appointed to examine it. They pointed out that, in order to make out his case, Colonel Henrard had displaced the territory of the Eburones, taking away from it that part which, according to Caesar, touched the Rhine, and handing it over to the Treveri;<sup>2</sup> that, in the face of all authorities ancient and modern, he had confined the territory of the Remi within absurdly narrow limits, and *pro tanto* increased that of the Treveri;<sup>3</sup> and that, according to his theory, the Sugambri, in attacking Aduatuca, would have wandered so far from the Rhine as to expose themselves to the greatest danger.<sup>4</sup> I may add that the geographical features of Vieux-Virton and its environs do not correspond, at all events in one important particular, with Caesar's narrative; for the greatest breadth of the valley of Berchive, which Colonel Henrard identifies with the *magna convallis*, is only 150 metres, or about 165 yards;<sup>5</sup> and, as General Creuly shows,<sup>6</sup> a space at least three times as wide would have been required for the battle between Sabinus and Ambiorix. Therefore it is quite certain that Vieux-Virton is not Aduatuca.

5. It is hardly necessary to mention any of the other conjectures. M. de Vlaminck identifies Aduatuca with Aix-la-Chapelle:<sup>7</sup> M. Caumartin<sup>8</sup> with Hontem, near the eastern bank of the Meuse and the ford of Navague, and about 15 miles north-east of Liège: B. Schottler<sup>9</sup> with Rheinbach, about 11 miles south-west of Bonn, which is very much too far from the country of the Nervii to correspond with Caesar's narrative. Besides *Aduatuca*, in *B. G.*, vi. 35, § 8, there are, in inferior MSS., various readings, *ad Vatuca*, — or, according to Frigell, *at Vatuca*, which is absolutely meaningless, — and *ad Varuca*;<sup>10</sup> and accordingly, from the resemblance of the names, the camp has also been placed by some at Wittem,<sup>11</sup> about 8 miles west-north-west of Aix-la-Chapelle, and by others at Waroux,<sup>12</sup> on the west of the Meuse, about 3 miles from Liège. But it is needless to say that Caesar, being an educated man, would not have written *ad Vatuca* or *ad Varuca* (*veivre*); and besides it needs no critical acumen to see that *ad Vatuca* is nothing but *aduatuca*, miswritten by a dunce. Finally, Alfred Holder<sup>13</sup> places Aduatuca at

<sup>1</sup> *Mém. couronnés, etc., publiés par l'Acad. Roy. de Belgique*, xxxiii., 1882, pp. 10, 21, 37-40, etc.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, p. 54.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, p. 57.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, p. 54.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, p. 38.

<sup>6</sup> *Rev. arch., nouv. sér.*, t. viii., 1863, p. 142.

<sup>7</sup> *Messenger des sciences hist. de Belgique*, 1882, pp. 413-14.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, 1883, pp. 238-9.

<sup>9</sup> *Über die Lage der geschichtlichen Orte Aduatuca*, 1889.

<sup>10</sup> Schneider's *Caesar*, ii. 299.

<sup>11</sup> J. B. Renard's *Hist. pol. et mil. de la Belgique*, p. 442; *Mém. de l'Acad. Roy., etc., de Bruxelles*, ii. 1822, pp. 261-2.

<sup>12</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 258-61.

<sup>13</sup> *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, i. 47-8.

Vetschau,<sup>1</sup> about 3 miles north-west of Aix-la-Chapelle: but I have not been able to discover on what grounds he bases his opinion. Vetschau may perhaps be the place; for, if Aduatuca was, as I conclude, on the right bank of the Meuse, and if it was 50 miles from a point on the common frontier of the Remi and the Treveri, and 50 miles from a point in the country of the Nervii, it must have been somewhere in the neighbourhood of Aix-la-Chapelle.<sup>2</sup>

The truth is that the data are insufficient. Aduatuca was somewhere between the Meuse and the Rhine: it was naturally a strong place: it was probably near the middle of the southern frontier of the Eburones: it was, if Caesar's numbers are to be trusted, roughly speaking, about 50 Roman miles from a point somewhere in the territory of the Nervii, and about the same distance from a point somewhere near the common frontier of the Remi and the Treveri: there were woods quite close to it: there was a valley about 2 miles off, just long enough to hold the brigade of Sabinus marching in column, and wide enough to admit of that brigade being surrounded, when formed in a circle, by the Eburones;<sup>3</sup> and there was a hill close by. Furthermore, as it is not likely that Ambiorix knew whether Sabinus intended to march for the camp of Labienus or for that of Cicero, we may perhaps infer, with General Creuly, that, in either case, the first part of his route would have led through the valley which Ambiorix occupied.<sup>4</sup> That is all that we have to go upon. If there were some one place and one only to which Caesar's description applied, Aduatuca might be identified.

III. Napoleon<sup>5</sup> places Cicero's camp at Charleroi, which, he says, "is situated near the Roman road from Amiens to Tongres, and, as the Latin text requires, at 50 miles from this latter town. On the high part of Charleroi, where the camp was no doubt established, we command the valley of the Sambre, and we can see, in the distance towards the west, the country through which Caesar arrived."<sup>6</sup> Moreover, the valley of the Haine and Mont Sainte-Aldegonde, above the village of Carnières, agree perfectly with the details of the combat in which the Gauls were defeated."<sup>7</sup> But Aduatuca was not at Tongres; and therefore Napoleon's argument falls to the ground.

Desroches<sup>8</sup> places Cicero's camp at Assche; Dewez and others at Mons;<sup>9</sup> von Guler<sup>10</sup> and von Kampen at Namur. But it would be as tedious as it is needless to prolong the list of guesses. Until the position of Aduatuca has been fixed,—and it never will be fixed with certainty unless an inscription or some piece of evidence equally

<sup>1</sup> See Sheets 2965-6 of the German Government Map (1:25,000).

<sup>2</sup> Fauquemont, Julemont, Juliers, Maestricht, Rolduc, Wandre and the "plateau de la Falise," at the confluence of the Ourthe and the rivulet of Laval, have also been proposed.

<sup>3</sup> General Creuly estimates that the army of Sabinus, numbering, as it probably did, about 6000 men, must have occupied, when formed in the *orbis*, a level space at least 550 yards square. *Rev. arch., nouv. sér.*, t. viii., 1863, p. 142.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 143-4.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 214, n. 2. <sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, v. 48, § 10. <sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 48-52.

<sup>8</sup> *Nouveaux mém. de l'Acad. Roy., etc., de Bruxelles*, ii., 1822, pp. 241, 243.

<sup>9</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 241-4. <sup>10</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, pp. 170, 173-4.

decisive is found,—it will be absolutely hopeless to search for Cicero's camp. For we know nothing about its position, except that, if Caesar's, or rather Ambiorix's, figures are accurate, it was about 50 Roman miles from Aduatuca, was within a short march and on the east of a river, and was probably close to the road that led from Amiens to Aduatuca. And regarding the camp of Labienus, which the omniscient Napoleon places at Lavacherie on the Ourthe, we are equally in the dark. It was rather more than 50 Roman miles from Aduatuca:<sup>1</sup> it was near the common frontier of the Treveri and the Remi: it was close to a river; and that river was perhaps the Ourthe.<sup>2</sup> There our knowledge ends.

**Aduatuci.**—The Aduatuci and the Eburones were, in the opinion of Desjardins<sup>3</sup> and others, practically one people: but it is difficult to understand how any one who knows the *Commentaries* can maintain such a paradox. Caesar clearly implies, again and again, that the two peoples and their territories were distinct. Ambiorix, one of the two kings of the Eburones, says that he has been relieved by Caesar from the obligation of paying tribute to the Aduatuci, his neighbours.<sup>4</sup> Again, after his victory over Sabinus, Ambiorix marched into the country of the Aduatuci, "who were conterminous with his kingdom" (*qui erant eius regno finitimi*),<sup>5</sup> and persuaded them to join him in attacking Cicero. In the following year (53 B.C.) Trebonius was sent to ravage that part of the country of the Eburones which bordered on the country of the Aduatuci.<sup>6</sup> Lastly, Caesar says that the Aduatuci had numerous strongholds (*oppida*) and that the Eburones had none.<sup>7</sup>

I. According to Dion Cassius,<sup>8</sup> who is no authority, the territory of the Aduatuci bordered on that of the Nervii: but he may be right here,

<sup>1</sup> Caesar (*B. G.*, i. 27, § 9) makes Ambiorix say, in his interview with Arpineius and Julius, that the camp of Cicero was about 50 Roman miles from Aduatuca, and that of Labienus a little more (*Ipsorum esse consilium relinque prius quam finitimi sentiant eductos et hibernis milites aut ad Cicermem aut ad Labienum deducere, quorum alter milia passuum circiter L, alter paulo amplius ab iis absit*). General Creuly, referring to *B. G.*, vii. 17, § 2 (*De re frumentaria Boios atque Aeduos adhortari non destitit; quorum alteri, quod nullo studio agebant, non multum cultivabant; alteri non magnis facultatibus, quod civitas erat exigua et infirma, celeriter quod habuerunt consumpserunt*), argues that the first *alter* refers to Labienus and the second to Cicero. But the two passages are not parallel. In the second it is made clear by the context that the first *alteri* refers to the Aedui and the second to the Boii; whereas in the other passage the context does not help us, and to prove his point, Creuly ought to be able to show that Caesar habitually uses *alter . . . alter* in an inverted order. But Heller (*Philologus*, xxii, 1865, p. 154) caps his quotation by another from *B. G.*, v. 54, § 4 (*ut praeter Aeduos et Remos quos praecipuo semper honore Caesar habuit, alteros pro vetere ac perpetua erga populum Romanum fide, alteros pro recentibus Gallici belli officiis, nulla fere civitas fuerit non suspecta nobis*). In this passage it is unquestionable that the first *alteros* refers to the Aedui and the second to the Remi. On Creuly's theory, in v. 27 Caesar's meaning would have been doubtful even to Roman readers: but it is clear that as, in that passage, the context does not fix his meaning, he used *alter . . . alter* in their natural order.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, v. 24, § 2, 58, § 6.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, v. 27, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, vi. 33, § 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xxxix. 4 § 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 437-8, 457.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 38, § 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, ii. 29, §§ 1-2; vi. 34, § 1.

for, according to Caesar,<sup>1</sup> a part at least of their territory was between that of the Nervii and that of the Eburones. The Eburones had some territory on the west of the Meuse, east of the Nervii and south of the Menapii: but the greater part was between the Meuse and the Rhine.<sup>2</sup> South of the Meuse, in the neighbourhood of Condruz, were the Condrusi. Accordingly, the Aduatuci are generally placed in the valley of the Meuse, principally along its left or northern bank, between the Nervii and the Condrusi.

The French Commission, who identify Aduatuca with *Tongres*, consider that the name *Aduatuca* proves that the Aduatuci possessed the vast plain which is dominated by Tongres.<sup>3</sup> But Caesar expressly says that Aduatuca was in the country not of the Aduatuci but of the Eburones;<sup>4</sup> and, moreover, as I have shown in the preceding note, Aduatuca was not on the site of Tongres. The Commission also argue that the Aduatuci must have possessed Namur, because numerous coins bearing the legend AVAVCIA, which the eminent numismatist, F. de Sauley, attributed to them, have been found there.<sup>5</sup> The attribution is not certain: but, assuming its correctness, what does the discovery of the coins prove? Coins belonging to the Helvetii, the Santones, the Sequani, the Carnutes, the Senones, the Lingones, the Bituriges and the Atrebatas have been found on Mount Beuvray<sup>6</sup> (Bibracte): but these peoples did not live in Aeduan territory. Still, the orthodox faith is that the Aduatuci occupied Namur and its neighbourhood,<sup>7</sup> that is to say, the district of Hesbaye, on the northern bank of the Meuse, and perhaps also some little territory in the western part of Condruz, on the southern bank of the same river.

A novel view regarding the geographical position of the Aduatuci has recently been propounded by M. de Vlaminck, and accepted by M. A. Longnon.<sup>8</sup> According to this view, as originally stated, they occupied that part of the country between the Meuse and the Rhine which subsequently belonged to the Ubii. M. de Vlaminck takes his stand upon the well-known passage in which Caesar says that the Aduatuci were descended from the Cimbri and Teutoni, who, when they were about to invade the Province and Italy, had left a detachment on the left bank of the Rhine to protect all the *impedimenta* that they were unable to take with them.<sup>9</sup> As, argues M. de Vlaminck, the detachment evidently had to keep open the communications of the Cimbri and Teutoni, and to cover their retreat in case of a disaster, it would be absurd to suppose that their territory was so far removed from the Rhine as is generally supposed. He also insists that so powerful a tribe would never have been confined in the narrow space between the Eburones and the Nervii.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, v. 38, §§ 1-2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 24, § 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 11.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 32, §§ 3-4.

<sup>5</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 11.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, t. 1. Lists and illustrations of the coins are given; but I cannot give the reference, for the plates are not numbered.

<sup>7</sup> D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 33.

<sup>8</sup> *Atlas hist. de la Gaule*, p. 4.

<sup>9</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 29, § 4.

<sup>10</sup> *La Ménapië*, etc., 1879, pp. 42-4.



The first of these arguments is childish. The Aduatuci were not required to keep open the communications of their kinsmen for half a century : M. de Vlamincck himself, in a later paper, extended their territory as far westward as a point between Liège and Embourg ; and they had plenty of time to move away from the Rhine if they had any motive for doing so. In reply to the second argument, it may be said first, that, judging from the size of the contingent which the Aduatuci furnished to the Belgic army in 57 B.C., they were inferior in strength even then to the Bellovaci, the Suessiones and the Morini ;<sup>1</sup> and secondly, that it is quite possible that, after the crushing blow which Caesar inflicted upon the Aduatuci in that year, when he slew 4000 of them, sold 53,000 into slavery, and released the Eburones from the obligation of paying them tribute,<sup>2</sup> he may also have transferred to the Eburones a portion of their territory, including the fastness of Aduatuca.

M. de Vlamincck's arguments naturally provoked hostile criticism ; and he subsequently modified his theory. In a series of replies to his critics he adduces fresh arguments. (1) The Aduatuci, he says, could have had no motive for quitting their original settlement between the Rhine and the Meuse, which was sufficiently fertile. (2) The statement of Dion Cassius that their territory bordered upon that of the Nervii is worthless, because Dion was an inaccurate writer, and probably had no other authority for what he said than Caesar's narrative, upon which he put his own construction. Moreover, the fact that the Aduatuci failed to join the Nervii in time to take part in the battle on the Sambre, although they were in full march on the day before the battle, can only be accounted for on the theory that their territory was at a distance from that of the Nervii. Besides, Caesar calls the Atrebatcs and the Viro-mandui neighbours of the Nervii, but refuses that designation to the Aduatuci. (3) Although they did undoubtedly push their conquests westward and northward, there is no proof that they ever crossed the Meuse : they would certainly have been destroyed if they had attempted to penetrate far into the territory of the Belgæ ; and Caesar's statement that, according to the Remi, the Belgæ boasted that they had kept the Teutoni and Cimbri at bay,<sup>3</sup> is proof positive that they made no such attempt. (4) Caesar's narrative proves that the Eburones submitted to him before the Aduatuci ; for it is certain that they submitted in 57 B.C. ; and they could not have deferred their submission until after the reduction of the Aduatuci in that year, because, immediately after that event, Caesar left Gaul for Italy. We are not justified, therefore, in arguing that the country of the Aduatuci was between that of the Nervii and that of the Eburones. (5) The Ubij made overtures of submission to Caesar in consequence of his victory over the Aduatuci : but they would not have done so if the Aduatucan stronghold, which Caesar captured, had been far from their country.<sup>4</sup>

The answer is (1) that, according to Caesar<sup>5</sup> and to the admission of

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 4, §§ 5-9.

<sup>2</sup> *Id.*, ii. 33, § 7 ; v. 27, § 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Id.*, ii. 4, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Messenger des sciences hist. de Belgique*, 1882, pp. 391-2 ; 1884, p. 282 ; 1887, pp. 39, 55-6, 351-2.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 29, § 5 ; v. 27, § 2

M. de Vlamincq himself, the Aduatuci, whether they abandoned their original settlement or not, did push their conquests westward; and we may be sure that they extended their territory as far as they possibly could. (2) Dion's authority is certainly not worth much by itself: but, assuming that he was merely copying Caesar, the construction which he put upon Caesar's language is warranted by common sense, and is the construction which almost every commentator, except M. de Vlamincq, has put upon it. It is impossible to tell why the Aduatuci were too late to join the Nervii. They may have been late in starting, or they may have been remiss; and, as Caumartin argues,<sup>1</sup> they were evidently the first people whom Caesar encountered after quitting the country of the Nervii. It is true that Caesar calls the Atrebatcs and the Viromandui *finitimi* of the Nervii, and that he does not so designate the Aduatuci: but to say that he *refuses* them the designation is begging the question; and if the reader will turn to the passage to which M. de Vlamincq refers he will see, having regard to the run of the sentence, how natural it was for Caesar to omit to mention that the Aduatuci, as well as the other two tribes, were neighbours of the Nervii:—*trans id flumen omnes Nervios consedisce adventumque ibi Romanorum expectare una cum Atrebatibus et Viromanduis, finitimis suis—nam his utrisque persuaserant, uti eandem belli fortunam experirentur;—expectaturi etiam ab his Aduatucorum copias atque esse in itinere* (B. G., ii. 16, §§ 2-3). (3) It is absurd of M. de Vlamincq to say that the Aduatuci would have been destroyed if they had attempted to penetrate far into the country of the Belgæ, when he himself admits that they penetrated as far as they could push their conquests: and when Caesar expressly says that they made war upon their neighbours, and that they reduced the Eburones to the condition of tributaries.<sup>2</sup> The very fact that, as Caesar says and as M. de Vlamincq admits, they did conquer some of the Belgic territory, proves that the statement that the Belgæ had kept the Cimbri and Teutoni at bay is only generally true, and does not help M. de Vlamincq's argument. (4) There is no evidence that the Eburones submitted before the Aduatuci; for Caesar does not say that he went to Italy *immediately* after the capture of the stronghold of the Aduatuci; and the Eburones may have submitted, like certain of the Transrhenean peoples,<sup>3</sup> in the interval between the capture of the stronghold and his departure. But, assuming for the sake of argument that they did submit before the Aduatuci, that does not prove that Caesar crossed their territory on his march to the stronghold of the Aduatuci. Even according to M. de Vlamincq's latest map,<sup>4</sup> he need not have done so. (5) It is childish to argue that the Ubii would have submitted if, as M. de Vlamincq supposes, the stronghold of the Aduatuci had been at Embourg, but would not have submitted if it had been at or near Huy, a few miles farther off.

In B. G., vi. 32, § 1, Caesar says that the Segni and the Condrusi are

<sup>1</sup> *Annales de la Soc. arch. de Namur*, xv., 1881, pp. 233-4.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 29, § 5; v. 27, § 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, ii. 35, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Messenger*, etc., 1887, facing p. 3.

between the Eburones and the Treveri. According to M. de Vlaminck's maps, they are between the Aduatuci and the Treveri.<sup>1</sup>

Again, in *B. G.*, v. 38, §§ 1-2, describing how Ambiorix followed up his victory over Sabinus and Cotta, Caesar writes:—*Huc victoria sublatus Ambiorix statim cum equitatu in Aduatucos, qui erant eius regno finitimi, proficiscitur: neque noctem neque diem intermittit peditumque sese subsequi iubet. Rc demonstrata Aduatucisque cecitatis, postero die in Nervios perrenit*, etc. After reading the first of M. de Vlaminck's series of papers, I wrote, "this passage proves that the Aduatuci were between the Eburones, from whose territory Ambiorix started, and the Nervii." But in a later passage M. de Vlaminck extends the territory of the Aduatuci westward a little beyond Embourg; and, placing Aduatuca at Aix-la-Chapelle, he forces his theory into possible conformity with Caesar's narrative. Yet even so, Ambiorix would only have passed across the extreme western corner of the country of the Aduatuci, and would then have had to recross the territory of the Eburones or to cross the territory of the Condrusi before reaching that of the Nervii. But no unbiassed reader can fail to see that, taken in their natural sense, Caesar's words imply that the territory of the Aduatuci intervened between that of Ambiorix and that of the Nervii.

Nevertheless, I believe that in M. de Vlaminck's pages there is a grain of truth. He wholly fails to prove that the Aduatuci did not possess the territory on the western bank of the Meuse which, until he wrote, geographers had generally assigned to them. But it is probable, or at least possible that, before their treachery provoked the vengeance of Caesar, they also possessed a considerable tract of country between the Meuse and the Rhine.<sup>3</sup> I also fully admit that there is no positive proof that the Aduatuci ever crossed the Meuse: I simply maintain that Caesar's narrative is best explained on the hypothesis that they did so.

II. The Eburones are not mentioned by any ancient writer except Caesar.<sup>4</sup> The greater part of their country was between the Rhine and the Meuse, from which it may be inferred that the remaining part was west of the Meuse. Their neighbours on the south were the Treveri, the Segni and the Condrusi; on the north the Menapii; and on the

<sup>1</sup> It will hardly be believed that M. de Vlaminck adduces this very passage to prove his own theory. "N'est-il pas évident," he asks, "qu'en plaçant les Aduatucos dans la Hesbrie, les Condruses ne pouvaient plus être intermédiaires entre les Eburons et les Trévires?" Let the reader turn to M. de Vlaminck's latest article, and examine the three maps which he gives,—Napoleon's, M. Wanters's and his own. It is true that, on the orthodox theory, a part of the territory of the Condrusi was not between the territories of the Eburones and the Treveri. But the eastern part was; and so was the entire territory of the Segni; whereas, on the theory of M. de Vlaminck, the entire territory of the Segni was separated from that of the Eburones by that of the Aduatuci.

<sup>2</sup> *Messenger*, etc., 1887, p. 398.

<sup>3</sup> According to M. de Vlaminck's latest map (*Messenger*, etc., 1887), their territory was bounded on the east by the Rhine, on the north by the rivers Ahr and Vesdre, and on the south and west by the river Vinxbach, which enters the Rhine about midway between Coblenz and the Ahr, and the river Amblève. Its extreme western point was between Embourg and Liège.

<sup>4</sup> See *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 362.

south-west, I believe, the Aduatuci. Their territory may also have been conterminous on the west with that of the Nervii.<sup>1</sup> But it is impossible to define the frontiers of any of these peoples, except perhaps the Nervii; and therefore it is impossible to define the frontiers of the Eburones. General Creuly endeavours to prove that their territory extended northward as far as the sea, and separated the Menapii from the Morini.<sup>2</sup> This theory contradicts the evidence of Strabo, who says that the territories of the Menapii and the Morini were conterminous.<sup>3</sup> But Creuly relies on Caesar. Caesar says that those of the Eburones who dwelt nearest to the sea took refuge, in 53 B.C., in the islands which were formed at high tide.<sup>4</sup> These, says Creuly, must have been the islands at the mouths of the Scheldt. They must have belonged to the Eburones because Caesar, after describing his campaign against the Eburones, says *Hæc in omnibus Eburonum finibus gerebantur*.<sup>5</sup> But Creuly unduly strains Caesar's text. I have no doubt that his statement refers only to the events described in *B. G.*, vi. 33-4. If it refers to chapters 31 and 32 as well, it obviously includes events which did not take place in the country of the Eburones; for in chapter 32 Caesar describes what the Segni and Condrusi were doing; and in chapter 31, on which Creuly lays great stress, he says that many of the Eburones fled beyond their own borders. I believe, then, that those Eburones who took refuge in the islands were not at the time in their own country, though doubtless they were quite close to it; and I conclude that Strabo was right in saying that the territories of the Menapii and Morini were conterminous.

Caesar says that Aduatuca was *fere in mediis Eburonum finibus*.<sup>6</sup> I have explained in the preceding note (pp. 338-40) the true meaning of these words. Some writers, assuming that Aduatuca stood upon the site of Tongres, have argued from them that the territory of the Eburones extended westward as far as the Scheldt; and, in support of this theory, they point to the fact that Caesar marched, or intended to march, in 53 B.C., from Aduatuca to the Scheldt, in pursuit of Ambiorix, who, he heard, had fled to the neighbourhood of the Scheldt.<sup>7</sup> But there is no evidence that Ambiorix was at that time in Eburonian territory; for in the preceding chapter Caesar says that many of the Eburones had fled beyond their own borders. Moreover, Aduatuca was not on the site of Tongres, but somewhere on the east of the Meuse. Therefore it is impossible to say how far westward the territory of the Eburones extended.

**Aduatucorum Oppidum.**—According to Caesar, the stronghold of the Aduatuci was steep and rocky on every side, except at one place, where it was approached by a gentle slope not more than 200 feet wide:—*cunctis oppidis castellisque desertis*, he writes, *sua omnia in unum oppidum egregie natura munitum contulerant*. *Quod cum ex omnibus in circuitu partibus altissimas rupes despectusque haberet, una ex parte leniter adclivis aditus in latitudinem non amplius ducentorum pedum relinquebatur*.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, v. 24, § 4; vi. 32, § 1, 33, §§ 1-2.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. vii., 1863, pp. 385-6.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 456, *infra*. <sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 31, § 3. <sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 35, § 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 32, § 4. <sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 33, § 3. <sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, ii. 29, § 3.

It was large enough to shelter at least 57,000 people;<sup>1</sup> and the line of contravallation with which Caesar surrounded it was traced along ground comparatively high but of varying elevation, and measured 15 or, according to another interpretation of the text, only 3 Roman miles.<sup>2</sup>

A score of sites or more have been suggested: but the majority are not worth examining. Either they do not correspond with Caesar's description, or they are in territory which could not have belonged to the Aduatuci.<sup>3</sup>

The great Napoleon, probably following d'Anville, decided for Falais, near Huy, a height which is nearly surrounded by the river Méhaigne.<sup>4</sup> Des Roches and others<sup>5</sup> have suggested Hastodon, which is quite close to Namur: M. Wauters, who formerly inclined to Montaigu or Sicheu, has more recently suggested "les Kessellergen," north-east of Louvain, but without giving any reason.<sup>6</sup> Napoleon III. pronounced for the citadel of Namur: von Goler, the French Commissioner, K. Thomann, von Kampen and Kiepert for Mont Falhize.

1. "According to the researches," says Napoleon, "which have been carried on in the country supposed to have been formerly occupied by the Aduatuci, two localities only, Mont Falhize and the part of the mountain of Namur on which the citadel is built, appear to agree with the site of the *oppidum* of the Aduatuci. But Mont Falhize is not surrounded with rocks on all sides, as the Latin text requires. The contravallation would have had a development of more than 15,000 feet, and it would have twice crossed the Meuse, which is difficult to admit. We therefore adopt . . . the citadel of Namur."<sup>7</sup>

Long, in his edition of Caesar,<sup>8</sup> rejected Namur, on the ground that it "is on the Maas, a circumstance incompatible with Caesar's description, for he mentions no river." But, in his *History*,<sup>9</sup> he accepted Mont Falhize, which is also on the Meuse, and therefore virtually withdrew his objection. Long also argued, as d'Anville<sup>10</sup> had done before him, that Namur is too small. Dewez, indeed, urges<sup>11</sup> that, although the citadel of Namur is too small in itself, it communicates with other rocky heights, and that all of them taken together would have been sufficiently large. Caesar, however, does not describe a group of hills, but a single hill. The writer of the article *Aduatuci* in the *Dictionnaire archéologique de la Gaule* rejects Namur, not only because it is too small, but also because (1) the gently sloping ascent mentioned by Caesar<sup>12</sup> is

<sup>1</sup> B. G., ii. 33. §§ 5-7.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 30, § 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, p. 11.

<sup>4</sup> See A. E. E. Desjardins, *Alésia*,—suivie d'un appendice renfermant des notes inédites écrites de la main de Nap. I., etc., and d'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 34.

<sup>5</sup> *Nouveaux mém. de l'Acad. Roy. des sciences . . . de Bruxelles*, ii., 1822, pp. 251-2.

<sup>6</sup> *Bull. de l'Acad. Roy. de Bruxelles*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. i., 1881, pp. 343-4.

<sup>7</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 116, n. 1.

<sup>8</sup> Page 135.

<sup>9</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 63-4.

<sup>10</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 33-4.

<sup>11</sup> *Nouv. mém. de l'Acad. Roy. de Bruxelles*, ii., 1822, p. 247.

<sup>12</sup> B. G., ii. 29, § 3.

not to be found ; and (2) if the contravallation had been made to follow the windings of the Sambre, which, in his opinion, would not have been a sufficient obstacle, it would have required a development of 9 kilometres, or much more than 15,000 feet ; whereas, if Caesar had considered the Sambre a sufficient obstacle, and merely drawn the line round the citadel from the bank of the Meuse to the bank of the Sambre, 2000 metres, or much less than 15,000 feet, would have sufficed. As a matter of fact, Napoleon, in his plan (Planche 11), adopts the latter alternative, thereby contradicting his own interpretation of "*XV milium*." I think, therefore, that Namur may be rejected without hesitation.

2. The writer of the article, already referred to, in the *Dictionnaire archéologique de la Gaule* says that of all the localities which have been proposed Beaumont, Namur and Mont Falhize alone deserve serious consideration. He rejects Namur for the reasons which I have already given. Beaumont he also rejects because it is only 25 kilometres or about 15 miles from Neuf-Mesnil, the site of the battle with the Nervii,<sup>1</sup> and, as the Atrebatas and the Viromandui, who also took part in the battle, had to travel respectively 80 and 100 kilometres, the Aduatuci, if they had only had so short a distance to go, could have easily arrived in time. But there is no reason to assume that, because the Aduatuci took refuge against Caesar in a certain stronghold, therefore that stronghold must have been the point from which they marched to join the Nervii. There are, however, other reasons for rejecting Beaumont. First, the plateau of the alleged *oppidum* is too small to have accommodated 57,000 people,<sup>2</sup> smaller even than the plateau of Namur ; and secondly, Beaumont is not in the territory which belonged to the Aduatuci.

3. General von Goler,<sup>3</sup> who carefully examined Mont Falhize, considered that it corresponded exactly with Caesar's description of the stronghold of the Aduatuci ; and General Creuly, after carefully examining the *Carte topographique de la Belgique* (1 : 20,000) came to the same conclusion, and also recorded his belief that no other site in the whole of Belgium could be reconciled with Caesar's description.<sup>4</sup> Napoleon's objections to this site have been already stated. In answer to them it may be said (1) that *Quod cum omnibus in circuitu partibus altissimas rupes despectusque haberet* describes, as the writer of the article in the *Dictionnaire* says, a hill with scarped flanks, "d'où la vue dominait sur la campagne environnante ;"<sup>5</sup> and that, as von Goler and O. Bocquet testify, this description applies to Mont Falhize. (2) The contravallation need not have had "a development of more than 15,000 feet," because (3) it need not have crossed the Meuse at all. In von Kampen's Plan<sup>6</sup> the line of contravallation is drawn

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 654-60.

<sup>2</sup> See *Carte topographique de la Belgique* (1 : 20,000), Feuille 52, Planchette 6.

<sup>3</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 91 and note 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Rev. arch., nouv. sér.*, t. viii., 1863, p. 392. See also O. Bocquet in *Bull. de l'inst. arch. liégeois*, v., 1862, pp. 167-76, and A. Hock, *Études sur quelques campagnes de Jules César dans la Gaule belge*, 1897.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Schneider's *Caesar*, i. 191.

<sup>6</sup> *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. comm. tabulae*, iv.

round the north only of Mont Falhize ; for, as the writer of the article in the *Dictionnaire* observes, the Meuse, which encloses the southern slopes, is, on that side, a sufficient obstacle ; and Caesar need only have left a corps of observation on the right bank at Huy, to watch it. Moreover, the word *circummuniti* need not necessarily mean that the contravallation *entirely* surrounded the town ;<sup>1</sup> and in fact Napoleon's Plan does not make it surround Namur or cross the Meuse.

The extent of the contravallation is, however, uncertain. The reading of  $\beta$  is *vallo p. XII circuitu XV milium crebrisque castellis circummuniti*. Schneider supplies *passuum* with *XV milium* ; and, if he is right, the extent of the rampart was 15 Roman miles. As *XII* is omitted in  $\alpha$ , Frigell<sup>2</sup> believes that the true reading is *vallo passuum in circuitu XV milium*. A. Holder<sup>3</sup> prefers the reading of  $\alpha$ ,—*vallo pedum in circuitu XV milium*, that is to say, "with a rampart 15,000 feet in extent" ; and in one inferior MS. (*Coplecianus*) the reading is simply *vallo pedum in circuitu XV crebrisque, et c.*, which means that the height of the rampart was everywhere 15 feet, and leaves its extent uncertain. This reading is certainly wrong, because it would have no point unless it implied that ramparts sometimes varied in height at different points.<sup>4</sup> Creuly and Bertrand, who are followed by Napoleon,<sup>5</sup> adopt the reading of  $\beta$ , but supply *pedum* after *XV milium*, remarking that Caesar nowhere else uses *milia* or its cases, without *passuum* to express "miles."<sup>6</sup> But this is an astounding blunder ; as, in a very incomplete search, I have found no less than three passages where he does so.<sup>7</sup> Schneider, whom Long follows, says that to supply *pedum* after *XV milium* would be contrary to the usage of Latin : but Heller remarks that the word *pedum* is employed, as "a joint factor," to be coupled both with *XII* and with *XV milium*.<sup>8</sup> I believe that Heller is right ; but at all events it is certain that to construct a line of contravallation 15 Roman miles in extent round either Namur or Mont Falhize would have been contrary to the usage of a sane, not to say a great general. And, if Holder's reading is adopted, the whole difficulty, if there is a difficulty, disappears. Finally, as General Creuly observes, the line along which Caesar would naturally have made his wall of contravallation round Mont Falhize is just 15,000 Roman feet in extent.

Other objections have been urged against Mont Falhize. The Aduatuci, we are told, would not have built their principal stronghold near their north-eastern frontier, which separated them from the Condrusi. To this General Creuly replies (1) that we do not know what that frontier was ; and (2) that, if the Condrusi occupied the right bank of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *B. G.*, i. 38, § 4,—*flumen Dubis ut circino circumductum paene totum oppidum cingit*.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, vol. i. p. 38 ; vol. ii. p. 23.

<sup>3</sup> *Caesar*, p. 50.

<sup>4</sup> See Schneider's *Caesar*, i. 194.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 117, n. 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Rev. arch.*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. iv., 1861, p. 459.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, i. 4, § 4 ; iii. 17, § 5 ; iv. 14, § 1. See also Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii. 607-8.

<sup>8</sup> *Philologus*, xxvi., 1867, pp. 665-7.

the Meuse, that was the very reason why the Aduatuci should have established a stronghold on the opposite bank. Moreover, the general considers that of all the places which they could have chosen for a city of refuge, Mont Falhize was naturally the best.<sup>1</sup>

4. The same objection applies to Falais as to Mont Falhize,—it is nearly surrounded by a river; and in other respects it does not conform so closely to Caesar's description.

5. MM. G. Arnould and de Radigués<sup>2</sup> consider that the plateau of Hastodon, about a mile and a half north-west of Namur, corresponds with Caesar's description more nearly than any other place which has been suggested; and they claim that its area, 13 hectares or about 32 acres, is greater than that of any of the other sites. This, however, is a gross blunder. The area of Mont Falhize is far greater than that of Hastodon; and if, as the great Napoleon maintained, the plateau of Mont Auxois, which covers a space of 97 hectares, is too small to have held 80,000 men,<sup>3</sup> it is hard to see how 57,000 could have found room in a space nearly eight times as small. MM. Arnould and de Radigués strive hard to overcome this objection. In France, they remark, "on admet comme surface minima, pour le campement de l'infanterie sous la tente, un rectangle de 48 m. carrés, pour 15 hommes . . . soit 3 m<sup>2</sup>. 20 par homme. Admettons 13 hectares 25 ares pour la superficie d'Hastodon; on trouve 2 m<sup>2</sup>. 45 par individu." MM. Arnould and de Radigués omit to say that, as even soldiers must have room to move about, the tents in a camp do not cover anything like the whole area of the camp; and even so he allots much less space to the unhappy Aduatuci than the "surface minima" which he mentions. But without elaborate calculation any one can see that to pack 57,000 men into a space of 32 acres and keep them there for several days would be impossible.

In conclusion, I ought to say that M. de Vlaminck, followed<sup>4</sup> by M. A. Longnon,<sup>4</sup> considers that nearly all the attempts that have been made to identify the stronghold were foredoomed to failure because they were based upon the assumption that the territory of the Aduatuci was confined to the country of Namur, whereas it really extended nearly as far eastward as the Rhine. I have examined elsewhere<sup>5</sup> M. de Vlaminck's theory of the habitat of the Aduatuci. He himself identifies the *oppidum* with Embourg, on the east of the Meuse, near the junction of the Vesdre and the Ourthe:<sup>6</sup> but this place does not correspond with Caesar's description. Colhausen and others have also assumed that the stronghold is identical with Aduatuca,<sup>7</sup> the site of the camp in which Sabinus and Cotta were quartered in the autumn of B.C. 54. It is hardly necessary to refute

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. arch.*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. vii., 1863, p. 392.

<sup>2</sup> *Congrès internationale d'anthropologie et d'archéologie préhist.* (Bruxelles, 1872), 1873, pp. 318-26; *Annales de la Soc. arch. de Namur*, xii., 1872-3, pp. 229-39.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 215-16, *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 4.

<sup>5</sup> See pp. 349-52, *supra*.

<sup>6</sup> *Messenger des sciences hist. de Belgique*, 1887, pp. 46, 49.

<sup>7</sup> See A. von Kampen, *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. comm. tabulae*, ii.



this assumption, for which there is not a particle of evidence : but one fact is sufficient to demonstrate its absurdity. The stronghold of the Aduatuci was situated upon a steep and rocky hill, which even Caesar's powerful army could only approach, with the aid of a terrace, by one narrow slope. Aduatuca, although a strong place, was so situated that in 53 B.C. 2000 German cavalry nearly carried it by a *coup-de-main*.<sup>1</sup>

To sum up, Mont Falhize conforms perfectly,<sup>2</sup> in the judgement of trained professional observers, to Caesar's description ; and this is more than can be said of any other site which has yet been proposed. On the other hand, Caesar does not mention the Meuse or any other river :<sup>2</sup> no antiquities whatever had been found on Mont Falhize up to the date (1868) when the first part of the *Dictionnaire archéologique de la Gaule* was published, and I have not been able to discover that any have been found since ; the place was not, so far as we know, occupied in the Middle Ages, nor has it been occupied in modern times. Moreover, I agree with M. de Vlaminck that the territory of the Aduatuci, before they came into collision with Caesar, extended farther eastward than is commonly supposed.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, although I mark the *oppidum* upon the map, I only do so tentatively.

**Aedui.**—The territory of the Aedui, if we include in it, as most geographers do, the territories of their clients,<sup>4</sup> the Auleri Braunnovices and the Mandubii (*q.v.*), comprised, roughly speaking, at all events, the dioceses of Autun (Augustodunum), Chalon-sur-Saône (Cabillonum), Mâcon (Matisco) and Nevers (Nivernum), the last three of which were severed from the primitive diocese of Autun.<sup>5</sup> This territory corresponded with the departments of Saône-et-Loire and Nièvre and parts of Côte-d'Or and Allier. Desjardins has shown, in his posthumous volume, that in the third century of our era, if not in Caesar's time, the Aedui also possessed the territory which belonged to the *civitas Autessiodurum* (Auxerre).<sup>6</sup>

According to Strabo,<sup>7</sup> the Saône separated the Aedui from the Sequani : but the French Commission disregarded his statement and follow the indications of the dioceses, remarking that Strabo's text " n'a rien d'absolument affirmatif quant à la non-discontinuité de la limite le long du fleuve, comme il est facile de s'en convaincre en examinant l'ensemble de la phrase." <sup>8</sup> Strabo may have made a mistake, but his language seems precise enough :—*ῥέϊ δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἄραρ ἐκ τῶν Ἀλπεων, ὀρίζων Σηκοανούς τε καὶ Αἰδοίους*. Ptolemy<sup>9</sup> also says that the Saône was the eastern boundary of the Aedui. Caesar says that the Saône *per fines Aediorum et Sequanorum in Rhodanum influit*.<sup>10</sup> From this

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 29, § 3 ; vi. 37-8.

<sup>2</sup> It has been argued that he did not mention the Meuse because it played no part in the siege (A. Hock, *Études sur quelques campagnes de Jules César*, etc., 1897, p. 22) : but surely it would have played the part of a natural line of contravallation.

<sup>3</sup> See the preceding article.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 328-9.  
<sup>5</sup> D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 35 ; Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 325 ; *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 14.

<sup>6</sup> See BOII and SENONES.

<sup>7</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 1, § 11, 3, § 2.

<sup>8</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 14.

<sup>9</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 8, § 12.

<sup>10</sup> *B. G.*, i. 12, § 1.

passage also von Goler<sup>1</sup> infers that the Saône formed the boundary between the Aedui and the Sequani: but, as R. Schneider<sup>2</sup> says, he mistranslates the passage; and Napoleon refers to three others in the *Gallie War*,—*inter fines Helvetiorum et Allobrogum Rhodanus fluit* (i. 6, § 2), *cum Sequanos a provincia nostra Rhodanus divideret* (i. 33, § 4) and *flumen Ligerim, quod Bituriges ab Aeduis dividit* (vii. 5, § 4),—to show that if Caesar had meant what von Goler says, he would have expressed himself differently. Caesar simply meant that the Saône flowed through the territories of the Aedui and the Sequani considered as one tract. Thomann, however, commenting on Napoleon's remarks, asks "Are we then to conclude that the tribes mentioned in the tenth chapter of the Fourth Book lived on the right as well as on the left bank of the Rhine?"<sup>3</sup> The well-known passage to which Thomann refers runs as follows:—*Rhenus . . . per fines Nantuatium, Helvetiorum, Sequanorum, Mediomatricorum, Tribocorum, Treverorum citatus fertur*. In my note on the TRIBOCI I try to show that, unless Caesar made a slip, some portion of the territories of these peoples must have been on the right bank of the Rhine, as otherwise *per* must mean the same as *præter* ("past" or "along"); and there is no evidence that *per* ever bears this meaning. M. P. Guillemot,<sup>4</sup> differing from von Goler, holds that "la Bresse châlonnaise" belonged to the Aedui, arguing that when they complained to Caesar that the Helvetii were ravaging their territories,<sup>5</sup> the Helvetii had not yet crossed the Saône and were still in Bresse. I do not think that this inference can legitimately be drawn from Caesar's narrative; for he appears to have attacked the Tigurini directly after the Aedui made their complaint; and, at the moment when he attacked the Tigurini, three-fourths of the Helvetii had crossed the Saône.<sup>6</sup>

My own belief is that no certain conclusion can be drawn from the statements of any of the ancient writers as to the eastern boundary of the Aedui. Caesar's words, even though they do not prove that that boundary was formed by the Saône, are not irreconcilable with the view that it was: on the other hand, Strabo and Ptolemy, if they did not misunderstand Caesar, may only have meant that the Saône was, roughly speaking, the boundary. On the whole, it seems to me safer to prefer the evidence of the dioceses to their uncertain statements.

**Agedincum** has always been generally identified with Sens: but a few commentators have decided for Provins, which is about 25 miles, as the crow flies, from Sens, and nearly due north of it. There is no evidence for Provins. It is on the right bank of the Seine; and Labienus, when he decided to abandon his campaign against the Parisii, in order to return to Agedincum,<sup>7</sup> crossed from the right to the left bank of the Seine. It is true<sup>8</sup> that some commentators maintain that he crossed from the left to the right bank. But on this theory it is

<sup>1</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 15.

<sup>2</sup> *Jahresberichte d. philol. Vereins*, xii., 1886, pp. 240-41.

<sup>3</sup> *Des françaises Atlas zu Casars gall. Kriege*, 1868, p. 9.

<sup>4</sup> *Excursions arch. dans les montagnes de la Côte-d'Or*, 1861, p. xx.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, i. 11, §§ 2-3.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, vii. 59-62.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, 12, 13, §§ 1-2.

impossible to explain Caesar's narrative of Labienus's campaign. For, in the first place, if Labienus marched, *in the first instance*, from Agedincum up the right bank of the Seine, the marsh behind which Camulogenus drew up his army ready to oppose him was evidently on "the right bank. Now Camulogenus would hardly have been mad enough to cross the Marne and look out for such a marsh,<sup>1</sup> when he need only have drawn up his army behind the Marne itself, to prevent Labienus from crossing. Therefore the marsh was on the left bank; and as Labienus, after he had failed to force the passage of the marsh, crossed the Seine at Metiosedum (Melun), he was on the right bank when he decided to return to Agedincum. Secondly, Caesar, describing the position in which Labienus found himself, when he was about to return, says,<sup>2</sup> "on one side he was menaced by the Bellovaci; on the other Camulogenus held the field with a well-found army, ready for action" (*altera ex parte Bellovaci . . . instabant; alteram Camulogenus parato atque instructo exercitu tenebat*). This passage proves that Labienus was, at that moment, on the right bank of the Seine. For he was on one bank, and Camulogenus on the other. Therefore, if he was on the left bank, Camulogenus was on the right; and Camulogenus and the Bellovaci were both on his right; whereas Caesar says that he was between them. Achaintré makes a desperate attempt to anticipate and turn this argument. Caesar, he urges, was only speaking "generally": the Bellovaci were preparing for war: the Parisii, on the other hand, were already prepared. But that Caesar used the words, *altera ex parte*, etc. in a strictly geographical sense, is proved by his having, in the same breath, used the phrase "*alteram (partem) Camulogenus parato atque instructo exercitu tenebat*."

It is clear, then, that Agedincum was not Provins. There is evidence to show that it was Sens. Caesar says that Agedincum was in the territory of the Senones.<sup>3</sup> Now, the chief town of the Senones, in the early days of the Church, was Sens, or, as it was then called, *Senones*; and the chief town of the Senones was, according to Ptolemy,<sup>4</sup> Ἀγνδικόν. In the Annals of St. Bertin, a writer of the eighth century,<sup>5</sup> Sens is called *Agendincum*. Again, in the *Itinerary of Antonine*,<sup>6</sup> *Agredicum* is marked as 13 Gallic leagues, or 19½ Roman miles from *Condate* (Montereau-sur-Yonne), and as 30 Gallic leagues or 46 Roman miles from *Augustobona* (Troyes); and the actual distances, according to Cassini,<sup>7</sup> are 21 and 42½ Roman miles respectively.<sup>8</sup> Finally, an inscription of the year 250 A.D., in which the name *Agedincum* occurs, was discovered, in 1837, at Sens.<sup>9</sup>

M. A. de Barthélemy has, however, suggested<sup>10</sup> that, although a Gallo-Roman town called Agedincum undoubtedly stood upon the

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 57, § 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 59, § 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, vi. 44, § 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 8, § 9.

<sup>5</sup> Bouquet, *Recueil des hist. des Gaules*, vii. 74A, 75A.

<sup>6</sup> Ed. Wesseling, p. 383.

<sup>7</sup> Walekenaer, *Geogr. des Gaules*, iii. 54.

<sup>8</sup> See also *La Table de Peutinger*, ed. Desjardins, p. 26, col. 2.

<sup>9</sup> *Rev. de philologie*, ii., 1847, p. 355.

<sup>10</sup> *Rev. celt.*, viii., 1887, p. 398.

site of Sens, the Gallic town of the same name may have been situated elsewhere. Just as Gergovia was succeeded by the Gallo-Roman Augustonemetum, and Bibracte by the Gallo-Roman Augustodunum, so, he suggests, the Agedincum which stood upon the site of Sens may have been the Gallo-Roman successor of the Agedincum mentioned by Caesar. I cannot accept this suggestion; for if the Gallic Agedincum had yielded its position as the chief town of the Senones to a Gallo-Roman foundation, the latter would not have been called by a Celtic name, but by some name of which *Cæsar*, as in *Cæsarodunum*, or Augustus, as in *Augustonemetum*, would have formed an element.

**Alesia.**—The site of Alesia is absolutely certain. It covered the plateau of Mont Auxois, on the south-western slope of which now stands the village of Alise-Sainte-Reine. But, as it was the scene of the most famous event in the Gallic war, the question of its whereabouts has given rise to a controversy, the echoes of which have not yet died away. M. Ruelle, in his *Bibliographie générale des Gaules* (pp. 163-72), enumerated 158 works bearing upon the subject; and since 1870, the date which he fixed as his limit, new pens have been busy with the same theme. The controversy was not closed by the publication of the results of Napoleon's investigations. M. Quicherat, who was, in his day, one of the best known of French antiquaries, remained unconvinced: C. Muller, in the Atlas which he published in 1880, to illustrate Strabo's *Geography*, marked Alesia on the site of Alaise;<sup>1</sup> and other writers of less note, while differing among themselves as to the true site, agree in rejecting Napoleon's conclusion. I am therefore bound, by the principles which have guided me in writing this book, to discuss the question; and as, notwithstanding the multitude of treatises which have appeared, the whole of the arguments have never been marshalled within any one work, it may save future enquirers trouble if I supply the want.

Besides Mont Auxois, six sites have been proposed, namely Alaise in the department of Doubs, Alais in the department of Gard, Novalaise and the plateau of La Crusille in Savoy, Izernore in the department of Ain, and a place, the name of which I cannot discover, in Auvergne.<sup>2</sup> Izernore and La Crusille are dismissed by M. A. de Barthélemy, in an admirable article on Alesia,<sup>3</sup> as unworthy of discussion: but as Izernore was advocated by a serious student, and still finds support, I shall examine its claims here. The pretensions of Alais,<sup>4</sup> Novalaise and the

<sup>1</sup> "Alesiam urbem cum hodierno vico *Alaise* composui. Hinc corrigenda sunt quae dixi in Indice nominum s. v. *Alaia*, ubi eam sententiam secutus sum quae olim obtinebat quamque etiam nunc sunt qui tueri studeant." *Strabonis Geographi-corum Tabulae* XV, Praefatio, p. vi.

<sup>2</sup> *La véritable situation d'Alesia en Auvergne* (a memoir addressed to M. Berthelot by M<sup>me</sup> Richenet-Bayard and mentioned in *Comptes rendus de l'Acad. des inscr.*, 4<sup>e</sup> sér., t. xvii., 1889 [1890], p. 410). I do not know whether the memoir was published.

<sup>3</sup> *Rev. des questions hist.*, iii., 1867, pp. 43-4.

<sup>4</sup> Alais, which was advocated in 1896 by Hours de Mandajors (*Nouvelles découvertes sur l'état de l'ancienne Gaule du temps de César*) is at least 200 miles, as the crow flies, from the nearest frontier of the Lingones, in whose country

above-mentioned (or any) site in Auvergne, are so wildly absurd that it is difficult to believe that any one could have advocated any of the three, except from a love of singularity. The real controversy has always been between the advocates of Mont Auxois and those of Alaise.

Caesar gives a description of the physical features of Alesia, of the camp which Vercingetorix formed upon its eastern slope, and of his own camps and lines of contravallation and circumvallation, the gist of which I have embodied in my narrative<sup>1</sup> and need not reproduce here. The additional data which he supplies for determining the geographical position of Alesia may be stated in a few words. When he was passing "through the farthest part of the territory of the Lingones" (*per extremos Lingonum fines*), towards the country of the Sequani, Vercingetorix encamped at a distance of 10 Roman miles from his camp. Next morning Vercingetorix attacked the Roman column, when it had advanced to within a short distance from his own camp. Beaten in this engagement, he retreated to Alesia; and the Romans arrived there on the day after the battle.<sup>2</sup>

I. Alesia, according to J. Maissiat, stood upon the site of Izernore, near the Porte du Rhône and 9 kilometres, or between 5 and 6 miles, north-west of Nantua. The whole weight of his theory rests upon his interpretation of the famous passage in which Caesar describes his own position and that of Vercingetorix on the night before the cavalry action which immediately preceded the blockade of Alesia,—*cum Caesar in Sequanos per extremos Lingonum fines iter faceret, quo facilius subsidium provinciae ferri posset, circiter milia passuum X ab Romanis trinis castris Vercingetorix consedit*.<sup>3</sup> I discuss, on pp. 771-4, the meaning of *per extremos Lingonum fines*, in so far as those words bear upon the question where the action was fought. The passage means that, at the time of which Caesar wrote, he was marching through the country of the Lingones towards the country of the Sequani. Nothing of the kind, says Maissiat: Caesar "*indique seulement la direction de sa marche actuelle, à savoir, du pays des Lingons, chez les Sequanes et vers la Province*."<sup>4</sup> Again, Maissiat says that in this passage *in* does not mean "vers" or "dans la direction de"; for, in order that *in* should have either of these meanings, "*il nous paraît indispensable que le texte présente quelque raison accessoire et particulière, comme pourrait être la nature du verbe employé par l'auteur*";<sup>5</sup> as, for instance, *instituit*, in the passage *iter in Senones facere instituit*.<sup>6</sup> Now, there is one passage in the *Commentaries* which proves conclusively that Maissiat is wrong. In *B. G.*, ii. 29, § 4, Caesar, speaking of the Aduatuci, writes:—*ipsi erant ex Cimbris Teutonisque prognati, qui, cum iter in provinciam nostram*

Caesar was the day before he reached Alesia (*B. G.*, vii. 66-8). In order to make Caesar's narrative square with his theory, the author placed the Lingones in the neighbourhood of Langogne, on the borders of the Gevaudan and the Vivarais; Bibracte near the confines of the Gevaudan and Auvergne; and the Sequani in the neighbourhood of Orange!

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 136-8.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, vii. 66, § 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 271-2.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 66, § 2; 67-8.

<sup>4</sup> *Jules César en Gaule*, ii. 269.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 56, § 5.

*atque Italiam facerent, iis impimentis, quae secum agere non poterant, citra flumen Rhenum depositis custodium ex suis ac praesidium sex milia hominum una reliquerunt.* At the time of which Caesar wrote, the Cimbri and Teutoni were marching in *provinciam nostram atque Italiam*; and they had not yet come anywhere near either of those places. Therefore *in*, without any "raison accessoire et particulière," does mean "towards"; and *cum Caesar in Sequanos per extremos Lingonum fines iter faceret* means that Caesar was marching through the country of the Lingones towards the country of the Sequani.<sup>1</sup>

Thus the foundation of Maissiat's theory is undermined; and it is needless to examine the buttresses by which he strives to sustain the shattered structure.<sup>2</sup>

II. The reasoning by which I have refuted the advocates of Izernore is equally fatal to the claims of Novalaise, which is in the *arrondissement* of Chambéry, and more than 40 miles farther than Izernore from the country of the Lingones! Still, to avoid any chance of cavil, I shall examine a novel argument by which M. I. Tessier<sup>3</sup> endeavours to support them. He interprets *cum Caesar in Sequanos per extremos Lingonum fines iter faceret* as I have done: but he contends that Caesar's subsequent words, *circiter milia passuum decem ab Romanis trinis castris Vercingetorix cœdidi*, have been misunderstood. What Caesar meant, he says, was this:—"César, traversant l'extrémité du pays des Lingons pour aller par la Séquanie secourir plus facilement la Province, Vercingetorix trois jours de suite campa à dix mille pas environ des trois campements successifs des Romains." Now, there are three objections to this interpretation, every one of which is fatal. First, no scholar would admit that it is possible to get it out of the Latin. Secondly, it makes nonsense of the word *cum*; for to say "when Caesar was traversing the remotest part of the country of the Lingones, Vercingetorix on three successive days encamped at a distance of about 10 miles from the three successive encampments of the Romans" is gibberish; seeing that, *ex hypothesi*, on the second and third days, both Caesar and Vercingetorix had moved far south of the country of the Lingones. Thirdly, if Vercingetorix and Caesar had done what M. Tessier supposes, Caesar would not have been so foolish as to describe it: it would have been irrelevant to say that he marched *per extremos Lingonum fines*; and to add that Vercingetorix "encamped on three successive days," etc. would have been a superfluity wholly alien to his manner. In those three days, moreover, M. Tessier makes Vercingetorix and Caesar march the whole way from

<sup>1</sup> M. A. de Barthélemy justly argues that, if Caesar had already penetrated into Sequania, he would have written, not *iter faceret* but *iter fecisset*. *Rev. des quest. hist.*, iii., 1867, p. 50. Further proof, if it be required, will be supplied by a comparison of *B. C.*, i. 39, § 3 with *B. C.*, i. 60, § 5.

<sup>2</sup> Perhaps it is worth mentioning that the Gallic name of Izernore was Isarnodunum (see A. Longnon, *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 29); and it is incredible that this name should have been given to the stronghold after the conquest if it had ever borne the famous name of Alesia.

<sup>3</sup> *La nouvelle Alésia découverte par M. Théodore Fivel*, 1866, pp. 14, 16, 18, 32-3, 38, etc.

the Doubs to the Rhône, or, according to his own reckoning, between 120 and 140 kilometres: he makes Vercingetorix fight a battle with the Rhône in his rear, and get safely across it after his defeat; and, in order to make Novalaise correspond with Caesar's description of Alesia, he turns the whole of Caesar's narrative upside down.

III. I now come to the knot of the question. I have sufficiently established the meaning of *per extremos Lingonum fines*. There is room for doubt as to the exact spot in the country of the Lingones to which Caesar referred:<sup>1</sup> but it is absolutely certain that, on the night before the battle, he was somewhere *within* that country. As the battle-field was not more than 10 Roman miles from this point, and as, before the battle began, Caesar was marching towards the country of the Sequani, it is clear that the battle-field was either within the country of the Lingones or only just south of the Saône, which separated their country from that of the Sequani. I show on p. 780, and it is universally admitted, that Alesia could hardly have been more than 35, or perhaps at the very outside 40 miles from the battle-field. Now on the south of the Saône the only conceivable site, the only site that has ever been suggested, answering to these conditions, is Alaise. On the north of the Saône, the only conceivable site, the only site that has ever been suggested *at all*, is Mont Auxois. Between these two the choice must lie.

Quicherat tries to show that the names of various localities in the neighbourhood of Alaise recall various scenes in the drama of Alesia, and that the geography of Alaise corresponds with Caesar's description of the geography of Alesia. But the proof derived from nomenclature is no proof at all; and similar "evidence" has been adduced to show that Alesia was at Iternore and at Novalaise. Even when the meaning of names of places is certain, their evidence should be used with great caution. Many so-called "camps de César" were never occupied by Caesar at all. But when a writer, determined to make out his case by hook or by crook, arbitrarily attaches this or that meaning to the name of a place, his arguments may be safely ignored. "En règle générale," says M. A. de Barthélemy,<sup>2</sup> "je ne me fie pas plus aux lieux-dits qu'aux traditions. Ces sources altérées à chaque siècle par l'influence de l'imagination populaire, aidée de ce que les érudits peuvent y ajouter en passant, ne peuvent que faire composer une histoire fantastique."<sup>3</sup>

Now for the alleged correspondence of Alaise with Caesar's description of the geography of Alesia.

1. Alaise, says Quicherat, is large enough to have contained the garrison of Alesia, which, according to Plutarch, numbered 162,000.<sup>4</sup> Plutarch is no authority on a point like this. Caesar says that the

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 771-81.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. des quest. hist.*, iii., 1867, p. 43.

<sup>3</sup> Here are a few instances of the way in which Quicherat manipulates "lieux-dits." Mouniot, he says, is derived from *munitorium*, Châteley from *castellare*, Châtaillon from *castellio*, etc. etc. (*Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire*, i., 518-20). Therefore Alaise = Alesia!

<sup>4</sup> *Mélanges d'arch. et d'hist.*, i., 527.

garrison numbered 80,000, exclusive of the Mandubii; and, as I have shown in my essay on "The Credibility of Caesar's Narrative," although Mont Auxois could have accommodated more than 80,000, at a pinch, there are strong reasons for believing that even this estimate is an exaggeration. Anyhow, the fact that Alaise is so large lends no support to the theory which identifies it with Alesia.

2. Quicherat argues that, as Caesar says that he learned from deserters that Vercingetorix had withdrawn his army from the camp into the town after the departure of his cavalry, the eastern part of the hill of Alesia, where the camp was placed, must have been so situated that Caesar could not see for himself what was going on there. Now, says Quicherat, Saraz, which forms the eastern part of the mountain mass of Alaise, fulfils this condition.<sup>1</sup> But what if the condition is purely imaginary? Caesar does not say that he learned from deserters the particular fact to which Quicherat alludes. He describes, in one chapter, the instructions which Vercingetorix gave to his cavalry, their departure, the arrangements which Vercingetorix made for economising his stores, his withdrawal of the garrison into the stronghold, and his determination to carry on the struggle until the arrival of reinforcements. Then, beginning a new chapter, he says generally that, after learning these things from deserters, he proceeded to plan his own system of works (*Quibus rebus cognitis ex perfugis et captivis Caesar hæc genera munitionis instituit*).<sup>2</sup> It is mere cavilling to argue that these words prove that Caesar could not see for himself that the Gallic troops had been withdrawn from their camp into the town. Caesar left something to the intelligence of his readers.

3. The valley of the Todeure, says Quicherat, narrow though it was, would have been very suitable for the cavalry combats which took place in the western plain at Alesia; for less than 12,000 horsemen were engaged in those combats; they only fought in groups; and in the combats no charges were made at the gallop.<sup>3</sup> But the valley of the Todeure, as the Duc d'Aumale shows,<sup>4</sup> would have been wholly unsuitable for any cavalry combat. Quicherat had no means of knowing how many horsemen were engaged in the combats in question, or at what speed they charged; and, as I shall presently show, he asserts, in another passage, that a space more extensive than the valley of the Todeure would have been too confined for the combats which Caesar describes.

4. Perverse and wrong-headed as he was, Quicherat was no fool, and he saw clearly enough that the mountain mass of Alaise was too large to have been surrounded by the lines of contravallation and circumvallation which Caesar described. Accordingly he set to work to distort and force, if by any means it were possible, the narrative of Caesar into some sort of agreement with the geography of Alaise. He insists that, after Vercingetorix withdrew his army into the town,

<sup>1</sup> *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire*, i. 523-4.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 71, 72. § 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Mélanges*, etc., i. 524, 526.

<sup>4</sup> *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2<sup>e</sup> pér., t. xv., 1858, p. 123.



Caesar entirely changed his plan of blockade. From Caesar's description, he says, "on se croirait revenu au moment où le blocus vient d'être décidé." The works which Caesar describes in *B. G.*, vii. 72 did not surround Alesia, but, as we may gather from the geography of Alaise—observe how naively Quichelat begs the question—only one side of it, namely that on which is situated Charfoinge; for on the other sides nature had done his work for him. Why, then, I may ask, did Caesar *change* his plan of attack? Had he neglected to examine the ground before he originally invested Alesia? Caesar, continues Quicherat, speaks of the lines of contravallation and circumvallation as his own work; whereas he speaks of the entrenchments that defended the camp of Rebilus and Reginus as the work of his men (*nostrî*),—"premier indice que ce camp n'adhérait pas aux lignes qui enveloppaient la ville."<sup>1</sup> This, as Dr. Johnson would have said, is sad stuff; and no unbiassed person who has read the *Commentaries* would thank me for refuting it. If anything about Alesia is certain, it is that Caesar's lines surrounded the place entirely, and that every stroke of work was done by his men (*nostrî*) under his supervision.

The following reasons are sufficient to convince any one who has a good map and can read it that Alesia was not Alaise. First, Alaise is not a hill at all, but a mountain mass, rising into numerous hills, various in form and elevation, nearly all wooded, and separated from one another by ravines. Secondly, the plain, about 3 miles long, which extended on the west of Alesia, does not exist at Alaise. The only "plain" which the advocates of Alaise can point to is situated in the valley of the Todeure,<sup>2</sup> and forms an inclined plane, not a plain, about 1000 yards long and 165 yards wide: the cavalry battle which Caesar describes could not possibly have taken place here. Thirdly, Alaise is not surrounded, as Caesar's description requires, by hills about as high as itself, but on the north, the west and the south by hills 460, 567 and 687 metres high respectively, and on the east by the vast plateau of Amancey, which rises to a height of 707 metres. Moreover, these surrounding heights are not only of very unequal altitudes, but they are, one and all, much higher than that part of the mountain mass of Alaise on which the town of Alesia is assumed to have been situated. Fourthly, if the Gallic army had been encamped on the eastern slopes of Alaise, the fortifications which Caesar describes would have been superfluous; for nature had fortified the site with huge precipices.<sup>3</sup> Fifthly, the smallest line of contravallation which could have been drawn round Alaise would have been more than 22 kilometres in

<sup>1</sup> *Mélanges*, etc., i. 530-39.

<sup>2</sup> In the *Carte de l'État-Major* (Feuille 126) the Todeure is called "Ruisseau de Conche."

<sup>3</sup> Chataillon, where the camp has been placed, is far too small; and, as it is protected by the precipitous banks of the Lison, the Gallic fortifications would have been unnecessary; or, if they had been made, they would have looked not towards the east but towards the west, facing the town. Quicherat, recognising the objections to this site, placed the camp in the neighbourhood of Saraz; but, as the Duc d'Aumale points out, Saraz is not on the east but on the south of Alaise. See *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, xv., 1858, p. 133, note.

extent; whereas the line of contravallation which Caesar drew round Alesia was not more than 11 Roman miles, or 16 kilometres. Sixthly, the labour of constructing and of defending such elaborate lines of contravallation and circumvallation as Caesar describes, on this vast scale, would have been beyond the power even of Caesar's army. Seventhly, this stupendous labour would have been labour thrown away; for the mountain mass of Alaise was easily accessible, on the west and south-west, by the pass of "la maison Pourtalis" and Montforges; and Caesar could have gained possession of the western and southern parts of the mountain, which dominated the site of the alleged *oppidum*.<sup>1</sup> Eighthly, Quicherat, finding it impossible to discover on the north of Alaise a hill corresponding with the description which Caesar gives of that on the southern slope of which was situated the camp that Vercassivellaunus attacked, coolly identifies it with the plateau of Amancey. "La colline au nord," comments the Duc d'Aumale, "serait le plateau d'Amancey, qui est situé à l'est, et qui a soixante-quatre kilomètres de tour!"

These facts, I submit, prove that Alaise does not correspond with Caesar's description of Alesia: but if any one is not convinced, let him read pages 125-134 of the Duc d'Aumale's article in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, and I warrant that he will make up his mind.

But there are other arguments equally conclusive. The geographical position of Alaise suits Caesar's description no better than its physical features. Alesia had been provisioned in advance. If, then, Alesia was Alaise, it must be admitted that Vercingetorix had known Caesar's intentions for weeks before Caesar started on his march for the Province; and, what is more, that he knew exactly what route Caesar would take. That he possessed such foreknowledge is, as the Duc d'Aumale argues, incredible. It may be replied that the assumed identity of Alesia with Mont Auxois is open to the same objection. But the two cases are widely different. For at Mont Auxois Vercingetorix was in a central position from which he could strike at Caesar, whatever route Caesar might take in marching to the relief of the Province; whereas if Vercingetorix established himself at Alaise, he must have expected that Caesar would take that route through the country of the Sequani which would lead him to the Jura; and this was just the route which Caesar would have avoided. Again, it is obvious that, in taking up his position at Alaise, Vercingetorix would have left the all-important city of Bibracte,—the political centre of Gaul,—exposed to Caesar's attacks. As the Duc d'Aumale says, "Le proconsul pouvait par une marche rapide fondre sur cette ville, peut-être l'enlever par un coup de main, peut-être détacher du parti national les Éduens mécontents. En tout cas, la position excentrique prise par l'armée gauloise aurait laissé le champ libre au génie de César."<sup>2</sup> Moreover, as Heller points out,<sup>3</sup> if Vercingetorix had intended to take up a position in Sequania at all,

<sup>1</sup> See Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 696, n. 3, 697, n. 1-3, 699, n. 1, 700, n. 1, and *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, xv., 1858, pp. 122-34.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 84-5, 90, 94-5.

<sup>3</sup> *Philologus*, xiii., 1858, p. 595.

he would probably have occupied its strong capital, Vesontio (Besançon), not Alaise.

On the theory that Alesia was Alaise, it is impossible to discover any site for the cavalry action which immediately preceded the blockade of Alesia. I show, on pp. ¶71-4, that, on the night before the action, Caesar encamped somewhere on the north of the Saône.<sup>1</sup> It is impossible to believe that Vercingetorix would not have attacked him while he was endeavouring to cross that river; and to cross a river in the face of an enemy is one of the most difficult of military operations. Delacroix, however, one of the foremost champions of Alaise, places the battle-field in the neighbourhood of Gugney, near the northern bank of the Ognon. But, objects the Duc d'Aumale, if we accept this site, we still have to admit that Vercingetorix, the greatest general of Gaul, was so imbecile that he sat idle in his camp and allowed the Romans to cross the Saône without molestation. As this assumption is incredible, we must look for the battle-field south of the Ognon. Between Pont-tailler and the forest of Serre there is a site which might, perhaps, by a prejudiced enquirer, be regarded as agreeing with Caesar's description of the battle-field. But even on this theory, the Romans would have virtually crossed the Saône in presence of the enemy; for Vercingetorix would have been quite near enough to dispute the passage. In any case, then, to quote the Duc d'Aumale, we must admit that, within the space of two days, Caesar crossed three, or even four rivers,—the Saône, the Ognon, the Doubs and the Loue; that he crossed the Saône on the morning of the battle and in the presence of an apathetic enemy; that of all these rivers he only mentioned one; and that within those two days he also fought a battle, and marched at least 60 kilometres, or 36 miles, over a broken and wooded country. Such an admission would be absurd. Therefore Alesia was not Alaise.<sup>2</sup>

One word more. After the fall of Alesia, Caesar went to the country of the Aedui. Either he took his army or a part thereof with him or he went alone. In any case, after the surrender of Vercingetorix, he sent Labienus, with two legions and the cavalry, into the country of the Sequani.<sup>3</sup> Alaise is in the country which belonged to the Sequani. If, then, Alesia was Alaise, and if Caesar took his army with him, he needlessly marched Labienus's large force, as well as his other eight legions, across the Saône, and then sent it back again. If he left Labienus at Alesia, it was at Alesia that Labienus received orders to go to Sequania. But in that case, if Alesia was Alaise, Labienus received orders to go from Sequania into Sequania, which is absurd.

IV. If the foregoing arguments are sound, Alesia can only have

<sup>1</sup> Quicherat simply drives a coach and four through this difficulty. He mistranslates *per extremos Lingonum fines*, and he mistranslates *circiter milia passuum X ab Romanis trinis castris Vercingetorix consedit* as completely as M. Tessier:—"au moment où César passait de la frontière des Lingons en Séquanie . . . Vercingetorix se tint, pendant trois étapes, à environ dix milles des Romains." See articles by M. Rossignol in *Mém. de la Comm. des antiquités du dép<sup>t</sup> de la Côte-d'Or*, v., 1857, pp. 6-10, 24-7, 42-65.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, xv., 1858, pp. 90-93.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 90, §§ 1-4.

stood upon the plateau of Mont Auxois. Intrinsically, the reasons for accepting this view, which was adopted at least as early as the ninth century, are (1) that the geographical position of Mont Auxois alone agrees with the indication which Caesar gives of his own whereabouts on the day before he reached Alesia; (2) that its physical features alone agree with Caesar's description of Alesia; (3) that excavation has revealed (a) unmistakable traces of Caesar's lines both of contravallation and of circumvallation, (b) numbers of weapons both Roman and Gallic, (c) five barbed spikes each as Caesar describes, in his inventory of the siege-works, under the name of *stimuli*, and (d) 619 coins,—none of which are of a later date than 52 B.C., the year of the siege, and one of which bears the image and superscription of Vercingetorix;<sup>1</sup> (4) that a Gallic inscription, in which occurs the word ALI/SIA has been discovered at Alise-Sainte-Reine;<sup>2</sup> (5) that in the territory which the advocates of Mont Auxois, but not those of any other site, assign to the Mandubii, there has been found an inscription, now preserved at Dijon, containing the name Mandu-bilos,<sup>3</sup> a spelling which is supported by the *Μανδιβούλων* of Strabo,<sup>4</sup> and (6) that the geographical position of Mont Auxois alone agrees with the description which Caesar gives of his distribution of the legions, after the capture of Alesia, into winter-quarters. To quote M. A. de Barthélemy,<sup>5</sup> “de toutes les localités où l'on a proposé de placer *Alisia*, Alise-Sainte-Reine est la seule qui présente les caractères les plus certaines : le texte de César, la description des travaux de siège, et les découvertes archéologiques et numismatiques s'accordent à faire accepter cette identification.”<sup>6</sup>

The coins are fully described on pages 555-61 of the second volume of Napoleon's *Histoire de Jules César*. One hundred and thirty-two were Roman; four hundred and eighty-seven Gallic. It is significant that the latter include specimens belonging to twenty-four different states,—more than half of those which sent contingents to the relieving army; that no less than one hundred and three of the whole number belonged to the Arverni,—the countrymen of Vercingetorix; and that they were discovered in the trenches of the very camp,—the camp on Mont Réa,—which, assuming the identity of Alesia with Mont Auxois, must have been the scene of the final struggle. Now the evidence of these coins, taken by itself, is so strong that it is not surprising that an attempt has been made to impeach the genuineness of the find. But Léon Fallue, the sceptic who led the attack, knew nothing of numis-

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. i., 1860, p. 271; Napoléon III., *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 555-61.

<sup>2</sup> Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 467, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> R. Mowat, *Inscr. de la cité des Lingons*, 1<sup>re</sup> part., p. 35, No. 37, quoted by M. d'A. de Jubainville, *Les noms gaulois chez César et Hirtius de Bello Gallico*, 1891, p. 128.

<sup>4</sup> Ed. Muller and Dubner, iv. 2, § 3 and p. 962.

<sup>5</sup> *Rev. des quest. hist.*, iii., 1867, p. 66.

<sup>6</sup> The various antiquities discovered at Mont Auxois by the French Commission are to be seen in the “salle d'Alesia” of the Musée de St-Germain. See also *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 26-9, and *Journal des Savants*, 1880, pp. 561, 563-4.

matics ; and M. A. de Barthélemy<sup>1</sup> treated his remarks with the contempt which they deserved. To quote that eminent numismatist, it is impossible that the coins should have been brought to the spot where they were found in order to establish the identity of Alesia with Alise, for the sufficient reason that of many of them no specimen had ever been found before the excavations which brought them to light.

I proceed to deal with the remaining objection :

The advocates of Alaise have insisted that Caesar would not have transformed the Gallic word *Alis̄ia* into the Latin *Alesia*, and that *Alesia* would not have developed into the modern *Alise*, but into *Alaise*. But this argument will not impose upon any one who has any knowledge of Gallic names.<sup>2</sup> To begin with, one naturally asks, if *Déc̄ia* has been derived from *Dec̄tia*, why should not *Ales̄ia* have given birth to *Alise*? In the next place, every scholar knows that *i* and *e* were frequently interchanged in Latin. Thus we have the forms *om̄ius* and *om̄nis*, *vit̄ae* and *vit̄ai*, *V̄espasianus* and *V̄ispasianus*. Again, the Greek form of *Ales̄ia* was Ἀλῆσία. Divers Gallic names appear in the MSS. of Greek writers alternately with an *i* and an *η*. Thus Caesar's *Nannetes* appears in Strabo as Ναννῆται and in Ptolemy as Ναννηται. And, what is still more to the purpose, numerous Gallic names, which, as we learn from Gallic coins, were written with an *i*, were transcribed by Caesar with an *e*. To quote only a few from a long list, *AVLIRCOS* reappears as *AULERCI*, *LIXOVIVS* as *LEXOVII*, *ORCITIRIX* as *ORGETORIX*, *TASGITIOS* as *TASGETIVS*, *RIMOS* as *REMI*. What, then, can be more certain than the identity of *Alis̄ia* with *Alesia*?

2. Quicherat<sup>3</sup> argues that Mont Auxois is not Alesia because, as Caesar was marching towards the Province and Vercingetorix was marching against the Allobroges, Mont Auxois was far to the west of their respective lines of march. But there is no authority for the statement that Vercingetorix was marching against the Allobroges, except Dion Cassius ;<sup>4</sup> and the testimony of Dion Cassius, when it conflicts with that of Caesar, is worthless. Blundering, as he so often did when he was not inventing, he evidently confounded Vercingetorix's march against Caesar with the expedition which he had *sent*,—not led in person,—a short time before against the Allobroges.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, even if Vercingetorix was marching against the Allobroges, he was beaten by Caesar ; and he therefore fled to Alesia, the stronghold which he had provisioned in advance.

3. Quicherat insists that the plain of Les Laumes, on the west of Mont Auxois, cannot be the plain which Caesar describes, because when Caesar said that that plain was about three miles long, he was thinking of the distance between the foot of the hill of Alesia and the foot of the western hill, upon which the relieving army encamped ; whereas the distance between the foot of Mont Auxois and the foot of Mussy is

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. des quest. hist.*, iii., 1867, p. 65.

<sup>2</sup> See *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. xi., 1865, pp. 244-7.

<sup>3</sup> *Mélanges d'arch. et d'hist.*, i. 572-3.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xl. 39, § 1.

<sup>5</sup> See *B. G.*, vii. 64, §§ 4-8, 65, §§ 1-3.

barely a mile.<sup>1</sup> But when Caesar spoke of the length of the plain, he of course spoke of its greatest dimension ; and the greatest extent of the plain of Les Laumes is about 4 kilometres, or nearly 3 Roman miles.<sup>2</sup> Quicherat's interpretation of Caesar's words leads him into all sorts of absurdities. Caesar says that, between the line of circumvallation and the hill on which the relieving army was encamped, there was a space of one Roman mile. • Quicherat insists that the distance between this hill and the hill of Alesia was 3 Roman miles. Therefore, if the circumvallation crossed the plain, it must have been a good English mile and three-quarters from the hill of Alesia ! Accordingly Quicherat, driven from one absurdity to another, says "Je m'étonne . . . que tout le monde ignore que les Romains avaient laissé entièrement libre dans sa longueur la plaine" ;<sup>3</sup> in other words, he maintains that the Roman lines did not cross the plain at all. Quicherat is apt to think that "tout le monde" is wrong, and that he alone is right. But, as de Saulcy<sup>4</sup> shows, apart from its intrinsic absurdity, this particular opinion of his is contradicted by Caesar over and over again. If the *campestres munitiones*, of which Caesar repeatedly speaks,<sup>5</sup> did not cross the plain, where were they ? And how could he have drawn a line of investment right round the town, if that line did not cross the plain ?

4. Quicherat<sup>6</sup> says that the line of circumvallation revealed by the excavations near Alise-Sainte-Reine is too near the town, being considerably more than a mile from the summit of the hill on which the relieving army is said to have encamped ; whereas Caesar says that the circumvallation was only one (Roman) mile from the encampment.<sup>7</sup> But, as de Saulcy replies, Quicherat seems to forget that the Gauls would have occupied the slopes as well as the summit of the hill. "M. Quicherat pense-t-il," he asks, "que leur cavalerie, par exemple, est restée sur ce plateau pour que ses chevaux mourussent de soif, quand ils ne pouvaient venir s'abreuver qu'à la Breune ?" <sup>8</sup> Besides, Caesar does not say that the *summit* of the hill, but that the hill itself was a mile from the line of circumvallation.

5. Quicherat also says that as (according to his theory) the Roman lines were only a mile from the *summit* of the hill on which the relieving army was encamped, and as the slope of the hill on the west of the plain of Les Laumes was a kilometre in length, the width of that portion of the plain which lay between the foot of the slope and the Roman line of circumvallation could only have been half a kilometre, if Alesia was Alise ; and he argues that this strip of plain would have been too narrow to afford room for the cavalry action<sup>9</sup> which Caesar describes in chapter 80. The whole of this argument, as

<sup>1</sup> *Mélanges d'arch. et d'hist.*, i. 553-4.

<sup>2</sup> F. C. de Saulcy, *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, p. 439. See p. 374, *infra*.

<sup>3</sup> *Mélanges*, etc., i. 553-4.

<sup>4</sup> *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, pp. 446-7, 451.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 72, § 3, 81, § 1, 83, § 8, 86, § 4.

<sup>6</sup> *Mélanges*, etc., i. 553.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 79, § 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, p. 441.

<sup>9</sup> *Mélanges*, etc., i. 553-4.

I have just shown, is based upon a fallacy. But what is truly absurd is that Quicherat places the cavalry action in the valley of the Todeure,<sup>1</sup> on the west of the mountain mass of Alaise, which is considerably narrower even than half a kilometre.

6. Quicherat<sup>2</sup> asserts that the two trenches which Caesar describes as *duas fossas XV pedes latas, eadem altitudine*<sup>3</sup> have not been discovered at Mont Auxois. Caesar's words, he says, mean that the two trenches were each 15 feet wide and 15 feet deep; while, as a matter of fact, the two trenches which, according to Napoleon, correspond with Caesar's description, were of unequal width and of unequal depth. Now, according to Colonel Stoffel, who superintended the excavations, the inner of the two ditches was 15 feet wide, the outer one "15 feet at certain points but more frequently a little less." "The two ditches," adds Napoleon, "have the same depth; but it does not reach 15 feet, as the translators have wrongly understood it."<sup>4</sup> The question is whether by *duas fossas XV pedes latas, eadem altitudine* Caesar meant "two trenches, each 15 feet wide and 15 feet deep" or "two trenches, each of the same depth and each 15 feet wide." Schneider<sup>5</sup> argues that the former is the right interpretation, first, because it would not have been worth while to tell us that the two trenches were of the same depth without saying what that depth was; and secondly, because, if Caesar had simply meant to say that the two trenches were of the same depth, he would have made his meaning clear by writing the words *eadem altitudine* before instead of after *XV pedes latas*. But the depth of a trench was, as a rule, considerably less than its breadth: a trench 15 feet deep would not have been worth the enormous labour which it would have cost; and I believe that Caesar did make his meaning clear to Roman readers simply by using the word *eadem*, and that if he had intended to convey that the depth of the trenches was equal to their breadth, he would have written *pari* instead.<sup>6</sup> Anyhow, Quicherat's conclusion is wrong. If the lines of contravallation and circumvallation which the excavations revealed were not Caesar's lines, one must admit that a position which corresponds exactly with Caesar's description of Alesia was blockaded in a manner which corresponded exactly with his description of the blockade; that the blockader defended himself, like Caesar, against a relieving army; and that no record remains of the blockade. The chances against such a coincidence are almost infinite. Surely it is more reasonable to admit that Quicherat's interpretation of Caesar's text is wrong.

7. It has been objected that the line of contravallation surrounding Mont Auxois, as revealed by Napoleon's excavations, is not, as the text of Caesar requires, 11 Roman miles in extent. This, says Desjardins,<sup>7</sup> who was once an advocate of Alaise and afterwards made the fullest

<sup>1</sup> *Mélanges*, etc., i. 526.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 72, § 3.

<sup>5</sup> Caesar, ii. 564.

<sup>6</sup> After writing this sentence, I found that Desjardins (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 700, n. 1) had said the same thing.

<sup>7</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 711, n. 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 551-2.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 319.

recantation of his error, is the only point in which Mont Auxois fails to satisfy the requirements of Caesar's narrative. Even in this respect, if there is a discrepancy, the discrepancy is insignificant. And it is not proved that there is a discrepancy. Caesar does not say that the line of contravallation was 11 miles in extent: he only says that his original line of investment was;<sup>1</sup> and it is not certain that the two were identical. Assume, however, that they were. 11 Roman miles are equivalent to 16½ kilometres. The actual extent of the contravallation at Mont Auxois was 14 kilometres.<sup>2</sup> Considering that Caesar did not employ a land-surveyor and took no account of fractions, the difference is not worth making a fuss about. But the actual difference may have been much less. The number "eleven" is not certain. The  $\alpha$  MSS., it is true, read XI; but the  $\beta$  MSS. have X,<sup>3</sup> which is equivalent to less than 15 kilometres.

8. Quicherat has also written a long dissertation<sup>4</sup> with the object of proving that the Gallic and the Roman weapons discovered in the excavations at Mont Auxois were not such as would have been used in the year of the siege of Alesia. I do not propose to go into this question, which, for the purpose of the present discussion, has no interest;<sup>5</sup> for, even if Quicherat were right, it would be impossible to refute the evidence of the coins.

9. The most rational of all the objections that have been brought against Mont Auxois comes from the pen of Captain Gallotti:<sup>6</sup> but it is safe to say that he would have withdrawn it if he had known that the choice lay between Mont Auxois and Alaise, and that the objections to Alaise were unanswerable. If Alesia was on Mont Auxois, it is certain that the hill which, Caesar says, extended so far to the north that he had not been able to include it within his circumvallation, was Mont Réa. Now, observes Gallotti, Réa is connected with the plateau of Ménétreux by a col: the circumvallation would naturally have crossed the col; and in order to give it this extension, Caesar would only have had to increase its length by 2 kilometres. Let any one look at the map, and he will see that Gallotti's statement is correct. But surely the natural conclusion to be drawn from Caesar's words is that he had not had time, before the arrival of the relieving army, to increase the length of his circumvallation by a fraction which would have been about one-eighth of the whole. Again, Gallotti argues that Vercassivellaunus would not have required 10 hours to march the 4 kilometres which separated his camp from Mont Réa: but he forgets that it was necessary for Vercassivellaunus to make a long *détour*, in

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 69, § 6.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, p. 508.

<sup>3</sup> Meusel's *Caesar*, p. 202.

<sup>4</sup> *Mélanges*, etc., i. 557-69.

<sup>5</sup> Any one who may be interested in the question may satisfy himself, by reading an article in the *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Pädagogik* (xci., 1865, pp. 692-4), that Quicherat failed to prove his case.

<sup>6</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. d'émulation du Doubs*, 4<sup>e</sup> ser., t. 1., 1866, pp. 361-75, and especially 364-5, 368, 370 and 374.



order to avoid observation ;<sup>1</sup> for his chance of storming the camp of Caninius would be greatly increased if he could attack it unawares.<sup>2</sup> Nor can I see any force in Gallotti's objection that Caesar would not have called the defences of the camp on Mont Réa *superiores munitiones*.<sup>3</sup> They were higher than the contravallation ; and, as Caesar himself says that the camp was on "gently sloping ground" (*leniter declivi loco*<sup>4</sup>), we may reasonably infer that it was not high up the hill.

Furthermore, Gallotti denies that the plain of Les Laumes can have been the plain of Alesia ; for, he argues, measured, as it must have been, from the foot of Mont Réa to the foot of the Montagne de Flavigny, the plain of Les Laumes is only 2 kilometres long, not 3 Roman miles. But it will be obvious to any one who looks at the map and bears in mind that Caesar mentions the plain in connexion with the cavalry combats which took place therein,<sup>5</sup> that the measurement ought to be made over that part of the plain of Les Laumes which would have been available for the movements of the cavalry, that is to say from the Oze, just south of Mont Réa, to Pouillenay ; and this distance is, as nearly as possible, 3 Roman miles.

Gallotti raises various other objections, which I need not notice, because some of them are identical with objections which I have already answered, while others depend upon the untenable assumption that the "steep places" (*loca prærupta*<sup>6</sup>) which Vercingetorix endeavoured to storm on the last day of the blockade must be identified with Mont Pevenel.

10. Finally, Maissiat denies that Vercingetorix could have got water on Mont Auxois.<sup>7</sup> But, to quote Napoleon,<sup>8</sup> "Near the western summit of the mountain two abundant springs arise ; there is another on the eastern side. . . Besides, manifest traces of a great number of wells are visible on the table-land, so that it is evident the besieged can never have wanted water, besides which they could always descend to the two rivers." See also Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 711, n. 3, and Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 336.

I have now proved the assertion with which I began this note. No sane man who has studied the subject will ever again deny that Alesia stood upon the plateau of Mont Auxois. The question should now be closed. And if any man with an eye for a country, who knows his Caesar and happens to be travelling to or from Dijon, will get out at the station of Les Laumes, walk up to the top of Mont Auxois and look about him, he will marvel that the question should ever have arisen.

**Allobroges.**—We learn from Caesar that the Allobroges were separated from the Helvetii by the Rhône ; that they possessed certain

<sup>1</sup> See Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 309-10.

<sup>2</sup> The distance from the nearest point of the Gallic camp to the rear of Mont Réa, where Vercassivellaunus halted (*B. G.*, vii. 83, § 7) is 5½, not 4 kilometres ; and the time which he spent on his circuitous march,—from some period in the first watch to daybreak,—may not have been more than 7 hours.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 85, § 4.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 70, § 1, 79, § 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Jules César en Gaule*, iii. 52-3.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 83, § 2.

<sup>6</sup> See pp. 796-7.

<sup>8</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 300, n. 1.

lands on the right bank of the Rhône; that their territory was continuous with the territories of the Vocontii, the Segusiavi and the Nantuates; and that they possessed Geneva, which was the most northerly town in their country.<sup>1</sup> Their other important towns were Vienna (Vienne) and Cularo (Grenoble).<sup>2</sup> It is clear, then, that the greater part of their territory lay between the Rhône, the Isère and the Lake of Geneva. Roughly speaking, it comprised, as the French Commission remark,<sup>3</sup> the territories of the *civitas Viennensium*, the *civitas Gratianopolitana* and the *civitas Genavensium*. But in the opinion of the Commission, in order to determine their frontiers, it is not enough to unite the dioceses of Vienne, Grenoble and Geneva, because "nous nous trouvons . . . en présence de diverses petites populations réunies à de plus grandes sans que nous puissions bien saisir la loi qui a présidé à ces réunions." For example, the dioceses of Geneva and Grenoble included the territories of the Nantuates, Veragri, Ceutrones, Medulli and Tricorii; while it is probable that of the diocese of Lyons certain portions on the left bank of the Rhône belonged to the Allobroges. These statements, however, are not altogether accurate: at all events, I can see no reason for including either the Nantuates (as a whole) or the Veragri in the diocese of Geneva. That diocese extended eastward along the southern bank of the lake to a point about midway between Évian and its eastern extremity, and did not include St-Maurice, which belonged to the Nantuates: while we learn from Caesar that the Veragri possessed territory on the southern bank of the upper Rhône. At all events, the reasons given by the Commission need not prevent us from tracing approximately the frontiers of the Allobroges.

Eastward their territory extended as far as Évian, or a little to the east of it.<sup>4</sup> The Nantuates and Veragri, who were their eastern neighbours, certainly possessed the towns of Taurétunum, which was close to the point where the Rhône enters the lake,<sup>5</sup> St-Maurice and Martigny; and the eastern frontier of the diocese of Geneva may serve to mark, at least approximately, the eastern frontier of the Allobroges. The Ceutrones, who occupied the Tarentaise, were their neighbours on the south; and the famous inscription of Forclaz, which was discovered in the valley of the Arve, between Chamonix and Sallanches, enables us to trace the frontier of the Ceutrones, as it was in the time of Vespasian. The tracing of the frontier which took place then was probably, as Desjardins says, an official delimitation of the frontier as it had existed before. It ran along the valley of the Arly to its confluence with the

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 6, § 2, 11, § 5, 10, § 5, 11, § 3; iii. 1, § 1, 6, § 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Ptol.*, *Geogr.*, ii. 10, § 7; *Cic.*, *Ad Fam.*, x. 23, § 10 (not 33, as in *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 330).

<sup>3</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 41-2.

<sup>4</sup> Desjardins (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 242) thinks that the Dranse or the spurs of the Alps, which abut on the Evian and Thonon, would have formed a natural boundary.

<sup>5</sup> See Gregory of Tours, *Hist. franç.*, iv. 31 (*Patrologiae cursus completus*, ed. Migne, lxxi. 294), Marius of Aventis (*Ib.*, lxxii. 799) and Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 234, 242.

Isère, and thence along the ridge which separates the Tarentaise from the Maurienne. The last-named valley belonged to the Medulli, who, like the Ceutrones, were conterminous with the Allobroges. So too were the Uceni and the Tricorii, who occupied respectively the valleys of the Romanche and the Drac.<sup>1</sup> Desjardins, who does not believe that rivers generally served as frontiers, makes the southern frontier of the Allobroges leave the Isère on the south, and extend across the two last-named valleys along the foot of the hills: but he believes that it may have followed the line of the Isère from the mountains of St-Nizier to the Rhône.<sup>2</sup> Who can tell? Rivers often did serve as frontiers, for instance between the territories of the Aedui and the Bituriges.<sup>3</sup>

De Valois, remarking that part of the diocese of Vienne was in the Vivarais, argued that the Transrhodane possessions of the Allobroges, which Caesar mentioned, were on the frontier of the Helvii (*q.v.*), below the confluence of the Saône and the Rhône.<sup>4</sup> But these Transrhodane possessions were ravaged by the Helvetii;<sup>5</sup> and, as d'Anville points out,<sup>6</sup> the Helvetii would not have gone in that direction, as they were bound for the country of the Aedui. Still, it is possible that, besides the Transrhodane possessions which Caesar mentioned, the Allobroges had others in the tract indicated by de Valois.<sup>7</sup> Debombourg, who finds fault with Napoleon for tracing the common frontier of the Sequani and Allobroges without regard to natural boundaries, gives the Allobroges *trans Rhodanum* the "archiprêtres" of Belley, Virieu-le-Grand and Arbignieu, that is to say, a triangular tract of land of which the apex is near Tenay, and which

<sup>1</sup> I can see no reason for including the territories of the Uceni and Tricorii, as M. Longnor does (*Atlas hist. de la France*, Pl. 1), apparently because they were in the diocese of Grenoble, in the territory of the Allobroges. "Clients" they may have been: but the Tricorii, at all events, were plainly regarded by Livy (xxi. 31) as an independent people. See pp. 512-13.

<sup>2</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 236.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 5, § 4. Debombourg (*Rev. du Lyonnais*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. i., 1866, p. 456) argues that a letter from Plancus to Cicero (*Ad Fam.*, x. 23) proves that Culuro was on the frontier of the Allobroges, and therefore that the Isère, in a part of its course, was their southern frontier,—namely from Vinay and St-Marcellin on its right bank and St-Gervais and Iseron on its left as far as its confluence with the Rhône. Between these limits the Isère is a natural barrier, difficult to cross. Not so in the upper part of its course: there the Allobroges possessed both banks as far as the foot of the mountains of Belladonne. Debombourg may be right: but Plancus only said that Culuro was *ex finibus Allobrogum*,—in the territory (not on the frontier) of the Allobroges.

<sup>4</sup> *Notitia Galliarum*, p. 608.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, i. 11, § 5.

<sup>6</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 54.

<sup>7</sup> Debombourg (*Rev. du Lyonnais*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. i., 1866, pp. 455-6) infers from Strabo (iv. 2, § 4) that the territory of the Allobroges extended on the west of the Rhône as far as the chain of the Vivarais; and, he adds, Strabo's statement is confirmed by the fact that the diocese of Vienne extended on the right bank of the Rhône as far as Doux, near Tournon. But Strabo only says that the peoples beyond the Rhône and the Saône and between the Loire and the Seine are adjacent to (*παρὰκείραι*) the Allobroges; and, as he includes the Carnutes among these peoples, it is plain that he used the word *παρὰκείραι* loosely. The argument based on the western extension of the diocese is, however, reasonable enough.

is bounded by the "chainon d'Inimont" and the "chainon de Parve."<sup>1</sup> The French Commission agree with d'Anville in assigning them those parts of the dioceses of Geneva and Belley which are on the right bank of the Rhône, that is to say, a strip of land extending from Bellegarde to Mar, comprising the val Romé, the districts of Châtillon and Michaille, and the Bugey.<sup>2</sup> Desjardins, having regard to Caesar's statement<sup>3</sup> about the complaints which the Transrhodane Allobroges made to him of the devastation of their lands by the Helvetii, and to the fact that Caesar was then in the angle between the Rhône and the Saône, infers that their territory extended further westward, and gives them the cantons of Ambérieux, Ménémiex and Montluel.<sup>4</sup> See NANTUATES and SEQUANI.

**Ambarri.**—The name of the Ambarri appears to be preserved in Amberieu and Ambronay. Their territory formed that part of the *civitas Lugdunensium* which lies between the Rhône and the Saône, excepting the small tract which belonged to the Segusiavi (*q.v.*). The French Commission<sup>5</sup> remarks that, after defining the territories of the surrounding peoples,—the Aedui, the Sequani, the Helvetii, the Allobroges and the Segusiavi,—we find remaining for the Ambarri a district corresponding roughly with the department of Ain. The Commission, however, do not admit that the Segusiavi possessed any territory between the Rhône and the Saône. According to d'Anville,<sup>6</sup> the northern boundary of the Ambarri reached its northernmost point near Mâcon. But the Commission, following the traces of the ancient dioceses, extend it to the river Seille, and trace its other boundaries along the Saône, the Rhône and the mountains of Bugey. They admit, however, that the northern frontier, as traced in their map, is quite conjectural, and that d'Anville may be right. For my part, I cannot see why they do not adhere to the principle by which they are usually guided. I believe therefore that, besides the central and western parts of Ain, the Ambarri possessed the south-eastern part of Saône-et-Loire. Desjardins,<sup>7</sup> who restricts their territory by extending that of the Segusiavi on the eastern bank of the Saône as far north as Mâcon, is, I believe, so far wrong. M. d'Arbois de Jubainville<sup>8</sup> appears to think that the Ambarri, originally at all events, possessed territory on both banks of the Saône: for he derives their name from *Ambi-arari*,—"ceux qui habitent sur les deux rives de l'Arar" (Saône). M. Debombourg<sup>9</sup> assigns to the Ambarri the "archiprêtre" of Anse on the western bank of the Saône, which is usually assigned to the Segusiavi, and the "archiprêtre" of Morestel on the southern bank of the Rhône, which is usually assigned to the Allobroges (*q.v.*). "To sceptics," he says, "I should reply by pointing to Ambérieux in Anse and Ambliègnieu on the southern bank of the

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. du Lyonnais*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. iv., 1867, pp. 10-12.

<sup>2</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 43.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, i. 10, § 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 605.

<sup>5</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 48.

<sup>6</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, map facing p. 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 605.

<sup>8</sup> *Les noms gaulois etc: César et Hirtius de Bello Gallico*, 1891, p. 38.

<sup>9</sup> *Rev. du Lyonnais*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. i., 1866, pp. 183-97 (esp. 189-90).

Rhône." But whatever may be the etymology of Ambérieux, it is evident from Caesar's narrative,<sup>1</sup> read in conjunction with Ptolemy,<sup>2</sup> that Anse, which is nearly opposite Trévoux, belonged, at least in his time, to the Segusiavi; and the very faint resemblance between the names "Amblagnieu" and "Ambarri" will hardly prevail against the evidence which goes to prove that the country between the Rhône and the Isère belonged to the Allobroges.

The parts of the frontier of the Ambarri which can be defined with least certainty are those which separated them from the Segusiavi and from the Transrhodane Allobroges.

**Ambiani.**—The Ambiani occupied the diocese of Amiens, which nearly corresponds with the department of the Somme.<sup>3</sup> See BELLOVACI.

**Ambibareti** is the form found in the *a* MSS.<sup>4</sup> of the name of a people mentioned in *B. G.*, vii. 90, § 6, in whose country Caesar quartered a legion after the fall of Alesia. Schneider<sup>5</sup> identifies this people with the *Ambluaretii*,—to adopt the reading of the *a* MSS.,<sup>6</sup>—who are mentioned in *B. G.*, vii. 75, § 2, among the clients of the Aedui. All the well-known editors likewise hold that in both passages Caesar is speaking of the same people: but most of them adopt, with Glück,<sup>7</sup> the reading *Ambivareti*. Nipperdey,<sup>8</sup> however, thinks it probable that *Ambluaretii* and *Ambibareti* (or, according to the reading which he follows, *Ambilareti*) are corrupt forms of *Ambarri*, as the Ambarri were intimately connected with the Aedui, and are not mentioned in *B. G.*, vii. 75. If, however, the *Ambluareti* (so-called) were identical with the Ambarri, the Ambarri must have been clients of the Aedui; and we are not told that they were. The French Commission<sup>9</sup> also identify the *Ambluareti* with the Ambarri, but think it doubtful whether the *Ambibareti* were the Ambarri or the *Ambibarii* (*q.v.*). Long, who also includes the *Ambibareti* among the clients of the Aedui, places them east of the Loire and west of Bibracte. He remarks that in the winter of 52-51 B.C. Caesar left Bibracte, joined the legion which was quartered among the Bituriges, and joined to it the 11th legion, which was nearest. This legion, says Long, could not have been either of those which were quartered in the valley of the Saône, for they were the 8th and 14th: it could not have been the legion at Bibracte, for Caesar left Bibracte with only a cavalry escort: it must, therefore, have been the legion which was quartered in the country of the *Ambibareti*. That legion must have been on the west of Bibracte: it must, being quartered among clients of the Aedui, have been quartered near their country; and therefore it was probably on the east of the Loire.<sup>10</sup>

Napoleon, perhaps following Dr. Noëlas,<sup>11</sup> places the *Ambibareti*, or,

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 10-12.

<sup>2</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 49.

<sup>3</sup> *Caesar*, ii. 641.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 813-14 *infra*.

<sup>5</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 50.

<sup>6</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 8, § 11.

<sup>7</sup> Meusel's *Caesar*, p. 217.

<sup>8</sup> Meusel's *Caesar*, p. 206.

<sup>9</sup> *Caesar*, p. 106.

<sup>10</sup> Long's *Caesar*, pp. 407-8.

<sup>11</sup> *Rev. du Lyonnais*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér. t. iii., 1867, pp. 261-79. Noëlas's paper was not published till after the appearance of the *Hist. de Jules César*; but he may have communicated his views to the Emperor before.

as he calls them, the Ambluareti, on the west of the Loire, in the neighbourhood of Ambierle, where a Roman camp has been discovered, in the arrondissement of Roanne. Maissiat<sup>1</sup> suggests that they may have possessed a subdivision of the territory of the Ambarri, and that their name may survive in Vavre, Vavrette and Varambon,—places in the neighbourhood of the confluence of the Ain and the Suran. But the truth is that, unless we identify them with the Ambarri, which we have no right to do, it is useless to look for their territory.

**Ambibarii.**—The Ambibarii, who are mentioned only by Caesar,<sup>2</sup> appear in his list of the Armorican or maritime states. The French Commission<sup>3</sup> place them in the diocese of Avranches, which subsequently belonged, wholly or in part, to the Abrincatui,<sup>4</sup> because, they argue, after the territories of the other Armorican states have been fixed, this diocese alone remains unoccupied. Desjardins, who agrees with the Commission, adds the reason that the Abrincatui are not mentioned by Caesar, while the Ambibarii are not mentioned by Ptolemy or Pliny. But this is hardly a sufficient reason for assuming that the Ambibarii were identical with the Abrincatui; and the Commission regard them as distinct though conterminous peoples. Moreover, it is impossible, as I show elsewhere (see *DIABLINTES*), to determine the frontiers of all the Armorican states. The Ambibarii, in the opinion of the Commission,<sup>5</sup> may have also possessed a part of the diocese of Coutances, as they consider that the southern frontier of the Unelli (*q.v.*) is very uncertain.

Desjardins,<sup>6</sup> comparing Caesar's two lists of maritime states, notes that the Ambibarii, whom he wrongly calls Ambivariti,<sup>7</sup> are mentioned only in the latter, the Auleri only in the former list.<sup>8</sup> As none of the known Aulerian tribes were maritime, he infers that the Ambibarii belonged to the Aulerian group.

**Ambiliati.**—The Ambiliati are mentioned once only in the *Commentaries*,<sup>9</sup> among the tribes whom the Veneti engaged to join them in their war against Caesar. The  $\beta$  MSS. read *Ambianos*. Orosius, mentioning in one and the same passage<sup>10</sup> all the other tribes that are mentioned in this passage by Caesar, wrote *Ambivaritos*. The French Commission,

<sup>1</sup> *Jules César en Gaule*, i. 81.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 75, § 4. There are various readings: but *Ambibarii* has the most support. See Schneider's *Caesar*, ii. 583, and Meusel's *Caesar*, p. 207. Desjardins, however (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 487, n. 6), and K. Thomann (*Der französische Atlas zu Cæsars gall. Kriege*, 1871, p. 17) call the tribe in question *Ambivariti*. Desjardins (ii. 465) believes that some copyist wrote *Ambibarii* in mistake for *Ambarri*, and that he ought to have written *Ambivariti*; and the mistake, he says, is the more intelligible because in the same chapter,—*B. G.*, vii. 75,—which gives the list of the various contingents of the host that marched to the relief of Vercingetorix, “il est parlé,”—among the clients of the Aedui,—“des *Ambivariti*, peuple de la confédération des cités armoricaines.” But Desjardins is mistaken. No MS. has *Ambivariti*; and the  $\alpha$  MSS. have *Ambluareti*.

<sup>3</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 49.

<sup>4</sup> Ptolemy, *Géogr.*, ed. C. Müller, ii. 8, § 8, pp. 214-15.

<sup>5</sup> *Rev. arch. nouv. sér.*, t. ix., 1864, pp. 406-7.

<sup>6</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 487-8.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, p. 490.

<sup>8</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 9, § 10.

<sup>9</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 34; vii. 75.

<sup>10</sup> *Ib.*, vi. 8, § 8.

considering the unsupported testimony of Orosius insufficient, and having regard to the fact that, except in certain MSS. of one solitary passage of Caesar, there is no mention of the name *Ambiliati*, prefer the reading *Ambianos*.<sup>1</sup> They consider it probable that the Ambiani joined the Venetian alliance, as their near neighbours, the Morini, did so; and they call attention to the fact that those very neighbours are mentioned by Caesar, in *B. G.*, ii. 4, § 9, immediately after the Ambiani. Thomann<sup>2</sup> reads *Ambivaritos*, but in addition to, not instead of *Ambiliatos*. He says that the Ambiliati were evidently the same as the Ambilatri of Pliny;<sup>3</sup> and, he continues, as Pliny observes geographical order in his enumeration of the Gallic peoples, the Ambiliati were on the left bank of the lower Loire. But Pliny often departs from geographical order; for instance, he mentions the Veneti immediately after the Caleti, the Abrincatui immediately after the Veneti, and the Orismi immediately after the Abrincatui.<sup>4</sup> Walckenaer,<sup>5</sup> who accepts the reading *Ambiliatos*, places them in the environs of Lamballe, in the diocese of St-Brieuc, because, he says, there is no other place for them. But, say the French Commission, "ils seraient là en plein pays curiosolite." Nor is it certain that "there is no other place for them"; for we cannot determine the frontiers of all the Armorican peoples. Dittenberger<sup>6</sup> suggests that Caesar may have written *Ambiburios* (*q.v.*).

I follow the *a* MSS. in accepting the reading *Ambiliatos*: but the problem of their whereabouts is insoluble.

**Ambivareti.** See AMBIVARETI.

**Ambivariti.**—The geographical position of the Ambivariti cannot be determined. No ancient writer mentions them except Caesar.<sup>7</sup> He says that, when the envoys of the Usipetes and Tencteri first met him, their cavalry were in the country of the Ambivariti, on the further bank of the Meuse; and the common opinion is that the further bank means the left or western bank. This opinion is based upon the fact that the Usipetes and Tencteri had, before Caesar marched against them, reached the territories of the Eburones and Condrusi;<sup>8</sup> and that the greater part of the territory of the Eburones<sup>9</sup> and the whole of the territory of the Condrusi (*q.v.*) were on the right bank of the Meuse. Various writers place the Ambivariti in the environs of Antwerp (Anvers). Others place them more to the south, near Givet, in a district where there is a place called Amberive.<sup>10</sup> Napoleon asserts, without giving any reasons, that they were "established on the left bank of the Meuse, to the west of Ruremonde, and to the south of the marshes of Peel."<sup>11</sup> General Von Veith<sup>12</sup> finds them in the country round Weert, about 12 miles west-north-west of Roermond. Desjardins thinks it

<sup>1</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 50.

<sup>2</sup> *Der französische Atlas zu Cäsars gall. Kriege*, 1871, p. 17.

<sup>3</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 19 (33), § 108.

<sup>4</sup> *Geogr. des Gaules*, i. 382.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 9, § 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 6, § 4.

<sup>7</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 51.

<sup>8</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 140, n. 1.

<sup>9</sup> *Jahresberichte der Geschichtswissenschaft*, Jahrg. iii., 1880, ii. 2.

<sup>10</sup> *Ib.*, iv. 18 (32), § 107.

<sup>11</sup> *Caesar*, 15th ed., p. 315.

<sup>12</sup> *Ib.*, v. 24, § 4.

possible that the name *Ambivariti* had a purely local significance, and meant the Eburones (!) "situés des deux côtés de la Meuse, comme *Ambitrevius* signifie le pays situé des deux côtés de la Trébie."<sup>1</sup> But if so, why *Ambivariti*?

The French Commission endeavour to prove that the common view is erroneous, and that the Ambivariti were between the Meuse and the Rhine.<sup>2</sup> They argue that, if the Roman army had been on the right bank of the Meuse, Caesar would have been able to prevent the cavalry of the Usipetes and Tencteri from taking refuge in the country of the Sugambri.<sup>3</sup> This argument will not bear examination. The rout of the Usipetes and Tencteri took place either near the (assumed) confluence of the Meuse and the Waal at Fort St-Andries or near the confluence of the Rhine and the Moselle.<sup>4</sup> In either case there is nothing to show that the Ambivariti, assuming that their territory was anywhere near the left bank of the Meuse, were not as near as Caesar to the Sugambrian frontier. If so, how was he to prevent the German cavalry from crossing that frontier? Even if he had had the shorter distance to march, he might have failed to intercept them; for, as his cavalry were no match for the Germans,<sup>5</sup> he would have been obliged to march against them with his infantry; and the light German horse would probably have been too quick for him. It is even possible that, when the rout of the Usipetes and Tencteri took place, the German cavalry had quitted the country of the Ambivariti, and were actually on their way to rejoin their countrymen. Besides, as I have already remarked, Caesar says that when he began to march against the Usipetes and Tencteri, they had reached the territory of the Condrusi, which was on the right bank of the Meuse. Therefore the territory of the Ambivariti, which, from the standpoint of the Usipetes and Tencteri was *trans Mosam*, must have been on the left bank of the Meuse. General Creuly<sup>6</sup> assumes that when Caesar said that the Usipetes and Tencteri had advanced as far as the country of the Condrusi, he was speaking of a reconnoitring party only: but, in order to support the theory that the Ambivariti dwelt between the Meuse and the Rhine, he is obliged to make the further assumption that the main body remained throughout the campaign on the western side of the Meuse. He believes that they had originally crossed the western arm of the Rhine below the (alleged) confluence of the Waal and the Meuse at Gorkum; for otherwise, he argues, when the Germans marched towards the country of the Treveri, their course would have been parallel with the Rhine, and the words *uti ab Rheno discederent*<sup>7</sup> in Caesar's account would be meaningless. But Caesar says that they marched towards the country of the Condrusi, not that of the Treveri; and the map shows that, marching

<sup>1</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 651, n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 51-2. So also Walckenaer (*Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 508), who places them on the south of Liège, in the plain watered by the Amblève.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 16, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 680-93.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 12.

<sup>6</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, pp. 26-8.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 6, § 3.



between the Meuse and the Rhine towards the country of the Condrusi, they would have moved away from the Rhine.<sup>1</sup>

The conclusion of the matter is this. The Ambivariti dwelt somewhere on the left bank of the Meuse; and, as they are not mentioned by any ancient writer, except Caesar, and do not appear in the *Notitia provinciarum*, it is probable that they were dependents of some more powerful people. But there is not the faintest evidence for fixing their geographical position; and to mark them on the map would be simply to mislead.

**Andes.**—The Andes or Andecavi occupied the whole of the diocese of Angers, excepting the canton of Mauges, that is to say, the department of Maine-et-Loire and part of Sarthe.<sup>2</sup>

**Aremoricae (civitates).**—Walckenaer<sup>3</sup> and Desjardins<sup>4</sup> understand by "Armorican" simply "maritime." D'Anville<sup>5</sup> observes that Caesar appears to apply the term specially to the peoples between the Seine and the Loire. The only passage in which Caesar mentions by name any of the Armorican peoples, as such, occurs in *B. G.*, vii. 75, § 4, in the enumeration of the states which sent contingents for the relief of Alesia. In this passage he says that 30,000 men were levied *universis civitatibus quae Oceanum attingunt quaeque eorum consuetudine Aremoricae appellantur, quo sunt in numero Curiosolites, Redones, Ambibarii, Caletes, Osismi, Lexovii, Venelli*. All these peoples dwelt between the Seine and the Loire, except the Caletes, who were on the right bank of the estuary of the Seine; and as the Morini, the Atrebatas and the Ambiani, maritime peoples who dwelt on the east of the Seine, and the Pictones and the Santones, maritime peoples who dwelt on the south of the Loire, are mentioned in the enumeration, it is clear that Caesar did not reckon them as Armorican.

According to Pliny,<sup>6</sup> the country between the Garonne and the Pyrenees was called by the name "Aremorica," before it was called "Aquitania." But Pliny could hardly have had any authority for this statement; and, as he does not apply the term "Armorican" to the states which Caesar called by that name, Long concludes that he simply made a mistake.<sup>7</sup>

**Arverni.**—The territory of the Arverni, exclusive of the territories of their clients, is represented by the diocese of Clermont and part of that of St-Flour, which was severed from the parent diocese in the fourteenth century. This territory comprises the departments of Cantal and Puy-de-Dôme and part of those of Allier and Loire-

<sup>1</sup> The theory of General Creuly and of the French Commission, on which their location of the Ambivariti depends, that the Usipetes and Teneteri crossed the Meuse (regarded as the western arm of the Rhine) below Gorkum, I refute on pp. 678-9. See also Heller in *Philologus*, xxii., 1865, p. 132.

<sup>2</sup> D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 67-8; Walckenaer, i. 376.

<sup>3</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 437.

<sup>4</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 437, 461, 489.

<sup>5</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 103.

<sup>6</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 17 (31), § 105.

<sup>7</sup> W. Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geogr.*, i. 218.

Supérieure. The Gabali, one of the client peoples of the Arverni, occupied the remaining part of the diocese of St-Flour.<sup>1</sup>

**Atrebates.**—The Atrebates occupied the diocese of Arras, that is to say the south-eastern part of the department of Calais and the adjacent part of the department of Nord.<sup>2</sup>

**Aulerci Brannovices.**—The Aulerci Brannovices and Blannovii are only mentioned by Caesar, and only once by him; and he tells us nothing about them, except that they were clients of the Aedui.<sup>3</sup> To add to the difficulty of identifying their territories, the MSS. offer a variety of readings. A has *Blannovicibus* instead of *Brannovicibus*. Nipperdey follows one of the old editions in reading *Brannovii* instead of *Blannovii*; but there is no other authority for *Brannovii*, except *βραννοβίους*, which is found in the Greek Paraphrast. Ciacconius deleted *Blannovii*; and Holder and Meusel print it in brackets.

The French Commission<sup>4</sup> agree with d'Anville<sup>5</sup> that the territory of the Brannovices may be represented by the canton of Brionnais, on the eastern bank of the upper Loire. Walckenaer, who accepts the reading (Aulercis) *Blannovicibus*, *Blannovii*, places the Blannovices in the neighbourhood of Blannot in the arrondissement of Mâcon, and the Blannovii in the neighbourhood of another Blannot in the arrondissement of Beaune in Côte-d'Or.<sup>6</sup> Napoleon adopts the reading *Brannovicibus*, *Blannovii*, and places the former in the canton of Brionnais, the latter in the district assigned by Walckenaer to the Blannovices.<sup>7</sup> M. Longnon proposes to identify the territory of the Brannovices with the diocese of Auxerre, which he assigns to the Aedui (*q.v.*). He bases his conjecture on "la mention d'un 'quidam Aeolercus,' que la légende du premier évêque d'Auxerre montre élevant un temple païen à Entrains (Nièvre)." <sup>8</sup>

The whole matter is quite uncertain, as we have no evidence except that of nomenclature. I follow d'Anville, but doubtfully, in assigning to the Brannovices the canton of Brionnais. As to the Blannovii, supposing that they existed, nobody can tell where they lived; for there are two Blannots, and one might as well toss up as attempt to decide between them.

**Aulerci Eburones.**—The Aulerci Eburones appear, in all the good MSS., among the tribes who sent troops to the relief of Vercingetorix.<sup>9</sup> De Valois,<sup>10</sup> however, conjectured that for *Eburonibus* should be read *Ebuovicibus*, (1) because the Aulerci Ebuovices appear in *B. G.*, iii. 17, § 3, side by side with the Lexovii, immediately after whom the Aulerci Eburones are mentioned in the passage which I am discussing; and (2) because the Aulerci Eburones are mentioned nowhere else by Caesar and by no other writer, whereas the Ebuovices are mentioned not only

<sup>1</sup> See d'Anville, pp. 104-5; Walckenaer, i. 340; and *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 83.

<sup>2</sup> Walckenaer, i. 433; *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 89.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 75, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 129.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 25, note.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 75, § 3.

<sup>7</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 93.

<sup>8</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 331.

<sup>9</sup> *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 4.

<sup>10</sup> *Notitia Galliarum*, p. 66.

by Caesar, but also by Pliny,<sup>1</sup> Orosius<sup>2</sup> and later writers. De Valois's emendation is accepted by most editors: but Schneider retains the reading of the MSS., believing that, if a mistake was made, it was made by Caesar in consequence of his having been misinformed. I am inclined to think that de Valois's arguments are sufficient; and it is significant that in *B. G.*, iii. 17, § 3, where Caesar mentions the Eburovices, one inferior MS. has Eburones.<sup>3</sup> The Ebuovices occupied the diocese of Evreux, or the central and southern parts of the department of Eure.<sup>4</sup>

**Ausci.**—The Ausci occupied the southern part of the diocese of Auch, that is to say, the central and southern parts of the department of Gers.<sup>5</sup>

**Belgae.**—Are the Treveri and Mediomatrici to be included among the Belgae? Caesar's introductory chapter, taken by itself, certainly implies that this question is to be answered in the affirmative. After telling us that the Gauls, or Celtae, "are separated from the Belgae by the Marne and the Seine," he says, "that part of the country which, as I have said, is occupied by the Gauls, begins at the river Rhône, and is bounded by the Garonne, the Atlantic and the country of the Belgae: *it extends, moreover, in the region occupied by the Sequani and the Helvetii, to the Rhine*" (*eorum una pars, quam Gallos obtinere dictum est, initium capit a flumine Rhodano: continetur Garumna flumine, Oceano, finibus Belgarum; attingit etiam ab Sequanis et Helvetiis flumen Rhenum*).<sup>6</sup> Now he says elsewhere that the territory of the Mediomatrici and the Treveri extended to the Rhine.<sup>7</sup> But if the Treveri and the Mediomatrici had been Celtae, not Belgae, he ought to have written, in the passage which I have just quoted, *attingit etiam ab Treveris, Mediomatrici, Sequanis, Helvetiis flumen Rhenum*. On the other hand, the Remi told him in 57 B.C. that all the Belgae, except themselves, were in arms; and neither the Treveri nor the Mediomatrici are mentioned in the list which they furnished of the various contingents.<sup>8</sup> There is, moreover, a passage in *B. G.*, vi. 3, § 4, which might suggest that Caesar reckoned the Treveri as Celtae. He says that when he held his annual council of Gallic chiefs in the spring of 53 B.C., all the states, except the Senones, the Carnutes and the Treveri, sent their representatives (*concilio Galliae primo vere, uti instituerat, indicto, cum reliqui praeter Senones, Carnutes Treverosque venissent*, etc.); and, as the preceding chapter proves that the Nervii, the Aduatuci and the Menapii,—all Belgic peoples,—were not represented, Long<sup>9</sup> concludes that Caesar was only speaking of the states of Gallia Celtica. But it is certain that the Remi, Caesar's devoted adherents, who were unquestionably a Belgic people, did not fail to send their representatives; and it seems possible that by *Galliae* Caesar meant those states of the whole of Gaul, not Gallia Celtica only, which were habitually represented in the councils.

<sup>1</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 18 (32), § 107.

<sup>2</sup> Schneider's *Caesar*, i. 263.

<sup>3</sup> Walckenaer, i. 288; *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 97-8.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, i. 1, §§ 2, 5.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, ii. 3, § 4, 4.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist.* vi. 8, § 18.

<sup>7</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 94.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, i. 97-8.

<sup>9</sup> *Ib.*, iv. 10, § 4; vi. 9, § 5.

<sup>10</sup> *Caesar*, p. 288.

Besides, as the Condrusi, clients and neighbours of the Treveri, were undoubtedly Belgae,<sup>1</sup> it might be inferred that the Treveri themselves belonged to the same group. Still, after looking at both sides of the question, it seems most reasonable to conclude, from the fact that neither the Treveri nor the Mediomatrici appear in the list of the Belgic tribes and from the fact that the Treveri actually assisted Caesar in his first campaign against the Belgae,<sup>2</sup> that, according to his informants, both peoples were reckoned among the Celtae; and, if he did not mention them among the Celtic tribes whose territories adjoined the Rhine, the explanation may possibly be that he observed striking differences between them and the rest of the Celtae.<sup>3</sup>

**Belgium.**—Did Caesar use this word in *B. G.*, v. 24, § 2, and if so, in what sense? He mentions Belgium three times (*B. G.* v. 12, § 2, 24, § 2, 25, § 4), or, according to the *a* MSS., twice (*Ib.*, 12, 25). In the former of these two chapters he says that the maritime part of Britain had been colonised by immigrants from Belgium, almost all of whom were designated by the names of the states from which they had come:—*maritima pars (incolitur) ab iis qui praeduae ac belli inferendi causa ex Belgio transierant qui omnes fere iis nominibus civitatum appellantur, quibus orti ex civitatibus eo pervenerant.* The natural conclusion to be drawn from this passage is that *Belgium* meant the country of the Belgae;<sup>4</sup> for, if it had meant only a particular part of that country, how would Caesar's readers have known what part he meant? In the second of the two chapters (25) he says that he ordered Plancus to march with his legion from Belgium to the country of the Carnutes; and this statement, taken by itself, would lead to the same conclusion. But in the preceding chapter (24) there occurs a passage which has led most commentators to adopt a different opinion. Describing the distribution of the legions which he made in the autumn of 54 B.C., Caesar says that he placed three, under Crassus, Plancus and Trebonius respectively, in the country of the Belgae, or, according to the *β* MSS., in Belgium:—*tres (legiones) in Belgis (or Belgio) collocavit: his M. Crassum quaestorum et L. Munatium Plancum et C. Trebonium legatos praefecit.* Now all the other legions, except one, were also quartered in the country of the Belgae; and accordingly the reading *Belgis* would seem to have no point. For this reason Meusel and A. Holder, following Thomann,<sup>5</sup> read *Bellovaris*; while d'Anville,<sup>6</sup> Walckenaer<sup>7</sup> and the French Commission<sup>8</sup> read *Belgio*. Assuming that this is the true reading, it is obvious that, in this passage at all events, unless Caesar was very careless, *Belgium* can only mean a part of the whole territory of the *Belgae*. If so, what was that part? Now Hirtius<sup>9</sup> mentions

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 4; iv. 6; vi. 32, § 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, ii. 24, § 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, viii. 25. Long, who, in two passages of his edition of Caesar (pp. 78, 111) calls the Treveri Belgae, implies in a third (p. 238) that they were Celtae, and finally says, in an article which he contributed to Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography*, ii. 1227, that it is impossible to determine the point!

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Schneider's *Caesar*, ii. 56.

<sup>5</sup> *Der französische Atlas zu Cäsars gall. Kriege*, i., 1868, p. 5; iii., 1874, p. 25.

<sup>6</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 147-8.

<sup>7</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 420-2.

<sup>8</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i., 138.

<sup>9</sup> *B. G.*, viii. 46, §§ 3, 6, 49, § 1, 54, § 4.

"Belgium" four times: but we only learn from him that within the limits of Belgium was Nemetocenna, the chief town of the Atrebatæ. A passage in *B. G.*, v. 46, § 1,—*Caesar . . . in Bellovacos ad M. Crassum quaestorem mittit, cuius hiberna aberant ab eo milia passuum XXV*,—proves that the camp of Crassus, one of the three camps which, according to the passage in *B. G.*, v. 24, were in "Belgium," was in the territory of the Bellovaci. As it is clear, then, says d'Anville, that Belgium comprised the territories of the Bellovaci and the Atrebatæ, it must have also comprised the territory of the Ambiani, which was between the other two.<sup>1</sup> This is the orthodox view; and if, in the doubtful passage (*B. G.*, v. 24), the true reading is *Belgio*, it is right.

But is *Belgio* the true reading? It would be quite natural that Caesar should have called the country of the Belgæ *Belgium*: but, although he used the word "Gallia" both in a general and in a restricted sense, it seems unlikely that he should have also used the word "Belgium" to denote a portion only of the country of the Belgæ. On the other hand, the emendation *Bellovacis* does not mend matters; for it is certain that Trebonius's legion was at Samarobriua (*Amiens*) in the country of the Ambiani.<sup>2</sup> Caesar must have forgotten this, if he wrote *Bellovacis*. If he wrote *Belgis* or *Belgio*, he must have made a slip, unless the term "Belgium" was really used in a restricted sense, to describe the territory of the Bellovaci, the Ambiani and the Atrebatæ, as well as in a general sense, to describe the whole territory of the Belgæ.

To sum up, if we adopt the reading *Bellovacis*, we adopt a purely conjectural reading, and we have to admit that Caesar made a slip. If we adopt either of the readings, *Belgis* and *Belgio*, we have the support of good MSS.; and although it seems probable that, in either of these cases, Caesar made a slip, it is at least possible that in the latter he did not. Taking probability as our guide, we must, I think, decide in favour of *Belgio*. It may indeed be argued that it is unlikely that Caesar, departing from his habitual practice, would have said that certain legions encamped in Belgium, instead of mentioning the peoples among whom they encamped; and Nipperdey, who reads *Belgis*, remarks that, in *B. G.*, v. 24, "when we see that the Belgæ are mentioned after certain Belgic tribes, we must conclude either that Caesar thought it superfluous to state what Belgic tribes he meant by Belgæ or that he simply forgot to do so."<sup>3</sup> But the retort is obvious. If we read *Belgio*, we must conclude either that Caesar thought it superfluous to state what part of the territory of the Belgæ he meant by Belgium or that he simply forgot to do so. Again, it seems more likely that the word *Belgium* should have been used in a restricted as well as in a general sense than that Caesar should have used the word

<sup>1</sup> C. Wastelain (*Descr. de la Gaule belgique*, 1788, p. 9) also includes the territory of the Viromandui in Belgium, because, he says, it was between the territories of the Bellovaci and the Atrebatæ. So it was,—just: but a glance at the map will show that it need not have been included in "Belgium." See d'Anville, p. 148.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 335, n. 4, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> See Nipperdey's *Caesar*, p. 79. It must be remembered that Nipperdey was unduly prejudiced against the  $\beta$  MSS.

*Belgae*, the meaning of which he had himself defined at the outset of his work, in a way which would have been certain to mislead. Moreover, it is possible that the word *Belgium* was *only* used in a restricted sense; for in the chapter (v. 12) in which we read that immigrants from Belgium settled in Britain, there is a various reading,—found, it is true, only in inferior MSS.,—*Belgis*. See Nipperdey's *Caesar*, p. 355.

**Bellovaci.**—The Bellovaci certainly possessed the diocese of Beauvais. D'Anville,<sup>1</sup> Walckenaer,<sup>2</sup> and the French Commission<sup>3</sup> also assign them the diocese of Senlis, corresponding with the territory of the *Silvanectes*,<sup>4</sup> a people who are not mentioned by Caesar, and who may have been one of their *pagi*. The Commission observe that the diocese of Beauvais alone would not have been sufficient for so important a state. But by the same reasoning the diocese of Senlis might be, as it has been, assigned to the *Suessiones*,<sup>5</sup> who, according to Caesar,<sup>6</sup> had a very extensive territory. To one or the other of the two tribes, it has been argued, this intermediate tract must have belonged; for Caesar<sup>7</sup> says that their territories were conterminous. But Caesar's statement is consistent with the theory that the *Silvanectes* were an independent people, or that they were a *pagus* of the *Parisii*; for in either case the Bellovaci and the *Suessiones* would have been conterminous in the country north of the *Silvanectes*. Still, as Caesar does not mention the *Silvanectes* in his list of the Belgic tribes, I am inclined to believe that they were dependents of or included among the *Suessiones*.

The Commission further propose to extend the territory of the Bellovaci to the sea, giving them the tongue of land which separates the river Bresle from Arques, as this tract cannot be assigned with certainty either to the *Ambiani* or to the *Caletes*<sup>8</sup> (*q.v.*). But neither can it be assigned with certainty to the Bellovaci; and it seems to me safer to follow the indications of the dioceses.

M. Mazière<sup>9</sup> believes that the Bellovaci also possessed the *Noyonnais*. The district in question is generally assigned to the *Vivomandui*; and, in support of this opinion, it is pointed out that in 531 the see of the bishopric of Vermand was transferred to Noyon. M. Mazière, however, infers from Caesar's statement that the Bellovaci numbered 100,000 fighting men,<sup>10</sup> that their entire population must have amounted to at least 400,000; and he argues that, without the *Noyonnais*, their territory would have been much too small to support such a multitude. I admit that, if it was confined to the diocese of Beauvais, it was disproportionately small; but, if we are to disregard the law of the dioceses, we must have stronger evidence. See *VELLOCASSES*.

**Bibracte.**—For centuries past historians, geographers, antiquaries

<sup>1</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 143.

<sup>2</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 429.

<sup>3</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 140.

<sup>4</sup> Ptol., *Geogr.*, ii. 9, § 6; Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 17 (31), § 106.

<sup>5</sup> Longnon, *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 7.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 4, § 6.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>8</sup> The district in question forms part of the diocese of Rouen. See the map in *Gallia Christiana*, t. xi.

<sup>9</sup> *Comptes rendus et mèm. du comité arch. de Noyon*, iii., 1868, pp. 34-9.

<sup>10</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 4, § 5.

and editors have disputed over the identification of Bibracte. In the seventeenth century Adrien de Valois gave reasons for placing it on Mont Beuvray : in the fifteenth the same view had been advocated by Raimondus Marlianus, and in the sixteenth by Guy Coquille : in the eighteenth the Abbé Belley upheld the claim of Autun. For a long time his arguments, which were erroneously attributed to d'Anville, were practically decisive. In 1839 Walckenaer and, twenty years later, von Goler followed his lead. But in 1864 the Emperor Napoleon, relying on the results of excavations which had been made under the supervision of M. Bulliot, as well as on the judgement of Colonel Stoffel, again pronounced for Beuvray ; and four years later, M. Bulliot himself published in the *Revue archéologique* an account of his work, which he followed up by a series of papers in the *Mémoires de la Société éduenne*. M. Rossigneux vigorously combated his views : but, with the exception of Long, who was not to be convinced except by infallible proofs, the French Commission, who suspended judgement, Mommsen,<sup>1</sup> the younger von Goler, Mr. Warde Fowler and Mr. E. S. Shuckburgh, who give no reasons for their dissent, recent historians and editors have accepted his conclusion. The discussion is summed up, but very imperfectly, in the *Dictionnaire archéologique de la Gaule*.<sup>2</sup>

Caesar<sup>3</sup> mentions Bibracte four times, and Aulus Hirtius<sup>4</sup> twice. Caesar calls it "by far the largest and wealthiest town of the Aedui,"—*oppido Aeduiorum longe maximo et copiosissimo*,—and again *oppidum apud eos maximae auctoritatis* : he also tells us that it was the seat of government. Lastly he says that he determined to spend the winter of 52-51 B.C. in Bibracte ; and Hirtius says that, during a part of that winter, it was his headquarters.

Belley and his disciples, maintaining that Bibracte and Augustodunum, which is universally identified with Autun, were two names of the same town, suppose that, under Augustus, the name Bibracte was changed to Augustodunum. The opposite school, who insist that Bibracte was situated on Mont Beuvray, conclude that, under Augustus or Tiberius, it was abandoned, and that a new capital, Augustodunum, was founded, 12 miles to the east, on the site of Autun, just as Gergovia, the capital of the Arverni, was apparently succeeded by Augustonemetum.

The arguments of Belley<sup>5</sup> and his disciples may be thus summarised :—(1) Strabo,<sup>6</sup> writing in A.D. 18, speaks of Bibracte as the *φρούριον* of

<sup>1</sup> Mommsen's identification of Bibracte with Autun remains unchanged in the latest edition of his *Römische Geschichte* and in the revised and authorised translation of 1894.

<sup>2</sup> i. 154-8, 449-51. It may be worth while to mention that Blaise de Vigenère, in the sixteenth century identified Bibracte with Beaune, which is 40 kilometres, or about 25 miles, east of Autun : but there is nothing to be said for this conjecture ; and it has never been taken seriously.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, i. 23, § 1 ; vii. 55, § 4, 63, § 6, 90, § 8.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, viii. 2, § 1, 4, § 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Eclaircissements sur l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 271-337. I ignore in this article some of Belley's arguments, because they have been rendered obsolete by the results of excavations at Autun and on Mont Beuvray ; and also some of the arguments for the identity of Beuvray and Bibracte, because they are now superfluous.

<sup>6</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 3, § 2.

the Aedui,—their city of defence. Augustodunum certainly existed at this date; for we learn from Tacitus<sup>1</sup> that, in A.D. 21, it was their capital (*caput gentis*). Now, if Augustodunum had been different from Bibracte, Strabo would certainly have mentioned it.

Commenting on this argument, the writer of the article *Bibracte* in the *Dictionnaire archéologique de la Gaule* points out that Strabo was not aware of the existence of the newly founded Augustonemetum, and that he never mentions such important Aeduan towns as Decetia, Noviodunum and Matisco. Mr. Freeman, indeed, infers from the passage in Strabo that Augustodunum was different from Bibracte.<sup>2</sup> The passage, he says, “points to an interval when Bibracte had lost its old headship, but when Augustodunum had not yet taken its place. In no other state of things could any one have spoken of Chalon as the city of the Aedui, and of Bibracte only as a military post.”

2. If Augustodunum had been, in the time of Augustus, a new town, how, we are asked, could it have had, only seven years after his death, the importance and the large population of which Tacitus speaks?

Assuming that Augustodunum was founded in the reign of Augustus, and was intended to be the Aeduan capital, it is natural to believe that people flocked to live there in large numbers.<sup>3</sup>

3. Three inscriptions, bearing the legend DEAE BIBRACTI, have been discovered at Autun.

This argument has no value; for, observes the writer in the *Dictionnaire archéologique*, assuming that Bibracte was on Mont Beuvray and was named after some local divinity, there would be nothing surprising in the fact that some Gallic inhabitants of Augustodunum should have preserved the ancient cult.

4. The summit of Beuvray, according to Belley, is only a little more than 2 miles in circumference. How, then, he asks, could the *oppidum Aeduarum longe maximum et copiosissimum* have been there?

This argument has been demolished by M. Bulliot. The buildings discovered on Mont Beuvray covered an area of 135 hectares, or about 333 acres;<sup>4</sup> and this is half as large again as the plateau of Alesia.

5. M. Rossigneux asserts that he has been assured by M. Roidot-Déléage that he had himself discovered Gallic coins within the circuit of Augustodunum; and, he adds, “un membre de l’Institut a pu . . . constater la couche de la cité celtique.”<sup>5</sup>

But, on the former point, M. Bulliot flatly contradicts M. Rossigneux, on the authority of M. Roidot-Déléage himself! “M. Roidot-Déléage,” he says,<sup>6</sup> “m’affirmait tout à l’heure n’en avoir jamais rencontré une seule (médaille gauloise) dans les divers travaux qu’il a dirigés à Autun depuis cinquante ans.” And with regard to the alleged “couche celtique,” M. Bulliot says, “Ce qu’il a pris pour une couche celtique se trouve être un remblai de terre glaise . . . Ce sol soi-disant celtique

<sup>1</sup> *Ann.* iii. 43.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. Essays*, 4th ser., p. 106.

<sup>3</sup> See *Mém. de la Soc. éduenne*, nouv. sér., t. xx., 1892, pp. 341-4.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, p. 301.

<sup>5</sup> *Rev. des questions hist.*, i. 1866, p. 434.

<sup>6</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. xv., 1867, p. 72.



est directement couvert de deux lits de béton romain, séparés par 0 m. 10 cent. d'argile, à 0 m. 20 cent. à peine de la surface actuelle du sol. Ce double béton romain ne renferme aucun arcane historique . . . Une autre circonstance aurait dû frapper M. Rossigneux. C'est que les carrelages romains à droite et à gauche, ainsi que le pavé d'une *via* voisine sont à plus de 0 m. 50 cent. au-dessous de la copche en question, etc."

6. There is a poem by a mediæval monk, named Hericus, who evidently thought that the city which Caesar spoke of as Bibracte was that which was afterwards called Augustodunum. The poem contains these lines :—

"Urbs antiqua fuit toto celeberrima mundo,  
Haedua dicta prius  
Hanc primum veniens Alpino a litore Caesar  
Adscivit sociam  
Urbs quoque propectum meritisque et nomine sumpsit,  
Augustidunum demum concepta vocari."<sup>1</sup>

Now Hericus lived several centuries after the town on Mont Beuvray had been abandoned: the very existence of that town had probably been long forgotten; and it seems natural to conclude that Hericus did not write from positive knowledge, but merely expressed his own or a current opinion.

7. I have reserved to the last the argument on which Belley lays the most stress. He appeals to a passage in an oration, which used to be unhesitatingly attributed to Eumenius, but which is now referred to as *VIII Incerti Gratianum Actio Constantino Augusto I.* The orator, returning thanks to Constantine for having conferred various favours upon Augustodunum, announces that it is henceforth to be called, after the family name of its benefactor, "Flavia." As the reading is uncertain, I give that of Baehrens's edition,<sup>2</sup> with the one accepted by de Valois and Belley in brackets: *omnium sis licet dominus urbium, omnium nationum, nos tamen etiam nomen accepimus tuum: iam non antiquum Bibracte, quod huc usque dictum est Julia, Pola, Florentia, sed Flavia est civitas Aeduorum* (. . . *tuum iam non antiquum. Bibracte quidem huc usque dicta est Julia; Pola, Florentia; sed Flavia est civitas Aeduorum.*) Belley's argument will be best given in his own words—"L'adverbe *jam*," he says, "d'un membre répond aux adverbes *huc usque* de l'autre. Ces adverbes affectent une même ville, qui jusqu'alors, *huc usque*, a porté un nom, et qui vient d'en prendre un autre, *accepimus tuum jam*. Or, c'est la ville d'Autun . . . qui vient de prendre le nom de *Flavia*; c'est donc la même ville qui avoit porté le nom de *Julia* jusqu'alors, *huc usque*; et cette ville est *Bibracte*, *Bibracte quidem huc usque dicta est Julia*." The abbé de Longuerue had maintained that Bibracte had been called Julia, but that the *civitas Aeduorum*, which was indisputably Augustodunum, was called Flavia. But Belley was ready with an answer. "Afin," he says, "que le raisonnement fût concluant, il faudroit que *Civitas Aeduorum* eut eu le surnom de *Flavia*, pendant que

<sup>1</sup> *Patrologiæ cursus completus*, ed. J. P. Migne, t. cxxiv., p. 1150, vv. 33 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *XII Panegyrici Latini*, recensuit A. Baehrens, 1874.

*Bibracte* avoit celui de *Julia*: or *Civitas Aeduorum* n'a commencé à prendre le nom de *Flavia*, que lorsque *Bibracte* a quitté celui de *Julia*: ce sont les propres termes d'Eumène."

M. Roidot points out in reply, that, among the names which *Bibracte* had borne, the Panegyrist did not mention *Augustodunum*, which he surely would have done if *Augustodunum* had been identical with *Bibracte*.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Freeman<sup>2</sup> says, "The plain meaning is 'Bibracte may be Julia, like Pola . . . Florence, and many other places'"; and, he argues, "*Bibracte*, otherwise *Julia*, is opposed to *Augustodunum*, otherwise *Flavia*; and the city of the Aeduans is declared to be not *Julia* but *Flavia*." Desjardins,<sup>3</sup> on the other hand, holds that the Panegyrist did identify *Augustodunum* with *Bibracte*: but his conviction that *Bibracte* was on Mont Beuvray remains unshaken. We must conclude, he says, that the name *Bibracte* was transferred from the old to the new town, and remained, for a time, in popular use. For myself, although I agree with Mr. Freeman,<sup>4</sup> I doubt whether the words of the Panegyrist will ever be decisively explained; and the problem which we are investigating must be solved by other methods.

II. The champions of Beuvray affirm (1) that that mountain has, from time immemorial, been regarded with veneration throughout the country once inhabited by the Aedui; and (2) that tradition, embodied in charters of the twelfth century, assigned the name of *Bibracte* to the plateau of Beuvray.

These two arguments will be taken for what they are worth. Tradition, or what is called tradition, embodied in the statement of Hericus, assigned the name of *Bibracte* to *Augustodunum*.

3. There is, it is maintained, an analogy between the names "*Bibracte*" and "*Beuvray*."

To this argument the philologists of the other side reply that the French termination *ay* of proper names is generally derived from *acum*. Thus "*Cambray*" comes from *Camaracum*; "*Tournay*" from *Turnacum*; and "*Bavay*" from *Bagacum*. *Bib* (*Bibracte*) cannot, they say, have become *Beu* (*Beuvray*); for the modern *eu* generally comes from *ou* or *ol*.

M. A. Longnon, on the other hand, endeavours to prove that "*Beuvray*" is the form which would naturally have been evolved from *Bibracte*. Taking the letters of the word *Bibracte* one after another, he says that *i* would have become *e* in French, and that *e*, in many French geographical names, has been changed into *eu*: and he cites the derivation of "*beuvrage*,"—the form current in the fourteenth century,—

<sup>1</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. éduenne*, i., 1872, p. 276.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. Essays*, 4th ser., p. 97, note.

<sup>3</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii., 609, n. 2.

<sup>4</sup> M. Bulliot's remarks are to this point. "Si *Bibracte* . . . eût continué de vivre sous le nom d'*Augustodunum*, Eumène n'eût pas pu dire qu'elle n'était pas *Flavia*, puisqu'elles eussent été une seule et même ville . . . pas plus qu'il ne serait permis de dire sans absurdité, topographiquement, ce n'est donc pas Lutèce, mais Paris qui est la capitale de la France . . . comme *Augustodunum* n'avait nullement pris la place de *Bibracte*, Eumène . . . met en opposition avec la ville romaine . . . l'antique chef-lieu gaulois, l'illustration de la *civitas* des Éduens," etc. *Mém. de la Soc. éduenne*, xx., 1892, pp. 323-4.

from *biberaticum*. *b* medial, following a vowel, is generally, in French, changed into *v*: thus "avoir," "devoir," "livre" and "ivoire" come from *habeo*, *debeo*, *liber* and *ebur*. *r* would have remained unchanged. So would *a*, witness "an" (*annus*), "cheval" (*caballus*), "haut" (*altus*) etc. *c*, in the combination *ct*, generally becomes *i* in French; thus we have "fait" (*factum*) and "nuit" (*noct-em*). *t*, standing between a consonant and a vowel, remains. *e* final is dropped, in virtue of the law by which all post-tonic vowels except *a*, which becomes *e* mute, are dropped in French. Consequently, the preceding *t* would have become mute, and was therefore likely to disappear. Thus, M. Longnon concludes, "Bibracte a dû devenir en français *Bevrait*, puis *Beuvrait* ou *Buvrait* et enfin *Beuvrai*"; and he shows that the form *Buvrait* occurred in 1233 and 1333, and *Bevray* in 1524.<sup>1</sup>

4. No Roman coins have been found on Beuvray of a later date than 5 B.C., except in the temple.<sup>2</sup>

5. Augustodunum was, at the commencement of the imperial era, a new town; for the antiquities that have been discovered at Autun are much more Roman in character than those discovered on Mont Beuvray.<sup>3</sup>

6. Excavations have demonstrated that Augustodunum was built with perfect regularity. The plan was the work of a single mind, executed "sans entraves ni gênes d'aucune sorte résultant de la présence de monuments antérieurs."<sup>4</sup> If Bibracte had pre-existed on the same site, its old buildings would, M. Bulliot argues, have obstructed the architect and forced him to deviate from his plan. "Tous les débris," he says, "sont romaines; pas un indice qui puisse se rattacher à l'époque des Celtes."<sup>5</sup> Again, the walls of Augustodunum, as they existed in the time of Julian, were either the Roman walls, the ruins of which M. Roidot examined; or, if they were Gallic, those Roman walls were built at some later period. Now there are the strongest reasons for accepting the former alternative. First of all, as the Roman builders undoubtedly demolished every vestige of Bibracte, if it really pre-existed on the site in question, before building Augustodunum, it is probable that they would have demolished its walls also, and built new ones. Secondly, the ruins of the walls of Augustodunum examined by M. Roidot differed essentially from the ruins of Gallo-Roman walls belonging to

<sup>1</sup> *Congrès scientifique de France*, t. ii., 1876 (1878), pp. 18-22.

<sup>2</sup> According to de Saulcy (*Journal des Savants*, 1880, p. 627), none of the coins discovered on Mont Beuvray belonged to a period later than the reign of Augustus. Coins belonging to later periods have been found there, but only in the ruins of the temple which M. Bulliot discovered, and which he believes to have been erected in the reign of Augustus, by an act of Imperial favour. *Mém. de la Soc. éduenne*, nouv. sér., t. ii., 1873, pp. 164-5, 170; t. iv., 1875, p. 120. In a recent article (*Ib.*, xx., 1892, p. 348) M. Bulliot says that none of the coins found in the ruins of the houses were struck later than 11 B.C. See also *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, vii., 1896, p. 597.

<sup>3</sup> Napoleon III., misled by a supposed discovery of M. Garenne, stated (*Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 67, n. 2) that a theatre had been revealed by the excavations on Mont Beuvray: but M. Bulliot (*Mém. de la Soc. éduenne*, x., 1881, p. 76) corrects this mistake.

<sup>4</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. éduenne*, i., 1872, p. 356.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, p. 367.

the fourth century. Thirdly, the masons who built the walls which M. Roidot describes made no use of the material which they would have had ready to their hands, and would certainly have used, if they had been replacing an old construction by a new one.<sup>1</sup> "Pas une pierre de cette gigantesque bâtisse," says M. Roidot,<sup>2</sup> "n'a porté témoignage, depuis qu'elle est elle-même en ruines, d'un emploi antérieur." Fourthly, the string-course of bricks which is found in the civil buildings of the time of Constantine, is not found in the walls of Augustodunum.<sup>3</sup> On this point the testimony of Freeman, supporting as it does that of M. Roidot, will carry great weight; for his knowledge of architecture was hardly less than his knowledge of history, and he made a thorough examination of Autun. "The walls of Autun," he says, "are emphatically the walls of Augustus. . . . No layers of bricks . . . disturb the uniformity of their stone construction."<sup>4</sup> Lastly, the Panegyrist makes no mention of walls in his enumeration of the buildings which Constantius restored.

7. Every scholar is familiar with the law of nomenclature by which, in the Gallo-Roman period, the chief Gallic towns took the names of the tribes to which they belonged, from which, in turn, their modern names have been derived. Thus *Lutetia* became *Parisii* (Paris): *Avaricum* became *Bituriges* (Bourges): *Agedincum* became *Senones* (Sens); and so on. *Augustodunum* was an exception; and Freeman infers that it was not Bibracte. "Augustodunum," he says, "was not a Gaulish hill-fort . . . gradually growing into a Roman town; it was a new city on a new site, deliberately laid out from the beginning on a great scale . . . it was the head of the Aedui but it was not the old head of the Aedui; it was not the traditional spot to which the tribe name would traditionally cleave. . . . The Flavia of Eumenius is quite distinct from the Julia of Eumenius; in other words Augustodunum is not Bibracte."<sup>5</sup>

III. The author of the article *Glux* in the *Dictionnaire archéologique de la Gaule*<sup>6</sup> proposes a compromise. He considers it hard to believe that Caesar and his legion would have spent eighteen days of the winter of 52-51 B.C. on a mountain 2000 feet above the level of the sea. He therefore suggests that a town, to which he gives the name of "Bibracte d'en bas," afterwards called *Augustodunum*, may have been founded shortly before the arrival of Caesar in Gaul; that the town on Mont Beuvray, the old Bibracte,—or, as he calls it, "Bibracte d'en haut,"—may then have been, in part, abandoned; that the new one may have been the *oppidum Aeduarum longe maximum et copiosissimum*; and that Caesar may have passed the winter of 52-51 B.C. there.

This compromise is as unsatisfactory as the similar suggestion of Desjardins, that there were two Cenabums, or rather one Cenabum and one Genabum;<sup>7</sup> and moreover it is demolished by the arguments which M. Roidot advanced to prove that Augustodunum was the creation not of Gallic but of Roman architects. According to M. Bulliot, the

<sup>1</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. étienne*, i., 1872, pp. 311-13, 315.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, p. 316.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, p. 317.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. Essays*, 4th ser., p. 113.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 103-5.

<sup>6</sup> i. 449-51.

<sup>7</sup> See pp. 414-15.

climate in winter on the southern slope of the mountain is comparatively mild.<sup>1</sup>

IV. I have now put the case fairly before the reader. There is no evidence that any town existed, in the pre-Roman period, upon the site of Augustodunum; and MM. Roidot and Bulliot have proved that Augustodunum was built upon virgin soil. On the other hand, it has been proved, and is universally admitted, that a great Aeduan town, which was a seat of manufactures and a busy centre of commerce, stood upon Mont Beuvray. That that town was Bibracte is proved not only by its unquestioned importance and by the survival of its name, but also by the certainty that it was abandoned early in the imperial era, and succeeded by the neighbouring and newly-founded town of Augustodunum.

**Bibrax.**—Bibrax was 8 Roman miles from the camp which Caesar made in 57 B.C., immediately after crossing the Aisne, and was situated on or near the road by which the Belgæ advanced against him.<sup>2</sup> Many places have been proposed for the site;<sup>3</sup> but, as Caesar crossed the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac,<sup>4</sup> there are only two which answer sufficiently to his description to call for discussion. They are Beaurieux and Vieux-Laon.<sup>5</sup>

1. Von Gölér<sup>6</sup> pronounced for Beaurieux, which is about 8 Roman miles west of the hill of Mauchamp, where Caesar pitched his camp, and about 2 miles north of the Aisne. General Creuly<sup>7</sup> objects that Beaurieux was so situated that it could have been entirely surrounded by the Belgæ; and that the relieving force sent by Caesar would therefore have been useless. Von Gölér assumes, however, that Bibrax extended southward as far as the right bank of the Aisne; and his son argues that this assumption explains the fact that Caesar's light-armed troops were able to relieve Bibrax (by crossing the river) although it was blockaded by the Belgæ. But von Gölér's assumption compels us to assign an unduly large space to the Gallic town. Moreover, Beaurieux was not on the road by which the Belgæ marched against Caesar, unless they came from Soissons; and, as I show on pp. 644-5, this is most improbable.

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. des questions hist.*, ii., 1867, pp. 376-83.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 6, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> See *Bull. de la Soc. acad. de Laon*, xix., 1869-70, pp. 265-76.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 645-52, *infra*.

<sup>5</sup> See Caignart de Sauley, *Les Campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, 1862, p. 110. D'Anville indeed, who believed that Caesar crossed the Aisne at Pontavert, decided for Bièvre, "qui conserve évidemment le nom de Bibrax" (*Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 159-60). But the hill of Bièvre is scarped on every side, except the north, which would have prevented the Belgæ from attacking it in the way which Caesar describes (*B. G.*, ii. 6, §§ 2-3); and it is almost 16 kilometres, or about 11 Roman miles, from the Aisne. Therefore, if it was the site of Bibrax, Caesar's camp must have been on the heights of Craonne; and this, as I show on p. 649, is impossible. Moreover, Caesar did not cross the Aisne at Pontavert. See de Sauley, p. 120, and von Gölér, *Gall. Krieg*, p. 67, n. 1 and p. 272.

<sup>6</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 67.

<sup>7</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. vii., 1863, pp. 299-300.

2. Napoleon<sup>1</sup> adopted the plateau of Vieux-Laon, which Thillois<sup>2</sup> and de Saulcy<sup>3</sup> had selected before him. A little to the south of this plateau and dominated by it, is the village of Berriex, or, as it was once called, Bébriex.<sup>4</sup> It has been conjectured that in the fifth century a town which stood upon the plateau was abandoned by its inhabitants, who took up their abode upon the hill of Laon; that they in turn built a settlement upon the site of Berriex; and that they gave to this settlement the name of Bibrax, their abandoned home.<sup>5</sup> Anyhow, it is certain that the hill of Laon was once called Bibrax:<sup>6</sup> it is certain that Laon is much too far from the Aisne to have been the Bibrax of the *Commentaries*: it is therefore probable that the name *Bibrax* was given to it because the inhabitants of the Bibrax of the *Commentaries* had migrated to it: this probability is increased by the fact that the entrenchments of St-Thomas, which stood on the hill of Vieux Laon, were called in the charter of the abbey of St-Vincent, in 1213, *Vetus Landunum*; <sup>7</sup> and it is a reasonable conjecture that the Bibrax of the *Commentaries* stood on or close to the hill which is now called Vieux Laon.

This hill is at the right distance from Caesar's camp at Mauchamp; and, as the French Commission<sup>8</sup> point out, it commands the two routes, leading respectively from Vermand and Bavay to Reims, by one or the other of which the Belgæ must have marched to Berry-au-Bac. Moreover, Napoleon<sup>9</sup> observes that Vieux Laon was, on its southern side, unassailable by the Gallic method of assault;<sup>10</sup> and he argues that the Belgæ, with the carelessness of a half barbarous people, would have neglected to invest it on that side. But, objects Long,<sup>11</sup> Napoleon assumes "that Caesar's light troops entered Bibrax, which is not distinctly stated by Caesar." This is true: but, if the light troops did not actually enter Bibrax, it is probable that they were prepared to do so.<sup>12</sup>

M. Lefevre, who identifies Bibrax with Corbeny, objects to Vieux Laon on the ground that the Belgæ could not have hurled their missiles from all points surrounding the camp of St-Thomas.<sup>13</sup> I attach no

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 101.

<sup>2</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. acad. de Laon*, xix., 1869-70, pp. 263-76.

<sup>3</sup> *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, p. 1103.

<sup>4</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. acad. de Laon*, xix., 1869-70, pp. 273-4.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>6</sup> See *Acta Sanctorum*, June 20, — *Landunum montem qui antiquo nomine Bibrax nuncupabatur*. M. Wanters does not believe that Laon was ever called Bibrax, because he considers it unlikely that one place should have had two Gallic names, — *Bibrax* and *Landunum*, — at the same time. *Bull. de l'Acad. Roy. de Bruxelles*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. i., 1881, p. 367. But the evidence is against M. Wanters: it is not certain that the names *Bibrax* and *Landunum* were applied to Laon at the same time; and M. Wanters might have remembered that the Saône was called by two Gallic names, *Sarconna* and *Avar*. Ammianus Marcellinus, xv. 11, § 17.

<sup>7</sup> A. Piette, *Itinéraires gallo-romains dans le dép' de l'Aisne*, 1856-62, pp. 263-4.

<sup>8</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 158.

<sup>9</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 101, n. 1.

<sup>10</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 6, §§ 2-3.

<sup>11</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 48, n. 2.

<sup>12</sup> See p. 229, n. 1, *supra*.

<sup>13</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. acad. de Laon*, xiii., 1863, pp. 187-9.

weight to this objection. Caesar does not expressly say that the Belgæ assailed Bibrax from *every* side: he only says that the Gauls generally attacked towns by throwing missiles at their defenders from every side (*undique*); and he often uses words like *undique* loosely. Moreover, it is doubtful whether, if the Belgæ had been able to assail Bibrax from *every* side, his light-armed troops could have relieved the garrison. Anyhow, Corbeny, which is only 5 Roman miles from Caesar's camp, cannot be identified with Bibrax.

**Biducasii.**—The Biducasii are mentioned only by Ptolemy,<sup>1</sup> who places them between the Unelli and the Osismii; and they are identified by d'Anville<sup>2</sup> and Desjardins<sup>3</sup> with the Viducasses. If they are right, Ptolemy made a mistake; for the Viducasses were on the south-east of the Unelli. Walckenaer<sup>4</sup> differs from d'Anville. Remarking that Ptolemy observed geographical order in enumerating the states of Gaul, he concludes that the Biducasii occupied the diocese of St-Brieuc. Quoting P. de la Force's *Description de la France*, 3rd ed., 1754, viii. 412, he remarks that St-Brieuc itself was formerly called Bidué. It is true that Ptolemy intended to observe geographical order: but he made mistakes; and there is no doubt that his Biducasii are the same people as the Viducasses. For the chief town of the Biducasii, Aregenna, the Araçenne of the *Table*, was Vieux, which is on the river Orne, in the country of the Viducasses; and, as Desjardins remarks, the Greek form of *Viducasses* would have been Βιδουκασίοι or Οιδουκασίοι, both of which are found in MSS. of Ptolemy.<sup>5</sup>

**Bigerriones.**—The Bigerriones, whose name is preserved in Bigorre, occupied the diocese of Tarbes, or, roughly speaking, the department of Hautes-Pyrénées.<sup>6</sup>

**Bituriges.**—The Bituriges Cubi occupied the diocese of Bourges, which included the departments of Cher and Indre and the north-western part of the department of Allier.<sup>7</sup>

The Bituriges Vivisci, who are not mentioned by Caesar, occupied the diocese of Bordeaux, that is to say, the greater part of the department of Gironde.<sup>8</sup> See SANTONES.

**Boii.**—See GORGOBINA.

**Brannovices.**—See AULERCI.

**Bratuspantium.**—Bratuspantium cannot be identified with certainty. Caesar mentions the town once only;<sup>9</sup> and no other ancient writer mentions it at all. Caesar merely says that it was a stronghold of the Bellovaci, who surrendered it to him in 57 B.C., when he was marching from Noviodunum (Suessionum) into the country of the Ambiani, whose chief town was Samarobriua, or Amiens.

<sup>1</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 8, §§ 2, 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 701-2.

<sup>3</sup> *Geogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i. 338, n. 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Geogr. des Gaules*, ii. 253-5.

<sup>5</sup> See C. Muller's ed., 1889, p. 209.

<sup>6</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 160.

<sup>7</sup> D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 162.

<sup>8</sup> See d'Anville, p. 163, and *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 165.

<sup>9</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 13, § 2.

Napoleon,<sup>1</sup> following the Abbé Devic,<sup>2</sup> adopts a site, close to Breteuil, which, he remarks, is just 25 miles,—the distance, he says, mentioned by the *Commentaries*,—from Amiens. What there is to be said for this site is that it is on the Roman road from Soissons to Amiens; that the ground is suitable for a stronghold; and that in the neighbouring valley of Vandeuil a few Gallic and numerous Gallo-Roman antiquities have been found.<sup>3</sup> But when Napoleon said that 25 miles was the distance from Bratuspantium to Samarobriua, “mentioned by the *Commentaries*,” he must have been dreaming; for the *Commentaries* do not mention the distance at all. Walckenaer<sup>4</sup> considers it unlikely that the chief *oppidum* of the Bellovaci should have been situated, like Breteuil, close to their frontier, instead of in the heart of their territory: but this objection is not conclusive. It used to be asserted that Breteuil itself, or the neighbourhood of Breteuil, had, from time immemorial, been called Bratuspance:<sup>5</sup> but that argument has long been abandoned, even by the advocates of Breteuil. “From time immemorial,” in questions of this kind, generally means from the time when some forgotten antiquary started a theory which grew into a pseudo-tradition; and, as Walckenaer observes, if Breteuil was ever called Bratuspance, it probably began to be so called in 1574, when a certain curé of Breteuil reported to the prince of Condé in favour of the probable identity of Breteuil with Bratuspantium. Neither in the archives of the parish to which Breteuil belongs nor in those of any of the neighbouring parishes is there any evidence that Breteuil was ever called Bratuspance before that time.

2. Another conjecture is that of Perrot d’Abancourt, who published a translation of the *Commentaries* in 1652. He placed Bratuspantium at Gratepanse, a hamlet about 5 miles east of Montdidier.<sup>6</sup> Gratepanse was in the canton of Maignelay, and must not be confounded with Gratepanche in the diocese of Amiens, with which Bratuspantium has also been absurdly identified.<sup>7</sup> The hamlet has disappeared, but was still standing at the beginning of this century. In support of this conjecture, it has been said that between the words *Bratuspantium* and “Gratepanse” there is a resemblance; that the hill upon which Gratepanse stood was suitable for a Gallic stronghold; that various roads met at the hamlet, from which it might be inferred that the place had once been an important centre; that, in 1687, the remains of massive walls were discovered there; and that since then Roman coins have been found.<sup>8</sup> But it is needless to say that all these facts taken together do not amount to anything like proof. Besides, the hill on

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 106, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Dissertation sur Bratuspantium*, 1833.

<sup>3</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 193.

<sup>4</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, p. 427-8.

<sup>5</sup> L. d’Allonville, *Dissertation sur les camps romains du dépt de la Somme*, 1828, p. 155.

<sup>6</sup> V. de Beauvillé, *Hist. de la Ville de Montdidier*. 1857 (2nd ed., 1875), i. 23-5.

<sup>7</sup> *Comptes rendus et mém. du comité arch. de Noyon*, 1862, pp. 198-9.

<sup>8</sup> De Beauvillé, i. 23-5; *Comptes rendus et mém. du com. arch. de Noyon*, i., 1862, p. 200.



which the hamlet stood is only about 600 metres long and between 400 and 500 broad; and this is too small to have been the site of an important *oppidum* like Bratuspantium. M. L. Caudet<sup>1</sup> argues further that Gratepanse is on the road by which Caesar must have marched for Samarobriva: but it is impossible to say what road Caesar took.

3. De Valois<sup>2</sup> identified Bratuspantium with Beauvais. The only evidence for Beauvais is that on its site stood Caesaromagus, which was the Gallo-Roman capital of the Bellovaci; and de Valois assumed that the Gallo-Roman capital was built upon the site of the Gallic *oppidum*. Possibly it was: but there is not a shadow of proof. According to the French Commission,<sup>3</sup> it has been proved that no Gallic town existed where Beauvais now is. At all events, the site of Beauvais does not satisfy the requirements of a Gallic stronghold;<sup>4</sup> and, as Caesar says that the Bellovaci had taken refuge in Bratuspantium,<sup>5</sup> it was probably a strong place.

4. Von Goler decides for Montdidier, which is about 12 miles, in a direct line, east of Breteuil: and his son, endorsing his decision, says that Montdidier was the place selected for the camp of Crassus in the winter of 54-53 B.C.<sup>6</sup> But there is not a tittle of evidence that Crassus was ever at Montdidier; and even if he was, that is no reason for inferring that Montdidier was the site of Bratuspantium. In fact there is nothing to be said for Montdidier, except that it was situated on or near the route which it may be conjectured that Caesar took.<sup>7</sup>

The reader now knows all that can be known about the site of Bratuspantium,—that is nothing: but he also knows why nothing can be known; and that is something gained. There is, I admit, more to be said for the site near Breteuil than for any other site which has been suggested: but if Bratuspantium is to be marked upon the map at that point, it should be with a note of interrogation.

**Cadurci.**—The Cadurci were dependents of the Arverni;<sup>8</sup> and their territory corresponded with a part at least of the diocese of Cahors, in other words of the department of Lot.<sup>9</sup> Caesar mentions them three times;<sup>10</sup> and in the last passage he uses the term *Eleutheri* (or, according to the MSS., *Eleuteti*) *Cadurci*. Napoleon,<sup>11</sup> apparently assuming that the name *Eleutheri* is a latinised form of ἐλευθεροί, conjectures that *Eleutheri* Cadurci means “the independent Cadurci”; that the Eleutheri Cadurci occupied the northern part of the whole territory of the Cadurci; and that the southern part was, even in Caesar’s time, under the dominion of Rome. This conjecture is simply a bad guess. If the southern part of the territory of the Cadurci had been under the dominion of Rome, it would have necessarily formed a part of the Province; and when Caesar was writing of the danger that was likely

<sup>1</sup> *Comptes rendus et mém. du com. arch. de Sens*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. iv., 1878, p. 26.

<sup>2</sup> *Notitia Galliarum*, p. 113.

<sup>3</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 193.

<sup>4</sup> Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 451.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 13, § 2.

<sup>6</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 73, n. 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Comptes rendus et mém. du com. arch. de Sens*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. iv., 1878, p. 19.

<sup>8</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 75, § 3.

<sup>9</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 215.

<sup>10</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 4, § 6, 64, § 6, 75, § 3.

<sup>11</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 24, n. 2.

to threaten the Province if the Helvetii were allowed to settle in the country of the Santones,<sup>1</sup> he would have given additional point to his statement by saying that the country of the Santones was not far from the country of the Cadurci, instead of saying that it was not far from the country of the Tolosates; for the country of the Cadurci was nearer than the country of the Tolosates to the country of the Santones. Walckenaer<sup>2</sup> and Schneider<sup>3</sup> hold that there was a people called Eleutheri,<sup>4</sup> or, as Schneider spells the name, Eleuteri, who were distinct from the Cadurci. Long<sup>5</sup> suggests that *Eleutheri*, like *Aulerci*, was a generic name: but if so, why was it not applied by any ancient writer to any other people besides the Cadurci? I believe that if Caesar wrote *Eleuteti* or any such name, the Eleuteti were distinct from the Cadurci.<sup>6</sup> Gluck,<sup>7</sup> following F. A. Ukert,<sup>8</sup> proposes to read *Helviis* instead of *Eleutetis*: but Heller<sup>9</sup> rightly objects that the Helvii, as far as we can judge, rendered no assistance to Vercingetorix, whereas the Eleuteti appear among the peoples who sent contingents to his relief. The Helvii, indeed, just before the blockade of Alesia, had taken an active part against Vercingetorix.<sup>10</sup>

**Caeroesi.**—The Caeroesi, the Condrusi, the Paemani and the Segni are mentioned by no ancient writer except Caesar. He groups the Condrusi with the Eburones, the Caeroesi and the Paemani: he implies that the Eburones and the Condrusi were conterminous; and he says that the Segni and the Condrusi were between the Eburones and the Treveri.<sup>11</sup> From these statements, supplemented by a comparison of the names of the several tribes with modern local names, attempts have been made to determine their respective territories.

1. Sanson<sup>12</sup> is inclined to place the Caeroesi either in the neighbourhood of a village called Siré, not far from Liège, or in the neighbourhood of Bouillon, near the river Chiers, which enters the Meuse between Meuzon and Sedan. M. Wauters,<sup>13</sup> arguing that their powerful neighbours, the Treveri, would have kept the best parts of the country for themselves, and driven them into the mountainous regions of the Ardennes, assigns them a tract north of Trèves, on the banks of the Prum, which was called in the eighth century *pagus Caros* or *Carascus*; and this view is adopted by the French Commission.<sup>14</sup>

2. The Condrusi were placed by d'Anville<sup>15</sup> in a district which, in

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 10, §§ 1-2.

<sup>2</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 351.

<sup>3</sup> *Caesar*, ii. 582.

<sup>4</sup> N. L. Achaintre (*Caesar*, i. 377) objects to the reading *Eleutheri*, on the ground that it is a Greek, not a Gallic name.

<sup>5</sup> *Caesar*, p. 393.

<sup>6</sup> Two of the  $\beta$  MSS. have *helutetis et cadurcis* (*B. G.*, vii. 75, § 2). See Meusel's *Caesar*, p. 206.

<sup>7</sup> *Die bei C. J. Caesar vorkommenden keltischen Namen*, 1857, pp. 111-12.

<sup>8</sup> *Geographie der Griechen und Römer*, 1816-46, ii. 2, 265.

<sup>9</sup> *Philologus*, xvii., 1861, p. 282.

<sup>10</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 64, § 6, 65, § 2.

<sup>11</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 4, § 10; iv. 6, § 4, vi. 32, § 1.

<sup>12</sup> *Les Comm. de César*, 3rd ed., 1658, p. 25.

<sup>13</sup> *Bull. de l'Acad. Roy. de Bruxelles*, xiii., 1862, p. 393.

<sup>14</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 217.

<sup>15</sup> *Notice*, etc., p. 240.

the ninth century, was called Condrustum ; and this identification is generally accepted. Their name is still preserved in Condroz, a tract which extends along the eastern bank of the Meuse, between Liège and Dinant, Namur and Huy.

Cluver<sup>1</sup> insists that the rout of the Usipetes and Tencteri must have taken place in the country of the Condrusi, because Caesar says that the Usipetes and Tencteri had reached their territory and that of the Eburones when he began his march against them : he places the scene of the rout near Coblenz ; and accordingly he assigns the Condrusi the country on the left bank of the Rhine from its confluence with the Moselle northward as far as the mouth of the Sieg. This argument is worthless ; for Caesar does not imply that the rout of the Usipetes and Tencteri took place in the country of the Condrusi. Besides, on Cluver's theory, their rout took place both in the territory of the Eburones and in that of the Condrusi ! Finally, when Caesar crossed the Rhine for the second time, if not for the first, he started, not from the territory of the Condrusi but from the territory of the Treveri ;<sup>2</sup> and he certainly crossed between the mouth of the Moselle and the mouth of the Sieg.<sup>3</sup>

3. The Paemani are placed, unanimously I believe, in the Pays de Famenne, a district which appears to retain their name, and also adjoins Condroz, the assumed territory of the Condrusi.<sup>4</sup>

4. The name of the Segni is believed to be preserved in that of Sine or Signi, a town in the county of Namur, near Condroz.<sup>5</sup>

**Caletes.**—The Caletes occupied that part of the diocese of Rouen which did not belong to the Velicasses ; and their territory included the Pay de Caux (*pagus Caletus*), or the western and central portion of the department of Seine-Inférieure. Their precise limits, however, cannot be traced. D'Anville gives them, besides the archdeaconries of Grand Caux and Petit Caux, a part of the archdeaconry of Rouen, because, he says, their chief town, Juliobona (Lillebonne), was situated in the archdeaconry. But, according to the French Commission, Lillebonne is in the archdeaconry of Grand Caux. Longnon adds to the archdeaconries of Grand Caux and Petit Caux the archdeaconry of Eu.<sup>6</sup>

**Carnutes.**—The Carnutes possessed the dioceses of Chartres, Orléans and Blois, or the greater part of the departments of Eure-et-Loire, Loiret and Loire-et-Cher. The diocese of Blois was formerly incorporated in that of Orléans.<sup>7</sup>

**Caturiges.**—Caesar mentions the Caturiges once only. He says that they, as well as the Ceutrones and the Graioceli, occupied the heights when he was crossing the Alps in 58 B.C., on his way from

<sup>1</sup> *Germania antiqua*, 1st ed., lib. ii., p. 172.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 9, § 5.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 694-7.

<sup>4</sup> D'Anville, pp. 511-12 ; Walckenaer, i. 508.

<sup>5</sup> See d'Anville, p. 591, and generally, on the position of all four tribes, K. Müllenhoff's *Deutsche Alterthumskunde*, ii. 196-7.

<sup>6</sup> D'Anville, pp. 192-3 ; Walckenaer, i. 434-5 ; *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 219 ; A. Longnon, *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 5. Eu is just in the territory which d'Anville's map assigns to the Caleti.

<sup>7</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 232.

Cisalpine to Transalpine Gaul, and that they attacked him. The route which he followed led over Mont Genève.<sup>1</sup>

Ptolemy<sup>2</sup> mentions only one of the towns of the Caturiges,—Ebrodunum, or Embrun; and he places them erroneously in the Graian, instead of the Cottian Alps.<sup>3</sup> Embrun, however, according to Strabo,<sup>4</sup> was either in the country of the Vocontii or just on their western frontier. Another town belonging to the Caturiges, namely Caturigae, or Caturigomagus, mentioned in the itineraries, has been identified with Chorges. If it belonged, in Caesar's time, to the Caturiges, Ebrodunum, as a glance at the map will show, almost certainly belonged to them too. Walckenaer<sup>5</sup> believes that their territory extended westward of Vapincum, or Gap, to a place called Fines, a name which, in Gallo-Roman geography, always marked a boundary. This place is identified by the measurements in the *Itinerary of Jerusalem* with Blaynie-Sept-Fons. The French Commission, however, do not believe that Vapincum belonged to the Caturiges. They prefer to assign it to the Vocontii (*q.v.*) or one of the small neighbouring tribes which they regard as their dependents, on the ground that it has never belonged to the same ecclesiastical province as Embrun. Fines, on their theory, marked the frontier, not of the Caturiges, but of the small tribe to which, they assume, Vapincum originally belonged. Besides, they argue, there is no ground for assuming that the diocese of Gap was split into two parts, one of which, on the west of Fines, belonged to the Vocontii, and the other, on the east, to the Caturiges: yet, if Fines marked the western boundary of the Caturiges, this assumption is necessary. Vapincum is not mentioned by any authority earlier than the itineraries of Antonine and Jerusalem: but Desjardins<sup>6</sup> holds with good reason that it belonged to a small tribe called the Avantici; for, as he observes, the name of this people is preserved in Avançon and St-Étienne d'Avançon,—the names of two communes in the neighbourhood; and accordingly he believes that Fines marked the western boundary of the Avantici. But the question remains whether the Avantici were a *pagus* or a dependent tribe of the Caturiges or of the Vocontii.

D'Anville<sup>7</sup> believes that Brigantio, or Briançon, which Ptolemy<sup>8</sup> assigns to the Segusiani, really belonged to the Caturiges, as it lay outside the natural limits of the Segusiani, whose other town was Segusio (Susa); and Long and the French Commission are inclined to agree with him: but Walckenaer maintains that Ptolemy was right, because, in his opinion, Ptolemy used, in preparing his book, a description of Italy written before the new divisions were made by Augustus. This is not a convincing argument; and whoever reads Caesar's notice of the Caturiges side by side with a good map<sup>9</sup> will agree with me that Brigantio must have belonged to that tribe.

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 10, §§ 3-4. See pp. 432-3, 609.

<sup>2</sup> *Geogr.*, iii. 1, § 35.

<sup>3</sup> See d'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 216, and *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 240.

<sup>4</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 1, § 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 541.

<sup>6</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 228.

<sup>7</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 174.

<sup>8</sup> *Geogr.*, iii. 1, § 36.

<sup>9</sup> I recommend Sheet 60 of the *Carte de France* (1 : 200,000).

Evidently it is impossible to trace with certainty the frontiers of the Caturiges ; and all that can be said is that, in Caesar's time, they occupied the valley of the upper Durance.<sup>1</sup> But I can see no reason for denying that they possessed both Embrun and Chorges. Maissiat,<sup>2</sup> relying on the authority of Strabo, who places the Caturiges between the Salassi and the Lepontii, denies that the Caturiges of Caesar were the same people as the Caturiges who dwelt in the valley of the Durance. But every one, except Maissiat, admits that Strabo was wrong ; and Maissiat was forced to adopt this eccentric theory in order to maintain the absurd view that Caesar, before entering the country of the Segusiavi, crossed the Rhone at the Perte du Rhône. See CEUTRONES and GRAIOCELL.

**Cenabum.**—Where was Cenabum ? This is one of the most vexed questions of Gallic geography ; and it has been a vexed question for centuries. Napoleon identifies Cenabum, or, as he calls it, Genabum,<sup>3</sup> with Gien. Mr. Froude, it is needless to say, follows Napoleon : so does Colonel Dodge ; and so do some of the modern English editors.<sup>4</sup> But I suspect that they all follow blindly ; and they certainly follow a blind guide. Most of them seem to fancy that Napoleon has made a new discovery ; whereas the truth is that many antiquaries had argued for Gien, or rather Gien-le-Vieux, which is about two kilometres, or a mile and a quarter, north-west of Gien, before Napoleon, and had argued much more forcibly than he. The tradition which identified Cenabum with Orléans appears to have been unbroken until, in the sixteenth century, some citizen of Gien endeavoured to make out a claim on behalf of his own town. Early in the eighteenth century, the famous Abbé Lebeuf attempted to sustain this claim : but, after Lancelot and Belley had refuted his arguments, he virtually recanted his error. The authority of Belley was practically unquestioned for more than a century. But while Napoleon was collecting the materials for his work, MM. Bréan and Petit renewed the battle on behalf of Gien, or rather Gien-le-Vieux. Their arguments were criticised with relentless acumen by a commission, appointed by the Société archéologique de l'Orléanais to consider the question : but meanwhile the Emperor's book appeared ; and his verdict was given for Gien. Besides Mr. Froude and the other writers to whom I have alluded, Desjardins, Colonel Stoffel and Alfred Holder,<sup>5</sup>—scholars whose opinion has weight,—agree with Napoleon. The literature of the subject is very bulky. I have worked through it all, totally indifferent to the result to which my researches might lead me ; and I undertake to prove to demonstration that Cenabum stood, not upon the site of Gien, nor upon the site of Gien-le-Vieux, but upon the site of Orléans.

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps Desjardins is right in affirming that, in Caesar's time, "ils s'étendaient aussi sur le versant oriental des Alpes, dans la vallée supérieure de la Dura" (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i. 84-5).

<sup>2</sup> *Jules César en Gaule*, i. 49-50, 53-6.

<sup>3</sup> The right form is *Cenabum*. See p. 815.

<sup>4</sup> For instance, Mr. W. C. Compton, in *Caesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul*, an edition which has been enthusiastically praised by the late Headmaster of Harrow.

<sup>5</sup> *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, i. 979. This work is still in progress.

I. First of all, let us hear Caesar. He says that Cenabum belonged to the Carnutes, and that a number of Roman traders had settled there. The town was on the right bank of the Loire, and about 160 Roman miles from some point in the territory of the Arverni. It was seized by Carnutian rebels in the early part of 52 B.C.; and they massacred the traders. A few weeks later Caesar marched with eight legions from Agedincum (Sens) *ad Boios*, that is to say, for the country of the Boii, intending to relieve their town, Gorgobina, which was besieged by Vercingetorix. Caesar left his heavy baggage at Sens, and directed the Aedui and the Boii to keep him supplied with corn. On the day after his departure from Sens, he reached Vellaunodunum, a town belonging to the Senones, and captured it on the third day following. From Vellaunodunum he marched to Cenabum, and arrived there on the evening of the following day: but, as it was late, he was obliged to postpone the work of preparing for the siege. He implies that he marched from Vellaunodunum to Cenabum as quickly as possible. Expecting that the inhabitants would try to escape in the night by a bridge over the Loire, he kept two legions under arms. He says distinctly that the bridge was in actual contact with the town.<sup>1</sup> About midnight he learned from his scouts that the inhabitants were trying to escape. He accordingly fired the gates, and sent the two legions into the town; and, as the fugitives were checked by the narrowness of the streets and bridge, they were nearly all captured. After this Caesar crossed the bridge, and made his way into the country of the Bituriges.

Hirtius says that when Caesar marched, in the winter of 52-51 B.C., to punish the Carnutes for having attacked the Bituriges, he quartered some of his troops in the houses of the Gauls; from which statement it is clear that some, at all events, of the houses were still standing. Hirtius adds that, after this expedition, Caesar left two legions at Cenabum, evidently to keep the Carnutes in awe.<sup>2</sup>

II. I will make one observation to clear the ground. It has been proved, so conclusively as to win the assent of Napoleon himself, that there was, on the site of Orléans, a Gallo-Roman, if not a Gallic town, called Cenabum. The proof is furnished by the testimony of ancient and mediæval writers, by the itineraries, by an inscription which was discovered in 1846 in the Faubourg St-Vincent at Orléans, and by the

<sup>1</sup> I assume, with all the best modern editors, except Nipperdey, that in the passage *oppidum Cenabum pons fluminis Ligeris continebat*, Caesar wrote *continebat*, which is the reading of the  $\beta$  MSS., not *continuebat*, which is found in the  $\alpha$  MSS. Schneider (ii. 359) demonstrates that *continuebat* is wrong. It has been defended on the assumption that *Cenabum* consisted of two parts, one on the right, the other on the left bank of the river, which the bridge joined (*continuebat*). But Caesar's narrative shows that *Cenabum* was situated entirely on the right bank. Vossius, who accepts the reading *continuebat*, explains that the bridge "linked the town to the opposite bank of the river" (*urbem adversus fluminis ripæ adiungit, aut quasi unum cum illa continentem facit*), an explanation which, as Schneider shows, introduces ambiguity and obscurity into Caesar's text. Anyhow, if the town had been only near the bridge and not in actual contact with it, Caesar could have barred the inhabitants from all access to the bridge. See von Goler's *Gall. Krieg*, p. 239, n. 5.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 3, 10, §§ 3-4, 11; viii. 5, § 2, 6, § 1.

discovery of Gallic and Gallo-Roman coins. I shall briefly re-state the proofs, because to the editors and historians who identify Cenabum with Gien they are evidently unknown; because, even on the continent, some writers have tried to explain them away; and because they have never been collected in one publication.

1. General Creuly,<sup>1</sup> points out that, if Cenabum was Orléans, the error in Ptolemy's estimate<sup>2</sup> of the longitude of Cenabum was only 1' or about 1375 yards; whereas, if Cenabum was Gien, the error amounts to 45' or 35 miles. Similarly Ptolemy's estimate of the latitude of Cenabum, compared with that of Autricum (Chartres), contains an error of only 3' or about three miles and a half if Cenabum was Orléans, but of 16' or about 18 miles if Cenabum was Gien.

2. According to the *Itinerary of Antonine*<sup>3</sup> and the *Table of Peutinger*,<sup>4</sup> the distance from Brivodurum (Briare) to Cenabum was 38 Gallic leagues; and this is the distance from Briare to Orléans. But the distance from Briare to Gien is only four.<sup>5</sup>

The distance from Cenabum to Agedincum, according to the *Table*,<sup>6</sup> is 59 Gallic leagues, or 131 kilometres nearly. According to Cassini,<sup>7</sup> the distance from Sens to Orléans is 69,000 toises, or about 60 Gallic leagues.<sup>8</sup>

It has been proved by an inscription discovered in 1865 at Mesves that the Gallo-Roman town of Masava stood upon the site of Mesves.<sup>9</sup> From Masava to Cenabum, according to the *Table*,<sup>10</sup> is 53 Gallic leagues, or nearly 118 kilometres. From Mesves to Orléans is 127 kilometres. But from Mesves to Gien is only 65. Moreover, it is probable that, if we had the original MS. of the *Table*, we should find that it is almost perfectly accurate. From Masava to Brivodurum (Briare), which was between Masava and Cenabum, the distance, according to the *Table*, is XVI Gallic leagues. Now copyists often wrote V in mistake for X; and Desjardins believes that the compiler of the *Table* wrote not XVI but XXI, which is virtually equivalent to the actual distance between Mesves and Briare.

According to the *Itinerary of Antonine*,<sup>11</sup> the distance from Lutetia (Paris) to Cenabum is 48 Gallic leagues; according to the *Table*,<sup>12</sup> 47. The actual distance is 104½ kilometres, or 47 Gallic leagues.<sup>13</sup> On the

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, p. 391. I freely admit that this argument, if it stood alone, would be worth very little.

<sup>2</sup> *Geogr.* ii. 8, § 10. <sup>3</sup> Ed. Wesseling, p. 267. <sup>4</sup> Ed. Desjardins, p. 34, col. 1.

<sup>5</sup> D'Anville, *Éclaircissements sur l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 180.

<sup>6</sup> Ed. Desjardins, p. 26, cols. 2-3.

<sup>7</sup> See J. B. P. Jollois, *Mém. sur les antiquités du dépt du Loiret*, 1836, p. 14.

<sup>8</sup> As the exact direction of the route mentioned in the *Table* is uncertain, it is impossible to say whether, assuming the identity of Cenabum and Orléans, the distance given in the *Table* is exactly correct. But this does not matter. For on the assumption that Cenabum is identical with Gien, it is admitted that the distance given in the *Table* is far in excess of the truth.

<sup>9</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. arch. de l'Orléanais*, xi., 1868, pp. 234-73 and especially 260-5.

<sup>10</sup> Ed. Desjardins, pp. 33, col. 3, 34, col. 1.

<sup>11</sup> Ed. Wesseling, pp. 367-8.

<sup>12</sup> Ed. Desjardins, p. 24, col. 3.

<sup>13</sup> One Gallic league was equivalent to 2222 metres, or, according to d'Anville's estimate, 1133½ toises. 48 Gallic leagues,—the distance, according to the *Itinerary*,

other hand, the distance from Paris to Gien, *as the crow flies*, is over 130 kilometres.

The identity of Tours with Caesarodunum is undisputed and indisputable. From Caesarodunum to Cenabum the distance, according to the *Table*,<sup>1</sup> was 51 Gallic leagues, or  $113\frac{1}{2}$  kilometres; and that is the exact distance, by the same route, from Tours to Orléans. From Tours to Gien, on the other hand, the distance is equivalent to 70 Gallic leagues.<sup>2</sup>

J. Lebeuf argues that, as the *Itinerary of Antonine*, in the state in which it has come down to us, dates from a period later than that of Constantine, Cenabum ought, if it had been Orléans, to have been called in the *Itinerary* "Aureliani,"—the name by which Orléans was called after the Emperor Aurelian.<sup>3</sup> But, at the time when the *Itinerary* was compiled, most of the towns of Gaul had two names,—the old Gallic name and the name of the people in whose territory the town was situated;<sup>4</sup> and in the *Itinerary* the old Gallic names were generally used. Thus we find *Samurobriva*, not *Ambiani*, *Agedincum*, not *Senones*, etc.

3. The chief towns of the Carnutes were Autricum and Cenabum. Their territory embraced the dioceses of Chartres and Orléans. It is not disputed that Chartres is identical with Autricum. The logical conclusion, says General Creuly,<sup>5</sup> is that Orléans is identical with Cenabum.

4. Aimoin, who flourished in the tenth century, spoke of "Gennabus, ubi nunc Aurelianus."<sup>6</sup> The monk Hugo, writing in 1109, spoke of "Gennabus, quae et Aurelianus."<sup>7</sup> Aegidius Parisinus, in a work dated 1198, wrote

from Cenabum to Lutetia,—were, on d'Anville's estimate, equivalent to 54,396 toises. The actual distance, according to Cassini, is 57,900 toises (J. B. P. Jollois, *Mém. sur les antiquités du dépt du Loiret*, pp. 62-3). The slight discrepancy between this result and Desjardins's estimate, which makes the measurement given in the *Table* absolutely correct, may be accounted for by Cassini's having measured from points in Paris and Orléans different from those between which Desjardins's measurement was taken. Moreover, a toise being equivalent to 6·39459 feet, d'Anville's estimate of the Gallic league,—about 2209 metres,—was rather too low. Anyhow, the discrepancy is of no real importance: for the road mentioned in the *Itinerary* and the *Table* ran through Salioclitia (Saclas); and the distance from Gien to Saclas is nearly double the distance from Orléans to the same place.

<sup>1</sup> Ed. Desjardins, p. 26, col. 3.

<sup>2</sup> D'Anville, *Éclaircissements sur l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 180.

<sup>3</sup> Lebeuf (*Recueil de divers écrits pour servir d'éclaircissements à l'hist. de France*, t. ii., 1738, pp. 225-8), who, like Napoleon, tries in vain to prove that the Cenabum of the *Commentaries*, which he identifies with Gien-le-Vieux, was different from the Cenabum of the itineraries, insists that the latter stood upon the site of Chenon, near Château-Landon. In order to make good this astounding identification, he asserts that, according to the *Itinerary of Antonine*, the distance from Cenabum to Lutetia was only "48 mille pas," that is to say Roman miles. It is hardly necessary to say that the distance in the *Itinerary* was reckoned in Gallic leagues. See pp. 332-3, and d'Anville's *Eclaircissements*, etc., pp. 181-2. Various other arguments of Lebeuf, which are not worth mention, are demolished by Belley in the last-named work.

<sup>4</sup> See d'Anville, *Eclaircissements*, etc., pp. 185-8.

<sup>5</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, p. 391.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist. Franc. scriptores*, ed. F. Duchesne, t. iii., p. 5 A.

<sup>7</sup> A. de Valois, *Notitia Galliarum*, p. 226.



"urbem, cui Genabus olim  
Nomen erat, noto quod deinde recessit ab usu,  
Diversumque illi nunc Aurelianis habetur."<sup>1</sup>

5. In 1846 a marble slab was discovered in the Faubourg St-Vincent at Orléans, bearing an inscription, which was deciphered in 1865 by M. de Piriac :—

L. CornELIVS MAGnus  
atePOMARI fil  
civIS SENONIus  
cuR CENAB  
viVOS SIBI.

Which, being interpreted, runs as follows :—

L. Cornelius Magnus  
son of Atepomarus,  
a Senonian citizen,  
curator (or minister of finances) at Cenabum,  
(erected this monument) to himself  
in his own life-time.

He had been summoned, as Desjardins explains, from the neighbouring country of the Senones, to put the finances of Cenabum in order.<sup>2</sup>

6. Antiquities have been discovered at Orléans, which attest the presence of Romans during the first and second centuries.<sup>3</sup> They include coins of Augustus, Tiberius, Trajan, Antonine, Marcus Aurelius and Constantine.<sup>4</sup> More important still, 332 Gallic coins have been discovered in the Loire at Orléans, no less than 267 of which belonged to the Carnutes.<sup>5</sup>

It is certain, then, that, at all events in the Gallo-Roman period, there was a town called Cenabum on the site of Orléans. But while admitting this, Napoleon, Colonel Stoffel, Desjardins and others deny that this town was the Cenabum captured by Caesar.

III. 1. Napoleon bases his first argument on <sup>his</sup> hypothesis, which he believes himself to have proved, that the site of Gorgobina is St-Parize-le-Châtel, near the confluence of the Allier and the Loire. He cannot believe that Caesar, marching from Sens to relieve Gorgobina, would have gone so far out of his way, even in order to attack a rebellious town, as the site of the modern Orléans, the route by which is nearly 60 miles longer than the route by Gien.<sup>6</sup>

Now it is not proved that Gorgobina was at St-Parize-le-Châtel : but wherever it was, if Caesar marched by way of Orléans, he certainly went out of his way in order to reach it.<sup>7</sup> But there is no reason why Caesar, even though his ultimate object was to relieve Gorgobina, should

<sup>1</sup> A. de Valois, *Notitia Galliarum*, p. 226.

<sup>2</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 477, n. 1 : *Bull. de la Soc. de géogr.*, 5<sup>e</sup> sér.,\*t. xi., 1866, pp. 503-8 ; *Mém. de l'Acad. des insér.*, xxvi., 1867, pp. 119-36. The inscription is referred by experts to the period of Augustus.

<sup>3</sup> Jollois, *Mém. sur les antiquités du dépt du Loiret*, 1836, pp. 88-92, 94.

<sup>4</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. arch. de l'Orléanais*, xviii., 1884, pp. 172-5.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, xv., 1876, pp. 115, 123-5, 133-47.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii., 247, n. 1 (and following pages).

<sup>7</sup> See pp. 430-31.

not have gone some distance out of his way in order to capture a town so important as Cenabum. Since I wrote the foregoing sentence, I have found that Belley enforces the same argument. "S'il avoit une ville alliée," he writes, "à secourir, il devoit avant tout venger la majesté du nom Romain violé par le massacre de Genabum : c'étoit l'unique moyen de conserver les peuples qui restoient encore fidèles."<sup>1</sup> Besides, how can we tell that, to the east of Orléans, any bridge spanned the Loire in that part of its course which crossed Caesar's line of march? Or, if there were bridges, how can we tell that Vercingetorix had not destroyed them?<sup>2</sup>

2. Secondly, says Napoleon, the distance from Cenabum to the country of the Arverni was, according to Caesar, 160 Roman miles. Assuming that Caesar is alluding to Gergovia, the capital of the Arverni, Napoleon points out that this distance corresponds exactly with the distance from Gergovia to Gien; whereas the distance from Gergovia to Orléans is nearly 40 miles more.

This argument has no weight; for how can we be sure that Caesar's estimate of the distance was strictly correct, or that when he spoke of the distance from Cenabum to the territory of the Arverni, he meant the distance from Cenabum to Gergovia?

3. Thirdly, Napoleon says that, after crossing the Loire at Cenabum, Caesar found himself in the country of the Bituriges. This, he remarks, is true if he crossed at Gien, but false if he crossed at Orléans.

This argument is worthless. Caesar does *not* say that, after crossing the Loire, he found himself in the country of the Bituriges. On the contrary, he implies that he did not. He simply says that "he led his army across the Loire, and made his way into the country of the Bituriges" (*exercitum Ligerim traducit atque in Biturigum fines pervenit*)<sup>3</sup> Napoleon does not know the meaning of the word *pervenit*.<sup>4</sup>

4. Fourthly, argues Napoleon, the site of Orléans, not being a hill, fails to answer the requirements of a Gallic *oppidum*.

The answer is that even of the Gallic *oppida* which were intended as cities of refuge, many, such as Avaricum, were not built upon hills;

<sup>1</sup> *Éclaircissements sur l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 212.

<sup>2</sup> See *B. G.*, vii. 34, § 3.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 11, § 9.

<sup>4</sup> I have not the slightest doubt that every competent scholar will agree with me that Caesar meant that, after he had crossed the Loire, he had some distance, great or small, to travel before he could reach the frontier of the Bituriges. There is a passage in *B. G.*, i. 11, § 1, which is almost exactly parallel with the one which I am discussing. I print the two side by side:—

*Helvetii iam per angustias et fines exercitum Ligerim traducit atque in Sequanorum suas copias traducebant Biturigum fines pervenit.*  
*et in Aeduum fines pervenerunt.*

Now Napoleon ought, if he were consistent, to hold that the moment after the Helvetii stepped across the Sequanian frontier they were in Aeduan territory. But, as a matter of fact, he holds rightly that, before they reached Aeduan territory, they crossed the territory of the Transrhodane Allobroges and the territory of the Ambarri. Petit (*Dissertation sur Genabum-Gien*, etc., 1863, p. 39) asserts that if Caesar had not stepped off the bridge on to the territory of the Bituriges, he would have written *not atque but deinde in Biturigum fines pervenit*: but the passages which I have quoted answer this futile argument.

and that we may gather from Caesar's narrative and from Strabo<sup>1</sup> that Cenabum was rather a trading town than a stronghold, and was not strongly placed. If it had been, would the Carnutes have run away from it without making the slightest attempt to stand a siege?

5. Finally, Napoleon gets over the difficulty presented by the discovery of the inscription at Orléans, by assuming that, after the destruction of Genabum, its surviving inhabitants built a new town on the site of Orléans, and called it by the name of the old one.

In reply to this conjecture, I have only to say that there is not a particle of evidence for it.

6. Adrewald, a monk of the abbey of St-Benoist, who wrote in the ninth century, says that "almost the whole of Neustria, extending from the town of Genabum as far as Lutetia, was a prey to the ferocity of the Normans" (*omnis fere Neustria, quae a Genabensi urbe per transversum Lutetiam usque Parisiorum pertingit oppidum; Normannicae patuit feritati*).<sup>2</sup> Afterwards, says Lebeuf,<sup>3</sup> Adrewald proceeds to narrate how the Normans plundered Orléans, "qu'il nomme toujours Aureliani," and then the abbey of St-Benoist. He could not have meant Orléans by *Genabensis urbs* unless he intended to exclude the abbey from the territory which was ravaged: yet he expressly states that the abbey was situated within this territory, although it is 8 leagues east of Orléans. Therefore *Genabensis urbs* must have been Gien.

If I understand this argument aright, Lebeuf means that the Normans did not plunder the abbey of St-Benoist in the course of the raid which they made from *Genabensis urbs* to Lutetia; that they would have done so if the abbey had been between those two places; and therefore that, as the abbey was between Orléans and Lutetia, *Genabensis urbs* was not Orléans. Now even if Adrewald's chronicle proves that Cenabum was not Orléans, it does not prove that it was Gien. But it does not prove that Cenabum was not Orléans. What Adrewald says is simply this. The Normans plundered the whole country between *Genabensis urbs* and Lutetia. Not long afterwards they sailed up the Loire from Tours and captured Orléans, and, in a second onslaught, plundered and burned it (*haud longo post, superiora Ligeris amnis navibus, Aurelianis perveniunt: captamque urbem auro distrahant . . . secundo adventu praedictam civitatem combustione dissipant*). "Meanwhile," says the writer, a page or two further on, "the Normans, as we have said above, made a second attack upon Orléans and burned it; and some of them made for the abbey of St-Benoist (*interea Normanni, ut supra paucis praelibavimus, secunda irruptione Aurelianis aggressi, urbem combustione concremant: parsque illorum . . . Monasterium Sancti Patris Benedicti expetunt, quod ab urbe Aurelianensi decem et octo distat millibus*).<sup>4</sup> Now first of all, it does not follow from the fact that the Normans plundered the whole country between *Genabensis urbs* and Lutetia that they attacked every single

<sup>1</sup> Strabo (iv. 2, § 3) calls Cenabum the emporium of the Carnutes.

<sup>2</sup> F. Duchesne, *Hist. Franc. script.*, iii. 446 B.

<sup>3</sup> *Recueil de divers écrits pour servir d'éclaircissements à l'hist. de France*, t. ii. 1738, pp. 232-3.

<sup>4</sup> Duchesne, iii. 446 C, 447 A.

place between the two: secondly, when Lebeuf says that Adrewald *always* called Orléans *Aureliani*, he is begging the question; and thirdly, it is clear from Adrewald's narrative that the Normans who sailed up the Loire from Tours to Orléans were a different band from those who plundered the country between *Genabensis urbs* and *Lutetia*.<sup>1</sup>

7. If, says Bréan,<sup>2</sup> Cenabum was at Orléans, Caesar, after leaving Cenabum, must have had the infuriated Carnutes on his rear, the Bituriges on his right, and Vercingetorix in his front. He could not have recrossed the Loire, and he was too far from the Aedui to get supplies. The least check, therefore, must have been disastrous to him.

It is amazing that Bréan does not see that every one of his arguments recoils against himself. Let the reader look at his map. He will then see that, if Cenabum was at Gien or at Gien-le-Vieux, Caesar, after leaving Cenabum, would also have had the infuriated Carnutes on his rear, the Bituriges on his right, and Vercingetorix in his front. If he could not have recrossed the Loire in the one case, neither could he have recrossed it in the other; and as for supplies, when he marched to Avaricum, he was necessarily at a considerable distance from the Aedui. But of course the dangers which M. Bréan conjures up were no more than the risks which every invader must face. "The infuriated Carnutes" had been soundly thrashed, and were wise enough to keep their fury bottled up: the Bituriges, who, wherever Cenabum may have been, were on Caesar's right, aye and on every side of him, took good care to keep out of his way; and Vercingetorix, as soon as he ventured a battle, was beaten. Caesar was actually, as he tells us,<sup>3</sup> obliged to do without the supplies which he expected from the Aedui: yet he survived the deprivation.

8. One question remains. Would Caesar have been able to march from Sens to Orléans in the time which he says that it took him to march from Agedincum to Cenabum?<sup>4</sup> The distance from Sens to Orléans was, by the road mentioned in the *Table*,<sup>5</sup> 88½ Roman miles, or 131 kilometres: by the other Roman road, which, according to Napoleon,<sup>6</sup> can never have been a Gallic road, 108 kilometres. The time which he occupied on the march was four days. Admit, with Napoleon, that he must have gone by the longer road. We are then obliged to assume that he marched at the rate of 22 Roman miles a day. This is a high rate of marching.<sup>7</sup> But Caesar gives us to understand that he was doing his best; and it must be remembered that the army was encumbered by very little baggage. There is, however, no proof that the other Roman road was not made upon the line of a Gallic road. It is incredible, says M. Challe,<sup>8</sup> that there should not have been a Gallic road running in a direct line from the important town of Agedincum

<sup>1</sup> See also *Mém. de la Soc. arch. de l'Orléanaise*, ix., 1866, pp. 167-8.

<sup>2</sup> *Itinéraire de l'expédition de César d'Agedincum à Gergovia-Bonorum*, etc., 1865, pp. 3-4.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 17, §§ 2-3.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, vii. 10-11.

<sup>5</sup> *La Table de Peutinger*, ed. Desjardins, p. 26, cols. 2-3.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 249, note.

<sup>7</sup> See pp. 626-7.

<sup>8</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. des sciences hist.*, etc., de l'Yonne, xx., 1866, p. 142.

into the heart of the rich country of the Carnutes, and following almost the same direction as the Roman road which is still traceable between Sens and Beaune. M. de Monvel, indeed, and other opponents of Orléans deny that Caesar could have performed the journey, even by the shortest road, in four days. M. de Monvel says that, in the retreat of the Ten Thousand, the average daily march was, according to Xenophon, little more than 8 Roman miles a day; that Caesar took five days to march from Vichy, where, according to M. de Monvel, he crossed the Allier, to Gergovia, a distance of only 56 kilometres; and that in forced marches he accomplished 16 or at the outside 22 kilometres a day.<sup>1</sup>

Now there is no weakest link in this chain of reasoning; for the whole chain is equally rotten. There is no analogy between the long weary retreat of the Ten Thousand and the rapid march of four days only from Agedincum to Cenabum. There is no evidence that Caesar crossed the Allier at Vichy; if he did, he had no motive for hurrying on to Gergovia; and, as Napoleon has shown, he very likely made short marches on the first and the last day of the five.<sup>2</sup> It is beyond dispute that Caesar marched 25 Roman miles down and 25 Roman miles up the valley of the Allier in about 28 hours;<sup>3</sup> and practical soldiers like General Creuly, Colonel Stoffel and the Duc d'Aumale consider that he could easily have marched 27 kilometres, or 18 Roman miles a day for several days at a stretch. As a matter of fact, he marched from Corfinium to Brundisium, a distance of 465 kilometres, in 17 days, or at the rate of more than 27 kilometres a day.<sup>4</sup>

Thus every objection that has been brought against the view which identifies the Cenabum of the Gallo-Roman period with the Cenabum of Caesar falls to the ground. I proceed to examine the arguments that have been devised to prove that the Cenabum of Caesar stood on the site of Gien or of Gien-le-Vieux.

IV. 1: Five roads, we are told, meet at Gien-le-Vieux, namely from Sens (*Agedincum*), Autun (*Augustodunum*), Chartres (*Antricum*), Bourges (*Avaricum*) and Sancerre; and the supporters of Gien-le-Vieux labour to prove that these roads were Gallic. The so-called proof amounts to this,—that the road leading from Sens to Gien is called the “chemin perré”; that, as the number of French roads which are called by this name is very few, they were probably Gallic; and that the mode in which this particular “chemin perré” was constructed, as revealed by excavation, appears to show that it cannot be referred to any later period.<sup>5</sup> This “proof” is not very convincing;<sup>6</sup> but even if it could be accepted, it would only show that there was an important Gallic town at Gien-le-Vieux: it would not show that that town belonged to the Carnutes, still less that it was Cenabum.

<sup>1</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. d'Agriculture, etc., d'Orléans*, vii., 1863, pp. 51-5.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 267, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 40-41.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 626-7.

<sup>5</sup> Bréan, *Itinéraire*, etc., pp. 47-8; Petit, *Dissertation*, pp. 74-5.

<sup>6</sup> Gallic, as distinguished from Gallo-Roman roads, says Desjardins (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, iv. 160-61), have left no certain traces of their existence; for they were not constructed with the solidity of Roman roads.

2. According to Bréan,<sup>1</sup> an old bridge spanned the Loire opposite Gien-le-Vieux; and he infers that this was the very bridge by which Caesar crossed the Loire after capturing Cenabum. The "proofs" which he offers of the former existence of this bridge are, that various inhabitants of Gien and the neighbourhood told him that they had seen the ruined piles of the bridge in the bed of the river when the water was low, and that he had himself discovered a "massif" of stone close to Port Gallier (a quay on the southern bank), which had evidently formed a part of the bridge. Moreover, a number of antiquities, of which Bréan gives a list, were discovered at Gien-le-Vieux; and he affirms that among them were Gallic coins of a period anterior to the Roman conquest. Finally, on the spot to which Bréan points as the site of Cenabum, charred remains were discovered; and he maintains that they are a relic of the fire which Caesar kindled in 52 B.C.!

Now a commission was appointed by the Société archéologique de l'Orléanais to investigate the value of Bréan's discoveries; and the report of the commission is embodied in two papers published in volume ix. (1866) of the Society's Memoirs,—*Rapport sur les communications de M. Bréan* (pp. 234-52) by M. Marchand, and *Question de Genabum* (pp. 253-90) by M. Collin.<sup>2</sup> The certificates, written by inhabitants of Gien, which Bréan printed in support of his theory regarding the alleged bridge, are demolished by the evidence of their authors! No less than 2090 soundings, in which Bréan himself took part, were made in the bed of the Loire, with the object of discovering the alleged remains of the bridge: but all in vain.

Some years ago a coin of Pope Clement VIII. was discovered adhering to the masonry of the so-called bridge,—the "massif" to which Bréan pins his faith. It is almost certain that the coin could only have been left where it was found by the workmen who built the structure. If so, the structure itself cannot be assigned to any date earlier than the pontificate of Clement VIII.<sup>3</sup>

It has also been asserted by Marchand, representing the Commission, that all the objects in Bréan's cabinet that were discovered at Gien-le-Vieux, were Gallo-Roman, not Gallic;<sup>4</sup> and, according to the French Commission, no Gallic antiquities have been found either at Gien or at Gien-le-Vieux.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, I will assume that a Celtic *oppidum* did really exist upon the site in question. Still, it cannot be proved that that *oppidum* was Cenabum; and it can be proved that it was not. First of all, as to the charred remains:—the fact that coins of Tetricus (about A.D. 273) were found among them proves that the fire which we are asked to believe was kindled by Caesar, took place not less than three centuries after Caesar's death!<sup>6</sup> Secondly, the dimensions of the Gallo-Roman town, as far as they can be ascertained by the results of the

<sup>1</sup> *Itinéraire*, pp. 33-44.

<sup>2</sup> See also L. A. Marchand, *Hist. de la ville, des seigneurs et du comté de Gien*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>3</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. arch. de l'Orléanais*, ix., 1866, p. 290.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, p. 247.

<sup>5</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 446.

<sup>6</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. arch. de l'Orléanais*, ix., 1866, p. 247.

excavations, were far too small for an *oppidum* of the importance of Cenabum.<sup>1</sup> Now it is proved by Caesar's words,—*oppidum Cenabum pons fluminis Ligeris contingebat*,—that the town of Cenabum was in actual contact with the bridge over the Loire.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly the advocates of Gien-le-Vieux are compelled to assume that the small settlement which the excavations have revealed was only a minute fraction of the entire Cenabum, which must have extended right down to the bank of the Loire. But this imaginary Cenabum is as much too large as the other is too small. "La ville actuelle d'Orléans," says M. Marchand,<sup>3</sup> "tournerait à l'aise dans l'enceinte assignée à Gien-le-Vieux."

3. There are traces of a Roman camp in the wood "des Marceaux," near Gien-le-Vieux.

So says Bréan.<sup>4</sup> But, under the cold scrutiny of the commission, the "camp" turns out to be of quite modern construction, and to have been made for a very peaceful and even prosaic purpose. "Ces fossées," says Marchand, "ont été faites pour arrêter les moutons des Merceaux, et non les Carnutes de Gien-le-Vieux."<sup>5</sup> Readers of *The Antiquary* will remember the shrewd aside of Edie Ochiltree, as he listens to the old pedant dilating on the construction of the "camp" on the Kaim of Kinprunes:—"Prætorian here, Prætorian there! I mind the bigging o't."<sup>6</sup>

4. Gien contains a street called "à la Genabye," which leads not towards Orléans, but towards the higher part of the town itself.<sup>7</sup>

Now there is no evidence that the street in question was called by this name before the seventeenth century; and it is probable that, as A. de Valois says,<sup>8</sup> the name was given to it, from motives of local patriotism, in consequence of the theory that Gien was identical with Genabum. M. de Monvel indeed contends that the name of Genabie was of immemorial antiquity; for, he says, "le pouille de Gien que nous avons consulté, et dont les titres remontent à Charlemagne . . . écarte toute idée d'une fraude." This is a vague statement, and absolutely unsupported by any other advocate of the claims of Gien or of Gien-le-Vieux. I do not believe it. But, assuming it to be true, the fact that a street in Gien was called "Rue de la Genabie" would no

<sup>1</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. arch. de l'Orléanais*, ix., 1866, pp. 237-8.

<sup>2</sup> Petit, indeed (pp. 54-5) denies that the word *contingebat* proves this. It does not, he says, necessarily mean that the town actually touched the bridge, but only that it was near it. But this is sheer nonsense. The suggested interpretation emasculates the word *contingebat*; and it is, besides, nullified by the mere fact that if the town had not been in actual contact with the bridge, Caesar would have cut off the retreat of the townspeople by simply occupying the bridge-head, whereas his narrative plainly shows that he could not reach the bridge, owing to the barrier interposed by the town-wall, without first entering the town itself.

<sup>3</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. arch. de l'Orléanais*, ix., 1866, p. 245.

<sup>4</sup> *Itinéraire*, pp. 45-6.

<sup>5</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. arch. de l'Orléanais*, ix., 1866, p. 241.

<sup>6</sup> Abbotstford edition, p. 28.

<sup>7</sup> Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 250, note. De Monvel (*Mém. de la Soc. d'agriculture*, etc., d'Orléans, vii., 1863, p. 47) calls the street "rue de la Genabie."

<sup>8</sup> *Notitia Galliarum*, p. 226. Cf. *Mém. de la Soc. arch. de l'Orléanais*, ix., 1866, p. 168.

more prove that Gien,—still *les Gien-le-Vieux*,—was Cenabum, than the fact that a street in Hastings is called “London Road” proves that Hastings is London. Moreover, there is, or was in the time of Walckenaer<sup>1</sup> a faubourg in Orléans which was also called by the name of “Génabie.”

But, urges Petit,<sup>2</sup> there is also a street in Gien called “Rue de la Porte César.” No doubt! But what then? If Caesar had occupied or passed through all the places in France which bear his name, he would have been as active as the Wandering Jew. The *Porte César*, which was demolished about seventy years ago, was doubtless so called, like the *Rue de la Génabie*, from motives of misplaced local patriotism. Anyhow, it did not receive its name, because it did not exist, before the sixteenth century!

5. Colonel Stoffel<sup>3</sup> sees that Cenabum was not *Gien-le-Vieux*, because Cenabum must have touched the right bank of the Loire: but he maintains with Napoleon that Cenabum was “*le Gien actuel*”; and these are his reasons. Vellaunodunum, he says, was at Toucy. Caesar marched from Vellaunodunum to Cenabum in two days. “D’après cela, et en évaluant toujours les étapes à trente kilomètres . . . on est conduit à placer Genabum sur la Loire, à l’ouest et à soixante kilomètres de Toucy. Cette distance est exactement celle de Toucy à Gien. . . . Il en résulte que Genabum correspond à la ville actuelle de Gien.”

But, as I show elsewhere,<sup>4</sup> there is no proof, there is no evidence that Vellaunodunum was at Toucy; and if it was, the fact that Toucy is 60 kilometres from Gien proves absolutely nothing.

That, reader, is the case for Gien, and *Gien-le-Vieux*; and thus, at every point, it breaks down. I have proved that a Gallo-Roman town called Cenabum, in the country of the Carnutes, was at Orléans. I have refuted the theory that this Cenabum was different from the Genabum of Caesar. I have shown that there is no evidence for the theory that the Genabum of Caesar was at Gien or at *Gien-le-Vieux*. I shall now prove, by independent arguments, that it was not at either of those places.

V. 1. It is certain that, after the conquest, both *Gien* and *Gien-le-Vieux* were situated not in the territory of the Carnutes at all, but in that of the Senones, or possibly in that of the Aedui;<sup>5</sup> and, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it may be confidently affirmed that this statement is equally applicable to the time of Caesar. As this fact, if it is a fact, alone decides the whole question, a desperate effort has been made to disprove it. We may assume, say the advocates of Gien, that Caesar deprived the Carnutes of part of their territory as a punishment, and transferred it to the Senones; and this assumption would explain the fact that Gien belonged to the diocese of Auxerre.<sup>6</sup>

Yes, we may assume whatever we like: but assumption is not proof.

2. The argument from tradition against Gien is very strong.

<sup>1</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 401.

<sup>2</sup> *Guerre de César et d'Arrioviste*, pp. 149, 156.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 483.

<sup>4</sup> *Dissertation*, p. 48.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 508.

<sup>6</sup> See *Achaintre, Caesar*, iv. 264.



Although we have Latin documents, which relate to Gien, ranging from the sixth to the seventeenth century, Gien was never called either *Genabum* or *Cenabum* in any of them, except once by Séguier, bishop of Auxerre, who, in 1634, headed a certain document with the words *Datum Genabi*. This solitary exception proves no more than the bishop's private opinion. To quote a modern antiquary, "une tradition qui sommeille durant onze siècles n'a plus le droit de se réveiller."<sup>1</sup> And, asks Marchand,<sup>2</sup> if Gien was *Cenabum*, why did not St-Aunaire and St-Téatrice, bishops of Auxerre, call it so instead of *Gienmus*?

3. Hirtius says that, in the winter of 52-51 B.C., Caesar, after punishing the Carnutes for having attacked their neighbours the Bituriges, left Trebonius at *Cenabum* with two legions to overawe them.<sup>3</sup> Now, if *Cenabum* was at Gien-le-Vieux, even assuming that Gien-le-Vieux was in the country of the Carnutes, Trebonius was left on the extreme eastern limit of the Carnutian territory. But from such a position how would he have been able to keep the Carnutes in check, or to prevent them from making another raid across the frontier of the Bituriges? Surely Caesar would have had the common sense to assign him a more central position.

Every argument which tells against the identification of *Cenabum* with Gien-le-Vieux tells equally against the identification of *Cenabum* with Gien. Even if the narrative of Caesar did not make it clear that *Cenabum* was not a hill-fort, it would be impossible to identify the hill of Gien with the site of *Cenabum*: for the hill is too small; and the very name of Gien-le-Vieux tends to show that it is older than Gien.<sup>4</sup>

VI. Desjardins<sup>5</sup> proposes a compromise. *Genabum*, he says, is the reading of all the MSS. for the town which Caesar captured; whereas the town which stood upon the site of Orléans was *Cenabum*. Desjardins agrees with "Napoleon that Orléans was too far from Agedincum to have been the place captured by Caesar. He therefore suggests that the town plundered by the Carnutes was Orléans; and that *Genabum* was Gien.

If this theory had been propounded by any one of less eminence than the late French geographer, I should not notice it. I do not believe that any one of Caesar's readers during the last 2000 years, except Desjardins, ever dreamed of doubting that the *Genabum* of B. G., vii. 3 was identical with the *Genabum* of chapter 11.<sup>6</sup> Every scholar knows that *c* and *g* were often interchanged. The town of the Carnutes which Caesar captured was confessedly identical with the town of the Carnutes in which he encamped in the following year; and Hirtius calls that town *Cenabum*, which, as I show on page 815, is the right form. Desjardins would of course have maintained that Gien *must* have

<sup>1</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. arch. de l'Orléanais*, ix., 1866, pp. 161, 166.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, p. 250.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, viii. 6, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> See Bréan, *Itinéraire*, etc., pp. 19-25.

<sup>5</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 477, n. 1, 478, 480.

<sup>6</sup> In both passages the reading of the MSS. is not *Cenabum*, but *Genabum*.

been in the country of the Carnutes. Granted that it *may* have been, though the evidence is all the other way. Still, as Desjardins maintains that, besides Cenabum, there was a town called Genabum, on him lies the burden of proving that this assumed place was at Gien. But he has not attempted to do this. As I have shown, there is not a particle of evidence for the theory that either Gien or Gien-le-Vieux was ever called *Genabum*; and the argument which Desjardins bases upon the distance of Orléans from Sens I have already refuted.

To conclude. There is no evidence at all that Cenabum or Genabum,—call it which you will,—stood upon the site either of Gien or of Gien-le-Vieux; and there is conclusive evidence that it did not. That Cenabum stood where Orléans stands now is proved by evidence strong enough to convince Lord Justice Collins or Professor Huxley. It is proved by the evidence of Caesar and Hirtius, by the evidence of Ptolemy, by the evidence of the itineraries, by the evidence of a tradition which is at least as old as the ninth century, by the evidence of coins and other antiquities, by the evidence of the inscription of the Faubourg St-Vincent. The conclusion is not merely probable, but certain,—as certain as that Lutetia stood upon the island of Notre Dame, and Alesia upon Mont Auxois. It is the conclusion to which the most sagacious students of the *Commentaries* and the most eminent geographers and antiquaries in France, in Germany and in Great Britain have come. It is the conclusion to which diligent study has led the Commission de la carte des Gaules, the Académie des Inscriptions, the Comité des travaux historiques.<sup>1</sup> If Napoleon came to a different conclusion, it was because he allowed himself to be misled by writers whose local patriotism was stronger than their judgement. It is a pity that Colonel Stoffel, Mr. Froude, Desjardins and other writers of less distinction, should have helped to propagate the error which he revived.

**Cenomani.**—The Cenomani occupied that part of the diocese of Le Mans, which did not belong to the Diablintes (*q.v.*) and the Arvii: but the frontier can only be conjecturally traced. Their territory corresponded, roughly, with the department of Sarthe.<sup>2</sup>

**Centrones (or Ceutrones).** See NERVII.

**Ceutrones.**—The Ceutrones occupied the valley of Tarentaise and the adjoining mountains.<sup>3</sup>

**Cocosates.**—The Cocosates are mentioned by no ancient writer except Caesar<sup>4</sup> and Pliny,<sup>5</sup> neither of whom gives the slightest indication as to their geographical position. D'Anville<sup>6</sup> conjectures that *Coequosa*, for which he proposes to read *Cocosa*, a place mentioned in the *Itinerary of Antonine*, 16 Gallic leagues north of Dax, on the road to Bordeaux, was their capital; and his conjecture is adopted by Walckenaer, Long and Longnon. The French Commission,<sup>7</sup> by the process of exclusion, arrive

<sup>1</sup> See *Bull. de la Soc. arch. et hist. de l'Orléanais*, ix, 1887, p. 81.

<sup>2</sup> D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 138; *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 93.

<sup>3</sup> D'Anville, p. 221; Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i. 78.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 27, § 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 19 (33), § 108.

<sup>6</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 229.

<sup>7</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 295.

at a result substantially the same. After marking on the map all the peoples whose territories are approximately known, they find remaining for the Cocosates a strip of land in the department of Les Landes, between Castetz and Mimizan. If they are right, the Cocosates must have been dependents or a *pagus* of the Tarbelli<sup>1</sup> (*q.v.*).

**Condrusi.** See CAEROESI.

**Curiosolites.**—The neighbours of the Curiosolites were the Osismi on the west, the Veneti on the south and the Redones on the east. They dwelt in the country round Corseult, which preserves their name. D'Anville,<sup>2</sup> with whom Walckenaer<sup>3</sup> agrees, believes that their territory extended westward as far as the neighbourhood of St-Brieuc, where, he maintains, a place called Finiac as evidently marks an ancient frontier as Fins (*Fines*) in other parts of France. But the so-called "Finiac" is really Iffiniac; and the name has no etymological connexion with *Fines*. The French Commission<sup>4</sup> are inclined to believe that the diocese of Tréguier, or a part of it, as well as the dioceses of Aleth and Dol, belonged to the Curiosolites. With regard to the diocese of Aleth (which is identical with that of St-Malo) they have no doubt. The position of Aletum, or St-Servan, which commands the mouth of the Rance on its right bank, was, they argue, so important that the Curiosolites would not have allowed it to pass out of their hands. M. Kerviler,<sup>5</sup> on the other hand, insists that the Rance, being a natural frontier, must have separated them from the Redones. Certainly, the possession of Aletum would have been just as essential to the Redones as to the Curiosolites; and as the Redones were a maritime people,<sup>6</sup> and in any case only possessed a small seaboard, it seems likely that their territory extended westward as far as the Rance. If so, the Curiosolites did not occupy the diocese of Dol, or even the whole of that of Aleth. But it is impossible to define their frontiers with any approach to certainty. The geography of this part of Gaul, as d'Anville<sup>7</sup> observes, is most obscure. The number of dioceses greatly exceeds the number of states:<sup>8</sup> those who, like the French Commission, are guided by the indications of the dioceses, are obliged to admit that it is impossible to say with certainty whether the whole or only a part of the diocese of Tréguier belonged to the Curiosolites: the diocese of Rennes does not touch the sea, and yet Caesar says that the Redones were a maritime people; and finally M. J. Loth<sup>9</sup> has proved that of the dioceses in the Armorican peninsula only those of Vannes, Nantes and Rennes were Gallo-Roman; that all the rest were created by the invaders from Britain; and that when those invaders formed their dioceses, they took no account of the existing political divisions. On the south, it seems probable that the territory of the Curiosolites was limited by the natural barrier of the

<sup>1</sup> See Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 362-3 and 363, n. 14.

<sup>2</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 259.

<sup>3</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 381-2.

<sup>4</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 332.

<sup>5</sup> *Bull. arch. de l'Association bretonne*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. iv., 1885, pp. 225-8.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 34.

<sup>7</sup> *Notice*, p. 508.

<sup>8</sup> See *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. ix., 1864, p. 325.

<sup>9</sup> *L'émigration bretonne en Armorique*, 1883, pp. xxi., 50-51, 75-82.

Montagnes Noires, and the French Commission<sup>1</sup> hold that it extended eastward as far as Feins, which they identify with the *Fines*<sup>2</sup> of the Redones: but all that we can say with certainty is that it corresponded more or less closely with the department of Côtes-du-Nord.

II. Ptolemy<sup>3</sup> mentions a people called the Arvii ('Αρῳίοι). Desjardins<sup>4</sup> believes that they were identical with the Curiosolites, whom Ptolemy does not mention. In the environs of Corseult there were discovered in 1707 the remains of a temple, which is locally known, or was known as recently as 1849, as the Temple de Mars.<sup>5</sup> In the *Table*<sup>6</sup> is mentioned a place called *Fanum Martis*, the distance of which from Condate (Rennes) appears to identify its site with that of Corseult. Desjardins infers that the temple which I have just mentioned is that from which *Fanum Martis* took its name. He argues that 'Αρῳίοι is only another form of 'Αρῑοι (of or belonging to 'Αρῑς [Mars]); and that 'Αρῳίοι ought to be translated, not by *Arvii*, but, as it was translated in the fourth century, by *Martenses*.<sup>7</sup> This reasoning is accepted by M. Longnon.<sup>8</sup> To my mind it is unsatisfactory. Ptolemy places the Arvii between the Diablintes (*q.v.*) and the Veliocasses (*q.v.*). If he was right, it is evident that they lived far to the east of Corseult; and d'Anville<sup>9</sup> conjectures that they lived in the valley of the Arve or Erve, a tributary of the Sarthe.

On the other hand, the Commission<sup>10</sup> disbelieves in the existence of the 'Αρῳίοι, (1) because no ancient writer, except Ptolemy, mentions them; (2) because the name Arve, which has been supposed to be derived from their name, is common to numerous rivers; and (3) because the word 'Αρῳίοι is probably only another form of 'Ερσῳίοι (the Esvii of Caesar). None of these reasons, except the second, which I am unable to verify,<sup>11</sup> appears to me to have any weight. Several Gallic tribes, whose existence has never been disputed, are mentioned by only one ancient writer; and it is incredible that Ptolemy should have invented the name. The third reason is simply a bad guess.

III. According to M. A. Longnon,<sup>12</sup> with whom M. Kerviler formerly agreed, the Curiosolites disappeared, as an independent people, before the publication of the *Notitia provinciarum*, that is to say before the

<sup>1</sup> *Diet. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 399.

<sup>2</sup> *Itin. Ant.*, p. 387.

<sup>3</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 8, § 7.

<sup>4</sup> *Geogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i. 322-4; *Rev. arch.*, 1849, p. 228.

<sup>5</sup> A. de la Borderie, *Hist. de Bretagne*, i., 1896, p. 114. M. Burgault (*Bull. de la Soc. polytechn. de la Morbihan*, 1875, p. 72) denies that there is any proof that the debris exhumed in the neighbourhood of Corseult were those of a temple; and he adds triumphantly that, according to the *Itinerary of Antonine* (p. 387), *Fanum Martis* was in Gallia Belgica. A *Fanum Martis* certainly! But not the *Fanum Martis* of the *Table*. Were there not many Noviodunums in Gaul?

<sup>6</sup> *La Table de Peutinger*, ed. Desjardins, p. 28, col. 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Notitia dignitatum*, ed. E. Bocking, ii., 107\*, cap. xxxvi.

<sup>8</sup> *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 5.

<sup>9</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 105.

<sup>10</sup> *Diet. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 85.

<sup>11</sup> Only one "Arve" is mentioned in Cassell's *Universal Atlas*, which is the first English edition of Andree's.

<sup>12</sup> *Geogr. de la Gaule au I<sup>er</sup> siècle*, 1878, p. 316.

fifth century, and were absorbed by the Diablintes. Although I am not concerned directly with the state of Gaul after the time of Caesar, it is my business to examine the theory of M. Longnon, because he makes use of his conclusion to argue that the Diablintes, and not the Curiosolites, occupied the diocese of Aleth.

Certain MSS. of the *Notitia* have the form *Coriosolitum*, others *Corisopitum*; <sup>1</sup> and M. Longnon <sup>2</sup> maintains that the latter is the true reading, because it is found in a MS. of the sixth century, which is probably to be assigned to the year 570. Therefore, he concludes, the *Notitia* does not mention the Curiosolites at all.

Now, among the antiquities which were discovered at Corseult were a large number of Gothic coins; and from this fact M. A. de la Borderie <sup>3</sup> rightly concludes that the chief town of the Curiosolites was still flourishing in the sixth century. M. Kerviler, <sup>4</sup> however, while admitting that the discovery of these coins proves that Corseult was *inhabited* in the sixth century, denies that it proves that the Curiosolites then existed as an independent people. Moreover, the reading *Corisopitum* has still to be accounted for. M. A. de Courson <sup>5</sup> observes that, in examining one of Camden's maps of Britannia, he found the name *Corstopitum*, for which some MSS. read *Corisopito*. <sup>6</sup> He concludes that emigrants from this place founded Corisopitum, or Quimper, in Brittany. It is unlikely, says M. de la Borderie, <sup>7</sup> who agrees with this conclusion, that the Curiosolites existed, as an independent people, after the immigration from Britain in 514. Accordingly he pictures the copyist who transcribed the MS. of the *Notitia* mentioned by M. Longnon, saying to himself, as he read his original, “*Civitas Co-ri-o-so-li-tum*, qu'est-ce que cela peut être? Je n'ai jamais ouï ce nom-là.—Puis tout-à-coup il se frappe le front: ‘Ah! j'y suis, c'est en Bretagne, c'est un évêché breton, seulement ici ils se sont trompés d'une lettre.’”

M. de la Borderie's explanation may conceivably be right: but of course it is a mere guess; and there is no proof that Corisopitum was founded in the fifth century by British immigrants. The bishop of Quimper was, it is true, called *episcopus Corisopitrensis* in the eleventh century: but the earliest previous mention of the name *Corisopitum*, as applied to Quimper, was in the ninth century. The Breton name of this place in the fifth and the four following centuries was *Kemper*. <sup>8</sup> But it is unnecessary to have recourse to conjecture in order to refute M. Longnon; for, save the very doubtful evidence of the *Notitia*, there is absolutely no evidence that there were any Corisopites in Gaul either in Caesar's time or at the time when the *Notitia* first appeared. They are not mentioned by Caesar, by Strabo, by Ptolemy, by Pomponius

<sup>1</sup> *Coriosopotum*, according to M. Loth (*L'Émigration bretonne*, p. 57).

<sup>2</sup> *Mém. du Congrès scientifique de France*, 38<sup>e</sup> session, 1872, p. 397.

<sup>3</sup> *Géogr. gallo-rom. de l'Armorique*, 1881, pp. 17-19.

<sup>4</sup> *Bull. arch. de l'Association bretonne*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. i., 1881, p. 213.

<sup>5</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. de géogr.*, 4<sup>e</sup> sér., t. xx., 1860, pp. 264-5.

<sup>6</sup> See *Itin. Ant.*, p. 464.

<sup>7</sup> *Géogr. gallo-rom. de l'Armorique*, pp. 27-8.

<sup>8</sup> See E. Halléguen, *La Cornouaille et Corisopitum*, 1861, pp. 20, 26, 30, and J. Loth, *L'Émigration bretonne*, p. 59.

Mela or by any other ancient writer. The natural conclusion is that the reading *Corisopitum* (or rather, according to M. Loth, *Coriosopotum*) in one of the MSS. of the *Notitia* is a copyist's blunder.<sup>1</sup> "Ne lit-on pas aussi," asks M. Loth,<sup>2</sup> "immédiatement au-dessus *Nammîtum* pour *Namnetum*, dans ce manuscrit 12,097, qui semble un livre sacré pour certains érudits?"

**Diablintes.**—Caesar<sup>3</sup> mentions the Diablintes once only, among the allies whose services the Veneti enlisted in 56 B.C. Ptolemy<sup>4</sup> describes them thus:—ἐν δὲ τῇ μεσογείᾳ τῶν μὲν Οὐνετῶν εἰσὶν ἀνατολικώτεροι Αὐλῖρκιοι οἱ Διαβλίται, ὧν πόλις Νοιόδουνον. Νοιόδουνον is generally identified with the *Nu-Dionnum* of the Table,<sup>5</sup> which was situated on the road from Le Mans to Bayeux.

The foregoing evidence supports d'Anville's<sup>6</sup> theory that the Diablintes occupied the neighbourhood of Jublains,<sup>7</sup> near Mayenne, where the remains of a Gallo-Roman town have been discovered. Nor is this the only evidence. Long remarks that a document of the seventh century speaks of "condita Diablantica" as situated "in pago Cenomannico"; thus, says Long, "we obtain . . . an explanation of the fact of the name Aulerci being given in Ptolemy both to the Diablintes and Cenomani." "Another document," he observes, "of the seventh century speaks of 'oppidum Diablintes juxta ripam Araenae fluvioli'; and the Arena is recognised as the Aron, a branch of the Mayenne."<sup>8</sup>

The principal opponent of the received view is M. A. Longnon.<sup>9</sup> He admits that the ancient name of Jublains was Diablintes; but he will not allow that Diablintes was the chief town of the *civitas Diablintum*. It was simply, in his opinion, a colony founded by the Diablintes. He cites a case which he regards as parallel. Exmes, he says, the *pagus Orimensis*, in the diocese of Séez, doubtless owes its name to the Osismii. But nobody would contend that it was their capital; for it was not in their proper territory. It was probably only an Osismian colony. The territory of the Diablintes proper was in the neighbourhood of Aleth (St. Servan) between the territories of the Redones, the Veneti and the Curiosolites: Aleth is a contraction of Dialeth (*Dialetum*): and *Dialetum* was the capital of the Diablintes.

M. Longnon's arguments have been answered by the distinguished Breton antiquary, A. de la Borderie.<sup>10</sup> As he remarks, M. Longnon's theory rests upon the hypothesis that the Curiosolites disappeared as a *civitas*, before the publication of the *Notitia provinciarum*, that is to say before the fifth century, and that they were absorbed by the

<sup>1</sup> The MSS. of the *Notitia* offer many variants, e.g. *Consulitum*, *Conisolitum*, *Corosopitum*, *Consolitum*, *Corisolitum*, *Coriosolitum* and *Corisuletum*.

<sup>2</sup> *L'Émigration bretonne*, p. 57.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 9, § 10.

<sup>4</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 8, § 7.

<sup>5</sup> *La Table de Peutinger*, ed. Desjardins, p. 23, col. 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 266-7.

<sup>7</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 339-40.

<sup>8</sup> W. Smith, *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geogr.*, i. 772.

<sup>9</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule au VI<sup>e</sup> siècle*, 1878, p. 318.

<sup>10</sup> *Géogr. gallo-rom. de l'Armorique*.

Diablintes; and, as I have shown, this is a mistake. Nevertheless, I will examine M. Longnon's arguments.

1. The only passage in which Caesar mentions the Diablintes,—*socios sibi ad id bellum (Veneti) Osismos, Lexovios, Namnetes, Ambiliatos, Diablintes, Menapios adiscipunt; auxilium ex Britannia, quae contra eas regiones posita est, arcessunt*,<sup>1</sup>—proves, in M. Longnon's opinion,<sup>2</sup> that the Diablintes were a maritime people. M. de la Borderie<sup>3</sup> replies that the statement of Ptolemy, which I have quoted above, proves that the territory of the Diablintes was not maritime. It is true that Ptolemy is sometimes mistaken; and I do not think that his statement, taken by itself, amounts to proof. But it is supported by the fact, admitted by M. Longnon, that *some* Diablintes lived in Jublains and the neighbourhood. Moreover, Caesar's statement that Britain was opposite a number of states, of which the Diablintes were one, does not prove that the Diablintes actually possessed a seaboard. It has, indeed, been argued that the Diablintes must have been a maritime people because Caesar includes the Aulerci in his list of maritime peoples,<sup>4</sup> and none of the other known Aulerean peoples possessed a seaboard. But, assuming that Caesar did not make a slip, or did not carelessly include the Aulerci Diablintes, who were certainly *near* the sea, among the maritime tribes strictly so called, the Aulerci may have included other peoples besides the Cenomani, the Brannovices, the Ebuovices and the Diablintes: moreover, it was not Caesar but Ptolemy who included the Diablintes among the Aulerci. Again, in support of Ptolemy's statement, the French Commission<sup>5</sup> point out that, while Caesar twice enumerates the maritime (Armorican) states<sup>6</sup> he does not include the Diablintes among them. Finally, it is possible that the Diablintes, even if we place them next the Cenomani, may have possessed a strip of coast.

2. M. Longnon<sup>7</sup> maintains that if Jublains had been the chief town of the Diablintes, it would have been the see of a bishop. But M. de la Borderie replies that it is unreasonable to assume that because, as a general rule, Gallo-Roman states became dioceses, they did so without exception.<sup>8</sup>

3. M. Longnon quotes a passage from the *Acta Sanctorum* (October, t. vii., pars 2, p. 1098), from which it appears that in the ninth and tenth centuries the metropolitan see of Dol and its seven subordinate sees, St-Pol de Léon, Vannes, Carhaix, Quimperlé, Quimper, Portus

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 9, § 10.

<sup>2</sup> *Mém. du Congrès scientifique de France*, 38<sup>e</sup> session, 1872, p. 430.

<sup>3</sup> *Géogr. gallo-rom. de l'Armorique*, pp. 4-5.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 34.

<sup>5</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 340.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 34, vii. 75, § 4.

<sup>7</sup> *Mém. du Congrès sc. de France*, 1872, p. 429.

<sup>8</sup> "Il n'est pas vrai," says M. de la Borderie (pp. 31-2) "que toutes les cités de la Notice soient devenues des diocèses. Outre les Diablintes, il en est quatre tout au moins d'où l'on ne voit sortir nul évêché, savoir: la *civitas Batium* . . . *civitas Rigmagensium* (Chorges), *civitas Sollinientium* (Seillans), *civitas Equestrium* . . . D'autre part, en dehors de la troisième Lyonnaise, on trouve dans les Gaules au moins une dizaine d'évêchés . . . qui ne figurent point comme cités dans la Notice," e.g., Nevers, Laon, Maurienne, Toulon and Carpentras. See also J. Loth, *L'Émigration bretonne*, p. 49.

Saliocon and Dialectic, were pillaged by the Northmen. This appears to him a proof that the territory of the Diablintes was situated in the Armorican peninsula. M. de la Borderie<sup>1</sup> replies first, that the date of the document quoted by M. Longnon deprives it of all value; and secondly, that there is no proof that by Dialectic the writer meant Aleth.

4. A MS. of the *Notitia provinciarum*, belonging to the tenth century, has the gloss (civitas Diablintum) *quae alio nomine Aliud vel Adala vocatur*; and another MS. of the same century has the gloss (civitas Diablintum) *id est Carifes*. This, says M. Longnon,<sup>2</sup> proves that, in the Middle Ages, the *civitas Diablintum* was not regarded as having formed part of the diocese of Le Mans; for the gloss *id est Carifes* evidently points to one of the numerous Breton local names of which the radical prefix is the Breton *ker* (a house). Replying to this argument, M. de la Borderie<sup>3</sup> says, "We are told that the least practised eye must recognise Aleth in *Aliud* and that *Adala* means Dol. . . . Admitting this provisionally, it should seem that the Diablintes must have had three capitals,—Aleth, Dol and 'Carifes,'—and as this is too many, the only conclusion to which we can come is that the copyists of the *Notitia* did not know which was the real capital, and wrote these names at haphazard. . . . The gloss *Carifes* is to be regarded simply as a blunder on the part of the copyists, analogous to that which, in the same chapter of the *Notitia*, ascribes to Vannes the name of *Cianeti*, *civitas Cianetium* . . . a name which Vannes has never borne."

5. Comparing the province of (Gallia) Lugdunensis Tertia, as described in the *Notitia provinciarum*, with the ecclesiastical province of Tours, we find, says M. Longnon,<sup>4</sup> that the first seven states of the former correspond with seven dioceses of the latter:—

Landranen, bishop of Tours	Metropolis civitas Torinorum
Aldric,           ,,    Mans	Civitas Cenomannorum
Gernobrius,   ,,    Rennes	,,    Redonum
Dodon,         ,,    Angers	,,    Andicavorum
Actard,        ,,    Nantes	,,    Namnetum
Felix, episcopus Corisopitensis	,,    Corisopitum
Susannus, bishop of Vannes	,,    Venetum
Liberalis, episcopus Oximensis	,,    Ossismorum
Salacon, episcopus Aletensis or Dialetensis	,,    Diablintum

Besides those seven states Lugdunensis Tertia included the *civitas Ossismorum* and the *civitas Diablintum*: besides those seven dioceses the province of Tours included in 848 the *episcopatus Oximensis* and the *episcopatus Aletensis*. In the face of these facts, says M. Longnon, no man who is not blinded by prejudice can fail to see that the *episcopatus Aletensis* (or *Dialetensis*), out of which were formed the dioceses of St-Brieuc, St-Malo and Dol, was identical with the *civitas Diablintum*.

This argument perhaps looks plausible: but it rests upon the

<sup>1</sup> *Géogr. gallo-rom. de l'Armorique*, pp. 13-14.

<sup>2</sup> *Mém. du Congrès*, etc., p. 434.

<sup>3</sup> *Géogr. gallo-rom. de l'Armorique*, pp. 29-30.

<sup>4</sup> *Mém. du Congrès*, etc., pp. 400, 426.



assumption which, in my article on the Curiosolites, I have refuted, that the compiler of the *Notitia* wrote *Corisopitum* and not *Curiosolitum*, and upon the assumption that the territory of the Cenomani comprised the whole of the diocese of Le Mans, that the territory of the Redones was identical with the diocese of Rennes, and that the territory of the Osismi did not include, besides the *episcopatus Oximensis*, some part of the *episcopatus Corisopitensis* or diocese of Quimper. Moreover, it must be remembered in the fifth century, when the *Notitia* was published, only three of the dioceses in the Armorican peninsula,—namely Vannes, Nantes and Rennes,—existed: there was no *episcopatus Corisopitensis*, no *episcopatus Oximensis*, and no *episcopatus Aletensis*.<sup>1</sup> The two lists which M. Longnon prints side by side are easily explicable on the orthodox theory. The *civitas Diablintum* occupied a part of the diocese of Le Mans: the territory or a part of the territory<sup>2</sup> which subsequently corresponded with the *episcopatus Aletensis* belonged to the *civitas Curiosolitum*. There is no evidence that the diocese of Le Mans corresponded exactly with the territory of the Cenomani, or that the Redones possessed only the diocese of Rennes. What shadow of proof is there, then, that the territory of the Diablintes corresponded with the *episcopatus Aletensis*? Absolutely none, save the imaginary resemblance between the names *Diablintes* and *Aletensis*.

Writing in 1885,<sup>3</sup> M. Kerviler, who had formerly supported M. Longnon, frankly admitted his mistake: but he insists that his conversion is due solely to M. Loth. This eminent Celtic scholar shows, he remarks, in his work on *L'Émigration bretonne* that the dioceses of Breton, as distinguished from those of Gallo-Roman origin in Brittany were not formed out of Gallo-Roman states. The Armorican peninsula, completely Romanised in the fifth century, was completely Bretonised by the British invasion which followed. The invaders, in forming their dioceses, took no account of the Gallo-Roman states. It is therefore idle to look for a complete correspondence between the political divisions mentioned in the *Notitia* and the ecclesiastical divisions mentioned in 848 by the council of Tours.

In his *Atlas historique de la France* (p. 4) M. Longnon says "les arguments de nos adversaires ne nous ont pas convaincu. Cependant nous n'avons pas voulu, pour une question ainsi controversée, abuser de l'occasion qui nous est offerte aujourd'hui pour faire pénétrer en quelque sorte notre opinion dans le domaine public, et nous avons marqué le nom des Diablintes auprès de la ville romaine de Jublains (*Diablintes*)," etc. If I may say so without offence, M. Longnon's modesty is out of place. He has not hesitated on other controverted points, for example, the position of the Aduatuci (*q.v.*), to "faire pénétrer son opinion dans le domaine public." If he believes that the Diablintes did not occupy the neighbourhood of Jublains, he is doing his best to mislead his readers by marking on his map the name

<sup>1</sup> See J. Loth, *L'Émigration bretonne*, pp. 75-82.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 416, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> *Bull. arch. de l'Ass. bretonne*, 3<sup>e</sup> ser., t. iv., 1885, pp. 225-8.

*Diablantes* near Juhlains. If his map represents his real opinion, he ought to recant his error.

**Durocortorum.**—No one, as far as I know, has ever doubted that Durocortorum stood upon the site of Reims, except the Belgian antiquary, M. A. Wauters, who argues that it was situated at Vieux-Reims, near Condé-sur-Suippe, which is about 11 miles north-west of Reims.<sup>1</sup> But he has nothing to say in support of his conjecture, except that numerous antiquities have been discovered at Vieux-Reims; that the site was better suited than Reims for a Gallic *oppidum*; and that the name Vieux-Reims seems to show that that place was the original capital of the Remi. The orthodox view is supported by the *Itinerary of Antonine*<sup>2</sup> and the *Table*,<sup>3</sup> as well as by the well-known law of nomenclature, by which the original names of so many Gallic capitals were exchanged for the names of the tribes to which they belonged. Durocortorum was undoubtedly the town which, in the Gallo-Roman period, was called Remi; and there is no doubt that Remi was on the site of the modern Reims. M. Wauters would, I presume, reply that these arguments are beside the question. He would doubtless admit at once that on the site of Reims there stood a town called Durocortorum, but would deny that it existed in Caesar's time. The alleged Gallic Durocortorum would, in his opinion, stand to the Gallo-Roman Durocortorum in the same relation in which Gergovia stood to Augustonemetum or Bibracte to Augustodunum.

It is obviously as impossible to disprove M. Wauters's theory as to prove it. But, on the analogy of Augustonemetum and Augustodunum, I should be inclined to think that if the Remi, those subservient allies of Rome, had built a new capital in the Gallo-Roman period, they would have called it after the name of the reigning emperor. Moreover, the example of Vieux-Laon, the Gallic name of which was almost certainly Bibrax (*q.v.*), while Laon itself was called Landunum, should warn us not to draw hasty inferences from such names as Vieux-Reims. See my notes on AGEDINCUM and LIMONUM.

**Eburones.** See ADEATUCI.

**Eleuteti.** See CADURCI.

**Elusates.**—The Elusates occupied the southern part of the diocese of Eause, which, in the ninth century, was incorporated in that of Auch. Their frontiers cannot be traced: but they apparently possessed the north-western part of the department of Gers and a fraction of the southern part of that of Lot-et-Garonne.<sup>4</sup>

**Esviii.**—Caesar is the only ancient writer who mentions the Esviii; and, if I am not mistaken, their name, under one form or another, occurs three times in the *Commentaries*. In the first passage,<sup>5</sup> they are mentioned along with the Veneti, the Unelli, the Osismi, the Curiosolites,

<sup>1</sup> *Bull. de l'Acad. Roy. de Bruxelles*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. i., 1881, pp. 565-6.

<sup>2</sup> *Ed. Wesseling*, pp. 362, 379, 381.

<sup>3</sup> *La Table de Peutinger*, ed. Desjardins, p. 16, col. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 368; Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 367; Longnon, *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. iv.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 34.

the Auleſci and the Redones, "which," says Caesar, "are maritime states and border upon the ocean." In the second passage<sup>1</sup> they are mentioned along with the Curiosolites and the Veneti; in the third<sup>2</sup> they appear as the people into whose territory the legion of Roscius was sent to winter in 54 B.C.; and from a subsequent chapter<sup>3</sup> we learn that Roscius was threatened by the maritime states. It is therefore probable that, although the MSS. offer a large choice of readings,<sup>4</sup> Caesar is speaking, in all three passages, of the same people.

In the first passage all the good MSS. have *Sesuvios*, and in the third *Essuos*: in the second the *a* MSS. have *Esubios*. Schneider reads *Sesuvios* in the first two passages and *Essuos* in the third, remarking that *Sesuvios* might easily have been corrupted into *Esubios*, but that *Sesuvios* could hardly have been evolved by any copyist out of *Essuos*. Nipperdey and Meusel read *Esvuvios* in all three passages; and it is probable that either *Esvuvios* or *Esvios* is the right form, because these forms are found on coins.<sup>5</sup> M. A. Longnon,<sup>6</sup> however, believes that, in all three passages, Caesar wrote *Lexovios*. Others again distinguish the *Essui* from the *Sesuvii*, but, like M. Longnon, identify the *Sesuvii* with the *Lexovii*. They urge that of all the Armorican peoples the *Lexovii* were one of the most important and the most frequently mentioned. Therefore, they say, it would have been extraordinary if they had been omitted from the list of the peoples whose submission Crassus was sent to receive. Finally, they point out that, in the list of the peoples who were called upon to furnish contingents for the relief of Vercingetorix,<sup>7</sup> the name *Sesuvii* is omitted; and this, they argue, is another reason for identifying them with the *Lexovii*.<sup>8</sup> M. de Valois<sup>9</sup> gives an independent reason for doing the same. He points out that, in *B. G.*, ii. 34, Caesar writes *Sesuvios* immediately after *Curiosolitas*, and that, in *B. G.*, iii. 11, § 4, he writes *Curiosolitas Leroviosque*.

The French Commission<sup>10</sup> reply first, that *Lexovii* is found, without any various reading, in five other passages of the *Commentaries*,<sup>11</sup> besides the two under discussion; and that it is therefore unlikely that if, in those two passages, Caesar had written *Lexovios*, the various readings should have been so many. Secondly, that, if *Lexovios* were read in *B. G.*, iii. 7, § 4, its presence in iii. 9, § 10, would be inexplicable; for it would be absurd to say that the Veneti allied themselves with the

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 7, § 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, v. 24, § 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 53, § 6.

<sup>4</sup> See Schneider's *Caesar*, i. 206.

<sup>5</sup> Desjardins (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 491, n. 1) says that M. C. Robert sent him a Gallic coin found in Jersey, bearing the inscription *ESVVIOS*. But Desjardins mis-spells the name. The name on the coin in question is spelt *ESVIVS*. This form, however, in the opinion of M. Eugène Hucher, is the prototype of *ESVVVS*, which is found on two coins of Tetricus. *Mélanges de numismatique*, t. i., 1875, pp. 321-2.

<sup>6</sup> *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 5. M. A. de Barthélemy (*Rev. cell.*, xii., 1891, p. 310) agrees with M. Longnon in identifying the *Esvvii* with the *Lexovii*.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 75.

<sup>8</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. ix., 1864, pp. 411-12.

<sup>9</sup> *Notitia Galliarum*, p. 494.

<sup>10</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. ix., 1864, p. 412.

<sup>11</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 9, § 10, 11, § 4, 17, § 3, 29, § 3; vii. 75, § 3. See Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii. 456.

Lexovii, when the Lexovii were their allies already.<sup>1</sup> Thirdly, that it would be inaccurate to describe the Lexovii as "neighbours" (*finitimi*<sup>2</sup>) of the Veneti. This last argument is worthless: the diocese of Séez, where the Commission place the Esvii, is very nearly as far from Venetia as the country of the Lexovii. In support of the other two arguments, it may be said that the theory which identifies the Sesuvii with the Lexovii is shaken (1) by the coins to which I have referred, and (2) by the fact that in none of the three passages does any single MS. give the reading *Lexovios*; and I therefore regard it as probable that there was, in the time of Caesar, a tribe called *Esvii* or *Esvii*, and that that tribe was the one which the MSS. call *Sesuvii*. It remains to enquire where their territory was situated.

Now, if Caesar was the only ancient writer who mentioned the Esvii, there were two maritime peoples, the Baiocasses and the Viducasses, whom he did not mention at all. Augustodunum, the chief town of the Baiocasses, was indisputably Bayeux. Arigenus or Aregenua, the chief town of the Viducasses, appears in the *Table* as Araegenue, which was indisputably Vieux, near Caen.<sup>3</sup> The Baiocasses appear for the first time, as a *civitas*, in the *Notitia provinciarum*,<sup>4</sup> which does not mention the Viducasses at all. Both tribes, it is true, figure in Pliny:<sup>5</sup> but Pliny mentions several tribes which did not rank as *civitates*; and Desjardins<sup>6</sup> considers that, at the time when Pliny wrote, the Baiocasses, or, as Pliny calls them, Bodiocasses, were merely clients of the Viducasses. The *Notitia provinciarum*<sup>7</sup> mentions a people called the Sagii, who do not figure in the *Commentaries*, and whose territory is identified with the diocese of Séez. As Caesar mentions the Sesuvii side by side with the Aulerci, who occupied the dioceses of Le Mans and Evreux, Walckenaer<sup>8</sup> infers that they occupied the diocese of Séez, which is counterminous with those two dioceses. The French Commission<sup>9</sup> arrive at the same conclusion. After assigning to the various peoples of Normandy on the west of the Seine, namely the Lexovii, the Aulerci Ebuovices, the Ambibarri and the Unelli, the dioceses which belonged to them, they find the diocese of Séez unoccupied, and accordingly assign it to the Esvii or, as they call them, the Essui.

Desjardins goes further. Having regard to the fact that the Esvii are mentioned only by Caesar, and that Caesar does not mention either the Baiocasses or the Viducasses, he identifies the joint territories of the two latter tribes, which included the diocese of Séez, with the territory of the Esvii. If he is right, the Esvii possessed the central and western parts of the departments of Calvados and Orne.

It is clear that we cannot get beyond conjecture: but the conjecture of Desjardins appears to me the most reasonable that we have. Just as the Helvetii were divided into four *pagi*, so it is probable that the

<sup>1</sup> It might, however, be replied that, when Caesar wrote the latter, he forgot what he had written in the former passage.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 8, § 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. de l'Acad. des inscr.*, xxi., 1768, p. 235.

<sup>4</sup> Ed. Guérard, p. 13.

<sup>5</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 18 (32), § 107.

<sup>6</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i. 338; ii. 492-3.

<sup>7</sup> Ed. Guérard, p. 11.

<sup>8</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, j. 391.

<sup>9</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. ix., 1864, p. 409.

Baiocasses, the Viducasses and the Sagii were *pagi*, if they were not clients, of the Esvii. The French Commission,<sup>1</sup> indeed, include the territories of the Baiocasses and Viducasses in the territory of the Lexovii (*q.v.*): but, unless we accept Desjardins's suggestion, it must be admitted that Caesar was mistaken in describing the Esvii as a maritime people.

Walckenaer<sup>2</sup> distinguishes the Essui from the Sesuvii, as, in *B. G.*, v. 24, § 2, all the MSS. give the former name; and, as he holds that Caesar, in that chapter, enumerates the various tribes according to their geographical position, he places the Essui on the frontier of the Treveri, in the environs of Esch: but as Long<sup>3</sup> points out, Caesar's subsequent narrative<sup>4</sup> is irreconcilable with this conclusion.

M. A. Bertrand, having regard to the position in which Ptolemy places the Arvii, suggests that 'Αρριοι is probably only a corrupt form of 'Εσσοριοι (*Essui*).<sup>5</sup> Yes, corrupt indeed! Suggestions of this kind lead to nothing. See CURIOSOLITES.

**Gabali.** See ARVERNI.

**Garumni.**—The Garumni are mentioned by no ancient writer, except Caesar.<sup>6</sup> D'Anville<sup>7</sup> agrees with de Valois in placing them in the valley of the Garonne, below St-Bertrand-de-Comminges; and Walckenaer, the French Commission, and Desjardins accept this conjecture.

**Gates.**—The Gates are placed by d'Anville,<sup>8</sup> who follows Sanson and de Valois, between the Elusates and the Ausci, in the "comté de Gaure." But, as the French Commission observe,<sup>9</sup> this conjecture was based merely upon the resemblance of the name "Gaure" to *Garites*, the name by which the tribe in question was designated in the old editions of the *Commentaries*. Now the reading *Garites* is only found in a few bad MSS.<sup>10</sup> The best have *Gates*. Walckenaer makes a similar guess, which is not worth transcribing.

**Geidumni.** See NERVII.

**Genakum.** See CENABUM.

**Gorgobina.**—Gorgobina was the stronghold, or the chief stronghold, of the Boii.<sup>11</sup> In order to find its site, it is first necessary to find the district which the Boii occupied.

Caesar says that the Boii, after the conclusion of the Helvetian campaign, were allowed by him, at the request of the Aedui, to settle in Aeduan territory; and he remarks that the Aedui made this request because they knew that the Boii were a brave people.<sup>12</sup> We may reasonably conclude that the Boii were established in the western part of the Aeduan territory, where they might perhaps serve as an outpost against those old rivals of the Aedui,—the Arverni.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, on any other hypothesis, Caesar's narrative of his march from Cenabum (Orléans) to

<sup>1</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, ii. 90-91.

<sup>2</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 393-4.

<sup>3</sup> W. Smith, *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geogr.*, i. 854.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, v. 53, § 6.

<sup>5</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. ix., 1864, p. 413.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 27, § 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 342.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, p. 340.

<sup>9</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 436.

<sup>10</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 27, § 2. See Schneider's *Caesar*, i. 290.

<sup>11</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 9, § 6.

<sup>12</sup> *Ib.* & i. 28, § 5.

<sup>13</sup> See *Bull. de la Soc. d'émulation du dép't de l'Allier*, viii., 1859, pp. 288-9.

Noviodunum and thence to Avaricum (Bourges), taken in conjunction with his statement that Vercingetorix, marching from the country of the Arverni to Gorgobina, passed through the country of the Bituriges, is inexplicable. I may add that, during the siege of Avaricum, Caesar expected a supply of corn from the Boii; and he would hardly have done so if they had not been near enough to forward the supply, that is, somewhere in the western part of the Aeduan territory.<sup>1</sup>

The next point is to determine the western frontier of the Aedui. The French Commission<sup>2</sup> trace the western frontier of the diocese of Nevers along the valley of the Loire. M. Clairefond, however, makes it embrace a narrow strip of territory on the left bank of the Loire, south of a point about 3 miles north of La Charité;<sup>3</sup> and this agrees with the delimitation of the diocese as shown in the twelfth volume of *Gallia Christiana*. But when Caesar said that the Loire separated the Aedui from the Bituriges, he must have meant that the Loire served as the common frontier of the two peoples in that part of its course to which the Aeduan force came in 52 B.C., when they had been sent to the assistance of the Bituriges.<sup>4</sup> This part of the river, it should seem, lay somewhere between its junction with the Allier and Gien or Sancerre. It is therefore improbable that, in Caesar's time, the Aedui possessed the strip of territory on the west of the Loire which belonged to them when the diocese of Nevers was formed.

According to one of the earliest editors of Caesar, Raimondus Marlianus,<sup>5</sup> the Boii settled in the Bourbonnais. This was also the view of Belley.<sup>6</sup> He premised that the Boii must have dwelt somewhere in the Bourbonnais, because the route which Caesar followed from Agedincum (Sens) by way of Orléans across the Berri must have led into that country.<sup>7</sup> He went on to quote passages from early mediæval writers, showing, in his opinion, that that part of the Bourbonnais which lay on the west of the Allier had belonged to the Bituriges and the Arverni. Therefore, he concluded, the Boii must have occupied the part between the Allier and the Loire. But it is not true to say that Caesar's route *must* have led him into the Bourbonnais; for it is not certain that he marched so far south. Still, if Belley's conclusion is wrong, then, unless he is mistaken in holding that the Aedui possessed no territory on the west of the Allier, the Boii must have been somewhere east of the Loire, which, below its confluence with the Allier, formed the boundary between the Bituriges

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 9, § 6, 12-13, 17, § 2

<sup>2</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 171.

<sup>3</sup> See Clairefond's map in *Bull. de la Soc. d'émulation du dépt de l'Allier*, t. viii., 1859.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 5, §§ 3-4.

<sup>5</sup> *Veternm Galliae locorum . . . descriptio*, ed. 1444.

<sup>6</sup> D'Anville, *Éclaircissements sur l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 203-6.

<sup>7</sup> Des Ours de Mandajors, a writer who obscured, instead of illustrating, every question of Gallic geography which he treated, insisted that the country of the Boii was not in the Bourbonnais, since Caesar said that the Loire separated the Bituriges from the Aedui, and therefore the Bituriges must have possessed the country between the Allier and the Loire. But of course Caesar was only speaking of the Loire below its confluence with the Allier. On de Mandajors's theory, he might have been speaking of the whole course of the Loire.

and the Aedui. But such a position is open to the objection that the Aedui had no reason for establishing an outpost against the Bituriges, who were in a state of friendly dependence upon them; and, as far as I know, there is nothing to be said in its favour. Nevertheless, this opinion has found adherents. Walekenaer<sup>1</sup> supposes that Caesar would have restored to the Boii their original territory, which he assumes to have been occupied by the Aedui; and accordingly he places them in the district which afterwards became the diocese of Auxerre. He observes that near Entrain, in the centre of that diocese, there is a place called Boui, which, in the Middle Ages, was known as Boiacum. But the name "Buy," between which and Boii the curious may also discover an affinity, is found more than once in the district between the Allier and the Loire. Moreover, there is no reason for assuming that the diocese of Auxerre was the original home of the Boii, except the fact, if it is a fact, that the diocese of Auxerre was adjacent to the territory of the Senones,<sup>2</sup> and that the Boian settlers in Italy were neighbours of the Senones. And this reason is purely fanciful.

In support of Walekenaer's view, a statement of Pliny<sup>3</sup> has been quoted:—*intus autem Aedui foederati, Carnutini foederati, Boi, Senones*, etc. But there is not the slightest proof that Pliny meant to enumerate the states in question according to their geographical order;<sup>4</sup> and if he did, his words would seem to mean that the Boii were wedged in between the Carnutes and the Senones, which is absurd.

M. de Monvel<sup>5</sup> quotes an inscription found at Tréteau, about 17 miles south-east of Moulins, to prove that, under Aurelian, the Bourbonnais belonged to the Arverni. The inscription runs as follows:—IMP · CAESARI · L · DVMETIO · AVRELIANO · M · GERMANICO · TRIBVNITIE · P · V · CO · SS · III · P · P · CIAR · LXXVI ·; which, as interpreted by M. Clairefond means *Inperatoris Cæsari Lucio Domitio Aureliano, Murmo, Germanico, tribunitiae potestatis (anno) quinto, consuli tertio, patri patriae, civitas Arvernorum*, etc. Of course, as Clairefond<sup>6</sup> says, it only proves that Tréteau itself was in the territory of the Arverni.

On the other hand, it is impossible to prove that the Boii did not dwell in the diocese of Auxerre. For it has been proved that that diocese or a part of it belonged to the Aedui in the year 245 A.D.;<sup>7</sup> and it is probable that it did so in Caesar's time as well. The route which Caesar followed from Sens by way of Orléans across the Berri might have led him into the south-western part of the Nivernais as well as into the Bourbonnais. The one strong argument, though it is by no means conclusive, against placing the Boii in the diocese of Auxerre,—

<sup>1</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 82-4.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 482-3.

<sup>3</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv., 18 (32), § 107.

<sup>4</sup> In the same chapter Pliny mentions the Andegavi (Andes), who lived in the neighbourhood of Angers, immediately after the Tricasses, who lived in the neighbourhood of Troyes!

<sup>5</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. d'agriculture*, etc., d'Orléans, vii., 1863, p. 31.

<sup>6</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. d'émulation du dépt. de l'Allier*, viii., 1859, p. 290.

<sup>7</sup> Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, iv. 184-5.

somewhere in the neighbourhood of Sancerre,—is the argument which I have already stated, namely that it is more reasonable to suppose that the Aedui should have established them as an outpost against the Arverni than against the Bituriges.

I conclude, then, that, while it is not certain that the country of the Boii was between the Allier and the Loire,<sup>1</sup> it is more probable that it was there than that it was anywhere else.<sup>1</sup>

II. But if we cannot positively determine the territory of the Boii, how can we fix the site of their chief town? Needless to say that there has been no lack of guesses. Clairefond<sup>2</sup> easily disposes of most of them, showing that the proposed sites are either outside the Aeduan frontier or otherwise irreconcilable with Caesar's narrative. There is really nothing, except doubtful military considerations, to guide the inquirer: but it may be useful to examine the conjectures which the best known commentators have made.

1. Gorgobina has been identified with Moulins. But Moulins is not an old town;<sup>3</sup> and besides, it is so far south that we may doubt whether Vercingetorix, after hearing the news of Caesar's departure from Cenabum (Orléans), would have been able to reach Noviodunum in time to fight a battle for its relief. For it must be remembered that, while the news was travelling from Cenabum to Gorgobina, Caesar was marching southward from Cenabum towards Noviodunum.<sup>4</sup>

2. Napoleon,<sup>5</sup> following M. Crosnier,<sup>6</sup> believes that he has found the site at St-Parize-le-Châtel. M. Crosnier says that this place was once known as "le village de *Gentili*," or, as it was called in the legends of St-Patrice, "*Pagus Gentilius*"; and that the people of this *pagus* remained idolaters until the middle of the sixth century, that is to say, for two centuries after the neighbouring peoples had accepted Christianity. This, argues Napoleon, is what we might expect from "a tribe settled in a foreign country as the Boii were, who would retain their customs and religion for a longer time unchanged." Perhaps. But precisely the same argument has been advanced in favour of placing the Boii in the neighbourhood of Sancerre;<sup>7</sup> and whatever Napoleon's argument may be worth, it has obviously no bearing upon the question whether St-Parize-le-Châtel is or is not to be identified with Gorgobina. At Buy in the neighbourhood of St-Parize-le-Châtel, says Crosnier, there is a

<sup>1</sup> M. Bruguère de Lamotte argues that, if the territory of the Boii had been on the right bank of the Allier, they could not have brought corn to Caesar at Avaricum (Bourges), or Vercingetorix would have intercepted them. But Vercingetorix could have intercepted them just as well if they had been on the left bank.

Again, Lamotte insists that, if Gorgobina was between the Allier and the Loire, Vercingetorix, in order to get from Gorgobina to Noviodunum, would have had to cross the Allier, which was not fordable. But Lamotte forgets that the Allier was spanned by several bridges (*B. G.*, vii. 34, § 3). Lamotte's arguments may be found in *Bull. de la Soc. d'émulation du dépt de l'Allier*, ix., 1864, pp. 434-5, 437-9, 444, 454, 473-5.

<sup>2</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. d'émulation du dépt de l'Allier*, viii., 1859, pp. 294-303.

<sup>3</sup> D'Anville, *Éclaircissements sur l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 209, 236-7.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 12-13.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 247-8, note.

<sup>6</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. nivernaise*, viii., 1880, pp. 104-6, 108-9.

<sup>7</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Ggule*, i. 171.



decided bend in the Roman road from Augustodunum (Autun) to Avaricum (Bourges); and from this circumstance he concludes that on or near the bend in the road, that is, at or near Buy, was situated the *oppidum* of the Boii. The only argument of any weight which Napoleon adds is that the site of St-Parize-le-Châtel is better adapted for a Gallic stronghold than any other which has been proposed. The choice has the qualified support of Desjardins, who speaks <sup>1</sup> of "Gorgobina . . . que l'auteur de la *Vie de César* place, avec vraisemblance, à Saint-Parize-le-Châtel."

3. Bonniard <sup>2</sup> places Gorgobina quite close to Boui, on the site of the ruins of a Gallic or Gallo-Roman town near St-Révérien in the department of Nièvre. But this conjecture rests simply upon the resemblance between the names "Boui" and "Boii."

4. General Creuly refuses to look for the site anywhere in the angle formed by the Allier and the Loire. He objects that Vercingetorix would not, in order to enter this district, have crossed the territory of the Bituriges on his march from that of the Arverni; <sup>3</sup> and that Caesar would not, in order to succour a town situated between the Allier and the Loire, have crossed the Loire so far to the west as Cenabum (Orléans), when he might easily have gone direct by Nevers. Accordingly Creuly thinks that the site must be looked for somewhere on the west of the Allier and of the Loire. Starting from this hypothesis, he affirms that no place in the neighbourhood in question is so well adapted for defence as Sancerre. If, he says, his suggestion is accepted, one can easily understand why Vercingetorix established himself at Gorgobina. His object was to prevent Caesar from crossing the Loire, all the bridges over which that lay on or near the probable direction of his march had doubtless been demolished by the Carnutes and the Bituriges: but Caesar upset his calculations by making a *détour* by way of Cenabum.<sup>4</sup> Creuly suggests that when Caesar said that the Loire separated the Bituriges from the Aedui, he only meant that part of the Loire which was in the neighbourhood of Nevers; for in Creuly's opinion it was probably at Nevers that the Aedui crossed the Loire when, as Caesar relates in *B. G.*, vii. 5, they entered the country of the Bituriges. It seems to me much more probable that Caesar meant that all that part of the Aeduan territory which extended northward of the confluence of the Allier with the Loire, was separated from the territory of the Bituriges by the Loire.<sup>5</sup> Nor have Creuly's other arguments any real weight. It is true that if Vercingetorix had started from the neighbourhood of Gergovia with the intention of marching direct to the district round St-Parize-le-Châtel, he would naturally have gone down the valley of the Allier, and therefore would not have entered the territory of the Bituriges. But it is not necessary to assume that he did march direct to Gorgobina: he may have had reasons, of which we

<sup>1</sup> *Héogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 478.

<sup>2</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. d'émulation du dépt de l'Allier*, viii., 1859, p. 298.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 9, § 6.

<sup>4</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, pp. 398-9.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 427, *supra*.

know nothing, for going back first into the country of the Bituriges; and, indeed, Caesar's words,—*Vercingetorix rursus in Bituriges exercitum reducit atque inde profectus Gorgobinam . . . oppugnare instituit*,<sup>1</sup>—would seem to suggest that from the country of the Bituriges he started off in a new direction. The objection that Caesar, marching from Agedincum, would not have gone so far to the west as Cenabum in order to relieve a town situated within the angle formed by the confluence of the Allier and the Loire, has been answered by anticipation in the note on CENABUM. Besides, if Cenabum lay far out of the way from Sens to St-Parize-le-Châtel, it lay just as far out of the way from Sens to Sancerre.<sup>2</sup> And Creuly himself maintains that Caesar made a *détour*.

5. The French Commission originally decided for St-Pierre-le-Montier: but this place is ill situated for defence;<sup>3</sup> and the Commission afterwards recanted, and professed themselves convinced by the arguments of Creuly.<sup>4</sup>

6. Von Goler<sup>5</sup> identifies Gorgobina with La Guerche-sur-l'Aubois, which is 17 kilometres, in a straight line, west by south of Nevers. But La Guerche is not as well situated for defence as St-Parize-le-Châtel; and General Creuly<sup>6</sup> also remarks that the name has only a deceptive resemblance to Gorgobina (or, as he calls it, Gergovina).<sup>7</sup>

7. M. Chazaud<sup>8</sup> adopts the reading *Gortona*, which is found in the  $\beta$  MSS.,<sup>9</sup> and identifies the stronghold with Château Gordon, or, as he calls it, *Gortonis castrum*, which, he says, is between Sancerre and St-Thibaud.<sup>10</sup>

The reader has now before him the pith of what has been written upon the subject. The conclusion of the whole matter, in my judgement, is that there is not sufficient evidence for fixing the site of Gorgobina; but that there is more to be said for St-Parize-le-Châtel than for any other site which has been proposed. In short, I claim only a negative value for this note: it shows, that cartographers who

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 9, § 6.

<sup>2</sup> It may be worth mentioning that the most ancient name by which Sancerre is known to have been called was *Castrum Syncerrium*. See *Mém. de la Comm. hist. du Cher*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. ii., 1882, p. 319.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 248, note.

<sup>4</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 453-4.

<sup>5</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 237 and n. 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, pp. 393-4.

<sup>7</sup> Napoleon also objects that La Guerche is situated west of the Loire, whereas, according to Caesar, the Loire formed the dividing line between the Aedui and the Bituriges. But Heller (*Philologus*, xxvi., 1867, p. 680) replies that La Guerche lies west of the Allier, not immediately of the Loire. So it does,—but only just (see *Carte de la France*, 1: 320,000, Sheet 18). Still, though it is in the diocese of Nevers, it is, as I have already remarked (p. 427) improbable that the Aedui possessed any territory west of the Loire below its junction with the Allier, or west of the Allier itself.

<sup>8</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. d'émulation du dep. de l'Allier*, viii., 1859, pp. 90-91.

<sup>9</sup> Meusel's *Caesar*, p. 164.

<sup>10</sup> St-Thibaud is, I take it, the same place as St-Thibaut, which is one kilometre north-east of Sancerre. See Vivien de St-Martin, *Nouv. Dict. de Géogr. univ.*, v. 489, s.v. St-Satur.

mark on their maps the territory of the Boii and the site of Gorgobina as if their geographical positions were certain, are not to be trusted.

**Graioceli.**—The Graioceli are mentioned only by Caesar,<sup>1</sup> immediately after the Ceutrones (*q.v.*) and immediately before the Caturiges (*q.v.*). These three Alpine tribes attacked him in 58 B.C., when he was returning from Italy to Transalpine Gaul, to deal with the Helvetii. Describing his march, he says that the last, that is to say, the westernmost town in the Citerior Provincia is Ocelum, and that he marched thence into the country of the Vocontii (*q.v.*) in seven days. Ocelum has been identified with Exilles, Uxeau or Usseau, Usseglio and Aosta.<sup>2</sup> But there are only two sites for which any real evidence can be adduced; and for one or the other of these two the evidence is conclusive.

Desjardins<sup>3</sup> maintains that the name *Graioceli* proves that the territory of the tribe was on the eastern slopes of the Graian Alps. Strabo,<sup>4</sup> he points out, says that Ocelum was 99 Roman miles from Epeprodunum (Embrun); and, within a mile or two, this is the distance from Embrun, along the Roman road which ran past Brigantio, or Briançon, and over Mont Genève, to Drubiaglio. Four vases, on each of which an itinerary is inscribed, have been discovered at Bagnì di Vicarello, the ancient Aquae Apollinares. Three of them place Ocelum at 20 Roman miles, or 29½ kilometres, from Turin, and two of them at the same distance from Susa.<sup>5</sup> These figures correspond approximately with the actual distances of Drubiaglio and of Avigliana from Turin and from Susa respectively, Drubiaglio being on the northern, and Avigliana opposite it on the southern bank of the Dora Riparia. According to the fourth itinerary, there was a station called *Ad Fines*, 23 Roman miles from Turin. The same station, according to one passage in the *Itinerary of Antonine* (p. 341), was 18 Roman miles from Turin and 32, which is evidently a mistake for 22, from Susa; according to another (pp. 356-7) 16 Roman miles from Turin and 23 from Susa; according to the *Jerusalem Itinerary* (p. 556) 16 Roman miles from Turin and 24 from Susa. At Avigliana an inscription has been discovered, containing the words FINIB(us) COTTI; and Strabo speaks of Ocelum as the boundary of Cottius's kingdom.<sup>6</sup> The inscription<sup>7</sup> in question and another found at the same place prove

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 10, § 4.

<sup>2</sup> N. Sanson, *Les Comm. de César*, 3rd ed., 1658, p. 64; von Goler, *ital. Krieg*, p. 13; d'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 500-501; Napoléon III., *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 56, n. 5; Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 538-9, 542-4; J. Maissiat, *Jules César en Gaule*, i. 113.

<sup>3</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i. 84-5.

<sup>4</sup> *Géogr.*, iv. 1, § 3.

<sup>5</sup> The third, by an obvious mistake, places Ocelum at 27 Roman miles from Susa.

<sup>6</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. v., 1862, pp. 254-8; t. xxii., 1871, pp. 124-9.

<sup>7</sup> The inscription runs as follows:—

PVDENS · SOC  
PVBL · XL · FER  
ZSCR · FINIB  
COTTI · VOVIT  
ARCAR · LGVY'  
S · L · M ·

that is to say,

*Pudens, sociorum] publ[ici] quadragesima servus, contrasc[ri]ptor] Finib[us] Cottii]*

that at the town which stood upon the site of Avigliana was collected the duty of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent (*quadragesima* or one-fortieth) which was levied upon merchandise; and on the fourth vase *Ad Fines* is called *Ad Fines XXXX*, which, as Desjardins explains, means *Ad Fines quadragesimae*. From this evidence and from the evidence of the itineraries, although they differ more or less among themselves as to the distance of *Ad Fines* from Susa and from Turin respectively, Garrucci, Heller<sup>1</sup> and Desjardins<sup>2</sup> identify *Ad Fines* with Avigliana; and from the fact that important antiquities have been discovered at Drubiaglio,<sup>3</sup> as well as from the evidence of the itineraries and of Strabo, they identify Ocelum with Drubiaglio.

Now every one who has read so far will admit that Caesar's Ocelum or a town of that name must have stood upon the site either of Drubiaglio or of Avigliana; and, as the inscription containing the words *FINIB(us) COTTI* and the reference to the toll of one-fortieth (*quadragesima*) was found at Avigliana, a plain man would say that Avigliana must have been the *Ad Fines XXXX* of the itineraries, and therefore that Ocelum must have been Drubiaglio. The French Commission,<sup>4</sup> however, and Kiepert<sup>5</sup> identify Ocelum with Avigliana.

M. E. Cellesia, in a note which he communicated to Napoleon,<sup>6</sup> argued that Ocelum meant "passage principal," and that, besides the Ocelum of the itineraries, there were others at Usseglio and at Usseau.<sup>7</sup> Usseglio is in the valley of Viù, 40 kilometres north-west of Turin: Usseau is in the valley of the Clusone, between Pignerol and the "col de Fenestrelle." Now, it is certain that Caesar's Ocelum was neither at Usseglio nor at Usseau. For,—to say nothing of the evidence which I have already adduced,—whether it was at either of these places or at Avigliana or at Drubiaglio, Caesar must have taken the route by Mont Genève; and, to reach Mont Genève, he would surely have followed the well-defined route along the Dora Riparia,<sup>8</sup> which the railway now follows, instead of going out of his way through the valley of the Stura or the valley of the Clusone.

**Grudii.**—See NERVII.

**Helvii.**—The Helvii occupied the Vivarais, which forms the southern part of the department of Ardèche.<sup>9</sup> See ALLOBROGES.

**Itius Portus.**<sup>10</sup>—The greater part of the vast literature which has

*novit.*—[Pudens, factus] *arcarinus Laigud[uni]*, s[olvit] l[ibenter] m[erito], or to quote Desjardins's translation, "Pudens, esclave des fermiers associés de l'impôt indirect du quarantième des Gaules, contrôleur à la station de *Fines de l'ancien royaume de Cottius*, a voué ce monument. Devenu trésorier de la douane à Lyon, il a acquitté son vœu de grand cœur."

<sup>1</sup> *Philologus*, xxii., 1855, p. 142.

<sup>2</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, iv. 19-20.

<sup>3</sup> See Carlo Promis, *Storia dell' antico Torino*, 1869, pp. 56, 129, 238.

<sup>4</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. vii., 1863, p. 344.

<sup>5</sup> *Galliae Cisalpinæ et Transalpinæ . . . tabula in usum scholarum descripta.*

<sup>6</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 56, n. 5.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. C. Promis, *Storia dell' antico Torino*, 1869, p. 129.

<sup>8</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. vii., 1863, p. 255.

<sup>9</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, ii. 17.

<sup>10</sup> See *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000), Sheets 1 and 3.

accumulated on the question of the identity of the Portus Itius is obsolete; and the most sceptical reader may take it as certain that the choice is restricted to two, or at the most four of the numerous ports that have been proposed, namely Boulogne, Ambleteuse, Wissant and Calais. Of these four Ambleteuse and Calais have now hardly any defenders.<sup>1</sup>

Caesar says that, before his first expedition to Britain, he entered the country of the Morini (*q.v.*), "because the shortest passage to Britain was from their country" (*quod inde erat brevissimus in Britanniam traiectus*). He set sail soon after midnight with about 80 transports and some ships of war from a port in the country of the Morini which he does not name; and at the same time he sent his cavalry to "a further port" (*in ulteriorem portum*), about 8 Roman miles off, there to embark in 18 transports, which had been prevented from reaching the port whence he himself sailed. In another chapter he speaks of the *ulterior portus* as *superior portus*; and it is admitted that this port lay north of the one from which he himself sailed. When he returned to Gaul, two of his ships were unable to reach "the same ports" (*eosdem portus*) as the rest of the fleet, and "were carried a little further down" (the coast),—*paulo infra*. Before his second expedition Caesar assembled a fleet of about 600 transports and 28 ships of war at the Portus Itius, "from which port he had ascertained that the passage to Britain was most convenient, being about 30 (Roman) miles from the continent" (*quo ex portu commodissimum in Britanniam traiectum esse cognoverat circiter milium passuum XXX transmissum a continenti*). His entire flotilla amounted to more than 800 sail, as it included "private vessels," which may have belonged to traders. When he set sail, he left Labienus behind "to protect the ports" (*ut portus tueretur*), which implies that, on the second expedition, as on the first, he thought it necessary to keep more than one port under his control.<sup>2</sup>

Ptolemy mentions the promontory of Itius. Its longitude, he says, was  $22^{\circ} 15'$ , and its latitude  $53^{\circ} 30'$ ; and he places it on the west of Gesoriacum, which is unquestionably to be identified with Boulogne. The longitude of Gesoriacum, he says, was  $22^{\circ} 30'$ , and its latitude  $53^{\circ} 30'$ .<sup>3</sup>

Strabo, evidently referring to Caesar's first expedition, says that he sailed from the Itian promontory or port ( $\tau\delta \text{ } \text{Ἰτιον}$ ), and that the length of his voyage was 320 stades, which is equivalent to 40 Roman miles.<sup>4</sup>

It is necessary to inquire whether Caesar sailed from the same port on both his expeditions; for he only mentions the *portus ulterior* in connection with the first expedition; and if on that occasion he sailed from the Portus Itius, the search for the Portus Itius is conditioned by

<sup>1</sup> See Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i. 348-50, and R. Schneider, *Portus Itius*, 1888, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 21, § 3, 22, §§ 3-4, 28, § 1, 36, § 4; v. 2, §§ 2-3, 8, §§ 1, 6.

<sup>3</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 9, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 5, § 2. D'Anville (*Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 354-5, 390) argues that, in this estimate, Strabo was referring to stades of which 10 were equivalent to a Roman mile.

the existence of the *portus ulterior*. Drumann,<sup>1</sup> remarking that Caesar chose the Portus Itius in 54 B.C. because he had ascertained that the passage from it to the island was *the most convenient*, argues that "before it was consequently unknown to him," and that "at first he sought the *shortest passage*." But, as Long<sup>2</sup> points out, when Caesar says that he had ascertained that the passage from the Portus Itius was the most convenient, he apparently means "that he had by his first voyage found out that this was the best place to sail from." "His first voyage," Long continues, "was very lucky, and there was no reason to change his place of embarkation, particularly as he intended to land, and did land, at the place where he had landed before. Besides this, when he speaks (v. 8) of his landing-place on the second voyage, he says, 'quod optimum esse egressum superiore aestate cognoverat'; the same form of expression that he uses in speaking of the place of embarkation (v. 2), except that he does not there use the words 'superiore aestate.'" On the other hand, Mr. H. E. Malden<sup>3</sup> has remarked (though he has since abandoned the conclusion to which his remarks led him) that Caesar "names the second (port) and does not name the first . . . he especially mentions that he disembarked on both occasions at the same place, he gives himself every opportunity for saying that he sailed from the same port, if he did so, but yet he never says it." Strabo admittedly implies that in the first expedition Caesar's point of departure was the Portus Itius: but his testimony does not settle the question; for he may only have been putting his own construction on Caesar's words. I agree with Rudolf Schneider<sup>4</sup> that it is impossible to *prove* that the Portus Itius was the starting-point of both voyages, but that it most probably was, because Caesar, before his first expedition, had stayed long enough in the country of the Morini to find out the most convenient harbour.<sup>5</sup>

R. Schneider insists that it is idle to lay stress on Caesar's estimate of the distance from the Portus Itius to Britain, first, because he had no means of making an accurate calculation, and secondly, because we cannot tell whether he reckoned the distance from the nearest port of Britain or from his own landing-place. As regards correspondence with Caesar's estimate, Schneider continues, there is nothing to choose between Boulogne, Wissant and Calais. Dover is 34 Roman miles from Boulogne, 25 from Wissant, 28 from Calais. I do not altogether agree with Schneider. To begin with, it seems morally certain that Caesar's estimate referred to the distance from the Portus Itius to his landing-place, which in both expeditions was the same. And although it is of course true that he could not make an accurate calculation, it must be

<sup>1</sup> *Geschichte Roms*, iii. 294.

<sup>3</sup> *Journal of Philology*, xvii, 1888, p. 164.

<sup>4</sup> *Portus Itius*, p. 5.

<sup>5</sup> Von Goler, who maintains that Caesar sailed from Wissant on the first, but not on the second expedition, affirms that the distance from Wissant to Calais alone corresponds with the distance of 8 miles, which, according to Caesar, separated his starting-point from the *portus ulterior*; and accordingly he identifies the latter with Calais (*Gall. Krieg*, p. 129, note). His blunder is inexplicable. The distance from Wissant to Calais, in a straight line, is  $15\frac{1}{2}$  kilometres or about  $10\frac{1}{2}$  Roman miles.

<sup>2</sup> Caesar, p. 277.

admitted that if one of the ports answers to his calculation decidedly better than any of the others, the fact constitutes an argument, however slight, in favour of the identity of that port with the Portus Itius. Now Wissant is 27 Roman miles, *in a straight line*, from Deal, and Boulogne 39. Again, accepting the theory that Caesar landed near Hythe, Wissant is 32 Roman miles from that port, and Boulogne 37. Schneider is, however, right in saying that it is useless to appeal from Caesar to Strabo, or to argue that because Strabo estimated the length of Caesar's voyage at 320 stades, which are equivalent to 40 Roman miles, therefore Caesar must have written XXXX and not XXX. As Schneider points out,<sup>1</sup> Strabo's estimate<sup>2</sup> of the length of the south coast of Britain differs from Caesar's;<sup>3</sup> and the accuracy of the MSS., as regards the number XXX, is supported by a comparison of Pliny, *Naturalis Historia*, iv., 16 (30), § 103, with Caesar, *B. G.*, v. 13, § 2. Pliny says that the shortest passage between Ireland and Britain is 30 miles; and Caesar says that the passage from Ireland to Britain is equal in length to the passage from Britain to Gaul.

I. Napoleon III.,<sup>4</sup> Desjardins,<sup>5</sup> and Schneider<sup>6</sup> identify the Portus Itius with Boulogne; and the two later writers have said everything that can be said in its favour. Desjardins, it should be noted, explains that the Portus Itius was not exactly the same as the harbour of Gesoriacum, but comprised that part of the estuary of the Liane which lies between the Port de Briques and Isques. He remarks (1) that Pliny<sup>7</sup> calls Gesoriacum the *portus Morinorum Britannicus*, and that in the neighbourhood of Boulogne, on the banks of the Liane, have been found Roman bricks, bearing the inscription *classis Britannica*; (2) that, as Ptolemy places the promontory of Itius west of Boulogne, it could not have been Cape Grisnez, as is usually supposed, but must have been the "cap d'Alprech," which, in Ptolemy's time, was a far more prominent headland than it is now;<sup>8</sup> (3) that the Gallic ports were always either in the mouths of rivers or otherwise sheltered from storms; (4) that "Isques" is derived from *Itius*; (5) that on the coast of the Morini the estuary of the Liane is the only port in which 600 ships could have been built and docked, while it is about 30 Roman miles,—33 exactly, from the coast of Britain; (6) that, as Strabo mentions the only four ports in Gaul from which ships set sail for Britain, namely the mouths of the Garonne, the Loire and the Seine, and the Portus Itius, the last-named must necessarily be identified with Gesoriacum, which, according to Pliny, was the *portus Morinorum Britannicus*; and finally that four Roman roads meeting at Gesoriacum are mentioned in the itineraries,<sup>9</sup> whereas not a single Roman road led to Wissant.

No unbiassed critic will admit that Desjardins has made out his case.

<sup>1</sup> *Portus Itius*, p. 9.      <sup>2</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 5, § 1.      <sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, v. 13, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 166-72.

<sup>5</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i. 348-90, and especially 363-8, 371-2 and 383-8.

<sup>6</sup> *Portus Itius*.

<sup>7</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 23 (37), § 122.

<sup>8</sup> This is undeniable. See *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, ii. 45.

<sup>9</sup> *La Table de Peutinger*, ed. Desjardins, p. 12, col. 3, p. 13, col. 1-3, p. 22, col. 1-3; *Itin. Ant.*, pp. 356-63, 376-7.

(1) If Gesoriacum was the recognised harbour in the country of the Morini in Pliny's time, the fact does not prove that it was the harbour from which Caesar set sail. (2) It is needless to tell any one who may read this note that there are numerous mistakes in Ptolemy's *Geography*; and since he implies that the promontory of Itius marks the point at which the northern coast of Gaul begins to trend towards the east, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the promontory of Itius was Cape Grisnez, which has suffered not less than the "cap d'Alprech" from the action of the sea,<sup>1</sup> and must always have been by far the most striking headland on the north-eastern coast. (3) The nature of the Gallic harbours is nothing to the purpose. If most of them were in the mouths of rivers, the reason is obvious: they existed for trade, and the rivers were the chief means of internal communication. Caesar was not a merchant; and, as Long<sup>2</sup> points out, we have only to look for the port from which he could make the shortest and the most convenient passage to Britain. (4) The name "Isques" cannot be derived from *Itius*: the names "Ausques," "Quesques," "Clerques," "Setques" and "Wisques" are derived from *Alciacum*, *Kessiacum*, *Querthiacum*, *Sethiacum* and *Wiciacum*; and the inference is that not *Itius* but *Isiacum* would have been transformed into "Isques."<sup>3</sup> (5) Caesar did not build his ships in the Portus Itius at all, he merely assembled them there before his voyage: nor did he need to dock them; for his custom, as Long observes,<sup>4</sup> was to haul up his ships on the beach. (6) When Desjardins says that the text of Strabo requires us to identify the Portus Itius with Gesoriacum, he forgets that, on his own showing, the Portus Itius was distinct from Gesoriacum and higher up the Liane. Moreover, the text of Strabo does not require us to identify the Portus Itius with Gesoriacum. What he says is this: "There are four regular passages from the continent to the island, namely from the mouths of the Rhine, the Seine, the Loire and the Garonne. People who cross from the country near the Rhine do not sail from the mouth of that river, but from the country of the Morini . . . who also possess the Itian (roadstead), which Caesar used as his naval station, when he was crossing to the island." Dr. Guest argues that the port from which the inhabitants of the country near the Rhine sailed must have been Boulogne; and, he continues, "every unprejudiced reader . . . will be of opinion that he (Strabo) distinguishes it from his 'Itium.'"<sup>5</sup> Dr. Guest's conclusion, which is shared by many other commentators, may perhaps be open to question: but Desjardins's will certainly not commend general assent. (7) Roman roads have nothing to do with the question: for Desjardins's argument is worthless unless

<sup>1</sup> See V. de St-Martin, *Nouveau Dict. de Géogr. univ.*, ii. 542.

<sup>2</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 432.

<sup>3</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, ii. 45-7.

<sup>4</sup> *Caesar*, p. 278.

<sup>5</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 5, § 2. τέτταρα δ' ἐστὶ διάρματα, οἷς χρῶνται συνήθως ἐπὶ τὴν νῆσον ἐκ τῆς ἡπείρου, τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκβολῶν τῶν ποταμῶν, τοῦ εἰς Ῥήνον καὶ τοῦ Σηκοάνα καὶ τοῦ Λεῖγηνος καὶ τοῦ Γαροῖνα. τοῖς δ' ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ῥήνον τόπων ἀναγομένοις οὐκ ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἐκβολῶν ὁ πλοῦς ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμορουμένων τοῖς Μενάπιοις Μορινῶν, παρ' οἷς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ Ἴτιον, ὃ ἐχρήσατο ναυστάθμῳ Καῖσαρ ὁ Θεός, διαίρων εἰς τὴν νῆσον.

<sup>6</sup> *Archaeological Journal*, xxi., 1864, p. 226.



it is assumed that the port from which Caesar started must have been identical with the naval station which existed in the time of Pliny; and, I repeat, Caesar simply says that he started from the port which was most convenient for his purpose. Besides, the argument that because no Roman roads led to Wissant, therefore Wissant was not the Portus Itius, proves too much: on the same theory, Ambleteuse was not the *portus superior*; and Desjardins maintains that it was. Finally, the very fact that Boulogne,—the *portus Morinorum Britannicus*,—was called Gesoriacum, is presumptive evidence of the strongest kind that neither Boulogne nor the reach of the Liane above Boulogne was called Portus Itius. R. Schneider, who is too honest and too hard-headed to be deluded by Desjardins's attempt to draw a distinction between Gesoriacum and Portus Itius, admits that the unrecorded change of name has not been explained.<sup>1</sup> I go further and maintain that it is inexplicable.

Schneider<sup>2</sup> lays great stress upon the fact that, according to Pomponius Mela,<sup>3</sup> no harbour on the northern coast of Gaul was better known than Gesoriacum; and that Pliny<sup>4</sup> mentioned no other harbour in the country of the Morini. Unless, he argues, the Portus Itius was identical with Gesoriacum, Mela, Pliny, and the later writers must have forgotten its existence.<sup>5</sup> But is it not still more remarkable that none of these writers even hints that Gesoriacum was the Portus Itius? Schneider forgets that no writer, except Caesar, mentions the *portus superior*. The fallacy that vitiates his whole train of reasoning is the baseless assumption that Caesar, whose object was purely temporary, must necessarily have chosen for his point of departure the port which was afterwards selected as a permanent naval station.

Napoleon insists that Boulogne is the only harbour in the country, at a distance of 8 Roman miles from which one finds another,—namely Ambleteuse. But, as Schneider points out,<sup>6</sup> the argument has no force. The distance from Ambleteuse to Wissant is as nearly as possible 8 miles;<sup>7</sup> and though Wissant is only 6½ miles from Sangatte, it is not necessary to assume that Caesar would have reckoned the distance from the site of Wissant: it would, as Schneider with his customary fairness points out,<sup>8</sup> have been quite natural for him to reckon it from a point between Wissant and Cape Grisnez.

There remains another objection to Boulogne, which is, to my apprehension, well-nigh decisive. It is universally admitted that Caesar returned from his second expedition to the port from which he had started,—the Portus Itius. Describing his return, he says that “at daybreak he reached land” (*prima luce terram attigit*) and that he “beached

<sup>1</sup> *Portus Itius*, p. 19.

<sup>2</sup> *Chorographia*, iii. 2, § 23.

<sup>3</sup> *Portus Itius*, p. 13.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, p. 12.

<sup>5</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. §§ 102, 122.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, p. 6.

<sup>7</sup> Von Kampen holds that Caesar started from Ambleteuse on the first expedition and from Wissant on the second (*Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. d. comm. tabulæ*, vii.). If he is right in thinking that Caesar started from different ports on the two expeditions, I have no doubt that his conclusion is right.

<sup>8</sup> *Portus Itius*, p. 6. See also Guest's article in *Arch. Journ.*, xxi., 1864, p. 225.

the ships" (*subductis navibus*).<sup>1</sup> Both of these expressions point to the conclusion that he did not enter the mouth of a river. If the Portus Itius was in the estuary of the Liane, to haul up the ships over the banks on to the meadows would surely have been a difficult operation.

General Creuly<sup>2</sup> makes another objection to Boulogne, to which I attach no importance. He remarks that if it is identified with the Portus Itius, the *portus ulterior* must have been Ambleteuse. But, referring to Virgil's well-known line,—*tendebantque manus ripae ulterioris amore*,—he argues that the word *ulterior* implies the intervention between the Portus Itius and the *portus ulterior* of an "objet disjonctif," such as a promontory; and no such "objet" intervenes between Boulogne and Ambleteuse. Heller, on the contrary, observes that a passage in the *Germania* of Tacitus,—*proximi ripae negligenter, ultiores exquisitius*,—would seem to show that *ulterior* meant much the same as *longinquior*.<sup>3</sup>

II. Wissant is between Cape Grisnez and Cape Blauenez. It was the port selected by d'Anville; and Camden, Long, Dr. Guest, von Kampen and many other commentators identify it with the Portus Itius. In Caesar's time both capes projected much further out to sea than they do now;<sup>4</sup> and the bay formed a convenient port. T. Lewin says that he was informed by a native of Wissant that the old harbour, the configuration of which, he remarks, is still traceable, was a mile and a quarter long and 550 yards broad;<sup>5</sup> but Dr. Guest argues that the sandy plain, more than 2 miles long and varying in breadth from a quarter to half a mile, which extends between the uplands and the sand-hills, was once covered by the harbour.<sup>6</sup> It is admitted that although Wissant is now sanded up, it was a frequented harbour in the Middle Ages; and two mediæval chroniclers, William of Poitiers and William of Jumièges, called it by the name of Itius.<sup>7</sup> Long<sup>8</sup> argues that its distance from Sangatte corresponds with the distance between the port from which Caesar started on his first expedition and

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, v. 23, § 6, 24, § 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, p. 308.

<sup>3</sup> *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, 1865, p. 164.

<sup>4</sup> V. de St-Martin, *Nouveau Dict. de Géogr. univ.*, ii. 542; *Mém. couronnés par l'Acad. Roy. des sciences . . . de Bruxelles*, vi., 1827, pp. 149-50,—"*le Blanez . . . s'avancait autrefois à plus d'une lieue en mer.*"

<sup>5</sup> *The Invasion of Britain by Julius Caesar*, 1862, p. xl. Lewin argues that this would have been too small. According to Desjardins (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, t. i., Pl. xv., p. 352), who holds that the Liane was much broader in Caesar's time than it is now, the Portus Itius was about 4 kilometres long, and its breadth varied from about 250 to 700 yards. Assuming provisionally that Lewin's measurements are right, any one who feels obliged to accept his conclusion should study a map in the British Museum, called *Plan général du port de Boulogne, avec les dispositions proposées . . . pour sortir du port dans une marée 300 batimens portant une armée de 60,000 hommes*, 1822. Moreover, as I have shown, Caesar's ships were beached.

<sup>6</sup> *Archæological Journal*, xxi., 1864, p. 223. See *Carte de l'État-Major* (1:80,000), Sheet 1.

<sup>7</sup> Caroli du Fresne *Dissertatio de Portu Iccio*, 1694, pp. 105-20. See also *Arch. Journ.*, xxi., 1864, pp. 228-9.

<sup>8</sup> *Caesar*, pp. 278, 285.

the *portus ulterior*; that its distance from the English coast agrees "at least as well as any other place" with the number XXX; that its name, which the French sailors call Essen and the Flemings Isten, "is near enough to Itius to add to the probability of the identity of the two places"; that there are traces of a Roman road from Wissant to Théronanne; that in the neighbourhood of Wissant "fresh water was abundant, the soil rich, and the beach the best that there could be for such ships as Caesar's"; and that although Wissant is not, strictly speaking, a port at all, "Caesar did not want a port in the modern sense of the word. He wanted his ships at the nearest place to Britain. . . . His vessels would be hauled up on the beach till the wind was fair. He had no port on the British coast, and he hauled up all his ships after they were damaged by a storm (v. ii.)." "This long sandy beach," he says, "was the best place along all this coast for Caesar's purpose."

Of these arguments the first, *mutatis mutandis*, is equally applicable to Boulogne and Ambleteuse. The second might, I think, have been put more strongly: the distance of Wissant both from Deal and from Hythe agrees better than that of any other place with the number XXX. The argument from nomenclature, however, is worthless: "Wissant" is not derived from "Itius,"—it is merely a corruption of "Whitesand." The evidence for the Roman road is questionable.<sup>1</sup> The last of Long's arguments is the one that goes furthest to prove the identity of the Portus Itius with Wissant.

Heller deduces an argument in favour of Wissant from Caesar's narrative of his second voyage. Caesar set sail about sunset with a light south-westerly wind. About midnight the wind dropped: the fleet, borne by the tide, drifted out of its course; and at daybreak Caesar saw Britain "left behind him on the left side."<sup>2</sup> From the last statement Heller infers that the fleet drifted to some point east or south-east, of the North Foreland. Caesar, he says, could have reached a point 2 German miles south-east of that promontory if he had started from Wissant,—but not if he had started from Boulogne. Appealing to the authority of T. Lewin,<sup>3</sup> he says that ships could not have drifted with the current more than 3 miles an hour.<sup>4</sup> Schneider,<sup>5</sup> on the contrary, maintains that the fleet could have reached from Boulogne the point, just east of the Goodwin Sands, which is indicated in Napoleon's Plan (Planche 16). Now Caesar started on his second expedition towards the end of July,—according to Napoleon, on the 20th. On that day the sun set at 8·3; and on the following morning it rose at 4·10. There must have been light enough to show the British coast

<sup>1</sup> Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i. 356, note.

<sup>2</sup> Ad solis occasum naves solvit et leni Africo provectus, media circiter nocte vento intermisso, cursum non tenuit et longius delatus aestu orta luce sub sinistra Britanniam relictam conspexit, *B.<sup>o</sup>G.*, v. 8, § 2.

<sup>3</sup> *The Invasion of Britain by Julius Caesar*, p. 82. An experienced pilot and a ship-captain consulted by a correspondent of Lewin stated that "a loaded vessel would drift about 12 or 14 miles in the six hours when the tide is at its greatest velocity."

<sup>4</sup> *Zeitschrift für allgemeine Ethnologie*, 1865, p. 122.

<sup>5</sup> *Portus Itius*, pp. 10-11.

at least as early as 3·30. According to Napoleon, Caesar sailed, *with a light wind*, 40 kilometres, or about 25 miles, between 8·3 and midnight, and drifted 17 kilometres, or more than 10 miles, between midnight and 3·30 A.M. His ships were flat-bottomed and not designed for speed. I believe, then, that every candid inquirer will admit that Heller has probability on his side.

Lewin<sup>1</sup> calls attention to Caesar's statement that when he returned from his first expedition, the soldiers who disembarked from the two vessels that were carried "further down," that is to say, south of the port where he himself landed, were attacked by the Morini; and that the assailants, being unable, owing to a drought, to take refuge in the marshes whither they had retreated in the previous summer, were obliged to surrender to Labienus. These facts, Lewin argues, prove that the Portus Itius was not Wissant; for there are no marshes between Wissant and Boulogne. Now, to begin with, it is not proved that the marshes in question were in the neighbourhood of the place where the soldiers landed; and moreover, as Dr. Guest remarks, "in Caesar's time every brook must have had its marsh, and no one who has explored the Slacq valley and its tributaries above Ambleteuse will be at a loss to discover the locality where . . . the Morini might have found a refuge."<sup>2</sup>

Schneider argues that Wissant was not sheltered from the west, the north-west or the north wind.<sup>3</sup> I reply first, that in Caesar's time, when both Cape Grisnez and Cape Blancnez extended very much further northward than they do now, the intervening bay would have been well sheltered from westerly winds; and secondly, that, as Caesar's ships were probably drawn up high and dry on the beach, the winds would not have hurt them.

Professor W. Ridgeway<sup>4</sup> argues that if Strabo is to be believed, the Portus Itius can only be identified with Wissant. Strabo calls the port τὸ Ἴτιον. This word, observes Professor Ridgeway, is obviously an adjective, and as it agrees with a neuter word understood, it cannot agree with λιμὴν or κόλπος (a harbour), but must agree with ἄκρον or ἀκρωτήριον (a headland). Evidently, then, Strabo's τὸ Ἴτιον is the same as Ptolemy's Ἴτιον ἄκρον. Similarly, Strabo<sup>5</sup> speaks of Cape Finisterre as Νέριον, while Ptolemy<sup>6</sup> calls it Νέριον ἀκρωτήριον. Now Strabo does not call τὸ Ἴτιον a harbour, but only a roadstead (ναύσταθμον), a term which Thucydides<sup>7</sup> applies to Cape Malea. Thus, if Strabo was right, the Portus Itius was the roadstead sheltered by the Itian promontory.

What did Caesar mean when he said that the passage from the Portus Itius was the most convenient? *Ceteris paribus*, the most convenient passage would be the shortest. If the shortest passage could be made from a port where it was possible for 800 small vessels to assemble and

<sup>1</sup> *The Invasion of Britain by Julius Caesar*, p. xlii.

<sup>2</sup> *Arch. Journ.*, xxi., 1864, p. 226.

<sup>3</sup> *Portus Itius*, p. 16.

<sup>4</sup> *Journal of Philology*, xix., 1891, pp. 141-2.

<sup>5</sup> *Geogr.*, iii. 3, § 5.

<sup>6</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 6, § 2.

<sup>7</sup> iii. 6.

await a favourable wind, if the shortest passage was not inconvenienced by currents which would unduly prolong the duration of the voyage, the shortest passage was unquestionably the most convenient. The passage from Wissant was shorter than any other. The merits of Wissant as a port have been faithfully described by Dr. Guest and by Long. Is any one prepared to prove that currents would have made the short voyage from Wissant last longer than the long voyage from Boulogne?

III. The French Commission<sup>1</sup> identify the Portus Itius with Ambleteuse. They argue that Strabo affirms the existence of two ports in the country of the Morini; that one of the two was evidently Gesoriacum; and that the Portus Itius was therefore something different. General Creuly,<sup>2</sup> who rejects Boulogne and Wissant for the reasons which I have already given, decides for Ambleteuse on the ground that its distance from Wissant corresponds with Caesar's statement of the distance which separated his own port of embarkation from the *portus ulterior*, and that the intervention of Cape Grisnez between Ambleteuse and Wissant would have justified Caesar in describing the latter as the *portus ulterior*.

The text of Strabo may prove, as the text of Caesar certainly proves, that the Morini had another port besides the Portus Itius;<sup>3</sup> it does not prove that the Portus Itius was Ambleteuse. Indeed, as I have already shown, if Strabo knew what he was writing about, it rather tends to prove that the Portus Itius was Wissant. As for General Creuly, if the distance from Ambleteuse to Wissant justifies us in identifying Ambleteuse with the Portus Itius and Wissant with the *portus ulterior*, the distance from Wissant to Sangatte, as I have also shown, equally justifies us in identifying Wissant with the Portus Itius and Sangatte with the *portus ulterior*. And, if Cape Grisnez is an "objet disjonctif" between Ambleteuse and Wissant, Cape Blancenez was, in Caesar's time, a most prominent "objet disjonctif" between Wissant and Sangatte.

The truth is that not a single strong argument ever has been or can be adduced in favour of Ambleteuse. No ancient, no mediæval writer ever called it the Portus Itius. It possesses no sheltered roadstead; and the harbour is far too small to have contained Caesar's fleet. It is further from Britain than Wissant; and the merest tiro in Caesar's army could have decided in five minutes between the merits of the two ports. Whatever pretensions it may have are negatived by the evidence of Strabo. So true is all this that Ambleteuse no longer counts a single defender.

IV. Calais is not less friendless; and I only consider its claims because their one modern advocate, von Goler, holds a distinguished position among Caesarian scholars. The argument which he adduced

<sup>1</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, ii. 45-7.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, pp. 307-8.

<sup>3</sup> Whether Strabo meant that besides the four ports which he had just mentioned, there was another in the country of the Morini, or that the Morini had more than one port, matters nothing; for we know already from the *Commentaries* that the Morini had at least two ports.

in its favour I have shown to be worthless. There is no evidence that it was ever used as a harbour in, or for thirteen centuries after, the time of Caesar. If Caesar started from the Portus Itius on his first expedition, it is impossible, on the theory that Calais was the Portus Itius, to find the *portus ulterior*. And, as Calais harbour is 21 kilometres from the Itian promontory and was separated from it by the ports of Sangatte and Wissant, it would be absurd to maintain that Calais was ever called the Portus Itius.

To sum up. Prolonged study of the question has gradually led scholars to the conviction that the choice lies between Wissant and Boulogne. I believe that Boulogne is not the Portus Itius, because there is no evidence that it was ever called by that name, while it is certain that it was called Gesoriacum; because Caesar would not have increased the length of his voyage by 9 miles without strong reason; because he could have had no such reason, except the alleged convenience of the harbour at Boulogne; because his own narrative shows that he did not require that convenience, but as a rule simply beached his ships; and because the chief advocate of Boulogne rightly admits that his choice was wrong unless the Itian promontory was the Cap d'Alprech, whereas there is hardly any doubt but that it was Cape Grisnez. I believe that Wissant is the Portus Itius, because there appears to be direct evidence,—the evidence of Strabo,—that it was called by that name; because, alone among all the harbours in the country of the Morini, it was called by that name in the Middle Ages; because in the Middle Ages it was a frequented port; because, assuming that Caesar's ships could have assembled and remained there for a few weeks in safety, it was the most convenient port from which he could have started; because this assumption is justified by his narrative as well as by the strong probability that, in his time, the port of Wissant was a spacious harbour in the true sense of the word, and by the certainty that it was sheltered by two great flanking promontories, that the beach was convenient and that there was abundant fresh water near; because Wissant was the nearest port to Britain; and because the promontory under the shelter of which it lay was called Cape Itius.<sup>1</sup>

If the identity of the Portus Itius with Wissant cannot be *proved* in the same sense as the identity of Alesia with Mont Auxois, I am confident that it will sooner or later be generally accepted as morally certain.

**Latobrigi.**—It will be convenient to treat of the Latobrigi in conjunction with the Raurici and the Tulingi. All three peoples were near neighbours of the Helvetii;<sup>2</sup> and, according to Ptolemy,<sup>3</sup> the chief

<sup>1</sup> See *Arch. Journ.*, xxi., 1864, pp. 227-8. "Cape Grisnez," says Dr. Guest, "there can hardly be a doubt, was the Itian promontory, and if so, the great port which lay beneath it must have been the Itian Port." No man has ever brought to the study of this question a greater personal knowledge of the topography than Dr. Guest.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, i. 5, § 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Geogr.*, ed. C. Müller, ii. 9, § 9. Cf. Müller's note (p. 231) with *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 77, d'Anville's *Notice sur l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 97-9, and Walckenaer's

towns of the Raurici were Augusta (Augst), about 7 miles east by south of Basle, and Argentovaria, which was probably near Heidelberg, close to the common frontier of the former departments of Haut-Rhin and Bas-Rhin.

J. D. Schoepflin<sup>1</sup> remarks that Pliny<sup>2</sup> places the Raurici between the Sequani and the Helvetii, and infers that they occupied the slopes of the Jura, their territory being bounded on the east by the Aar and the Rhine, on the south by the ridge of the Jura between the sources of the Birse and the Pierre-Pertuis, and on the west by the branch of the Jura known as Lomont. As a matter of fact, Pliny only mentions the Raurici between the Sequani and the Helvetii, which, as any careful reader of Pliny will admit, is no proof that they separated the two peoples; and Caesar distinctly says that the Jura separated the Helvetii from the Sequani.<sup>3</sup> Ptolemy, Schoepflin argues, is mistaken in assigning Argentovaria to the Raurici: their territory did not extend so far northward; otherwise the territory of the Sequani would not have touched the Rhine; and Caesar says that it did. But if the territory on the north of Argentovaria is rightly assigned to the Triboci (*q.v.*), and if they crossed the Rhine with Ariovistus, Schoepflin's argument collapses; for Ariovistus's followers settled in the territory of the Sequani.<sup>4</sup>

According to the principle of the dioceses, to which I have often referred, the territory of the Raurici, in the imperial epoch, corresponded with the diocese of Basle; and if so, it extended as far northward as Markolsheim: but if its extent was as great in the time of Caesar, it was perhaps included in the territory of the Sequani; for Caesar does not mention the Raurici among the peoples whose territory reached the western bank of the Rhine.<sup>5</sup> C. Martin,<sup>6</sup> however, argues that the Raurici could not have been clients of the Sequani because Caesar, in his enumeration of the tribal levies which were raised for the relief of Alesia, couples the Raurici with the Boii and mentions them quite apart from the Sequani; whereas he mentions the clients of the Aedui and of the Arverni respectively in the same breath, as it were, with those two tribes.<sup>7</sup> This reasoning appears to me to be sound, and also to prove that the Raurici were not, as W. Gisi<sup>8</sup> supposes, a *pagus* of the Sequani. On the other hand, L. W. Ravenèz<sup>9</sup> argues that the Raurici must have been clients of the Sequani, because Caesar does not mention them in *B. G.*, iv. 10 among the tribes who dwelt on the banks of the Rhine. But neither does he mention among those tribes the Nemetes or the Eburones or the Menapii. In *B. G.*, vi. 25, §§ 1-2, he says that the Hercynian forest, which was wholly in Germany, was con-

*Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 521. Artzenheim, near Markolsheim, which d'Anville and Walckenaer identify with Argentovaria, is about 5 miles south of Heidelberg.

<sup>1</sup> *L'Alsace illustrée* (translated by L. W. Ravenèz, 1849), i. 89-90.

<sup>2</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 17 (31), § 106.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 31, § 10.

<sup>4</sup> *Questions alsaciennes*, 1867, p. 18.

<sup>5</sup> *Anzeiger für schweizerische Alterthumskunde*, 1884, p. 82.

<sup>6</sup> *L'Alsace illustrée*, i. 380-81.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, i. 2, § 3.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, iv. 10, § 3.

<sup>9</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 75, §§ 2-3.

terminous with the territory of the Raurici; and Schneider<sup>1</sup> infers that when the Raurici left their country to join the Helvetian emigration, some of them remained at home. But Caesar also says that the Hercynian forest was conterminous with the territory of the Helvetii, which, if we may accept his express statement,<sup>2</sup> was wholly on the left bank of the Rhine; and therefore it is possible that the territory of the Raurici was wholly on the same bank.

Martin argues further that the Latobrigi, Raurici and Tulingi must all have been conterminous with the Helvetii,<sup>3</sup> because Caesar calls them neighbours (*finitimi*) of that people; that they were Gauls, not Germans; and therefore that their territories must have been entirely on the left bank of the Rhine. The fact, he goes on to say, that Caesar expressly says that the Boii, who were associated with the Latobrigi, the Raurici and the Tulingi in their emigration, dwelt on the eastern bank of the Rhine, proves by implication that the other three tribes did not. Following the indications of Ptolemy, he says that the territory of the Raurici extended along the western bank of the Rhine, from the Helvetian frontier as far as the northern frontier of Upper Alsace, and was bounded on the west by the Ill. In order to maintain this view, he argues that Caesar never intended to say that the territory of the Sequani touched the Rhine, a view which I refute elsewhere.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, even if Martin is right in his delimitation of the territory of the Raurici, it does not follow that Sequania did not touch the Rhine.<sup>5</sup> Martin admits that there are no texts which show directly the whereabouts of the Latobrigi and Tulingi: but he thinks that local names, such as Larg, Oberlarg, Largitzen, Thur, Thuringheim and Thurbourg, indicate their position; and he maintains that, in the tenth century, the Tulingi were called Thuringi. Accordingly, he places the Tulingi in the valley of the Thur, between the Ill, the Doller, the Vosges and the Eckenbach; and the Latobrigi between the Vosges, the Doller and the Ill.<sup>6</sup>

These arguments are worth nothing. Caesar often uses the word *finitimus* loosely.<sup>7</sup> If one of the three tribes had been conterminous with the Helvetii, and the other two had been at all near that one, he would not have hesitated to call them all three *finitimi* of the Helvetii. Indeed, if none of the three had been, strictly speaking, conterminous with the Helvetii, he might have called them *finitimi* of that people; for he calls the Santones, who dwelt in Charente-Inférieure, *finitimi* of the Provincia.<sup>8</sup> In the argument based upon Caesar's statement about the Boii there is a contradiction, which Martin overlooks: if the Boii, who, on his own showing, were undoubtedly Gauls, dwelt on the eastern bank of the Rhine, why should not the other tribes have done so too?

<sup>1</sup> Caesar, i. 57.

<sup>2</sup> B. G., i. 1, § 5, 2, § 3.

<sup>3</sup> Martin does not mean exactly what he says; for on his own showing, the Latobrigi and the Tulingi were not conterminous with the Helvetii.

<sup>4</sup> See note on the SEQUANI.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>6</sup> *Questions alsaciennes*, pp. 4-5, 8-12, 16.

<sup>7</sup> See B. G., i. 10, § 2; iii. 7, § 3, 20, § 2; vii. 7, § 5.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, i. 10, § 2.



Besides, Martin forgets that the Menapii, who were also Gauls, had territory on both banks of the Rhine.<sup>1</sup> Doubtful similarity in names proves nothing. There is not much resemblance between *Larg* and *Latobrigi*, and there is no proof that the Thuringi were the same people as the Tulingi, or that, if they were, the Thuringi of the tenth century occupied the same territory as the Tulingi of Caesar's time. Walckenaer,<sup>2</sup> who is followed by Napoleon,<sup>3</sup> places the Tulingi in the south of the Grand Duchy of Baden, and believes that Stuhlingen, a town near Schaffhausen, derives its name from theirs. Walckenaer and Martin cannot both be right, and may both be wrong.

Walckenaer,<sup>4</sup> arguing from similarity of names, places the Latobrigi in the neighbourhood of Brugge, on the river Bregge or Briggach (query—Brege?), a tributary of the Danube. But the French Commission,<sup>5</sup> perhaps more wisely, confess ignorance. The form *Latobrigi*, on which Walckenaer's conjecture is based, is not certain: Gluck and A. Holder prefer *Latovici*.<sup>6</sup> Cluver<sup>7</sup> rejects Walckenaer's view (which had been advocated long before Walckenaer's time); for, he argues, it is difficult to see who the Germans that were continuous with the Helvetii<sup>8</sup> could have been unless they dwelt in the valley of the upper Rhine, between Lake Constance and the Aar, that is to say in the district which Walckenaer assigns to the Latobrigi. He goes on to argue that there was no room for either the Tulingi or the Latobrigi beyond the Jura, and therefore that they must have dwelt either on the east or on the south of the Helvetii. He concludes that the Latobrigi dwelt in that part of the Valais which was not occupied by the Nantuates, Veragri and Seduni, namely on the east of the last-named people, in the district round Brige; and the only place which he can find, left for the Tulingi is in the valley of the Rhine, above Lake Constance.

I am not concerned to defend Walckenaer, who simply made a guess; but Cluver's argument does not refute him. If the Latobrigi were a small tribe, there was room for them as well as the Germans between Lake Constance and the Aar; and when Caesar said that the Rhine separated the Helvetii from the Germans, he may have been thinking of the Germans who dwelt on the north of Lake Constance, through which the Rhine flows. Besides, Caesar's geographical statements are often loose.<sup>9</sup> As for the Tulingi, they may have been where Cluver places them or they may not. And if *Latovici*, not *Latobrigi*, is the true form, Cluver's "Brige" helps us no more than Walckenaer's "Bregge."

To conclude. It is impossible to do more than guess at the positions of the Latobrigi (or Latovici) and Tulingi: but the conjecture which assigns to the latter the country round Stuhlingen appears to me

<sup>1</sup> B. G., iv. 4, § 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 559.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 46, n. 3; *Centralblatt für Anthropologie, Ethnologie und Urgeschichte*, 1897, p. 69.

<sup>4</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 559-60.

<sup>5</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, ii. 13.

<sup>6</sup> See p. 818, and P. Geyer in *Jahresberichte d. philol. Vereins*, v., 1879, p. 333.

<sup>7</sup> *Germania antiqua*, 1631, pp. 358-9.

<sup>8</sup> B. G., i. 2, § 3. <sup>9</sup> See p. 328.

probable. As for the Raurici, the evidence of Ptolemy is not decisive; for, like the Ubii and other Rhenish peoples, they may have changed their abode before Ptolemy wrote; or their territory may have been smaller in Caesar's time than in Ptolemy's. All that we can say for certain regarding their habitat in Caesar's time is that it must have been near the Upper Rhine: what Caesar says about the Hercynian forest proves that. They sent a contingent to the relief of Vercingetorix; and it is hardly credible that such a contingent would have been sent by a Transrhenane people. The solution of the puzzle may be that, as Napoleon holds, the Raurici dwelt, in Caesar's time, on both banks of the Rhine. I find it difficult to believe that any of the three peoples could have been clients or *pagi* of the Sequani; for if they had been, it is unlikely that the Sequani would have acquiesced in their emigration.

**Lemovices.**—The Lemovices possessed the dioceses of Limoges and of Tulle, which was severed in 1318 from the ancient diocese of Limoges.<sup>1</sup> This territory corresponded roughly with the departments of Haute-Vienne, Corrèze and Creuse.

**Lemovices Armorici.**—In the enumeration of the states that were called upon to furnish contingents for the relief of Vercingetorix, are mentioned two tribes which bear the name *Lemovices*. The position of one, which is mentioned immediately after the Bellovaci, I have just defined. The name of the other occurs in the enumeration of the Armorican tribes.<sup>2</sup> This second tribe is mentioned nowhere else by Caesar, and is not mentioned at all by any other writer; and the appearance of the name in this passage has given rise to much discussion. Davis, Oudendorp and Schneider retain the word because it is found in all the MSS. Nipperdey<sup>3</sup> considers that *Lemovices* was written by some copyist in mistake for *Lexovii*. Desjardins,<sup>4</sup> following Frigell, proposes to substitute *Nannetes* for *Lemovices* and *Veneti*, which appear side by side in Caesar's list,—an idle conjecture, which leaves the question exactly where it was. De Valois<sup>5</sup> is inclined to read *Leonnenses*, the assumed name of the Gallic inhabitants of the district of Léon in southern Brittany; and d'Anville<sup>6</sup> approves of the conjecture, though for *Leonnenses* he would substitute *Leonnices*, "pour s'écarter d'autant moins de ce qui est écrit *Lemovices*." Walckenaer<sup>7</sup> remarks that some of the MSS. of Ptolemy assign the town of Ratiatum to the Λιμονίκοι (*Lemovices*), while others give the Pictones two chief towns,—Limonum (Poitiers) and Ratiatum,—and mention *Augustoritum* (Limoges) as the capital of the *Lemovices*.<sup>8</sup> "Ne doit-on pas croire," he asks, "d'après cela, que les *Limovici* étaient probablement mentionnés deux fois dans Ptolémée comme dans César,

<sup>1</sup> See d'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 407, and *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, ii. 82.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 75, §§ 3-4.

<sup>3</sup> *Caesar*, pp. 167-8.

<sup>4</sup> *Notitia Galliarum*, p. 269.

<sup>5</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 369.

<sup>6</sup> *Géogr.*, ii. 7, §§ 5, 9. See C. Muller's ed., pp. 202-4.

<sup>7</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 705-6.

<sup>8</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 408.

et que les copistes, ayant considéré cette double mention comme une faute, auront fait disparaître un des deux *Limovici*?"

Maximin Deloche<sup>1</sup> develops Walckenaer's suggestion. He rejects the emendations of de Valois and d'Anville, because there is no evidence of the existence of any ancient Gallic tribe called *Leonenses* or *Leonices*. He goes on to say, in pursuance of Walckenaer's argument, that the MS. of Ptolemy known as A (No. 1401 of the Bibliothèque nationale) wrongly assigns Ratiatum to the Lemovices and both Limonum and Augustoritum to the Pictones. "Ces transpositions," he observes, "sont d'autant plus étranges, que le paragraphe relatif aux Pictones (§ 5) est séparé du paragraphe des Limovices (§ 9) par les paragraphes 6, 7 et 8, et qu'il a fallu un motif particulier pour que le copiste du manuscrit A plaçât Ratiatum chez les Limovices; et on ne peut s'expliquer cette circonstance qu'en admettant, suivant la conjecture de M. Walckenaer, que les Limovices se trouvaient nommés dans le paragraphe des Pictones." This explanation seems to me unconvincing. If, as Walckenaer and Deloche maintain, Ptolemy mentioned a people called Lemovices in § 5 and another people of the same name in § 9, how are we to account for the fact that none of the MSS. exhibit, in these two sections, the names of any towns except Ratiatum and Limonum, which unquestionably belonged to the Pictones, and Augustoritum, which unquestionably belonged to the Lemovices of Limoges? To quote C. Muller, the best editor of Ptolemy (p. 202), "Contusio ista forte e tabula fluxit in qua Ratiati et Augustoriti nomina permutata erant. Similes errores Aquitaniae tabula habet in codice A, ubi positioni in Cadurcorum finibus notatae *Mediolanum* (quod est Santonum opp.) adscribitur, dum vera Mediolani positio indicatur quidem, sed nomine caret," etc.

Deloche then proceeds to search for the Armorican Lemovices. From the fact that Caesar has not distinguished them by any surname analogous to that of the Auleri Cenomani, he concludes that they were merely a branch of the inland Lemovices. We learn, he says, from the anonymous author of *La Vie de St-Waast*, who flourished about A.D. 667, that there was once, in western Gaul, a people called *Leuci*. Scattered over a strip of territory which extends from a little to the east of Limoges along a chain of heights in a westerly, and then a north-westerly direction to the Bay of Biscay, near St-Jean-des-Monts, are to be found vestiges of this people and proofs of their Lemovician origin. Such are the names—*La Mothe-Limousin*, *Le Puy Limousin*, *La Limouzinière*, etc. Appealing to the anthropological observations of Dufour,<sup>2</sup> Deloche maintains that the aforesaid chain of heights was inhabited by a race different from that of the neighbouring Pictones; and from the evidence of nomenclature, specimens of which I have just given, he concludes that this race "was the Lemovices Armoricani. Finally, to the anticipated objection that this theory requires a curtailment of the territory of the Pictones, he replies that it ought to be

<sup>1</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. impériale des antiquaires de France*, xxiii., 1857, pp. 51, 56-63, 67-78.

<sup>2</sup> *Ancien Poitou*, pp. 111-12.

curtailed; for the Pictones only contributed 8000 men to the army destined for the relief of Vercingetorix, whereas the Armorican Lemovices contributed 10,000.

Deloche's anthropological argument is absolutely worthless; and it is certain that, if he had studied the ethnology of Gaul as a whole, he would never have adduced it. Generally speaking, however, when a reading is found in all the MSS. of an ancient writer, a critic who rejects it is more likely to be wrong than right. If there were two tribes of Bituriges and three tribes of Aulerci, there may also have been two tribes of Lemovices. Limousin, the name of the province which roughly corresponded with the territory of the inland Lemovices, is unquestionably derived from their name; and it is certainly remarkable that in the territory which Deloche assigns to their alleged Armorican kinsmen there are two places bearing a name of which the same word forms a part, as well as a third of which the name is the obviously analogous *Limouzininière*. But Deloche has not proved his case; and it is not capable of proof.<sup>1</sup> I have therefore not marked the territory of the alleged Armorican Lemovices on my map.

**Leuci.**—The Leuci, in the opinion of the French Commission, possessed the ancient dioceses of Verdun and Toul, as they were before the dioceses of St-Dié and Nancy were severed from them, or the department of Vosges and the southern parts of the departments of Meuse and Meurthe-et-Moselle.<sup>2</sup> The diocese of Verdun corresponded with the territory of the Verodunenses, who are not mentioned by Caesar; and I am inclined to agree with Walckenaer and M. A. Longnon that they were a *pagus* or clients of the Mediomatrici (*q.v.*), not of the Leuci: but it is impossible to decide the question.

**Levaci.**—See NERVII.

**Lexovii.**—The Lexovii certainly possessed the diocese of Lisieux: <sup>3</sup> the only question is whether they did not possess something more. The members of the French Commission were not unanimous;<sup>4</sup> the majority decided that to the diocese of Lisieux must be added the dioceses of Bayeux and Séez, because Caesar does not mention either the Viducasses or the Baiocasses,<sup>5</sup> both of whom must therefore, in their opinion, have been clients of the Lexovii; and because he couples the Lexovii, without mentioning any intermediate people, with the Unelli, while between the known territory of the Unelli and the diocese of Lisieux intervene the territories of the Viducasses and Baiocasses. M. A. Longnon is inclined to agree.<sup>6</sup> He also considers that the Lexovii are identical with the Esvii: but in my notice of the Esvii (*q.v.*) I

<sup>1</sup> The French Commission (*Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, ii. 82) agree with Deloche.

<sup>2</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, ii. 87.

<sup>3</sup> D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 413; Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 394-5.

<sup>4</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 114, ii. 90-91; *Rev. arch. nouv. sér.*, t. ix., 1864, p. 408.

<sup>5</sup> The Baiocasses are not mentioned under that name by any author before the compiler of the *Notitia provinciarum*: but Pliny doubtless referred to them when he wrote *Bodiocasses*, *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 18 (32), § 107.

<sup>6</sup> *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 5.

have combated this opinion. Desjardins identifies the joint territories of the Viducasses and Baiocasses with the territory of the Esuvii. He argues further that, as Caesar does not mention the Lexovii in *B. G.*, vii. 75 among the maritime peoples, their territory probably did not touch the sea.<sup>1</sup> But this view is refuted (1) by the fact that no known people intervened between the Lexovii and the sea, and (2) by the fact that the Lexovii are placed by Strabo<sup>2</sup> and Ptolemy<sup>3</sup> at the mouth of the Seine, and by Strabo, in another passage, on the sea-coast. Moreover, it is doubtful whether Caesar did not mention the Lexovii in the passage to which Desjardins refers.<sup>4</sup>

**Limonum.**—Limonum has generally been identified with Poitiers: but M. Wauters<sup>5</sup> prefers Vieux-Poitiers, which, though now an obscure village, was, he says, in the eighth century, a place of some importance. His arguments are much the same as those by which he labours to prove that Durocortorum was at Vieux-Leims. Vestiges of a theatre and other antiquities have been discovered, he says, at Vieux-Poitiers; and a Roman road connects it with Poitiers. I do not think that these arguments are sufficient to overthrow a belief which is supported by the evidence of the itineraries, and has been held *semper, ubique, ab omnibus*. M. Wauters, however, regards the evidence of the itineraries as irrelevant. He would admit that there was on the site of Poitiers a Gallo-Roman town called Limonum: but he would deny that that town was identical with the Gallic Limonum mentioned by Hirtius. See, however, DUROCORTORUM.

**Lingones.**—The Lingones possessed the diocese of Langres, as it was before the diocese of Dijon was severed from it.<sup>6</sup> To this territory M. A. Longnon<sup>7</sup> adds the dioceses of Troyes and Chalons-sur-Marne, representing the territories of the Tricasses and the Cativellauni, two tribes not mentioned by Caesar, whom, contrary to the prevailing opinion, he regards as clients of the Lingones. He argues that his view is the only one that can be reconciled with the passage in which Strabo<sup>8</sup> says that the Lingones were conterminous on the north with the Mediomatrici (*q.v.*). I am not sure that Strabo's words necessarily mean this: but if they do, he may have made a mistake, as Long believes.<sup>9</sup> For the territory of the Cativellauni is generally assigned to the Remi (*q.v.*); and, on M. Longnon's theory, the territory of the Remi appears to be unduly small<sup>10</sup> and that of the Lingones unduly large.

Von Goler<sup>11</sup> maintains that the diocese of Dijon must have belonged, in Caesar's time, not to the Lingones but to the Mandubii; for otherwise, he argues, the Helvetii would not have taken four days to march from the neighbourhood of Bibracte to the frontier of the Lingones.

<sup>1</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 489.

<sup>2</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. i, § 14, 3, § 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 8, § 5.

<sup>4</sup> See Nipperdey's *Caesar*, pp. 107-8, and Holder's *Caesar*, p. 192.

<sup>5</sup> *Bull. de l'Acad. Roy. de Bruxelles*, 3<sup>e</sup> série, t. 1, 1881, pp. 558-62.

<sup>6</sup> D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 417.

<sup>7</sup> *Atlas hist. de la France*, pp. 5, 6.

<sup>8</sup> ὑπὲρ τῶν Μεδιοματρικῶν Λαῦκοι καὶ τῶν Αἰγγυῶν τι μέρος. *Geogr.*, ii. 3, § 4.

<sup>9</sup> W. Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geogr.*, ii. 194.

<sup>10</sup> See *B. G.*, vi. 12, §§ 7-9.

<sup>11</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, pp. 331-2.

But von Güler made the mistake of placing the scene of the Helvetian defeat at Château Chinon, on the north, instead of on the south of Bibracte. From the site which Colonel Stoffel rightly identifies with the battle-field<sup>1</sup> to the nearest point of the frontier of the Lingones as ordinarily traced, the distance, *in a direct line*, is over 50 miles. The distance actually traversed would have been, say, a fifth longer than the distance in a direct line; and there is no evidence that the Helvetii marched towards the nearest point of the frontier.<sup>2</sup> Von Güler's argument therefore collapses.

**Magetobriga.**—Regarding the site of Magetobriga, the scene of the decisive victory which Ariovistus gained over the Aedui and their allies,<sup>3</sup> enough has been written to stock a small library. But it all amounts to guess-work, more or less ingenious; for Caesar gives us no indication whatever of the site, and thus there is nothing to go upon, except the name, which is itself doubtful.

Belley identifies the site with a place which he calls Moigte-de-Broye, near the confluence of the Oignon and the Saône; but no such place is to be found in any map, except Belley's own.<sup>4</sup> J. D. Schoepflin, however, who wrote in 1751-1761, affirmed<sup>5</sup> that in his time there was a place of that name. At Moigte-de-Broye, says Belley, a piece of pottery was found, bearing the inscription MAG. ETOB: but this piece of evidence, such as it was, has long been generally discredited; for, if Walckenaer<sup>6</sup> is to be believed, "on a eu soin de perdre presque aussitôt après l'avoir trouvé." Not content, however, with exposing the futility of Belley's conjecture, Walckenaer must needs make one of his own; and his choice falls upon Amage, near Luxeuil. Most absurd of all, Desjardins, who is never tired of ridiculing the antiquaries who waste their time and ingenuity in the conjectural restoration of Gallic geography, dogmatically asserts that Admagetobriga was near Broye,—the same place, I suppose, which Belley calls Moigte-de-Broye,—near the confluence of the Oignon and the Saône, without troubling himself to produce any evidence or to offer any argument in support of his assertion.<sup>7</sup>

And now, absurd as it may seem, I am going to have my say. Of all the guesses Belley's is the least likely to be wrong. I give reasons, on page 812, for believing that the true form of the name of the town near which the battle was fought, is not *Admagetobriga* but *Magetobriga* or *Magetobria*. That questionable piece of pottery may after all have been really lost; and if it ever existed, it was evidence of a sort.<sup>8</sup> Anyhow there is no other, good, bad or indifferent.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 618-20.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 623-5.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, i. 31, § 12.

<sup>4</sup> See the map facing p. 165 of d'Anville's *Éclaircissements sur l'ancienne Gaule*.

<sup>5</sup> *L'Alsace illustrée*, pp. 216-18.

<sup>6</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 319-20.

<sup>7</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 355.

<sup>8</sup> F. Fiedler indeed says (*Geographie des transalpinischen Galliens*, 1828, pp. 45-6), apparently on the authority of some members of the Academy of Dijon, that the piece of pottery was still preserved at that town at the time when he wrote (1828?): but I cannot find any confirmation of his statement.

<sup>9</sup> M. d'A. de Jubainville thinks that Admagetobriga, as he spells it, may have been on the site of Moyeuve in Lorraine. *Les noms gaulois chez César et Hirtius de B. G.*, 1891, pp. 82-3.

But to my mind the mere fact that Ariovistus defeated the Gauls is enough; for Caesar does not describe the battle, he merely registers it. The curious, however, may refer to d'Anville, Walckenaer, Long (*Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 35, n. 7), the *Dictionnaire archéologique de la Gaule* and Desjardins; and, if they do not agree with me then, to Ruelle's *Bibliographie générale des Gaules*, Nos. 1880-1886.

**Mandubii.**—The Mandubii possessed the stronghold of Alesia (q.v.), or Mont Auxois. Their territory, therefore, comprised part of the department of Côte-d'Or, but how much it is impossible to tell. Strabo<sup>1</sup> says that they were neighbours of the Arverni,—an obvious blunder.<sup>2</sup> M. A. Barthélemy<sup>3</sup> says that the manner in which Vercingetorix was received by the Mandubii in Alesia proves that they were an independent people. I am quite unable to understand this argument. The Mandubii admitted Vercingetorix into Alesia either because they had voluntarily joined in the rebellion, or because they were a *pagus* or clients of the Aedui or under their influence, or because Vercingetorix compelled them to admit him. The French Commission,<sup>4</sup> following the principle of the dioceses, includes their territory in that of the Aedui. D'Anville,<sup>5</sup> in support of the same view, cites Hericus, who says, referring to Alesia,

*Te fines Aeduos et limina sacra tuentem.*<sup>6</sup>

The geographical accuracy of a mediæval monk, who wrote in verse, may be questioned: but, assuming that Hericus was well informed, his words may only mean that Alesia was near the Aeduan frontier, not necessarily that it was in their territory. It seems morally certain, however, that the Mandubii were either a *pagus* or clients of the Aedui.

Those persons who deny that Alesia stood upon Mont Auxois of course deny that the Mandubii dwelt in the Côte-d'Or. But I have proved in my note on ALESIA that it did stand upon Mont Auxois. In the territory which is usually assigned to the Mandubii there has been found an inscription,<sup>7</sup> which is now preserved at Dijon, containing the name *Mandu-bilos*, a spelling which is supported by the *Μανδουίλων* of Strabo.<sup>8</sup>

**Mediomatrici.**—The Mediomatrici are mentioned by Caesar<sup>9</sup> between the Sequani and the Triboci, among the peoples whose territories bordered on the Rhine. Their chief town was Divodurum<sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 2, § 3.

<sup>2</sup> Desjardins (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 468) suggests that the Mandubii may have been neighbours of the Arverni at the time when Vercingetorix was at the height of his power, and when he may have extended the hegemony of the Arverni over the territory of the Aedui. But it is much more likely that Strabo made a mistake. On Desjardins's theory, if Vercingetorix had extended his hegemony over north-western Gaul, the Osismi, who lived near Brest, might have been called neighbours of the Arverni.

<sup>4</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 14.

<sup>5</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 431.

<sup>6</sup> *Patrologiæ cursus completus*, ed. J. P. Migne, t. cxxiv., p. 1178, l. 106.

<sup>7</sup> R. Mowat, *Inscr. de la cité des Lingons, 1<sup>re</sup> part.*, p. 35, No. 37, quoted by d'A. de Jubainville, *Les noms gaulois chez César et Hirtius de Bello Gallico*, 1891, p. 128.

<sup>8</sup> Ed. Muller and Dubner, iv. 2, § 3, and p. 962.

<sup>9</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 10, § 3.

<sup>10</sup> Ptolemy, *Geogr.*, ii. 9, § 7.

(Metz). Their neighbours on the north were the Treveri (*q.v.*), on the west the Remi, on the south the Leuci and the Sequani. D'Anville<sup>1</sup> believes that they were separated from the Remi by a people called the Verodunenses, whose name survives in "Verdun," and who are not mentioned in any document earlier than the *Notitia provinciarum*; for, he remarks, a place called "Fines," between Virodunum (Verdun) and Divodurum, is mentioned in the *Itinerary of Antonine*:<sup>2</sup> but, as the Verodunenses were not mentioned by Caesar, their territory is generally included in that of the Mediomatrici. According to Strabo,<sup>3</sup> the Triboci (*q.v.*) had settled in the country of the Mediomatrici: but the Triboci were one of the tribes who fought under Ariovistus; and Caesar says that the followers of Ariovistus had settled in the country of the Sequani.<sup>4</sup> It is probable that the country round Worms and Spire, which, in Ptolemy's time, was occupied by the Vangiones and the Nemetes (*q.v.*), belonged, when Caesar wrote, to the Mediomatrici; for otherwise, unless the Mediomatrici possessed the country which Ptolemy assigns to the Triboci, their territory could hardly have touched the Rhine;<sup>5</sup> and Caesar does not mention either the Vangiones or the Nemetes in his list of the Cisrhenane tribes. If they were really established, in his time and after the defeat of Ariovistus, on the left bank of the Rhine, I conclude that they occupied territory which belonged to the Mediomatrici. It should seem then that the Mediomatrici possessed the country round Metz, Worms, Spire and perhaps Verdun.

**Meldi.**—A tribe called Meldi is mentioned by Strabo,<sup>6</sup> Pliny,<sup>7</sup> Ptolemy<sup>8</sup> and in the *Notitia provinciarum*;<sup>9</sup> and it is universally admitted that this people occupied the diocese of Meaux, that is to say, the northern part of the department of Seine-et-Marne and a fraction of the south-eastern part of the department of Oise. It has, however, been denied that Caesar's Meldi were the same people. Strabo puts the Meldi next the Lexovii and says that they were a maritime tribe, a blunder into which he may have been led by misunderstanding the passage in Caesar which I am about to discuss. Caesar mentions the Meldi once only, when describing the preparations which he made for his second expedition against Britain.<sup>10</sup> On arriving at the Portus Itius (*q.v.*), where he had ordered the whole of his fleet to assemble, he found that 60 ships, which had been built in the country of the Meldi, had been prevented by contrary winds from making the harbour, and had returned to the place from which they had started. The Portus Itius must be identified either with Boulogne or, as I believe, with Wissant. Strabo<sup>11</sup> says that the naval arsenal was at the mouth of the Seine; and as the legions, by which the ships had been built, had wintered in the country of the Belgae,<sup>12</sup> it is certain that all the ships had been built or repaired on or east of the Seine. Long<sup>13</sup> argues that, as the

<sup>1</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 692.

<sup>2</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 3, § 4.

<sup>3</sup> See Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 519-29.

<sup>4</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 3, § 5.

<sup>5</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 3, § 11.

<sup>6</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 3, § 3.

<sup>7</sup> Ed. Wesseling, p. 364.

<sup>8</sup> *B. G.*, i. 31, § 10, 51, § 2.

<sup>9</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 18 (32), § 107.

<sup>10</sup> *B. G.*, v. 5, § 2.

<sup>11</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 38, § 4.

<sup>12</sup> *Caesar*, pp. 221-2.



wind had prevented those ships which had been built in the country of the Meldi, but not the others, from reaching the Portus Itius, and as the bulk of the fleet must have been constructed south of that harbour, we may look for the Meldi to the north of it. He goes on to say that "the hypothesis of these ships being built on the Marne and carried down the Seine is inadmissible. If Caesar had built ships on the Seine, he would have built them lower down. . . . These ships of the Meldi returned to the place from which they set sail<sup>1</sup>; and it is absurd to suppose that they sailed back up the Seine and the Marne to the country of the Meldi." But Long's argument notwithstanding, these ships may have sailed from the same side of the Portus Itius as the rest; for the wind which blew them back may not have arisen until after the others had reached port.<sup>1</sup> Besides, it is not certain that the bulk of the fleet was constructed south of the Portus Itius; for Caesar does not say in what part of the country of the Belgae the legions wintered. On the other hand, Strabo's statement makes it probable that the bulk of the fleet was built somewhere south of the Portus Itius. Again, it certainly seems unlikely that the ships should have been built so far from the sea as in the neighbourhood of Meaux; and it is more than unlikely that, after having put out to sea, they should have sailed all the way back again up the Seine and the Marne. Bonamy, however, remarked that in his time,—the middle of the eighteenth century,—timber used in the construction of barges at Rouen came down the Marne from the neighbourhood of Meaux. Moreover, the reader will observe that Caesar does not say that the ships returned to any point in the country of the Meldi. He simply says that they returned to the 'point from which they had set sail (*eodem unde erant profectae revertisse*); and it seems possible that this point was some harbour at the mouth of the Seine, where they may have remained for a time after they had dropped down the river from the neighbourhood of Meaux. If, however, this conjecture is correct, and if the rest of the ships were also assembled at the mouth of the Seine, the ships that were driven back by the wind could not have sailed until after the rest, which did not encounter contrary winds, had put to sea; and I admit that this is improbable. Moreover, I do not think that the reason which Napoleon<sup>2</sup> gives for identifying the Meldi of Caesar with the Meldi of Meaux is satisfactory. He argues that the former could not have inhabited the country where d'Anville places them, namely Meldfelt<sup>3</sup> in the neighbourhood of Bruges, because Caesar would not have left "important ship-yards in an enemy's country and out of the reach of protection." But why should the ship-yards have been left unprotected? Were there not Roman legions at hand to protect them?

<sup>1</sup> I find that Bonamy used the same argument more than a century ago. See *Mém. de litt. tirés des registres de l'Acad. des inscr.*, etc., xxi., 1768, p. 226.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 183, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> I cannot find Meldfelt in any map. Desjardins (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i. 361, n. 2) thinks that de Sauley is probably right in placing the Meldi in the neighbourhood of Meldegem, which is about 10 miles due east of Bruges.

Heller<sup>1</sup> has an argument to prove that the ships came from the mouth of the Seine, which rests upon the assumption that the wind which drove them back was the *Corus*. Caesar says that, after he reached the *Portus Itius*, he was prevented from sailing for Britain for between three and four weeks by the *corus ventus*, "the prevailing wind in these parts" (*qui magnam partem omnis temporis in his locis flare consuevit*<sup>2</sup>). The *corus*, according to Pliny,<sup>3</sup> blew from the quarter where the sun sets at the solstice: apparently it was from a point between W.N.W. and N.W. by W. Obviously it is impossible to prove that this was the wind that blew back the 60 ships. Assuming that it was, Heller remarks that such a wind would not have driven back ships coming from the neighbourhood of Ostend to the Pas de Calais, but that it would have blown full against ships which were trying to get out of the mouth of the Seine. But surely no ancient ships could have sailed from Ostend to the Pas de Calais in the teeth of a W.N.W. wind.

Walcenaer,<sup>4</sup> Creuly,<sup>5</sup> and Desjardins<sup>6</sup> approve d'Anville's conjecture. Creuly, who regards the Meldi as a *pagus*, or sub-tribe of the Morini, advances the following arguments against identifying them with the Meldi of Meaux. The Roman army, he says, was cantoned in the neighbourhood of Cassel, Térouanne and Amiens:<sup>7</sup> they had plenty of timber on the spot to build the fleet; and there was no lack of ports along the coast of the North Sea. What reason, then, asks Creuly, could there have been for having any ships built at Meaux, nearly 400 miles away? I cannot answer this question: but Caesar may have had some reason, which he did not think it necessary to state.<sup>8</sup>

Although *Meldis* is the reading of the best MSS.,<sup>9</sup> it is just possible that Caesar may have written something different; and it is unlikely that, if there had been a people called Meldi different from those who

<sup>1</sup> *Philologus*, xxii., 1865, pp. 129-30.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, v. 7, § 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, ii. 47 (46), § 119. See also Vitruvius, i. 6, § 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 468.

<sup>5</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, pp. 385, 387.

<sup>6</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 473, n. 6.

<sup>7</sup> They were certainly cantoned in the country of the Belgae, along or near the northern coast.

<sup>8</sup> No commentator, as far as I know, has remembered, in discussing this question, that, during the civil war, Caesar had ships built at Hispalis, the modern Seville, which is quite 70 Roman miles by river from the sea. *B. C.*, ii. 18, § 1.

<sup>9</sup> Certain inferior MSS. read *Bely's* (Schneider's *Caesar*, ii. 22): but this cannot be right; for there would have been no point in saying that the ships in question were built in the country of the Belgae, when the rest of the ships, with which they were contrasted, were built there also. N. Sanson (*Les Comm. de César*, p. 55) makes the absurd conjecture that Caesar wrote not *Meldis* but *Venellis*. Sanson affirms that this hypothesis would agree with what Caesar said about the adverse wind. Now, as I have shown, it is impossible to draw any certain conclusion from what Caesar said about this wind: but whatever Caesar may have written, he did not write *Venellis*; for he entrusted the construction of his fleet to his *legati*; the *legati* spent the winter in the country of the Belgae; and they would not have been so foolish as to have ships built in the Cotentin, far away in the west.

occupied the neighbourhood of Meaux, there should be no direct evidence of their existence, unless, as Creuly supposes, they were only a *pagus* of the Morini. But if so, why did not Caesar write *Morinis*?

Reviewing the evidence and the arguments on both sides of the question, I am rather inclined to believe that Caesar's Meldi were different from the Meldi of Meaux. But if they were, there is no sufficient evidence for marking their name upon the map.

**Menapii.**—I. We learn from Caesar<sup>1</sup> and from Strabo<sup>2</sup> that the Menapii possessed land on the right bank of the Rhine, not far from the sea, as well as on the left, and from Caesar<sup>3</sup> that their territory was continuous on the south with that of the Eburones: according to Strabo,<sup>4</sup> Pliny,<sup>5</sup> and Dion Cassius,<sup>6</sup> they were neighbours of the Morini;<sup>7</sup> while, according to Ptolemy,<sup>8</sup> the eastern frontier of the Morini was the river Tabuda. Walckenaer<sup>9</sup> argues that this was the Aa, which, he remarks, was actually the frontier in the seventh century. Every other ancient writer, he adds, who mentions the Scheldt, calls it *Scaldis*; and Ptolemy is the only one who mentions the Tabuda. Walckenaer's theory, however, is combated by Piot<sup>10</sup> and Desjardins.<sup>11</sup> The former remarks (1) that the Aa was always called *Agnio* or *Agniona*; and (2) that Ptolemy placed the Tungri on the right bank of the Tabuda, a statement which, he says, is true of the Scheldt, but not of the Aa. Desjardins explains that most modern geographers identify the Tabuda with the Scheldt, (1) because Ptolemy places its mouth between Gessoriacum (Boulogne) and the estuary of the Meuse, thus:—

Gessoriacum . . . . .	22° 30', 53° 30'
Tabulae fl. ost. . . . .	23° 30', 53° 30'
Mosae fl. ost. . . . .	24° 40', 53° 30';

(2) because, on any other hypothesis, Ptolemy does not mention the Scheldt at all; and (3) because the geographer, Ortelius, found in mediæval documents the name *Tabuda* applied to the Scheldt.<sup>12</sup> The balance of probability, then, is in favour of identifying the Tabuda with the Scheldt. Pliny places the Menapii on the west of the Scheldt, and puts the Toxandri on the north of it.<sup>13</sup> But Caesar does not mention the Toxandri at all; and it is certain that in Caesar's time

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 1, § 1, 4, § 2.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 5, § 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 17 (31), § 106.

<sup>4</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 3, § 4.

<sup>5</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 3, § 5.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xxxix. 44.

<sup>7</sup> This may be also gathered from Caesar, though he does not say it in so many words. See *B. G.*, ii. 4, § 9; iii. 28, § 1; iv. 22, § 5, 34, § 1-3. Creuly (*Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. vii., 1863, pp. 385-6) argues that the Menapii were separated from the Morini by the Eburones,—a view which I have examined in my note on the latter people.

<sup>8</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 9, §§ 4-5.

<sup>9</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, ii. 446-7.

<sup>10</sup> *Annales de la Soc. d'émulation de Bruges*, iv., 1869, p. 290, n. 1.

<sup>11</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i. 137.

<sup>12</sup> What Ortelius actually says is this:—"huic (*i.e.* by Ptolemy) (*Scaldis*) TABUDA, Ταβούδα nominatur. Tabul, et Tabula etiam, apud scriptores mediæ ætatis reperio." *Thesaurus geographicus*, 1587, under *Scaldis*.

<sup>13</sup> "A Scalde incolunt extera Toxandri . . . Deinde Menapii, Morini."

the Menapii, whether they possessed any land on the west of the Scheldt or not, did possess land on the east of it. My conclusion is that the ancient writers do not help us much to trace the boundary between the Menapii and the Morini. Let us examine the other evidence.

II. *Castellum Menapiorum*, which is mentioned in the *Table*,<sup>1</sup> was undoubtedly Cassel, in the department of Nord, east of the Aa, and about 11 miles north-east of St-Omer. Long<sup>2</sup> insists that for *Menapiorum* we should read *Morinorum*. "If," he says, "we were to admit that the Menapii extended so far (westward) as Cassel, which is improbable, we should not expect to find their Castellum there; and it is just the place where we might expect to find the Castellum of the Morini." This is hardly a sufficient reason for making such a correction as Long proposes; and, as Walckenaer<sup>3</sup> observes, it is stated in the archives of the church of St-Pierre at Cassel that the town was *in pago Mempisco*. The statement in the *Table* harmonises with Walckenaer's theory that the Tabuda,—the eastern frontier, according to Ptolemy, of the Morini,—was the Aa: but on the other hand, Ptolemy mentions the *Castellum* of the Menapii; and, as he makes the Meuse the western frontier of the Menapii, and places the Tungri between them and the Morini, it is clear that, unless he defined the position of the Menapii wrongly, the *Castellum* which he mentions was not Cassel.<sup>4</sup> Some writers believe that it was Kessel, on the left bank of the Meuse, between Roermond and Venloo;<sup>5</sup> but even on this theory, Ptolemy's tracing of the frontier was wrong. At all events the Morini possessed, in Ptolemy's time,<sup>6</sup> Gessoriacum (Boulogne) and Taruana (Théroutanne); that is to say, their territory comprised *Bononiensis pagus* and *Tervanensis pagus*. The latter extended a little beyond the western and southern frontiers of the modern diocese of St-Omer: on the other hand, it did not extend so far as the eastern frontier of the original diocese of St-Omer, which comprised Bourbourg and other places included within the *pagus Mempiscus*. The diocese of Ypres, Walckenaer points out, also belonged to the *pagus Mempiscus*. He therefore concludes that the Aa, in its whole course, formed the eastern boundary of

<sup>1</sup> *La Table de Peutinger*, ed. Desjardins, p. 13, col. 2.

<sup>2</sup> W. Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geogr.*, i. 561.

<sup>3</sup> See also Life of St-Bertin (*Acta SS. Belgii*, v. 634), quoted by Piot (*Annales de la Soc. d'émulation de Bruges*, iv., 1869, pp. 288-9).

<sup>4</sup> Ptolemy places the Tungri on the east of the Tabuda, and the Menapii "beyond the Meuse" (*μετά τὸν Μόσων*). General Creuly (*Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, pp. 27-8) infers from these words that the Meuse was the eastern boundary of the Menapii. But, to say nothing of the fact that, according to Caesar, the Menapii possessed lands on both sides of the Rhine, Creuly mistranslates Ptolemy. Just before mentioning the Menapii, Ptolemy says that the Morini were *μετά* the Ambiani, and that next to the Morini, *μετά* the river Tabuda, were the Tungri. *μετά* the river Tabuda confessedly means on its eastern bank: surely then, when Ptolemy immediately afterwards says that the Menapii were *μετά* the Meuse, he means that they were on the east of that river. See Müller's ed. of Ptolemy, note to p. 223.

<sup>5</sup> *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geogr.*, i. 561.

<sup>6</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 9, §§ 1, 4.

the Morini, and that their southern boundary was formed by that of the diocese of St-Omer.<sup>1</sup>

A. G. B. Schayes<sup>2</sup> remarks that there was probably no definite frontier between two tribes so little civilised as the Morini and the Menapii. In another place,<sup>3</sup> however, he maintains that, on the side of the Morini and the Atrebatæ, the frontier of the Menapii must have been marked by the rivers Scarpe, Deule and Lys, which formed the boundary of the *pagus Mempiscus* in the early Middle Ages.

M. A. de Vlaminck<sup>4</sup> maintains that, in Caesar's time, the territory of the Menapii was much smaller than is commonly believed. He refuses to trace their western frontier along the western boundary of the *pagus Mempiscus*. He refers to the small number of the contingent, only 9000 men,<sup>5</sup> which was levied from the Menapii in 57 B.C., in comparison with the 25,000 contributed by the Morini. He remarks that no authentic document older than the *Table of Peutinger* indicates that the Menapii were established in Flanders. A considerable part of the *pagus Mempiscus* belonged to the diocese of Têrouanne, that is to say to the country of the Morini. The inference, he says, is that it was not until after Caesar's time that the Menapii established themselves in that part of the country. He also denies that there is any proof that the country round Cleve, which Napoleon assigns to the Menapii, ever belonged to them: on the contrary, he says, Caesar gives us to understand that it belonged to the Eburones, "most of whom dwell between the Meuse and the Rhine." But Caesar's vague statement is quite consistent with Napoleon's view; and on page 679, I give reasons for believing that Napoleon is right. M. de Vlaminck quotes Folquin de Lobbes, a writer of the eleventh century, who says that Flanders belonged to the Morini; and remarking that the supremacy which Arras claimed in the Middle Ages over the communes of Flanders doubtless originated in the transference by Caesar of the sovereignty of the Morini to Commius, King of the Atrebatæ,<sup>6</sup> he finds in this circumstance a confirmation of the statement of Folquin. Finally, he conjectures that the Morini, as a punishment for their repeated revolts in the time of Caesar and in 29 B.C., were deprived of the northern part of their original territory; that the *Castellum Menapiorum* was not built by the Menapii until after their immigration into these northern districts; and therefore that no safe conclusion can be drawn from the geographical position of Cassel as to the original westward extension of the Menapian territory.

In a subsequent paper,<sup>7</sup> M. de Vlaminck reinforces these arguments. As Caesar, he remarks, informs us that, when invading the territory of

<sup>1</sup> See Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 441-3.

<sup>2</sup> *La Belgique et les Pays-Bas avant et pendant la domination romaine*, t. i., 1887, p. 38.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, p. 402.

<sup>4</sup> *La Ménapië*, etc., 1879, pp. 13, 16, 23, 26-7, 78-81; *Messenger des sciences hist. de Belgique*, 1882, p. 427, 1884, pp. 441-2.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 4, § 9. According to the MSS., only 7000.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 21, §§ 6-7.

<sup>7</sup> *Messenger*, etc., 1887, pp. 352-5.

the Menapii in 53 B.C., he was obliged to build bridges,<sup>1</sup> we may conclude that the Menapii did not occupy Flanders, the southern frontier of which is not protected by any large rivers. This is a feeble argument. Caesar does not mention rivers, large or small. He only says that he invaded the country of the Menapii, *celeriter effectis pontibus*. Even small rivers would have had to be bridged, unless they were fordable; and Caesar says that the Menapii trusted for protection to woods and marshes. *Pontibus* may mean "causeways";<sup>2</sup> and even if Caesar did invade the country on the east of Flanders, the fact does not prove that Flanders also did not belong to the Menapii.

M. Wauters, on the other hand, argues that when Caesar invaded the country of the Menapii in 53 B.C., he must have gone to the west of the Scheldt, because he could not have made his bridges rapidly enough in the country on the east of that river.<sup>3</sup> But why not? If Caesar operated on the east of the Scheldt, we are not obliged to assume that he crossed the Meuse and the Rhine; and he would have had no more difficulty in bridging the smaller streams on the east of the Scheldt than those on the west. M. Wauters's argument is as futile as his opponent's.

M. de Vlaminck<sup>4</sup> infers from Caesar's narrative that the Menapii possessed the *insula Batavorum*, and consequently that the Batavi were not, as is commonly supposed, an independent people, but merely the inhabitants of one of the Menapian *pagi*. In support of this view, he contends that Caesar's description of the Menapii,—*perpetuis paludibus silvisque muniti*,—applies with peculiar fitness to the *insula Batavorum*; and he observes that Aurelius Victor describes the adventurer Carausius, who, according to Eumenius, was an *alumnus Batariae*,<sup>5</sup> as a Menapian citizen. M. de Vlaminck also asks why, if the Batavi were distinct from the Menapii, Caesar did not mention them among the tribes which sent contingents to the relief of Vercingetorix. The obvious answer is, because they sent no contingent. If the *insula Batavorum* was protected by stretches of forest and marsh (*perpetuis paludibus silvisque munita*),<sup>6</sup> so was the country on both sides of the Scheldt: it is absurd to infer from the statement of Aurelius Victor that the Batavi, in Caesar's time, were a *pagus* of the Menapii; and if they were, it is difficult to understand why Caesar and Ptolemy<sup>7</sup> described them as independent. Strabo<sup>8</sup> indeed says that the Menapii dwelt on both sides of the mouths of the Rhine: but I have no doubt that Strabo was simply putting his own interpretation on Caesar's statement that the Menapii owned lands on both banks of the Rhine "not far from the sea."<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> B. G., vi. 6, § 1.

<sup>2</sup> See B. G., vii. 19, § 2.

<sup>3</sup> *L'Athenaeum belge*, 1883, p. 77.

<sup>4</sup> *La Ménapië*, etc., pp. 12-13, 34, 72-3.

<sup>5</sup> M. Bouquet, *Recueil des hist. des Gaules*, i. 566 A. The Panegyrist, as far as I can see, does not mention Carausius by name. I can only find this,—*terram Bataviam quondam alumno suo*; and I do not think much reliance can be placed on an obviously rhetorical passage. See Æ. Baehrens, *XII Panegyrici Latini*, 1874, p. 163.

<sup>6</sup> B. G., vi. 5, § 4.

<sup>7</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 9, § 8.

<sup>8</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 3, § 4.

<sup>9</sup> B. G., iv. 4, § 3.

M. de Vlaminck also argues<sup>1</sup> that as, according to Ptolemy, the Menapii dwelt on the east of the Meuse, they must have dwelt in the country of the Batavi. But the *insula Batavorum* was not the only country on the east of the Meuse: there was plenty of room for the Menapii on the south of the Waal, between the Meuse and the Rhine.

III. My conclusion is that it is impossible to trace the common frontier of the Morini and the Menapii with certainty. If the Tabuda was the Scheldt, the evidence of Ptolemy is at variance with the evidence of the *Table* and with the evidence of mediæval documents. I cannot see any sufficient reason for denying that the *Castellum Menapiorum* of the *Table* really belonged to the Menapii: but there is no proof that it belonged to them in Caesar's time. M. de Vlaminck has not proved his case: but it may be that, as he argues, the Morini, after Caesar's time, were deprived of a part of their territory; and if this was the case, we can no more follow the western frontier of the *pagus Mempiscus* than we can follow the eastern frontier of the diocese of Téroüanne. My own belief is that the Scheldt, as a natural boundary, formed the common frontier of the two peoples. But all that can be said with certainty is that the Menapii, in Caesar's time, possessed lands on both sides of the Rhine, probably above its first bifurcation; that their territory extended at least as far westward as the Scheldt; that it was bounded by the territory of the Eburones on the south and by that of the Morini on the west; and that the territory of the Morini was bounded on the west by that of the Ambiani and on the south by that of the Atrebatas and possibly also by that of the Nervii, all of them fairly well ascertained.

**Morini.**—See MENAPII.

**Namnetes.**—The Namnetes occupied the ancient diocese of Nantes, or that portion of the department of Loire-Inférieure which lies on the right bank of the Loire and is bounded on the north-east by the river Sennon.<sup>2</sup> See SAMNITAE and VENETI.

**Nantuates.**—The Nantuates, the Veragri and the Seduni, reckoning from west to east, dwelt in the valley of the upper Rhône. The Nantuates occupied the territory which extended on the south of the lake of Geneva as far west as the frontier of the Allobroges<sup>3</sup> (*q.v.*). What that frontier was is uncertain: but, speaking roughly, the Nantuates probably possessed the eastern part of the Chablais, or that part of Upper Savoy which lies between the Valais and the river Dranse, as well as the north-western part of the Valais, including St-Maurice (*Agaunum*), which was their chief town.<sup>4</sup> The Veragri occupied the

<sup>1</sup> *Messenger*, etc., 1887, p. 358, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 471-2: J. Loth, *L'émigration bretonne*, p. 51.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 1, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> M. G. Debombourg (*Rev. du Lyonnais*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. ii., 1866, pp. 7-10) maintains that the basin of the Dranse, which flows into the lake of Geneva between Thonon and Évian, belonged not to the Nantuates but to the Allobroges, and that the Nantuates dwelt not in the Chablais but only in the Valais. It is unlikely, he argues, that they occupied both the eastern and the western slopes of the mountains

western part of the Valais, their chief town Octodurus being situated between Martigny-la-Ville and Martigny-Bourg. The name of the Seduni is preserved by the town of Sion.<sup>1</sup>

In *B. G.*, iv. 10, § 3, Caesar says that the Rhine rises in the country of the Lepontii, and flows through the countries of the Nantuates, Helvetii, Sequani, Mediomatrici, Triboci and Treveri (*Rhenus autem oritur ex Lepontiis, qui Alpes incolunt, et longo spatio per fines Nantuatium, Helvetiorum, Sequanorum, Mediomatricum, Tribocorum, Treverorum citatus fertur*). This passage has caused the commentators much needless vexation of spirit. For it is absolutely certain that, if Caesar did not make a slip or a gross blunder, and if the Rhine did really flow through the country of the Nantuates, these Nantuates were different,—different as a group, if not in blood,—from the Nantuates whom I have just mentioned; and there is no evidence for fixing their whereabouts. Among the various readings which are found instead of *Nantuatium* is *Nemetum*; and if Caesar did not appear to be enumerating the states in question in their geographical order from south to north, I should say that this was what he wrote. Schneider<sup>2</sup> tries to reconcile the two statements in *B. G.*, iii. 1 and iv. 10 by assuming that the Nantuates inhabited a long strip of land extending eastward from the lake of Geneva to the head-waters of the Rhine. But Caesar clearly implies that the Nantuates whom he mentions in *B. G.*, iii. 1, §§ 1, 4, 6, § 5, were on the west of the Veragri. Desjardins suggests that the Nantuates of the Rhine may have emigrated from the Valais at the time when the Tigurini, who defeated Cassius Longinus, emigrated from their original home.<sup>3</sup> So they may: but who can tell?

Mommsen offers a drastic solution of the difficulty. According to him, Caesar thought that the upper Rhône, where it flows through the Valais, was the Rhine, and that the Rhône had its source in the lake of Geneva!<sup>4</sup> The only argument that can be urged in support of this astounding conjecture is that Caesar says that the lake of Geneva flowed into the Rhône (*lacu Lemanno, qui in flumen Rhodanum influit*<sup>5</sup>); and this was only his way of saying that the surplus waters of the lake flowed off into the lower Rhône.<sup>6</sup> Mommsen points to the passage

which separate the Valais from the Chablais; and he affirms that the western slope has always belonged to the diocese of Geneva, and the eastern to the diocese of Martigny (Octodurus). But Martigny belonged to the Veragri, not to the Nantuates; and if the Nantuates possessed territory which afterwards belonged to the diocese of Martigny, why should they not have possessed territory which afterwards belonged to the diocese of Geneva? See my note on the ALLOBROGES.

<sup>1</sup> D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 472-3, 589-90, 639; Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 234, 241-2.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, i. 328.

<sup>3</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 239-41.

<sup>4</sup> *Hermes*, xvi., 1881, pp. 445-6.—"Es scheint vielmehr, dass für ihn der Rhodanus aus dem Genfer See kommt und die obere Rhone ihm zwar bekannt war, aber als der oberste Theil des Rheines galt."

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, i. 8, § 1.

<sup>6</sup> Similarly Caesar says (*B. G.*, vii. 57, § 4) that the waters of a marsh or marshy stream drained into the Seine. Various unnecessary attempts have been made to amend the passage on which Mommsen bases his theory. Beatus Rhenanus writes *quem flumen Rhodanus influit*; Whitte deletes *qui in flumen Rhodanum influit*;



which we have been discussing, and in which Caesar says that the Rhine flows through the country of the Nantuates, who really dwelt in the valley of the upper Rhône. But in *B. G.*, iii. 1, describing the geographical position of the Nantuates, Veragri and Seduni, he says that they extend from the frontier of the Allobroges, the lake of Geneva and the Rhône to the high Alps (*Servium Galbam . . . in Nantuates, Veragros Sedunosque misit, qui ab finibus Allobrogum et lacu Lemanno et flumine Rhodano ad summas Alpes pertinent*). This statement alone disposes of Mommsen's theory. For the territory of the Allobroges extended at least as far eastward as Geneva.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, if Caesar had thought that the Rhône had its source in the lake, he could not have described the geographical position of the three tribes as he has done; and if he had confounded the upper Rhône with the Rhine, he would have written *in Nantuates, Veragros Sedunosque qui ab finibus Allobrogum et lacu Lemanno et flumine Rheno ad summas Alpes pertinent*. Moreover, if he thought that the upper Rhône was the Rhine, he must have thought that the Rhine flowed *uphill* from the east of the lake of Geneva. If it be objected that he had no personal knowledge of the valley of the upper Rhône, and therefore did not know its slope, I reply that Galba had and did; and that Galba would have told him that the upper Rhône (or an important river, whatever Galba may have called it) flowed westward into and through the lake of Geneva. It is incredible that Galba should not have learned that this river was the Rhône; and if he was not told so, he had eyes in his head.<sup>2</sup> Lastly Caesar says that the Rhine *rises* in the country of the Lepontii:<sup>3</sup> but if he had confounded the upper Rhône with the Rhine, he would have said that the Rhine rose in the country of the Nantuates.

Let us hear Strabo. He says that, reckoning from the source, the first people who dwell in the valley of the Rhine are the Aetuatii (τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τῇ Ῥήνῃ πρώτοι τῶν πάντων οἰκοῦσιν Αἰτουάτιοι, παρ' οἷς εἰσὶν αἱ πηγαὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ<sup>4</sup>). The Aetuatii are not mentioned by any other writer. For Αἰτουάτιοι Koray proposed Ἑλουνήττιοι (Helvetii). Xylander proposed Ναντουάται, a conjecture which Desjardins<sup>5</sup> accepts, remarking that Koray's emendation Ἑλουνήττιοι is much more unlike the Αἰτουάτιοι of the MSS.; and that, in the other places where Strabo mentions the Helvetii, he calls them, according to all the MSS., Ἑλουντανοί. But Desjardins is mistaken. Not counting the passage in which he speaks of the Aetuatii, Strabo mentions the Helvetii nine times (iv. 3, §§ 3-4, 4, § 3, 6, §§ 8, 11; vii. 1, § 5, 2, § 2). According to MM. Müller and Dubner, Ἑλουντανούς is found in the first of these passages only: in iv. 3, § 4 besides Ἑλουνττίους are found the various readings Λουνττίους and Σελουνττίους; and in all the nine places the

Hotoman substitutes *qua* for *qui* (see Meusel's, *Lex. Cæs.*, vol. ii. pars ii. [*Tabula coniecturarum*, p. 2]); while Eberz (*Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, etc., lxxv., 1857, pp. 847-8) proposes *qua flumen Rhodanus profuit*.

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 6, § 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, iii. 1-6.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, iv. 10, § 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Geogr.*, ed. Müller and Dubner, iv. 3, § 3, and p. 963.

<sup>5</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 240, n. 2. Desjardins wrongly attributes this conjecture to Cluver.

MSS. have Ἐλευήττιοι or its cases. Nevertheless, it seems possible that Xylander was right, and that Strabo did write *Ναυροδάται*; for in iv. 6, § 6 he places the Nantuates in the neighbourhood of the Veragri and of the lake of Geneva; and it may be that in both passages he copied the *Commentaries*. According to the *Commentaries* (iv. 10, § 3), however, the Nantuates were the second, not the first tribe that dwelt in the valley of the Rhine, reckoning from its source.

**Nemetes.**—The Nemetes are mentioned by Caesar<sup>1</sup> among the tribes who fought in the army of Ariovistus; and he tells us that the few persons who survived the battle and the retreat recrossed the Rhine.<sup>2</sup> He also says that the Hercynian forest, which was entirely in Germany, extended eastward from the frontiers of the Helvetii, Raurici and Nemetes.<sup>3</sup> This, however, does not help us to determine the geographical position of the Nemetes; for the Helvetii had no territory on the right bank of the Rhine;<sup>4</sup> and therefore it would be consistent with Caesar's statement to assume that the territory of the Nemetes was on the left bank of the Rhine, and that the Rhine formed their eastern frontier. They were established on the left bank in the neighbourhood of Spire, in the time of Tacitus,<sup>5</sup> of Pliny,<sup>6</sup> and of Ptolemy;<sup>7</sup> but it is possible that in Caesar's time no Nemetes dwelt on the left bank after the defeat of Ariovistus, (1) because he does not mention them among the Cisrhene tribes; and (2) because, if they had been established on the left bank in his time and after the defeat of Ariovistus, it would be necessary to admit that the Nemetes who formed part of Ariovistus's host were only a fraction of those who followed him into Gaul. The Nemetes mentioned by the later writers may only have been immigrants, descended from a portion of the tribe, which Ariovistus may have left behind.

Desjardins<sup>8</sup> says that, as the territories of the Sequani, the Mediomatrici and the Treveri extended to the left bank of the Rhine, it is impossible to find room for the Nemetes on that side: but this argument is not conclusive, because the host of Ariovistus, of whom the Nemetes, or some of them, formed a part, had settled, before they encountered Caesar, on the territory of the Sequani.<sup>9</sup>

Mommsen<sup>10</sup> says that "Caesar . . . left the Germans settled by Ariovistus along the left bank of the Rhine—the Triboci about Strassburg, the Nemetes about Spire, the Vangiones about Worms—in possession of their new abodes, and entrusted them with the guarding of the Rhine-frontier against their countrymen." This view he defends in the following note:—"That Ariovistus settled these peoples on the middle Rhine is probable, because they fight in his army and do not appear earlier; that Caesar left them in possession of their settlements

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 51, § 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 53, §§ 1-2.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, vi. 25, §§ 1-2. Cf. *Journal of the Anthropological Inst.*, vii., 1878, p. 219.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, i. 1, § 5, 2, § 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Germ.*, 28.

<sup>6</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 17 (31), § 106.

<sup>7</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 9, § 9.

<sup>8</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 439, n. 5, 445.

<sup>9</sup> *B. G.*, i. 31, § 10. See note on the TRIBOCI.

<sup>10</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, iv., 246.

is probable, because he in presence of Ariovistus declared himself ready to tolerate the Germans already settled in Gaul (*Caes.* i. 35, 43), and because we find them afterwards in these abodes." I venture to think that these reasons are insufficient. Caesar, in the presence of Divico, virtually "declared himself ready to tolerate" the Helvetii, provided they gave him hostages for their good behaviour:<sup>1</sup> but after he had defeated them, he sent them back to their own country. And if we find the Nemetes and the Triboci "afterwards in these abodes" on the left bank of the Rhine, we also find the Ubii afterwards on the left bank, whereas in Caesar's time they were on the right. Besides, if Caesar's statement that the Rhine flowed past the territory of the Triboci (*q.v.*) proves, as is generally maintained, that they dwelt in his time on the left bank of the Rhine, his silence about the Nemetes, to say nothing of Strabo's, raises a presumption that the latter people did not, at that time, dwell on the left bank.<sup>2</sup>

I have not marked the Nemetes on my map, because I only profess to represent Gaul as it was in the time of Caesar; and while there is no evidence to show what territory was occupied by the Nemetes before the defeat of Ariovistus, it is doubtful whether any considerable number of them remained in Gaul after his defeat: for we are told that his entire host took part in the campaign,<sup>3</sup> and, as I have said before, the few who survived the battle and the retreat recrossed the Rhine. Still Caesar's words,—*cum suis omnibus copiis*,—may only mean "with all his (available) forces"; and I cannot agree with Walckenaer that the silence of Strabo *proves* that in Caesar's time there were no Nemetes in Gaul after the defeat of Ariovistus. See TRIBOCI.

**Nemetocenna.**—Nemetocenna, where Hirtius says that Caesar wintered after his last campaign,<sup>4</sup> is usually identified with Nemetacum,<sup>5</sup> which stood upon the site of Arras. Desjardins, however, asserts that Nemetacum was distinct from Nemetocenna;<sup>6</sup> and if he is right, the position of the latter cannot be determined.

**Nervii.**—The Nervii are not mentioned in the *Notitia provinciarum*: but in their stead we find the *civitas Camaracensium*; <sup>7</sup> and accordingly it has been concluded that their territory corresponded with the ancient diocese of Cambrai, which comprised Hainault, that part of Brabant which lies west of the Demer and the Dyle, East Flanders and part of the province of Antwerp.<sup>8</sup> D'Anville<sup>9</sup> makes the Nervian territory extend to the sea round the mouth of the Scheldt, thus separating the Morini from the Menapii. He also observes that, in the *Notitia dignitatum*,<sup>10</sup> *Nervicanus tractus* is mentioned as a continuation of *Armoricanus tractus*. But Walckenaer replies that the term *Nervicanus tractus* was loosely applied to the entire north-eastern seaboard of Gaul,

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 14, § 6.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 522.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, i. 38, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, viii. 46, § 6.

<sup>5</sup> Ptol., *Geogr.*, ii. 9, § 4 (Müller's ed., i. 222).

<sup>6</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 724-5.

<sup>7</sup> Ed. B. Guérard, 1832, p. 18.

<sup>8</sup> Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 470-1.

<sup>9</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 482-3.

<sup>10</sup> Ed. E. Bocking, t. ii., p. 106\*, cap. xxxvi. See also pp. 822-3\*.

including the coasts of the Morini and the Menapii: d'Anville's theory is opposed to a statement of Strabo,<sup>1</sup> from which we learn that the territories of the Morini and the Menapii were conterminous; and the testimony of Strabo is confirmed by Pliny.<sup>2</sup> Still, it is possible that the territory of the Nervii may have extended as far northward as the head of the estuary of the Scheldt, in which case it might not have been considered as breaking the continuity of the Morini and the Menapii. It might be urged, in support of this view, that Caesar tells us that the Nervii, before encountering him in 57 B.C., sent their non-combatants for safety *in aestuaria*,<sup>3</sup> which can only mean the low-lying tracts bordering the estuary of the Scheldt.<sup>4</sup> But it is not proved that the *aestuaria* were in Nervian territory.

According to the mile-stone of Tongres, the nearest frontier of the Atrebatas was only 58 miles from that town: therefore, says General Creuly, at the time when the mile-stone was erected, Bagacum (Bavay), the chief town of the Nervii, must have been in Atrebatian territory. He suggests that, after the battle on the Sambre, Caesar may have assigned the territory of the Nervii to the Atrebatas, just as he subsequently made the Morini dependents of the Atrebatian king, Commius.<sup>5</sup> Desjardins,<sup>6</sup> however, has refuted the General's theory. Remarking that the mile-stone was probably erected in the time of Diocletian, he says that it is difficult to understand how the territory of the Nervii could have been included within that of the Atrebatas subsequently to the time of Caesar, seeing that it unquestionably formed a distinct whole in the first century of our era, and, as we learn from Ptolemy,<sup>7</sup> in the second as well.

The clients of the Nervii, namely the Ceutrones (or Centropes), Geidumni, Levaci and Pleumoxii, are mentioned by no ancient writer, except Caesar, and only once by him.<sup>8</sup> He says that the Nervii, just before they marched, on the instigation of Ambiorix, to attack Quintus Cicero, sent messengers to summon their clients to join them, and marched along with them to the attack. He also says that time was precious to the Gauls;<sup>9</sup> and from this it may possibly be inferred that the territories of the client tribes were situated close together somewhere in the neighbourhood of Cicero's camp. But if this inference is correct, the statement upon which it is founded is the sole hint which Caesar gives towards fixing their geographical position. The aid of etymology has, however, been invoked. (1) M. Wauters places the Ceutrones south of Chimai, in the neighbourhood of a hamlet called Cendron.<sup>10</sup> The French Commission<sup>11</sup> prefer to avow ignorance. (2) The position of the Geidumni is, so M. Wauters formerly considered, indicated by the

<sup>1</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 3, § 5, 4, § 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 17 (31), § 106.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 28, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 659.

<sup>5</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. iii., 1861, pp. 410, 413.

<sup>6</sup> *La Table de Peutinger*, p. 12, col. 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 9, § 6.

<sup>8</sup> *B. G.*, v. 39, §§ 1, 4.

<sup>9</sup> *Omnem spem hostes in celeritate ponebant.*

<sup>10</sup> *Bull. de l'Acad. Roy. de Bruxelles*, xiii., 1862, pp. 396-7.

<sup>11</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 249.

village of Gourdinne, in the canton of Walcourt.<sup>1</sup> But he admitted that this identification required that the name of the tribe should be differently spelled; and accordingly for *Geidumni* he substituted *Gorduni*, a reading which is found in certain inferior MSS.<sup>2</sup> Subsequently, reverting to the reading *Geidumni*, he selected Geidines, near Dinant; and Desjardins<sup>3</sup> tentatively follows him. D'Anville<sup>4</sup> places the Gorduni, as he calls them, near the dunes between Dunkirk and Ostend. But if he is right, the Geidumni, though clients of the Nervii, dwelt in territory that belonged either to the Morini or to the Menapii; and the position which he assigns to them is too far from any place that could be identified with the site of Cicero's camp.<sup>5</sup> (3) The Grudii are placed by d'Anville<sup>6</sup> in the canton of Groede, north-east of the tract which he assigns to the Geidumni; and the French Commission<sup>7</sup> think this a probable conjecture: but it is open to the same objection as d'Anville's choice in the case of the Geidumni, which the Commission reject.<sup>8</sup> M. Wauters finds their territory in the neighbourhood of Graux; and Desjardins<sup>9</sup> suggests that what Caesar wrote was not *Grudii* but *Gradii*. (4) Sanson,<sup>10</sup> who thinks that the clients of the Nervii were *pagi* or sub-tribes of the Morini, assigns to the Levaci the district of Loëuve,—wherever that may be; for Sanson's spelling is probably different from the modern, and I cannot find the place in the map. D'Anville<sup>11</sup> finds an analogy between their name and that of the river Lieva, which joins the Scheldt at Ghent. Others point to the resemblance between their name and Louvain.<sup>12</sup> M. Wauters<sup>13</sup> places them "entre l'Entre-Sambre-et-Meuse, où on rencontre Lesves, et le Brabant, où plusieurs localités présentent la syllable *Lev*." (5) The same writer<sup>14</sup> considers that the name *Pleumoxii* is preserved in Moxhe and Moxheron, villages situated near the river Méhaigne. M. A. Malengraen<sup>15</sup> places this people in the neighbourhood of the hill of Pleumont, near Chinay. Sanson<sup>16</sup> gives them the country round Peule, in which name his keen eye detects a resemblance to *Pleumoxii*.

These conjectures must be taken for what they are worth. Some of them may haply be right; but they all rest upon a frail foundation.

J. J. Raepsaet<sup>17</sup> believes that Caesar's narrative offers a clue for roughly fixing the position of the tribes. When, he says, Ambiorix attacked Cicero's camp, his allies, the Aduatuci and the Nervii, considering their geographical position, must have attacked it from the east and the south respectively. Therefore, he argues, the clients of the Nervii must have attacked it from the west and north-west. There is

<sup>1</sup> *Bull. de l'Acad. Roy. de Bruxelles*, xiii., 1862, pp. 396-7.

<sup>2</sup> See Schneider's *Caesar*, ii. 133.

<sup>3</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 436, n. 8.

<sup>4</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 357-8.

<sup>5</sup> See pp. 347-8.

<sup>6</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 362.

<sup>7</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 471-2.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, p. 437.

<sup>9</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 436, n. 5.

<sup>10</sup> *Les Comm. de César*, pp. 40-41.

<sup>11</sup> *Notice*, etc., pp. 411-12.

<sup>12</sup> N. L. Achaintre, *Caesar*, iv. 299.

<sup>13</sup> *Bull. de l'Acad. Roy. de Bruxelles*, xiii., 1862, pp. 396-7.

<sup>14</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>15</sup> *Annales du Cercle arch. de Mons*, x. 469.

<sup>16</sup> *Les Comm. de César*, pp. 40-41.

<sup>17</sup> *Analyse hist. et critique de l'origine . . . des Belges et Gaulois*, 1824, i. 15.

nothing in this argument. The Aduatuci, indeed, must have attacked, or must have marched to attack Cicero's camp from the east: but why *must* the Nervii have attacked it from the south? The camp was *in* their territory; and, for all that we can tell, the Nervian forces may have concentrated upon it from all points of the compass. We cannot even tell for certain whether the clients of the Nervii dwelt within the territory which is usually identified with the proper territory of the Nervii, or outside it; and if they dwelt within it, we cannot tell for certain in what part.

**Nitiobriges.**—The Nitiobriges occupied the dioceses of Agen and Condom, that is to say, the greater part of the department of Lot-et-Garonne and a small fraction of that of Tarn-et-Garonne.<sup>1</sup>

**Noviodunum (Aeduarum).**—The modern editors speak of the identity of Noviodunum,—the Noviodunum of the Aedui,—with Nevers as a thing absolutely certain. But Caesar is the only ancient author who mentions this Noviodunum; and he simply describes the place as *oppidum Aeduarum ad ripas Ligeris opportuno loco positum*.<sup>2</sup> However, although there is no direct evidence, the probability that Noviodunum stood upon the site of Nevers is sufficient to justify one in marking it upon the map. It is proved by the itineraries,<sup>3</sup> that the Gallo-Roman town of Nivernum was situated at Nevers. Aimoin, a monk of the tenth century, says that Nivernum is said to be identical with Noviodunum; and Hugo, a monk of Fleury, writing in 1109, unhesitatingly affirmed that identity.<sup>4</sup> The evidence, then, is simply the evidence of tradition. But this evidence is supported by the strong probability that an important place, like Noviodunum, would not have perished, but would have developed into a Gallo-Roman town. If so, it is very probable that Noviodunum was Nivernum, because there was no other Gallo-Roman town with which Noviodunum can be identified. Moreover, it seems possible that, as *Noviomagus* was corrupted into *Noviomum*, so *Nivernum* is a corruption of *Noviodunum*. Finally, the great strength of the site of Nevers,—*opportuno loco positum*,—would certainly have recommended it to Caesar;<sup>5</sup> and this is the strongest argument of all.

**Noviodunum (Biturigum).**<sup>6</sup>—The only clues that Caesar gives as to the position of Noviodunum are, that it was situated on the road from Cenabum, that is to say from Orléans, to Gorgobina; that Vercingetorix, on hearing that Caesar was marching from Cenabum to relieve Gorgobina, abandoned the siege of that place, and marched against Caesar; that his cavalry, who had moved on in advance of his column, appeared before Noviodunum on the day on which Caesar reached it, and apparently a few hours after Caesar's arrival; that

<sup>1</sup> D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 485-6.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 55, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Itin. Ant.*, p. 367; *La Table de Peutinger*, ed. Desjardins, p. 32, col. 8.

<sup>4</sup> D'Anville, *Éclaircissements sur l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 409-10.

<sup>5</sup> See E. A. Freeman's *Hist. Essays*, 4th series, p. 105.

<sup>6</sup> Sheet 18 of the *Carte de France* (1:320,000) will be found useful for the study of this question.

Caesar, after beating off this cavalry and receiving the surrender of Noviodunum, marched against Avaricum (Bourges) in the hope that, by capturing it, he might reduce the Bituriges to submission; and that Vercingetorix followed him by easy stages. The passage in Caesar<sup>1</sup> runs thus:—"exercitum Ligerim traducit atque in Biturigum fines pervenit. Vercingetorix, ubi de Caesaris adventu cognovit, oppugnatione desistit atque obviam Caesari proficiscitur. Ille oppidum *Biturigum positum in via Noviodunum* oppugnare instituerat," etc. The words which I have italicised are omitted in the *a* MSS.:<sup>2</sup> but these MSS. are obviously at fault, as Caesar would never have used such a vague expression as *Ille oppidum oppugnare instituerat*, without giving any intimation as to what or where the *oppidum* was. The word *Noviodunum* at all events must be genuine, as it is repeated in chapter 14. In certain inferior MSS. *Biturigum positum in via* is omitted. Accordingly it has been suggested that Noviodunum was identical with the Noviodunum of the Aedui,<sup>3</sup> the modern Nevers. This astounding blunder, which has been adopted by Mr. Froude,<sup>4</sup> implies that Caesar would have crossed and recrossed the Loire, without saying a word about it, in order to attack a town belonging to a people with whom he had every motive to remain friendly. Besides, any one who reads chapter 55 in connexion with the chapters that immediately precede it, will see that Caesar is there mentioning the Aeduan Noviodunum for the first time. The words *Biturigum positum in via* are certainly genuine; or, if they are not, they express Caesar's meaning. For, as the Noviodunum of chapters 12 and 14 was certainly not the Aeduan town of the same name, and as, immediately before mentioning it, Caesar says that he entered the territory of the Bituriges, it is plain that it was in their territory. It is also certain that this Noviodunum was *positum in via*, that is to say, situated on the road from Cenabum to Gorgobina, because, when Caesar laid siege to it, he was marching from Cenabum to relieve Gorgobina, and did not yet know that Vercingetorix had raised the siege of Gorgobina and marched to meet him. It is possible, however, that Caesar may have intended to march to Gorgobina by way of Avaricum; for by attacking or threatening so important a town as Avaricum he might have compelled Vercingetorix to raise the siege of Gorgobina.<sup>5</sup>

Not to mention mere guesses, Noviodunum has been placed by Napoleon at Sancerre; by von Goler and Heller at Nouan-le-Fuzelier; by d'Anville at Nouan, east-south-east of Bourges; by a writer whose name I cannot discover at Argent, on the Grande-Sauldre, north-west of Sancerre; by de Monvel at Neuvy-en-Sullias; by J. Dumontet at Nohan-en-Gracay; by various writers at Pierrefitte-sur-Sauldre; by General Creuly at some unknown point in the neighbourhood of Chatillon-sur-Loire; and by the French Commission and various independent writers at Neuvy-sur-Barangeon, or, with more probability,

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 11-12.

<sup>2</sup> Meusel, *Lex. Caes.*, ii. 835.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 55, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Caesar, a Sketch*, ed. 1886, p. 354.

<sup>5</sup> See A. Senault, *L'Œuvre de Jacques Maissiat*, 1892, p. 36.

at the village of Villate, about 3 kilometres east by south of Neuvy-sur-Barangeon.

1. The reasons which Napoleon<sup>1</sup> gives are that Sancerre is about half way between Gien, which he identifies with Cenabum, and the confluence of the Allier and the Loire, about 10 miles south-east of which, at St-Parize-le-Châtel, he places Gorgobina; that Sancerre is at a sufficient distance from Avaricum to correspond with Caesar's narrative; that it is situated on a hill, as, he maintains, Noviodunum must have been in order that its inhabitants might see "in the distance, from the top of their walls, the cavalry of Vercingetorix"; that the ground in the neighbourhood was suitable for a cavalry engagement; and that the remains of a Gallo-Roman town have been discovered at the foot of the hill of Sancerre.<sup>2</sup>

Not one of these reasons is convincing. The Gallo-Roman town may have been any town but the successor of Noviodunum. It is unnecessary to assume that Noviodunum was on a hill, unless the word *dunum* implies such a situation;<sup>3</sup> for from the top of an ordinary town-wall the range of vision, if the country were flat, would extend over several miles, and Lord Wolseley<sup>4</sup> tells us that cavalry cannot be distinguished from infantry at a greater distance than 1200 yards. Indeed, as the inhabitants made no attempt to defend themselves, it is possible that the town was not strongly situated.<sup>5</sup> The argument that Sancerre is situated at the right distance between Gien and St-Parize-le-Châtel is worthless; for it is not proved that Gorgobina was at St-Parize-le-Châtel, and Cenabum was not at Gien but at Orléans. Lastly, by the most ancient authorities, Sancerre was called, not Noviodunum but Sincerra or Sincerium Castrum.<sup>6</sup>

2. Von Goler<sup>7</sup> argues that Caesar must have taken two days to march from Cenabum to Noviodunum, and must have spent another day at Noviodunum before the cavalry of Vercingetorix appeared; that the news of Caesar's approach must have taken one day to reach Vercingetorix, and that Vercingetorix must have taken two days to march from Gorgobina to Noviodunum. The geographical position of Nouan-le-Fuzelier, he affirms, satisfies these conditions. But, as General Creuly observes,<sup>8</sup> all this calculation is mere guess-work. Caesar does not say how long he took to march from Cenabum to Noviodunum; he does not say what time elapsed between his arrival and the appearance of Vercingetorix's cavalry; and moreover, on von Goler's theory, the cavalry of Vercingetorix would have marched 107 kilometres,—the distance from La Guerche, which von Goler identifies with Gorgobina,

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 252, notes.

<sup>2</sup> Napoleon's arguments are identical with those of A. Bréan (*Itinéraire de l'expédition de César d'Agendicum à Gorgovia-Bocorum*, etc., 1865, pp. 83-4).

<sup>3</sup> See p. 472, *infra*.

<sup>4</sup> *The Soldier's Pocket Book*, 5th ed., p. 491.

<sup>5</sup> I find that General Creuly makes the same remark. *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, p. 400.

<sup>6</sup> D'Anville, *Éclaircissements sur l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 241-2.

<sup>7</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, pp. 240 and 241, n. 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, pp. 394-5.



to Nouan-le-Fuzelier,—in the same time in which Caesar is assumed to have marched 43 kilometres,—the distance from Orléans to Nouan-le-Fuzelier; which is very improbable. Moreover, it is not proved, and it is most improbable that Gorgobina stood upon the site of La Guerche.

Among other reasons for rejecting Nouan-le-Fuzelier, Belley<sup>1</sup> observes that it was in the ancient diocese of Orléans, and therefore would have belonged not, as Caesar's text requires, to the Bituriges, but to the Carnutes. It may be added that no remains, Celtic or Roman, have been discovered at Nouan-le-Fuzelier, and that it is not on the Roman road from Orléans to Bourges<sup>2</sup> or on any road by which Caesar would have marched from Cenabum (Orléans) to Gorgobina.

3. In favour of Nouan,<sup>3</sup> his own selection, Belley<sup>4</sup> urges that it is at the right distance from the southern frontier of the Carnutes and from Moulins, which he tentatively identifies with Gorgobina; that its name is derived from *Novio-dunum*; and that its geographical position tallies with Caesar's account of the march of his army, followed by Vercingetorix, from Noviodunum to Avaricum.

I know of only one positive objection to Belley's view: but that one is fatal. Nouan is only ten miles from Avaricum, and not more than 15 miles from any point within a radius of 16 (Roman) miles from Avaricum, where Vercingetorix can be assumed, according to Caesar's narrative, to have encamped. Now Vercingetorix could not have taken several stages<sup>5</sup> to traverse this short distance; and a glance at the map will show that he could not have followed Caesar at all; because, as Caesar encamped just outside Avaricum, and Vercingetorix 16 Roman miles from the same town,<sup>6</sup> Vercingetorix, marching from a point only 10 miles east of the town, must necessarily have taken a different route. Moreover, Moulins is certainly *not* identical with Gorgobina; and even if there were no positive objection to Belley's view, the reasons which he gives would be inadequate to prove it.

4. Argent, according to de Monvel,<sup>7</sup> shows evident traces of Roman occupation. But what of that?

5. At Neuvy-en-Sullias Gallo-Roman remains are said to have been found:<sup>8</sup> but there is nothing else to be said for it. Besides, it is not in the territory which is generally assigned to the Bituriges.

6. Nohan-en-Gracay is about 38 kilometres, or 24 miles, north by west of Avaricum; that is to say, it is far to the west of the road which Caesar would have followed in marching either to Gorgobina or to Avaricum, and so nullifies the words *positum in via*. Moreover, in

<sup>1</sup> D'Anville, *Éclaircissemens*, etc., p. 240.

<sup>2</sup> *Quelques notes sur Noviodunum Biturigum* (anon.), 1850, pp. 8-9; *Mém. lus à la Sorbonne*, 1866 (1867), pp. 114-15.

<sup>3</sup> Nohant-le-Gout, according to the Government Map (1 : 320,000), Sheet 18.

<sup>4</sup> D'Anville, *Éclaircissemens*, pp. 236-9.

<sup>5</sup> "Vercingetorix minoribus Cæsarem itineribus subsequitur, et locum castris deligit," etc. *D. G.*, vii. 16, § 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, and 17, § 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. d'agriculture . . . d'Orléans*, vii., 1863, p. 65.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, p. 66.

order to reach it and then to get to Avaricum, both Caesar and Vercingetorix must have crossed and recrossed the Cher.

7. Pierrefitte may be rejected at once. It is indeed on the Roman road from Orléans to Bourges: it is at a reasonable distance from Bourges; and it possesses Roman remains.<sup>1</sup> But it is not in the country of the Bituriges; and the name has no resemblance to *Noviodunum*.

8. General Creuly<sup>2</sup> selects the neighbourhood of Chatillon-sur-Loire because such a position harmonises with his identification of Gorgobina with Sancerre. • But this identification is almost certainly wrong.<sup>3</sup>

9. There remains only Villate, near Neuvy-sur-Barangeon. Neuvy-sur-Barangeon itself has been rightly rejected by writers who have made a special study of the question. It is not on the Roman road, but about 3 kilometres west of it; and no antiquities have been found in its environs.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, the name Neuvy is derived not from *Noviodunum*, but from *Noviacum*.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, local tradition, or what passes for local tradition, and long-established opinion, whatever they may be worth, are in favour of Villate. It is on the Roman road from Orléans to Bourges; and though it is only 30 kilometres from the northern side of Bourges, Caesar probably marched a much greater distance, by a circuitous route, in order to avoid the forests on the north and the marshes which nearly surrounded the town, and to reach his camping-ground on the south-eastern side:<sup>6</sup> therefore the words *Vercingetorix minoribus Caesarem itineribus subsequitur*—would not lose their force. Neuvy-sur-Barangeon was, in the Middle Ages, called *Novus Vicus*: and it has been argued<sup>7</sup> that the name *Novus Vicus* implies the existence of an older town, which may have been *Noviodunum*. Celtic weapons, Roman coins belonging to the period comprised between the reigns of Augustus and Gratian, the ruins of a building, which appears to have been a Gallo-Roman theatre, and inscriptions which are almost certainly genuine, and which, if so, must be referred to the Gallic epoch, have been discovered at the place in question.<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, Belley<sup>9</sup> maintains that Neuvy-sur-Barangeon is too near Orléans. Marching rapidly from St-Parize-le-Châtel, though not from the neighbourhood of Moulins, where Belley tentatively places Gorgobina,—the cavalry of Vercingetorix could certainly have reached Villate in time; and therefore Belley's objection disappears. But he adds that Vercingetorix, coming from Gorgobina, could not have followed Caesar from Neuvy-sur-Barangeon (or rather, as he ought to have said, Villate) to Avaricum. This objection has no more weight than the other. Vercingetorix may have been present in person in the combat before Noviodunum; and even

<sup>1</sup> St-Hypolite, *Recherches sur quelques points hist. relatifs au siège de Bourges*, etc., 1842, pp. 7-8.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. arch.*, viii., 1863, p. 400.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 430-31.

<sup>4</sup> *Quelques notes sur Noviodunum Biturigum* (anon.), 1850, p. 10; *Mém. lus à la Sorbonne*, 1866 (1867), pp. 123-30.

<sup>5</sup> Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 673, n. 4.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 15, § 5, 17, § 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Quelques notes*, etc., p. 19.

<sup>9</sup> D'Anville, *Éclaircissemens*, etc., p. 240.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 13-32.

if he was not, he doubtless marched up with his infantry to join his cavalry. Then, as Caesar tells us,<sup>1</sup> he held a council of war. By the time it was over, Caesar was well on his way to Avaricum. It is therefore no offence against language to say that Vercingetorix followed him thither.

Lancelot<sup>2</sup> objects to Neuvi-sur-Barangeon on the ground that it is not situated upon a hill; and the objection would also apply, though with less force, to Villate, which 'is on gently rising ground.'<sup>3</sup> The termination *dunum*, says Lancelot, implies an eminence. • *Caesarodunum* is no exception, for the original foundation must have been on one of the eminences near Tours, not on the low-lying site of the modern town. Plutarch, speaking of Lugdunum, confirms the view that *dunum* means a hill; and all other ancient towns in France, Germany and England, the names of which ended in *dunum*, were situated on hills. Similarly the Abbé Fénel<sup>4</sup> quotes Hericus, a monk who wrote in the reign of Charles the Bald, according to whom

"Augustidunum demum tum coepta vocari,  
Augusti montem transfert quod celtica lingua."<sup>5</sup>

These arguments are hardly convincing. Lancelot's assertion about the site of Caesarodunum is not supported by any evidence;<sup>6</sup> and if it is true, it does not prove his case. The statements of Plutarch and Hericus on a question of Celtic etymology will not be taken seriously. There is certainly one instance of a low-lying Celtic town, the name of which ended in *dunum*,—Lugdunum Batavorum (Leyden). Fénel urges that Ptolemy called it *Λουγύδιον*; but the best reading is *Λουγόδουνον*.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, Professor Rhys<sup>8</sup> says that "*dān*- is of the same etymology as the familiar English word *town* and the German *zaun*, 'a hedge or field-fence'"; and Zeuss<sup>9</sup> says that its proper meaning is that of a fortified position, not a hill ("*Locum munitum* proprie significat vox celtica *dān*, non *eminentem locum* vel *montem*: sunt etiam oppida quaedam eadem voce nominata non in monte sed in planicie sita"). The fact that Celtic strongholds were, as a rule, naturally built upon hills is no proof that the Celts would not have applied the word *dun* to a fortified town situated upon low ground. If this reasoning is sound, Lancelot's objection may be set aside.

The reader who has read so far will naturally exclaim with Desjardins,<sup>10</sup> "Qui a raison? il est bien probable qu'on le saura jamais." The reader will be right. It has been proved that nearly every place which has been identified with Noviodunum was not Noviodunum; and

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 14.

<sup>2</sup> *Mém. de litt. tirés des registres de l'Acad. Roy. des inscr.*, etc., vi., 1718-25, pp. 640-42.

<sup>3</sup> See *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000), Sheet 122.

<sup>4</sup> *Mém. de litt. tirés des registres de l'Acad. Roy. des inscr.*, etc., xx., 1753, p. 44.

<sup>5</sup> *Acta Sanctorum*, Julii, vii. 29.

<sup>6</sup> See J. J. Bourrassé, *La Touraine*, 1855, p. 68.

<sup>7</sup> *Geogr.*, ed. C. Muller, i. 229.

<sup>8</sup> *Celtic Heathendom*, 1888, p. 34.

<sup>9</sup> *Gramm. Celt.*, 2nd ed., 1871, p. 52 (64).

<sup>10</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 479.

it cannot be proved that any of the other places was Noviodunum. But, as every conceivable site would appear to have been proposed, and as there is more to be said for Villate than for any other, I mark Noviodunum there on my map, with a note of interrogation.

**Noviodunum (Suessionum).**—The position of this Noviodunum cannot be determined. Caesar gives us very little help. He tells us that Noviodunum was a strongly fortified town: <sup>1</sup> we may, as I show on pages 652-4, gather from his narrative that it was a long day's march from his camp on the Aisne; and we may reasonably infer that it was the chief town of the Suessiones. Caesar's camp on the Aisne was just north of Berry-au-Bac: <sup>2</sup> but we have no means of finding out how long the long day's march was.

1. Napoleon <sup>3</sup> and von Goler, <sup>4</sup> following most of the best known commentators of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, identify Noviodunum with Soissons. Soissons is on the road which Caesar would have naturally taken in marching from his camp on the Aisne to the country of the Bellovaci, if General Creuly <sup>5</sup> is right in believing that, after leaving his camp, he would have recrossed the Aisne and marched along its southern bank, in order to avoid the risk of being attacked in flank by the Belgae: it is 28 miles from Berry-au-Bac; and in the Gallo-Roman period Augusta Suessionum, which stood upon its site, was undoubtedly the capital of the Suessiones. But all this does not prove that it was Noviodunum. And indeed, if it is true that Caesar reached Noviodunum in one march, this very fact supplies an argument against identifying Noviodunum with Soissons; for it would appear unlikely that, immediately after making a march of 28 miles, he would have called upon his soldiers to attempt to take the town by a *coup-de-main*, and that, having failed in this attempt, he would have set them to work at preparing for a regular siege. This objection once appeared to me insuperable. But I might have remembered that in the Indian Mutiny Greathed's brigade marched 44 miles in 28 hours, and fought and won a battle almost immediately afterwards. <sup>6</sup>

M. E. Morin argues that Noviodunum must have stood upon the site of Soissons, because Soissons protected the passage of the Aisne in the fifth and fifteenth centuries, in 923 and in 1814. "C'est l'argument décisif," he says, "à nos yeux." <sup>7</sup> Not, I confess, in mine.

2. The Abbé Le Beuf <sup>8</sup> decided in favour of Noyant, which is on a hill a little south of Soissons. His argument is that Noviodunum must have been near Soissons; that the hill of Noyant is only 2 kilometres from Soissons; and that the name Noyant is derived from Noviodunum. Perhaps. Who can tell?

<sup>1</sup> Propter latitudinem fossae muriq; altitudinem paucis defendentibus expugnare non potuit. *B. G.*, ii. 12, § 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 105.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 645-51.

<sup>4</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 72.

<sup>5</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, pp. 300-301.

<sup>6</sup> Holmes's *Hist. of the Indian Mutiny*, 5th ed., 1898, pp. 392-4.

<sup>7</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. de géogr.*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. iii., 1862, p. 247, note.

<sup>8</sup> *Mercur de France*, Avril, 1736, p. 637.

3. Dom Lelong<sup>1</sup> adopted Noyon. But Noyon, as the *Itinerary of Antonine*,<sup>2</sup> proves, was not Novidunum, but Noviomagus.

4. M. Wauters<sup>3</sup> thinks that Noviodunum is to be identified with Nouvion-le-Vieux, in the department of Aisne; for, says he, "Nouvion est la contraction la plus naturelle qu'il soit possible de trouver de la dénomination gauloise." This is a fair sample of the "evidence" which often satisfies antiquaries of vast learning and high authority.

5. Peigné-Delacourt<sup>4</sup> proposes<sup>5</sup> Mont de Noyon, west of the Oise, which, he says, "présente tous les caractères des oppides gaulois," and is situated on a Gallic road leading from Vieux-Laon and Craonne, and (by another branch) from Pontarcy, to Caply, near Breteuil. But Mont de Noyon was not in the territory of the Suessiones. Peigné-Delacourt<sup>5</sup> replies that it *may* have *once* belonged to them, and have been detached from their territory after the conquest. Perhaps it may. But talk of this kind is idle. You cannot base a serious argument upon an unsupported assumption. Moreover, de Grattier<sup>6</sup> objects that the plateau of the hill on which, if Peigné-Delacourt is right, the *oppidum* must have been situated, is only 3 hectares, or about 7½ acres, in extent.

6. M. O. Vauvillé has discovered the traces of an important Gallic *oppidum* on the hill of Pommiers, which is on the northern bank of the Aisne, about 2½ miles north-west of Soissons.<sup>7</sup> It is significant that, although the ruins yielded a large number of Gallic coins, not a single Roman one was found; and M. A. de Barthélemy<sup>8</sup> suggests that this *oppidum* was the old capital of the Suessiones, which was succeeded by the Gallo-Roman Augusta Suessionum, just as Gergovia was succeeded by Augustonemetum and Bibracte by Augustodunum. This conjecture appears to me the most plausible of any that have been made regarding the site of Noviodunum; for it is unlikely that two large towns should have existed, before the Gallo-Roman period, so close to each other as Soissons and Pommiers; and therefore it is probable that Augusta Suessionum did not stand upon the site of a Gallic town. But the most plausible conjecture is worth very little; and on this point I am afraid that we shall never get beyond conjecture.

**Ocelum.**—See GRAIOCELL.

**Osismi.**—The Osismi dwelt in the department of Finistère: but it is impossible to determine the boundaries which separated them from the Curiosolites (*q.v.*) on the east, and from the Veneti (*q.v.*) on the south. Pomponius Mela<sup>9</sup> says that the island of Sena, or Sein, was opposite territory which belonged to the Osismi: on the other hand, Ptolemy<sup>10</sup> implies that the territory of the Veneti extended northward as far as

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. eccl. et civ. du diocèse de Laon*, 1783, p. 10, note.

<sup>2</sup> Ed. Wesseling, p. 262.

<sup>3</sup> *Bull. de l'Acad. Roy. de Bruxelles*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. i., 1881, pp. 564-5.

<sup>4</sup> *Recherches sur la position de Noviodunum Suessionum* (1856).

<sup>5</sup> *Comité arch. de Noyon*, i., 1862, p. 103.

<sup>6</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. des antiquaires de Picardie*, vii., 1861, pp. 335-6.

<sup>7</sup> See *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000), Sheet 33.

<sup>8</sup> *Rev. cell.*, viii., 1887, p. 398.

<sup>9</sup> *Chorographia*, iii. 6, § 48.

<sup>10</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 8, §§ 5-6.

the Gobeian promontory, or the Pointe du Raz; and, as Sein is nearly due west of the Pointe du Raz, the two statements are only reconcilable by the assumption that Mela was referring to the southernmost part of the country of the Osismi. Perhaps we shall not go far wrong if we assume that the Montagnes Noires,—a natural boundary,—divided the two peoples.<sup>1</sup> One of the towns of the Osismi was Vorgum or Vorgium, which is identified with Carhaix.<sup>2</sup>

**Paemani.**—See CÆROESI.

**Parisii.**—The territory of the Parisii corresponded with the modern diocese of Paris,<sup>3</sup> that is to say the department of Seine and part of the department of Seine-et-Oise.

**Petrucorii.**—The territory of the Petrucorii comprised the modern diocese of Périgueux and that of Sarlat, which was severed from the ancient diocese in the sixteenth century.<sup>4</sup> This territory is nearly identical with the department of Dordogne.

**Pictones.**—The Pictones occupied the ancient diocese of Poitiers, from which the cantons of Retz and Mauges were transferred to the dioceses of Nantes and Angers respectively, and the dioceses of Luçon and Maillezais were severed in 1317.<sup>5</sup> From this territory, however, must, if we accept the conjecture of Maximin Deloche regarding the Lemovices Armorici (*q.v.*), be deducted the southern part of Loire-Inférieure and the western part of Maine-et-Loire. Roughly speaking, there would then remain for the Pictones the departments of Vendée, Deux Sèvres and Vienne.

**Pleumoxii.**—See NERVII.

**Preciani.**—The position of the Preciani, as by geographers and historians they are usually called, cannot be determined. Their name is spelt in many different ways: but the reading of the best MSS., adopted by all the well-known editors, except Schneider,<sup>6</sup> who has *Ptiani*, is *Ptianii*.<sup>7</sup> Walckenaer<sup>8</sup> remarks that Caesar mentions them immediately after the Bigerriones; and that, after placing the surrounding peoples, there remains only the country whose chief town was Beneharnum. Following a suggestion of Sanson,<sup>9</sup> who observes that Béarn was divided into six districts called *parsans*, he inclines to place them in this country. It is difficult to see what connexion *parsans* can

<sup>1</sup> M. A. Bertrand, remarking that the author of the legend of St-Menulfe calls St-Corentin, who was bishop of Quimper, bishop of the Osismi, infers that they possessed the whole of the territory which corresponded with the diocese of Quimper (*Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. ix., 1864, p. 324). Now, as I have shown already (p. 422), the diocese of Quimper was one of those dioceses which were founded without reference to the boundaries of Gallo-Roman states; and no safe conclusion as to the area of the Osismian territory can be drawn from a document so late as the legend in question (Bolland, *Acta Sanctorum* Julii, t. iii., p. 292, F).

<sup>2</sup> *La Table de Peutinger*, ed. Desjardins, p. 29, col. 2; *Bull. de la Soc. arch. du Finistère*, ii., 1874-5, pp. 18-72. <sup>3</sup> Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 404.

<sup>4</sup> D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 517; Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 361.

<sup>5</sup> D'Anville, pp. 519-20; Walckenaer, i. 365-6; A. Longnon, *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 6. See also *Rev. arch.*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. xviii., 1891, pp. 260-61.

<sup>6</sup> Caesar, i. 290.

<sup>7</sup> See Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii. 1285.

<sup>8</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 293-5.

<sup>9</sup> *Les Comm. de César*, ed. 1650, p. 65.

have with Ptianii: but Walckenaer, who adopted the erroneous reading *Preciani*, insists that Sanson's conjecture brings the text of Caesar into harmony with the works of later writers, none of whom places any people in the country referred to.

**Ptianii.**—See PRECIANI.

**Raurici.**—See LATOBRIGI.

**Redones.**—The Redones are mentioned twice by Caesar, among the maritime states (*quæ Oceanum attingunt*).<sup>1</sup> D'Anville<sup>2</sup> considers that their territory extended beyond the diocese of Rennes, and included the diocese of Dol and part of that of St-Malo;<sup>3</sup> for otherwise, he remarks, Caesar would have been wrong in saying that they were a maritime people. The French Commission<sup>4</sup> reject this view (1) because Caesar reckons the Aulerici, who had no sea-board, as maritime states; (2) because, as Aleth belonged to the Curiosolites, it is probable that they possessed the diocese of Aleth, the see of which was transferred in the ninth century to St-Malo; and (3) because after the tenth century Dol and St-Malo were closely connected with the Breton-speaking part of Brittany, while Rennes remained French or Gallo-Roman. The Commission are further of opinion that if the territory of the Redones actually communicated with the sea, it did so along the valley of the Vilaine, which the Veneti could have afforded to let them retain. But it is not proved that no Aulerican state possessed a sea-board: it is not proved that Aleth belonged to the Curiosolites, and as the diocese of Aleth was not formed until after the Curiosolites had ceased to exist as a Gallo-Roman state, there is no evidence that that diocese corresponded with their territory: it is not likely that the powerful Veneti would have left the valley of the Vilaine in the possession of the Redones; and, as Caesar says twice over that the Redones were a maritime people, we must assume that he was right. MM. Kerviler<sup>5</sup> and J. Loth<sup>6</sup> give them the strip of coast between the Rance and the Couesnon, which was included in the diocese of Dol. See CURIOSOLITES.

**Remi.**—The territory of the Remi, according to Walckenaer<sup>7</sup> and Desjardins,<sup>8</sup> included not only the diocese of Reims and that of Laon, which was severed from it in the fifth century, but also that of Chalons. The diocese of Chalons was formed out of the territory of the Catalauni, or Cativellauni, a people who are not mentioned by Caesar, or by any writer before the time of Constantine.<sup>9</sup> Walckenaer remarks that, according to Caesar, the territory of the Remi was conterminous with Celtican Gaul;<sup>10</sup> and he maintains that this would not have been true unless they had possessed the diocese of Chalons. But Caesar's statement would be equally true if the diocese in question had belonged, as M. A.

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 34; vii. 75, § 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 542.

<sup>3</sup> It should be noted that these dioceses were not founded until after the Gallo-Roman period. The diocese of St-Malo included the broad headland east of the Rance.

<sup>4</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. ix., 1864, pp. 328-30.

<sup>5</sup> *Bull. arch. de l'Association bretonne*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. iv., 1885, pp. 225-8.

<sup>6</sup> *L'Émigration bretonne*, p. 52.

<sup>7</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 487-8.

<sup>8</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 455.

<sup>9</sup> See T. E. Mionnet's *Descr. des médailles*, i. 81.

<sup>10</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 3, § 1.

Longnon<sup>1</sup> maintains, to the Lingones. Still, I believe that the diocese of Chalons did form part of the territory of the Remi, or that the Catalauni were one of their client peoples; for Caesar tells us<sup>2</sup> that, in consequence of the favour which he showed the Remi, various tribes enrolled themselves as their clients. It is possible that the Tricasses also, who are not mentioned by Caesar, and whose territory corresponded with the diocese of Troyes, may have been clients of the Remi.<sup>3</sup>

D'Anville<sup>4</sup> believes that the Remi possessed only a part of the diocese of Laon, and that the other part belonged to the Viromandui. He thinks it likely that this part belonged originally not to the diocese of Reims, but to that of Noyon, which was formed out of the territory of the Viromandui; and he finds it difficult to believe that the territory of the Viromandui was confined within such narrow limits on the south of their chief town, Augusta (St-Quentin), as it must have been if they did not possess a part of the diocese of Laon. But there is no evidence for d'Anville's conjecture.

[See A. Piette's delimitation of the territory of the Remi (*Itinéraires gallo-rom. dans le dépt de l'Aisne*, 1856-62, pp. 29-31)].

**Ruteni.**—The territory of the Ruteni was identical with the ancient diocese of Rodez, that is to say, the greater part of the department of Aveyron and the northern part of that of Tarn.<sup>5</sup>

**Samarobriva** is generally identified with Amiens: but von Goler, V. Gantier and others reject this view. *Samarobriva*, Gantier<sup>6</sup> rightly observes, means "bridge over the Somme."<sup>7</sup> Then, apparently because of the resemblance between *briva* and the modern *Bray*, he proceeds to observe that Samarobriva must be identified with Bray-sur-Somme.<sup>8</sup> I shall not be expected to refute this argument. But M. Gantier has another. Referring to the much controverted passage in which Caesar mentions the distances that separated the several camps of his lieutenants at the beginning of the winter of 54-53 B.C.,<sup>9</sup> he says that he specified the distance of 100 Roman miles with the object of indicating the interval between his own camp and that of Q. Cicero, to whose relief

<sup>1</sup> *Atlas hist. de la Gaule*, pp. 5-6. See my note on the LINGONES.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 12, § 7.

<sup>3</sup> See my note on the SENONES.

<sup>4</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 693.

<sup>5</sup> D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 562.

<sup>6</sup> *La conquête de la Belgique par Jules César*, 1882, p. 111, n. 2.

<sup>7</sup> Dr. E. Guest insists that *Samarobriva* means "bank (*bruach*) of the Somme," and says that *brigas* are sometimes found in places where to build a bridge would tax the resources even of a modern engineer (*Origines Celticae*, 1883, i. 369). But Guest's etymological essays are not highly valued by Celtic scholars; and *briga* does not mean the same as *briva*. L. Petit-Radel indeed maintains that *briga*, which means "a town," is only another form of *briva*, remarking that *Samarobriva* is found in a document cited by Ortelius (see *Mém. de l'Inst. Roy. de France*, vi., 1822, p. 335). But Celtic scholars are now unanimous in holding that *briva* means "a bridge." See *Rev. celt.*, xi., 1890, p. 387, and A. Holder's *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, i. 534, 610, 612.

<sup>8</sup> Von Goler (*Gall. Krieg*, p. 168, n. 1) and A. Hock (*Études sur quelques campagnes de Jules César*, etc., 1897, pp. 72-5) also identify Samarobriva with Bray.

<sup>9</sup> *harum tamen omnium legionum hiberna . . . milibus passuum C continebantur. B. G.*, v. 24, § 7.



he was compelled to march. Cicero's camp was, he says, at Rèves. Caesar's was at Samarobriva. But Rèves is more than 100 miles from Amiens. Therefore Samarobriva was *not* Amiens. Therefore Samarobriva was Bray! The whole of this argument rests upon a gross misinterpretation of Caesar's text and a mere assumption. There is no evidence that Cicero's camp was at Rèves:<sup>1</sup> Caesar merely says that no one of the camps was more than 100 Roman miles from any other; and this statement, as I have already shown,<sup>2</sup> is incorrect.

L. P. Colliette identifies Samarobriva with St-Quentin:<sup>3</sup> but his arguments are refuted by the single fact that St-Quentin has been proved to be identical with Augusta, the chief town of the Viromandui.<sup>4</sup>

In support of the orthodox view there is this to be said. Samarobriva was the chief town of the Ambiani:<sup>5</sup> Amiens is the chief town of the district formerly occupied by the Ambiani. The names of the capital and of most of the chief provincial towns of France are derived from the names which the towns that originally stood upon their sites bore under the Roman Empire; and those names are identical with the names of the tribes in whose territories the towns were situated. Thus we have Paris (*Parisi*), Soissons (*Suessiones*), Reims (*Remi*), Bourges (*Bituriges*) and so on. Now, Amiens is, beyond all doubt, derived from *Ambiani*.

Again, there was in 1771, when Colliette wrote, in the abbey of St-Remi at Reims, a MS. of the thirteenth century, which contained these lines:—

urbem, quae florida Gallis  
Extiterat, quondam nomen Samarobria gestans,  
Ambianum quam nunc mutato nomine dicunt.<sup>6</sup>

The itineraries point to the same conclusion. The chief town of the Ambiani, which, in the *Table*,<sup>7</sup> is called *Samarobriva*, is mentioned in the *Itinerary of Antonine*<sup>8</sup> under the name of *Ambiani*. The following table, which Walckenaer<sup>9</sup> takes from the *Itinerary*, and prints side by side with an extract from Cassini, speaks for itself:—

<i>Itin. Ant.</i>	Gallie Leagues (each = 1½ Roman mile)		<i>Cassini</i>	
		Roman miles		Roman miles
Durocortoro . . . . .	...	...	Reims . . . . .	...
Suessonas . . . . .	25	37½	Soissons . . . . .	37
Noviomago . . . . .	18	27	Noyon . . . . .	27½
Ambianis . . . . .	23	34½	Amiens . . . . .	34½

Ambiani, then, and Amiens are the same; and Ambiani, as we have just seen, is the same as Samarobriva.

The famous mile-stone of Tongres furnishes additional proof. It

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 347-8.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 335-6.

<sup>3</sup> *Mém. sur le Vermandois*, 1771-3, pp. 6-14.

<sup>4</sup> See Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 400-81, and *Mém. de litt. tirés des registres de l'Acad. Roy. des inscr.*, etc., xix., 1744-6, pp. 671-90.

<sup>5</sup> Ptolemy (*Geogr.*, ii. 9, § 4) speaks of Ἀμβιανοὶ καὶ πόλις αὐτῶν Σαμαροβριουα.

<sup>6</sup> Colliette, *Mém. sur le Vermandois*, p. 12.

<sup>7</sup> *La Table de Peutinger*, ed. Desjardins, p. 14, col. 2-3, p. 15, col. 3.

<sup>8</sup> Ed. Wesseling, pp. 362, 380.

<sup>9</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, iii. 48, 89.

gives a *direct* route from Durocortorum (Reims) to Samarobriua. This route passed Augusta Suessionum (Soissons), Noviomagus (Noyon) and Roudium (Royeglise). As M. Cudell observes, "il est de toute impossibilité, en continuant la même direction, d'aboutir ailleurs qu'à Amiens."<sup>1</sup>

**Samnitae.**—Strabo<sup>2</sup> says that, according to Posidonius, an island opposite the mouth of the Loire was inhabited by "the women of the Samnitae," and that from time to time they visited their husbands, who dwelt on the mainland. Ptolemy<sup>3</sup> says that "below," that is to say, south of the Veneti, and in the neighbourhood of the Loire, dwelt the Samnitae. A few lines further on<sup>4</sup> he mentions the Namnetes (*q.v.*), placing them erroneously between the Cenomani and the Abrincatui.<sup>5</sup> Marcian<sup>6</sup> speaks of the Σαμνῖται. C. Muller<sup>7</sup> remarks that Ptolemy erroneously distinguishes Σαμνῖται from Ναμνῖται; and Desjardins<sup>8</sup> takes the same view, observing that, owing to the similarity between the letter Σ, which was often written M, and the letter N, and also to the fact that the name *Samnitae* was familiar to Italian ears, the error probably originally crept into the text of Strabo; and that Ptolemy doubtless copied Strabo, and Marcian Ptolemy. Accordingly Desjardins concludes that, in Strabo, for Σαμνιτῶν (*γυναῖκας*) we ought to read Ναμνιτῶν; and this conclusion is supported by the statement of Strabo<sup>9</sup> that the Loire entered the sea between the Pictones and the Namnetes.

Some coins belonging to the Armorican type, stamped on the reverse side with the letter Σ, were found some years ago at Candé and at Ancenis, in the valley of the Loire. These places are east of the country which belonged to the Samnitae, if there ever was such a people; but M. Parenteau<sup>10</sup> believes that Σ stands for Σαμνῖται. Unbiased critics will, I think, agree that this argument is worthless.

M. S. de Kersabiec<sup>11</sup> makes a laboured and fantastic attempt to prove that the Samnitae were an Egyptian people, who had emigrated from "la bouche Tsanitique du Nil"!

M. Orioux<sup>12</sup> believes that what Strabo really said was that the Loire entered the sea between the Pictones and the Samnitae. It is of course impossible to prove that Strabo did not say this: but it is idle to argue that he did when all the MSS. have Ναμνιτῶν; and M. Orioux appears to forget that Polybius,<sup>13</sup> like Strabo, affirms that "the Loire discharges

<sup>1</sup> *Bull. de l'Acad. Roy. des sciences et belles-lettres de Bruxelles*, iii., 1836, p. 392. See also *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. iii., 1861, pp. 408-13.

<sup>2</sup> *iv.* 4, § 8.

<sup>3</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 8, § 6.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, § 8.

<sup>5</sup> For a list of the blunders which Ptolemy made in dealing with Gallic geography see *Hist. de l'Acad. des inscr.*, xxxi., 1768, pp. 265-6.

<sup>6</sup> *Geogr. graec. min.*, ed. C. Muller, i. 552, T. 18. According to M. de la Monneraye (*Bull. arch. de l'Ass<sup>n</sup> bretonne*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. iv., 1885, p. 271, n. 3) a good MS. of Marcian gives the reading *Ναμνῖται*.

<sup>7</sup> *Ptol.*, i. 213, note.

<sup>8</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i. 143, 2<sup>e</sup> 4, ii. 140, n. 2.

<sup>9</sup> *iv.* 2, § 1.

<sup>10</sup> *Comptes-rendus de l'Ass<sup>n</sup> bretonne*, 1873, pp. 67-8.

<sup>11</sup> *Études arch.*,—*Corbilon, Samnites*, etc., pp. 9-20.

<sup>12</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. arch. de Nantes*, xix., 1880, p. 49.

<sup>13</sup> xxxiv. 10. The testimony of Polybius, which M. Kerviler also has overlooked, refutes various arguments by which he labours to prove (*Bull. arch. de*

itself between the Pictones and the Namnitae." He appeals triumphantly, however, to the passage in which Caesar reckoned the Namnetes among the peoples who dwelt opposite Britain.<sup>1</sup> The answer is that Caesar made a mistake. For it is certain that Caesar,<sup>2</sup> as well as Strabo<sup>3</sup> and Mela,<sup>4</sup> imagined that the coast of Gaul, from the Rhine to the Pyrenees, was opposite Britain. Nantes preserves the name of the Namnetes: Nantes, according to the *Table*,<sup>5</sup> was their chief town; and in the *Book of the Miracles of Gregory of Tours* St-Nazaire is placed in *territorio urbis Namneticae*.<sup>6</sup> M. de la Monneraye<sup>7</sup> observes further that Ptolemy makes the Samnitae neighbours of the Andecavi; and he argues that this proves that Ptolemy confounded them with the Namnetes.

To conclude, I am strongly inclined to believe, with C. Müller, Desjardins and the majority of scholars, that the Samnitae never existed.<sup>8</sup> If they did, they must have been a *pagus* of the Namnetes.

**Santones.**—The Santones occupied the dioceses of Saintes and Angoulême and the pays d'Aunis; in other words, the departments of Charente and Charente-Inférieure and part of Gironde.<sup>9</sup> To this M. A. Longnon<sup>10</sup> proposes to add the territory of the Bituriges Vivisci (*q.v.*), who are not mentioned by Caesar, and may conceivably have been clients of the Santones. He points out that, if his conjecture were adopted, Caesar's statement,<sup>11</sup> that the territory of the Santones was not far from that of the Tolosates, would be less open to objection. But, as I have already shown,<sup>12</sup> Caesar's statement throws no real doubt upon his good faith; and I do not see the use of making conjectures which there is no evidence to support, and which can neither be established nor refuted.

**Seduni.**—See NANTUATES.

**Segusiavi.**—According to all the good MSS., the people whom Caesar mentions in *B. G.*, i. 10, § 5, were the Sebusiani; the people whom he mentions in vii. 64, § 4, 75, § 2, the Segusiavi. A. Bernard argues, in the *Mémoires de la Société des antiquaires de France* (xviii.,

*l'Association bretonne*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. iv., 1885, pp. 231-2) that the Namnetes were an inland people. And when he insists that Caesar does not mention them in his list (*B. G.*, vii. 75, § 4) of the maritime peoples of Gaul, he forgets that Caesar only professes to enumerate *some* of those peoples.

<sup>1</sup> *Socios sibi ad id bellum Osismos, Lexovios, Namnetes, Ambianos, Morinos, Diablintes, Menapios adsciscunt; auxilia ex Britannia, quae contra eas regiones posita est, arcessunt.* *B. G.*, iii. 9, § 9.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, v. 13, §§ 1-2.

<sup>3</sup> *Strabonis Geographiconum tabulae XI*, instruit C. Müller, 1880, p. 5 and Tab. iv.

<sup>4</sup> *Chorographi*, ii. 6, § 85. Pyrenaeus . . in Britannicum procurrit Oceanum. So also, even in the fifth century, Vibius Sequester wrote *Liger Galliae* . . . in oceanum Britannicum evolvitur (*De fluminibus quorum apud poetas fit mentio*, ed. J. J. Oberlin, 1778, p. 13).

<sup>5</sup> Ed. Desjardins, p. 28, col. 3, p. 29, col. 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Patrologiae cursus completus*, ed. J. P. Migne, t. 71, p. 759.

<sup>7</sup> *Bull. arch. de l'Ass<sup>n</sup> bretonne*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. iv., 1885, p. 271.

<sup>8</sup> The Samnitae are identified by Mommsen (*Hist. of Rome,—the Provinces*, i. 96, note) with the Curiosolites!

<sup>9</sup> D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 576-7; Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 363.

<sup>11</sup> *B. G.*, i. 10, § 1.

<sup>12</sup> *Séa* p. 186.

1846, pp. 355, 374) that the Sebusiani and the Segusiavi were distinct peoples, of whom the former dwelt on the left, the latter mainly on the right bank of the Saône. But, says Nipperdey,<sup>1</sup> this assumption is refuted by Strabo,<sup>2</sup> who says that the Rhône, before it is joined by the Saône, flows through the territories of the Allobroges and the Segusiavi. As a matter of fact, Bernard, in the article to which Nipperdey refers, does assign to the Segusiavi a narrow strip of territory on the left or eastern bank of the Saône; and in a later work<sup>3</sup> he abandons his original theory, assigning to the Segusiavi the arrondissement of Trévoux, which he had before given to the imaginary Sebusiani.

In *B. G.*, i. 10, Caesar says that, after crossing the Alps from Italy in 58 B.C. by the shortest route into Transalpine Gaul, he passed into the country of the Vocontii, thence into that of the Allobroges, and thence into that of the Segusiavi. He goes on to say that the Segusiavi were "the first people beyond the Province, on the further side of the Rhône."<sup>4</sup> It is clear from *B. G.*, i. 12-13 that when he entered the country of the Segusiavi, he was on the eastern bank of the Saône. The greater part of their territory, however, was on the western bank; for two of their towns, Rodunna (Roanne) and Forum Segusiorum (Feurs), which Ptolemy<sup>5</sup> mentions, were on that side, and Rodunna was actually west of the Loire. Their chief town, Lugdunum (Lyons), Ptolemy places in Aeduan territory, doubtless because they were dependents of the Aedui. The western part of their territory appears to have comprised that part of the diocese of Lyons which extended on the right bank of the Rhône and of the Saône.

It is impossible to define the extent of the tract which the Segusiavi possessed in the angle between the Rhône and the Saône. Desjardins<sup>6</sup> thinks that it may have extended as far north as Mâcon; but M. V. Smith<sup>7</sup> argues that Trévoux, which is 25 miles south of Mâcon, being situated between two places called Ambérieux, must have belonged to the Ambarri; and accordingly he restricts the eastern Segusiavi to a very small tract. A. Bernard<sup>8</sup> gives them a considerable territory, extending in a north-westerly direction from a point near the confluence of the Ain and the Rhône to Thoissey.

Caesar speaks of the Segusiavi as clients of the Aedui,<sup>9</sup> and of the Ambarri as *necessarii et consanguinei Aduorum*.<sup>10</sup> Desjardins holds that we must understand the clientship of the Segusiavi in the same sense as that of the Cadurci, the Gabali and the Vellavi with regard to the Arverni (*B. G.*, vii. 75, § 2). It is clear, he remarks, that Caesar regarded the Segusiavi as forming a distinct state (*civitas*), because he says that the territories of the Aedui and the Segusiavi bordered on the Province (*finitimi provinciae*),<sup>11</sup> which proves that the Ambarri were

<sup>1</sup> Caesar, p. 792.

<sup>2</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 1, § 11.

<sup>3</sup> *Descr. du pays des Ségusiaves*, 1858, pp. 42, 46.

<sup>4</sup> *Hi sunt extra provinciam trans Rhodanum primi.*

<sup>5</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 8, § 11.

<sup>6</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 605.

<sup>7</sup> *Fouilles dans la vallée du Formans en 1862*, p. 5.

<sup>8</sup> *Descr. du pays des Ségusiaves*, 1858, pp. 41, 46.

<sup>9</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 75, § 2.

<sup>10</sup> *Ib.*, i. 11, § 4.

<sup>11</sup> *Ib.*, vii. 64, § 4.

regarded as forming part of the *civitas Aeduarum*, for the territory of the Aedui, properly so called, did not touch the Province. Besides, he goes on to say, the Segusiavi ranked as one of the sixty *civitates* of Augustus.<sup>1</sup> There is no doubt that the territory of the Segusiavi was distinct from that of the Aedui: but the argument by which Desjardins tries to prove that they were is wrong; for Caesar sometimes uses the word *finitimus* loosely. (See my note on the LATOBRIGI.)

B. Guerard,<sup>2</sup> who wrongly holds that client peoples were merely *pagi*, or subdivisions, of the people to whom they stood in that relation, includes the territory of the Segusiavi in that of the Aedui.

**Senones.**—The Senones undoubtedly occupied the diocese of Sens: the diocese of Auxerre (*civitas Autessiodurum*) is generally attributed to them; and, according to Walckenaer,<sup>3</sup> they occupied the dioceses of Troyes and Meaux as well. That is to say, in Walckenaer's opinion, the Tricasses, who are not mentioned by Caesar, and the Meldi were clients (or *pagi*) of the Senones. It has been argued that the territory of the Tricasses was not included in that of the Senones, because Pliny<sup>4</sup> and Ptolemy<sup>5</sup> mention the two peoples separately: but Walckenaer replies (1) that from the silence of Caesar and Strabo regarding the Tricasses we may infer that they and the Senones were practically one in the time of Caesar, and were only separated by Augustus, whose policy was to break up states that were unduly powerful; (2) that as, according to Caesar,<sup>6</sup> the Senones were neighbours of the Belgae, the territories of the Tricasses and the Meldi must have been included in theirs; and (3) that such a union harmonises with Caesar's remark regarding the great power of the Senones.<sup>7</sup>

These arguments are not conclusive. It is obvious that the first and the second might be used to prove that the Tricasses and the Meldi were clients, or *pagi*, not of the Senones but of the Remi or the Suessiones; and in fact Desjardins<sup>8</sup> does conclude that the Tricasses were clients either of the Senones or of the Remi. The conclusion is probable: but which of the alternatives is right? Walckenaer offers a further argument in support of his. He quotes from an inscription found at Auxerre, in which there is mention of *civitatis Senonum, Tricassinorum, Meldorum, Parisiorum, et civitatis Aeduarum*; and he argues that the omission of *Autessiodurum* proves that Auxerre too was included in the country of the Senones. But, as Long<sup>9</sup> remarks, "it is difficult to see what conclusion can be drawn from this inscription." It would seem to imply that in the Gallo-Roman period the Senones, the Tricasses, the Meldi and the Parisii formed only one *civitas*, which is certainly not true.<sup>10</sup> M. A. Longnon, as I have observed in my note on the LINGONES, holds

<sup>1</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 468-9.

<sup>2</sup> *Essai sur le système des divisions territoriales de la Gaule*, 1832, p. 8. Cf. p. 328, *supra*, and *Mém. présentés par divers savants à l'Acad. des inscr.*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. iv., 1860, p. 366.

<sup>3</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 407.

<sup>4</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 18 (32), § 107.

<sup>5</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 8, §§ 10-11.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 2, § 3.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, v. 54, § 2.

<sup>8</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 470.

<sup>9</sup> W. Smith, *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geogr.*, i. 346.

<sup>10</sup> See Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 18 (32), § 107.

that the Tricasses were clients of that people. I should say that the Tricasses were clients or a *pagus* either of the Senones or of the Remi: but, as these were both powerful tribes,<sup>1</sup> it would be useless to attempt to decide between them.

It is rather puzzling to find that while Walckenaer argues that Auxerre was included in the country of the Senones, he maintains that the diocese of Auxerre belonged to the Boii, whose territory was situated within the frontiers of the Aedui. Autessiodurum is not mentioned by any author earlier than Annumianus Marcellinus: but it appears in the *Notitia provinciarum*.<sup>2</sup> Walckenaer<sup>3</sup> thinks it natural to attribute the territory embraced by the diocese of Auxerre "au seul peuple célèbre de la Gaule dont l'emplacement n'est pas clairement indiquée par les auteurs," that is to say, to the Boii. In my article on GORGOBINA I have given reasons for dissenting from this view.

Desjardins<sup>4</sup> remarks that the Aedui, the Bituriges and the Carnutes were all neighbours of the Senones: "par conséquent l'Auxerrois faisait partie du domaine immédiat des Senones." But the conclusion does not follow. Substitute Aedui (*q.v.*) for Senones; and the argument remains as good.

[Since I wrote this article the last (and posthumous) volume of Desjardins's work has appeared. I learn that a mile-stone has been discovered, bearing the date 245, which was erected at the distance of 72 Roman miles from Augustodunum, on the road to Autessiodurum. It stood in Aeduan territory (*in Aeduorum finibus*) and also in the territory of Autessiodurum; and, as Desjardins<sup>5</sup> points out, it proves that, at all events at the time when it was erected, the territory which afterwards belonged to the *civitas Autessiodurum* formed a part of the territory of the Aedui. Thus Desjardins recants his former argument.]

**Sequani.**—The territory of the Sequani was bounded on the east by the Jura, which separated them from the Helvetii, and by the Rhine: they held the Pas de l'Écluse between the Jura and Mont Vuache: westward from the Pas de l'Écluse their territory was bounded, in part, on the south by the Rhône; but a part of the country between the Rhône and the Saône was occupied by the Allobroges, the Segusiavi and the Ambarri.<sup>6</sup> The western boundary of Sequania was, according to Strabo<sup>7</sup> and Ptolemy,<sup>8</sup> the Saône; and on the north-west and north their neighbours were the Lingones, the Leuci (from whom, as d'Anville<sup>9</sup> says, they were doubtless separated by the Vosges), and the Mediomatrici. D'Anville argues that those parts of the dioceses of Chalon (Cabillonum) and Macon (Matisco),—both Aeduan towns,—which are on the east of the Saône, belonged to the Sequani, not the Aedui. The proof which he offers is that, according to Frédégaire, the monastery of St-Marcel, which was in the neighbourhood of Chalon and on the eastern bank of

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, v. 54, § 2; vi. 12, §§ 7-8.

<sup>2</sup> Ed. Guérard, p. 16.

<sup>3</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 471-2.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, i. 1, § 5, 2, § 3, 6, § 1, 8, § 1; iv. 10, § 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 3, § 2.

<sup>6</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 599.

<sup>7</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 33-4.

<sup>8</sup> *Id.*, iv. 184-5.

<sup>9</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 8, § 12.

the Saône, was in Sequanian territory.<sup>1</sup> The French Commission<sup>2</sup> reject his view, preferring to follow the indications of the dioceses. Besides the diocese of Besançon, the Sequani probably possessed the northern part of that of Belley.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, if, as might be inferred from *B. G.*, i. 31, § 10, 51, § 2, the Triboci had settled before the defeat of Ariovistus in the territory of the Sequani, and if they then occupied, as they subsequently did, the territory which corresponded with the diocese of Strasbourg, that territory also belonged originally to the Sequani. According to Strabo,<sup>4</sup> however, the Triboci were established in the territory of the Mediomatrici (*q.v.*).

Colonel Stoffel<sup>5</sup> thinks that the river Ecken-Bach, between Gemar and Schlettstadt, was the boundary between the Sequani and the Mediomatrici; for, he observes, a strip of country bounded by two parallel lines running through Gemar and Schlettstadt respectively at right angles to the general direction of the Rhine, presents all the features which, in ancient times, would have constituted the natural obstacles desirable in a borderland.

It has been affirmed that the Sequani were entirely cut off from the Rhine by the Raurici: but Caesar expressly says that the territory of the Sequani touched the Rhine; and I agree with J. D. Schoepflin<sup>6</sup> that his testimony is decisive. If the Sequani did not originally possess the country which was occupied by the Triboci, they must have possessed the whole or some part of the country which belonged, in the imperial epoch, to the Raurici, unless, indeed, the Raurici and the Triboci were separated by an intervening tract. See LATOBRIGI, RAURICI and TRIBOCI.

**Sibuzates.**—The Sibuzates have been conjecturally placed in the neighbourhood of Sobusse, between Dax and Bayonne:<sup>7</sup> but there is no evidence except the resemblance between the names.

**Sotiates.**—The Sotiates occupied the northern part of the *civitas Elusatium*, or the country round Sos in the department of Lot-et-Garonne. The evidence for this, which is the common view, is put together by d'Anville.<sup>8</sup> He observes that Sos was, in the Middle Ages, called Sotium; and that the *Jerusalem Itinerary*<sup>9</sup> mentions a place called Scittium, the distances between which and Elusa and Vasata respectively very nearly corresponded with the actual distances between Sos and Eause and Bazas. He also points out that "Crassus, having passed through the country of the Santones, entered Aquitania by the north, and the Sotiates would be the first tribe on whom he fell,"<sup>10</sup> which condition is satisfied by the geographical position of Sos. This

<sup>1</sup> *Monumenta Germaniæ historica*, ed. B. Krusch, t. ii., 1888, p. 124.

<sup>2</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 14.

<sup>3</sup> *Anzeiger für schweizerische Alterthumskunde*, 1884, p. 112.

<sup>4</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 3, § 4.

<sup>5</sup> *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 89-90.

<sup>6</sup> *L'Alsace illustrée*, i. 96-7.

<sup>7</sup> A. de Valois, *Notitia Galliarum*, p. 524. See Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 360-1.

<sup>8</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 611-13.

<sup>9</sup> Ed. Wesseling, p. 550.

<sup>10</sup> See W. Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geogr.*, ii. 1024.

reasoning is sound enough : but many writers<sup>1</sup> have refused to accept it. M. A. Garrigou<sup>2</sup> places the Sotiates in the "pays de Foix," in the department of Ariège. Now the "pays de Foix" was occupied by the Consoranni; but this difficulty in no way disconcerts M. Garrigou. Evidently, he says,<sup>3</sup> Caesar (or Crassus ?), impelled by a barbarous thirst for revenge, deprived the tribe of the Sotiates of their individuality; for when Caesar mentions the general submission of the Aquitanian tribes which followed the victory of Crassus,<sup>4</sup> he says nothing about the Sotiates. It is true that they had submitted before<sup>5</sup> and that Caesar tells us that his list of the tribes which submitted is incomplete :<sup>6</sup> but trifles like these do not shake M. Garrigou's conviction. Again, the "pays de Foix," if it was in Caesar's Aquitania at all, was the very furthest part of Aquitania from the northern frontier, by which he invaded the country; while the Sotiates were the very first people whom he encountered ! This difficulty seems staggering; but M. Garrigou fancies that he can dispose of it. He claims to have proved that L. Manilius was defeated by the Aquitani in the valley of the Ariège.<sup>7</sup> Now there is no evidence whatever to show where Manilius was defeated; but I am willing to assume, for the sake of argument, that M. Garrigou is right. Well, he continues, Caesar says that Crassus was campaigning in the same country in which Manilius had been defeated, and that it was the Sotiates who had defeated Manilius ("César nous donne ce fait comme positif"); and to make assurance doubly sure, Caesar tells us that the country of the Sotiates was conterminous with the territories of Tolosa, Carcaso and Narbo, Toulouse, Carcassonne and Narbonne. The conclusion, says M. Garrigou, is inevitable that the territory of the Sotiates was in Ariège.

I reply that Caesar tells us none of these things. Speaking of the arrival of Crassus in Aquitania, he says that Crassus was aware that the theatre of the impending campaign was the same which had witnessed the defeat of Manilius (or Manlius): (*P. Crassus, cum in Aquitaniam pervenisset . . . cum intellegeret in iis locis sibi bellum gerendum . . . unde L. Manlius . . . profugisset.*)<sup>8</sup> Crassus waged war in different parts of Aquitania, first in the country of the Sotiates and afterwards in that of the Vocates and Tarusates; and Caesar's statement proves nothing, except that Manlius had been defeated somewhere in Aquitania. So far from stating "as a positive fact" that Manlius had been defeated by the Sotiates, Caesar never mentions the Sotiates or any other people in connexion with the disaster. Nor does Caesar say that the country of the Sotiates was conterminous with the territories of Tolosa, Carcaso and Narbo: he merely says that Crassus, on arriving in Aquitania, summoned to his standard "many stout soldiers from Tolosa, Carcaso

<sup>1</sup> There is a list of them in *Mém. de la Soc. des antiquaires de France*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. x., 1850, p. 285.

<sup>2</sup> *Études hist. sur l'ancien pays de Foix et le Consorann*, 1863.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 46-7, 58.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 27, § 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 22, § 4.

<sup>6</sup> *maxima pars Aquitaniae sese Crasso dedit . . . quo in numero fuerunt Turbelli, etc.* *Ib.*, 27, § 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Études*, etc., pp. 35-6.

<sup>8</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 1, § 1.



and Narbo, provincial states which are in the near neighbourhood of these parts, and then led his army into the country of the Sotiates" (*multis praeterea viris fortibus Tolosa et Carcasone et Narbone, quae sunt civitates Galliae provinciae finitimae his regionibus, nominatim evocatis in Sotiatum fines exercitum, introduxit*).<sup>1</sup> M. Garrigou assumes that Crassus marched right through Aquitania unmolested into the Province to fetch these reinforcements, instead of sending for them; and he asserts that the words "in Sotiatum fines exercitum introduxit" prove that the country of the Sotiates was contemporaneous with the Province!

There is not a tittle of evidence to support M. Garrigou's theory; and it is irreconcilable with the fact, to which d'Anville calls attention, that the Sotiates were the first enemy whom Crassus encountered after crossing the northern frontier of Aquitania. The same fact is fatal to the theory of B. de la Grèze,<sup>2</sup> who identifies the principal stronghold of the Sotiates with a rock, on which now stands a ruined castle, at Lourdes, in the department of Hautes-Pyrénées. The only argument worth noticing which he advances in support of his theory is that there are mines in the neighbourhood of Lourdes and that there are no mines in the neighbourhood of Sos.<sup>3</sup> But Caesar does not say that there were mines in the country of the Sotiates: he only says that the Sotiates undermined the terrace (*agger*) which Crassus constructed in besieging their stronghold, and then remarks parenthetically that "the Aquitani are very skillful in mining because there are mining works in many parts of their country" (*cuius rei sunt longe peritissimi Aquitani. propterea quod multis locis apud eos aerariae secturaeque sunt*).<sup>4</sup> He learned from Crassus's despatch that the *agger* had been undermined: he knew that mines were worked in Aquitania; and he connected the two facts. That was all.

I certainly cannot be accused of coming to conclusions hastily: but I have not the slightest doubt that the Sotiates lived in the country round Sos.

**Suessiones.**—The Suessiones possessed the diocese of Soissons, that is to say, the greater part of the department of Aisne; and possibly something more.<sup>5</sup> The diocese of Senlis (*civitas Silvanectum*) may have belonged either to them or to the Bellovaci (*q.v.*), with whom they were contemporaneous.<sup>6</sup> Desjardins,<sup>7</sup> who inclines to think that it belonged to the Suessiones, argues further that as, according to the description which the envoys of the Remi gave to Caesar,<sup>8</sup> the territory of the Suessiones was of great extent, it probably extended beyond the northern bank of the Oise, and thus included part of the diocese of Noyon, which is usually assigned in its entirety to the Viromandui (*q.v.*). This is also the view of Peigné-Delacourt;<sup>9</sup> but it is a guess and nothing

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 20, § 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. des antiquaires de France*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. x., 1850, pp. 284-304.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 290-91.

<sup>4</sup> Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 486.

<sup>5</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 452-3.

<sup>6</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. des antiquaires de Picardie*, iv., 1856, p. 318.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 21, § 3.

<sup>8</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 12, § 1.

<sup>9</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 4, § 6.

more. Longnon<sup>1</sup> assigns the diocese of Meaux (*civitas Meldorā* [q.v.]) to the Suessiones, but gives no reasons. See BELLOVACI and SENONES.

**Tarbelli.**—The territory of the Tarbelli, according to Ptolemy,<sup>2</sup> extended southward from the southern frontier of the Bituriges Vivisci (q.v.) to the Pyrenæes; and they are generally considered to have occupied that portion of the dioceses of Aquensis (Dax) and Lapurdensis (Bayonne) which did not belong to their clients, the Cocosates and the Sibuzates. This territory comprised the western part of the departments of Les Landes and Basses-Pyrénées.<sup>3</sup> M. A. Longnon<sup>4</sup> holds that the Tarbelli also possessed the diocese of Aire (*civitas Aturensium*), which is generally assigned to the Tarusates (q.v.), that of Béarn (*civitas Benarnensium*) and that of Oloron (*civitas Iluronensium*). He quotes Ausonius<sup>5</sup> to prove that Paulinus, a traveller, returning from Saragossa or Zaragoza (Caesar-augusta) to Hebromagus on the Garonne found himself, on leaving Spain, in the territory of the Tarbelli. Hebromagus is generally identified with Bram, about 12 miles north-west of Carcassonne.<sup>6</sup> But according to P. de Marca,<sup>7</sup> there was another Hebromagus, which stood upon the site of Embrau, near Blaye, on the right bank of the Gironde; and this is the place to which he believes that Ausonius referred. There is not, however, the slightest evidence that more than one Hebromagus ever existed. Still, I do not think that a single passage in Ausonius is sufficient to prove that the territory of the Tarbelli extended so much further eastward than is commonly believed. Desjardins, however, in his latest utterance on the subject,<sup>8</sup> expresses his agreement with M. Longnon. M. Longnon, he says, has shown that of the twenty-two peoples enumerated by Ptolemy as forming the imperial province of Aquitania, seventeen were on the right bank of the Garonne. The remaining five therefore occupied the whole of the Aquitania of Caesar; and this conclusion is confirmed by the fact that none of the ancient geographers who wrote between the time of Caesar and the time of Diocletian mentions any other people besides those five as having dwelt in the Aquitania of Caesar. Those five, of whom Caesar mentions only two, the Ausci and the Tarbelli, were the Tarbelli, the Vassarii, the Datii (whom M. Longnon identifies with the Lactorates, because the latter are not mentioned by any other writer), the Ausci and the Convenae. (I may remark, in passing, that Ptolemy<sup>9</sup> only mentions seven-

<sup>1</sup> *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 7.

<sup>2</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 7, § 8.

<sup>3</sup> D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 632; Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 362, n. 6.

<sup>4</sup> *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 7.

<sup>5</sup> The passage in Ausonius (ed. R. Peiper, 1866, pp. 281-2. vv. 123-9) runs as follows:—

Ecquando iste meus impellet nuntius auras?  
'Ecce tuus Paulinus adest: iam niuguida linquit  
Oppida Hiberorum, Tarbellica iam tenet arva,  
Hebromagi iam tecta subit, iam prædia fratris  
Vicina ingreditur, iam labitur amne secundo  
Iamque in conspectu est: iam prora obvertitur amni:  
Ingressusque sui celebrata per ostia portus.'

<sup>6</sup> D'Anville, *Notice*, etc., pp. 363-4.

<sup>7</sup> *Hist. de Béarn*, 1640, p. 32 (x).

<sup>8</sup> *Rev. arch.*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. ii., 1883, pp. 217-20.

<sup>9</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 7.

teen Aquitanian peoples in all). Now according to an inscription known as the inscription of Hasparren, this smaller Aquitania was occupied by nine peoples; and, according to M. Longnon, these nine peoples were the five already mentioned and the Boiates, the Elusates, the Bigerriones and the Consoranni. But the inscription of Hasparren cannot be referred to an earlier period than the end of the third century, when the province of Novempopulana was created.<sup>1</sup> In the time of Theodosius this province comprised twelve peoples,—the nine just mentioned and the Aturenses, Benarnenses and Iluronenses. Accordingly, having regard to their geographical position, M. Longnon considers that, in Caesar's time, the territories of the Aturenses (or Tarusates), the Benarnenses and the Iluronenses, who, so he infers from Ptolemy's not having mentioned them, were dependent peoples, were included in the territory of the Tarbelli.

M. Longnon may be right: but I do not think that the mere silence of Ptolemy proves that the Boiates, the Elusates, the Bigerriones and the Consoranni, or some one or more of them, did not exist as distinct communities in his time. Desjardins himself, in the second volume of his *Géographie de la Gaule romaine* (p. 377), which was written before the article to which I have referred, insisted that "il y a . . . une lacune considérable dans les tables du géographe alexandrin." I really believe that, when he wrote the article, he must have been dreaming. "Tous les textes classiques," he says, "lorsqu'ils ne mentionnent pas . . . les cinq grandes cités du Ptolémée, du moins n'en nomment-ils pas davantage; de sorte que les quatre autres peuples dont les documents postérieurs à Dioclétien nous fournissent les noms . . . n'étaient pas encore entrés en scène." These four were the Boiates, the Elusates, the Bigerri and the Consoranni.<sup>2</sup> But when I open the *Naturalis Historia* (iv. 19 [33], § 108), I find that Pliny mentions them all! And Desjardins ought to have explained how, without reckoning these four states, which, in his great work, he included in the sixty *civitates*<sup>3</sup> of Augustus, he proposed to make up the full number.<sup>4</sup>

I have ventured to criticise M. Longnon's arguments: but a glance at the map will show that Ptolemy included the territories of the Cocosates (*q.v.*) and the Sibuzates (*q.v.*), at all events, in the territory of the Tarbelli; and it may be inferred that these two peoples at least were their clients.

**Tarusates.**—The Tarusates appear to have been neighbours of the Vocates,<sup>5</sup> and are generally believed to have been identical with the

<sup>1</sup> See Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, iii. 157, n. 2 and facsimile facing p. 158. The judgement regarding the date of the inscription is based upon the form of the letters. See also *Rev. arch.*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. ii., 1883, pp. 216-17.

<sup>2</sup> Desjardins, in his *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 366, refuses to include either the Boiates or the Consoranni among the *Novem Populi*, remarking that the mere name of the former (obviously akin to *Boii*) proves that they were Gauls and not Aquitanians, and that the latter dwelt on the east of the Garonne.

<sup>3</sup> See Strabo, iv. 3, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> In writing his third volume (pp. 165-73) Desjardins felt the necessity of rearranging the sixty *civitates*, and succeeded in doing so,—to his own satisfaction.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 23, 27, § 1.

Aturenses of the *Notitia provinciarum*.<sup>1</sup> If so, they occupied the diocese of Aire (Atura),<sup>2</sup> or the eastern part of the department of Landes and the western part of that of Gers. D'Anville and Walckenaer only assign part of the diocese of Aire,—the “vicomté de Tursan,”—to the Tarusates, assigning the rest to the Oscidates Campestres of Pliny,<sup>3</sup> who, says d'Anville, if we may judge from the order in which the peoples among whom their name occurs are enumerated, lived on the common frontier of the dioceses of Auch, Bazas and Aire.<sup>4</sup> M. A. Longnon<sup>5</sup> regards the Tarusates as dependents of the Tarbelli (*q.v.*).

Desjardins,<sup>6</sup> remarking that after we have placed the Convenae, the Bigerriones, the Benarnenses and the southern Tarbelli in the districts which are known to have belonged to them, namely Cominges, Bigorre, the valley of the Gave de Pau and the western Pyrenees respectively, the valleys of Aspe and Ossau alone remain unoccupied, infers that those valleys must have been inhabited by the Iurouncenses, the Belendi and the Oscidates Montani: he agrees with d'Anville in connecting the name *Oscidates* with Ossau; but he places the *Oscidates Campestres* in the open country through which runs the Gave d'Oloron, below the junction of the Ossau and the Aspe. He also says<sup>7</sup> that Caesar's words, *Crassus in fines Vocatum et Turusatum profectus est*,<sup>8</sup> appear to show that the territories of the Vocates (*q.v.*) and the Tarusates were not separated from one another by the territory of the Sotiates (*q.v.*), as they must have been if the Vocates dwelt in the neighbourhood of Bazas, and the Tarusates in the neighbourhood of Aire. We must, then, he says, have the courage to admit that we do not know where the territories of the Vocates and the Tarusates were situated. I confess that I cannot follow this argument; for, as Sos lies well to the east of both Bazas and Aire, the Vocates need not, in the case which Desjardins supposes, have been separated from one another by the Sotiates.

P. de Marca,<sup>9</sup> who wrongly assigns the diocese of Aire to the Sotiates, places the Tarusates in the country round Tartas, which is on the Adour, about 15 miles north-east of Dax. He is guided, I suppose, by the resemblance between the names *Tarusates* and *Tartas*.

**Tigurini.**—The Tigurini were one of the four tribes (*pagi*) of the Helvetii.<sup>10</sup> Caesar gives no clue as to their geographical position. The geographers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Sanson, de Valois, d'Anville and the rest,<sup>11</sup> believed, for reasons which are not

<sup>1</sup> Ed. B. Guérard, p. 29.

<sup>2</sup> “According to all appearance,” says d'Anville (*Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 634), “the name of the Tarusates is preserved in a district of the diocese of Aire, under the name of Tursan.” Desjardins, however, says (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 645, n. 2) that the identification of *Tarusates* with *Aturenses* violates the most elementary phonetic rules. But he says the same of the identification of *Vocates* with *Vasates*, which is generally accepted.

<sup>3</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 19 (33), § 108.

<sup>4</sup> *Notice*, etc., p. 510. Pliny's order of enumeration proves nothing. See p. 428, *supra*.

<sup>5</sup> *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 7.

<sup>6</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 370-71.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, p. 645, n. 2.

<sup>8</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 23, § 1.

<sup>9</sup> *Hist. de Béarn*, 1640, pp. 35-6.

<sup>10</sup> *B. G.*, i. 12, § 4.

<sup>11</sup> See d'Anville, *Notice*, etc., p. 643.

worth mentioning, that they dwelt in the neighbourhood of Zurich. But an inscription, containing the words *PAGI TIGOR(inorum)*,<sup>1</sup> has been discovered in the neighbourhood of Avenches, south of the lake of Morat; and accordingly most modern scholars hold that the Tigurini dwelt in this part of Switzerland. Desjardins,<sup>2</sup> however, adheres to the old view. The fact that the inscription was found in the neighbourhood of Avenches does not, he says, prove that Avenches was in the *pagus Tigurinus*. No doubt: but it makes it more probable that it was in that *pagus* than in any of the other three. M. d'Arbois de Jubainville<sup>3</sup> says that the Tigurini have left a trace of their settlement in the name of Tegernau, which is in the canton of St-Gall. There is another Tegernau, about 15 miles N.N.E. of Basle, where he believes that they had a settlement before the Helvetii invaded Switzerland.

**Tolosates.**—The Tolosates occupied a part of the territory of the Volcae Tectosages, corresponding with the ancient diocese of Toulouse, which comprised the modern dioceses of Rieux, Loubes, Lavour, St-Papoul and Mirepoire, that is to say the greater part of the department of Haute-Garonne and part of the department of Gers.<sup>4</sup>

**Treveri.**—The position of the Treveri is roughly indicated by Caesar. He says that the Condrusi (*q.v.*) were their clients: he implies that their territory extended northward of that of the Mediomatrici (*q.v.*) along the left bank of the Rhine: he says that it was conterminous with that of the Remi (*q.v.*); and that it was separated (in part) from the Eburones (*q.v.*) by the territories of the Segni and Condrusi.<sup>5</sup>

Strabo<sup>6</sup> says that the Treveri were conterminous with the Nervii; but in Caesar's time they certainly were not. The territories of the Segni, Condrusi, Paemani and Aduatuci separated the two peoples.

D'Anville<sup>7</sup> and Walckenaer<sup>8</sup> assign the Treveri that part of the diocese of Trèves which lies on the west of the Rhine: but their limits cannot be defined, except on the south, in part; on the east, in part, where their territory was limited by the Rhine; and on the west, where it was conterminous with the territory of the Remi. The difficulty of

<sup>1</sup> See Desjardins (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 463 and n. 5). According to him, Mommsen says that the passage (*B. G.*, i. 12) in which Caesar describes his defeat of the Tigurini proves that they dwelt on the common frontier of the Helvetii and the Sequani.—namely in the neighbourhood of Avenches. If Mommsen really said this, he made a gross blunder. Any one who reads the passage in question will see that it proves nothing as to the habitat of the Tigurini. At the time of their defeat they and the rest of the Helvetii had emigrated from their original abode, and, as Caesar says (*Ib.*, 11, § 1), they had left not only the territory of the Helvetii but also that of the Sequani behind them. The one sound argument for placing the Tigurini in the neighbourhood of Avenches is based on the discovery of the inscription which I have mentioned in the text. The reference to Mommsen is *Inscript. confederat. Helvetiae latinae*, p. 27 (published in *Mittheilungen der antiq. Gesellschaft in Zurich*, a periodical which is not in the British Museum).

<sup>2</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 240-41, n. 6 and 463.

<sup>3</sup> *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, t. ii., 1894, pp. 75-6.

<sup>4</sup> D'Anville, *Notice*, etc., pp. 648-9; A. Longnon, *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. v.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 6, § 4, 10, § 3; v. 3, § 4, 24, § 2; vi. 32, § 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 3, § 4.

<sup>7</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 652.

<sup>8</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 510.

tracing the rest of their frontier arises from the fact that we cannot tell whether they or the Mediomatrici possessed the tract which afterwards belonged to the Vangiones (*q.v.*), and from the fact that we cannot exactly define the territories of the Eburones, Segni, Condrusi, Caerones and Paemani, with which no dioceses correspond. According to Ptolemy<sup>1</sup> and the *Notitia imperii*,<sup>2</sup> the river Obringa separated Germania Inferior from Germania Superior: but this does not prove that, in Caesar's time, the Obringa was the northern frontier of the Treveri. Moreover, although the Obringa is generally identified with the Ahr, the identification is not certain.<sup>3</sup> Long<sup>4</sup> thinks that "the rugged valley of the Ahr would be a natural boundary of the Treveri on the north." Zangemeister,<sup>5</sup> on the other hand, argues that their northern boundary was the little river Vinxtbach, between the Ahr and the Moselle. Roughly speaking, their territory may be said to have comprised the greater part of the province of Luxembourg, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the southern part of Rhenish Prussia.

**Triboci.**—The Triboci are mentioned by Caesar among the tribes who dwelt on the banks of the Rhine;<sup>6</sup> and, according to Strabo,<sup>7</sup> they had taken up their abode on the territory of the Mediomatrici (*q.v.*). D'Anville,<sup>8</sup> remarking that Ptolemy<sup>9</sup> places them on the north of the Raurici (*q.v.*), concludes that they possessed the diocese of Strasbourg; and Argentoratum, which stood upon the site of Strasbourg, was in their country.<sup>10</sup> Near the common frontier of the dioceses of Basle and Strasbourg, he observes, there is a place called Markolsheim, which means the same as the French Feins (*Fines*). But it is not certain that, in the time of Caesar, the Triboci occupied the same territory as in the time of Strabo or in the time of Ptolemy; and Desjardins<sup>11</sup> thinks it useless to attempt to fix their position, "puisque César nous les montre sans cesse en mouvement." Caesar, however, does no such thing either directly or by implication. He only mentions the Triboci twice.<sup>12</sup> In the former passage, they figure among the tribes that fought in the host of Ariovistus, which had for some time

<sup>1</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 9, § 8.

<sup>2</sup> Ed. F. Böcking, vol. ii. pp. 483\*-484\*.

<sup>3</sup> See d'Anville, pp. 498-500; Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 135-6; and C. Muller's ed. of Ptolemy, i. 225.

<sup>4</sup> W. Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geogr.*, ii. 1227.

<sup>5</sup> *Westdeutsche Zeitschrift*, Jahrg. iii. p. 317 (quoted by de Vlamincq, *Messenger des sciences hist. de Belgique*, 1887, p. 40, n. 1).

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 10, § 3.

<sup>7</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 3, § 4. De Golbéry (*Mém. de la Soc. Roy. des antiquaires de France*, v., 1823, pp. 142-3) thinks that Caesar, in his enumeration of the peoples past whose territories the Rhine flowed, mentioned the Triboci after the Sequani and the Mediomatrici because they occupied portions of the territories of both the two latter peoples; and in support of this view he appeals to Strabo, who says that *Σηκοανοὶ καὶ Μεδιοματρικοὶ κατοικοῦσι τὸν Ῥήνον, ἐν οἷς ἴδρυται Γερμανικὸν ἔθνος . . . Τριβοκχοῦ*. οἷς is generally referred to *Μεδιοματρικοὶ* only: but de Golbéry refers it to *Σηκοανοὶ* as well.

<sup>8</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 653-4.

<sup>9</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 9, § 9.

<sup>10</sup> See d'Anville, p. 96, and C. Muller's ed. of Ptolemy, p. 230.

<sup>11</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 621, n. 1.

<sup>12</sup> *B. G.*, i. 51, § 2; iv. 10, § 3.

been settled on the northern part of the territory of the Sequani. In the latter, as I have already remarked, they figure among the peoples who dwelt on the banks of the Rhine; and it is therefore clear that, at the time when Caesar wrote this passage, they possessed a fixed abode. After the defeat of Ariovistus, the remnant of his host were driven across the Rhine; and, in the absence of any evidence, we have no right to assume that, in Caesar's time, they returned. Sir Henry Howorth refers to *B. G.*, iv. 10; to prove that, when Ariovistus was defeated, "a portion of the Tribocci at least remained behind."<sup>1</sup> But there is nothing in the chapter to show this. Caesar merely mentions the Triboci among the peoples through whose territories the Rhine flows, without saying on which bank they lived. He says that "the Rhine flows swiftly through the territories of the Nantuates, Helvetii, Sequani, Mediomatrici, Triboci and Treveri" (*per fines Nantuatum, Helvetiorum, Sequanorum, Mediomatricorum, Tribocorum, Treverorum citatus fertur*). The word *Nantuatum* is probably corrupt.<sup>2</sup> Setting aside the Triboci, all the other peoples undoubtedly lived on the left bank of the Rhine, and are mentioned in geographical order, from south to north. The Triboci are mentioned in the place where we should expect to find their name if they occupied the same territory in Caesar's time which they occupied in Strabo's. The commentators conclude that they did. But there is one word in Caesar's description which, so far as I can discover, has escaped the criticism of all of them, — I mean the word *per*. If the Triboci were on the left bank of the Rhine, and if the people whose name was probably mistaken by the copyists for *Nantuatum* were there also, not one of the peoples whom he mentions were on the right bank; and therefore it would appear that he used the word *per* not in the sense of "through," but in the sense of "past" or "along." But there is not one single other instance in the whole of Latin literature in which the word *per* is used in this sense. The inevitable conclusion is that the people whose name was mistaken for *Nantuatum* or the Triboci, if not both, were on the right bank; or that Caesar made a mistake; or finally, that he wrote *praeter*, the abbreviated form of which, as written in some MSS., was *p̄tēr*.<sup>3</sup> I confess myself unable to decide between these three possibilities. If, as I am inclined to believe, the common view is right, and the Triboci were settled upon the left bank when Caesar wrote, then those Triboci who fought in the army of Ariovistus were only a portion of the tribe. If, however, the remaining portion were settled on the left bank of the Rhine in Caesar's time, it is difficult to understand why they did not throw in their lot with their brethren, who fought under Ariovistus, and also why Caesar allowed them to remain.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, vol. vii., 1878, p. 219.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 461-3.

<sup>3</sup> In a MS. of the *Commentaries* of the eleventh century in the British Museum (*Add. MS.* 10,084) the abbreviated form of *praeter* is *p̄tēr*, but *per* is itself abbreviated into *p*. In a MS. of the *Commentaries* of the twelfth century (*Add. MS.* 17,740) the abbreviated form of *praeter* is *p̄r*.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 463-4, *supra*.

If they subsequently appear on the left bank, so do the Ubii, who, in Caesar's time, were certainly on the right bank.<sup>1</sup>

Desjardins<sup>2</sup> argues that the Triboci could not have been on the left bank in Caesar's time, because the territories of the Sequani, the Mediomatrici and the Treveri touched the left bank, and therefore there could have been no room for the Triboci. But this is a bad argument; for if the Triboci were on the left bank, either they occupied a part of the territory which Ariovistus had wrested from the Sequani (see NEMETES) or, as Strabo<sup>3</sup> says, they had settled in the country of the Mediomatrici. Cluver<sup>4</sup> maintains that they had settled in Gaul before the invasion of Ariovistus,—a theory for which there is not a particle of evidence. Colonel Stoffel,<sup>5</sup> however, argues that it enables us to understand how it was that some of the Triboci remained in Gaul after the defeat of Ariovistus. They were, he suggests, entirely distinct from the later invaders who fought under the German king.

In any case, it is unsafe to attempt to determine the frontiers of the Triboci, as they existed in the time of Caesar. See SEQUANI.

**Tulingi.**—See LATOBRIGI.

**Turoni.**—The territory of the Turoni corresponded with the diocese of Tours, or, roughly speaking, the department of Indre-et-Loire.<sup>6</sup>

**Unelli.**—The Unelli dwelt in the Cotentin (the department of Manche). The French Commission believe that they only occupied a part of the diocese of Coutances, because it is cut in two, so to speak, by marshes; and they suggest that the Ambibarii (*q.v.*), who perhaps occupied the southern part, and possibly also occupied the adjacent part of the diocese of Avranches, may have been originally their clients.<sup>7</sup> Walckenaer<sup>8</sup> believes that the diocese of Avranches, which was formed out of the territory of the Abrincatui (probably, he thinks, the same people as the Ambibarii) belonged to the Unelli; and M. A. Longnon takes the same view.<sup>9</sup>

**Uxellodunum.**—Hirtius says that Uxellodunum was in the country of the Cadurci, which is represented by the modern department of Lot; that the stronghold was protected on all sides by steep rocks; that the ascent to it was difficult even when unopposed; that through the valley, which nearly surrounded the mountain, there flowed a stream; that the stream flowed at the foot of the mountain (*in infimis radicibus montis*) in such a way that it was impossible to divert its course; that the descent to it for the townspeople was difficult and steep; that below the stronghold itself, on that part of the hill which, for a space of about

<sup>1</sup> Napoleon (Planche 2) may be right in assigning to the Triboci lands on both banks of the river. Perhaps he was guided by the fact that the diocese of Strasbourg (see *Gallia Christiana*, vol. v.) included a tract on the east of the Rhine.

<sup>2</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 445.

<sup>3</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 3, § 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Germania antiqua*, ed. 1631, p. 365.

<sup>5</sup> *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 88-9.

<sup>6</sup> See Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 374.

<sup>7</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. ix., 1864, pp. 404-6.

<sup>8</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 385-7.

<sup>9</sup> *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 7.



300 feet, was not surrounded by the stream,—in other words, on a part which overlooked the narrow isthmus,—there was a spring; and that the Roman engineers drove subterranean galleries towards the source of the spring, and diverted its flow.<sup>1</sup> Orosius<sup>2</sup> says that the river was of considerable size: but his unsupported testimony on such a point is of no value.

Now, of the various sites that have been proposed several may be dismissed at once, because their pretensions have been shown to be absolutely groundless. Cahors<sup>3</sup> and Puy l'Évêque have no longer any supporters; Uzerche<sup>4</sup> has never received any but the faintest support, and besides it is in Limousin, not Quercy, and was therefore outside the limits of the territory of the Cadurei. There are only four about which there has ever been any serious discussion,—Capdenac, Ussel, Luzech and Puy d'Issolu.

I. To Capdenac,<sup>5</sup> which is on the river Lot, about 35 miles east of Cahors, there are several objections. (1) The place has never, so far as is known, borne a name at all resembling that of Uxellodunum. Champollion - Figeac<sup>6</sup> affirms indeed that, according to a mediæval charter, which was preserved in the archives of Capdenac, the town was formerly called Ucce-Lugdunum: but he only cites the charter as evidence that in 1320 tradition identified Capdenac with Uxellodunum. Moreover, MM. Creuly and A. Jacobs could learn nothing of the charter at Capdenac itself: the keeper of the archives at Cahors, whom they also consulted, could not enlighten them; and it should seem that the charter was a forgery.<sup>7</sup> (2) The hill is only protected by steep rocks on the east and the west; and on the north there was nothing to prevent the Roman army from undertaking a regular siege. (3) Capdenac was frequently and easily captured in mediæval wars. (4) Assuming that Uxellodunum was at or near Capdenac, the description of Hirtius would lead one to suppose that the stronghold was at Vic, which is at all events nearly surrounded by the river Lot.<sup>8</sup> But Vic is completely dominated by Capdenac; and accordingly Champollion is compelled to place the stronghold there. In this case, however, the isthmus of which Hirtius speaks is not to be found.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, viii. 32, §§ 1-2, 33, § 1, 40, §§ 2-4, 41, §§ 1, 4, 43, § 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist.*, vi. 11, § 21.

<sup>3</sup> N. Sanson (*Les Comm. de César*, pp. 90-94) advocated the claims of Cahors: but the Gallic town which stood upon the site of Cahors was, as every scholar now admits, Divona. See A. de Valois, *Not. Gall.*, p. 111, and *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 345. Moreover, the isthmus, if it can be so called, is not 300 feet, but 700 metres or about 2300 feet wide.

<sup>4</sup> Uzerche is in the département of Corrèze, between the river Vézère and the river Bradascon. The width of the isthmus is about 500 metres, or more than five times too great.

<sup>5</sup> See *Carte de l'État-Major* (1:80,000), Sheet 195.

<sup>6</sup> *Nouvelles recherches sur la ville gauloise d'Uxellodunum*, 1820, pp. 96-7, 110-11.

<sup>7</sup> *Examen des lieux proposés pour représenter Uxellodunum*, 1860, pp. 16-17; *Rev. d'Aquitaine*, ix., 1865, pp. 101-2.

<sup>8</sup> *Examen*, etc., pp. 18-21.

<sup>9</sup> In order to force the narrative of Hirtius into conformity with the geography of Capdenac, Champollion (pp. 50, 81) perverts the meaning of the famous passage,

Moreover, the area of the plateau of Capdenac is only 3 hectares, or about  $7\frac{1}{2}$  acres;<sup>1</sup> and this is, of course, too small to have admitted of the existence of an *oppidum* which accommodated more than 5000 men.<sup>2</sup> (5) The only spring which Champollion could find to identify with the spring described by Hirtius is more than 100 yards from the nearest point through which the wall of the town could have passed.<sup>3</sup> It would have been completely exposed to the fire of the Roman artillery and archers, and the terrace which Caesar constructed with such difficulty would have been unnecessary.<sup>4</sup>

II. Ussel, like Uzerche, is in Limousin, not Quercy, and was therefore almost certainly outside the limits of the country of the Cadurci. General Creuly and M. Alfred Jacobs, who personally examined every single locality that could conceivably be identified with Uxellodunum, considered that it in no way corresponded with the description of Hirtius, and that its claims were not worth discussing.<sup>5</sup> Still, as it is possible that the territory of the Cadurci may have extended beyond the boundaries of the diocese of Cahors, and as, since Creuly and Jacobs wrote, the claims of Ussel have been twice advocated, it may be well to examine them.

Ussel,—or rather the plateau of Peyrol near Ussel,—is described as

*magnus fons aquarum prorumpbat ab ea parte quae fere pedum CCC intervallo a fluminis circuitu vacabat*, in a manner which is simply astounding. He says that when Hirtius spoke of the isthmus as 300 feet wide, he was only thinking of the terrain on which the Roman troops could manoeuvre and construct their siege works ("Si l'on admet . . . que l'historien latin n'a pu parler que de l'étendue du terrain sur lequel les troupes romaines pouvoient manoeuvrer et les travaux de siège s'exécuter, ce sera de la superficie de l'isthme qu'il faudra connoître l'étendue. Selon César (*sic*), l'isthme d'Uxellodunum étoit de 300 pieds; celui de Luzech n'en a plus de 40)."<sup>6</sup> I shall not insult the reader by refuting this monstrous piece of special pleading.

<sup>1</sup> Champollion-Figeac, p. 74.

<sup>2</sup> The garrison of Uxellodunum consisted of the *oppidani* or townfolk who were there when Lucetius arrived, and of the force which he brought with him. Hirtius does not estimate the number of the *oppidani*. He says that when Drappes and Lucetius left the fort to get corn, they left 2000 armed men behind and took the rest with them (*B. G.*, viii. 34, § 2); and the words *duobus milibus armatorum relictis* seem to imply that there was an indefinite number of non-combatants as well: indeed, it is obvious that this must have been the case. Hirtius also says that when Drappes and Lucetius started on the flight that led them to Uxellodunum, they had "not more than 5000 men" (*non amplius hominum milibus ex fuga quinque collectis. Ibid.*, 30, § 1) or, according to the  $\beta$  MSS., 2000. Accepting the smaller estimate, and remembering that a sufficient force must have been left to hold the fort in the absence of Drappes and Lucetius, I conclude that the whole garrison, including non-combatants, numbered at the very least 5000.

<sup>3</sup> *Nouvelles recherches*, etc., pp. 81, 83.

<sup>4</sup> The Comte de Caylus (*A. C. P. de Tubières de Grimoard*), overlooking all the other objections which I have stated, says, "La seule difficulté est que cette fontaine étoit située dans la partie de la montagne qui n'étoit point environnée de la rivière dans un espace d'environ 300 pieds. . . . La fontaine de Capdenac . . . n'est pas précisément dans cette situation; mais on peut croire que cette fontaine ayant été coupée et détournée par les Romains . . . sa source aura changé de place." *Recueil d'antiquités égyptiennes*, etc., 1752-67, t. v., p. 280. One can believe anything, when the wish is father to the thought.

<sup>5</sup> *Examen*, etc., pp. 14-15.

follows by Colonel A. Sarrette.<sup>1</sup> The plateau, which is 2190 feet high, 1540 yards long from north to south, and from 440 to 770 yards wide, is protected by sheer scarped rocks, and almost completely isolated by a deep valley. On the west flows a little stream, the Sarsonne, and on the east "un très-petit affluent, faible filé d'eau." The assumed *oppidum* was only accessible by a narrow ridge on the north-east. On this ridge was a spring, which gushed forth at the foot of the assumed wall. The three camps of Caninius<sup>2</sup> were on the north of the *oppidum*, on the heights of Sarsonne and Teil, which dominate Peyrol. I need hardly add that, in the environs of Ussel, the inevitable "antiquités gauloises et gallo-romaines" have been discovered.

Now there is one feature in this description which is fatal to the assumed identity of Uxellodunum and Peyrol. The position of the spring cannot, by any ingenuity, be forced to agree with the description of Hirtius,—"*magnus fons aquae prorumpebat ab ea parte, quae fere pedum CCC intervallo fluminis circuitu vacabat.*" Colonel Sarrette struggles to meet this objection by saying that the word *fluminis* was substituted by some blundering copyist for *vallis*.<sup>3</sup> But this will not do. Unless a text is repugnant to reason or to undeniable and essential facts, one has no right to alter it, merely because it refuses to square with one's pet theory. Moreover, at Peyrol there is no isthmus; and a tunnel, by which the source of the spring was cut, has been discovered at Puy d'Issolu, and has not been discovered at Peyrol. In the face of these objections, I do not see how any unbiassed inquirer can identify Uxellodunum with Peyrol.

III. Luzech was the site adopted by General Creuly and M. Alfred Jacobs,<sup>4</sup> acting as the representatives of the French Commission. The town of Luzech is about 7 miles west-north-west of Cahors. It is situated on an isthmus at the foot and on the north of a hill which rises 87 metres, or 287 feet, above the level of the Lot, and is nearly surrounded by that river. The isthmus, according to MM. Creuly and Jacobs, is 330 feet wide: but this estimate is, I believe, too low.<sup>5</sup> The hill itself, according to the same authorities, occupies some 17 hectares, or 42 acres,—not more than one third of the peninsula. The spring described by Hirtius is, they maintain, represented by a slight oozing, so to speak, of water, which overlooks the isthmus. They argue that the feigned assault which Hirtius describes<sup>6</sup> is intelligible, as the hill is, in many places, easily accessible. Finally, it has been asserted that trenches have been discovered, uniting those points on the north, east and west of the hill, where the three camps of Caninius have been

<sup>1</sup> *Quelques pages des comm. de César*, 1863, pp. 228, 244-5, 263.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, viii. 33, § 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Quelques pages*, etc., p. 237.

<sup>4</sup> *Examen*, etc., pp. 27-32.

<sup>5</sup> M. J. B. Cessac, who holds a brief for the Puy d'Issolu, asserts (*Uxellodunum, aperçus critiques*, etc., 1862, p. 44) that the isthmus is 177 metres, or 621 feet: but he is mistaken, as any one who examines Sheet 194 of the *Carte de l'État-Major* (1:80,000) may see for himself. The isthmus is now divided by a canal; and I cannot ascertain its exact width.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, viii. 43, § 1. See p. 156, *supra*.

conjecturally placed : but I have not been able to discover any proof of this assertion.

In many respects this site does not conform to the description of Uxellodunum. The one point which tells strongly in its favour is that, alone among all the sites that have been proposed, it is almost entirely surrounded by a river, and that the breadth of the isthmus approximately corresponds with the statement of Hirtius. At first sight, indeed, as has been remarked by a skilled observer,<sup>1</sup> the traveller might fancy that he saw Uxellodunum rising before him : but a closer inspection suggests numerous doubts. First, the hill is only scarped on its northern side : the eastern face, indeed, is steep ; but on the south and west the slopes are so gentle that even carriages can ascend them without difficulty.<sup>2</sup> If it is objected that the hill may, in Caesar's time, have been as steep as the Uxellodunum of Hirtius, the answer is that the rocks of which it is composed are so hard that they cannot have suffered any considerable change of form.<sup>3</sup> But, it has been replied, Hirtius does not distinctly say that the mountain itself was steep (*praeruptum*) : he only says that the *oppidum*, which stood upon the mountain, was *praeruptum*, and that it was "protected by very steep rocks" (*praeruptissimis saxis munitum*). Von Goler,<sup>4</sup> remarking that *saxis* is the word which Hirtius uses, not *rupibus*, argues that he could not have meant to describe a naturally scarped plateau (like that of the Puy d'Issolu), but rather boulders laid by the hand of man. He places the *oppidum* on La Pistoule. The distinction between *saxum* and *rupes* is, however, not invariable ;<sup>5</sup> and Caesar does not always observe it.<sup>6</sup> Whether Hirtius did, we cannot tell. Secondly, the river does not flow, as the Latin text requires, at the very foot of the hill ;<sup>7</sup> the least distance which separates it from the bank is over 100, the greatest 500 yards. What becomes, then, of Hirtius's statement that the garrison could only approach the river by a steep and difficult descent ? To this objection also von Goler,<sup>8</sup> has an answer. He understands the words of Hirtius as applying, not to the descent from the hill to the bank of the river, but to the descent from the bank to the water. Such an interpretation is perhaps just possible : but it is certainly not the one which would naturally be put upon Hirtius's words. Thirdly, the summit of the hill is not a plateau at all, but, so to speak, a platform, only 44 yards long by 15 or 16 wide, and barely capable of accommodating 200 men. Evidently this narrow space cannot have been the site of the *oppidum*. Nor could the *oppidum* have been placed, even partially, upon the flanks of the platform ; for they are too steep. The platform, then, could only have been a citadel, and the *oppidum* itself could only have stood upon the lower plateau, called Pistoule.<sup>9</sup> Fourthly, Captain Gallotti maintains that, at the point which Creuly and Jacobs indicate as the site of the spring, and indeed at any point of the hill facing the isthmus, it is geologically

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. d'Aquitaine*, x., 1866, p. 14.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, ix., 1865, p. 251.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, x., 1866, p. 16.

<sup>4</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 359.

<sup>5</sup> See Forcellini, *Totius latinitatis lexicon*, v., 1871, p. 355.

<sup>6</sup> See *B. C.*, i. 68, § 2.

<sup>7</sup> in imis radicibus montis.

<sup>8</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 365, n. 1.

<sup>9</sup> *Rev. d'Aquitaine*, x., 1860, pp. 17-18.

impossible that there could ever have been a spring. "La partie du monticule," he says, "faisant face à l'isthme, ne présente pas un talus d'une certaine largeur, mais simplement une arête anguleuse comme le tranchant d'un soc de charrue. Toutes les couches qui composent la masse, sont inclinées du nord au sud, dans le sens opposé à l'isthme. Il y a solution de continuité entre ces couches et celles qui leur correspondent dans le massif voisin. Malgré ces faits, il fallait absolument trouver l'emplacement de la fontaine vis-à-vis de l'isthme, et cela ne pouvait se faire qu'en la plaçant sur ou contre l'arête anguleuse dont nous venons de parler . . . non-seulement en un point presque isolé dans l'espace, n'ayant aucune couche de terre soit au-dessus, soit à côté de lui, mais encore se trouvant situé au point le plus élevé du banc calcaire auquel il appartient, lequel banc ne communique à aucun autre du terrain circonvoisin. D'où l'eau a-t-elle jamais pu venir pour alimenter là . . . une *fontaine abondante*? Peut-être, objectera-t-on, qu'il a pu exister là une source artésienne naturelle tirant ses eaux du massif du nord. C'est une objection à laquelle la stratification du sol répond victorieusement. Ce phénomène ne pourrait exister que dans le cas où les couches sédimentaires du nord, s'inclinant vers l'isthme, se redresseraient ensuite pour former le monticule. . . . Mais . . . les bancs constitutifs du sol sont horizontaux dans le massif du nord et inclinés vers le sud dans celui de Luzech, ce qui rend la supposition impossible."<sup>1</sup> But I should warn the reader that Sir Archibald Geikie, who was so kind as to consider this argument at my request, does not regard it as conclusive. "There may of course," he writes, "be features of geological structure, not alluded to in the quotation you send me, which would show that the water could only flow along the planes of bedding. In that case, the argument would be valid enough. But in most limestone countries the water not only flows along the planes of bedding but rises through joints and gradually dissolves among their sides, forming open fissures, caverns and tunnels. It seems to me therefore quite possible that, supposing the form of the surrounding ground be favourable, a considerable body of water might issue from a line of joint on the spot indicated in your diagram." Fifthly, even assuming that there was a spring at the point in question, Gallotti denies<sup>2</sup> that it could have been the spring which Hirtius describes; for the Gauls could not have come down in force to attack their assailants, as the only approach was a narrow arête; the assumed spring was not more than 13 or 14 feet above the level of the isthmus; and the gigantic works which the Romans constructed<sup>3</sup> in order to place themselves on a level with it would therefore have been unnecessary. Sixthly, the Lot, in that part of its course which encircles the peninsula of Luzech, is more than 150 yards broad,—so broad that the archers of whom Hirtius speaks, could not have shot across it with effect. Long, indeed, replying to a similar objection, which has been brought against Capdenac, says,<sup>4</sup> "It was very possible to post archers and slingers in the river on

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. d'Aquitaine*, pp. 180-81.  
*B. G.*, viii., 41-2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, p. 188.

<sup>3</sup> *Cæsar*, p. 451.

rafts, or in boats . . . for it is not said that the archers, slingers, or 'tormenta' (artillery) were on the banks of the river." No. But the words of Hirtius,—“posting archers and slingers, and placing artillery at various points opposite the places where the descent was easiest, he prevented the townspeople from getting at the water of the river,”<sup>1</sup>—certainly seem to imply that they were: he would surely have mentioned the boats, if they had been used; and, if the objection is not insuperable, it is certainly serious. Catapults and *ballistae* could no doubt have easily shot across the river: but, if archers and slingers did so, we must assume, with Creuly and Jacobs, that the river was very low. The seventh objection has not, so far as I know, been urged before: but it seems to me, if not unanswerable, the most weighty of all. If Uxellodunum was on the peninsula of Luzech, or on any peninsula with an isthmus only 300 feet wide, how could 3000 men have got out of it, how could a long string of pack-horses have got into it again, when it was invested by two Roman legions?

Three other objections have been brought against this site: but they seem to me to have comparatively little weight. The hill of Luzech, we are told, is far too low to have been described as a *mons*; and, as some Roman cohorts climbed the slopes of Uxellodunum, with the object of making a feigned attack upon the fortress, the whole circuit of the river must have been fordable; whereas the Lot could not have been forded.<sup>2</sup> In answer to the former objection, I may point out that Caesar describes the hill which he occupied in the battle with the Helvetii as a *mons*,<sup>3</sup> and that this hill was certainly not more than 300 feet above the level of the plain.<sup>4</sup> With regard to the other objection, it has been strenuously maintained,<sup>5</sup> and as strenuously denied,<sup>6</sup> that the Lot, in the sweep which it makes round the hill of Luzech, is fordable in the autumn, at which season the siege of Uxellodunum probably took place. Creuly and Jacobs also maintain that, in Caesar's time, when the river was not, as it is now, provided with locks, its waters must have been liable to sink very low.<sup>7</sup> But was it necessary that the assaulting cohorts should cross the river at all? Could they not have made their way into the peninsula by way of the isthmus? Lastly, M. R. Perié<sup>8</sup> points out that the struggle for the possession of the spring took place on an elevated position (*excolso loco*);<sup>9</sup> whereas the isthmus at Luzech is nothing of the sort. But the Romans were fighting on the *agger*, which might fairly have been called an *excelsus locus*.

IV. The Puy d'Issolu, near Vayrac, is a hill, isolated on every side except the north-east, where it is connected by a col with the Pech

<sup>1</sup> *Sagittariis funditoribusque dispositis, tormentis etiam quibusdam locis contra facillimos descensus collocatis, aqua fluminis prohibebat oppidanos.* *B. G.*, viii. 40, § 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. d'Aquitaine*, ix., 1865, pp. 290-41.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, i. 24, § 3. He also speaks of the Kentish cliffs, off which he anchored on his first expedition to Britain, as *montes*. *Ib.*, iv. 23, § 3.

<sup>4</sup> See, pp. 618-19 and Plan facing p. 33.

<sup>5</sup> *Rev. d'Aquitaine*, ix. 1865, p. 243.

<sup>6</sup> *Examen*, etc., pp. 30-31.

<sup>7</sup> *Examen*, etc., p. 30.

<sup>8</sup> *Hist. de Quercy*, 1861, pp. 54-62.

<sup>9</sup> *B. G.*, viii. 42, § 4.

Demont, and rising about 650 feet above the valleys. Its summit is an undulating plateau, covering 80 hectares,<sup>1</sup> or about 198 acres, and nearly surrounded by steep escarpments of rock. On the north, east and south, the plateau is practically impregnable; while the western slopes, where, between the hamlets of Loulié and Léguillat, there is a considerable break in the encarpments, are nevertheless sufficiently steep to justify the statement of Hirtius that, even if no resistance had been offered, the ascent would have been difficult for armed men. On this side, about 72 feet below the line which the walls of the alleged *oppidum* would have followed,<sup>2</sup> there was a spring. The Dordogne flows past the south of the hill, about a mile from the nearest point of the plateau, and 1200 yards from the foot of the slope. The western slopes are bathed by a stream, about 10 metres or 11 yards wide, called the Tourmente, which, flowing through a narrow valley, hemmed in on the right by another steep hill, empties itself into the Dordogne, and is itself fed by a rивulet, which bathes the north-western side of the hill. The southern and south-eastern slopes are washed by a little stream, the Sourdoire, which, like the Tourmente, empties itself into the Dordogne.

The hill itself corresponds almost exactly with the description of Hirtius. It has received the greatest number of suffrages: its name closely resembles the *Uxello* in *Uxellodunum*: a charter of the abbey of Tulle, dated 944, proves that it was then called *Uxellodunum*,<sup>3</sup> and, as M. Cessac remarks, there is no evidence that any other place in the country of the Cadurci was ever called by any such name: <sup>4</sup> a tradition, which Achaintre describes as unbroken, and which is, at all events, some centuries old, identifies the Puy with Uxellodunum: numerous coins have been found on or quite close to it: <sup>5</sup> it is a position of great strength: it commands the northern entrance to the territory of the Cadurci; and therefore it is the very stronghold which Lucterius might have been expected to choose. The Tourmente could not have been diverted at any point of its course which the besieged garrison could have reached. Walckenaër indeed says that it could have been diverted: <sup>6</sup> but the map appears to show that he was wrong.<sup>7</sup> The Sourdoire could not have been approached by the garrison at all, because the sheer rocks

<sup>1</sup> Napoléon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 343.

<sup>2</sup> See Planche 32 of Napoleon's *Hist. de Jules César*.

<sup>3</sup> Inter præcipuas Veiracum (Vayrac), Mayronam et Wogaironum, in quorum vicinia, scilicet in podio vocato Uxelloduno, ubi olim civitas Romanorum obsidione nota. D. Bouquet, *Recueil des hist. des Gaules*, ix. 580 D.

<sup>4</sup> *Mém. lus à la Sorbonne*, 1866 (1867), p. 91, note. Mr. E. H. Barker says (*Two Summers in Guyenne*, 1894, p. 75) that an educated native of Vayrac told him that "the stream,"—I suppose the Tourmente,—"where it issues near the base of the rocky height has been known in the neighbourhood from time immemorial as 'le foun Conino'—Conino's fountain. Conino is a natural Romance corruption of Caninius." I attach less importance to this tradition than Mr. Barker appears to do. "Time immemorial" is a vague expression; and the stream may have been named after Caesar's lieutenant by some antiquary of the seventeenth century.

<sup>5</sup> N. L. Achaintre, *Caesar*, iv. 381, 386-7.

<sup>6</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 355.

<sup>7</sup> See *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000), Sheet 183, and Napoléon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 343-4.

which overlooked it were practically inaccessible, and if the garrison had attempted to reach it by a circuitous route, they must have been exposed, going and coming, to the fire of the Roman archers and artillery; the Dordogne was too far off; and access to it was barred by the Roman lines. Traces of those lines, or at all events, of *some* lines of investment, have been discovered; and also a gallery driven through the western side of the hill to the source of the spring.<sup>1</sup> These discoveries, it is claimed by the advocates of the site, are absolutely decisive. On the other hand, it is conceivable that the works in question were not made by Caesar at all; and no unprejudiced inquirer can deny that, in two respects at least, the site does not conform to the description of Hirtius. He expressly says that Uxellodunum was almost entirely surrounded by a river; and this cannot be said of the Puy d'Issolu. Achaintre points out that from the words in which Hirtius describes the position of the spring,—*magnus fons aquar prorumpbat ab ea parte quae fere pedum CCC intervallo fluminis circuitu vacabat*,—we must necessarily infer that, if Hirtius was not mistaken, Uxellodunum was nearly surrounded by one valley and one river.<sup>2</sup> M. Bial, however, says that every year, about the beginning of October, the Tourmente overflows its banks, increases the volume of a little rivulet called the Hierle, and thereby mingles its waters with those of the Sourdoire, in such a way as to form “une seule écharpe d'eau enseignant la montagne.”<sup>3</sup> Creuly and Jacobs, on the other hand, say that, when they visited the Puy, in November, the Tourmente and the Sourdoire did not commingle their waters;<sup>4</sup> and no unbiassed critic would lay any stress upon Bial's argument.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, Creuly and Jacobs deny that an army so small as that of Lucetius and Drappes would have taken refuge on a hill so large as the Puy.<sup>6</sup> In this argument, however, there is no force. The Puy was so strong that an army of 5000 men, backed by an indefinite number of townsmen, could have easily defended it.

It might also, perhaps, be objected that the Puy d'Issolu, on the east and south, was too steep to correspond with Hirtius's description. If the Romans had made a feint of storming the town on those sides, one is inclined to think that the garrison, unless fear had deprived them of their senses, would only have laughed at their efforts. If so, and if Uxellodunum stood upon the Puy d'Issolu, the words *ex omnibus oppidi partibus*, in Hirtius's 43rd chapter, must be inaccurate. Still, it is possible to ascend, at certain points, even on the east and south;<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Napoléon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 343-7 and Planches 31-2.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, iv. 452.

<sup>3</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. d'émulation du Doubs*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. iii., 1859, p. 600.

<sup>4</sup> *Examen*, etc., pp. 30-31.

<sup>5</sup> M. Cessac (*Uxellodunum*,—*aperçus critiques*, etc., p. 67) argues, on geological grounds, that the Dordogne itself once surrounded the whole of the Puy except the col on the north-east. But it is obviously impossible to prove that it did so in 51 B.C.; and even if it did, the spring, according to Hirtius, must have been on the col, whereas Cessac, as the result of his excavations, afterwards identified the spring mentioned by Hirtius with the one on the western slope!

<sup>6</sup> *Examen*, etc., p. 25.

<sup>7</sup> M. Tamizey de Larroque, quoting the abbé de Vayrac, says that at the Puy



and it must be remembered that the garrison would have been small in proportion to the size of the plateau.

A more serious difficulty remains. Hirtius describes the spring as situated *ab ea parte quae fere pedum CCC intervallo fluminis circuitu vacabat*. Napoleon explains this passage as meaning that the spring was 300 feet from the Tourmente.<sup>1</sup> But he has to admit that the spring was 1000 feet from the Tourmente; and therefore he is forced to read *passuum CC* instead of *pedum CCC*. Moreover, no scholar could accept his translation. The Latin can only mean that the spring was on that side of the hill which, for an interval of 300 feet, was not surrounded by the stream.<sup>2</sup> Von Kampen,<sup>3</sup> remarking that, just above the spring, there is a break of 300 feet in the escarpment, proposes to substitute *rupium* for *fluminis*. But in that case Hirtius's statement would have no point. Another emendation has more recently been proposed by Rudolf Schneider:—(*ab ea parte quae fere*) *passuum CC intervallum a fluminis circuitu habebat*.<sup>4</sup> In a passage which is supported by the unanimous authority of all the MSS. Schneider alters four words out of six and puts in another! He changes *pedum* into *passuum*; *CCC* into *CC*; *intervallo* into *intervallum*, *vacabat* into *habebat*; and he puts in *a*. Now Hirtius may not have been a stylist: but he did not write schoolboy's Latin; and if there were no fault to find with Schneider's Latinity, he would still say to himself, if he were a man of humour, "It is long odds that this emendation of mine, although it may make people say that I am a clever fellow, is not what Hirtius wrote."<sup>5</sup> To any unprejudiced mind it must be clear that either Hirtius made a gross blunder or the Puy d'Issolu is not Uxellodunum. Now Long suggests that Hirtius may never have seen Uxellodunum, and that his information or his interpretation of it may have been at fault.<sup>6</sup> Creuly and Jacobs, on the contrary, insist that Hirtius's narrative is worthy of the fullest confidence. His Preface, they argue, proves that he was a writer of scrupulous accuracy; for he tells us that he would not undertake to describe the African and Alexandrine wars

d'Issolu the rocks are "tellement escarpés, qu'on n'y peut monter qu'en grim pant, et par de petits sentiers qu'on a pratiqués dans le roc en quelques endroits; car partout ailleurs, les rochers sont aussi perpendiculaires que les tours de Notre-Dame de Paris." *Rev. d'Aquitaine*, ix., 1865, p. 108.

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 344.

<sup>2</sup> See Forcellini, *Totius latinitatis Lexicon* vol. vi., 1875, p. 231.

<sup>3</sup> *Quindecim ad Caesarem de b. G. comm. libular*, xv. As a matter of fact, the extent of the break is much more than 300 feet. See Ch. Lenthéric, *La Grèce et l'Orient en Provence*, 1878, Pl. ii.

<sup>4</sup> *Jahresberichte d. philol. Vereins*, xiii., 1887, pp. 362-4.

<sup>5</sup> M. Cessac (*Uxellodunum,—observations, touchant les fouilles exécutées à Luzech*, 1863, pp. 12-13) appeals to the authority of Orosius as a proof that there was no isthmus at Uxellodunum. Orosius (vi. 11, § 21) describes the position in these words:—*hoc oppidum in editissima montis arce pendebat, duabus partibus per abrupta latera non parvo flumine cingebatur. P. Duabus partibus*" are the words on which M. Cessac relies. I believe that Orosius's description was merely a loose and rhetorical paraphrase of that of Hirtius: but at all events it must be clear to any one who has the slightest critical faculty that the authority of Orosius cannot be weighed against the authority of Hirtius.

<sup>6</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 385.

because he took no part in either of them.<sup>1</sup> What Hirtius really said was that he took no part either in the Alexandrine or in the African war; and that, although he had gained some knowledge of them from conversation with Caesar, he listened to Caesar's story for the pleasure of hearing him, not with the object of writing history.<sup>2</sup> But, even if this statement implies that Hirtius did take part in the eighth campaign of the Gallic war, he could not have taken part in every operation of that campaign; and there is no proof that he ever saw Uxellodunum.

Creuly and Jacobs also maintain that we must either accept Hirtius's narrative as it stands, literally in every detail, or else candidly admit that the question is insoluble. If, they argue, Hirtius was mistaken in describing the isthmus, how can we tell that he was not also mistaken in saying that Uxellodunum was in the country of the Cadurci?<sup>3</sup> No experienced student will accept the principle which the authors lay down. Every historian makes mistakes; and in describing facts of a certain class it is very difficult to avoid error; while in narrating others it is almost impossible to go astray. For instance, an historian of the Indian Mutiny might, if he had never seen Delhi, make some slight mistakes in describing its principal features. He might place the Palace too near the Jumna: but he would hardly say that the Jumna almost entirely surrounded the town. In short, it is not necessary to fling a book to the other end of the room because one suspects the writer of having made mistakes; and it is necessary, in reading the most careful writer, to use one's critical faculty. At the same time I freely admit that the particular mistake which an advocate of Puy d'Issolu must, if he honestly translates the Latin, believe Hirtius to have made is one which is very difficult to understand.

And yet it is as certain as the Binomial Theorem that Uxellodunum did stand upon some one of the sites which I have examined. Scan closely the sheets of the great *Carte de l'État-Major* which embrace the department of Lot and the surrounding country, and you will not be able to find any other site which is even worth discussing. Every conceivable site has been carefully examined by keen eyes; and of the whole number there are, as we have seen, only four which have secured any real support. Two of the four have been, on closer examination, unhesitatingly rejected; and the final choice lies between Luzech and the Puy d'Issolu. Luzech is the only place where there is an isthmus even approximately corresponding with the description of Hirtius: the Puy d'Issolu is the only place which, in other respects, corresponds or even approximately corresponds with his description. It seems almost incredible that he should have described Uxellodunum as a peninsula surrounded by a river on every side, except an isthmus only 300 feet wide, if there was no isthmus at all. The mistakes which he is assumed to have made are nothing less than monstrous. If he had merely said that the hill was almost entirely surrounded by a river, I should say that there were ten chances to one against his having described the Puy d'Issolu in such terms. But when I consider that he made the

<sup>1</sup> *Examen*, etc., p. 24.    <sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, viii., Praef., § 8.    <sup>3</sup> *Examen*, etc., p. 23.

further statement that the spring was just above the isthmus, I am inclined to say that there are ten times ten chances to one against his having been mistaken. On the other hand, I am obliged to admit that, if Luzech was Uxellodunum, he made gross mistakes in his description. Yet, compared with those other assumed mistakes, they are perhaps easily explicable. But again, I am constrained to assume that Caninius was so careless, or rather so imbecile as to let Lucterius get out of the place with 3000 men, when he could have shut him in with the greatest ease.<sup>1</sup> Lastly, I am obliged to admit that the spring which he described is not to be found;<sup>2</sup> and that, if it was there, his account of the struggle which took place for its possession is absolutely incomprehensible. When I turn again to M. Cessac's circumstantial account of the way in which the spring on the Puy d'Issolu was diverted; when I consider the combined force of all the other arguments that have been urged by him and his fellow-advocates,—the argument from tradition, from the charter which mentions Uxellodunum, from the find of coins, from the discovery of lines of investment, from the great strength of the Puy d'Issolu, the difficulty of ascending it and the geographical position, which would have recommended it to Lucterius, lastly, the obvious resemblance of its name to Uxellodunum,—when I consider all these things, I can no longer hesitate. Hirtius did make that mistake which seems all but incredible; and Uxellodunum is to be identified with the Puy d'Issolu. Still, I confess that although reason has forced me to come to this conclusion, I cannot recommend it as absolutely certain.

**Vangiones.**—The Vangiones, one of the German peoples who contributed a contingent to the host of Ariovistus,<sup>3</sup> occupied, in the time of Ptolemy,<sup>4</sup> the country round Borbetomagus (Worms). It is doubtful whether they were settled there in the time of Caesar, after the defeat of Ariovistus. See NEMETES and TRIBOCI.

**Veliocasses.**—The Veliocasses dwelt in that part of the diocese of Rouen which did not belong to the Calètes (*q.v.*), namely the southern part of the department of Seine-Inférieure and the eastern part of the department of Eure. Their name survived in the old "Vexin."<sup>5</sup> Dr. Bonnejoy has persuaded himself that the common frontier of the Veliocasses and the Bellovaci passed by certain megalithic monuments at Ronesnil, Bercagny and between Lierville and Petit Serans, that is to say a little westward of the great road from Paris to Dieppe.<sup>6</sup>

**Vellaunodunum.**—Caesar says but little that can help us to find Vellaunodunum. He tells us distinctly why he laid siege to it: he wished to avoid leaving an enemy in his rear, in order that the supplies which he expected might reach him more quickly. He says that

<sup>1</sup> I am glad to find that R. Schneider has anticipated me in this argument. See *Jahresberichte d. philol. Vereins*, xiii., 1887, p. 362.

<sup>2</sup> "Luzech," sarcastically remarks M. Cessac (*Uxellodunum retrouvé*, 1865, p. 13), "eut la prudence de ne pas jeter en pâture aux hasards de la pioche le subside complémentaire mis à sa disposition par un membre de la commission de la carte des Gaules."

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, i. 51, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 9, § 9. See d'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 171.

<sup>5</sup> See d'Anville, p. 684, and Walckenaer, i. 397-8.

<sup>6</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. de géogr.*, vi<sup>e</sup> sér., t. xix., 1880, p. 344.

Vellaunodunum was a stronghold of the Senones; that it was on the road which he took from Agedincum (Sens) to Gorgobina, the stronghold of the Boii; and that, after leaving his heavy baggage at Agedincum, he reached Vellaunodunum *altero die*. As the garrison held out for two days, while he was making a line of contravallation, we may perhaps infer that the place was fairly strong. Finally he says that, after receiving the submission of Vellaunodunum, he marched thence in two days to Cenabum,<sup>1</sup> (Orléans). On pages 723-5, I prove that *altero die* means "the day after,"—that is, that if, for example, Caesar left Agedincum on the 1st of the month, he reached Vellaunodunum on the 2nd. It might be said that we are none the wiser for this knowledge; for Caesar may have arrived at Vellaunodunum *early* on the day which he calls *altero die*; or he may have arrived late: and the difference in time would involve a considerable difference in distance. Still, as Caesar marched the whole way from Agedincum to Cenabum in four days, and as Cenabum was not less than 108 kilometres, or about 67 miles, from Agedincum,<sup>2</sup> it is not likely that he made a short march on any one of the four days; and we may therefore perhaps infer that he did not reach Vellaunodunum until comparatively late in the day. On the other hand, as he took two whole days to march from Vellaunodunum to Cenabum, and arrived at Cenabum too late in the afternoon to begin the siege, it is tolerably certain that Vellaunodunum was at least as far from Cenabum as it was from Agedincum; and, as he says that, when he arrived at Vellaunodunum, he *oppugnare instituit*, which apparently means that he began his preparations for the siege on the day of his arrival, General Creuly<sup>3</sup> may be justified in inferring that Vellaunodunum was nearer to Agedincum than to Cenabum. It would be more to the purpose to ascertain the road by which Caesar marched. There was a Roman road from Agedincum to Cenabum, 108 kilometres or about 67 miles long, which passed by Château-Landon, Sceaux and Beaune. The road mentioned in the *Table*<sup>4</sup> passed through Aquæ Segeste and a little to the north of Gien: its length was 59 Gallic leagues, or about 131 kilometres, according to the MSS.; but Desjardins believes that this ought to be reduced to 54 Gallic leagues. Creuly<sup>5</sup> mentions a third,—"*l'ancien chemin*,"—of 116 kilometres or about 72 miles, which passed through Montargis and Ladon. The distance from Sens to Château-Landon is 44 kilometres, or about 27 miles; from Sens to Sceaux 52 kilometres, or rather more than 32 miles; from Sens to Beaune 66 kilometres, or about 41 miles; from Sens to Montargis 50 kilometres, or about 31 miles; from Sens to Ladon 65 kilometres, or rather more than 40 miles.

Now there is no proof that any of these three roads existed in the time of Caesar. Neither the road by Château-Landon nor that by Montargis is marked in the *Itinerary of Antonine* or in the *Table*; and

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 10, § 4, 11, §§ 1-4.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 409.

<sup>3</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, p. 393.

<sup>4</sup> *La Table de Peutinger*, ed. Desjardins, p. 26, cols. 1-2.

<sup>5</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, p. 392.

it has been argued that the Gauls would not have made a road through the Forest of Orléans and across the marsh of Sceaux. Belley,<sup>1</sup> it is true, says that the road by Château-Landon was commonly called the *Chemin de César*; but evidence like this, as the reader,—if there is such a person,—of the countless French monographs on questions of Gallic geography knows to this cost, is brought forward for almost every site that ingenious antiquaries have ever proposed.<sup>2</sup> The exact direction of the road mentioned in the *Table* cannot, except in part, be ascertained.<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, though it is not proved that the road which runs by way of Sceaux, Château-Landon and Beaune was a Gallic road, there is nothing to show that it was not. Though not mentioned in the itineraries, it was certainly a Roman road; and, Napoleon notwithstanding, it is certain that Caesar must have taken a road as direct or nearly as direct as this; because otherwise he could hardly have accomplished the march from Sens to Orléans in four days. For the same reason, although it is not proved that a Gallic road passed through Montargis, the absence of proof is not a sufficient reason for denying that Vellaunodunum lay on the “ancien chemin.”

I now come to the various conjectures that have been made as to the site of Vellaunodunum. 1. Napoleon,<sup>4</sup> who identifies Cenabum with Gien, pins his faith to Triguères, on the road from Sens to Gien-le-Vieux. His arguments appear to be an imperfect summary of those of an antiquary, M. A. Petit,<sup>5</sup> whom he does not mention. As Cenabum (*q.v.*) stood upon the site of Orléans, not of Gien, it is, as any reader who keeps his map open will see, useless to examine these arguments. For Caesar would have had to march in two days over 56 miles, the distance from Triguères, by the road which Napoleon makes him take, to Orléans. Such a march would not, indeed, have been absolutely impossible: but, if Caesar had made two such extraordinary marches on two successive days, he would certainly have said so.<sup>6</sup> Therefore we must reject Triguères.

2. Belley<sup>7</sup> proves that Lebeuf<sup>8</sup> is wrong in selecting for the site the village of Vellau, near Auxerre: but I need not summarise Belley's arguments; for Lebeuf argued on the untenable hypothesis that Cenabum was on the site of Gien.

3. Belley himself decides for Beaune. He argues that the distance of Beaune, both from Sens and from Orléans, answers to Caesar's narrative; that the place was well situated for the interception of the

<sup>1</sup> D'Anville, *Éclaircissements sur l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 189.

<sup>2</sup> According to J. B. Jollois (*Mém. sur les antiquités du dépt du Loiret*, 1836, pp. 16-20), that part of the road which lies between Sens and Nanterre is called *Chemin de César*; while its continuation, which crosses the Forest of Orléans, is called *Chemin Perré*.

<sup>3</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 68.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 251, note.

<sup>5</sup> *Dissertation sur Cenabum-Gien*, etc., 1863, pp. 43-4.

<sup>6</sup> He makes a point of telling us when he made forced marches. For a long list of passages see H. Meusel, *Lex. Cæs.*, ii. 370-71.

<sup>7</sup> D'Anville, *Éclaircissements*, etc., pp. 221-4.

<sup>8</sup> *Recueil de divers écrits pour servir d'éclaircissements à l'hist. de France*, t. ii., 1738, pp. 179-207.

supplies which Caesar expected; that it was in the diocese of Sens, and must therefore have been in the country of the Senones; that it was on the direct road from Sens to Orléans; and finally that the name "Beaune" is etymologically connected with *Vellaunodunum*. To prove this, he contends that *Vellauna* would have been contracted into *Velna*; and that *Velna* would have been changed into *Belna*, as *Vesuntio* was changed into *Bisuntio* (Besançon). "Beaune," he concludes, "est nommé Belna dès le neuvième siècle." But I believe that no Gallic or even Gallo-Roman antiquities have been found at Beaune;<sup>1</sup> and there is really no positive evidence in its favour, save the very doubtful evidence of etymology, which cannot be also cited in favour of Montargis. Beaune, moreover, is, as General Creuly<sup>2</sup> points out, considerably nearer to Orléans than to Sens, whereas Vellaunodunum was probably nearer to Sens than to Orléans.

4. Jollois<sup>3</sup> decided for a site about a mile and a half east of Sceaux, which is on one of the Roman roads between Sens and Orléans, and has yielded Celtic remains and Roman coins to the excavator.<sup>4</sup> It has been objected to on the ground that the site is low-lying, and was therefore not suited for a *dunum*. But the word *dunum* means "a town" or "strong place,"<sup>5</sup> not necessarily a stronghold built upon a hill. Like Avaricum (Bourges), Sceaux stands upon marshy ground; and some of the Gallic *oppida* were no better situated for defence.

5. Walckenaer<sup>6</sup> is inclined to place Vellaunodunum at Cran-et-Chenevière, between Châtillon-sur-Loing and Château-Renard, where, according to a MS. Memoir by Jollois, have been discovered the ruins of an ancient town. But of course Walckenaer is only guessing; and Cran-et-Chenevière, which is some 10 miles south-east of Montargis, is not situated upon the road by which Caesar would have marched to Cenabum.

6. Von Goler<sup>7</sup> decides for Ladon: but Ladon is 14 kilometres nearer to Orléans than to Sens, and must therefore, as General Creuly says, be rejected.

7. Creuly<sup>8</sup> thinks that the choice lies between Château-Landon and Montargis. Both, he thinks, are at a reasonable distance from Agedincum (Sens) and from Cenabum (Orléans): but he considers the site of Montargis,—the most defensible in a generally flat district,—better adapted for a Gallic *oppidum*. If Lebeuf<sup>9</sup> is to be believed, Château-Landon can hardly be the place we are looking for. "Il est constant," he asserts, "par les Actes de Saint-Severin, qu'encore de son tems, c'est-à-dire sous le regne de Clovis I., Château-Landon n'étoit qu'un bois et qu'une forest." M. Boyer, however, offers an etymological

<sup>1</sup> Petit, *Dissertation sur Genabum-Gien*, pp. 87-8.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. arch.*, viii., 1863, p. 393.

<sup>3</sup> *Mém. sur les antiquités du dép<sup>t</sup> du Loiret*, pp. 22-30.

<sup>4</sup> *Revue numismatique*, t. xxii., 1852, pp. 313-16.

<sup>5</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 410.

<sup>6</sup> *Rev. arch.*, 1863, viii., p. 293.

<sup>7</sup> See p. 472.

<sup>8</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 239.

<sup>9</sup> *Recueil de divers écrits pour servir d'éclaircissemens à l'hist. de France*, t. ii., 1738, p. 208; *Mém. de littérature tirés des registres de l'Acad. des inscr.*, etc., ix., 1781, p. 378. At the time of which Lebeuf speaks Château-Landon was called *Castrum Nantomis*.

argument in favour of Château-Landon.<sup>1</sup> *Vel*, he says, "préfix intensitif," is the Gallic form of the Welsh *gwel*: *layn* or *lan* means "country"; and *dunum* means "a town." Therefore *Vellaunodunum* means "la plus forte ville du pays." In course of time, M. Boyer explains, the prefix *vel*, which was probably confused in local pronunciation with "l'article *le* prononcé *el* (é-Landon)," would have been dropped; and between it and Landon "est glissé, par une superfétation très commune, le mot *château*, expressif de *ville fortifiée*." This "Vellaunodunum" was transmogrified into "Château-Landon." *Credat Iulæus Apella!*

To Montargis, in the environs of which Roman antiquities have been discovered,<sup>2</sup> I know no serious objection. It has, indeed, been argued that Montargis is too far from Orléans: but I cannot see that the objection is valid. Montargis is not more than 66 kilometres, or about 41 English miles, from Orléans: Caesar implies that it was his object to march as fast as he conveniently could;<sup>3</sup> and 20 miles, though a more than ordinary, was not an impracticable day's march. Still, there is no sufficient reason for definitely accepting Creuly's choice.

8. Colonel Stoffel<sup>4</sup> has persuaded himself that he has solved the problem which has amused and baffled so many generations of inquirers. If he had not a deservedly high reputation as a Caesarian scholar, I should not notice his arguments; for they are based upon the untenable hypothesis that Cenabum stood upon the site of Gien: but, as a specimen of the reasoning which satisfies Napoleon's ablest collaborator, they have a certain interest. *Vellaunodunum*, he says, was on the site of Toucy, which stands on the direct road from Sens to Nevers. His main arguments are these. First, Caesar's words prove that he marched by the direct road from Sens to Nevers: "*Les mots . . . ad Boios proficiscitur* (*B. G.*, vii. 10) ont un sens trop net pour qu'il ne soit pas évident que César marcha directement vers le pays des Boiens . . . par la route d'Agedincum à Noviodunum (Nevers)." Secondly, when Caesar says that, after leaving Agedincum, he arrived at *Vellaunodunum altero die*, he means that he arrived there *on the second day after his departure*. The proof of this is that the battle which Caesar fought with Vercingetorix immediately before the siege of Alesia undoubtedly took place on the river Vingeanne, at a distance of 72 kilometres from Alesia; that Caesar arrived at Alesia *altero die*; and that, as he could not have compassed that distance before nightfall *on the day after* the battle, he evidently did not reach Alesia until *the second day after*. Thirdly, Toucy is 61 kilometres from Sens. Caesar, being pressed for time, marched, on an average, 30 kilometres a day. That is to say, he marched from Sens, along the direct road on which Toucy stands, 60 kilometres before he reached *Vellaunodunum*. Therefore Toucy and *Vellaunodunum* are identical.

In the whole of this chain of reasoning there is not a single sound link. First, *ad Boios proficiscitur* does not necessarily mean that Caesar

<sup>1</sup> *Comptes rendus des travaux de la Soc. du Berry*, 1863-4, p. 349.

<sup>2</sup> Jollois, pp. 123-7.

<sup>3</sup> *Ea qui conficeret, C. Trebonium legatum (Vellaunoduni) relinquit, ipse ut quam primum iter faceret, Cenabum Carnutum proficiscitur.* *B. G.*, iii. 11, §§ 3-4.

<sup>4</sup> *Guerre de César et d'Arrioviste*, pp. 146-9, 154-5.

took the shortest road to the country of the Boii. Read in connexion with the context, the words mean that he marched to relieve the Boii: but that does not imply that he did not intend to punish Cenabum *en route*; nor is it certain that there was a bridge over the Loire nearer than Cenabum. Secondly, as I shall hereafter prove,<sup>1</sup> there is no evidence that the battle which preceded the siege of Alesia was fought on the Vingeanne, while there is strong evidence that it was not; and, as I prove on pages 723-5, the meaning which Colonel Stoffel, arguing from this questionable premiss, gives to *altero die* is entirely wrong. Thirdly, even if that meaning were right, even if it were certain that Caesar marched, on this particular occasion, at the rate of 30 kilometres a day,—no more and no less,—Colonel Stoffel's conclusion would not be justified; for he has no right to assume that Caesar made two complete marches, no less and no more. Caesar might have marched 20 kilometres on the day on which he left Agedincum; 30 on the second day; and 20 on the third.<sup>2</sup>

The conclusion of the whole matter is that there is no decisive evidence for any one of the sites which I have mentioned. Beaune, Cran-et-Chenevière, Ladon, Triguères and Toucy must be rejected; and so apparently must Château-Landon. Montargis and the site near Sceaux remain. I believe that there is more to be said for the former than for the latter. But unless some decisive inscription should hereafter be discovered,—and the chance of such a discovery is almost infinitesimal,—we shall never get beyond conjecture.

**Vellavii.**—The Vellavii were clients of the Arverni.<sup>3</sup> Their territory corresponded, roughly, with the ancient Velay, or the department of Loire-Supérieure.<sup>4</sup>

**Venelli.**—See UNELLI.

**Veneti.**—The Veneti, according to the common opinion,<sup>5</sup> occupied the diocese of Vannes, or, roughly speaking, the department of Morbihan. M. Longnon,<sup>6</sup> however, also gives them the alleged *civitas Coriosoporum* of the *Notitia provinciarum*,<sup>7</sup> which, if it ever existed, was perhaps in the territory of the Osismi; and Desjardins<sup>8</sup> gives them, besides Morbihan, the arrondissement of St-Nazaire, that is to say, the peninsula of Guérande.

Ptolemy<sup>9</sup> places the Veneti north of the Samnitae (*q.v.*) and south

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 775-6.

<sup>2</sup> As the colonel makes Caesar reach Vellaunodunum on the second day after his departure from Sens, and yet only accomplish two marches, I presume that, like Napoleon (*Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 251, note) he holds that the day of Caesar's departure was spent in concentrating the troops, whom Napoleon assumes to have been echeloned in the environs of Sens, and possibly in crossing the Yonne. This hypothesis is inconsistent with the meaning of *altero die*; and even if it were allowable, Colonel Stoffel's assumption that Caesar marched exactly 30 kilometres a day could not be justified. According to Napoleon, he marched 40 kilometres in two days. The concentration, if it took place at all, must have taken place before.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 76, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 685; Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 344.

<sup>5</sup> *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 7.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, i. 378.

<sup>7</sup> See note on the CURIOSOLITES.

<sup>8</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i. 435.

<sup>9</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 8, § 6.



of the Osismi, whose southern boundary, he says, was marked by the Gobæan promontory, that is to say, the Pointe du Raz. On pages 479-80 I have shown reason for believing that the "Samnitæ" never existed. Strabo<sup>1</sup> says that the Loire enters the sea between the Pictones and the Namnetes (*q.v.*), who were the southern neighbours of the Veneti; and he too places the Veneti south of the Osismi. Pomponius Mela<sup>2</sup> places the Osismi opposite the island of Sena, which is generally identified with Sein.

An attempt has been made to prove that Sein is not the same as Sena, and accordingly that the country of the Veneti extended further northward than Sein. According to M. Le Men,<sup>3</sup> the earliest document in which Sein is mentioned is "un acte du cartulaire de Landevennec," belonging to the eleventh century. Sein is there called "l'île de Seidhun." In the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, says M. Le Men, it was generally called "Sizun." "Seidhun," or "Seithyn," was, he says, the name of a Breton chief, who probably gave his name to the island. It has also been argued that as, according to Mela, Sena was situated in the *Oceanus Britannicus*, while Sein is not in the English Channel, Sein cannot be the same as Sena.

But M. Le Men's theory has been demolished by MM. L. A. de la Borderie and J. Loth. The resemblance between the names Sena and Sein is obvious. The cape opposite Sein is called Sizun. If, M. de la Borderie asks, the island itself was originally so called, why has its name become Sein, while the name of the cape remains unaltered? Finally he remarks that the opponents of the identification of Sena with Sein identify it with Ouessant, a name which is much less like Sena than even Seidhun.<sup>4</sup>

M. Loth, a distinguished Celtic scholar, says that the name Sena has nothing to do with Seidhun. He also observes that, as Sena, according to the *Itinerary of Antonine*, was between Uxantis (Ouessant) and Vindilis (Belle-Ile), it can only have been Sein. Further, he remarks, with perfect truth, that *Oceanus Britannicus* designated not merely the English Channel, but the Bay of Biscay as well, which the ancient geographers regarded as opposite the coast of Britain.<sup>5</sup>

It is certain, then, that Sein is identical with Sena, and therefore that, if Pomponius Mela was right, the country opposite Sein belonged to the Osismi. But, we are told, even if Sein is identical with Sena, still Venetia must have extended as far northward as the promontory of Penmar'h.<sup>6</sup> If Ptolemy is right in making the Pointe du Raz the southern boundary of the Osismi, it certainly did so.

To conclude, I do not think that it is possible to trace the northern

<sup>1</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 2, § 1, 4, § 6.

<sup>2</sup> *Chorographia*, iii. 6, § 48.

<sup>3</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. xxiii., 1872, pp. 51-54.

<sup>4</sup> *Géogr. gallo-rom. de l'Armorique*, 1881, pp. 20-22.

<sup>5</sup> *Rev. celt.*, x., 1889, p. 352; *L'émigration bretonne*, p. 54. For a full demonstration of the truth of what I have said about *Oceanus Britannicus*, see note on the SAMNITÆ.

<sup>6</sup> *Bull. arch. de l'Assn bretonne*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. i., 1881, p. 196.

frontier of the Veneti with certainty. It may have coincided with the northern frontier of the diocese of Vannes, one of the few Breton dioceses that existed as early as the fifth century :<sup>1</sup> but all that can be safely said is that Venetia did not extend further northward than the Pointe du Raz and the natural boundary formed by the Montagnes Noires.

The arguments that have been advanced to prove that the Veneti occupied the peninsula of Guérande are refuted on pages 664-6.

**Veragri.** See NANTUATES.

**Viromandui.**—The Viromandui, whose name was preserved in the old name of Vermandois, occupied the diocese of Noyon, or the northern part of the department of Aisne and the eastern part of that of Somme. See Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 431-2, and also REMI and SUESSIONES.

**Vocates.**—The Vocates are generally believed to have occupied the diocese of Bazas, or the south-eastern part of the department of Gironde.<sup>2</sup> Caesar says that Crassus, after he had defeated the Sotiates, marched against the Vocates and the Tarusates.<sup>3</sup> The Sotiates occupied the country round Sos, and the Tarusates (*q.v.*) probably occupied the country round Aire. Ptolemy<sup>4</sup> mentions a people called the Vassarii (*Οὐασάριοι*), whose chief town, Cossio, stood upon the site of Bazas. The people of Bazas are called in the *Notitia*<sup>5</sup> Vasates; and perhaps Ptolemy really wrote *Οὐασάριοι*. Desjardins, in his great work,<sup>6</sup> identifies the Vocates with the Vasates and the Vassarii. Pliny<sup>7</sup> mentions the Basabocates, a name which Cellarius regarded as a compound of Vasates and Vocates. The diocese of Bazas is divided by the Garonne, on the north of which Walckenaer places the Vocates and on the south the Vasates. This conjecture is certainly wrong; for how can any one believe that Crassus, who had invaded Aquitania from the north, would, after he had defeated the Sotiates,—the first tribe he encountered,—have marched *back* from the neighbourhood of Sos to the north of the Garonne, in order to attack another people, whose allies came from the Pyrenees? Besides, on Walckenaer's theory, the Vocates were separated by a considerable tract from the Tarusates; whereas it is clear from Caesar's narrative that the two peoples were conterminous. The problem of determining the habitat of the Vocates is further complicated by the fact that Pliny mentions, immediately after the Basabocates, another people called the Vassei. I am inclined to believe that the Vocates and the Vasates were identical: but if so, it will be evident to any one who looks at the map that that part of their territory which Crassus invaded must have been far south of Bazas, and was in the department of Les Landes.

**Vocontii.**—Caesar mentions the Vocontii once only.<sup>8</sup> He says that, after crossing the Alps,—doubtless by Mont Genève,<sup>9</sup>—he entered their

<sup>1</sup> See J. Loth, *L'Émigration bretonne*, pp. 50, 52-3.

<sup>2</sup> Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 302.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 23, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 7, § 11. See note to vol. i, p. 205 of C. Muller's edition.

<sup>5</sup> Ed. Guérard, p. 29.

<sup>6</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 362-3.

<sup>7</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 19 (33), § 108.

<sup>8</sup> *B. G.*, i. 10, § 5.

<sup>9</sup> See pp. 432-3, *supra*.

territory, and passed thence into that of the Allobroges. Strabo<sup>1</sup> also describes the Vocontii as conterminous with the Allobroges; and he implies that Epebrodunum (Ebrodunum), or Embrun, marked their eastern boundary. According to Ptolemy,<sup>2</sup> Ebrodunum belonged to the Caturiges (*q.v.*); and Long suggests that Strabo probably meant that it was "just on the borders of the Vocontii."<sup>3</sup> Ptolemy says that the chief town of the Vocontii was Vasio, which occupied the site of Vaison. Pliny<sup>4</sup> gives them another town, Lucus Augusti, which is identified with Luc. From the *Table* we learn that they had a third town, Dea, the modern Die. From these data it has been inferred that their territory comprised the dioceses of Vaison and Die. D'Anville<sup>5</sup> believes that they also occupied a part of the diocese of Gap, "dans lequel on ne connoît point d'aucun peuple en particulier," as well as Val-Benois, that part of the diocese of Sisteron which borders on Vaison; and, if Strabo is to be believed, they probably also possessed territory extending as far eastward as the river Durance. D'Anville, who traces their eastern frontier far to the west of the Durance, ignores or overlooks the testimony of Strabo. But Chorges or Caturigomagus, which belonged to the Caturiges, is nearly due west of, and about 12 miles from Embrun. If then Chorges belonged to the Caturiges in the time of Strabo, he was wrong in making Embrun the eastern limit of the Vocontii; and their territory could not have extended to the Durance, except perhaps below Tallard.

Maissiat, remarking that, according to Strabo, the Vocontii were conterminous with the Allobroges and above the Cavares, infers that their territory extended northward as far as the Isère, and that they possessed the valley of Graisivaudan as far eastward as Montmelian. But it does not follow that because the Vocontii were conterminous with the Allobroges, they were conterminous along the whole line of the southern frontier of the Allobroges: on Maissiat's theory the territory of the Vocontii must have included the territories of the Tricorii and the Uceni, and part of that of the Medulli as well; and these small tribes may just as likely have been clients of the Allobroges.

The task of determining the frontiers of the Vocontii is indeed rendered peculiarly difficult by the fact that the territory which undoubtedly belonged to them was surrounded by the territories of minor peoples, who may possibly have been *pagi* of theirs, actually incorporated within their proper territory, or may only have been connected with them by the loose tie of clientship; while some of these peoples may have been *pagi* or clients of the Caturiges or of the Allobroges. Napoleon, in his Atlas (Planche 2) as well as in his text, simply ignores the existence of these peoples: but his method of solving the problem is more simple than convincing. Even the Cavares, who dwelt on the west of the Vocontii and were unquestionably an independent people, find no mention in Napoleon's Atlas or in his list of tribes; and not

<sup>1</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 1, § 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Geogr.*, iii. 1, § 35.

<sup>3</sup> W. Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geogr.*, i. 798.

<sup>4</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iii. 4 (5), § 37.

<sup>5</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 715.

content with giving the strip of territory which they occupied on the left bank of the Isère to the Vocontii, he assigns to the latter people the northern part of the department of Ardèche as well; that is to say, he includes within their territory that of the Segalauni. The minor peoples, to whom I have referred, were the Memini, the Vulgientes, the Quariates, the Bodiontici, the Avantici, the Tricorii and the Uceni. Desjardins remarks that the insignificance of these peoples must have caused them to be absorbed in the *clivtela* of the Vocontii, although, if I understand him aright, he distinguishes their territories from those of the stronger people. But it seems more probable that the Uceni and the Tricorii, whose territories,—the valleys of the Romanche and the Drac respectively,—formed part of the diocese of Grenoble, were clients of the Allobroges (*q.v.*); and Desjardins himself elsewhere<sup>1</sup> says, rightly in my opinion, that the Memini must have been clients (if not a *pagus*) of the Cavarea. For the district of Carpentras (*Carpentoracte*), which belonged to the Memini,<sup>2</sup> separates that of Cavaillon\* (*Cabellio*) from that of Orange (*Arausio*), both of which formed part of the territory which Ptolemy<sup>3</sup> assigns to the Cavarea. The exact position of the Quariates, who were on the east of the Vocontii, is uncertain:<sup>4</sup> but there is no doubt that the Bodiontici dwelt in the neighbourhood of Digne; while, as Desjardins remarks, there is a striking resemblance between "Avantici" and "Avance," "Avançon" and "St-Étienne d'Avançon,"—the names of a river and of two communes which are to be found on the west of Chorges. It seems to me probable that these three peoples, as well as the Vulgientes, who dwelt in the neighbourhood of Apt, were clients of the Vocontii.<sup>5</sup> Desjardins thinks that the eastern boundary of the Vocontii would naturally have been formed by the Devoluy, the Montagne d'Aurouze and the chain "popularly known as Monts de France."

**Volcae.**—The Volcae (Arecomici and Tectosages) occupied the country comprised between the Rhône, the Cevennes and the Garonne; and the territory of the Tectosages included that of the Tolosates (*q.v.*). According to Strabo,<sup>6</sup> Narbo belonged to the Arecomici; according to

<sup>1</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 226, 232.

<sup>2</sup> Ptol., *Geogr.*, ii. 10, § 8 (C. Mullen's ed., p. 246).

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.* (Muller, pp. 243-4).

<sup>4</sup> Desjardins (ii. 228) is inclined to place them near Forcalquier.

<sup>5</sup> M. J. D. Long, who has devoted a monograph (*Mém. présentés par divers savants à l'Acad. des inscr.*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. ii., 1849, pp. 284-313) to the Vocontii, holds that their territory comprised the dioceses of Die, Vaison and Sisteron, part of the diocese of Gap and part of the diocese of Grenoble (on the left bank of the Isère), and traces their frontier as follows. On the west, separating them from the Segalauni and the Cavarea, it ran past Roche-Chinard, Château-Double, Eure, Cléon-d'Andran, Grignan, Richerance and Tulette, to the river Eygues or Aiques. On the south, it was formed by Mont Ventoux and the chain of Lure. On the east, the river Luye at Gap separated the Vocontii from the Caturiges, and the Durance, from Tallard to Volx, formed a natural barrier. The Drac separated the Vocontii from the Allobroges and the Tricorii on the north-east; and the Isère, between Grenoble and St-Nazaire, was the northern boundary.

<sup>6</sup> *ib.* 1, § 12.

Ptolemy,<sup>1</sup> to the Tectosages. D'Anville<sup>2</sup> thinks that so long as Narbo was the capital of the Province, it probably belonged, as Strabo says, to the Arecomici, and afterwards to neither of the two peoples. A passage in Caesar,—*praesidia in Rutenis provincialibus, Volcis Arecomicis, Tolosutibus, circumque Narbonem . . . constituit*,<sup>3</sup>—seems, as C. Müller remarks in his edition of Ptolemy (p. 241), to imply that Narbo was not, at all events in 52 B.C., in the country of the Arecomici. Walckenaer,<sup>4</sup> who accepts d'Anville's theory, assigns to the Arecomici the dioceses of Agde, Lodève, Montpellier, d'Uzes, Nîmes and Alais,—a territory corresponding roughly with the departments of Gand and Hérault; while the country of the Tectosages corresponded with the archbishopric of Toulouse and all that part of the diocese of Montauban which lies on the east of the Garonne. Desjardins<sup>5</sup> conjectures, in spite of Strabo, that the river Hérault, or else a line passing between the Hérault and the Orb, separated the two peoples.

<sup>1</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 10, § 6.

<sup>2</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 717.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 7, § 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 253.

<sup>5</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 107, n. 3.

## SECTION IV.—SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS

### F. DE COULANGES ON MONARCHY IN GAUL

DE COULANGES<sup>1</sup> asserts that kings in Gaul only attained power by the will of the majority; and he refers to the words which Caesar puts into the mouth of Ambiorix, king of the Eburones,—*sua esse eiusmodi imperia ut non minus haberet iuris in se multitudo quam ipse in multitudinem*<sup>2</sup> (“My authority is limited, the masses (?) having as much power over me as I have over them”)—to show that their power was extremely restricted. He holds that monarchy in Gaul was not a traditional institution, but rather a revolutionary power, created by a faction, which arose in troublous times.<sup>3</sup>

Let us examine these conclusions. Caesar mentions in all eleven Gallic kings, namely Catamantaloedes, king of the Sequani; Divitiacus, king of the Suessiones; Galba, king of the Suessiones; Commius, king of the Atrebatas; Tasgetius, king of the Carnutes; Moritasgus, king of the Senones; Cavarinus, king of the Senones; Ambiorix and Catuvolcus, each king of one half of the Eburones; Vercingetorix, king of the Arverni; and Teutomatus, king of the Nitiobriges.<sup>4</sup>

Three of these kings, Divitiacus, Galba and Commius were Belgic. Divitiacus and Catamantaloedes had ceased to reign before Caesar arrived in Gaul. Tasgetius and Cavarinus were nominees of Caesar: the ancestors of both had reigned before them, and Moritasgus, the brother of Cavarinus, was reigning when Caesar first entered Gaul; Tasgetius was murdered by enemies belonging to his own country, and Cavarinus incurred bitter odium during his reign. Orgetorix, Casticus, Dumnorix and Celtillus, the father of Vercingetorix, aimed at seizing the royal power; Celtillus was put to death by his countrymen for having done so, and an attempt was made to execute Orgetorix for the same offence.<sup>5</sup>

These facts prove that among those peoples which had discarded it, any attempt to revive the royal power was regarded by the republican party with extreme jealousy;<sup>5</sup> and as among the Aedui, if not among

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France,—la Gaule rom.*, 1891, pp. 12-13.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, v. 27, § 3.

<sup>3</sup> He refers to *B. G.*, vi. 8, § 9,—*Cingetorigi, quem ab initio permansisse in officio demonstravimus, principatus atque imperium est traditum*. But we are not told that Cingetorix was a king at all.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, i. 3, § 5; ii. 4, § 7; iv. 21, § 7; v. 25, § 1, 54, § 2; vi. 31, § 5; vii. 4, § 5, 31, § 5.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, v. 25, § 3; vi. 5, § ?; j. 2, § 1, 3, § 5, 4, 9, § 3; vii. 4, § 1.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. J. Rhys's *Celtic Britain*, 2nd ed., 1884, p. 58.

other peoples, a supreme executive magistrate called the Vergobret was annually elected, and as Caesar frequently mentions the senates of Gallic peoples in such a way as to imply that there were no kings to limit their power,<sup>1</sup> it has been concluded that, in Caesar's time, a monarchical form of government was the exception, and a republican the rule in Gaul.

The conclusion to which this analysis leads me is that monarchy was, in one sense, a traditional institution in Gaul, but that, in most cases, when Caesar arrived, it was no more than a tradition. Monarchy had once prevailed throughout the whole of Gaul: but by some revolution or series of revolutions, like those of which we read in the histories of Greece and Rome, it had, in the majority of states, perished.<sup>2</sup> Among the Belgae, however, it should seem that the dislike of monarchy was less active and the proportion of kings greater than in Celtic Gaul. Powerful nobles, Caesar tells us,<sup>3</sup> still frequently seized royal power, or rather, as Professor Rhys puts it, made themselves despots, just as Pisistratus did at Athens: but they attained this power not by the will of the majority but by the help of armed clients and mercenaries, and by ingratiating themselves with the masses.

#### CUNO'S VIEW REGARDING THE STATUS OF THE GALLIC "KINGS" WHOM CAESAR APPOINTED

J. G. Cuno<sup>4</sup> asserts that Commius, Tasgetius and Cavarinus, who were appointed by Caesar *reges* over the Atrebatas, Carnutes and Senones respectively, were not kings, in the strict sense of the term, but only governors, appointed to act in the interests of Rome (*römische Statthalter*); for, he argues, Caesar would never have forced upon these peoples kings properly so called, seeing that Casticus was burned at the stake for aiming at kingship.<sup>5</sup> Vercingetorix, Cuno adds, was only *rex* in the sense of "general" (*Feldherr*); for his so-called kingship had no territorial basis.

These remarks appear to me rather silly. When Caesar said that Vercingetorix was saluted by his adherents as *rex*, he certainly did not mean "general"; for in the same sentence he said that the *imperium*, that is to say the office of Commander-in-Chief, was bestowed upon him. If Caesar had meant what Cuno says, he would have written not *rex* but *imperator*<sup>6</sup> (a suis appellatur). No doubt Vercingetorix was not constitutionally elected: but, in spite of the lack of a "territorial basis,"

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 16, § 5, 31, § 6; ii. 5, § 1, 26, § 2; iii. 16, § 4, 17, § 3; v. 54, § 3; vii. 32, § 5, 33, § 2, 55, § 4.

<sup>2</sup> See Rhys's *Celtic Britain*, p. 57.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 1, § 4, in Gallia a potentioribus atque iis qui ad conducendos homines facultates habebant vulgo regna occupabantur. Cf. i. 4, § 2, 17, §§ 1-2, 18, §§ 3-6.

<sup>4</sup> *Vorgeschichte Roms*, 1878, i. 37-9.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 21, § 7; v. 25, § 1; vii. 4, § 1.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *B. G.*, vii. 63, § 6,—ad unum omnes Vercingetorigem probant *imperatorem*.

his adherents saluted him as king and meant that he was king, just as the adherents of Monmouth called him king; and his kingship would certainly have been consummated if his rebellion had succeeded.

Cuno's other argument is weaker still. Commius, Tasgetius and Cavarinus were of course to govern in Caesar's interest: but if Tasgetius and Cavarinus were not burned alive, the former was murdered, and the murder of the latter was planned.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, whatever Caesar may have meant when he called his nominees *reges*, his action was as fiercely resented by their subjects as if he had intended to invest them with the full powers of sovereignty. When he says that he made Tasgetius and Cavarinus *reges*, and says in the same breath that their ancestors had held the *regnum* before them, he surely means that they were kings in the same sense as their ancestors. "King" is an elastic word: but so far as the ruler of a small half-civilised community can be called a king, so far as Iva or Cerdic or Edwin were kings, the title was applicable to Commius, Tasgetius and Cavarinus. •

#### DID TWO VERGOBRETS HOLD OFFICE IN ONE STATE AT THE SAME TIME?

It is generally held that, at all events among the Aedui, only one Vergobret could legally hold office at a time. This opinion is based upon the well-known passage: <sup>2</sup>—*summo esse in periculo rem, quod, cum singuli magistratus antiquitus creari atque regiam potestatem annum obtinere consueissent, duo magistratum gerant et se uterque eorum legibus creatum esse dicat*. On the other hand, Caesar writes:—*convocatis eorum principibus, quorum magnam copiam in castris habebat, in his Divitiaco et Lisco, qui summo magistratui praeerat[n]t, quem vergobretum appellant Aedui, qui creatur annuus et vitae necisque in suos habet potestatem*,<sup>3</sup> etc. *Praeerant* is found in all the MSS.: but since Lipsius published his edition, the editors, following Nicasius, have unanimously substituted for it *praeerat*, on the ground that the other passage proves that there can only have been one Vergobret.<sup>4</sup> But M. Robert Mowat has disputed this opinion;<sup>5</sup> and Professor Rhys agrees with him.<sup>6</sup> There is a coin bearing the inscription CISIAMBOS · CATTOS · VERGOBRETO. The words *Cisiambos Cattos*, M. Mowat argues, must be the names not of one man, but of two; (1) because the word which follows them would otherwise be *vergobretos*, not *vergobreto*; and (2) because, by Gallic custom, no man had more than one name, sometimes followed by a patronymic. Therefore to *Cisiambos* and *Cattos* belongs in common the title *vergobreto*, which must be either plural or, more probably, dual.

M. Mowat's argument is controverted by M. P. Ch. Robert. He

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, v. 25, § 3, 54, § 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, i. 16, § 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Rev. celt.*, v., 1881-82, pp. 121-4.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, vii. 32, § 3.

<sup>5</sup> See Schneider's *Caesar*, i. 35.

<sup>6</sup> *Celtic Britain*, 2nd ed., p. 59.



does not deny that Cisiambos and Cattos were two persons: but, remarking that *s* is often dropped in Gallic, he explains *vergobreto* as an abridged form of the nominative singular *vergo Bretos*; <sup>1</sup> and M. E. Ernault, who agrees with him, says, in opposition to M. Mowat, that the dual would be not *vergobreto* but *vergo Bretu*.<sup>2</sup>

Professor Rhys admits the difficulty presented by the former of the two passages which I have quoted: but he struggles to get over it by suggesting that "the two offices were not filled at the same time of the year." I do not believe that anybody, reading the passage with an unbiassed mind, could agree with the professor. How can the (assumed) two offices have been filled at different times of the year when Caesar distinctly says that the Vergobret held office for a whole year (*singuli magistratus . . . regiam potestatem annum obtinere consueverunt*)? And if Caesar really wrote (*summo magistratui praeerant*, as Professor Rhys maintains, is it not obvious that the (assumed) two Vergobrets held office simultaneously? Also, is it not extraordinary that the professor should have failed to see that if two Vergobrets were elected every year, of whom one held office during one part of the year and the other during the remaining part, the magistracy was not dual but single?<sup>3</sup> Besides, on the professor's theory, how is one to explain the words italicised below in the other passage:—*convocatis eorum principibus . . . in his Divitiaco et Lisco, qui summo magistratui praeerant, quem vergobretum appellant Aedui, qui creatur annuus*," etc.? What can be the antecedent to *quem*, if it is not the preceding clause *qui . . . praeerant*? And if *praeerant* is the right reading, what becomes of the grammar of the sentence? Surely Caesar would have written *quos vergobretos* (*appellant Aedui*).

[Since I wrote the foregoing note, I have discovered a fact which is, I think, conclusive, even if what I have written is not. In the *Dictionnaire archéologique de la Gaule* (1<sup>re</sup> fascicule, Planches des monnaies, No. 78) there is an illustration of the coin in question, which I do not think Professor Rhys can have seen. It bears on the reverse side this inscription:—



Speaking of the Vergobret, Cottus, the writer of the article *Aedui* says, <sup>4</sup> "comme au moment de sa magistrature la cité des Éduens exerçait une suprématie de fait sur la Celtique entière, nous trouvons de beaux semis frappés chez les Lixoviates, par le chef Cisiambos, avec la mention

<sup>1</sup> *Comptes rendus de l'Acad. des inscr.*, xiii., 1885, pp. 283-4.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>3</sup> See M. d'A. de Jubainville's remarks in *Revue*, viii., 1887, p. 222, n. 8.

<sup>4</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 15.

purement honorifique du vergobret Cottus." To the same effect writes the distinguished numismatist, Caignart de Saulcy,<sup>1</sup> who may possibly be right in identifying Cottus with the Cotus whom Caesar displaced in favour of Convictolitavis.<sup>2</sup>

M. P. Ch. Robert offers a different explanation.<sup>3</sup> The Gauls, he remarks, formed their coinage upon Greek models. Now many Greek coins bear the name both of a magistrate and of a monetary agent. Possibly, then, Cisianbos may have been an official of this kind.]

### M. BULLIOT'S THEORIES ON CLANSHIP, SENATES AND LAW IN GAUL

M. J. G. Bulliot<sup>4</sup> holds that the so-called "states" (*civitates*) of Gaul,—the Aedui, the Arverni and the rest,—were merely aggregates of clans; for, he maintains, when Caesar uses the word *familia* or *clientela*, he means "clan." The *pagus* was the territory of the clan. Each clan was ruled by its own chief; and all these chiefs were subject to the tribal chief, whether he was an elected magistrate, like the Vergobret, or an hereditary ruler. This tribal chief, however, was himself virtually subject to the control of the senate, which was not a definite body, but comprised all the free landowners,—in fact all the influential men in the community. In a body politic of this kind "the clan was everything, the state little or nothing" (*le clan était tout, la cité rien ou peu de chose*). Written law did not exist: everything was regulated by custom,—*more patrio, more maiorum*,<sup>5</sup>—expressions which "se retrouvent à chaque ligne dans César, dans Strabon, dans Diodore, dans Tacite." The word *lex*, when used of Gaul, means "custom," as we may gather from Caesar's statement that *Germani multum ab hac consuetudine differunt*; from his remark that an armed gathering *more Gallorum initium est belli, quo lege communi omnes puberes armati convenire consueverunt*; and from his saying that Convictolitavis, who, as well as his rival Cotus, claimed to be legally Vergobret, was afterwards duly elected by the priests, in accordance with Aeduan custom.<sup>6</sup>

De Coulanges,<sup>6</sup> on the other hand, remarks that neither Caesar, nor Strabo, nor Diodorus Siculus makes any mention of clans in Gaul.<sup>7</sup> There is only one passage in Caesar in which *clientela* can possibly mean

<sup>1</sup> Numismatique des chefs gaulois mentionnés dans les Comm. de César (*Ann. de la Soc. num.*, 1867, p. 11). See also *Études sur la numismatique gauloise des Comm. de César*, 1885, pp. 8-9, by C. A. Serrure.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 32-3.

<sup>3</sup> *Comptes rendus de l'Acad. des inscr. et belles-lettres*, xiii., 1885, pp. 283-4.

<sup>4</sup> *La cité gauloise*, 1879, pp. 51-2, 32, 193-4, 198, 204-6, 209-12.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 21, § 1; v. 56, § 2; vii. 33, § 3, 34, § 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France,—la Gaule rom.*, 1891, pp. 8-9.

<sup>7</sup> I have already (pp. 12, n. 1, 13, n. 1) quoted the passages in which Sir H. Maine records his conviction that Caesar failed to notice the existence of "the natural divisions of the Celtic tribesmen, the families and septs or sub-tribes."

"clan,"<sup>1</sup>—the passage in which he describes, on the authority of the Aeduan envoys, the struggle between Cotus and Convictolitavis (*civitatem esse omnem in armis; divisum senatum, divisum populum, suas cuiusque eorum clientelas*<sup>2</sup>). Here *clientelas* obviously means "groups of *clientes*"; and there is nothing to show that the *clientes* of a Gallic chief were his clansmen.<sup>3</sup> Similarly there is only one passage in which it could with any plausibility be argued that *familia* means "clan,"—the passage in which Caesar says that Orgetorix assembled his *familia* and debtors to overawe his judges (*Orgetorix ad iudicium omnem suam familiam ad hominum milia decem undique coegit, et omnes clientes obaeratosque suos . . . eodem conduxit*<sup>4</sup>). It is curious that M. Bulliot should not have noticed that *familia*, in this passage, is distinguished from *clientes*, and that if, as he maintains, *clientes* were clansmen, *familia* was necessarily something different. If Caesar used the latter word in its usual sense, Orgetorix's *familia* comprised his slaves. As for the Gallic senates, such a passage as that in which Caesar tells us that the Nervian elders informed him that their senators had been reduced in number from 600 to 3,<sup>5</sup> would seem to point to the conclusion that they were definite bodies; and de Coulanges, while admitting that we do not know how they were composed, conjectures that they comprised, in each state, all the members of the class which Caesar called *nobiles*.<sup>6</sup> M. Bulliot's view of the meaning of *lex*, when used by Caesar in speaking of the Gauls, is certainly not established by the passages which he quotes: but there is not enough evidence to determine the question. It is, however, worth while to point out that of the two expressions, *more patrio* and *more maiorum*, which, M. Bulliot says, are found "à chaque ligne dans César," the former is never used by Caesar at all, while the latter is used once only, and then with reference not to the Gauls, but to the Romans.<sup>7</sup>

M. d'Arbois de Jubainville,<sup>8</sup> is one of those scholars who hold that the clan system did prevail in Gaul. After pointing out that the number of senators in each state was large,<sup>9</sup> and that, among the Aedui at all events, two members of one family might not sit in the senate simultaneously,<sup>10</sup> he remarks that "Il semble que ces deux faits nous mettent en présence d'une organisation analogue de Rome primitive. En Gaule, la race dominante dans chaque *civitas* se compose d'un certain nombre de *gentes* représentées chacune au sénat par son chef." And again, "Chaque peuple gaulois . . . était formé de *gentes* ou clans, au-dessus de chacun desquels s'élevait une famille plus noble et plus riche que les autres, c'est-à-dire un petit groupe aristocratique qu'entouraient des clients de race moins distinguée." I have nothing to say against

<sup>1</sup> See Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i. 562-5.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 32, § 5.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 525-7.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, i. 4, § 2. See Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i. 1280-2.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 28, § 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France*, etc., pp. 13-14.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 44, § 2. See Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii. 641-2. De Coulanges (*Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France*, etc., p. 15 and n. 2) is disposed to infer from *B. G.*, vi. 20 that the Gallic laws were written.

<sup>8</sup> *Recherches sur l'origine de la propriété foncière*, etc., 1890, pp. 51-2.

<sup>9</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 28, § 1.

<sup>10</sup> *ib.*, vii. 33, § 3.

this theory, which, indeed, appears probable in itself, and is supported by analogy: but it is a theory and nothing more.

### DID THE GAULS, IN CAESAR'S TIME, RECOGNISE PRIVATE PROPERTY IN LAND?

M. d'Arbois de Jubainville<sup>1</sup> holds that, in Caesar's time, private property in land did not exist in Gaul. Each community, he says, had over the whole of its land a right analogous to that which the Roman people had over their *ager publicus*. He remarks (1) that, according to Polybius,<sup>2</sup> the Cisalpine Gauls did not cultivate the soil, but that their property consisted in cattle and gold, which could be easily moved from place to place; (2) that the Helvetii never would have consented to emigrate if they had possessed private property in land; (3) that the tribute (*stipendium*) which the Aedui exacted from the Boii whom they invited to settle in their country<sup>3</sup> was simply rent due for a share of the *ager publicus*; (4) that when Caesar said that the Druids decided disputes "regarding inheritance" (*de hereditate*),<sup>4</sup> he used the word *hereditas* in the sense of "l'héritage de la royauté," and that the author of *Bellum Alexandrinum* (66, § 6) speaks of *hereditas regni*; (5) that when Caesar said that the Druids decided boundary disputes (*de finibus*), he meant by "boundaries" the frontiers of states; and (6) that, according to Caesar, it was the custom for a Gaul, when he married, to add to his wife's dowry an equivalent from his own personal estate, and to administer the whole as a joint piece of property, which, with its accumulated produce (*fructus*), went to the survivor.<sup>5</sup> M. d'Arbois's reason for denying that the dowry or its equivalent could have been land will be given presently.

F. de Coulanges<sup>6</sup> and M. Ch. Lécivain<sup>7</sup> have no difficulty in disposing of these arguments. To the first de Coulanges replies that Polybius was only speaking of the Gauls who had invaded Italy several centuries before the time of Caesar, and were in a nomadic state. In reply to the argument based upon the emigration of the Helvetii, he points out that they emigrated simply because they preferred the fertile plains of Charente to their own wild and mountainous country.<sup>8</sup> Have peasant proprietors, he asks, never been known to emigrate in order to seek more productive property elsewhere? To M. d'Arbois's third argument de Coulanges replies that the Aedui might well have had sufficient unoccupied public land to accommodate the small Boian community, and yet have been themselves landed proprietors. And, asks M. Lécivain, why should we infer from the fact that the Aedui

<sup>1</sup> *Comptes rendus de l'Acad. des inscr.*, 4<sup>e</sup> sér., t. xv., 1887, pp. 66-9, 74, 79-83; *Recherches sur l'origine de la propriété foncière*, etc., 1890, pp. xxiii-xxxi, 61.

<sup>2</sup> ii. 17.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, i. 28, § 5; vii. 10, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, vi. 13, § 5.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 19, §§ 1, 2.

<sup>6</sup> *Questions historiques*, ed. 1893, pp. 104-12.

<sup>7</sup> *Annales de la Faculté des lettres de Bordeaux*, 1889, pp. 182-94, esp. 184.

<sup>8</sup> *B. G.*, i. 3, § 5, 10.

assigned a portion of their territory to the Boii, that the whole of that territory was *ager publicus*? Is it not more likely that with the Aedui, as with the Italians, private and public property in land existed side by side? In answer to the fourth argument, de Coulanges remarks that, if the author of *Bellum Alexandrinum* uses the phrases *hereditas regni*, he only does so because the word *hereditas*, by itself, could not be taken as meaning "l'héritage de la royauté." Besides, he points out, M. d'Arbois has failed to notice that, while Caesar speaks again and again of sons who desired to succeed to the kingdoms of their fathers, their claims were never referred to Druids. Again, says de Coulanges, Caesar, in his digression on the manners and customs of the Gauls and Germans, twice uses *finis* in the obvious sense of boundaries of landed estates;<sup>1</sup> and whenever he uses the word in the sense of frontiers, that meaning is unmistakably defined by the name of the state in question or by a phrase of equivalent meaning. Replying to the sixth argument, de Coulanges remarks that M. d'Arbois tries to prove that the joint property of husband and wife, to which Caesar refers, could not have consisted of land, because the produce of the land could not have been laid by, or, if it had been sold, the proceeds would simply have been hoarded in a strong box.<sup>2</sup> The joint property, according to M. d'Arbois, must have consisted of cattle; and the *fructus* of which Caesar speaks were simply "le croît des troupeaux,"—the cattle which were bred from the original stock. But, says de Coulanges, M. d'Arbois forgets that the produce could have been sold and the profits thereof saved; and he makes the mistake of supposing that, in the passage in which Caesar describes the administration of the joint property of husband and wife, *pecunia* means "money"; whereas, in legal phraseology, *pecunia* meant not money only but every kind of property, including land.<sup>3</sup> But M. de Coulanges here does an injustice to M. d'Arbois, who does not make the statement which is attributed to him. Still, M. d'Arbois fails to prove his case. The dowry and its equivalent may have consisted, wholly or in part, of cattle: but if so, the fact is no evidence that the Gauls did not recognise private property in land.

Independently of the arguments which I have summarised, de Coulanges proves conclusively that private property in land was recognised in Gaul. It is significant, he remarks, that Caesar, while professing to tell us in what respects the customs of the Germans differed from those of the Gauls, says expressly that the former did not recognise private property in land,<sup>4</sup> and implies, in the passage *Si de*

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 13, § 5, 22, § 2.

<sup>2</sup> "On ne touchera pas au revenu de ces terres: les blés et les pailles seront emmagasinés dans les greniers . . . ou, si on les vend, on en gardera soigneusement le produit dans un coffre-fort sans jamais y toucher." *Comptes rendus de l'Acad. des inscr.*, 4<sup>e</sup> sér., t. xv., 1887, p. 74. Cf. *Rev. cell.*, xxii., 1896, p. 329.

<sup>3</sup> Thus Gaius says *Appellatione autem pecuniae omnes res in ea lege significantur; itaque si vinum vel frumentum, aut si fundum vel hominem stipulemur, haec lex observanda est.* (*Institutionum iuris civilis comm. quattuor*, ed. P. E. Huschke, 1873, iii. 124.)

<sup>4</sup> See an article by F. de Coulanges, entitled "Recherches sur cette question: Les Germains connaissaient-ils la propriété des terres?" in *Séances et travaux de*

*finibus controversia est*, that the latter did. Again the existence in Gaul of the institution of clientship, and the oft-quoted passage, *In omni Gallia eorum hominum, qui aliquo sunt numero atque honore, genera sunt duo; nam plebes paene servorum habetur loco*<sup>1</sup> ("In the whole of Gaul there are only two classes who are of any account or enjoy any distinction, for the masses are regarded almost as slaves") clearly point to a state of society in which the land belonged to the rich. I may add that Caesar expressly says that the Germans refused to sanction private property in land "for fear a spirit of avarice should arise" (*ne qua oreretur pecuniæ cupiditas*) and "in order to keep the masses contented" (*ut animi aequitate plebem contineret*), neither of which objects was attained in Gaul;<sup>2</sup> and that it is simply inconceivable that a people who had a coinage, a wealthy class and an extensive commerce, and with whom slavery was an institution, should not have recognised private property in land. See my quotation, on page 527, from Sir H. Maine, *Early Hist. of Institutions*, pp. 167-9.

#### F. DE COULANGES ON THE GALLIC NOBILES

De Coulanges<sup>3</sup> holds that the Gauls whom Caesar describes as *nobiles* formed a class apart, superior to the *equites*: but this view is, I think,

*l'Acad. des sciences morales et pol.*, nouv. sér., t. xxiv., 1885, pp. 5-10. In this article de Coulanges defends Caesar's testimony on this point, which, as he remarks, has of late been assailed. It would be irrelevant to discuss the question in this book; for, so far as concerns my argument, the only point that calls for notice is that Caesar believed that private property in land did not exist in Germany.

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 13, § 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 22, § 4. M. d'Arbois indeed asserts (*Comptes rendus de l'Acad. des insér.*, 4<sup>e</sup> sér., t. xv., 1887, pp. 80-81) that when Caesar says that none of the Germans have *agri modum certum aut fines proprios*, he means that none of them enjoyed the perpetual possession of a definite number of acres of *ager publicus*; for, he says, *modus agri* was the regular term used at Rome to denote the extent of *ager publicus* which a citizen might occupy; and *fines proprios* obviously means the boundaries of *possessions*,—a word which Caesar uses almost in the same breath,—"*c'est-à-dire, de champs qui font partie de l'ager publicus.*" I call this a triumph of special pleading. M. d'Arbois refers to Livy, vi. 35. and *Corpus Inscr. Lat.*, i. pp. 79-86, neither of which authorities proves his point. They simply show that the term *modus agri* was used in regard to *ager publicus*: they do not show that it was not used in regard to land owned by individuals. Listen to Fustel de Coulanges. "I doubt," says the great scholar, "whether M. d'Arbois has grasped the exact meaning of *ager publicus*. . . . *Ager publicus* was not common landed property, but property belonging to the state, which existed side by side with private property in land. . . . Where did M. d'Arbois learn that *modus agri* was the regular term used in speaking of *ager publicus*? In Varro (*De re rustica*, i. 15) he will find the words *de modo agri* used unmistakably to denote the extent of a private estate. He will also find in Varro (i. 18) the words *agri modum certum* in a passage in which the writer says that the number of slave-labourers ought to be duly proportioned to the size of the estate." [Here are the passages to which de Coulanges refers:—*Igitur primum hæc, quæ dixi, quattuor vitulæ agricolæ, de fundi forma, de terræ natura, de modo agri, de finibus tuendis*. M. T. Varronis *Rerum rusticarum* (ed. H. Keil, 1889) i. 15. *De familia Cato dirigit ad duas metas, ad certum modum agri et genus sationis*. *Ib.*, i. 18, § 1.]

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. des inst. pol.*, l'ancienne France,—la Gaule rom., p. 14, n. 1.

refuted by Caesar's express statement that in Gaul there were two classes and only two who were held in any esteem, namely Druids and *equites* (*In omni Gallia eorum hominum, qui aliquo sunt numero atque honore, genera sunt duo. . . . Sed de his duobus generibus alterum est Druidum, alterum equitum.* *B. G.*, vi. 13, §§ 1-3). The passages in the *Gallie War* which might seem to lend some support to de Coulanges's view are the one in which Divitiacus is made to say that the Aedui had lost *omnem nobilitatem, omnem senatum, omnem equitatum* (*Ib.*, i. 31, § 6) and the one in which Litavicus is made to say that all the Aeduan *equitatus* and *nobilitas* had perished (*Ib.*, vii. 38, § 2). But in these passages *nobilitas* does not mean a class of men who were superior to the *equites* as such: it simply means "men of rank and position." The proof is that between the two sentences, quoted above, in which Caesar says (1) that there were two classes and only two which were held in any esteem, and (2) that of these two classes one consisted of *equites* and the other of Druids, there occurs the following,—*Plerique cum aut aere alieno aut magnitudine tributorum aut iniuria potentiorum premuntur, sese in servitutem dicant nobilibus.*" Is it not clear that if the *nobiles* had formed a definite class, superior to the *equites*, Caesar would have written, *In omni Gallia eorum hominum, qui aliquo sunt numero atque honore, genera sunt tria. . . . Sed de his tribus generibus primum est Druidum, alterum nobilium, tertium equitum?* The men whom Caesar described as *nobiles* were simply the most prominent, in birth or in power or in both, of the *equites*.

#### MOMMSEN'S THEORY REGARDING THE POWER OF THE NOBLE FAMILIES IN GAUL

"The leading families," says Mommsen, "of the different clans were closely connected, and through intermarriages and special treaties formed virtually a compact league, in presence of which the single clan was powerless;"<sup>1</sup> and he goes on to say that the nobility were "powerful enough to allow no king and no caution to accomplish the work of union."<sup>2</sup> There is not sufficient evidence for these sweeping statements. Before the invasion of the Helvetii we find their chieftain, Orgetorix, trying to establish a triumvirate with Dumnorix and a Sequanian chief called Casticus:—*inter se fidem et iusurandum dant, et regno occupato per tres potentissimos ac firmissimos populos totius Galliae sese potiri posse sperant.* Orgetorix was brought to trial for this by the Helvetii: but the three chiefs were not combining against any king or against any one "clan";<sup>3</sup> and their combination was broken up by the action of a single people,—the Helvetii. Celtillus, the father of Vercingetorix, was put to death for trying to make himself king: but he was put to death by the nobles of his own tribe.<sup>4</sup> Of course the nobles of different tribes combined against Caesar: but what evidence is there that they combined

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 224. The word "clan" is here used in the sense of *civitas* or community.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, i. 3-4.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, p. 230.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, vii. 4, §

"to form a separate alliance hostile to the power of the community"? If they did, how are we to explain the internecine war which prevailed among them?<sup>1</sup> It is quite true that Dumnorix formed family alliances with the nobles of other tribes: but it is evident that he did this simply in order to strengthen his own position.<sup>2</sup> Again, what evidence is there that the nobility attempted to prevent any king or any canton from accomplishing "the work of union"; or that any canton or any king, except Bituitus, the Arvernian king, whose power was broken in 121 B.C.,<sup>3</sup> and perhaps Vercingetorix, attempted to accomplish that work?

### ON THE MEANING OF THE WORDS AMBACTI, CLIENTES AND OBAERATI

I. Caesar says that the Gallic *equites* surrounded themselves with "ambacti and clients" (*eorum* [sc. *equitum*] *ut quisque est genere copiosisque amplissimus, ita plurimos circum se ambactos clientesque habet*<sup>4</sup>). According to Festus,<sup>5</sup> Ennius translated *ambactus* by *servus*. M. d'Arbois de Jubainville<sup>6</sup> thinks that Caesar, in the passage which I have quoted, wrote *clientesque* simply as a gloss upon *ambactos*; in other words, that *ambacti* meant the same as *clientes*. If Ennius was right, M. d'Arbois is wrong; for as Schneider<sup>7</sup> remarks, all Gallic *clientes* were certainly not *servi*. Moreover, in another passage<sup>8</sup> Caesar distinguishes Gallic *servi* from *clientes*. As Schneider says, he appears to use the word *ambactus* as an established Latin word, though it was of Gallic origin, and does not explain its meaning, as he does that of the Aquitanian word *soldurius*;<sup>9</sup> and this militates against the theory that he wrote *clientesque* as a gloss upon *ambactos*.

M. d'Arbois, in another work,<sup>10</sup> draws a distinction between the words *ambactus* and *cliens*. "The Gallic word *ambactus*," he says, "had no exact equivalent in Latin; its meaning was intermediate between that of *servus* and that of *cliens*; the tie which bound an *ambactus* to his lord was looser than that which bound a *servus* to his owner, closer than that which bound a Roman client to his patron." Schneider thinks that the term *ambactus* applies to those who, as Caesar says, entered the service of nobles because they were oppressed by debt or taxation or wronged by powerful individuals, and over whom their respective lords had "exactly the same rights as masters have over their slaves";<sup>11</sup> while he identifies the *clientes* with the retainers of whom Caesar says in another passage<sup>12</sup> that if their lord failed to protect them against oppression, he lost all authority over them. I am not sure that there is enough

<sup>1</sup> B. G., vi. 15, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 3, *supra*.

<sup>5</sup> *De significatione verborum*, ed. Muller, 1839, p. 4.

<sup>6</sup> *Les noms gaulois chez César et Hirtius*, 1891, pp. 39-40.

<sup>7</sup> Caesar, ii. 235-6.

<sup>8</sup> B. G., vi. 19, § 4.

<sup>9</sup> *Ib.*, iii. 22, §§ 1-3.

<sup>10</sup> *Recherches sur l'origine de la propriété foncière*, etc., 1890, p. 64, n. 1.

<sup>11</sup> B. G., vi. 13, § 2.

<sup>12</sup> *Ib.*, 11, § 4.



evidence to establish this distinction: but if Schneider is wrong, then, according to Caesar, *all* Gallic retainers were in the position of slaves, and yet those "slaves" who are referred to in the latter passage could throw off the authority of their lord if they were dissatisfied with their lot, and attach themselves to another.

II. Caesar says that Orgetorix, in order to resist arrest, assembled his *familia*, his "clients" and his *obaerati* or debtors (*omnem suam familiam ad hominum milia decem undique coegit, et omnes clientes obaeratosque suos*<sup>1</sup>). By *obaerati*, says M. J. Flach,<sup>2</sup> Caesar means not only enslaved debtors, but also clients who rendered military service in return for grants of cattle.<sup>3</sup> This seems to me a gratuitous assertion. Possibly in the phrase *clientes obaeratosque* *obaeratos* might grammatically be regarded as explanatory of *clientes*: but it seems more natural to identify the *obaerati* with the debtors,<sup>3</sup> mentioned in *B. G.*, vi. 13, § 2. In this passage, as I have already observed, Caesar says that it was usual for men who were burdened with debt or taxes or wronged by powerful individuals to take refuge in servitude to some noble; and, he adds, the nobles possess the same rights over them that masters have over their slaves (*Plerique, cum aut aere alieno aut magnitudine tributorum aut iniuria potentiorum premuntur, sese in servitutem dicant nobilibus; in hos eadem omnia sunt iura quae dominis in servos*).<sup>4</sup> This seems plain enough: but M. Flach<sup>5</sup> says that the passage is generally misunderstood. Fathers, he remarks, in Gaul, as in Rome, had power of life and death over their families;<sup>6</sup> and Caesar only meant that those who sought the protection of a noble became members of his *familia* and were *ipso facto* subject to this power. I should say that Caesar meant exactly what he said. M. d'Arbois de Jubainville,<sup>7</sup> however, concludes from the passage in which Caesar describes the following of Orgetorix<sup>8</sup> that a Gallic chieftain had two classes of retainers, free and non-free; and assuming that Orgetorix's *familia* included his slaves, and remarking that Caesar distinguishes the *familia* from the *clientes* and *obaerati*, he infers that the *obaerati* were free. The free retainers (*vassaux*) were the companions of their lord, and, although poor, held a rank almost equal to his: they resembled the *sóer-chéli* of Ireland. The other class of "vassaux," who resembled the *doer-chéli* of Ireland, comprised shepherds and rural labourers, whose condition was analogous to that of Roman slaves. I do not altogether agree with M. d'Arbois. He appears to me to overlook the fact, expressly stated by Caesar, that those debtors who sought the protection of a lord, and who surely are to be identified with the *obaerati*, were virtually his slaves, even though they may have been distinct from the slaves, born in slavery or purchased, whom Caesar calls simply *servi*.

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 4, § 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Les origines de l'ancienne France*, 1884, i. 57.

<sup>3</sup> P. Geyer (*Jahresberichte d. philol. Vereins*, v., 1879, p. 341) assumes that these debtors were *clientes*: but Caesar does not call them by that name; and there is nothing to show that it was applicable to them.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 13, §§ 2-3.

<sup>5</sup> *Les origines de l'ancienne France*, i. 56.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 19, § 3.

<sup>7</sup> *Recherches sur l'origine de la propriété foncière*, etc., pp. 64-5.

<sup>8</sup> *B. G.*, i. 4, § 2.

If I am right, the free retainers, whose position was analogous to that of the Irish *sóer-chéili*, were not the *clientes* and the *obaerati*, but the *clientes* only.<sup>1</sup>

### SLAVERY IN GAUL

M. Chambellan denies that slavery existed in Gaul; but, as de Coulanges<sup>2</sup> remarks, three passages in the *Commentaries*, namely v. 45, § 3,<sup>3</sup> vi. 19, § 4,<sup>4</sup> and viii. 30, § 1,<sup>5</sup> prove that it did.

### DID ANY WEAKNESS IN THE NATIONAL CHARACTER PREVENT THE GAULS FROM ACHIEVING POLITICAL UNITY?

"If," says Sir Henry Maine,<sup>6</sup> "the country (Ireland) had been left to itself, one of the great Irish tribes would almost certainly have con-

<sup>1</sup> The following remarks of Sir Henry Maine (*Early History of Institutions*, pp. 167-9) illustrate the position of the *obaerati*:—"We obtain from the (Irish) law-tracts a picture of an aristocracy of wealth in its most primitive form; and we see that the possession of this wealth gave the nobles an immense power over the non-noble freemen who had nothing but their land. Caesar seems to me to be clearly referring to the same state of relations in the Celtic sister society, when he speaks of the Gaulish chiefs, the Equites, having one principal source of their influence in the number of their debtors (*B. G.*, i. 4; *B. G.*, vi. 13). Now you will remember how uniformly, when our knowledge of the ancient world commences, we find plebeian classes deeply indebted to aristocratic orders. At the beginning of Athenian history we find the Athenian communalty the bond-slaves through debt of the Eupatrids; at the beginning of Roman history we find the Roman commons in money bondage to the Patricians. The fact has been accounted for in many ways, and it has been plausibly suggested that it was the occurrence of repeated bad seasons which placed the small farmers of the Attic and Roman territory at the mercy of wealthy nobles. But the explanation is imperfect unless we keep in mind the chief lesson of these Brehon tracts, and recollect that the relative importance of land and capital has been altering throughout history. . . . In very ancient times land was a drug, while capital was extremely perishable, added to with the greatest difficulty, and lodged in very few hands. . . . The ownership of the instruments of tillage other than the land itself was thus, in early agricultural communities, a power of the first order, and, as it may be believed that a stock of the primitive capital larger than usual was very generally obtained by plunder, we can understand that these stocks were mostly in the hands of noble classes whose occupation was war, and who at all events had a monopoly of the profits of office. The advance of capital at usurious interest, and the helpless degradation of the borrowers, were the natural results of such economical conditions."

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. des institutions pol. de l'ancienne France,—la Gaule rom.*, 1891, p. 22.

<sup>3</sup> hic (Vertico) *servo spe libertatis* magnisque persuadet præmiis, ut litteras ad Caesarem deferat.

<sup>4</sup> Funera sunt pro cultu Gallorum magnifica . . . ac paulo super hæc memoriam servi et clientes, quos ab iis directos esse constabat, iustis funeribus confectis una cremabantur.

<sup>5</sup> Qua ex fuga cum constaret Drappeteni Senonem, qui, ut primum defecerat Gallia, collectis undique perditis hominibus, *servis ad libertatem vocatis*, etc.

<sup>6</sup> *Early History of Institutions*, ed. 1875, pp. 54-5.

quered the rest. All the legal ideas which, little conscious as we are of their source, come to us from the existence of a strong central government lending its vigour to the arm of justice would have made their way into the Brehon law; and the gap between the alleged civilisation of England and the alleged barbarism of Ireland during much of their history, which was in reality narrower than is commonly supposed, would have almost wholly disappeared."

I do not think that Mommsen is justified in asserting that the Gauls had reached their maximum of allotted culture.<sup>1</sup>

### M. SERRURE'S THEORY REGARDING INTER-TRIBAL RELATIONS IN GAUL

C. A. Serrure<sup>2</sup> infers from certain passages in the *Commentaries* that inter-tribal relationship in Gaul was of three kinds, namely (1) simple alliance (*in amicitia esse, in fide esse*), (2) protectorate (*in clientela*) and (3) dependence (*sub imperio esse*). According to the Aeduan, Divitiacus, the Bellovaci had always been *in fide atque amicitia civitatis Aeduae*: in 53 B.C. the Senones sued for Caesar's pardon *per Aeduos quorum antiquitus erat in fide civitas*; and in the following year the Bituriges asked the aid of the Aedui, *quorum erant in fide*, against Vercingetorix.<sup>3</sup> It is clear to my mind that *in fide* denotes something more than mere alliance: it is usually, and I think rightly, translated "under the protection of": after the submission of the Bellovaci Caesar says that, out of regard for the Aedui and Divitiacus, who had interceded for them, he will himself receive them *in fidem*,<sup>4</sup>—"under his protection"; and Cicero says, speaking of the assassins who had been employed by Chrysogonus, *quaere in cuius fide sint et clientela*.<sup>5</sup> Long<sup>6</sup> is, I believe, right in saying that the Bituriges (and of course he meant the Senones and the Bellovaci as well) were among the *veteres clientes* of the Aedui mentioned in *B. G.*, vi. 12. It is clear, then, that to be *in fide* was consistent with being *in clientela*.

In 53 B.C., the Carnutes, when soliciting Caesar's pardon, availed themselves of the intercession of the Remi, *quorum erant in clientela*.<sup>7</sup> To my mind *in clientela* here denotes virtually the same relationship as *in fide*. The Carnutes, a powerful people, were certainly not under the *imperium* of the Remi, in the sense in which M. Serrure uses the word: they acted, during the Gallic war, quite independently of them; and they joined the rebellion of 52 B.C., when the Remi adhered to Caesar.

Certain passages in the *Commentaries* prove that *clientela*, which M. Serrure distinguishes from the state of dependence denoted by the words *sub imperio esse*, was sometimes identical with it. The *clientes* of the

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 229.

<sup>2</sup> *Étude sur la numismatique gauloise des Comm. de César*, 1885, p. 35.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 14, § 2; vi. 4, § 2; vii. 5, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, ii. 15, § 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Pro Roscio Amerino*, 33, § 93.

<sup>6</sup> *Caesar*, p. 335.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 4, § 5.

Nervii were under their *imperium*; and the new clients who placed themselves under the protection of the Aedui after Caesar's arrival in Gaul found that they enjoyed in consequence *aequiore imperio*.<sup>1</sup>

The truth is that the word *clientela* was elastic. A state which had clients exercised over them whatever power it could; and some clients were less dependent upon the same overlord than others. The Bellovaci, the Bituriges and the Senones were in one sense no doubt clients of the Aedui: but they were not under their *imperium*, for in *B. G.*, vii. 75, § 2, Caesar specifies those clients of the Aedui who contributed along with them contingents for the relief of Vercingetorix: they were the Segusiavi, the Ambluareti and the Aulerci Brannovices. The Eleuteti, the Cadurci, the Gabali and the Vellavii stood in a similar relation to the Arverni.<sup>2</sup>

### THE NATURE OF THE HEGEMONY OF THE AEDUI, SEQUANI AND REMI

One wishes that Caesar had or could have told us more of the nature of the hegemony exercised by the Aedui and their principal rivals. Mommsen says that "A powerful canton induced a weaker to become subordinate on such a footing that the leading canton acted for the other as well as for itself in its external relations and stipulated for it in state treaties, while the dependent canton bound itself to render military service, and sometimes also to pay a tribute."<sup>3</sup> At all events the dependent canton did sometimes render military service; and we find the Eburones paying tribute to the Adriatici.<sup>4</sup>

Caesar speaks of the *imperium* of Divitiacus, king of the Suessignes, and of the Aedui: but I do not know in what sense he uses the word.<sup>5</sup> The dependent peoples evidently managed their own internal affairs; and it seems possible that the hegemony of the Aedui and of the Sequani may have resembled that of the earlier kings of the West-Saxons, who exercised lordship over the under kings of Kent, Sussex and Wight. But, as we learn from *B. G.*, vi. 12, §§ 6-8, client tribes occasionally transferred their allegiance from one overlord to another; while the Senones and the Carnutes, clients respectively of the Aedui and the Remi, rebelled against Caesar when they remained loyal.<sup>6</sup>

M. d'Arbois de Jubainville<sup>7</sup> warns us not to confound "les États clients avec les peuples clients qui ont cessé de former un État séparé et dont l'armée est fondue dans celle de l'État sous l'autorité ou *imperium* duquel ils se sont placés. Ces clients de second ordre ou sujets ne reçoivent pas dans les *Commentaires* . . . le titre d'État, *civitas*, donné

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, v. 39, §§ 1, 3; vi. 12, § 6.

<sup>2</sup> Fustel de Coulanges (*Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France, — la Gaule rom.*, p. 69, n. 1) affirms that "Ce que les Gaulois appelaient 'clientèle' de ville était une véritable sujétion." Sometimes: but, as I have shown, not always.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 226.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, i. 31, § 6; v. 27, § 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, ii. 4, § 7; vi. 12, § 6.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, vi. 4, §§ 2-6; vii. 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Recherches sur l'origine de la propriété foncière*, pp. 30-32, 34.

par l'auteur aux clients de premier ordre." The contingents, he goes on to say, of the Aeduan client peoples,—the Segusiavi, the Ambivareti and the Aulerci Brannovices,—who formed part of the host which marched to relieve Alesia,<sup>1</sup> "se confondaient avec celui des Aedui." This is true: but the contingent of the Cadurci was also lumped with that of the Arverni; yet, as M. d'Arbois has to admit, Caesar calls the Cadurci a *civitas*.<sup>2</sup>

### WERE THE PHILO-ROMAN AND THE ANTI-ROMAN PARTIES IN GAUL IDENTICAL WITH THE REPUBLICANS AND THE ADVENTURERS RESPECTIVELY?

De Coulanges<sup>3</sup> thinks that the philo-Roman party among the Gauls was identical with the supporters of republican institutions, and the party hostile to Caesar with the powerful adventurers, such as Dumnorix, who aimed at making themselves kings, and with the "clients" and members of the lower orders who supported them. There is no inconsistency, he maintains, between this general principle and the individual instances in which Caesar set up a king over such and such a people.

Desjardins, on the other hand, says that the object of Caesar in setting up these kings was to curb the democratic spirit and to paralyse the aristocratic leagues.<sup>4</sup>

I have shown elsewhere that no democratic spirit worth reckoning with, in the sense in which Desjardins understands the term, existed in Gaul in Caesar's time;<sup>5</sup> and I do not know what he means by the aristocratic leagues. Caesar set up three kings, Commius, Tasgetius and Cavarinus; and his object was to reward useful adherents and to strengthen his own hold upon the country.<sup>6</sup>

For the rest, Dumnorix certainly was hostile to Caesar: so was Vercingetorix; and so in general were the powerful adventurers who aimed at making themselves kings: but I do not think that de Coulanges has proved that the philo-Roman party,—if there was such a *party*,—was identical with the supporters of republican institutions. Tasgetius and Cavarinus both belonged to royal families, and were no doubt opposed to the supporters of republicanism in their respective states before Caesar appointed them. In Caesar's first campaign there is no evidence that any opposition was offered to him by any of the Gauls, except Dumnorix. In his second campaign all classes among the Belgae, with the exception of the Remi, appear to have been unanimous in opposing him. In the history of the campaign against the maritime tribes there is no trace of any philo-Roman party, except perhaps among the Eburvices and the Lexovii, whose senates, republican no doubt, were opposed to war; and it is reasonable to suppose that they wished to keep the peace because

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 75, § 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, vii. 6, § 7.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France,—la Gaule romaine*, 1891, pp. 52-3.

<sup>4</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 548.

<sup>5</sup> See pp. 536-45.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 21, § 7; v. 25, § 2, 54, § 2.

they had the good sense to perceive that they had no chance of contending successfully against Caesar. In the fifth and sixth campaigns, with the exception of the persistently faithful or servile Remi, Tasgetius, Cavarinus and Cingetorix are the only philo-Romans who are mentioned, and we do not know whether Cingetorix was a republican or not; while Ambiorix and Catuvoleus, both constitutional kings, rebel; and after the disaster at Aduatuca, Caesar has reason to suspect every Gallic people, except the Aedui and the Remi, of rebellious designs. Even then no doubt he had interested adherents among other peoples besides the Aedui and the Remi: but he does not mention them. The opponents of Tasgetius and Cavarinus were his opponents, and surely they were republicans: the Senones and Carnutes, apparently of all parties, were anti-Roman. In the seventh campaign, who were philo-Romans, except the Arvernian opponents of Vercingetorix, republicans it is true,—and their friendship to Rome was a compound of shrewd calculation and hatred of Vercingetorix,—a section of the Aedui, the Remi and the Lingones? Towards the close of the campaign “so intense was the unanimous determination of the entire Gallic people to establish their liberty and recover their ancient military renown that no acts of kindness, no recollection of former friendship had any influence with them, but all devoted their energies and their substance to the prosecution of the war” (*tanta universae Galliae consensio fuit libertatis vindicandae et pristinae belli laudis recuperandae, ut neque beneficiis neque amicitiae memoria moverentur, omnesque et animo et opibus in id bellum incumberent.* vii. 76, § 2). A passage in Hirtius’s narrative of the eighth campaign, however, supports the theory of de Coulanges: the constitutional party among the Bellovaci appear to have been opposed to hostilities; at least they throw the blame of rebellion upon Correus, the adventurer and leader of the *plebs*.<sup>1</sup>

I believe that there is some truth in de Coulanges’s theory; but it is too broadly stated. Our knowledge amounts to little more than this:—Caesar’s friends were his friends, republican or royalist, as the case might be; all whom he could gain over by favours or expectation of favours to come, all who hoped by his support to triumph over or to pay off old scores against enemies among their own countrymen, all who were shrewd enough to see that he was going to win.

It is remarkable that, with the exception of the Veneti and their allies, the Senones, the Carnutes and the Treveri, not a single Celtic tribe rose in rebellion against Caesar until the seventh year of the war. I have tried in my narrative to account for this as far as the evidence would allow: but it is possible that if Caesar had chosen to take us into his confidence, there would have been more to say.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, i. 17-20; ii. 1-4, 24, § 4; iii. 8, 16, 17, § 3; v. 3-4, 6-7, 26, § 1, 53-4; vi. 3-4, 8, § 9; vii. 4, § 2, 33, § 1, 63, § 7; viii. 21, § 4.

<sup>2</sup> See *B. C.*, iii. 59, which gives us an inkling of his methods.

## THE DRUIDS

1. Modern authorities are, I believe, agreed in holding that the Celtic invaders<sup>1</sup> found Druidism in existence when they invaded Gaul, and assimilated it.<sup>2</sup> While, however, M. A. Réville<sup>3</sup> holds that it originated in Gaul, MM. Deloche,<sup>4</sup> d'Arbois de Jubainville<sup>5</sup> and Desjardins<sup>6</sup> insist that it was derived from Britain. M. Deloche argues that M. Réville's view is inconsistent with Cæsar's statement,—*Disciplina in Britannia reperta atque inde in Galliam translata esse existimatur*<sup>7</sup> ("their religious system is supposed to have been found existing in Britain, and thence to have been imported into Gaul"); and, he asks, if Druidism was a product of Gaul, why did the Gallic invaders of Italy know nothing of it? M. Réville retorts that his critic has overlooked the word *existimatur*: Cæsar does not guarantee the British origin of Druidism; he merely records the opinion which was prevalent among the Gauls. Moreover, says M. Réville, although the Gauls who invaded Italy knew nothing of Druidism, it may have existed in Gaul before the invasion "à l'état d'humble compagnie de sorciers-médecins." He might have added that it has been argued by high authorities that the Gallic invaders of Italy came, not from Gaul but from the valley of the Danube;<sup>8</sup> and indeed, wherever Druidism originated, it is tolerably certain that it existed in Gaul before the Gauls set foot on Italian soil. M. Réville also says that, according to Tacitus,<sup>9</sup> Druidism was introduced into Britain by Gauls. But Tacitus merely says that it is reasonable to suppose that Britain was colonised by Gauls, as the same religion is to be found in both countries (*In universum tamen aestimanti Gallos vicinam insulam occupasse credibile est. Eorum sacra deprehendas, superstitionum persuasiones*, etc.); and it shows little sense of the value of evidence to found such an argument as M. Réville's on this remark. Professor Rhys is inclined to believe that Druidism was "the common religion of the aboriginal inhabitants from the Baltic to Gibraltar":<sup>10</sup> but this is not the view of M. Bertrand.<sup>11</sup>

2. The fashionable view is that Cæsar exaggerated the power of the Druids.<sup>12</sup> M. Réville holds that he was misled by Divitiacus, who hoped by exaggerating the importance of his own order<sup>13</sup> to secure for

<sup>1</sup> By "the Celtic invaders" I mean of course the Celtic-speaking conquerors whom French ethnologists generally designate as "les Galates,"—the Gauls properly so called. But see p. 300.

<sup>2</sup> See J. Rhys, *Celtic Britain*, 2nd ed., 1884, pp. 69, 73.

<sup>3</sup> *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 3<sup>e</sup> période, t. xxiv., 1877, pp. 473-5.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, p. 466.

<sup>5</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. xxx., 1875, p. 15.

<sup>6</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 518.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 13, § 11.

<sup>8</sup> See pp. 549-50.

<sup>9</sup> *Agricola*, 11.

<sup>10</sup> *Celtic Britain*, p. 73.

<sup>11</sup> See pp. 15-17 of my narrative.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Roget de Belloguet, *Ethnogenie gauloise*, 1858-68, iii. 310, and *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 430.

<sup>13</sup> De Coulanges (*Hist. de l'inst. pol. de l'ancienne France,—la Gaule rom.*, p. 29, n. 2) remarks that Cæsar, who knew Divitiacus intimately, does not say that he was a Druid. But Cicero, who conversed with him on matters of religion, says

himself "l'hégémonie spirituelle de la Gaule." There is no evidence, he says, that Vercingetorix received any support from the 'Druids.<sup>1</sup> Desjardins,<sup>2</sup> however, points out that Divitiacus would have defeated his own object by exaggerating the importance of his order; and he believes that Vercingetorix regarded the Druids as antagonistic to his own power and therefore would have nothing to do with them. Desjardins's view is that Caesar's account is correct as far as it goes, but that it refers to a state of things anterior to the Roman conquest, especially as regards the custom of human sacrifice. This is a pure guess, based, I suppose, upon the notion that the Gauls, in Caesar's time, were too civilised to sacrifice human victims. But Caesar tells us that it was their custom to torture to death the warrior who was the last to present himself at the general muster which preceded a military expedition;<sup>3</sup> and if the Romans, in the second Punic war, offered human sacrifice to the gods,<sup>4</sup> if suttee prevailed two generations ago in India, why should it be incredible that human sacrifice was practised in Gaul? Moreover, Tertullian<sup>5</sup> affirms that the Druids offered human sacrifices to Mercury, and Suetonius<sup>6</sup> speaks of "the superstition of the Druids with its terrible cruelty." Professor Rhys<sup>7</sup> says that "in Ireland . . . druidism and the kingship went hand in hand; nor is it improbable that it was the same in Gaul, so that when the one fell, the other suffered to some extent likewise." Duruy<sup>8</sup> says that the nobles had dealt a fatal blow at the power of the Druids. I cannot find a scrap of evidence in support of this statement; and Caesar expressly says that in 52 B.C. the Aeduan Vergobret, or chief magistrate, was elected by the priests.<sup>9</sup> Mommsen<sup>10</sup> takes a different view from Duruy's. "It may readily be conceived," he says, "that such a priesthood attempted to usurp, as it partially did usurp the secular government. . . . The Gauls were not much removed from an ecclesiastical state with its pope and councils, its immunities, interdicts and spiritual courts, etc." If we are entitled to infer from Caesar's silence that the Druids did not play the part of a national priesthood in the

that he was; and Caesar's silence proves nothing. When one reads the passage in Cicero, his testimony appears conclusive:—*Eaque divinationum ratio ne in barbaris quidem gentibus neglecta est, siquidem et in Gallia Druidae sunt, e quibus Divitiacum Haedum cognovi, qui et naturae rationem, quam φιλοσοφίαν Graeci appellant, notam esse sibi profitebatur et partim auguriis, partim coniectura, quae essent futura, dicebat, etc. De Divin. i. 41, § 90.*

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 3<sup>e</sup> pér., t. xxii., 1877, p. 849.

<sup>2</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 532.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, v. 56, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, xxii. 57, §§ 1-6.

<sup>5</sup> *Apologeticus*, 2. *Adversus Gnosticos*, 7, quoted by M. M. P. Monceaux in *Rev. hist.*, xxxv., 1887, p. 255.

<sup>6</sup> *Claudius*, 25,—Druidarum religionem dirae inhumanitatis. M. A. Bertrand, remarking (*La religion des Gaulois*, p. 252) that there is no trace of human sacrifice in the history of Ireland,—“le pays druidique par excellence,”—argues (pp. 68-73, 386) that the Druids did not originate, but merely tolerated and sanctioned this rite, which he believes to have been a survival of prehistoric times.

<sup>7</sup> *Celtic Heathendom*, 1888, p. 231.

<sup>8</sup> *Hist. des Romains*, t. iii., 1889, pp. 119, 131.

<sup>9</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 33, § 3.

<sup>10</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 225-6.



Gallic war, does the truth of the inference prove that their power had been broken by the nobles?<sup>1</sup> Froude's assertion<sup>2</sup> that, "So far as can be seen, the Druids were on the Roman side," may perhaps find support in the fact that Caesar's friend and ally, Divitiacus, was a Druid, and that Convictolitavis, whose candidature for the office of Vergobret Caesar supported, was the nominee of the Druids.<sup>3</sup> But there is no evidence that all the Druids were politically of one mind; and even if the Aeduan Druids had been opposed to Caesar, is it likely that he would have thought it worth while to accentuate their hostility and outrage public opinion by deliberately setting at naught the constitution of his principal allies?<sup>4</sup>

De Coulanges<sup>5</sup> holds that the authority of the two chapters in which Caesar describes Druidism is seriously weakened by the rest of his book. Nowhere else, he remarks, does Caesar mention Druids. But why should he have done so? It was enough, for his purpose, to mention them once for all in those two chapters. And he does allude to them, as I have already remarked, in his account of the election of Convictolitavis. For my part, I can discover no reason for distrusting the accuracy of the two chapters or their applicability to the time when Caesar arrived in Gaul.

3. De Coulanges<sup>6</sup> remarks that Caesar does not say that the Druids acted as judges in all suits, but only in almost all (*in omnibus fere controversiis*);<sup>7</sup> and also that he does not say that their jurisdiction, as far as it extended, was obligatory, but rather leaves on our minds the impression that litigants sought it voluntarily. He infers, moreover, from Caesar's statement that every one submitted to the verdicts of the

<sup>1</sup> Michelet (*Hist. de France*, i. 63, ed. 1835) fancies that *B. G.*, vii. 1-2 show that Druids played an important part in initiating the great rebellion: but, as de Coulanges remarks (*Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France,—la Gaule rom.*, p. 31, n. 2), this whimsical notion is unsupported by any evidence, and is simply an instance of the strength of preconceived ideas.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar, a Sketch*, ed. 1886, p. 224.

<sup>3</sup> De Coulanges, indeed, says (*Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France,—la Gaule rom.*, p. 27, n. 2) that there is no evidence that the priests by whom Convictolitavis was elected were Druids: but I take leave to say that there is, and that of the most convincing kind. Caesar distinctly says (*B. G.*, vi. 13, §§ 1-3) that in the whole of Celtic Gaul there were only two classes of men who were held in any esteem, the "knights" (*equites*) and the Druids. He mentions no other priests, except the Druids; and he implies (*Ib.*, 13, §§ 4-7, 10) that there were no other. The Aedui were in Celtic Gaul. The priests, who elected Convictolitavis were certainly important personages. Is it to be supposed that the Druids, to whom Caesar ascribes such importance, would have permitted any other priests, if there were any, to oust them?

<sup>4</sup> M. d'Arbois de Jubainville (*Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. xxxviii., 1879, p. 378) asserts that Caesar "avait triomphé des chevaliers, grâce à l'appui du sacerdoce qu'il était parvenu à détacher de la cause nationale." There is simply no evidence for this sweeping assertion except the fact that Divitiacus was on Caesar's side; and if the Druids were so powerful that their alleged support enabled Caesar to triumph over the "knights," why were they powerless to prevent or even to put the least drag on the insurrection in 52 B.C.?

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. des inst. pol.*, etc., p. 30.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 19-20.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 13, § 5. Cf. H. d'A. de Jubainville in *Rev. cell.*, viii., 1887, p. 519, and *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, t. ii., 1894, p. 375.

Druids,<sup>1</sup> that they had no power of enforcing them. No legal power, I dare say, but a very real one; for they could and did excommunicate those who were refractory. Besides, Caesar distinctly says that those who were excommunicated were outside the pale of the law (*neque his potentibus ius redditur*).<sup>2</sup> Whether the law here spoken of was that administered by the Druids themselves or by the secular authorities, matters nothing. Practically, if Caesar was not misinformed, the Druids had the most irresistible power of enforcing their judgements.

On page 17 of my narrative I have written that "Every year they met to dispense justice in the great plain above which now soar the spires of Chartres cathedral," etc. Of the passage in the *Commentaries* on which this statement is based<sup>3</sup> Long very naturally remarks<sup>4</sup> that "All persons certainly could not come there to have their disputes settled." No doubt this court sat only for the decision of important disputes between "knights" who could afford to attend.

4. Desjardins<sup>5</sup> and others hold that the Druids and the oligarchical nobles were leagued together to repress the democratic aspirations of the populace: but, as de Coulanges points out,<sup>6</sup> there is no evidence whatever in support of this view. Nor, I may add, is there any evidence that such aspirations existed.<sup>7</sup>

5. Desjardins<sup>8</sup> points out that there is no evidence that Druidism existed, in Caesar's time, in Aquitania or in that part of Gaul which Caesar describes as the *Provincia*; and, he says, it seems clear from Caesar's narrative that the Romans came in contact with Druids for the first time when they had passed beyond the northern boundary of the Province. But neither is there any evidence that Druidism did not exist in Aquitania or in the *Provincia*; and it seems clear that it must have existed in the latter before it became Romanised.

6. With regard to what I have said in my narrative (pages 9, 15) about the prehistoric local divinities,—"divinités des sources, divinités des forêts, divinités des montagnes et des lacs,"—the worship of which the Druids may have sanctioned, I need only refer to M. A. Bertrand's *La religion des Gaulois* (pages 192-3, 268-9), and Professor Rhys's *Celtic Heathendom* (pages 105-6).

M. Bertrand, after remarking that "les Gaulois avaient un nombre infini de divinités," asks, "quel rapport pouvait-il y avoir entre ces génies protecteurs multiples et Mercure" etc.; and he goes on to assert that Caesar, "avec le dédain d'un Romain d'éducation grecque pour la barbarie gauloise, concentre artificiellement en cinq types toutes les divinités de cette superstitieuse nation."<sup>9</sup> But it was not the "nombre

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 13, § 10.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, §§ 6-7.

<sup>3</sup> *Hi certo anni tempore in finibus Carnutum, quae regio totius Galliae media habetur, considunt in loco consecrato. Huc omnes undique qui controversias habent conveniunt eorumque decretis iudicisque parent.* *Ib.*, § 10.

<sup>4</sup> *Caesar*, p. 302.

<sup>5</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 529.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist. des inst. pol.*, etc., p. 31, n. 1.

<sup>7</sup> See pp. 536-47.

<sup>8</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 515. See also de Coulanges, *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France,—la Gaule rom.*, p. 3, n. 3.

<sup>9</sup> *La religion des Gaulois*, pp. 320-21.

infini de divinités," which, as M. Bertrand himself remarks,<sup>1</sup> were pre-Celtic, that Caesar assimilated to Mercury, Apollo, Mars, Jupiter and Minerva: it was the gods worshipped by the Celtic-speaking conquerors of Gaul, between which and the gods of the Greeks, of the Italians and of the Germans, Professor Rhys finds a "striking similarity."<sup>2</sup>

### WAS THE REBELLION OF VERCINGETORIX A DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT?

M. Albert Réville has written two very interesting and very ingenious articles upon Vercingetorix in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* for August and September, 1877. One of his objects is to show that the rebellion of which Vercingetorix was the leader was not merely a national movement for the overthrow of the Roman dominion, but also a movement for the vindication of popular rights. "Notre démocratie," he says, "remonte par ses origines premières jusqu'au parti égalitaire, impatient de l'oligarchie, déjà national, qui permit à Vercingétorix de grouper un instant sous ses ordres les forces de la Gaule entière."<sup>3</sup> Similarly, Mommsen, who asserts that most of the Gallic attempts to throw off the Roman yoke "were to an undue extent the work of certain prominent nobles," appears to think that in 52 B.C. the situation was reversed. Describing how rapidly the insurrectionary movement spread after Vercingetorix had declared himself, he says, "where the common council made any difficulty, the multitude compelled it to join the movement."<sup>4</sup> Desjardins takes the same view. Of the nobles and the Druids he says that the rebellion of Vercingetorix was "un mouvement national accompli sans eux et malgré eux." Indeed he appears to consider that the democratic movement had begun or was beginning when Caesar first set foot in Gaul. He tries to prove that the state of society described by Caesar in *B. G.*, vi. 13, 15, in which the lower classes had no political power, belonged to a period anterior to Caesar's arrival. "Pendant les huit années qu'il passa dans les Gaules, il semble qu'une révolution fut, si non accomplie, du moins en voie de s'accomplir, car cette infériorité politique du peuple s'était déjà profondément modifiée au temps de Vercingétorix, que nous voyons en effet, avec l'aide de ses clients, et malgré la noblesse arverne, malgré sa famille, appeler son pays aux armes . . . il n'est pas possible de se méprendre sur le double caractère du soulèvement qui se produisit alors, non pas seulement en faveur de la patrie,—de la patrie mal défendue jusque-là par la noblesse,—mais encore en faveur de la liberté." In another passage, alluding to the statement which Ambiorix, king of the Eburones, is reported to have made regarding the popular rights by which his own authority was

<sup>1</sup> *La religion des Gaulois*, pp. 192-3.

<sup>2</sup> *Celtic Britain*, p. 67; *Celtic Heathendom*, pp. 41, 49, 57, 64-5, 81-8, etc.

<sup>3</sup> *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 3<sup>e</sup> pér., t. xxiii., 1877, p. 75.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 268, 286.

limited,—*suaque esse eiusmodi imperia ut non minus haberet iuris in se multitudo quam ipse in multitudinem*,—Desjardins says, “il faut donc admettre que, dans certaines cités de la Gaule,—exceptionnellement, peut-être même seulement chez les nations qui cachaient et défendaient si bien leur liberté dans les épaisses profondeurs de l’Ardennes, il existait,—chez un peuple au moins,—avant la révolution politique accomplie par le héros arverne,—une constitution admettant la classe inférieure au partage de certains droits publics.”<sup>1</sup>

I have stated elsewhere my opinion of M. Monnier’s *Vercingétorix et l’indépendance gauloise*. But, whatever may be the value of that work, it is quoted with approval by so distinguished a writer as M. Albert Réville. M. Monnier argues from Caesar’s words (Aedui) *nil publico factum concilio demonstrant*<sup>2</sup> that, by 52 B.C., popular assemblies had begun to exist even among the conservative Aedui; and from an expression which Caesar put into the mouth of Vercingétorix, in the speech which he makes him deliver after the fall of Avaricum, he draws the conclusion that the great aim of Vercingétorix, as the representative and leader of democratic aspiration, was to create a national assembly, in which *all* the warriors of Gaul should have the right to vote.<sup>3</sup> The words of Caesar are “Nam quae ab reliquis Gallis civitates dissentirent, has sua diligentia adiuncturum atque *unum consilium*<sup>4</sup> *totius Galliae effecturum, cuius consensui ne orbis quidem terrarum possit obsistere*”; and the words which I have italicised M. Monnier translates thus:—“Je formerai une seule Assemblée de toute la Gaule, et quand elle sera d’accord, le monde entier ne pourra lui résister.”

Two questions, then, of considerable historical importance have to be discussed. First, whether a democratic revolution was in progress in Gaul, or was in process of inception, during the first six years of Caesar’s proconsulship: in other words, whether Caesar’s account of the condition of the Gallic *plebs* is to be regarded as applying, not to those six years but to an earlier period. Secondly, whether such a revolution began during, and was stimulated by the rebellion of Vercingétorix.

To begin with M. Monnier. It is hardly necessary to tell any one who has the most elementary knowledge of Latin that his arguments are based upon a mistranslation. And on that mistranslation hangs the whole *motif* of his book. *Consilium*, in the two passages which he cites, does not mean “council” but “counsel.”

The former passage means “they explain that nothing had been done with the authority of the Government”; the latter means “for he would make it his business to gain over the dissentient states, and would make the whole of Gaul pursue the same policy; and if Gaul were united, the whole world could not stand against her.” Even if

<sup>1</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 539-43; see also J. G. Cuno’s *Vorgeschichte Roms*, 1878, i. 40.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 43, § 1. I reproduce M. Monnier’s spelling. Of course the real reading is *consilio*; and that is the reading of all the MSS.

<sup>3</sup> *Vercingétorix*, pp. 174, 282.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 29, § 6. Here again M. Monnier reads *concilium*; and here again all the MSS. have *consilium*.

M. Monnier's translations were correct, there would be nothing to show that the "assemblée" of the Aedui or the general "assemblée" of Gaul was a democratic, not an aristocratic assembly.

I shall now quote and examine *seriatim* every single passage in Caesar's narrative that bears upon either question.

(1) In *B. G.*, i. 2-4 Caesar describes the origin of the Helvetian emigration. Orgetorix "apud Helvetios longe nobilissimus et ditissimus," concocted a plan with his brother nobles (*coniurationem nobilitatis fecit*), and persuaded the state (*civitati persuasit*),—which, if it does not mean the government, must mean either the whole community, whom an individual would not have had time to persuade, or those leading men who could influence the community,—to emigrate *en masse*. Orgetorix was chosen to superintend all the necessary arrangements. He undertook a diplomatic mission to Gaul, and secretly formed a triumvirate with Dumnorix and Casticus, son of a former king of the Sequani. The plan devised by Orgetorix was that the three should seize the disused royal power in their respective states; that Orgetorix should help the other two to secure their thrones; and finally that the three should divide between them the supremacy of Gaul. The Helvetii got information of the conspiracy, and summoned Orgetorix to answer for his conduct. He appeared before his judges with an army of clients, debtors and slaves. Then comes the passage which we are in search of. It tells us that "the state" was provoked to assert its authority by force of arms; that "the magistrates" raised a posse from the country side; and that Orgetorix perished (*Cum civitas ob eam rem incitata armis ius suum exsequi conaretur, multitudinemque hominum ex agris magistratus cogerent, Orgetorix mortuus est*). *Civitas* here plainly means the state or the leading men as represented by the magistrates, who take the initiative. There is nothing in the three chapters that indicates anything like a popular revolution, anything different from the state of society depicted by Caesar, in which the *plebs* are without political power. Even if *civitas* in the expression *civitati persuasit* means "the whole community," including the *plebs*, that does not prove that the *plebs* had begun to enjoy political rights; for of course a whole people could not be coerced into leaving their country.

(2) Some passages in *B. G.*, i. 17-20 may throw light upon the question. Liscus, Vergobret of the Aedui, when he and his brother chiefs were taxed by Caesar with neglecting to fulfil their engagement to supply him with corn, replied that "there were men who had great influence with the masses" (*Esse nonnullos quorum auctoritas apud plebem plurimum valeat*), which simply implies that the Aeduan *plebs*, like the mass of the people in every nation, whether they enjoy definite political power or not, had to be reckoned with, and that clever leaders could work upon them for their own purposes. So in chapter 18 we read that Dumnorix enjoyed *magna apud plebem propter liberalitatem gratia*. In chapter 20, Divitiacus, begging Caesar not to punish Dumnorix too severely for his treachery, pleads *sese et amore fraterno et existimatione vulgi commoveri*. But this does not go to prove that

democracy had taken root in Gaul; for, in the first place, *vulgi* need not necessarily mean *plebis*. In *B. G.*, vii. 15, *vulgi* simply means the mass of the chiefs present at a council of war summoned by Vercingetorix; and in the passage under discussion *existimatione vulgi* may mean no more than "public opinion." But, assuming that it means the opinion of the *plebs* as well as of the nobles, nothing is proved except that, even in a country governed by a powerful aristocracy, it is dangerous to ride roughshod over pronounced popular sentiment; and this needs no proof.

(3) The next passage tells more in favour of Desjardins's theory, though, strange to say, he has overlooked it:—"Aulerci Eburonices Lexovique *senatu suo interfecto*, quod auctores belli esse nolebant,"<sup>1</sup> etc. Who put the senate to death? One would be inclined to say that they fell victims to an outburst of popular fury; and this is how Mommsen<sup>2</sup> understands the passage. I do not think that such an interpretation can be regarded as certain: because there is no proof that the senate comprised the whole of the *equites*; and those of that class who dissented from the policy of the senate may have been the authors or the instigators of the massacre. Obviously the actual murderers must have been comparatively few in number; and the natural conclusion is that they were hounded on by influential men. But assuming that what Caesar describes was a spontaneous outburst of popular fury, should we be warranted in concluding that "une révolution fut, si non accomplie, du moins en voie de s'accomplir"?

(4) The only remaining scrap of evidence is the well-known statement which Caesar attributes to Ambiorix,—*sua esse eiusmodi imperia ut non minus haberet iuris in se multitudo quam ipse in multitudinem*. But in the first place, Caesar can only have written his account of Ambiorix's speech at second, or rather at third hand,—from the report of the report of the deputies who were sent by Sabinus to confer with Ambiorix;<sup>3</sup> and in the second place, supposing that Ambiorix was correctly reported, is it not possible that, as his speech was confessedly intended to deceive Sabinus and Cotta, this particular statement of his may have been intended to give an air of plausibility to his arguments? I will assume, however, that, among the lies which Ambiorix told, this particular statement was true; that, among the Eburones, the multitude,—if, indeed, *multitudo* necessarily means "multitude," and not simply the whole body of *equites*, who alone, according to Caesar's express statement, were held in any account,—did enjoy political power. That *multitudo* does not necessarily mean "the multitude" in the sense of "the masses," is proved by a passage in *B. G.*, vii. 63, § 6, which I shall examine in its turn. Moreover, Professor W. K. Sullivan, discussing this very question and writing at a time when the franchise was far more restricted than it is now, aptly remarked, "We say of a member of parliament that he is elected by the county, although only those who possess the franchise take part in the election."<sup>4</sup> Assume,

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 17, § 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 251.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, v. 27, § 3, 37, § 9.

<sup>4</sup> E. O'Curry's *Lectures on the Manners and Customs of the Ancient Irish*, 1873, Introduction, p. cclviii.

however, that, in the passage on which Desjardins relies, *multitudo* does mean "the masses"; how little, after all, the statement proves! Desjardins, who begins by saying that a popular revolution was, if not accomplished, at least in a fair way of being accomplished, can find nothing more to say, after examining his evidence, than this,—that there existed, *in one state at least*, before the rebellion of Vercingetorix, a constitution which admitted the *plebs* to a share in political power. In *one* state out of more than sixty! Truly this is a lame and impotent conclusion!

I now proceed to examine the passages in the Seventh Book of the *Gallie War* that bear upon the question whether a democratic revolution in Gaul began during, and was stimulated by the rebellion of Vercingetorix. (1) The first is in chapter 1. "*Indictis inter se principes Galliae conciliis . . . queruntur de Acconis morte; vosse hunc casum ad ipsos recidere demonstrant . . . omnibus pollicitationibus ac praemiis deposcunt qui belli initium faciant*," etc. In this passage, the nobles (*principes*), of whom Desjardins says that the rebellion took place "*sans eux et malgré eux*," are represented by Caesar as having been its authors!<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The meaning of the words *princeps* and *principatus*, as used in the *Gallie War*, has been the subject of a good deal of discussion. Deloche (*Mém. présentés par divers savants à l'Acad. des inscri.*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. iv., 1860, p. 308) thinks that the term *princeps*, as used in such passages as *indictis inter se principes Galliae conciliis . . . queruntur de Acconis morte* and (Dumnorix) *principes Galliae sollicitare . . . coepit*, denoted a magistrate; to which M. d'Arbois de Jubainville (*Rev. celt.*, viii., 1887, p. 226, n. 1) replies that the passage on which Deloche relies,—*In pace nullus est communis magistratus, sed principes regionum atque pagorum inter suos ius dicunt controversiasque minuant* (*B. G.*, vi, 23),—refers to Germany and not Gaul. But the true answer is that the word is used in several different senses by Caesar, as any one may convince himself by studying Meusel's *Lexicon Caesarianum*, ii. 1196-1203; and that, although some of the *principes* mentioned by Caesar may have been magistrates, the word, as such, never bears that meaning. When used absolutely, its most common meaning is that of "a leading man." Deloche (*Mém. présentés*, etc., p. 308, n. 3), admits that it sometimes has this meaning; but he nevertheless insists that it frequently denotes the holder of an office. He cites the passage (*B. G.*, vii. 39, § 2) in which Caesar describes the struggle between Convictolitavis and Cotus for the *principatus* of the Aedui; the passage in which we read that Celtillus once held the *principatus* of Gaul (*Ib.*, 4, § 1); and the passage in which Caesar describes Sedulius as *dux et princeps Lemovicum* (*Ib.*, 88, § 4). "Since," he argues, "*dux* evidently denotes the military chief, *princeps* naturally denotes the civil magistrate." It is quite possible that Sedulius may have been a civil magistrate: but the fact that Caesar called him a *princeps* does not prove that he was. When Caesar tells us that Cotus and Convictolitavis were struggling for the *principatus*, he means, as the context shows, that they were struggling for the office of Vergobret; but *principatus* does not mean "the office of Vergobret," though in this particular passage it connotes that meaning: "*his erat inter se de principatu contentio* simply means "these men were rivals for supreme power." Finally, the passage in which Celtillus is mentioned tells directly against Deloche's theory; for every one who has the most elementary knowledge of Gallic history knows that the *principatus totius Galliae* was not a definite office. The Sequani at one time held that *principatus* (*Ib.*, vi. 12, §§ 4, 6), and at another time the Aedui (*Ib.*, i. 43, § 7). Caesar only means that Celtillus, as the most powerful chief of the Arverni, exercised at one time a kind of loose and indefinite supremacy over Gaul. Again, C. Valerius Proculus was certainly not the chief civil authority of

(2) In chapter 4 we read that Vercingetorix, on hearing that the Carnutes had actually commenced the insurrection, "*convocatis suis clientibus facile incendit. Cognito eius consilio, ad arma concurritur: ab Gobannitione patruo suo, reliquisque principibus, qui hanc tentandam fortunam non existimabant, expellitur ex oppido Gergovia; non destitit tamen, atque in agris habet delectum egentium ac perditorum. Hac coacta manu, quoscumque adit ex civitate ad suam sententiam perducit . . . magnisque coactis copiis, adversarios suos, a quibus paullo ante erat eiectus, expellit ex civitate. Rex ab suis appellatur; dimittit quoque versus legationes . . . omnium consensu ad eum defertur imperium.*" These last italicised words cannot, except by a most forced interpretation, refer to a popular election. They probably mean that Vercingetorix was elected commander by a general council of the chiefs of the insurgent states, or recognised as such by the senate of each several state: they may also imply that this arrangement was sanctioned by popular sentiment.<sup>1</sup> The rest of the passage contains nothing to warrant us in supposing that the populace were asserting their rights against the nobles. It only shows that Vercingetorix, at the head of his clients and his popular levies, banished from Gergovia his brother chiefs, who objected to rebellion. Nor is there any evidence that the course of events in the country of the Arverni had its counterpart in any other state.

(3) Chapter 14 relates that Vercingetorix, "*tot continuis incommodis Vellaunoduni, Genabi, Novioduni acceptis suos ad concilium convocat,*" and explained to them that thenceforward they must adopt a guerilla warfare. In the next chapter (15) we are told that this plan was approved *omnium consensu*. Caesar goes on to relate how "*Deliberatur de Avarico in communi concilio, incepti placeret an defendi. Procurant omnibus Gallis ad pedes Bituriges. . . . Datur petentibus aenia, dissuadente primo Vercingetorige, post concedente et precibus ipsorum et misericordia vulgi.*" Probably the council mentioned in this chapter

the Province, though Caesar (*Ib.*, i. 19, § 3) calls him *principem Galliarum provinciarum*; and Cingetorix, the Treveran, who is called *alterius principem factionis* (*Ib.*, v. 56, § 3), was simply the leader of the party opposed to Indutiomarus, which does not prove that he held any civil appointment.

G. Braumann, I find, is of my opinion: the *principes*, he holds, were simply the most important among the *nobiles* or *equites*, and had no special office as such (*Die Principes der Gallier und Germanen bei Cäsar und Tacitus*, reviewed in *Bursian's Jahresbericht*, lxxviii., 1868, p. 73). I am glad to see also that I have the support of M. d'A. de Jubainville (*Recherches sur l'origine de la propriété foncière*, etc., 1890, pp. 46-9).

<sup>1</sup> Desjardins (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 543) admits that, in this passage, there is no allusion to a regular *concilium*: but he goes on to say, "*il y eut du moins acclamation populaire.*" Very likely: but popular acclamation does not imply popular revolution. Desjardins believes that Strabo was thinking of this passage when he said (*Géogr.*, iv. 4, § 3) that Gallic generals were elected by popular suffrage. This may be true; though it seems more likely that Strabo was thinking of a passage in *B. G.*, vii. 63, § 6, to which I shall presently refer. At all events there is no better authority in Caesar for Strabo's statement; and commentators have attached to it an importance which it does not deserve. If such a law or custom had really existed, Caesar would certainly have mentioned it: but, as a matter of fact, Strabo's statement, if by *τὸ πλῆθος* he meant *plebs*, is absolutely irreconcilable with what Caesar says about the condition of the lower orders.



was identical with that mentioned in the fourteenth. I will assume, however, that there were two. The former *concilium* is obviously a council of war. *Suos* cannot possibly mean *all* the troops: it means the insurgent chiefs under the command of Vercingetorix. The same may be said of *omnium consensu* and of *omnibus Gallis*. For the meaning of *miser cordia vulgi* see p. 725.

(4) Chapter 20 contains the famous speech in which Vercingetorix defends himself from the charge of treason:—"Vercingetorix *cum ad suos redisset, proditionis insimulatus . . . regnum illius Galliae malle Caesaris concessu quam ipsorum habere beneficio*—tali modo accusatus ad haec respondit," etc.; and chapter 21 describes the effect produced by his vindication:—"Conclamat omnis multitudo . . . Summum esse Vercingetorigem ducem . . . Statuunt," etc. The expression *omnis multitudo* may refer to the entire host, or as many of them as could hear what Vercingetorix said. But I cannot see that the fact of their having shouted their approval of their general's speech, proves that a popular revolution was in progress. Similar scenes must often have been enacted in Gallic history long before. Nothing is proved except that the most popular and powerful noble could not afford to disregard the wishes of his clients.

(5) Chapter 29 reports the speech which Vercingetorix made after the fall of Avaricum. "*Concilio convocato*," writes Caesar, "*cohortatus consolatuse est*." Desjardins himself calls this a "*concilium des officiers*,"<sup>1</sup> and so it obviously was.

(6) Chapter 31 tells us that Vercingetorix tried to gain over the dissentient tribes, and bribed their *chiefs* or leading men to join him,<sup>2</sup> and that the *king* of the Nitiobriges came over to his side.

(7) Chapter 36 shows Vercingetorix at Gergovia in daily consultation with the "*principes civitatum*."

(8) In chapter 37 we find Convictolitavis, Vergobret or chief magistrate of the Aedui, trying, in conjunction with others, "who belonged to a very illustrious family,"<sup>3</sup> to get up a rebellion.

(9) In chapter 42 the Aedui rob and murder Roman citizens; and Convictolitavis, still taking the lead, "adds fuel to the flame and hounds on the masses to frenzy."<sup>4</sup>

(10) From chapter 55 we learn that Convictolitavis has gained over "the majority of the (Aeduan) council." Eporedorix, "a young man of the highest birth and the greatest influence in his own country,"<sup>5</sup> and Viridomarus, whom Caesar had raised "to a position of the highest dignity,"<sup>6</sup> now join the rebellion. Among the Aedui, at all events, the *plebs* are merely instruments in the hands of the nobles.

(11) Chapter 57 says that, when the Parisii and their allies assembled

<sup>1</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 541.

<sup>2</sup> *animo laborabat ut reliquas civitates adiungeret, atque earum principes donis pollicitationibusque alliciebat.*

<sup>3</sup> *amplissima familia nati.*

<sup>4</sup> *adiuvat rem proclatam plebemque ad furem impellit.*

<sup>5</sup> *summo loco natus adolescens et summae domitientiae.*

<sup>6</sup> *ad summam dignitatem.*

to oppose Labienus, "Summa imperii traditur Camulogeno." It is conceivable perhaps that this may mean that Camulogenus was elected by a *plébiscite*: but it is, in my judgement, certain that the election rested with the chiefs or the *equites*. I am aware that Strabo says, in a passage which has been quoted *ad nauseam*, that Gallic generals used to be elected by "the multitude" (εἰς πόλεμον εἰς ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους ἀπεδείκνυτο στρατηγός):<sup>1</sup> but I am strongly inclined to believe that Strabo simply based this statement upon the following passage in *B. G.*, vii. 63, § 6:—"Petun' a Vercingetorige Aedui ut ad se veniat rationesque belli gerendi communicet. Re impetrata contendunt ut ipsis summa imperii tradatur; et re in controversiam deducta totius Galliae concilium Bibracte indicitur. *Conveniunt undique frequentes. Multitudinis suffragiis res permittitur: ad unum omnes Vercingetorigem probant.*" Generally, when Caesar speaks of *totius Galliae concilium*, he means a council of chiefs;<sup>2</sup> and undoubtedly that is what he means here. For it is simply absurd to suppose that *concilium* denotes the whole aggregate of tribal contingents which composed the army of Vercingetorix; and when Caesar goes on to say that the Remi, the Lingones and the Treveri kept aloof from the council, he evidently implies that the council consisted of delegates from the various states. Is it credible that those delegates included representatives of the masses, who could not have borne the expenses of the journey, and who, we are distinctly told, *nulli adhibetur consilio*? At the most, the *multitudo* can only have comprised all the *equites* who were present. [I find that Desjardins regards this *concilium* also as composed of "chefs,"<sup>3</sup>]

(12) In chapter 75 the *principes* unmistakably take the lead:—*Dum haec ad Alesiam geruntur, Galli concilio principum indicto non omnes qui arma ferre possent, ut censuit Vercingetorix, convocandos statuunt, sed,*"<sup>4</sup> etc.

(13) In chapter 76 we read:—"haec in Aeduorum finibus recensebantur numerusque inibatur. *Praefecti constituebantur.* Commio . . . *summa imperii traditur.* His *delecti et civitatibus* attribuuntur quorum consilio bellum administraretur."<sup>5</sup> Considering that the number of troops assembled in the country of the Aedui exceeded 250,000, it is clear that both the officers and the civil delegates were chosen, not by a *plébiscite* but by the chiefs.

<sup>1</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 4, § 3.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, i. 30, § 4; v. 24, § 1; vi. 3, § 4, 44, § 1; vii. 63, § 5, 75, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Geogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 542.\* Judge then of the amazement with which I have read this passage in his book (p. 691):—"Chefs et soldats s'y rendirent en foule, et, par un vote populaire,—on pourrait même dire par le suffrage universel,—le commandement fut confirmé à Vercingétorix." Evidently the distinguished geographer did not know his own mind.

<sup>4</sup> "While this was going on at Alesia, the leading men of Gaul were summoned to a council. They decided not to adopt Vercingetorix's plan of assembling all who could bear arms, but," etc.

<sup>5</sup> "The levies" (destined for the relief of Alesia) "were reviewed in the country of the Aedui, where their numbers were computed and officers appointed. The chief command was entrusted to Commius. . . . Delegates from the various tribes were associated with them, in accordance with whose advice they were to conduct the campaign."

The above list comprises every single passage in Caesar's *Seventh Commentary* that bears upon the question at issue. That, with all these passages before him, Desjardins should have asserted that the insurrection of 52 B.C. was "un mouvement national accompli sans eux,"—the nobles,—"*et malgré eux*," only shows how the judgement even of a man of vast learning may be warped by prejudice. A national movement the insurrection assuredly was: but, so far from having been accomplished "*sans et malgré*" the nobles, it could never have been begun, much less accomplished without them. It was the nobles of central Gaul who planned it. It was the Carnutian nobles who undertook to strike the first blow. It was an Arvernian noble who thenceforth became the life and soul of the movement. At Gergovia he regularly consulted with all the *principes* in his force. When he had proved his natural right to command, the majority of the Aeduan nobles joined him; and their action encouraged a multitude of waverers. Finally, when he was in extremest peril, the nobles of all Gaul raised and organised the host who marched to rescue him. Yet we are told that the insurrection was accomplished "*sans eux et malgré eux*"! The passages which I have quoted prove that it was accomplished "*malgré*" the Arvernian nobles,—all except Vercingetorix and his cousin Vercassivellaunus: but that does not greatly support the thesis of MM. Desjardins and Réville. There is nothing which proves,—nothing which even renders it in the smallest measure probable that a democratic revolution had begun.

The statements which Caesar makes about the condition of the *plebs* are so emphatic and so precise that I cannot see what right any commentator has to modify them without the very strongest evidence:—"In omni Gallia eorum hominum, qui aliquo sunt numero atque honore, genera sunt duo; nam plebes paene servorum habetur loco, quae nihil audet per se, nulli adhibetur consilio. Plerique, cum aut aere alieno aut magnitudine tributorum aut iniuria potentiorum premuntur, sese in servitutem dicant nobilibus; in hoc eadem omnia sunt iura quae dominis in servos. Sed de his duobus generibus alterum est druidum, alterum equitum."<sup>1</sup> We are told that Caesar's words refer to a period anterior to his arrival in Gaul. This cannot be proved; and it is intrinsically most improbable. It is clear at all events that he *intended* to describe the Gauls of his own time. Partly no doubt he got his information from Gauls whom he trusted, like Divitiacus: partly, keen observer as he was, he saw and judged for himself. I cannot see what motives his informants could have had for trying to mislead him: still less can I see how, after he had passed eight seasons in Gaul and had enjoyed ample opportunities for observation, he should have allowed

<sup>1</sup> "In the whole of Gaul there are only two classes who are of any account or have any distinction; for the masses are looked upon almost as slaves, never venture to act on their own initiative, and are not invited to attend any council. When crushed by debt or heavy taxation, or ill treated by powerful individuals, they generally bind themselves to serve men of rank, who exercise over them all the rights that masters have over their slaves. One of the two classes is composed of the Druids, the other of the knights." *B. G.*, vi. 13, §§ 1-3.

himself to be misled. It is possible, though it is not proved, that, among the Eburones, the power of the king was limited by the power of the people. But it would be very bad logic to generalise from a doubtful particular, in defiance of the plain statement of our best authority. Still, it is one thing to deny that the Gallic *plebs* had begun, in Caesar's time, to acquire definite political power; quite another thing to deny that they had the power of making their wishes felt. It may be that, as Professor Rhys supposes, "the common people were collectively beginning to acquire influence, and already here and there to understand their own power, though they had not yet taken the initiative."<sup>1</sup> Nor would I deny that, if there was a democratic tendency "in the air," it became stronger during the rebellion of Vercingetorix: I simply deny that there is any sufficient evidence to decide the question. And when a great historian, whose word with the majority of his readers is law, says of the rebellion of Vercingetorix that, "where the common council made any difficulty, the multitude compelled it to join the movement,"<sup>2</sup> it is necessary to say that for such a statement there is no evidence at all.

[Since I wrote the rough draft of this note, I have come across an article<sup>3</sup> by the eminent Celtic scholar, M. d'Arbois de Jubainville, which supports the view for which I am contending. It would be absurd, he says, to suppose that there was in Gaul a democratic party opposed to the oligarchy. Individuals with democratic leanings could not have cut themselves adrift from the *clientela* of their lord without losing their personal freedom, perhaps even their lives; for the state was powerless to afford them any protection.

I have lately been reading the chapters in which the late M. Fustel de Coulanges describes the political condition of Gaul in Caesar's time. On the whole, he appears to agree with MM. Réville and Desjardins. "La question," he says, "qui divisait le plus la Gaule, à cette époque, était celle de la démocratie."<sup>4</sup> "Chaque fois," he insists, "qu'un peuple est vaincu, nous voyons les principaux personnages de ce peuple se présenter devant César, l'assurer qu'ils ont combattu malgré eux, et rejeter la responsabilité de la guerre sur 'la multitude';"<sup>5</sup> and in support of this assertion he refers to *B. G.*, ii. 13-14, v. 27, vi. 13 and vii. 43. He remarks further that Caesar almost always spoke with contempt of the Gallic forces which opposed him, as composed of the dregs of the population; and he holds that "la monarchie démocratique" of Vercingetorix was viewed with distrust and even hatred by the aristocracy, and that he counted so little on willing obedience that he required all the Gallic states to give him hostages. "Il ne régnait qu'à force de se faire craindre."<sup>6</sup>

Let me examine these arguments. The first is based upon a serious

<sup>1</sup> *Celtic Britain*, 1884, pp. 60-61.

<sup>2</sup> Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 268.

<sup>3</sup> *Rev. celt.*, vii., 1886, p. 9 and n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. des institutions pol. de l'ancienne France,—la Gaule rom.*, 1891, p. 43.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 54-6.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, p. 58.

exaggeration. It is not true that every time a Gallic people was conquered the leading men of the state assured Caesar that "the multitude" had set at naught their authority and insisted upon making war. The Bellovaci did so in the last campaign; and the Aedui assured Caesar that the outrages which followed the defection of Litavicus had been perpetrated without the sanction of the government: but Caesar refused to accept the excuses of the Bellovaci and only pretended to accept the excuses of the Aedui, and I see no reason why we should be more credulous; while in both cases it is clear that "the multitude" was a mere tool in the hands of leading men. What M. de Coulanges represents as having happened on every occasion did not happen in the Belgic war of 57 B.C.; or in the war with the maritime states in the following year; or, excepting the doubtful case of Ambiorix and the Eburones, which I have already mentioned, in the campaigns of 54 and 53 B.C.; or, except in the cases of the Aedui and the Bellovaci, in the great rebellion or in the final campaign. †

Caesar says that the army of Viridovix was *reinforced* by a rabble; that the army of Indutiomarus was *reinforced* by exiles and "condemned men," who most probably had belonged to the upper classes; and that the *nucleus* of Vercingetorix's Arvernian contingent consisted *partially* of "needy and broken men." Hirtius tells us that the host of Drappes and Lucterius was reinforced by "broken men," emancipated slaves, exiles and bandits. That is all. On the other hand, the huge Belgic host, in the second year of the war, was composed of regular levies; the host of the Veneti and their allies included all the foremost men of each state; the army of Vercingetorix was almost entirely composed of regular levies, raised, certainly in part and perhaps altogether, by the *principes* of the various states; and the huge host which marched to the relief of Vercingetorix was, we are expressly told, similarly composed and similarly raised.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the fact that a small fraction of the vast multitude of Gauls who fought against Caesar consisted of the dregs of the population in no way proves that democracy was in the ascendant; it only proves that the leaders enlisted every man whom they could get.

Finally, if Vercingetorix required hostages from the states which joined the insurrection of 52 B.C., he only followed an established custom.<sup>2</sup> M. de Coulanges appears to think that these hostages were wrung from the reluctant aristocrats as pledges of their fidelity. There is no evidence for this view; and it is difficult to see how the aristocrats could have been compelled to give hostages against their will. The monarchy of Vercingetorix may have been democratic in the sense that he was the idol of the populace; and he may have been distrusted by those aristocrats who supported oligarchical institutions. But that does not prove that democracy, properly so called, was even in process of inception. †

<sup>1</sup> B. G., ii. 4, §§ 4-10; iii. 16, § 2, 17, §§ 2-4; v. 55, § 3; vii. 4, §§ 3, 7, 31, § 4, 75, § 1; viii. 30, § 1.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. B. G., vii. 2, § 2.—*principes, quoniam in praesentia obsidibus cavere inter se non possint, etc.*

M. de Coulanges refers to various other passages, which I have discussed, and to one which I overlooked,—the passage from which we learn that Indutiomarus, the Treveran, excused himself to Caesar for not having repaired to his camp by the plea that he had desired “to keep the community loyal,” as there was a danger that “if all the nobles abandoned them, the ignorant populace would lapse into rebellion.”<sup>1</sup> Indutiomarus was confessedly making a false excuse: but, accepting his statement, where is the evidence that a democratic movement was afoot? The ignorant populace of any country occupied by an invader, even if they were as destitute of political power as the Russian serfs under Nicholas I., might readily fall to committing excesses if they were left to themselves.

I have considered M. de Coulanges's arguments with the attention which every utterance of his deserves; but I cannot see that they lend any support to the theory of MM. Réville and Desjardins. After all, a good deal depends upon the meaning which one attaches to the word “democracy.” If a state in which a rich adventurer with a glib tongue can ingratiate himself with the populace and hire their bows and spears and thereby exalt himself to power is governed by democracy, then democracy flourished in Gaul and flourished in Greece also long before the constitution of Cleisthenes or even of Solon. But, for all that I can see, such a democracy is not inconsistent with the state of society described by Caesar, in which “the populace are looked upon almost as slaves, do not venture to take the initiative in anything, and are not allowed to take part in any discussion.” And if there is any inconsistency in Caesar's narrative; if among the Eburones, say, the *plebs* really did enjoy political power; the inconsistency is easily explained. Caesar did not profess to be a constitutional historian. He had neither the time nor the inclination, if he had the knowledge, to modify his general statements.]

<sup>1</sup> quo facilius civitatem in officio contineret, ne omnis nobilitatis discessu plebs propter imprudentiam laberetur. *B. G.*, v. 3, § 6.

## SECTION V.—RELATING TO THE NARRATIVE OF CHAPTER I.

### THE CELTIC INVASION OF ITALY

I. THE date of the Celtic invasion of Italy has been the subject of much controversy. According to Livy,<sup>1</sup> it was contemporaneous with the foundation of Massilia, which took place in 606 B.C. Mommsen<sup>2</sup> rejects this date. "The association," he argues, "of the migration of Bellovesus with the founding of Massilia, by which the former is chronologically fixed down to the middle of the second century of the city, undoubtedly belongs, not to the native legend which of course specified no dates, but to later chronological research, and it deserves no credit. Isolated incursions . . . may have taken place at a very early period; but the great overflowing of northern Italy by the Celts cannot be placed before the age of the decay of the Etruscan power, that is, not before the second half of the third century of the city,"—or some period between 503 and 453 B.C.

Desjardins,<sup>3</sup> on the other hand, argues that even during the continuance of the Etruscan power the Celts may have been established in the country between the Alps and the Po for a century and a half before they invaded the country of the Senones, from which they started on their march against Rome. He remarks further that Livy mentions four distinct Celtic invasions of Italy, namely those of Bellovesus, of Elitovius, of the Boii and the Lingones, and of the Senones; and he maintains that three-quarters of a century, the period which elapsed between the foundation of Massilia and the 64th Olympiad (527-524), the date assigned by Dionysius of Halicarnassus<sup>4</sup> for the fall of the Etruscan power, is not too much to concede for these successive immigrations.

M. d'Arbois de Jubainville<sup>5</sup> declines to accept Desjardins's reasoning. He argues that the date which Livy assigns to the Celtic invasion of Italy is irreconcilable with the fact that the Etruscan hegemony in the country north of the Po was, according to Polybius,<sup>6</sup> contemporaneous with their supremacy in Campania, which ended in the last quarter of

<sup>1</sup> v. 34.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, i. 337, note.

<sup>3</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 68, n. 1, 203-4.

<sup>4</sup> *Antiquitatum Romanarum* vii. 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Rev. celt.*, iii., 1876-8, p. 471.

<sup>6</sup> ii. 14, 17.

the fifth century B.C. The Gauls, he maintains,<sup>1</sup> conquered northern Italy from the Etruscans about 396 B.C.; for the most ancient recorded event of the conquest was the capture of Melpum, which took place on the day on which the Romans captured Veii.<sup>2</sup> Polybius<sup>3</sup> tells us that the Etruscans were expelled from Lombardy only a short time before the Gauls captured Rome. According to Appian,<sup>4</sup> the Celts invaded Italy in the 97th Olympiad (392-389 B.C.); and according to Diodorus Siculus,<sup>5</sup> in the second year of the 98th (387 B.C.). Both indeed are wrong as to the exact date; for the capture of Melpum belonged to the year 396 B.C.: but Dionysius of Halicarnassus<sup>6</sup> also makes the period which elapsed between the invasion of Italy and the capture of Rome very short.<sup>7</sup>

M. Alexandre Bertrand<sup>8</sup> infers from archæological discoveries that peaceful Celtic tribes had been established for six centuries or more in Cisalpine Gaul, when, about the beginning of the fourth century B.C., a warlike host of Gauls, akin to them in race, descended the northern passes of the Alps and overthrew the Etruscan power. That this invasion took place only a short time before the capture of Melpum and the battle of the Allia, he infers from a passage in which Livy<sup>9</sup> describes the invaders as "an unfamiliar and unheard-of enemy."

It appears to me that the data are insufficient. Dionysius of Halicarnassus certainly antedates the fall of the Etruscan power; and from a collation of the other texts it may be inferred that the last invasion which preceded the capture of Melpum occurred shortly before 396 B.C. But, unless we are to follow M. Bertrand and reject Livy's account altogether, we must assume that this last invasion had been preceded by others, the dates of which it is useless to attempt to fix; and this assumption, which is intrinsically probable, is perhaps supported by Polybius,<sup>10</sup> who seems to imply that the Celts by whom the Etruscans were expelled from the valley of the Po had been for some time their neighbours and that the invasion of the Boii, Lingones and Senones was subsequent to that of the Insubres and Cenomani, and who says that "some of the (Celtic) tribes who dwelt on the Alps, comparing their own barren districts with the rich territory occupied by the others, were continually making raids upon them."<sup>11</sup>

II. M. Bertrand rejects *in toto* Livy's statement, that the Gallic invaders of Italy came from Transalpine Gaul. He argues (1) that it may be inferred from Polybius<sup>12</sup> that they came from the country north of the Alps, that is to say from the valleys of the Inn and the Danube; (2) that of the six tribes,—the Aedui, Ambarri, Arverni, Auleri, Bituriges and Carnutes,—which, according to Livy, emigrated under

<sup>1</sup> *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, 2nd ed., i., 1889, p. 166.

<sup>2</sup> See Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, iii. 17 (21), § 125.

<sup>3</sup> ii. 17, § 3, 18, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *De rebus gallicis*, 2 (ed. Didot.), p. 25-6).

<sup>5</sup> xiv. 113-16.

<sup>6</sup> *Antiquitatum Romanarum* xiii. 10-11.

<sup>7</sup> See d'A. de Jubainville's *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, ii., 1894, pp. 297-9.

<sup>8</sup> *Les Celtes dans les vallées du Pô et du Danube*, 1894, pp. 27, 45, 48-9.

<sup>9</sup> v. 37.

<sup>10</sup> ii. 17-18.

<sup>11</sup> I quote from Mr. Shuckburgh's translation.

<sup>12</sup> ii. 16; iii. 47.



Belloves's from Gaul, not one finds mention in the histories of Polybius or in any history of Cisalpine Gaul ;<sup>1</sup> (3) that, according to Livy, Gallia Celtica was occupied about 600 B.C. by the same tribes which occupied it in the time of Caesar, which is not credible ; (4) that the population of Gaul could not, as Livy says, have been so great as to necessitate emigration ; and (5) that the king of the Bituriges could not have been supreme over the whole of Gallia Celtica and certainly could not have induced 600,000 of his subjects to quit their fertile country.<sup>2</sup>

These reasons do not appear to me sufficient to warrant the absolute rejection of the legend reported by Livy. It is not necessarily to be inferred from Polybius that the invaders came from the country north of the Alps. In the passages to which M. Bertrand refers he states that the slopes of the Alps "on the north towards the Rhône" are inhabited by "the Gauls called Transalpine,"<sup>3</sup> and he describes the whole course of the Rhône and particularly that part of its course which is in the Valais.<sup>4</sup> These passages lend no support to M. Bertrand's theory ; for Polybius knew perfectly well that there were Transalpine Gauls in Gaul properly so called as well as in the Valais. I cannot see anything absurd in the notion that Gallia Celtica should have been occupied, at the time of the Gallic invasion of Italy, by some of the tribes which occupied it in the time of Caesar. It must be remembered that even in the time of Caesar large parts of Gaul were overgrown by dense forests ;<sup>5</sup> and if the Helvetii, the Usipetes and Tencteri, the Cimbri and the Teutoni emigrated from their respective abodes, why should not Gallic tribes have emigrated from Gaul ? If Bituitus, king of the Arverni, was overlord of half Transalpine Gaul in the second century B.C., it is hard to see why the king of the Bituriges should not have ruled over as wide an area ; and M. Bertrand appears to forget that Caesar,<sup>6</sup> as well as Livy, reports that Gauls had emigrated, in bygone times, from Transalpine Gaul, properly so called, and that he also assigns as a reason for their emigrations over-population. It must, however, be admitted that the argument which M. Bertrand bases upon the absence of any mention of the Aedui, Ambarri, Arverni, Bituriges and Carnutes in the later history of Cisalpine Gaul does militate against the complete acceptance of Livy's account. Another reason for scepticism may perhaps be found in the fact that, as far as we know, the Gallic invaders of Italy were not accompanied by Druids.<sup>7</sup>

Desjardins, whose views on the question are conservative, may perhaps be right when he suggests that the invaders may have come from the valley of the Danube as well as from Transalpine Gaul.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The Aulerci are mentioned by Polybius under the name of Cenomani.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. d'anthr.*, ii., 1873, pp. 430, 643, n. 1 ; *Les Celtes et les Gaulois dans les vallées du Rhin et du Danube*, pp. 19-27.

<sup>3</sup> ii. 16.

<sup>4</sup> iii. 47.

<sup>5</sup> L. F. A. Maury, *Hist. des grandes forêts de la Gaule et de l'ancienne France*, 1850, p. 166.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 24, § 1.

<sup>7</sup> See p. 532.

<sup>8</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 207. M. Bertrand's view is supported by B. Niese, *Zur Geschichte des Keltischen Wanderns*, 1898, noticed in *Rev. arch.*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. xxxii., 1898, p. 452.

## THE CIMBRI AND TEUTONI

Where did the Teutoni and the Cimbri respectively dwell immediately before they set out on the wanderings which first brought them into contact with the Romans? When did the Teutoni first join the Cimbri? To what races did the Teutoni and the Cimbri respectively belong? All these questions have provoked much controversy.

I. The Cimbri, according to the common opinion, came from Jutland. This view is based upon the evidence of Strabo,<sup>1</sup> Tacitus,<sup>2</sup> Pliny,<sup>3</sup> Pomponius Mela,<sup>4</sup> and Ptolemy:<sup>5</sup> but of these writers Strabo was the only one who affirmed that the Cimbri still occupied the lands from which the emigrants whom Marius encountered had come. Karl Müllenhoff holds that the Romans, when they first heard of the Cimbri, were misled as to their original home by Greek geographers; and that when the Roman fleet, mentioned by Pliny as having been sent by Augustus,<sup>6</sup> arrived off the coast of Jutland, the officers wrongly assumed that the inhabitants of that country were Cimbri. He considers that the original home of the Cimbri is plainly indicated by the first known fact in their history, namely their attack on the Boii, who lived in the upper valley of the Elbe. Accordingly he places the original home of the Cimbri in the central valley of the Elbe, that is to say in Saxony.<sup>7</sup> But the fact that they attacked the Boii in the course of their wanderings does not prove that they had not marched a long distance from the north before they attacked them: it is not likely that Roman officers should have been mistaken as to the name of a people whose country they visited and whose ambassadors, in the reign of Augustus, visited Rome;<sup>8</sup> and there is no evidence that the Greek geographers of whom Müllenhoff speaks were mistaken on this particular point. On the other hand, it would be rash to base any theory upon Strabo's unsupported statement; and I agree with Lemaire<sup>9</sup> that it is impossible to define the country which the Cimbri inhabited before they set out upon their great expedition.

According to Dr. R. G. Latham, Caesar implies that the home of the Cimbri was Gaul, and Ptolemy places them in Finmark.<sup>10</sup> Latham must have been dreaming. Ptolemy<sup>11</sup> places the Cimbri in the extreme north of the Cimbric Chersonese, that is to say in Jutland; and Caesar<sup>12</sup> clearly implies that they merely overran Gaul.

The Teutoni, according to Müllenhoff and almost every other writer, ancient and modern, originally dwelt somewhere in northern Germany. But the Teutoni were probably neighbours of the Cimbri. Accordingly

<sup>1</sup> *Geogr.*, vii. 2, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, ii. 67, § 167; iv. 18, §§ 96-7.

<sup>5</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 11, § 7.

<sup>6</sup> See also *Corpus Inscr. Lat.*, iii. 782, cap. 26, 796, l. 14-18.

<sup>7</sup> *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, ii. 282-90.

<sup>8</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, ii. 44-52. See *Rev. celt.*, xii., 1891, pp. 7-11.

<sup>10</sup> J. M. Kemble's *Horæ Fœdæ*, 1863, pp. 21-2.

<sup>12</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 29, § 4; vii. 77, §§ 12, 14.

<sup>2</sup> *Germ.*, 37.

<sup>4</sup> *Chorographia*, iii. 3, § 32.

<sup>9</sup> Strabo, vii. 2, § 1.

Dr. Kossina, who accepts Müllenhoff's theory regarding the home of the Cimbri, logically develops it, and places the Teutoni in northern Bavaria.<sup>1</sup> As his premiss is questionable, it is needless to discuss his conclusion.<sup>2</sup>

II. Regarding the chronology of the Teutonic invasion, the ancient authorities are not agreed. The portion of Livy's work which narrated the history of the period is lost. According to Plutarch,<sup>3</sup> the Teutoni and Cimbri made their first appearance side by side, and pursued their wanderings together until after Marius had been appointed to take command against them. But Mommsen<sup>4</sup> attaches more weight to the *Epitome* of Livy,<sup>5</sup> in which the Teutoni are mentioned for the first time in the narrative of the events of 102 B.C. Mommsen's view has of course been widely accepted; but Müllenhoff<sup>6</sup> dissents from it. His argument is as follows. The *Epitome*, in recording the battles of 105, 109 and 113 B.C., mentions the Cimbri, but not the Teutoni. In all three cases, however, Livy himself must have mentioned the Teutoni as well; for, according to Julius Obsequens<sup>7</sup> and Velleius Paterculus,<sup>8</sup> the Teutoni fought in the battle of 113; according to Florus<sup>9</sup> and Velleius Paterculus,<sup>10</sup> they fought in the battle of 109; and according to Florus, Eutropius,<sup>11</sup> Orosius,<sup>12</sup> Valerius Maximus<sup>13</sup> and Velleius Paterculus, they fought in the battle of 105; and the authority of all these writers was probably Livy. Moreover, two passages in Plutarch<sup>14</sup> appear to show that Posidonius, who was probably Livy's authority, had mentioned the Teutoni in his allusion to the battle of 105.<sup>15</sup>

There is a passage in Caesar's narrative which may help us to understand the silence of the *Epitome*. In the speech which he puts into the mouth of the Arvernian chief, Critognatus,<sup>16</sup> he makes him allude to the war which the combined forces of the Cimbri and Teutoni waged against the Gauls: but a few lines further on in the same speech he makes him say, without mentioning the Teutoni, that the Cimbri left Gaul to invade other lands. So I believe that the epitomiser, in the passages in which he mentioned the Cimbri alone, hastily used the word *Cimbri* as a general expression for the united hosts of the two peoples.<sup>17</sup>

III. Dr. Kossina maintains that *Teutoni* is a Celtic word, and he infers, in opposition to the general opinion, that the Teutoni were not a Germanic but a Celtic people. M. d'Arbois de Jubainville, however, remarking that the Gallic alphabet had no *th*, suggests that *Teutoni* was only the Gallic form of a German name *Theudanés*. "Quand nous Français," he says, "nous disons Cologne au lieu de *Koeln*, Mayence au lieu de *Mainz*, nous obéissons à une sorte d'instinct conservateur, com-

<sup>1</sup> *Westdeutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kunst*, ix. 199-216.

<sup>2</sup> See *Rev. cell.*, xii., 1891, pp. 11-12.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, iii. 190, note.

<sup>6</sup> *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, ii. 292, 295, 298.

<sup>8</sup> Ed. I. C. H. Krause, ii. 8, § 3, 12, § 2.

<sup>10</sup> ii. 12.

<sup>12</sup> iv. 7, § 3.

<sup>15</sup> See *Rev. cell.*, xii., 1891, pp. 3-7.

<sup>17</sup> See also Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 309-10, 316-17.

<sup>3</sup> *Marius*, 11-12, 15, 19, 25.

<sup>5</sup> c. 63, 65, 67-8.

<sup>7</sup> c. 98, 103.

<sup>9</sup> i. 38 (iii. 3, §§ 1-4).

<sup>11</sup> *Hist.*, v. 16, § 9.

<sup>14</sup> *Marius*, 16; *Sertorius*, 3.

<sup>16</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 77, §§ 12, 14.

parable à celui qui, vers le fin du second siècle avant J. C., faisait prononcer par les Gaulois . . . *Teutoni* le nom de peuple transformé en *Theudands* depuis un siècle ou deux sur la rive droite du Rhin inférieur.”<sup>1</sup>

Whether the Cimbri were a Celtic or a Teutonic people, is a question which can never be decisively settled. As the word “Celtic” is used in several different senses, I may say that by a Celtic people I mean a people who belonged to the same race as the Gauls properly so called,—the tall fair Gauls whose physical characteristics have been described for us by various ancient writers, and whom certain French ethnologists contrast with the *Celtae* of central France. But, as it is a question whether these Gauls were not of the same stock as the tall fair Germans,<sup>2</sup> I go further, and mean by a Celtic people a people who not only belonged to the same stock as these Gauls, but were also or had recently been allied to them in language, manners and customs. And it is in this sense, if I am not mistaken, that the word “Celtic” has been used by all who have discussed the question.

The prevalent view is that the Cimbri were Germans. Most of the arguments on either side have been stated and examined by Canon Rawlinson.<sup>3</sup> The arguments for the prevalent view are as follows:—(a) the name *Cimbri* is believed to be of Teutonic origin. It has been variously derived from *kämpfer* (a warrior), from *chempho* (a champion), and from the Scandinavian *kimpari* (to rob). Rawlinson, however, considers that the Latin form *Cimbri* could not have been evolved either from *kämpfer* or from *chempho*, but that from *kämpfer* would have come “Camfi” or “Camferi,” from *chempho* “Camfones” or “Camphi.” (b) Jutland, which is generally believed to have been the original home of the Cimbri, was, we are told, bordered by lands the inhabitants of which were mainly German. But it is admitted that Celtic tribes once occupied the valleys of the Rhine and upper Danube. Why then, asks Rawlinson, may we not suppose that Jutland also was peopled by Celts? (c) As the Cimbri were allied with the Teutoni, and as the Teutoni were confessedly German, it is reasonable to infer that the Cimbri were German also. The answer is that the Cimbri were also allied with the Helvetii, and that the Helvetii were Gauls. (d) The Cimbri had blue eyes and fair hair. This argument, it is replied, is worthless; for, if our authorities are to be believed, the Gauls had the same. (e) The host of the Cimbri was accompanied, and their movements were directed by priestesses, not by priests. Now Caesar tells us that the Gauls had priests, and that the movements of the German army of Ariovistus were directed by women. But Caesar does not say that there were no priestesses in Gaul; and, if Pomponius Mela is to be believed, there were. Moreover, Rawlinson argues that Strabo’s account of the priestesses of the Cimbri agrees “better with what we know of the bloody rites of the Druids . . . than with what the most trustworthy writers tell us of the religious temper of the ancient

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. cell.*, xii., 1891, p. 16.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 305-17, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> *Journ. Anthr. Inst. of Great Britain and Ireland*, vi., 1877, pp. 150-58.

Germani." Druidism, however, in the opinion of most modern scholars, was not of Celtic origin, but was simply taken over by the Gauls from the people or from some one of the peoples whom they conquered in Gaul. (f) Caesar,<sup>1</sup> Strabo,<sup>2</sup> Tacitus<sup>3</sup> and Pliny<sup>4</sup> agree in calling the Cimbri Germans. To this argument Rawlinson replies that if Caesar had been personally familiar with the Cimbri, great weight might be attached to his testimony, but that there is no proof that he had ever seen a single individual of the Cimbrian nation.<sup>5</sup> As for Strabo, Tacitus and Pliny, in the Canon's opinion, "the terms 'Gaul' and 'German' are with them geographical rather than ethnological." I believe, however; that, as one may infer from the care with which Tacitus discriminated between those tribes who only "affected" a Germanic origin and those whom he regarded as genuinely German,<sup>6</sup> he aimed, at all events, at ethnological accuracy.

To prove that the Cimbri were Celts, it has been argued (a) that the word "Cimbri" is a Latin corruption of *Cymry*. But this argument is obsolete. It is certain that the two words have nothing to do with one another.<sup>7</sup> As Professor Rhys<sup>8</sup> has remarked, *Cymry* Latinised would have assumed the form *Combroyes*. (b) Sallust,<sup>9</sup> Florus,<sup>10</sup> Appian,<sup>11</sup> Diodorus Siculus<sup>12</sup> and Dion Cassius<sup>13</sup> agree in calling the Cimbri Celts; and, says Rawlinson, "the importance of these witnesses is the greater because they evidently intend their assertions ethnically." Perhaps they do; but how can we tell that their ethnological information was correct? Sallust was a grossly inaccurate writer.<sup>14</sup> Florus was a blundering rhetorical compiler, whose worthless chapter on the Gallic war<sup>15</sup> gives the measure of his authority. Dion, as every scholar knows, confused the Celts with the Germans. As M. d'Arbois de Jubainville<sup>16</sup> observes, Caesar was the first writer who drew a marked distinction between the two peoples; and even after his time there persisted, in the writings of Appian and others, "par une sorte de routine, l'usage de la confusion entre les Celtes et les Germains." (c) *Boiorix*, the name of the Cimbrian leader, is admittedly Celtic. This argument looks strong;

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 40, § 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Geogr.*, vii. 1, § 3.

<sup>3</sup> *German.*, 37.

<sup>4</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 13 (28), § 99.

<sup>5</sup> As to the sense in which the word *Germani* was used by the Roman envoys who told Caesar that the Belgæ were of "German" origin, see p. 314, *supra*.

<sup>6</sup> *Germania*, 28.

<sup>7</sup> Greenwell's *British Barrows*, p. 632, note; Holder's *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, i. 97.

<sup>8</sup> *Celtic Britain*, p. 279.

<sup>9</sup> *Jug.*, 114.

<sup>10</sup> iii. 3.

<sup>11</sup> *B. C.*, i. 29; iv. 2.

<sup>12</sup> v. 3, § 2; xiv. 114.

<sup>13</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xlv. 4, § 2.

<sup>14</sup> Henri Martin (*Bull. de la Soc. d'anthropologie de Paris*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. xii., 1877, p. 487) laid stress upon the fact, if it is a fact, that Sallust had seen Cimbrian prisoners in the streets of Rome. But unless Sallust was also familiar with the appearance of Gauls, and was as acute an observer as Dr. Beddoe, it does not follow that his conclusion was correct; and Pliny, who visited the country of the Cimbri, described them as Germans.

<sup>15</sup> *Epitoma*, i. 45 (iii. 10).

<sup>16</sup> *Rev. celt.*, xii., 1891, p. 16. See also the same writer's *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, ii. 401, 419-20. The lists of the classical authorities on either side are extended by Professor Rolleston (*Greenwell's British Barrows*, p. 632, note); but his labour is in vain.

and Rawlinson rejects Mommsen's suggestion that the leader of the host may have arisen from the Celts who may have joined them on the march.<sup>1</sup> But it happens that *Ariovist(-us)*, the name of the leader of the German host which Caesar overthrew in 58 B.C., was also Celtic; and the true inference would seem to be that the hosts both of Boiorix and Ariovistus were composed of mingled Celtic and Teutonic elements. (d) The Romans, in the war with the Cimbri, employed Celts as spies; and it has been inferred that the Cimbri must have spoken a Celtic dialect. But Mr. Hyde Clarke considers that Celtic spies would have been employed even if the Cimbri had been Germans, as "they would have had more practice in communicating with them than the Romans, who were not at that time in contact with the Germans."<sup>2</sup> (e) The Cimbrian system of warfare was, as Mommsen himself admits, "substantially that of the Celts";<sup>3</sup> and Rawlinson adds that the same may be said of the Cimbrian use of waggons and the Cimbrian practice of sacrificing prisoners to the gods. But the Cimbrian system of warfare was likewise "substantially" that of Ariovistus and his German host. As to waggons, what would the Canon propose as a substitute? At all events, Ariovistus and his Germans were, like the Cimbri, sensible enough to use waggons;<sup>4</sup> and Ariovistus and his Germans sacrificed prisoners to the gods.<sup>5</sup> Arguments like these might be used to prove that all Celts were Germans, and all Germans Celts.

Professor Rolleston<sup>6</sup> was inclined to identify the Cimbri with the Celts on craniological grounds. The skulls found in the tombs of the neolithic age in Denmark closely resemble those found in the British round barrows, which are believed by many ethnologists to have belonged to Belgæ: they also resemble the skulls of the modern Walloons, the assumed descendants of the continental Belgæ, and those of the Sion type, which the Swiss ethnologists, His and Rutimeyer, ascribe to the Helvetii. But it is not certain that the men whose skeletons have been found in our round barrows were Belgæ;<sup>7</sup> it is very doubtful whether the Sion skulls belonged to the Helvetii properly so called; and it is not certain that the Cimbri themselves were of the same race as the men whose skulls have been found in the neolithic tombs of Denmark.<sup>8</sup>

Dr. J. Thurnam<sup>9</sup> adduced, as an argument, "the resemblance of the armour of the Cimbri, as described by Plutarch (*Marius*, 25), to that of the Gauls as described by Diodorus (v. 30), and its dissimilarity to that of the Germans as described by Tacitus." He remarks further that a passage in Pliny<sup>10</sup> seems to show that the language of the Cimbri was Celtic:—"Morimarusan a Cimbris vocari; hoc est, mortuum mare."

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, iii. 179. According to Mullenhoff (*Deutsche Alterthumskunde*, ii. 120), "Boiorix" is simply a German word "Baierik" Gallicised. But there was another Boiorix, king of the Boii, a Celtic people. See Livy, xxxiv. 46, § 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, vi., 1877, p. 157.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, iii. 179.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, i. 51, § 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 53, § 7.

<sup>6</sup> Greenwell's *British Barrows*, p. 632, note.

<sup>7</sup> See my essay on "The Ethnology of Gaul," pp. 307-9.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>9</sup> *Crania Britannica*, pp. 86, note †, 147, note §.

<sup>10</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 13 (27), § 95.

(*Mor y marw* in Welsh = Dead Sea.)<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, on the other hand, says that *Cimbri* is a German word: but Plutarch calls the Cimbri Celts in one passage<sup>2</sup> and Germans in another.<sup>3</sup>

Finally, M. A. Bertrand<sup>4</sup> is inclined to regard the Cimbri as a Celtic, or, as he would say, "Galatic" people, because in Jutland there have been found traces of the worship of the three Gallic deities known as the "Triades": but this proves nothing; for, as Professor Rhys has shown,<sup>5</sup> there is a "striking similarity between the ancient theologies of Celts and Teutons."

When we ask ourselves whether the Cimbri were Celts or Germans, we should be careful to settle exactly what we mean. Two thousand years hence, perhaps, ethnologists will be disputing as to whether the English were a Celtic or a Teutonic people. We English know that we are neither one nor the other, but both; and that the blood of ancestors who were neither Celtic nor Teutonic is also coursing in our veins. We may indeed be sure that the Cimbri were not as composite a people as ourselves: but we may be equally sure that they were not homogeneous. It would only be true in a limited sense to say that even the Arverni, for instance, were a Celtic people. In point of fact, they were a *Celtic-speaking* people, among whom the aristocracy were men of more or less pure Celtic blood, while the populace was a medley of races. Even assuming that the familiar descriptions of the physical characteristics of the Cimbri applied to the entire people, the people might have been composed both of Celtic and Teutonic elements; for the physical characteristics of the Celts and the Germans are described by the ancient writers in terms which are practically identical. If the Cimbri all spoke a Celtic, or if they all spoke a Teutonic dialect, Celts or Teutons may, for aught we know, have formed the conquering, and Teutons or Celts the conquered section of the population. We know that Celts lived for centuries in Germany; and they may have become intermingled with Teutons.<sup>6</sup> Even if it is certain that the name "Cimbri" is Teutonic, it does not follow that the Cimbri were wholly a Teutonic people. The name Aedui is Celtic; but within the territory of the Aedui there dwelled many people of non-Celtic origin. All that we should be justified in inferring would be that a Teutonic or virtually Teutonic people called Cimbri had conquered or imposed their name upon some other people unknown. I do not deny that the Cimbri were mainly a Teutonic, or that they were mainly a Celtic, people. I simply deny that either the one theory or the other can ever be proved. But, as the only ancient writers whose opinions on such a point are worth considering are unanimous in calling the Cimbri *Germani*, I incline to accept, with the necessary limitations, the orthodox view.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Zeuss, *Gram. Celt.*, pp. 25, 752.

<sup>2</sup> *Marius*, 11.

<sup>3</sup> *Celtic Heathendom*, p. 41.

<sup>4</sup> *Camillus*, 15.

<sup>5</sup> *La religion des Gaulois*, pp. 347-8.

<sup>6</sup> See pp. 313-14.

### MOMMSEN'S THEORY REGARDING THE ANTI-AEÐUAN ALLIANCE OF THE SEQUANI WITH ARIOVISTUS.

Mommsen<sup>1</sup> says that the Sequani "stood at the head of the party hostile to the Romans," and "had every reason at this very time (61 B.C.) to call in the Germans against the Romans, who immediately threatened them; the remiss government of the senate and the signs of the revolution preparing in Rome, which had not remained unknown to the Celts, made this very moment seem suitable for ridding themselves of the Roman influence and primarily for humbling the Roman clients, the Aedui." The evidence in support of Mommsen's view is that the Sequani stood at the head of the party hostile to Rome's clients, the Aedui; that the advent of Caesar had the effect of restoring the supremacy of the Aedui and deposing the Sequani from their high place; and that Strabo speaks of the Sequani as having "long been hostile both to the Romans and to the Aedui."<sup>2</sup> But on the other hand, Caesar<sup>3</sup> says that Catamantaloedes, the late king of the Sequani, had received from the Senate the honorary title of "Friend of the Roman People." Merivale<sup>4</sup> says that "The Sequani complained bitterly of the tyranny of the Aedui, who had imposed heavy tolls upon the navigation of the Saône." This is pure figment. Strabo simply speaks of "the dispute about the Saône, which separated the two peoples, each claiming that the river and the tolls for transporting merchandise across it belonged to itself";<sup>5</sup> while Caesar says, "After the two states (the Aedui and the Sequani) had been carrying on for many years a fierce strife for the mastery, it came to pass that the Arverni and Sequani sent for German mercenaries;"<sup>6</sup> and again, "When Caesar arrived in Gaul, one group (of states) was headed by the Aedui, the other by the Sequani. The latter, being in themselves the less powerful of the two, because, from time immemorial, the supremacy had been vested in the Aedui, who also possessed extensive dependencies, had secured the alliance of the Germans under Ariovistus."<sup>7</sup> I cannot see that we have any warrant for saying more than that the Aedui and the Sequani were rivals, and that they disputed the exclusive right of levying tolls on the Saône: certainly we have no right to affirm that the action of the Sequani was due to hostility to Rome.

### WHEN DID ARIOVISTUS ARRIVE IN GAUL?

Caesar puts into Ariovistus's mouth the statement that for fourteen years his Germans had not sought shelter beneath a roof.<sup>8</sup> It has been inferred that Ariovistus entered Gaul in 71 B.C.; and Mommsen<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 234.      <sup>2</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 3, § 2.      <sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, i. 3, § 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire*, vol. i., 1850, p. 274.

<sup>5</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 3, § 2.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, i. 31, § 4.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, vi. 12, §§ 1-2.

<sup>8</sup> *B. G.*, i. 36, § 7.

<sup>9</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 235, note.



endorses this conclusion. But, Schneider asks, is it certain that the wanderings of Ariovistus and his host had not begun in Germany itself? Ariovistus, in his interview with Caesar, tauntingly remarked that the Aedui had not helped the Romans "in the recent war with the Allobroges."<sup>1</sup> This war took place in 61 B.C. Merivale<sup>2</sup> infers that it must have taken place "before the Aedui were menaced by the Suevi. . . . Accordingly the date of the arrival of the Germans cannot be placed earlier than 61 B.C." Merivale means of course that the Aedui would not have been in a position to help the Romans after they were themselves threatened by Ariovistus: but I doubt whether this consideration would have prevented Ariovistus from making what he thought a telling remark. I am inclined to believe that he arrived in Gaul, if not as early as 71 B.C., at all events before the rebellion of the Allobroges. For, according to Caesar, Ariovistus affirmed that he would never have left his own home and his kindred without strong inducements;<sup>3</sup> and this statement, if true, is hardly consistent with the theory that his wanderings had begun in Germany. Again, Divitiacus told Caesar that at first 15,000 Germans only had crossed the Rhine, and that more had followed when they heard what a pleasant country Gaul was; and Caesar says that Ariovistus had defeated the Aedui in several battles.<sup>4</sup> It seems unlikely that all these events should have taken place within a single year; and the general impression which Caesar's narrative leaves upon my mind is that Ariovistus's stay in Gaul had been prolonged.

### THE BATTLE OF MAGETOBRIGA

Colonel Stoffel<sup>5</sup> infers from a passage in one of Cicero's letters<sup>6</sup> that the battle of Magetobriga took place in 60 B.C. Mommsen,<sup>7</sup> following the same authority, and also referring to *B. G.*, i. 35, § 4, says 61. I agree with Colonel Stoffel. Cicero, in the letter referred to (written in 60 B.C.), tells Atticus that the Aedui are at war and that the Sequani have been fighting; while Caesar says that in the consulships of Messala and Piso, that is to say in 61, the Senate had decreed that the Governor of Gaul for the time being, whoever he might be, should protect the friends and allies of the Roman people. This decree, as Long<sup>8</sup> says, "appears to have been made on the occasion of the ineffectual efforts of the Aedui to oppose Ariovistus." But, as it appears from Cicero's letter that the Gauls were still at war with Ariovistus in the following year (60), and as the battle of Magetobriga appears to have been the closing event in the war, I infer that it took place in 60 and not in 61 B.C.

Mommsen<sup>9</sup> says that this battle was fought between Ariovistus and

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 44, § 9.      <sup>2</sup> *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire*, i. 273, note.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, i. 44, § 2—non sine magna spe magnisque praemiis domum propinquosque reliquisse.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 31, § 5; vi. 12, § 2.

<sup>6</sup> *Ad Att.*, i. 19, § 2.

<sup>8</sup> *Caesar*, p. 35.

<sup>5</sup> *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 29, n. 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 235.

<sup>9</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 235.

the Aedui and their clients only: Thierry,<sup>1</sup> on the other hand, thinks that Ariovistus encountered the united forces of the Aedui and the Sequani. According to Caesar,<sup>2</sup> Ariovistus, as the ally of the Sequani, defeated the Aedui and their allies "again and again." "But," says Divitiacus, whose speech Caesar reports,<sup>3</sup> "the victorious Sequani were worse off than the beaten Aedui"; and he goes on to say that "Ariovistus, after *once* defeating the forces of the Gauls in a battle which took place at Magetobriga,"<sup>4</sup> etc. The use of the words *semel* as opposed to *semel atque iterum* (*armis contendisse*) and *proeliis compluribus* and of *Gallorum* as opposed to *Aeduos eorumque clientes* would seem to imply that the Sequani, finding that they had not profited by their victories, had joined forces with the Aedui and made a desperate effort to get rid of their masterful ally; and this view is supported by the fact that, in the speech<sup>5</sup> which he made at Vesontio (Besançon), Caesar alluded to a *single* battle,—not one of a series,—in which Ariovistus defeated the Gauls. Evidently this was the battle of Magetobriga. I am inclined therefore to believe that Thierry is right.

#### WHERE WAS L. CASSIUS DEFEATED BY THE TIGURINI?

According to the *Epitome* of Livy (ch. 65), the defeat of Cassius took place in the country of the Allobroges.<sup>6</sup> Mommsen<sup>7</sup> prefers the authority of Orosius,<sup>8</sup> who places the battle-field in the west of Gaul; and accordingly for *Allobrogum* in the *Epitome* he reads *Nitiobrogum*, the name of a people who dwelt in the departments of Lot-et-Garonne and Tarn-et-Garonne. But, says Desjardins,<sup>9</sup> the testimony of Orosius cannot outweigh that of Livy; and the alleged pursuit of the Tigurini as far as the basin of the Garonne by a general whose mission was simply to protect the Province, appears very improbable. Long<sup>10</sup> considers the text of Orosius corrupt; and A. de Valois<sup>11</sup> conjectured that what he really wrote was *usque ad Rhodanum*.

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. des Gaulois*, 6<sup>me</sup> éd., ii. 70. Cf. Caesar, ed. Kraner-Dittenberger, 15th ed., p. 92.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, i. 31, § 6; vi. 12, § 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, i. 31, § 10.

<sup>4</sup> Ariovistum autem, ut semel Gallorum copias proelio vicerit, quod proelium factum sit ad Magetobrigam, superbe et crudeliter imperare. *Ib.*, i. 31, § 12.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, i. 40, § 8.

<sup>6</sup> L. Cassius consul a Tigurinīs Gallis, pago Helvetiorum . . . in finibus Allobrogum cum exercitu caesus est.

<sup>7</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, iii. 182.

<sup>8</sup> L. Cassius consul in Gallia Tigurinos usque Oceanum persecutus rursusque ab eadem insidiis circumventus occisus est. *Hist.*, v. 15, §§ 23-4.

<sup>9</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 241, note, 311, note 4.

<sup>10</sup> W. Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geogr.*, i. 955.

<sup>11</sup> *Notitia Galliarum*, p. 553.

# WAS DUMNORIX VERGOBRET OF THE AEDUI?

Merivale affirms that Dumnorix had succeeded Divitiacus "in the office of Vergobret":<sup>1</sup> but Caesar only says that Dumnorix held the *principatus* at the time of Orgetorix's mission; and *principatus* does not necessarily mean "the office of Vergobret."<sup>2</sup>

## WHEN WAS CAESAR BORN?

According to Velleius Paterculus,<sup>3</sup> Caesar was about 18 in the year when Sulla became supreme, that is to say in 82 B.C. Plutarch<sup>4</sup> says that he died at the age of 56. Suetonius<sup>5</sup> and Appian<sup>6</sup> say that he died in his 56th year. Eutropius<sup>7</sup> says that he was 56 at the time of the battle of Munda, which was fought in March, 45 B.C. Macrobius<sup>8</sup> says that he was born in July. Until Mommsen wrote, the date of his birth was fixed, on the evidence of Suetonius and Appian, as 100 B.C.: but Mommsen<sup>9</sup> proposed 102. Mommsen's reasoning has been developed and supported by the Comte de Salis;<sup>10</sup> and it is only necessary to summarise his arguments.

Cicero was born on the 3rd of January, 106 B.C.,<sup>11</sup> and became consul in 43. It may be inferred from a passage in Cicero<sup>12</sup> that a man could not legally become consul until he had entered his forty-third year. This rule was broken in the case of Pompey, who became consul in 70, when he was only 35: but he had not served as quaestor or as praetor; and his election was irregular. Caesar became consul in 59, four years after Cicero; and, as there is no direct evidence that he was elected before he had reached the legal age, we may infer that he was born not later than 102, four years after the birth of Cicero. Again, Caesar and Cicero were both praetors three years before their respective consulships, and aediles three years before their respective praetorships. It therefore seems clear that, if any exception was made in Caesar's favour, which permitted him to stand for the consulship before the legal age, that exception must have been made at least six years in advance, before he stood for the aedileship. "L'histoire," says the Comte de Salis, "ne nous dit rien d'une pareille exception, sans raison ni précédent, qui n'aurait servi qu'à avancer d'un an ou deux l'accès à ces charges." Furthermore, certain coins of Caesar (numbered

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire*, i. 281.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, i. 3, § 5. See p. 540, n. 1, *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> *Caesar*, 69.

<sup>5</sup> *Divus Iulius*, 88.

<sup>3</sup> ii. 41.

<sup>6</sup> *B. C.*, ii. 149.

<sup>7</sup> vi. 24.

<sup>8</sup> *Sat.*, i. 12, § 34.

<sup>9</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 157.

<sup>10</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. xiv., 1866, pp. 17-22. A futile objection which Napoleon III. makes to Mommsen's view is disposed of by Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, ii. 377, note.

<sup>11</sup> Aulus Gellius, xv. 28.

<sup>12</sup> *De lege agraria*, ii. 2.

25-29 by E. Babelon in his *Description historique et chronologique des monnaies de la république romaine*, ii. 18-19) bear the number LII. These coins were probably struck in 49 B.C., immediately after Caesar's entry into Rome; and the Comte de Salis, with whom M. Babelon agrees, believes that the number indicates Caesar's age. Similarly, M. Babelon remarks, coins of Mark Antony bear the numbers XL and XLI, "indiquant l'âge du futur triumvir."

It is impossible to fix the date of Caesar's birth with certainty: but the weight of evidence is in favour of the view that he was born in 102 B.C.

### HOW MANY LEGIONS DID CAESAR RECEIVE FROM THE SENATE AND THE ROMAN PEOPLE?

According to Appian<sup>1</sup> and Dion Cassius,<sup>2</sup> the Roman People and the Senate only gave Caesar four of the legions which served under him in Gaul. Desjardins,<sup>3</sup> who prefers the authority of Orosius,<sup>4</sup> says that Caesar obtained seven legions from the Roman People, in virtue of the Vatinian Law. It is needless to weigh the authority of Orosius against the combined authority of Dion and Appian when we have that of Caesar himself. De Coulanges<sup>5</sup> remarks that, if we compare the eighth with the tenth chapter of the *First Commentary*, we can see that Caesar only got four legions from the Senate; for, after he had raised two new ones on his own responsibility, he only had six. In strict accuracy, Caesar received three legions from the people; and the Senate added another. In 57 B.C. Caesar raised two more legions; and thus, at the time of the conference at Luca, when his term of office was prolonged, he was master of eight. That the four which he raised himself were raised without authority from the Senate, is proved by the fact that it was agreed, in the conference at Luca, that he should receive a grant for the payment of the legions which he had raised on his own responsibility, and that this grant was duly voted by the Senate.<sup>6</sup>

### DID CAESAR INTEND, BEFORE HE ENTERED GAUL, TO CONQUER IT?

Long<sup>7</sup> says that "Caesar's object,"—before he set foot in Gaul,—“and the policy of the Senate was the complete subjugation of Gallia”; and

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, ii. 18.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xlviii. 8.

<sup>3</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 355.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist.*, vi. 7, § 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France,—la Gaule rom.*, p. 45, n. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Cicero, *Ad Fam.*, i. 7, § 10. Cf. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 307, and Strachan-Davidson's *Cicero*, p. 269.

<sup>7</sup> *Caesar*, p. 36. See also E. G. Sihler in *Classical Review*, May, 1890, p. 198.

in support of this assertion he refers to *B. G.*, i. 35, § 4, and Cicero, *De Prov. Cons.*, 13. But Caesar merely says that, if Ariovistus declines to accept his terms, *sese, quoniam M. Messalla M. Pisone consulibus senatus censuisset, uti quicumque Galliam provinciam obtineret, quod commodo reipublicae facere posset, Aeduos ceterosque amicos populi Romani defenderet, se Aeduorum iniurias non neglecturum*; and Cicero merely says, *non enim sibi solum cum eis quos iam armatos contra populum Romanum videbat bellandum esse duxit, sed totam Galliam in nostram dicionem esse redigendam*.

There is nothing in either of these passages to show what policy, if any, Caesar had sketched out before he came to Gaul.

M. de Coulanges, on the other hand, holds that, at the time when Caesar was made Governor, he did not meditate the conquest of Gaul:—"le jour où il se trouva en présence de 200,000 Helvètes, il avait si peu songé à la guerre qu'il ne disposait que d'une seule légion."<sup>1</sup> At all events, it still would seem that Caesar was surprised by the sudden emigration of the Helvetii; for he had to return from Geneva to Italy to fetch reinforcements.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France,—la Gaule rom.,* pp. 45-6.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, i. 10, § 3.

## SECTION VI.—MILITARY

### THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE CAESARIAN LEGION

COLONEL STOFFEL pours ridicule on Frohlien and other scholars for wasting their time in trying to calculate the normal strength of the legion. "Qu'entendent-ils," he asks, "par l'effectif normal de la légion? Peuvent-ils affirmer qu'il y en eût un?"<sup>1</sup> Colonel Stoffel does not indeed, as I understand him, mean to deny that the legion had a fixed numerical standard on paper, just as an English battalion of infantry, on a war footing, is supposed to number 1096 men of all ranks.<sup>2</sup> What he means, I suppose, is that the effective strength of this or that legion varied from time to time, and that the legions of Caesar had no normal effective, as distinguished from an ideal strength. But all this Fröhlich admits: by "Normalstarke" he simply means the fixed numerical standard which the legion, at its full strength, was supposed to attain.

C. C. L. Lange<sup>3</sup> argues that the normal strength of the legion in the time of Marius was 6000 (or, according to Festus,<sup>4</sup> 6200) men, because when Mithridates reorganised his army on the Roman model, he fixed the strength of the cohort at 600.<sup>5</sup> The legions of Sulla<sup>6</sup> and of Lucullus<sup>7</sup> were, Lange points out, of the same strength. But he holds that in Caesar's time the normal strength had fallen below this standard, first because those of his legions which were at their full strength numbered less than 6000 men;<sup>8</sup> and secondly because 28 legions of Octavian, which were at their full strength, together with the auxiliaries (*μετὰ τῶν συντασσομένων*), numbered only 170,000.<sup>9</sup> But how can Lange tell what legions of Caesar or of Octavian were at their full strength?<sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. de philologie*, xv., 1891, p. 139.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Wolseley's *The Soldier's Pocket Book*, 5th ed., p. 183.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. mutationum rei mil. Rom.*, 1846, p. 18.

<sup>4</sup> S. P. Festi *De verborum significatione*, ed. C. O. Müller, p. 336.

<sup>5</sup> Appian, *Mithr.*, 87, 108.

<sup>6</sup> Plutarch, *Sulla*, 9; *Marius*, 35.

<sup>7</sup> Appian, *Mithr.*, 72.

<sup>8</sup> Appian, *B. C.*, i. 82, ii. 32; Caesar, *B. C.*, i. 7-8; Plutarch, *Caesar*, 32, 44; *Pompey*, 60, 71.

<sup>9</sup> Appian, *B. C.*, iv. 108, v. 5.

<sup>10</sup> Guischart (*Mém. crit. et hist.*, iii. 295), referring to the statement of Appian, says "It is clear that Antony, in reckoning the number of soldiers at 170,000, did not form his estimate with reference to the existing strength of the legions (for they were all much weakened by the recent war), but reduced the whole number of

Le Beau<sup>1</sup> remarks that Cicero had two legions when he was pro-consul in Cilicia, and that this force amounted to 12,000 men.<sup>2</sup>

"At the outbreak of the civil war," says Mr. H. P. Judson,<sup>3</sup> "Caesar had with him . . . only the 13th legion.<sup>4</sup> But Plutarch<sup>5</sup> says that Caesar had at that time 5000 men. So we may fairly assume that that number was in round numbers the strength of a legion when its ranks were full." This is a very hasty inference. Plutarch is not a trustworthy authority, least of all about numbers. He was just the sort of writer who, if he had known that the full strength of a legion was 5000 men, and if he had read that Caesar had had one legion with him, would have considered himself at liberty to say that he had had 5000 men, without pausing to inquire whether the legion had suffered depletion or not. Fröhlich<sup>6</sup> undertakes to prove that Plutarch made a mistake. He shows that Plutarch's figures are sometimes wrong; and he shows, on the authority of Caesar himself,<sup>7</sup> that the legions had suffered heavy losses in the Gallic war. The 13th legion took part in the campaigns of 54 B.C. and the three following years: therefore it could not, at the outbreak of the civil war, have numbered as many as 5000 men. But Fröhlich is as hasty as Mr. Judson. How can he tell that the losses of the 13th legion had not been made good by fresh drafts (*supplementa*)? And if the normal strength of a legion was 6000, how can he tell that the 13th had lost more than 1000 men?

Mr. Judson<sup>8</sup> endeavours to support Plutarch's statement by a calculation taken upon certain statements in the Fourth Book of the *Gallic War*. "In the return from Britain in 55 B.C.," he says, "two transports came to land below the main port, and the soldiers debarked and marched overland. From these two ships 300 soldiers landed. Assuming the two transports to have been of about the same size, that would average 150 men to a ship. Now Caesar had 80 transports and an unknown number of galleys. He lost 12 vessels in the storm. It seems likely that those 12 were transports, as they lay at anchor, and hence would be more exposed to the storm than the galleys, which were hauled up on the beach. Then at that rate the 68 transports remaining carried 10,200 men. Allowing for staff officers and servants, the two legions must have averaged somewhat less than 5000 men." All this is highly ingenious: but it is simply labour thrown away. For (1) Mr. Judson has no right to assume that "the two transports,"—still less all the transports,—were of "about the same size"; (2) he forgets

survivors to the corresponding number of legions at their full strength; so that, reckoning all his effective troops, he only estimated them as forming twenty-eight complete legions, instead of the forty-three which the triumvirs had at the outset of the war." But Guisehard estimates the normal strength of the legion at 6000. How then does he account for the auxiliaries who were included in the 170,000 men?

<sup>1</sup> *Mém. de litt. tirés des registres de l'Acad. Roy. des inscr. et belles-lettres*, 1752-4 (1759), pp. 488-9. <sup>2</sup> *Ep. ad Att.*, v. 15, § 1; Plutarch, *Cicero*, 36.

<sup>3</sup> *Caesar's Army*, pp. 5-6.

<sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, i. 7, § 7. <sup>5</sup> *Caesar*, 32.

<sup>6</sup> *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, 1891, p. 9.

<sup>7</sup> *B. C.*, iii. 2, § 3.

<sup>8</sup> *Caesar's Army*, p. 5; *B. C.*, iv. 22, § 3, 29, 31, § 3, 36, § 4, 37, §§ 1-2.

to mention that, according to Caesar, not 300, but *about* 300 soldiers (*mīlites circiter trecenti*) landed from the two ships, and that, according to the same authority, there were originally not 80 but *about* 80 transports (*Navibus circiter LXXX onerariis coactis*, etc.); (3) he forgets to mention that part of the two legions were carried in the galleys; and (4) he cannot tell whether the two legions were or were not at their full strength.

But if Mr. Judson is a bad advocate, it does not follow that his case is bad; and Colonel Stoffel<sup>1</sup> maintains that Plutarch was probably right in saying that the 13th legion, when it crossed the Rubicon, numbered 5000 men. Frohlich indeed says that the only *supplementum* which Caesar received in Gaul formed a separate corps:<sup>2</sup> but, says Colonel Stoffel, Frohlich must not assume that, because Caesar only mentioned one *supplementum*,<sup>3</sup> he only received one; and in the next place, this particular *supplementum* did *not* form a separate corps, but was incorporated in the rest of the army. It was indeed sent to Agedincum (Sens), the grand dépôt of the Roman army, probably to be drilled, armed and equipped: but, though Caesar does not mention the fact, we may be sure that it was subsequently distributed among the legions.<sup>4</sup>

Frohlich<sup>5</sup> adduces evidence to show that, even in Caesar's time, the normal strength was 6000. Cicero, in one of his letters to Atticus,<sup>6</sup> tells him that Pompey had crossed the Adriatic with 30,000 *mīlites*. *Mīlites*, says Fröhlich, means legionaries: Caesar says that Pompey crossed with five legions;<sup>7</sup> therefore each legion averaged 6000 men. Fröhlich goes on to argue that, even if, under the head of *mīlites*, Cicero included cavalry and light-armed auxiliaries, the average strength of the five legions could not have fallen much below 6000; because the light troops whom Pompey employed to cover his retreat from Brundisium could not have been numerous; and the archers and slingers whom he employed in Greece, coming as they did from Pontus and Syria,<sup>8</sup> could not have joined his army until after he left Italy.

I do not think that Frohlich succeeds in proving his case, because the evidence of Cicero is not enough to go upon. He may have written from hearsay. Even if Pompey himself had been Cicero's authority, there would be room for doubt; for modern generals have been known to make statements in their letters, regarding the numbers of the armies under their command which the Adjutant-General's returns have subsequently shown to be incorrect. Colonel Stoffel<sup>9</sup> ridicules Fröhlich's calculations. Pompey's legions could not, he insists, have numbered, at Brundisium, 6000 men apiece: for at Pharsalus their average strength was only 4000, and they could not have lost a third of their number in

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. de philologie*, xv., 1891, pp. 140-41.

<sup>2</sup> *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, p. 9.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 7, § 5, 57, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> This view is supported by the fact that after *B. G.* vii. 57, § 1, we hear no more of the *supplementum*, while in chap. 90 all the legions are accounted for.

<sup>5</sup> *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, p. 10.

<sup>6</sup> ix. 6, § 3.

<sup>7</sup> *B. C.*, iii. 4, § 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, iii. 4, § 3.

<sup>9</sup> *Rev. de philologie*, xv., 1891, p. 140.



the interval. Still the view for which Fröhlich contends is probable in itself: there is no evidence against it; and, as he points out, it is supported by the fact that each of the two cohorts of slingers which Pompey commanded in Greece numbered 600 men.<sup>1</sup>

Sextius Rufus<sup>2</sup> says that Caesar conquered Gaul with 10 legions, each numbering 4000 men: but this statement is of no use. The number is suspiciously "round"; and, for aught that we can tell, it may merely represent the writer's own rough estimate, based upon such data as we possess ourselves. Besides, the statement is hopelessly vague. It may mean that Caesar kept his legions at an 'average effective strength of 4000 by regularly filling up with fresh drafts the gaps caused by casualties or disease; or it may mean something quite different.

J. Maissiat,<sup>3</sup> eager to minimise the credit of Caesar's victories, strives to maximise, if I may be pardoned the expression, the average strength of his legions. Caesar says that, when he was marching to the relief of Quintus Cicero, his force numbered nearly 7000 men.<sup>4</sup> This force, Maissiat argues at great length, consisted of only one legion: but it would be sheer waste of time to reproduce his arguments; for Caesar himself says expressly that it consisted of two:—*Caesar . . . etsi opinione trium legionum deiectus ad duas redierat*, etc. A little further on, Maissiat asserts that four chapters in the *Civil War*<sup>5</sup> prove that the strength of the legion in Caesar's time exceeded 5500 men. From the first two of these chapters we learn that the legions which Caesar commanded at Pharsalus had, from one cause or another, fallen far below their normal strength. The fourth shows that Caesar brought into action 80 of these depleted cohorts, numbering 22,000 men, which yields an average for each legion of 2750 men. From the third chapter we learn that, in the same battle, Pompey brought into action 110 cohorts, or 11 legions, numbering 45,000 men, which yields an average of rather less than 4100. What support these facts lend to Maissiat's theory, I fail to perceive.

Fröhlich<sup>6</sup> argues that, even in the first year of Caesar's proconsulship, after the battle with the Helvetii, the 10th legion could not have numbered many more than 4000 men; for, before starting for his interview with Ariovistus, Caesar mounted the men of that legion on the horses of his Gallic cavalry; and he tells us that the cavalry numbered 4000 men.<sup>7</sup> But it is not likely that the number *quattuor milium* was exact: it is not certain that Caesar mounted the whole of the legion; and, even if we decide these two points in Fröhlich's favour, we learn nothing except the strength of one legion at one particular time.

We are told, in such a way as to suggest that the number was remarkably small, that, in the fifth year of the Gallic war, two legions, including, it should seem, the 400 cavalry that accompanied them,

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, iii. 4, § 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Breviarium*, ch. 6 (ed. Nisard, 1851, p. 884).

<sup>3</sup> *Jules César en Gaule*, i. 153-7, 159.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, v. 49, § 7.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, iii. 2, § 3, 87, § 3, 88, §§ 4-5, 89, § 2.

*Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, pp. 11-12.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, i. 15, § 1, 42, § 5.

numbered barely 7000 men;<sup>1</sup> and we know that the average strength of the eight legions which Caesar commanded at Pharsalus was 2750 men.<sup>2</sup> As he tells us that these eight legions had suffered heavy losses since the conclusion of the Gallic war, I infer that, during that war, their average effective strength never fell below 3000 men.

My conclusions are these. The ideal strength of the Marian legion was 6000. There is perhaps no positive proof that the ideal strength of the Caesarian legion was the same: but neither is there any reason to believe that it had changed; and the evidence of Cicero, such as it is, as well as the inference which Fröhlich reasonably draws from the recorded strength of Pompey's cohorts of slingers, goes to show that it had not. But, as Mr. Judson sensibly remarks, "From the experience of modern armies we know that the number of effectives ready for duty in the field always falls considerably below the number on the rolls; and again, that even the number on the rolls rarely approximates very closely to the full strength of any organisation as prescribed by the tactics." Rustow, as Judson goes on to remark, "estimates the average effective force of the legions throughout Caesar's campaigns at from 3000 to 3500 men."<sup>3</sup> But, to quote Mr. Judson again, "the effective strength of any legion must have varied constantly with the exigencies of the campaign"; and, we do not want to know the "average effective force" of the legions, but the effective force which Caesar brought into action at any and every given time. Now Caesar, as we have seen, twice gives us the information that we require. When he fails us, there is but one way of obtaining that information for ourselves. It is idle to say, The average effective strength of a legion was so much: multiply this amount by the number of legions. The only sound method is to consider what legions were employed at any given time, how long they had been enlisted, what service they had seen, and how far, if at all, the losses which they had sustained had been made good; and it is obvious that, for want of sufficient information, even this method can only lead, at the best, to fairly approximate results.

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## WHO MADE THE COHORT THE TACTICAL UNIT OF THE ROMAN INFANTRY?

There is good reason, as Marquardt<sup>4</sup> remarks, to believe that it was Marius who made the cohort the tactical unit of the Roman army; for, as far as we know, Metellus, in the Jugurthine war, was the last Roman

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, v. 49, § 7.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, iii. 89, § 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Caesar's Army*, p. 5. "General Sherman," remarks Lord Wolseley (*The Soldier's Pocket-Book*, 5th ed., pp. 118-19), "says that all experience proves that in a large organised modern army not more than 66 per cent of the total force can be reckoned upon for actual battle."

<sup>4</sup> *De l'organisation mil. chez les Romains*, 1891, p. 150.

general who employed the manipular organisation;<sup>1</sup> and from the time of Marius the size of Roman armies is reckoned by both Greek and Roman historians in cohorts.<sup>2</sup>

### THE LEGATI

*Legati* were officers of senatorial rank, appointed by the Senate<sup>3</sup> and immediately responsible to the proconsul to whom they were assigned. They were his lieutenants, as their name implies, and were expected to perform any duty with which he might entrust them. On Monday a *legatus* might be placed in command of a legion and lead it in battle: on Tuesday he might be charged with the duty of raising a fresh levy of troops. O. Sumpff<sup>4</sup> remarks that the chief difference between *legati* and our generals<sup>5</sup> division consists "in the want of permanence of their position."

Colonel Stoffel,<sup>5</sup> remarking that a passage in *B. G.*, i. 52, § 1, proves that the *legati* were not the regular commanders of legions in the first year of the Gallic war, suggests that each legion was probably then ordinarily commanded by the principal tribune, and that the other five tribunes, acting under his orders, commanded groups of cohorts. In *B. G.*, ii. 26, § 1, Caesar says that, in the battle with the Nervii, he ordered the *tribunes* to bring the 7th and 12th legions together. From this Colonel Stoffel infers that in the second year of the war the position of the *legati* was unchanged: but he believes that subsequently they became "véritables chefs de légion." Similarly Mr. Judson says "Caesar made a great improvement in organisation by placing a legate regularly in command of each legion."<sup>6</sup> There is no doubt that in Caesar's time the office of *legatus* was passing through a transitional stage and gradually tending to crystallise into the form which it assumed under the empire, when the *legatus* became a *legatus legionis*. But Colonel Stoffel is not quite right. No *legatus* was a "véritable chef de légion," that is to say a permanent "chef," in Caesar's time. If the legion had any recognised commander, that commander was a tribune, who was, however, of course frequently superseded by a *legatus*; and after the second campaign in Gaul, as before, any *legatus* who commanded a legion was specially appointed to his command by Caesar and held it only so long as Caesar pleased. Colonel Stoffel has overlooked several passages which prove this. If Caesar placed individual *legati* in command of individual legions in the battle with Ariovistus, he did the same in his attack on

<sup>1</sup> See Sallust, *Jug.*, 49. § 6.

<sup>2</sup> See C. C. Lange, *Hist. mutationum rei mil. Rom.*, pp. 16-17.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, *Ad Fam.*, i. 7, § 10.

<sup>4</sup> *Caesars Beurteilung seiner Offiziere in den Comm. vom gallischen Kriege* (Zweiter Teil, p. 10).

<sup>5</sup> *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 126-7. <sup>6</sup> *Caesar's Army*, p. 26.

Gergovia;<sup>1</sup> and the *legati* who commanded legions in the winter of 55-54 B.C. and in the winter of 54-53 were specially appointed by him to their commands for those two periods;<sup>2</sup> in other words, when they received their commands, they were not "*chefs de légion*." •

It is worth mentioning that Caesar sometimes appointed a *legatus* whom he specially trusted to the command of several legions.<sup>3</sup>

## THE MILITARY TRIBUNES

We are generally taught nowadays that Caesar chose his military tribunes, as a rule, for political reasons rather than for military efficiency; that he was therefore obliged to relegate them to a position of comparative insignificance; and that the *legati* and centurions gained in importance at their expense. Thus Long<sup>4</sup> says: "It is plain from Caesar's *Commentaries* that the tribuni were not employed by him to command legions . . . we may infer that, though he could not remove the tribunes . . . he reduced them to insignificance"; and Messrs. Bond and Walpole,<sup>5</sup> following Kraner-Dittenberger, say "their duties in Caesar's army are insignificant, with the exception of C. Volusenus Quadratus . . . the tribunes commanded only small detachments. . . . We find the tribunes occupied in details of military administration."

There is some truth in this view: but it is, as a rule, stated too broadly. The only direct evidence in the *Commentaries* for the assertion that Caesar chose his tribunes without regard to their military efficiency is his statement that the panic which seized his army at Vesontio (Besançon) before his campaign against Ariovistus "began with the tribunes, the auxiliary officers and others who had left Rome to follow Caesar, in the hope of winning his favour, and had no great experience in war" (*Hic [timor] primum ortus est a tribunis militum, praefectis reliquisque, qui ex urbe amicitiae causa Caesarem secuti non magnum in re militari usum habebant*). Assuming that *qui* refers to *tribunis militum*,<sup>6</sup> Caesar's statement is general; and it is not proved that his

<sup>1</sup> *legatis, quos singulis legionibus praefecerat, quid fieri velit, ostendit.* *B. G.*, vii. 45, § 7.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, v. 1, § 1, 25, § 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, i. 54, § 2; ii. 11, §§ 3-4; iii. 11, § 4; v. 17, § 2; vii. 34, § 2, etc.

<sup>4</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, i. 26.

<sup>5</sup> *Caesar's Gallic War*, p. lv.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, i. 39, § 2. G. Hubo (*Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, etc., cxlix., 1894, pp. 272-4), who has such a high opinion of the tribunes that he refuses to believe that the panic began with them, proposes to read *trionibus* (*militum, praefectis*, etc.). This conjecture is rightly rejected by Wesener (*Ib.*, p. 576), who remarks that some tribunes, e.g. Volusenus, were experienced, others the reverse. Anyhow, the conjecture is unnecessary; and if the text is wrong, nobody can put it right. The centurions and veterans, whose bravery and experience no one denies, yielded to panic: why then should Hubo refuse to believe that the tribunes did the same? Lange observes (*Hist. mutationum rei mil. Rom.*, p. 22) that "although (in Caesar's time) military tribunes were sometimes, as formerly, appointed by the people (Sallust, *Jug.*, 63; Plutarch, *Cato min.*, 8, *Caes.*, 5; Suetonius, *Caes.* 5), it should seem that they were usually nominated by the generals themselves." The evidence

tribunes generally were chosen without regard to their efficiency. It is quite untrue that their "duties are insignificant" or that they "commanded only small detachments." The *Commentaries* prove that their duties were most important; and it is evident that Caesar must have taken care, with due regard, no doubt, to political exigencies, to choose the best men that he could get for the places. The tribunes, like the centurions of the first rank, attended councils of war.<sup>1</sup> In the great battle on the Sambre Caesar instructs the tribunes, not the centurions, of the 7th and 12th legions to bring them closer together;<sup>2</sup> and as each legion in that battle was apparently commanded by a *legatus*, I think we must infer that the tribunes commanded groups of cohorts. In the sea-fight with the Veneti each ship was commanded by a tribune or by a centurion.<sup>3</sup> When Caesar was about to land, for the first time, in Britain, he gave special instructions to the *legati* and to the tribunes:<sup>4</sup> but of the centurions he says nothing. Certain tribunes were personally thanked by Caesar for the gallantry which they had shown in the defence of Quintus Cicero's camp.<sup>5</sup> When the foraging detachment which Cicero sent out from his camp at Aduatua was attacked by the Sugambri, the young recruits looked for orders to the tribune, who probably commanded the whole detachment, as well as to the centurions.<sup>6</sup> When Caesar attempted to surprise Gergovia, each legion was, it is true, commanded by a *legatus*: but the tribunes evidently played a more important part in the action than the centurions; for in describing the efforts which the officers made to keep the troops in hand, Caesar couples the tribunes with the *legati*, and does not mention the centurions.<sup>7</sup> Finally, in the battle of Lutetia, the tribunes jointly commanded the 7th legion;<sup>8</sup> and in this connexion Caesar makes no mention either of a *legatus* or of centurions. Still it remains certain that the position of the tribunes was not what it had once been: Caesar was ready to grant sinecure tribuneships to men who had no experience of war, in order to oblige political associates;<sup>9</sup> and there is no evidence that any one tribune ever commanded an entire legion in action in any of Caesar's battles in Gaul.

From the fact that Caesar, in the *Civil War*, speaks of *tribuni cohortium*,<sup>10</sup> it has been argued that, in his time, each cohort was commanded by a tribune: but, as Fröhlich<sup>11</sup> points out, it would follow from this view that the number of tribunes in each legion had been raised from six to ten, of which there is no evidence; and Caesar was

which he cites for this view is to be found in Cicero, *Ad Att.*, vi. 3, § 5, and *Ad Fam.*, vii. 5, § 3, from which it would appear that Caesar offered Trebatius a tribuneship. Cicero also tells his brother (*Ad Q. Fr.*, ii. 13 (15 a), § 3) that he asked Caesar for a tribuneship for M. Curtius. It is clear then that whether Caesar appointed all his tribunes or not, he had tribuneships in his gift.

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, v. 28, §§ 3-4; vi. 7, § 8.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, ii. 26, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, iii. 14, §§ 3-4.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, iv. 23, § 5.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, v. 52, § 4.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, vi. 39, § 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, vii. 47, § 2.—a) *tribunis militum legatisque, ut erat a Caesare praeceptum, [militibus] retinebantur.*

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, vii. 62, § 6.

<sup>10</sup> *B. C.*, ii. 20, § 2.

<sup>9</sup> Cicero, *Ad Fam.*, vii. 8, § 1.

<sup>11</sup> *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, p. 21.

only speaking of tribunes who had been placed in command of six cohorts which were sent to Cadiz.<sup>1</sup>

### WHO WERE "THE CENTURIONS OF THE FIRST RANK"?

The *primorum ordinum centuriones* were the centurions who ranked highest in a legion. This obvious statement is almost the only one that can be made about them with absolute certainty. We do not know, for certain, how many centurions of the first rank (*primi ordines*) there were in each legion. We do not know, for certain, to what cohorts and to what maniples the centurions of the first rank belonged. We do not even know,—at least Mommsen<sup>2</sup> does not,—whether the *primorum ordinum centuriones* formed, in Caesar's time, a definite class, or whether their number was fixed. Our information being so scanty, it is only natural that many theories should have been formed upon the subject. Before examining these theories, I will set down a few essential facts.

1. The ten cohorts in the legion were numbered. As the 1st cohort ranked above the rest,<sup>3</sup> it appears to me morally certain that they took rank according to their numbers: but this view, as will presently appear, is not universally accepted. 2. The 1st centurion of the 1st maniple in each cohort was called *pilus prior*, the 2nd *pilus posterior*; the 1st of the 2nd maniple *princeps prior*, the 2nd *princeps posterior*; the 1st of the 3rd maniple *hastatus prior*, the 2nd *hastatus posterior*. The 1st centurion of the 1st maniple of the 1st cohort was called *primus pilus prior* or *primipilus*, and definitely ranked as the chief of the 60 centurions of the legion.<sup>4</sup> 3. Whether the *primi ordines* did or, as Mommsen thinks, did not form a definite class in the time of Caesar, they certainly did so, as he admits, after the time of Hadrian. 4. If it had not been disputed, I should also say that it was indisputable that there were at least eight definite classes of centurions in the time of Caesar; for he relates that, for gallantry at Dyrrachium, a centurion named Scaeva was promoted from the 8th class to the rank of *primipilus* (*ab octavis ordinibus ad primipilum promotus est*).<sup>5</sup> 5. If we may trust a passage in Tacitus,<sup>6</sup> there were, in the time of Galba, at least six *primorum ordinum centuriones* in the 7th legion. Describing the battle between Vitellius and Antonius Primus, he writes, *Urguebatur maxime septima legio, nuper a Galba conscripta. Occisi sex primorum ordinum centuriones*, etc. But, if the view, already noticed, of Mommsen

<sup>1</sup> B. C., ii. 18, § 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ephemeris Epigraphica*, iv., 1881, pp. 238-9.

<sup>3</sup> "At least from the time of Hadrian," says Mommsen (*Eph. Epigr.*, iv. 230). But there is a passage in Caesar which, I think, proves that, in his time, the 1st cohort of the legion was also the highest in rank:—*duabus missis subsidio cohortibus a Caesare atque his primis legionum duarum*. B. G., v. 15, § 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Primus centurio erat, quem nunc primi pili appellant*. Livy, vii. 41.

<sup>5</sup> B. C., iii. 53, § 5.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist.*, iii. 22.

is correct, it does necessarily follow that there were six *primorum ordinum centuriones* in the other legions, even in Galba's day.

But Mommsen's view is so strained that, if it were not sanctioned by his great name, it would hardly be worth noticing. In *B. G.*, i. 41, §§ 1-3, we read that the legions, ashamed of having yielded to panic at the prospect of encountering Ariovistus and his Germans, asked the tribunes and the *primorum ordinum centuriones* to make their excuses to Caesar.<sup>1</sup> This, as Marquardt observes,<sup>2</sup> proves that the privates recognised the *primorum ordinum centuriones* as such no less clearly than they recognised the tribunes, and therefore that the *primorum ordinum centuriones* formed a definite class. Moreover, whenever Caesar alludes to the *primi ordines*, he does so in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt that they formed a definite class. Describing the defeat of Sabinus and Cotta, he writes, "Tum T. Balventio, qui superiore anno primum pilum duxerat . . . utrumque femur tragula traicitur: Q. Lucanius eiusdem ordinis . . . interficitur: L. Cotta legatus omnes cohortes ordinesque exhortans . . . vulneratur."<sup>3</sup> It has never been denied that the *primipilus* was one of the *primi ordines*. Would Lucanius have been described as *eiusdem ordinis* unless the description implied that that *ordo* was a definite class? Again we read, "Erant in ea legione fortissimi viri centuriones, qui iam primis ordinibus appropinquarent."<sup>4</sup> Would the words which I have italicised have been used if the *primi ordines* had been, not a definite class, but merely those centurions who stood highest in general estimation? A passage in *B. G.*, vi. 40, § 7,—*Centuriones, quorum nonnulli ex inferioribus ordinibus reliquarum legionum virtutis causa in superiores erant ordines huius legionis traducti*, etc.,—is meaningless unless it means that the centurions in question had been promoted to definite higher grades, the highest of which was of course composed of the *primorum ordinum centuriones*. Tacitus would not have used the words *sex primorum ordinum centuriones* unless the *primi ordines* had formed a definite class. Besides, the *primi ordines*, as well as the *tribuni militum* and the *legati*, were called to councils of war.<sup>5</sup> Would it not have been invidious to summon them if they had been simply the centurions of the greatest weight and reputation in the legion, and had not attained a definite rank, which gave them a formal right *ex officio* to attend?

For all these reasons, I unhesitatingly state as a fact that the *primi ordines* formed, not only after the time of Hadrian, but also in the time of Caesar, a definite class.

I shall now proceed to summarise and examine the various theories that have been constructed upon these facts, or upon such of them as the theorist took into account.

1. H. Bruncke<sup>6</sup> holds that the only difference in rank among the

<sup>1</sup> Reliquae legiones cum tribunis militum et primorum ordinum centurionibus egerunt uti Caesari satisfacerent.

<sup>2</sup> *De l'organisation mil. chez les Romains*, 1891, p. 68, n. 4.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, v. 35, §§ 6-7.

<sup>4</sup> *Id.*, 44, § 1.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, v. 28, § 3, 30, § 1; vi. 7, § 8. See also y. 37, § 1, and *B. C.*, i. 74, § 3.

<sup>6</sup> W. Smith's *Dict. of Antiquities*, i. 799; *Die Rangordnung der Centurionen*,

centurions was between *primi ordines* and *inferiores ordines*: but he also holds that the *primorum ordinum centuriones* were the centurions of the 1st cohort. In this I believe that he is right: but the other part of his theory, which assumes that the centurions of all the cohorts below the 1st were of equal rank, appears to me inconsistent with his identification of the *primorum ordinum centuriones*. In *B. G.*, v. 44, § 1, Caesar writes, "erant in ea legione . . . centuriones, qui iam *primis ordinibus appropinquarent*"; and in *B. C.*, ii. 35, § 1, "Fabius Pelignus quidam *ex infimis ordinibus*," etc. I hold that Caesar, who uses the comparative *inferiores ordines*, would not have used the superlative *infimi ordines* in exactly the same sense, and would not have used that expression to denote nine cohorts of equal rank, to which only one, the 1st, was superior.<sup>1</sup> The expression *qui iam primis ordinibus appropinquarent* is absolutely meaningless, unless it means that the centurions in question had already gained one or more steps in rank, and would soon be promoted to the highest class of all.<sup>2</sup> This meaning is established in the very next sentence, in which Caesar says that these two centurions "every year contended for their steps in rank with the greatest acrimony" (*omnibus annis de locis summis simultatibus contendebant*). Again, the expression *ab octavis ordinibus*, etc., which I have already quoted, can only mean one of two things. Either it means, as I hold, that Scaeva was promoted from the 8th class, that is to say the 8th cohort; or it means that he was promoted from the 8th cohort, the 6 centurions of which belonged to different classes. In either case, Scaeva, before his promotion, was below the rank of *primi ordines*. But why should Caesar have taken the trouble to indicate his original rank, if all the centurions below the *primi ordines* had been on a footing of equality. Finally, the fact that there were *superiores ordines* as well as *primi ordines* simply pulverises Bruncke's theory that all the centurions except those of the 1st cohort were grouped together in *inferiores ordines*.<sup>3</sup>

1884, by H. Bruncke; Bursian's *Jahresbericht*, xlv., 1887 pp. 342-5; *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, etc., cxix., 1879, p. 635. Mr. Purser, the writer of the article in the *Dictionary of Antiquities*, wrongly says that Bruncke divides the centurions into *superiores ordines* and *inferiores ordines*.

<sup>1</sup> I am glad to find that R. Schneider, in a review of Bruncke's pamphlet (*Jahresberichte der philol. Vereins*, x., 1884, p. 251) takes the same view.

<sup>2</sup> Bruncke actually says (*Die Rangordnung*, etc., p. 19) "Only by accepting the view that there were two classes, can we explain why Pulio and Vorenus contended with one another *quoniam Antefertur*, i.e. who should be first admitted to the *primi ordines*." This is simply begging the question. Caesar's words can be just as well explained on the hypothesis that Pulio and Vorenus, having reached the 2nd class, contended with one another who should be first admitted to the *primi ordines*; and Bruncke ought to have said "Only by accepting the view that there were more than two classes can we explain why Caesar, in describing the rivalry of Pulio and Vorenus, said that 'they were now getting close to the first grade' (*primis ordinibus appropinquarent*), and why he added that 'every year they contended for their steps in rank' (*omnibus annis de locis . . . contendebant*)."

<sup>3</sup> Bruncke calmly denies that *superiores ordines* are ever mentioned ("dieser Ausdruck existiert nicht." *Die Rangordnung*, etc., p. 19, n. 9). Let him turn to *B. G.*, vi. 40, § 7, and he will find his mistake:—*Centuriones, quorum nonnulli ex inferioribus ordinibus reliquarum legionum virtutis causa in superiores erant*



2. Marquardt<sup>1</sup> groups the centurions in six classes, the *primi ordines* being the ten *pili priores* of the ten cohorts, the 2nd class the ten *principes priores*, the 3rd class the ten *hastati priores*, and so on.

This scheme is plausible at the first glance, because, as each cohort must have been commanded by some one, it might be argued that the *pilus prior* of each cohort must have commanded the cohort; and one would certainly say *a priori* that the centurions who commanded cohorts must have been higher in rank than any of the other centurions, and therefore must have been the *primi ordines*.

Nevertheless, Marquardt's scheme must be rejected, because it flatly contradicts the fact, attested by Caesar himself, that there were at least eight classes of centurions. It is true that *octavis ordinibus*, in the passage to which I refer, has been differently interpreted. Kraner<sup>2</sup> agrees with Marquardt in thinking that the *primi ordines* were the ten *pili priores*. Yet, with manifest inconsistency, he says that the centurion who was promoted *ab octavis ordinibus ad primum pilum* was *octavus pilus prior*. On his own showing, this man, being a *pilus prior*, had belonged to the *primi ordines*. Therefore *primi ordines* and *octavi ordines* were identical! The only way of escaping from this absurdity is to assume that in the expressions *primi ordines* and *octavis ordinibus* the word *ordo* is used in two different senses,—that *primi ordines* means "the 1st class," and *octavis ordinibus* "the 8th cohort" without reference to any class.<sup>3</sup>

Marquardt's explanation has been condemned, but on different grounds, by Mommsen. Referring to the passage in the *Civil War* to which I have alluded,—*Quem Caesar . . . ab octavis ordinibus ad primum pilum se traducere pronuntiavit*,—he says, "si octavus pilus, octavus princeps, octavus hastatus dignationis tam diversae fuissent quam fuisse eos adversarii statuunt, non octavos ordines Caesar ponere debuit, sed eum in quo Scaeva erat gradum";<sup>4</sup> and Mr. L. C. Purser, echoing this objection, says, "On Marquardt's theory . . . *octavis ordinibus* would be 8th, 18th, 28th, etc."<sup>5</sup>

*ordines huius legionis traducti*). Bruncke also maintains (pp. 18-19) that "if promotion really took place according to cohorts,"—that is to say, that if, for example, the centurions of the 9th cohort ranked above those of the 10th,—"one would think that a newly appointed centurion would have entered as *decimus hastatus posterior*." But, he continues, from *Corpus Inscr. Lat.*, v. 7004, we learn that an *optio*, or sub-centurion, on being promoted to a centurionship, became *octavus pilus prior*. On the theory which Bruncke combats, the 16 centurions below would, he maintains, have had reason to feel aggrieved. This argument is unavailing. If these centurions would have had reason to feel aggrieved, so would those over whose heads Scaeva was promoted. This *optio* may have had great merit; and besides, for aught we know, there may have been numerous vacancies. Cf. *B. G.*, vi. 40, § 7.

<sup>1</sup> *De l'organisation mil. chez les Romains*, pp. 66-70.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, ed. Kraner-Dittenberger, pp. 48-9.

<sup>3</sup> As Bruncke (p. 14) justly remarks, if the *primi ordines* had been the ten leaders of the ten cohorts, there would have been no room in the legion for *octavi ordines*, seeing that there were only 60 centurions in all. And, he adds, if Caesar had meant to convey that Scaeva was *octavus pilus prior*, he would have written not *ab octavis ordinibus* but *ab octavo pilo priore*.

<sup>4</sup> *Eph. Epigr.*, iv. 230, n. 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Dict. of Antiquities*, i. 799.

Now I hold, with Marquardt, that *octavis ordinibus* does mean "the 8th cohort": but if it simply means "the 8th cohort" and not "the 8th class" as well, Mommsen's objection holds good. *Octavis ordinibus*, on Marquardt's theory, comprises six centurions of widely different rank: we have no right to assume with Marquardt that Scaeva was *octavus pilus prior*; and therefore we have no clue whatever as to the rank from which he was promoted. And if *octavis ordinibus* does mean "the 8th class" as well as "the 8th cohort," the other objection applies; for Marquardt's scheme only provides for six classes.

The well-known passage in which Vegetius describes the system of promotion of centurions has been quoted in favour of Marquardt's view. The passage runs thus:—*Nam quasi in orbem quemdam per diversas scholas milites promoventur, ita ut ex prima cohorte ad gradum quempiam promotus vadat ad decimum cohortem; et rursus eam, crescentibus stipendiis, cum maiore gradu per alias recurrit ad primum.*<sup>1</sup> But, as Mr. Purser observes, "this only means that a common soldier of the 1st cohort, if advanced to be a centurion, begins at the bottom of the centurions of the 10th cohort and works his way up."<sup>2</sup> That Mr. Purser is right is proved by another passage in which Vegetius says that the *primus princeps* was regularly promoted to the post of *primipilus*.<sup>3</sup> Except in rare instances, such as that of Scaeva, when a man was promoted over the heads of his fellows to the post of chief centurion, or when casualties or disease had caused several simultaneous vacancies, the officer who was chosen to succeed to this post must have been the 2nd centurion of the legion. Therefore, if Vegetius was right, the 2nd centurion of the legion was the 2nd centurion of the 1st cohort. But on the theory of Marquardt the 2nd centurion of the legion was the 1st centurion of the 2nd cohort. Von Goler<sup>4</sup> tries to wriggle out of this *impasse* by insisting that Vegetius was only speaking of the earlier period when the tactical unit of the legion was not the cohort, but the manipule. This is a mere assumption and an absurd one; for Vegetius goes on, in the same chapter, to describe the organisation of the 1st cohort when it was twice as strong as any of the remaining nine, that is to say as it existed in the time of Hadrian, if not later. Moreover, the statement of Vegetius is supported by three inscriptions,<sup>5</sup> two of which show that, in the time of Augustus, a *primus princeps* became *primus pilus*; while a fourth<sup>6</sup> shows that a *primus hastatus* was promoted to the rank of *primus princeps*. Besides, if we admit with Marquardt that, in the period of the manipular organisation, the first ten centurions of the legion were

<sup>1</sup> "A soldier, as he advances in rank, proceeds as it were by rotation through the different degrees of the several cohorts, in such a manner, that one who is promoted passes from the first cohort to the tenth, and returns again regularly, through all the others . . . to the first." Clarke's translation, p. 77 (ii. 21).

<sup>2</sup> *Dict. of Antiquities*, i. 799. See also Bruncke, pp. 15-16.

<sup>3</sup> *Vetus consuetudo tenuit ut ex primo principe legionis progroveretur centurio primipili*, ii. 8. Cf. *Jahresberichte d. philol. Vereins*, x. 1884, p. 250.

<sup>4</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, ii. 228.

<sup>5</sup> *Inscr. regni Neapolitani* (ed. Mommsen), 5712, and *Corpus Inscr. Lat.*, viii. 2768, 2941. See Bruncke, pp. 16-17.

<sup>6</sup> *Eph. Epigr.*, iv. 231. Cf. Bruncke, p. 16.

the *pili priores* and the second ten the *principes priores*, the *primus princeps* was in that period only the 11th centurion of the legion. If we take A. Müller's view,<sup>1</sup> that the second ten were the *pili posteriores*, the *primus princeps* was only the 21st of the legion. If we hold with Mommsen and F. Giesing that, even in the time of the manipular organisation, the 2nd centurion of the legion was the *primus princeps*, there is no justification for asserting that the *primus princeps* took a lower rank when the legion came to be organised by cohorts. Marquardt holds, as I do, that Vegetius was speaking of the imperial epoch, when the 1st cohort was twice as strong as each of the remaining nine: but what reason is there to believe that the system of promotion was different then from what it had been in the days of Caesar?

There is yet another objection to Marquardt's view. I have shown that the 1st cohort, even in Caesar's time, ranked above all the other cohorts in the legion. That being the case, is it conceivable that the 6th centurion of the principal cohort should have been only the 51st in the legion?

3. Von Goler's scheme<sup>2</sup> embraces twelve classes, the first of which comprised the ten *pili priores*; the 2nd the ten *pili posteriores*; the 3rd the ten *principes priores*; and so on down to the 6th. The last six classes are composed of sub-centurions, or *optiones*, the 7th class consisting of ten sub-centurions serving respectively under the ten *pili priores*, and so on.

This theory must also be rejected, not only because its arrangement of the *primi ordines* is identical with that of Marquardt, but also because, although it does provide for the necessary eight classes and more, it only does so by including *optiones*. Now although there is evidence that an *optio* might rise to be a centurion,<sup>3</sup> just as with us a non-commissioned officer may get his commission, I am not aware that there is any evidence that *optiones* were ever spoken of as belonging to *ordines* at all. Caesar never mentions them. Von Goler, indeed, argues that Caesar might have spoken loosely of *centuriones* when he meant *optiones*, just as we speak loosely of colonels when we mean lieutenant-colonels. But this is a mere assumption. If the *optiones* formed the last six classes, Caesar must have been thinking of them when he wrote of the centurions who had risen *ab inferioribus ordinibus*; and this is most unlikely. Moreover, as Mr. Judson remarks, "each centurion seems to have selected his own (*optio*), as the word implies, and as is expressly stated by Varro, Festus and Paulus Diaconus. This choice would be impossible if they were graded as Goler supposes."<sup>4</sup>

4. L. Müller<sup>5</sup> thinks that the *primi ordines* were only three, namely

<sup>1</sup> *Philologus*, xxxviii., 1879, pp. 126-49.

<sup>2</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, ii. 222-6.

<sup>3</sup> *C. I. L.*, vol. iii., pars i., No. 3445.—*Iovi optimo maximo pro salute domini nostri M. Aureli Antonini pii felicitis Augusti L. Septimius Constantinus optio spei legionis II adiutricis pio fidelis Antoniniana, votum solvit libens merito imperatore Antonino et Advento cos.*

"*Optio spei*," remarks Mommsen, "est, ni fallor, qui optio est itemque centurio designatus." See also *C. I. L.*, v. 7004.

<sup>4</sup> Allen and Greenough's *Caesar*, Notes, p. 51.

<sup>5</sup> *De re mil. Rom. quaedam e Caesaris comm. excerpta*, p. 9.

*primus pilus*, *primus princeps* and *primus hastatus*. This theory is irreconcilable with the implied statement of Tacitus that there were not less than six *primorum ordinum centuriones* in the legion.

5. F. Giesing groups the centurions of each legion in three classes, the 2nd and 3rd of which have each three subdivisions. The 1st class consisted of the three *primi priores*,—the *primus pilus prior*, *primus princeps prior* and *primus hastatus prior*. These three were the *primi ordines*. The 2nd class consisted of all the remaining *priores*, the 1st subdivision comprising the *pili priores* of the nine cohorts below the 1st, the 2nd the *principes priores* and the 3rd the *hastati priores* of the same nine cohorts. The 3rd class consisted of all the thirty *posteriores*, the first subdivision comprising the ten *pili posteriores*, the 2nd the ten *principes posteriores* and the 3rd the ten *hastati posteriores*.<sup>1</sup> As regards the *primi ordines*, this view is identical with that of L. Müller.

In support of his theory Giesing cites a well-known passage in which Vegetius,<sup>2</sup> apparently speaking, or intending to speak, of the first cohort as it existed in the time of Hadrian, when it comprised ten centuries instead of six, says that it was officered by five *ordinarii*. Obviously therefore, says Giesing, the five *ordinarii* held the same position as the three *primi priores* had done in the 1st cohort of the old legion. The five *ordinarii*, according to Vegetius, held an exceptional position. Therefore they were the *primi ordines*. Therefore their prototypes, the three *primi priores*, were also the *primi ordines*. Giesing points out that, according to Vegetius, there were five other centurions in the 1st cohort, besides the five *ordinarii*; and he concludes that in Hadrian's time the five *ordinarii* and the five other centurions did not constitute a "closed rank-class." Now, as Mommsen has shown, the five other centurions (so-called) were probably *optiones*; and if so, they were certainly not in the same class as the *ordinarii*.<sup>3</sup> But this fact tells against Giesing's theory, not in its favour. For in Caesar's legions there were also *optiones*; and in Caesar's legions the 1st cohort was officered by six centurions. Therefore the five *ordinarii*, who were the only centurions, properly so called, in the 1st cohort of Hadrian's time, corresponded, not with the first three centurions of the 1st cohort of the Caesarian legion, but with all six centurions of that cohort. Therefore, if the five *ordinarii* were the *primi ordines*, so were the six centurions of the 1st cohort of the Caesarian legion.

Giesing does not ignore the passage in which Tacitus says that *sex primorum ordinum centuriones* of one legion were killed in a single battle, or the passage in which Scaeva was said to have been promoted *ab octavis ordinis*: but he believes that both these passages can be reconciled with his theory. Like Madvig,<sup>4</sup> he holds that Tacitus was not speaking of the *primi ordines* as a definite class, but used the phrase

<sup>1</sup> *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, etc., cxlv., 1892, pp. 495-503.

<sup>2</sup> *De re mil.*, ii. 8.

<sup>3</sup> It is proved by inscriptions that in Hadrian's time and after there were only five centurions, properly so called, in the 1st cohort.

<sup>4</sup> *Kleine philologische Schriften*, 1875, p. 515, n. 1.

in a wide sense; in other words, that by *primorum ordinum* he meant *superiorum ordinum*. But to explain away is not to explain; and I hold that we are bound to believe that Tacitus meant what he said. The passage in Caesar Giesing attempts to explain in a way which, if not satisfactory, is at least ingenious. *Octavis ordinibus*, he says, refers not to the 8th cohort of Scaeva's legion, but to several legions: Scaeva was the leader of "one of the 8th files (?) (*Zug*) that is to say of the 2nd file (?) of the 2nd cohort.<sup>1</sup> In other words, he was *secundus princeps prior*, or, on Giesing's theory, the 13th centurion of the legion. How this meaning is to be dragged out of the Latin, I am unable to discover. And even if Giesing is right, even if Caesar used such a ridiculous expression as "from the 8th centuries" (of the several legions), to only one of which "8th centuries" Scaeva could have belonged, Giesing contradicts himself. For if the 8th century of a legion was the 2nd century of the 2nd cohort, surely all the six centuries of the 1st cohort ranked above all the centuries of all the remaining cohorts, which is what Giesing denies.

6. B. de Launay<sup>2</sup> reckons no less than fifteen *primi ordines*, namely all six centurions of the 1st cohort and the chief centurions of the other nine cohorts. The first three places he assigns to the *primipilus*, *primus princeps prior* and *primus hastatus prior*: after them he places the nine *pili priores* of the nine remaining cohorts; and last of all the *primus pilus posterior*, *primus princeps posterior* and *primus hastatus posterior*. He maintains that, when Caesar spoke of *octavi ordines*, he meant the 8th cohort; but that, when he spoke of *primi ordines*, *superiores ordines*, *inferiores ordines* and *infimi ordines*, he designated a hierarchy, the several grades of which did not correspond with the numbers of the cohorts.

This view, in so far as it agrees with that of Marquardt, is open to the same objection. Moreover, the reader will have no hesitation in rejecting it when he has reflected on what I shall have to say of Rustow's scheme.

7. According to Lange,<sup>3</sup> there were seven classes. He holds that Caesar took over the relations of rank from the manipular organisation, making, however, one change: owing to the growing importance of the 1st cohort, he placed its centurions in a class by themselves. Like Rustow, he identifies the *primi ordines* with the six centurions of the 1st cohort: the 2nd class he identifies by a cross division with the nine *pili priores* of the nine remaining cohorts; the 3rd with the nine *pili posteriores*; and so on. I agree with his identification of the *primi ordines*; the other part of his scheme is open to the objections which are fatal to the schemes of Marquardt and von Göler.

8. Rustow,<sup>4</sup> who is followed by F. Fröhlich,<sup>5</sup> believes that there were ten classes of centurions, each composed of the six centurions of a single

<sup>1</sup> By "filé" (*Zug*) Giesing evidently means "century."

<sup>2</sup> *L'ordre en bataille et les centurions à l'époque de Jules César*, 1873, pp. 26-32.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. mutationum rei mil. Rom.*, pp. 20-22.

<sup>4</sup> *Heerwesen und Kriegführung C. Julius Cæsars*, 1855, pp. 8-10.

<sup>5</sup> *Das Kriegswesen Cæsars*, 1891, pp. 23-8.

cohort; and consequently that the *primi ordines* were the six centurions of the 1st cohort.<sup>1</sup> This theory, which, as regards the relative rank of the first three of the *primi ordines*, is supported by Mommsen, clashes with none of the proved facts. But it is open to two objections. First, it provides only for six centurions of the first rank in each legion. Now Tacitus, as we have seen, says that in the battle between Antonius Primus and Vitellius, six centurions of the first rank were killed in the 7th legion alone. On Rustow's theory therefore, unless the number of *primi ordines* had been increased between the time of Caesar and the time of Galba,<sup>2</sup> all the centurions of the first rank in one legion were killed in one battle. This seems very improbable. Still it is possible. Caesar's famous battle with the Nervii is almost a parallel case. Speaking of the 12th legion, Caesar writes, *quartae cohortis omnibus centurionibus occisis . . . reliquarum cohortium omnibus fere centurionibus aut vulneratis aut occisis.*" Still, even if we admit that all the centurions of the first rank in a single legion may have been killed in a single battle, would not Tacitus have written not *sex* but *omnes* (primorum ordinum centuriones)?<sup>4</sup> The two difficulties combined appear to me almost insuperable,—unless we assume that Tacitus made a mistake. But this assumption is not extravagant. The most accurate historian, unless he had access to carefully compiled returns, might blunder on such a point.<sup>5</sup>

The other objection to Rustow's theory has been stated by Marquardt.<sup>6</sup> Suppose that a centurion had reached the rank of *secundus pilus prior*, that is, of 1st centurion of the 2nd cohort. He would then, according to Marquardt, have commanded the cohort. But, according to Rustow, on his next promotion, he would, supposing that he only gained one step, become *primus hastatus posterior*; that is to say, while rising to the coveted grade of *primi ordines*, he would sink from the position of commander of a cohort to that of centurion of the lowest manipule of another cohort. But this objection may, I think, be satisfactorily answered. First, it is certain that, little more than a century before Caesar's time, centurions were sometimes called upon to serve in grades lower than those to which they had attained in previous campaigns. Livy<sup>7</sup> relates that in 171 B.C. 23 centurions *qui primos pilos duxerant* appealed to the tribunes of the plebs against having to serve on such terms; but that they were induced to desist from their appeal. He also relates that in 341 B.C. a law was passed *ne quis, ubi tribunus militum fuisset, postea ordinum ductor esset.* Of course I do not mean to say that the appointment of a centurion, on public grounds, to a post

<sup>1</sup> This theory is nowadays generally spoken of as Rustow's: but Lipsius (*Opera*, 1637, iii. 52-3) advocated it more than two centuries ago.

<sup>2</sup> See *Philologus*, xxxviii., 1877, p. 142.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 25, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> I find that Madvig has made the same remark. *Kleine philologische Schriften*, 1875, p. 515, n. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Assuming that there were only six centurions of the first rank in each legion, Tacitus might perhaps have been ignorant of the fact, and accordingly have written *sex* instead of *omnes*. Many a modern historian would be puzzled if he were asked how many captains there are in a regiment.

<sup>6</sup> *De l'organisation mil. chez les Romains*, p. 69.

<sup>7</sup> xlii. 32-5.

lower than one which he had previously filled, is analogous to a system of promotion which might involve descent from the command of a cohort to the command of a manipule. Still, the facts which Livy relates tend to show that such a system of promotion would not have been as startling to a Roman as it sounds to us. Secondly, even if we must infer that the *pilus prior* of a cohort commanded that cohort, no ancient writer mentions that the cohort, as such, had any commander at all;<sup>1</sup> and we may perhaps conclude that comparatively little importance was attached to the command.<sup>2</sup> Groups of cohorts, as I have shown in a former note, were commanded by tribunes.<sup>3</sup> As Mr. Judson<sup>4</sup> remarks, "the Roman organisation was marked by a peculiar solidarity very much unlike our own": in other words, it is probable that the *pilus prior* of a cohort was more highly esteemed as *pilus prior* than as *ex officio* commander of the cohort. Lastly, whatever may be the force of Marquardt's objection to Rüstow's scheme, it cannot be sustained unless we accept Marquardt's own scheme or some one of the other schemes which have already been examined and condemned.

There are, on the other hand, very strong arguments in favour of Rüstow's scheme. Mommsen, in the article from which I have quoted, agrees with the theory of rank on which it is based, that is to say, he regards each and every centurion of any cohort as superior to all the centurions of the cohort or cohorts below.<sup>5</sup> His reasoning amounts in brief to this. The 1st cohort ranked above all the other nine, certainly in Hadrian's time, and probably long before.<sup>6</sup> It is therefore simply incredible that the 2nd centurion of the 1st cohort should have been, as Marquardt tries to make out, only the 11th centurion of the legion. By way of further proof, Mommsen adds that the bulk of the inscriptions referring to centurions which throw light upon the matter contain the names of *primi principes* and *primi hastati*, and that very few inscriptions mention the *cohortes posteriores*. Moreover, putting aside a passage in *B. C.*, iii. 64, § 4, and two inscriptions (numbered 49 and 56 in his article), he shows that all centurions except the first three of the 1st cohort are designated by the numbers of their respective cohorts and the grades which they held therein, for example *centurio legione III Cyrenaica, cohorte V princeps posterior*; and from this fact he concludes that the first three centurions of the 1st cohort were distinguished above all their fellows. Again, it is probable that, even in the period of the manipular organisation, that is to say, before the time of Marius, these

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Dict. of Antiquities*, i. 799. Brunke (p. 15) argues that the cohort no more had a special commander than the manipule had had in earlier times.

<sup>2</sup> Giesing, indeed, insists that the responsibility attaching to the command of 500 men was by no means small (*Neue Jahrtücher für Philologie*, etc., cxlv., 1892, pp. 497-8). Granted. But there is evidence that, in Caesar's battles, cohorts or groups of cohorts were commanded by tribunes; and Giesing's argument has no force against those which have been urged on the other side.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 570, *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> *Caesar's Army*, p. 11.

<sup>5</sup> *Eph. Epigr.*, iv. 229, ll. 1, 230-1, 235.

<sup>6</sup> In the time of Hadrian it contained twice as many men as each of the other nine, had charge of the eagle and standards of the legion, and performed sentry-duty in the most honourable position.

three centurions were the first three of the legion; for in referring to that period, the historians mention them more frequently than any others.<sup>1</sup> Finally Mommsen refers to an inscription (numbered 50 in his article) from which it appears that a centurion named Modestus, after serving for eighteen years in four grades of rank, held the position of *hastatus posterior* in the 3rd cohort. It is incredible, he argues, that Modestus, after such a long service, should have been only the 53rd centurion of his legion; but he may well have been the 17th, as he would have been if all the centurions of any one cohort had ranked above all the centurions of the next.

Giesing objects to Rustow's theory that it compels us to assume that the cohorts in the third line of the *acies triplex*,—the army formed in order of battle,—were commanded by the youngest and least experienced centurions. "What an idiotic expenditure," he exclaims, "of the best materials in the first line at the cost of the reserve."<sup>2</sup> To this I reply first, that the reserve would sometimes not come into action at all, while the first line bore the brunt of the battle; secondly, that the cohorts of the third line, or rather groups of those cohorts, were commanded by tribunes, who sometimes acted under the orders of an experienced *legatus*; thirdly, that the younger centurions must have been in command somewhere, and that it would be more natural to look for them in the reserve than anywhere else; and fourthly, that there is no reason to suppose that the younger centurions were inefficient, while there is abundant evidence that they did their work thoroughly well.

Again, unless we are to accept von Goler's theory or Giesing's, both of which have been shown to be absolutely inadmissible, *octavis ordinibus* can only mean the six centurions of the 8th cohort. The conclusion is irresistible that the six centurions of the 1st cohort were *primi ordines*.

I have already, in discussing Marquardt's theory, adduced evidence from Vegetius and from inscriptions, which proves that the *primus pilus prior*, *primus princeps prior* and *primus hastatus prior* were the first three centurions of the legion, and therefore *primi ordines*. If there were any others, those others must, as every scholar admits, have been the 4th, 5th and 6th centurions of the 1st cohort, or the nine chief centurions of the nine remaining cohorts, or both these two groups. But if the first three centurions of the 1st cohort ranked above all the centurions of all the other cohorts, it seems logical to infer that the 4th, 5th and 6th centurions of the 1st cohort did the same; and if so, why should not all the centurions of the 2nd cohort have ranked above all the centurions of the remaining eight cohorts, and so on? These arguments command the proof that the centurions of the 1st cohort were *primi ordines*.

9. One other scheme appears possible. It would be identical with that of Rustow, except that the *primi ordines* would be, not necessarily

<sup>1</sup> *Dict. of Antiquities*, i. 799.

<sup>2</sup> *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, etc., cxlv., 1892, p. 498.

<sup>3</sup> So also argues Brucke, p. 14.



the six<sup>1</sup> centurions of the 1st cohort only, but a class of indefinite number comprising also any who might once have filled the office of *primipilus* or belonged to the 1st cohort, and possibly also such others as the General may have thought worthy of the honour. We have already seen that a little more than a century before Caesar's time a centurion who had been the first of his legion might be called upon afterwards to serve in a lower grade. May we explain this apparent anomaly by supposing that it might sometimes have been advisable to place a centurion of experience and proved capacity in command of a manipule or century of low rank and consisting mainly of raw recruits? It seems possible, at all events, that the same liability existed in Caesar's time. Otherwise, how is one to explain the following passages:—"Tum T. Balventio, qui superiore anno primum pilum duxerat, viro forti et magnae auctoritatis,"<sup>1</sup> etc., and (perhaps also) "Publius Sextius Baculus, qui primum pilum ad Caesarem duxerat,"<sup>2</sup> etc.? It will be replied that Balventius and Baculus were *evocati*; in other words, that they had completed their term of service, and were serving again as volunteers.<sup>3</sup> This is not absolutely certain: but, assuming the truth of the conjecture, is it likely that two centurions, who had been the first in their respective legions and belonged to the highly privileged *evocati*, should have ceased to rank with the *primi ordines*? Caesar calls Balventius "a man of commanding influence" (*vir magnae auctoritatis*); and Baculus, the Hector Macdonald of the Roman army, was perhaps the most distinguished of all his centurions. Both men, if *evocati*, must still, like the volunteer, Crastinus, at the battle of Pharsalus, who had, in the previous year, been the chief centurion of the 10th legion, have held positions of trust: whether they commanded other *evocati*, who, as at Pharsalus, may have been dispersed among the ranks to "stiffen" them, or were employed in some other way, matters little. My suggestion is that centurions *qui primos pilos duxerant* or who had belonged to the 1st cohort and had, whether as *evocati* or not, been appointed on public grounds to some other command, probably still ranked with the *primi ordines*.<sup>4</sup> If so, there might sometimes have been more than six centurions of the first rank in a legion. At all events, Rustow's scheme, or the modification of it which I have suggested, is the only one that agrees with all the known facts, and is open to no real objection.

One word more. It is certain that those who reached or approached the rank of *primi ordines* were not obliged to pass through each and

<sup>1</sup> B. G., v. 35, § 6.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, vi. 38, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Schneider's *Caesar*, ii. 127. Long (*Caesar*, p. 252) suggests that Caesar may mean that Balventius had only received his promotion in the preceding year and was still *primipilus*. I believe that if Caesar had meant this, he would have written *qui superiore anno ad primipilum promotus erat*. Cf. B. C., i. 46, § 4. Moreover, in B. G., iii. 91, § 1, he says that Crastinus, *qui superiore anno apud eum primum pilum duxerat*, was an *evocatus*.

<sup>4</sup> I find that the author of the article *Evocati* in Daremberg and Saglio's *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, ii. 867, remarks that "il est bien difficile de supposer qu'ils (*primipili*) aient accepté, en reprenant du service, un rang inférieur à celui qu'ils avaient en le quittant."

every grade in the list of centurions. For, if that had been the case, the *primipilus* would have had to climb no less than 59 or, according to von Göler, 119 successive steps before he reached the top of the ladder. No doubt the majority of centurions never reached the rank of *primi ordines* at all. Sometimes several steps of rank may have been gained at a time, owing to vacancies caused by death or superannuation. Sometimes, as in the case of Q. Fulginius<sup>1</sup> and Scaeva,<sup>2</sup> an officer of exceptional merit may have risen at one bound from nearly the lowest to one of the highest or even to the very highest rung of the ladder. Anyhow, it seems tolerably certain that the *primipilus*, in the course of his career, had seldom served in more than six or seven grades. To quote Mommsen once more, "It is clear that the conditions of service were such that a man would reach the rank of *primipilus* before his fiftieth year, and generally after passing through six or seven grades of rank. I am aware that many scholars nowadays are of opinion that a centurion had regularly to pass through the whole of the sixty grades of rank. But this view is at once refuted by the inscriptions, which mention a much smaller number of grades, and is condemned by common sense; for who would allow himself to be convinced that a centurion only remained some six months in each grade?"<sup>3</sup>

## THE *FABRI*

Some writers assert that the *fabri*, in Caesar's time, still formed a separate corps:<sup>4</sup> but there is no evidence for this statement; and it is refuted by a passage<sup>5</sup> in which Caesar says that, in order to repair the ships which had been damaged on his second expedition to Britain, he selected *fabri* from the various legions. See Daremberg and Saglio, *Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines*, ii. 957-8, and Fröhlich, *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, pp. 51-3.

## CAESAR'S CAVALRY

Caesar's cavalry consisted entirely of foreigners,—Gauls, Spaniards and Germans. They were organised in *alae* or squadrons of from 300 to 400 men, divided into *turmæ* or troops, and were commanded by *præfecti equitum*, who were often their national chiefs.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> B. C., i. 46, § 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Id.*, iii. 53, §§ 4-5.

<sup>3</sup> *Eph. Epigr.*, i. 235-6.

<sup>4</sup> Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, ii. 19; Bond and Walpole's *Caesar*, pp. lx.-lxi.

<sup>5</sup> B. G., v. 11, § 3.

<sup>6</sup> See Marquardt, *De Organisation mil. chez les Romains*, 1891, p. 157.

It is commonly asserted that legionary cavalry, that is to say cavalry organised as permanent corps and attached to the legions, no longer existed in Caesar's time; and that this arm was not revived before the imperial epoch.<sup>1</sup> There is, however, some reason to believe that this view is erroneous. In *Bellum Africae*, 51, § 7-52, § 2 the following passage occurs:—"Dum haec opera, quae ante dixi, fiebant a legionibus, interim pars acie instructa sub hoste stabant, equites barbari levisque armaturae proeliis minutis communius dimicabant. Caesar ab eo opere cum iam sub vesperum copias in castra reduceret, magno incursu cum omni equitatu levisque armatura Iuba, Scipio, Labienus in *legionarios* impetum fecerunt. *Equites Caesariani* vi universae subitaeque hostium multitudinis pulsati parumper cesserunt." According to this passage, as it stands, the *equites Caesariani* were obviously identical with the *legionarii*. Davis, however, remarking that *legionarii* properly means "legionary infantry," concluded that the words in *legionarios impetum fecerunt* were corrupt. Nipperdey,<sup>2</sup> who accepts the text, remarks that *legionarios* here must mean *legionarii equites*, as opposed to *equites barbari levisque armaturae*. He points out that, according to Plutarch,<sup>3</sup> there were legionary cavalry in the army of Antonius; and Fröhlich<sup>4</sup> quotes a passage from Appian,<sup>5</sup> from which it should seem that there was a similar force in the army of Pompey. Madvig<sup>6</sup> and O. Schambach<sup>7</sup> endorse the argument of Nipperdey; and Schambach undertakes to prove from the *Commentaries* that in the Gallic war also a permanent corps of cavalry was attached to the legion. He quotes three passages, from *B. G.*, v. 2, § 4, 5, § 3, 8, § 1. In the first passage Caesar says that he marched (in 54 B.C.) for the country of the Treveri with four legions and 800 cavalry (*ipse cum legionibus expeditis IV et equitibus DCCC in fines Treverorum proficiscitur*): in the second he says that the cavalry of Gaul, to the number of 4000, assembled at the Portus Itius before he set sail for Britain. (*Eodem equitatus totius Galliae convenit numero milium IV*); and in the third he says that when he set sail, he left Labienus behind with three legions and 2000 cavalry, while he himself took the same number of cavalry and five legions (*Labieno in continente cum tribus legionibus et equitum milibus duobus relicto . . . ipse cum quinque legionibus et pari numero equitum quem in continenti relinquebat . . . naves solvit*). From the first two passages, says Schambach, one would expect to find that Caesar had 4800 cavalry, not 4000 only, to divide between himself and Labienus. It is clear that none of the 4000 Gallic cavalry took part in the expedition against the Treveri. It follows that Caesar immediately before his embarkation must have had at least 4800 cavalry under his

<sup>1</sup> See, for instance, P. Geyer in *Jahresberichte d. philol. Vereins*, v., 1879, p. 345; and C. C. L. Lange, *Hist. mutationum rei mil. Rom.*, p. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Caesar, p. 213.

<sup>3</sup> Anton., 37.

<sup>4</sup> *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, p. 38, n. 7.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, ii. 49.—Πομπήλιος δὲ πέντε μὲν (τέλη) ἐξ Ἰταλίας . . . καὶ τοῖς ὅσοι συνοδεύοντο ἵπποις.

<sup>6</sup> *Kleine philol. Schriften*, 1875, p. 502, note.

<sup>7</sup> *Die Reiterei bei Caesar*, 1881; Bursian's *Jahresbericht über die Fortschritte der classischen Alterthumswissenschaft*, xxxvi., 1883, pp. 258-9.

command. Since he ignores the odd 800, "we may gather that their connexion with the legion was already firmly established and was taken for granted."<sup>1</sup> Guischard,<sup>2</sup> however, says that Caesar's account of his interview with Ariovistus proves that at that time (58 B.C.) legionary cavalry no longer existed; as he had none to form his escort, and was obliged to mount the soldiers of the 10th legion on the horses of his Gallic cavalry, to whom he dared not entrust his safety. The fact may prove that there were no legionary cavalry in this, the first year of the Gallic war: but I am not sure that it even proves this; for, as Caesar's escort numbered 4000, the legionary cavalry, if there were any, would have been far too few; and he may not have cared to entrust his safety to Germans or Spaniards more than to Gauls.

Nevertheless, it appears to me that Schambach has failed to prove his case; for it is by no means clear that the 4000 cavalry who assembled at the Portus Itius did not include the 800 who had accompanied Caesar to the country of the Treveri: he did not "take for granted" the existence of those 800 when he described the expedition on which they accompanied him, but thought it necessary to mention them expressly; and if Schambach is right, he did not take the same number of cavalry with him to Britain as he left with Labienus, but considerably more.

Guischard<sup>3</sup> also says that Caesar had raised the 400 German cavalry whom he employed against Vercingetorix in the combat at Noviodunum, in the first year of the war. Caesar speaks of them as *equites* . . . *quos ab initio secum habere instituerat*.<sup>4</sup> As Long<sup>5</sup> says, "it is not clear what he means by 'ab initio.'" I believe with Long that he had not had them from the beginning of the war; for otherwise he would certainly have mentioned them; it is quite clear that he did not employ them in his first campaign; and we may be sure that he did not raise them until after he had learned their value in his campaign against Ariovistus. Either *ab initio* is used in a loose sense, or it means "from the outset" (of the seventh campaign).

## CAESAR'S ARTILLERY

Neither *ballistae* nor *catapultae* are ever mentioned in the *Gallic War*; but both are doubtless included under the generic name of *tormenta*, which Caesar mentions often. How the Roman *catapultae* and *ballistae* were constructed, we are not told: but it is generally assumed that they were identical or virtually identical with those of the Greeks. Both *ballistae* and *catapultae* are fully described in Dr. W. Smith's *Dictionary of Antiquities*, ii. 853, with which compare Marquardt, *De l'organisation mil. chez les Romains*, 1891, pp. 256-9 and 43, n. 3.

<sup>1</sup> In *B. C.*, iii. 29, § 2, we find 800 cavalry mentioned in connexion with four gions.

<sup>2</sup> *Mém. crit. et hist.*, iii. 310.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, p. 305.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 13, § 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Caesar*, p. 338.

Caesar mentions a piece of artillery called *scorpio*.<sup>1</sup> Vegetius<sup>2</sup> calls the *scorpio* a "hand-ballista" and says that it shot small arrows. The writer of the article on *Tormenta* in the *Dictionary of Antiquities* (ii. 853) thinks that by *scorpio* Caesar meant a catapult; and Vitruvius<sup>3</sup> and Heron<sup>4</sup> identify "scorpions" with catapults. The writer of *Bellum Africae*, on the other hand, distinguishes them. Polybius<sup>5</sup> and Livy<sup>6</sup> appear to regard "scorpions" as cross-bows. Mr. Judson,<sup>7</sup> referring to *Bellum Africae*, c. 31, describes the *scorpio* as "a small catapult capable of being managed by one man." "It consisted," he adds, "of a firm framework, on which was fastened a bow of steel. This was bent by a windlass, and shot its arrow (18 inches long) to a distance of some 300 to 400 feet." This is highly edifying: but there is not a word about it in *Bellum Africae*.

The *scorpio* mentioned by Caesar was used for shooting at individuals, from which I conclude that it was not a *catapulta*, properly so called, but a "hand-ballista," or what Livy<sup>6</sup> calls a *scorpio minor*.

I have shown in my narrative (pages 43-4 and page 44, note 1) that Caesar occasionally used, or was prepared to use, artillery in the field as well as in the defence or attack of fortified places.

## THE CLOTHING AND DEFENSIVE ARMOUR OF CAESAR'S REGULAR INFANTRY

I. Daremberg and Saglio<sup>9</sup> give a woodcut, after Trajan's column, representing Roman soldiers wearing *braccae*, which resembled tightly fitting drawers and reached down to the middle of the calf. There is no direct evidence that they were worn by Caesar's troops: but they appear to have been worn by Roman soldiers generally when they were serving in the comparatively cold climates of central Europe. Bandages (*fasciae*) were also worn by Roman soldiers in the imperial epoch; and I should think that they were probably used, as they are now, in order to prevent or to support varicose veins.

II. In a monument preserved in the museum at Verona a centurion is represented wearing greaves.<sup>10</sup> A. Muller says that in the representations of Roman soldiers known to him no greaves are to be found; and he concludes that those of the centurion in question are due to the artist's imagination: but E. Hubner<sup>11</sup> replies that we know from the

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.* vii. 25, §§ 2-3.

<sup>3</sup> x. 15 (10).

<sup>6</sup> xxvi. 47, § 5.

<sup>9</sup> *Dict. des antiquités grecques et rom.*, i. 746. See also *Rec. coll.*, xi., 1890, pp. 34-6.

<sup>10</sup> *Philologus*, xxxi., 1874, p. 651.

<sup>11</sup> *Hermes*, xvi., 1881, pp. 304-5. Monuments representing soldiers with greaves have also been found at Verona and Colchester. See *Corpus Inscr. Lat.*, vii. 90.

<sup>2</sup> ii. 13; iv. 22.

<sup>5</sup> viii. 7, § 6.

<sup>8</sup> xxvi. 47.

<sup>4</sup> § 3.

<sup>7</sup> *Caesar's Army*, p. 24.

testimony of Livy<sup>1</sup> that they were worn in the early republican period, and that we must not assume, in the absence of express testimony, that their use was abandoned in later times. He remarks also, quoting Lampridius,<sup>2</sup> that Alexander Severus rewarded deserving soldiers with presents of greaves.

Livy, in the passage already referred to, says that greaves were worn on both legs; and this statement, according to Lebeau,<sup>3</sup> is confirmed by various monuments. Arrian,<sup>4</sup> on the other hand, says that Roman soldiers wore greaves on their right legs only, because, when they were fighting, their right legs were advanced, and their left legs protected by their shields. Vegetius<sup>5</sup> confirms this statement; and Lebeau infers that the soldiers represented in the monuments were either foreigners, officers or gladiators. The common view is that two greaves were worn in the earlier, and one in the later period of the republic.<sup>6</sup>

III. Caesar nowhere mentions the *lorica* or cuirass: but the common opinion is that in his time legionaries wore cuirasses consisting of bands of leather covered with metal. On Trajan's column legionaries are depicted, wearing cuirasses of this kind. According to Polybius, a metal breast-plate was worn by the common soldiers without any *lorica*:<sup>7</sup> but there is no evidence that it was still in use in Caesar's time. *Loricæ* of other kinds are portrayed on monuments: on the column of Antonine there is one with scales like those of a serpent (θώραξ φοιδωτός): on the arch of Trajan there is one with plates like a bird's feathers: on the column of Antonine there is a representation of a shirt of chain-mail; and on a monument preserved in the museum of Verona a centurion is represented wearing a cuirass with scales like those of a fish (*lorica squamata*).<sup>8</sup>

Lebeau remarks that at Dyrrachium Caesar's soldiers improvised cuirasses of cloth and leather, in order to protect themselves from the arrows of the Pompeians, which, he says, proves that their ordinary cuirasses were not missile-proof.<sup>9</sup> Perhaps the arrows had penetrated between the joints of the *loricæ*.

## THE RATIONS

In Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities*, i. 811-12, it is stated on the authority of Ammianus Marcellinus, xvii. 9, § 2 and

<sup>1</sup> i. 43.

<sup>2</sup> *Vita Alex.*, 40.

<sup>3</sup> *Mém. de litt. tirés des registres de l'Acad. Roy. des inscr. et belles-lettres*, xxxix., 1770-72, pp. 475-6.

<sup>4</sup> *Ars tactica*, 3. § 5.

<sup>5</sup> i. 20.

<sup>6</sup> See Stoffel's *Guerre civile*, ii. 323, and W. Smith, *Dict. of Antiquities*, ii. 261.

<sup>7</sup> Marquardt (*De l'organisation mil. chez les Romains*, pp. 25-6), says that the breast-plate was worn under a cuirass: but this is a mistake. See Polybius, vi. 23.

<sup>8</sup> *Mém. de litt. tirés des registres de l'Acad. Roy. des inscr.*, etc., xxxix., 1770-72, pp. 465-6, 468; Marquardt, pp. 25-6; W. Smith, *Dict. of Antiquities*, ii. 80; Rich's *Dict. of Rom. and Gk. Ant.*, 4th ed., pp. 392-3; *Hermes*, xvi., 1881, p. 304.

<sup>9</sup> Omnes fere milites aut ex coactis aut ex centonibus aut ex coriis tunicas aut tegimenta fecerant, quibus tela vitarent. B. C., iii. 44, § 7.

Lampridius (*Alex. Sev.*, 47) that the legionary used to carry rations for 16 or 17 days. The soldiers of Afranius, however, in their retreat from Ilerda, are said to have carried supplies for 22 days:<sup>1</sup> but the number XXXII in the MSS. has been variously corrected by suspicious editors.<sup>2</sup> Josephus (*De bello Iudaico*, iii. 5, § 5), speaks of a 3 days' ration; and common sense suggests that the amount must have varied according to circumstances.

## THE FORTIFICATION OF CAESAR'S CAMPS

It is unnecessary, for the purpose of this book, to describe the interior arrangement of a Roman camp. The only questions with which I am concerned are the average size of the camp, which it is necessary to know in order to decide whether certain camps discovered on French soil are really the camps of Caesar with which they have been identified, and the nature of the fortifications which surrounded the camp. On the former point what we know amounts to this:—the camp described by Polybius<sup>3</sup> and intended for 18,400 foot and 2400 horse was 2150 Roman feet square or about 106 acres in extent; and the camp described by Hyginus<sup>4</sup> and intended for at least 40,000 men was  $2320 \times 1620$  feet or about 86 acres.

Caesar's camps were of two kinds, permanent and temporary. The former were occupied during the winter, and occasionally in the course of a campaign: the latter were constructed at the close of each day's march. Speaking of the winter camps, Vegetius<sup>5</sup> says that "the camp must be surrounded with a regular ditch 12 feet broad and 9 deep. . . . A parapet is then raised on the side next the camp, of the height of 4 feet, with hurdles and fascines properly covered and secured by the earth taken out of the ditch. . . . on the top of the whole are planted strong palisades which the soldiers carry with them constantly." The dimensions of the ditch and rampart of course varied according to circumstances. The camp which Caesar constructed on the Aisne, and which he occupied for several days, had a rampart 12 feet high<sup>6</sup> and a ditch 18 feet wide. It should be noted, however, that when he mentions the height of the *vallum*, he means the combined height of the

<sup>1</sup> *B. C.*, i. 78, § 1.

<sup>2</sup> Meusel's *Lec. Cues.*, vol. ii. (*Tabula coniecturarum*, p. 51), and Kübler's edition, p. xxiv.

<sup>3</sup> vi. 27-37, 41.

<sup>4</sup> *De munitionibus castrorum*, § 21 (ed. A. von Domaszewski, 1887). See also W. Smith, *Dict. of Antiquities*, i. 381.

<sup>5</sup> i. 24 (Clarke's translation, p. 39).

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 5, § 6. M. P. Bial (*Chemins, habitations et oppidum de la Gaule au temps de César*, 1864, pp. 214-15) holds that when Caesar mentioned the height of a rampart, he reckoned not from the level of the ground, but from the bottom of the trench. He refers to *B. C.*, iii. 63, § 1, which does not prove his point. Here is the passage:—*Erat eo loco fossa pedum XV et vallum contra hostem in altitudinem pedum X, tantundemque eius valli agger in latitudinem patebat.*

rampart, properly so called, and of the palisade.<sup>1</sup> The rampart, says Vegetius, which was made of sods of turf, cut in the form of large bricks, or, when the earth was too loose, of earth simply, was faced "with fascines or branches of trees, well fastened together with pickets (?), that the earth may be better supported."<sup>2</sup> "Upon this rampart," he adds, "they raise a parapet with battlements." Such a parapet, which Caesar erected upon the rampart in his line of contravallation round Alesia, is minutely described in *B. G.*, vii. 72, § 4. Guischard,<sup>3</sup> referring to Polybius as his authority, says that the palisade was generally planted on the edge of the ditch and at the foot of the rampart: but there is nothing in Polybius which supports this view; and it is irreconcilable with the description of Vegetius and, as it seems to me, with common sense. Polybius<sup>4</sup> gives an interesting description of the palisade, as it was made in his time. "As soon as they fix their stakes," he says, "they interlace them in such a manner that it is not easy to know to which of the stems fixed in the ground the branches belong . . . it is impossible to insert the hand and grasp them owing to the closeness of the interlacing of the branches and the way they lie one upon another, and because the main branches are also carefully cut so as to have sharp ends." M. Viollet-le-Duc<sup>5</sup> says that the winter camp was defended by "a rampart of sodded earth or of stone": but I cannot find any evidence in support of the words which I have italicised.

The rampart of the temporary camp was also defended by a palisade.<sup>6</sup>

Hyginus<sup>7</sup> describes two kinds of trenches,—*fossa fastigata*, of which both the scarp and the counterscarp were sloping, and *fossa punica*, of which the scarp was sloping and the counterscarp vertical. Caesar does not tell us what was the usual form of his trenches: but as he once mentions a trench, evidently exceptional, both the scarp and the counterscarp of which were vertical (*directis lateribus*<sup>8</sup>), we may infer that his trenches were usually either *fastigatae* or *punicae*; and Colonel Stoffel's excavations have proved that they were *fastigatae*.<sup>9</sup>

In conclusion, it should be noted that, although the normal form of the Roman camps was oblong, they were sometimes, owing to the lie of the ground, necessarily irregular in outline.<sup>10</sup>

## CAESAR'S ORDER OF BATTLE

Caesar, when about to fight a battle, formed his army sometimes in two lines (*duplec acies*), once, for a special purpose, in four (*quadruplex*:

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 49, 113, *supra*, and Napoleon III., *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 100, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> iii. 8 (Clarke's translation, p. 113). P. Bial (*Chemins*, etc., p. 206) points out that, where earth was wanting, the rampart, as we may gather from designs on Trajan's column, was sometimes constructed of logs piled cross-wise.

<sup>3</sup> *Mém. crit.*, iv. 69.

<sup>4</sup> xviii. 18 (E. S. Shuckburgh's translation, ii. 217).

<sup>5</sup> *Military Architecture*, p. 7 (translated by Mr. Macclermott). <sup>6</sup> Veg. iii. 8.

<sup>7</sup> *De munitionibus castrorum*, § 49.

<sup>8</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 72, § 1.

<sup>9</sup> See Atlas (Planches 9, 22, 27-8) to Napoleon's *Hist. de Jules César*.

<sup>10</sup> Darenberg and Saglio, *Dét. des antiquités grecques et rom.*, i. 950.



*acies*), but generally in three (*triplex acies*).<sup>1</sup> The questions which we must try to answer are (1) what was the normal depth of each line; (2) what interval separated each cohort from the one next to it; and (3) how was the relief of the first line effected during a battle?

1. Von Göler<sup>2</sup> believes that the three maniples of each cohort stood one behind another, and that the two centuries of each maniple stood side by side, in two ranks. According to this arrangement, the cohort, that is to say the line, would have been six men deep. Colonel Stoffel<sup>3</sup> considers that this depth would not have been sufficient to stand the shock of ancient warfare. Frontinus<sup>4</sup> says that, at the battle of Pharsalus, Pompey ranged his cohorts ten men deep. Colonel Stoffel maintains, I think rightly, that Frontinus mentions this depth as something exceptional; and he concludes that the normal depth of the cohort in line of battle was eight men. The conclusion appears probable: but the point to notice is that if the maniples of each cohort were arranged in the manner indicated by von Göler, then at the battle of Pharsalus, they could not have been of equal depth. But, argues Fröhlich,<sup>5</sup> as they were of equal strength, they must have been of equal depth: therefore von Göler's theory must be rejected. It must be remembered, of course, that, in point of fact, the different maniples must often have been of unequal *effective* strength. Nevertheless, Fröhlich's argument holds good; for it is most improbable that in every cohort, all along each of the three lines, one maniple should have been of greater or less depth than the other two. It is then, if not certain, at least in the highest degree probable that the three maniples in each cohort were

<sup>1</sup> Von Göler (*Gall. Krieg*, etc., ii. 214-15, 267-71), while admitting that Caesar's army was generally formed for battle in three lines, rejects the obvious interpretation of the phrases *duplex acies*, *triplex acies* and *quadruplex acies*. A *triplex acies*, according to him, was so called because it contained three divisions in the same line, namely a right wing (*cornu dextrum*), a centre (*acies media*) and a left wing (*cornu sinistrum*); while a *duplex acies* consisted only of a right and a left wing. This theory has, so far as I know, gained no converts; and the common sense of most readers would reject it: but it may be worth while to prove that it is false. First, it fails to explain the formation known as *simulæ acies*, or the single line, which Caesar once employed in Africa, and which, as the writer of *Bellum Africæ* (13, § 2) expressly says, included a right and a left wing. Secondly, the *duplex acies* which Crassus formed when he offered battle to the Aquitani (*B. G.*, iii. 24, § 1), had a centre (*media acies*), and therefore ought, on von Göler's theory, to have been a *triplex acies*. To quote Mr. Judson, "it seems plain enough that Caesar used the terms *right wing*, *left wing* and *centre* quite as they are used of a modern army; applying them in an indefinite way to those parts of a line of battle, but not necessarily implying distinct divisions under separate commanders" (*Caesar's Army*, pp. 44-5. Compare Fröhlich's *Das Kriegswesen Cæsars*, p. 150). Thirdly, it is clear from Caesar's account of the battle with Ariovistus (*B. G.*, i. 52, § 7) that the third line (*tertia acies*) acted as a reserve, and was therefore not brought into action unless and until its services were required. Fourthly, we read (*Bell. Afr.*, 60, § 3) that, on one occasion, Caesar's left wing was *triplex*. See *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, etc., lxxv., 1892, pp. 214-16, and cf. Frontinus, *Strat.*, ii. 3, §§ 16, 22, and Caesar, *B. C.*, i. 41, which, by itself, overthrows von Göler's theory.

<sup>2</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, ii. 216-18.

<sup>4</sup> *Strat.*, ii. 3, § 22.

<sup>3</sup> *Guerre civile*, ii. 327.

<sup>5</sup> *Das Kriegswesen Cæsars*, p. 144.

placed side by side; and if so, it is probable that the two centuries in each maniple were placed one behind the other.

2. The theory which finds favour in dictionaries of antiquities and handbooks is that, in the period of the manipular organisation, the maniples in each of the three lines were separated from one another, not only before but during close combat, by intervals equal to the breadth of a maniple; and that the maniples of the second and third lines respectively stood immediately behind the intervals of the first and second. The principal modern exponent of this theory is Rüstow.<sup>1</sup> From certain statements in Caesar he inferred that during the later period, when the tactical unit was the cohort, the formation of the army in battle was the same. He argues, first, that Caesar once states that there was an interval between two cohorts standing in the same line;<sup>2</sup> secondly, that the expression "*cohortes disponere*"<sup>3</sup> proves that such an interval was usual; and thirdly, that Caesar appears to have always regarded it as an evil that cohorts in the same line should have been huddled together.

None of these arguments has any value. In the first passage quoted by Rüstow<sup>4</sup> Caesar describes an attack made by a number of Britons upon a Roman force on guard in front of a camp in process of construction. He sent two cohorts to the rescue; and the Britons broke through the "very narrow space" that separated the two cohorts. Now, first of all, it is absurd to argue from the fact that two cohorts, fighting in the same line, were on one occasion separated from each other by "a very narrow space," that, as a general rule, a large number of cohorts fighting in the same line, in a pitched battle, were separated from each other by intervals each equal to the front of a cohort: secondly, Caesar may have had some special reason for placing these cohorts apart; and thirdly, the two cohorts may have issued from two opposite gates of the camp.<sup>5</sup>

In the second passage Caesar describes the efforts which Titurius Sabinus made to repel the troops of Ambiorix. The Roman column was attacked in front and in rear, on right and left, at the same moment. Sabinus had to arrange his cohorts in such a way as to repel this attack; and *cohortes disponere* simply means "to make his dispositions," not, as Rüstow imagines, "to arrange the cohorts with intervals between them." As Fröhlich<sup>6</sup> points out, to leave intervals between the cohorts would have been to invite destruction.

With regard to Rüstow's third argument, it is of course perfectly

<sup>1</sup> *Heerwesen und Kriegführung Caesars*, 1855, p. 45.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, v. 15, §§ 3-4.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 33, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Equites hostium essedariique acriter proelio cum equitatu nostro in itinere conflixerunt, ita ut nostri omnibus partibus superiores fuerint atque eos in silvas collesque compulerint: sed compluribus interfectis cupidius insecuti nonnullos ex suis amiserunt. At illi intermisso spatio, imprudentibus nostris atque occupatis in munitione castrorum, subito se ex silvis eiecerunt impetumque in eos facto, qui erant in statione pro castris collocati, acriter pugnauerunt, duabusque missis subsidio cohortibus a Caesare . . . cum hac perexiguo intermisso loci spatio inter se constitissent, novo genere pugnae perterritis nostris, per medios audacissime perruperunt, etc.*

<sup>5</sup> See Fröhlich's *Das Kriegswesen Caesars*, p. 156.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, p. 157.

true that Caesar regarded it as an evil that his troops should be huddled together: but the passages which Rustow quotes only show that the evil was that the soldiers composing each maniples were so crowded that they had no room to strike: they do not show that Caesar considered it necessary to leave intervals between the several cohorts.

The theory which Rustow upholds has been strenuously opposed,—in the last century by Guischart, afterwards by Renard, and of late years by Delbruck, Soltau, Giesing and Stoffel. These writers indeed admit that, in the period of the manipular organisation, there were intervals between the maniples, to allow of the free passage to and fro of the *velites* or light-armed troops, who opened the action, up to the moment when close fighting began: but they insist that from that moment the intervals were closed, either by the extension of the ranks in the several maniples or, as Guischart thought, by the advance of the maniples in the second line into the intervals in the first.<sup>1</sup> If, says Guischart, intervals had been left in the fighting line, the inevitable result would have been that the enemy would have rushed through the intervals, attacked the maniples in flank and rear, and destroyed the whole formation. When, he adds, Livy<sup>2</sup> says that in the Latin war the Roman first and second lines retreated between the intervals of the third, he simply exposes his own ignorance. He did not understand the object of the intervals, which existed prior to the commencement of close fighting. General Renard,<sup>3</sup> on the other hand, observing that, according to Livy, the maniples stood at “moderate distances apart” (*distantes inter se modicum spatium*), argues that what he meant was, not that the maniples of the first line retreated between the intervals which separated the maniples of the second, but that the several files of the first line retreated between the files of the second. The Roman tacticians, Guischart continues, did not tie themselves down to any one formation; and the intervals were merely intended to facilitate the movements necessary for taking up any order which circumstances might require. The German writers whom I have mentioned take the same view; and Delbruck<sup>4</sup> adds that it would have been impossible, in the stress of battle, to preserve the prescribed intervals; and further, that the maniples of the second line could not have relieved those of the first, when they were tired, by advancing through the assumed intervals, since, when the tired maniples began to fall back, the enemy would have pressed after them and thrown the whole array into confusion. General Renard<sup>5</sup> quotes from Livy the passage *Inde tribunis centurionibusque imperat ut viam equitibus patefaciant. Panduntur inter ordines*

<sup>1</sup> *Mém. mil.*, ii. 91. I am sure that Guischart was wrong on this point. His view is irreconcilable with the passage quoted in the next note and with Appian, *B. C.*, iv. 128.

<sup>2</sup> viii. 8.—*Prima acies hastati erant, manipuli quindecim, distantes inter se modicum spatium . . . Sic hastati profligare hostem non possent, pede presso eos retrocedentes in intervalla ordinum principes recipiebant.*

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. pol. et mil. de la Belgique*, 1847, p. 311, note.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. Zeitschrift*, Neue Folge, xv., 1883, pp. 240-43.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. pol. et mil. de la Belgique*, pp. 310-16. \*

*vias*<sup>1</sup> ("he then ordered the tribunes and centurions to make room for the cavalry; and spaces were opened between the centuries"); and he remarks that since it was necessary to make these intervals in the heat of battle, they evidently did not exist before. Various other passages point to the conclusion that the normal intervals between maniples or cohorts were only sufficient to mark their individuality without breaking their interdependence. Thus Livy says that Scipio, before the battle of Zama, "*did not form his companies in close order*, but at considerable intervals, in order that there might be room for the enemy's elephants to pass without breaking the formation."<sup>2</sup> These spaces, Livy goes on to say, were occupied by light-armed troops, who, as we learn from Polybius,<sup>3</sup> fell back after they had opened the battle, and avoided the rush of the elephants by getting into the *lateral* spaces which separated each maniple from the one in front of it and from the one behind. Polybius, it is true, in describing the battle of Zama, says that the maniples of the second line generally stood immediately behind the intervals of the first; but this does not prove that the width of each interval was equal to the width of a maniple; and I cannot discover any other passage which proves that it was. I need hardly add that Colonel Stoffel<sup>4</sup> rejects Rustow's theory.

3. The next problem which we have to solve is this:—how were the cohorts of the first line relieved? Fröhlich<sup>5</sup> originally held that, if it was necessary to relieve the first line *as a whole*, the relief was effected by a flank movement on the part of the second. But, as Giesing<sup>6</sup> remarks, on Fröhlich's theory, the relieving force "would have had to work itself along sideways, fighting all the time, until the relief was effected." It needs no reflection to see that this would have been impracticable in any circumstances; and when, as in the case of Caesar's position on the Aisne, the line of battle occupied the whole width of the field, it would have been impossible even to attempt it.

In cases where it was impossible to attempt a flank movement, Fröhlich,<sup>7</sup> postulating that the tactical unity of each cohort must be preserved, originally held that the ranks of the tired cohorts closed up, and thus created intervals for the fresh cohorts to enter and take their places. The tired cohorts retired fighting, while the ranks of the relieving cohorts immediately spread out on both sides and filled up the intervals. Soltau,<sup>8</sup> improving a little upon this theory, held that, instead of the relieving cohort's waiting patiently until the whole

<sup>1</sup> x. 41.

<sup>2</sup> Non confertos autem cohortes ante sua quemque signa instruebat, sed manipulos aliquantum inter se distantes, ut esset spatium quo elephanti hostium accepti nihil ordines turbarent. . . . Vias patentes inter manipulos antesignanorum velutibus . . . complevit, xxx. 33. Frontinus (*Strat.*, ii. 3, § 16) says much the same,—"nec continuas construxit cohortes; sed manipulis inter se distantibus spatium dedit, etc.,—clearly implying that close order was usual. See also Livy, x. 5, 27.

<sup>3</sup> xv. 9.

<sup>4</sup> *Guerre civile*, ii. 326.

<sup>5</sup> *Realistisches und Stilistisches zu Cäsar und dessen Fortsetzern*, pp. 11-14.

<sup>6</sup> *Jahrbücher für Philologie*, etc., cxxxvii., 1888, pp. 849-50.

<sup>7</sup> *Realistisches und Stilistisches zu Cäsar*, etc., pp. 11-14.

<sup>8</sup> *Hermes*, xx., 1885, pp. 264-7.

interval was ready for it to enter, the men of the relieving cohort gradually insinuated themselves into the interval the moment it began to be formed. Then and not till then, Soltau thought, the tired cohort began to fall back. The thing sounds easy, says Giesing;<sup>1</sup> but there is one difficulty to be reckoned with. The moment the tired cohort begins to fall back, "the plaguy enemy" press after: the relieving cohort finds itself surrounded; and the line of battle is destroyed. Giesing's theory is as follows:—in hard fighting the foremost ranks of the first line inevitably become thinned. The gaps are filled up by the advance of the rear ranks between the files of those in front; and this process goes on until the depth of the first line is in danger of becoming unduly thinned. Should it be necessary to relieve any of the cohorts as a whole, the relief is accomplished in the same way: the ranks of the relieving cohort advance between the files of the tired cohort; and the enemy never gets a chance of breaking the formation.<sup>2</sup> The only criticism which I would offer on Giesing's theory is this. In ancient battles the loss of the victors was generally very slight;<sup>3</sup> and it is probable that the ranks of the first line on the winning side very rarely became unduly thinned. I conclude that in Caesar's battles the rule was to relieve the first line as a whole when the men became fagged.

I ought to say that Fröhlich was converted by Giesing's arguments.<sup>4</sup>

It may be worth while to add that Fröhlich<sup>5</sup> affirms, on the strength of certain passages in Plutarch<sup>6</sup> and Appian,<sup>7</sup> that, after the first two ranks of the first line had thrown their javelins and while they were using their swords, the rear ranks threw their javelins over the heads of the first two. I do not dispute this statement: but I can find nothing in the passages referred to which proves it. Colonel Stoffel<sup>8</sup> simply remarks that the first two ranks opened the battle by throwing their javelins, the second rank throwing theirs "à travers les intervalles du premier."

## THE AGGER

I. No ancient writer has left any detailed account of the mode in which the *agger*, or siege mound, as used by Caesar, was constructed: but there is evidence enough to enable us to piece together an accurate,

<sup>1</sup> *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, etc., cxxxvii., 1888, pp. 852-9.

<sup>2</sup> So also Colonel Stoffel (*Guerre de César et d'Arioniste*, pp. 120-21) writes, "comme le légionnaire était pesamment armé et que les combats étaient des luttes d'homme à homme, il est à croire qu'au bout de quinze à vingt minutes, la première ligne avait besoin d'être soutenue ou relevée. Alors les soldats de la deuxième ligne passaient dans les intervalles des combattants pendant que ceux de la première se retiraient," etc.

<sup>3</sup> See *B. C.*, iii. 99, § 1, and Stoffel, *Guerre civile*, ii. 339-40.

<sup>4</sup> *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, p. 164.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, p. 148.

<sup>7</sup> *B. C.*, iv. 128.

<sup>6</sup> *Sulla*, 18.

<sup>8</sup> *Guerre civile*, ii. 339.

if not complete description of its material, form and mode of construction.

Before the construction of the *agger* could be begun, the ground upon which it was to be erected had to be levelled; and this was done by men working under the cover of a *testudo*,<sup>1</sup> or sapper's hut. The *agger* was made largely, if not mainly of wood; and sometimes, if not always, it contained earth and rubble as well.<sup>2</sup> The woodwork consisted of logs, piled in successive layers, the logs in each layer being laid at right angles with those in the layer below. The *agger* was sometimes undermined and fired by the enemy. The workmen were protected from the enemy's missiles by *vincae*,<sup>3</sup> or sheds.<sup>4</sup>

II. 1. Mr. Hudson,<sup>5</sup> following Rüstow,<sup>6</sup> has propounded a theory regarding the construction of the *agger*, which it would be useless to examine, because it is based upon the fantastic assumption that the *agger* was not solid, but contained galleries. Von Goler,<sup>7</sup> who agrees with Rüstow, cites a passage in which Caesar, describing the siege of Avaricum, says that the Gauls endeavoured, by means of sharp stakes, molten pitch and huge stones, to prevent the Romans from bringing their open (?) galleries up to the wall (*apertos cuniculos praeusta et praeacuta materia et pice fervefacta et maximi ponderis saxis morabantur moenibusque appropinquare prohibebant*).<sup>8</sup> Now this passage is omitted in two of the MSS.:<sup>9</sup> but I have little doubt that Caesar wrote it; for I cannot frame any theory to account for its having been interpolated. Von Goler holds that by *apertos cuniculos* Caesar meant the ends, open towards the town, of galleries which ran through the whole length of the *agger*. Schneider<sup>10</sup> and Fröhlich,<sup>11</sup> on the other hand, believe that these *cuniculi* were subterranean galleries, by which Caesar intended to undermine the enemy's wall or make his way into the town; and this view is supported by a passage in Curtius,<sup>12</sup> from which we learn that Alexander the Great, while constructing an *agger* during the siege of Tyre, made galleries for the purpose of undermining the wall. But

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 603-4, and *B. C.*, ii. 2, § 4. Colonel Stoffel (*Guerre civile*, ii. 358) asserts that when, as in the Gallic war, the besieged had no artillery, the workmen were protected merely by mantlets, ranged in their front and on their flanks. How about arrows?

<sup>2</sup> Colonel Stoffel (*Guerre civile*, ii. 356) thinks that timber, being much lighter than earth or stones, would, in places where it was sufficiently abundant, have been used almost exclusively, earth being only employed "à combler les espaces vides, à égaliser et à affermir la masse."

<sup>3</sup> See p. 602.

<sup>4</sup> *B. C.*, ii. 2, § 4; *B. G.*, vii. 24, §§ 2-3; Thucydides, ii. 75; Lucan, *Phars.*, iii. 394-8, 455; Appian, *Milhr.*, 30; Silius Italicus, xiii. 109-10. See also Stoffel, *Guerre civile*, ii. 355-6, and Daremberg and Saglio, *Dict. des antiquités grecques et rom.*, i. 141.

<sup>5</sup> *Caesar's Army*, pp. 93-5.

<sup>6</sup> *Heerwesen und Kriegführung C. J. Cäsars*, 1855, pp. 147-51.

<sup>7</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 252.

<sup>8</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 22, § 5.

<sup>9</sup> Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i. 800.

<sup>10</sup> *Caesar*, ii. 399.

<sup>11</sup> *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, p. 254.

<sup>12</sup> *De rebus gestis Alexandri Magni*, iv. 6, § 21. Alexander . . . aggerem quo moenium altitudinem aequaret, extruxit, et pluribus cuniculis muros subrui iussit. Cf. Livy, xxiii. 18, §§ 8-9, xxxiii. 1.

if the galleries of which Caesar speaks were subterranean and had not yet reached the wall, how could he have called them "open"? Long<sup>1</sup> says, "If the text is right . . . the Galli . . . contrived to work into the Roman 'cuniculi,' to open into them," etc. This explanation is supported by a passage in which Appian<sup>2</sup> describes how, in the siege of Athens by Sulla, the mines of the besiegers and of the besieged met: but it seems doubtful whether *apertos* can be taken as a participle.<sup>3</sup> Those commentators who hold that the *cuniculi* were galleries in the *agger* believe that they were intended to protect the workmen: but, as protection could have been obtained just as well by the use of *vineae*, it is clear that if the *agger* was made with galleries, the object must have been to save material. Such a saving, however, would have been more than counterbalanced by the enormous increase of labour that would have been entailed by making an *agger* with galleries sufficiently strong to carry the host of soldiers, the *vineae* and the huge towers that stood upon it. Indeed, it is hardly credible that, without bricks, the Romans could have made such an *agger*. There is absolutely no evidence for the view that *aggeres* were ever built with galleries, except the passage which I have quoted from *B. G.*, vii. 22; and of the scholars who admit the genuineness of that passage the majority understand by the word *cuniculos* not galleries in the *agger* but subterranean galleries. It is true that the writer of the article *Agger* in Daremberg and Saglio's *Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines*<sup>4</sup> points to a drawing which he reproduces from S. Bartoli's *Colonne Trajane* as evidence that the Roman *agger* did contain galleries. "Dans la figure," he says, "on voit des soldats romains occupés à construire un *agger* et entassant des troncs d'arbres entre-croisés. On remarque une sorte de voûte formée de poutres disposées en arc-boutant et peut-être destinée à protéger un de ces chemins couverts (*cuniculi*) par lesquels on pouvait faire avancer des sares et des mines jusqu'aux murs." But it is very doubtful whether the drawing in question represents an *agger* at all. Mr. Judson argues that the *agger* could not have been destroyed by fire unless it had been built with galleries. Thinking over this argument, it occurred to me that Caesar would hardly have played into his enemies' hands by affording them facilities for destroying his handiwork; and when I consulted scientific men and members of the London Fire Brigade, I found that they did not agree

<sup>1</sup> *Caesar*, p. 346. See also Schneider's *Caesar*, ii. 399.

<sup>2</sup> *Mithr.*, 36.

<sup>3</sup> See W. Paul in *Zeitschrift für das Gymnasialwesen*, 1878, pp. 168-9. Paul, who holds that the *cuniculi* were subterranean, conjectures that Caesar wrote *repertos*. P. Geyer (*Jahresberichte d. philol. Vereins*, v., 1879, p. 353), objecting to Paul's emendation, argues that the *cuniculi* must have been galleries in the *agger*, (1) because the second *agger* which the Romans constructed at Massilia contained galleries, and (2) because the use of boiling pitch by the besieged would have been more applicable to such galleries than to underground ones. But the second *agger* at Massilia contained one gallery only: it consisted of "two walls of brick, 6 feet thick, and a planking of timber laid across those walls": Caesar expressly says that it was of "a novel and unheard-of kind" (*aggerem novi generis atque inauditum . . . facere instituerunt* [*B. C.*, ii. 15, § 1]); and, as far as I can see, boiling pitch would have been as inconvenient to workmen underground as above.

<sup>4</sup> i. 142.

with Mr. Judson. If he had read his Josephus,<sup>1</sup> he would have understood how an *agger* could be set on fire, even though it had no galleries. On one occasion, the Jews "supported the ground over the mine,"—underneath the *agger*,—"with beams laid across one another, whereby the Roman works stood upon an uncertain foundation. Then did he (John) order such materials to be brought in, as were daubed over with pitch and bitumen, and set them on fire; and as the cross beams that supported the banks were burning, the ditch yielded on the sudden, and the banks were shaken down, and fell into the ditch with a prodigious noise. Now at the first there arose a very thick smoke and dust, as the fire was choked with the fall of the bank; but as the suffocated materials were now gradually consumed, a plain flame broke out,"<sup>2</sup> etc. Colonel Stoffel,<sup>3</sup> who ridicules the notion that the *agger* contained galleries, sensibly remarks that at Avaricum the besiegers only learned that the *agger* was on fire by seeing smoke rising from its surface. If, he argues, there had been galleries in the *agger*, "on se serait aperçu de l'accident plus tôt," etc. Moreover, there is direct evidence that some *aggers*, at all events, had no galleries. The *agger* which the Lacedæmonians constructed at the siege of Plataea was solid, and had tiers of logs on either side to prevent the interior wood, earth and stones from scattering.<sup>4</sup> Finally, Lucan says that the first *agger* constructed at Massilia was made of a core of earth and faggots supported by walls of timber on either side:—

tunc omnia late  
Procumbunt nemora, et spoliantur robore silvæ.  
Ut cum terra levis mediani virgultaque molem  
Suspendant, structa laterum compage ligatam  
Arctet humani, pressus ne cedat turribus agger.<sup>5</sup>

Ciacconius,<sup>6</sup> contrasting *apertos cuniculos* with the *TECTOS CUNICULOS*<sup>7</sup> ("covered galleries") which were driven into the rock at Uxellodunum, in order to divert a spring, maintains that the former were open trenches; and this view is perhaps supported by a passage in which Ammianus Marcellinus<sup>8</sup> describes besiegers as attempting under the protection of *plutei*, or mantlets, to undermine a wall. I am very doubtful whether the word *cuniculus* could be used of an open trench; but if so, Ciacconius's explanation is probable enough. Whatever the true explanation may be, I am absolutely certain that the *agger* was never built with galleries; and my conviction is shared not only by Colonel Stoffel but also by a distinguished officer of the Royal Engineers, who has had great experience in military mining.

2. Colonel Stoffel has devised a theory entirely different from that of Rüstow. He holds that Caesar's terraces were of two kinds,—the "terrasse-viaduc" and the "terrasse cavalier." The former, which was perpendicular to the wall of the besieged town and carried only one

<sup>1</sup> Whiston's translation, ed. 1858, ii. 422 (*De bello Iudæico*, ed. Dindorf, v. 11, § 4).

<sup>2</sup> *Guerre civile*, ii. 363.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 24, §§ 2-3.

<sup>4</sup> Thucydides, ii. 75.

<sup>5</sup> *Phars.*, iii. 394-8.

<sup>6</sup> *Caesar*, ed. G. Jungermann, 1606, p. 288.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, viii. 41, § 4.

<sup>8</sup> xxi. 12, § 6.



tower, was used, he explains, when the attack was to be directed "sur un seul point déterminé,"—when it was intended to breach the wall with the battering-ram, and not to take the town by escalade. To this type the colonel refers the terraces which Caesar constructed in besieging the stronghold of the Aduatuci and Uxellodunum. When, on the other hand, the besieged town was situated, like Avaricum, in a plain, and when (as was the case throughout the Gallic war) the besieged had no artillery, Colonel Stoffel holds that the terrace was a "cavalier," parallel with and close to, but not actually touching the wall.<sup>1</sup>

Now, if the colonel means that there was no "terrasse-viaduc" at Avaricum,<sup>2</sup> Caesar's narrative does not support his contention. The only evidence which he can adduce in support of his assertion that the *agger* at Avaricum did not reach the wall is Caesar's statement that on the night of the grand sortie the *agger* "almost reached the wall" (*cum is murum paene contingeret*). But this does not prove that it was not destined actually to reach it. Again, though Caesar does not say in so many words that the terrace at Avaricum was built at right angles to the wall, he implies that it was. In saying this, I find that I have the support of Guisclard.<sup>3</sup> Describing the siege, Caesar uses the words "Cum iam muro turres *appropinquassent*,"<sup>4</sup> etc. (the towers had now got close to the wall). The towers stood on the terrace;<sup>5</sup> and the word *appropinquassent* would be misleading, not to say meaningless, if the terrace had been merely a "cavalier," parallel with the wall. Again, describing the measures which he took to repel the sortie from Avaricum, Caesar says that some of his men drew back the towers (*turres reducerent* <sup>6</sup>), in order to prevent the fire which the Gallic miners had kindled under the terrace from destroying them. The word *reducerent* speaks for itself.

I conclude, then, that the *agger* at Avaricum was a "terrasse-viaduc," in so far that it carried two towers, on the right and on the left, which, as the work progressed, gradually approached the wall. But it was also a "terrasse cavalier"; for its width was 330 feet, and it served as a platform over which the legionaries advanced to storm the town.<sup>7</sup> The question is whether the "cavalier" occupied the entire space between the two viaducts or only the front part of that space. Napoleon adopts the latter view. According to General de Reffye,<sup>8</sup> whose explanation he borrows, the *agger* consisted of two parallel viaducts, with an empty space between, on each of which, flanked by two rows of *vineae*, moved

<sup>1</sup> *Guerre civile*, ii. 351-61. The colonel means, as I understand, that the dimension of the terrace from front to back was much less than its dimension parallel with the wall: but I am not sure whether he means that it was as narrow as the "cavalier" shown in Napoleon's Planche 20.

<sup>2</sup> One would certainly infer that this was his meaning from pages 354-5 of the second volume of his *Guerre civile*: but when I look at Planche 10 of his Atlas, I am doubtful.

<sup>3</sup> *Mém. mil.*, ii. 7.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 18, § 1.


<sup>5</sup> See p. 728.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 24, § 5.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 27, §§ 2-3.

<sup>8</sup> There is a model of the *agger* at Avaricum by General de Reffye in Salle XIII. of the Musée de St-Germain. See also R. Oehler's *Bilder-Atlas zu Cäsars Büchern* de *B. G.*, 1890, pp. 66-7 and Pl. 62.





PLAN OF THE AGGER AT AVARICUM  
ACCORDING TO NAZOLFO III AND GENERAL DI REFFAY

one of the two towers. The "cavalier," which joined the two viaducts, was, from front to rear, very narrow: it was ascended from the rear by an elaborate system of steps; and along its whole extension, parallel with the wall, stood two rows of *vineae*, the *vineae* in each row being placed end to end. Now I cannot understand how, on this theory, the assault was delivered at all. The steps, or rather staircases, are of course purely imaginary. There would have been little or no room on the "cavalier" for any troops except those who stood under the *vineae*: if the sides of the *vineae* which faced the wall were closed, the troops could not have got out of them; and if they were open, the *vineae* would have afforded no protection! I have always understood from Caesar's description of the assault that the *vineae*, the ends of which were open, stood end to end in a direction perpendicular to the wall. Moreover, on Napoleon's theory, the gap between the edge of the cavalier and the top of the wall of Avaricum was at least 50 feet; and I cannot understand how the assaulting columns were to get across that space.

Nevertheless, I am inclined to think that there is some truth in Napoleon's view. He estimates the length of each viaduct at about 250 feet; and to construct a terrace of which the dimensions were 330 feet by 250 would have been a work of enormous labour. Would it have been necessary? An engineer whom I have consulted agrees with me in thinking that the "cavalier" would probably only have occupied so much space as was requisite to afford room for the leading companies of the assailants, and that fresh troops could have moved up to support them through the rows of *vineae* which stood upon the viaducts. But to draw a plan, which could only be conjectural, of the *agger* at Avaricum would be absurd.

Colonel Stoffel does not attempt to explain in detail the construction of the "terrasse cavalier," which he believes to have been used at Avaricum: but he offers a very elaborate explanation of the "terrasse-viaduc."<sup>1</sup> The following is a summary. The colonel assumes that the ground sloped, as at Avaricum, towards the town. As soon as the inequalities of the surface had been removed, logs were passed from hand to hand to a group of workers who arranged them in layers descending like huge steps, those of each tier being laid crosswise on those of the tier immediately underneath. As soon as the first series, so to speak, of layers, was finished, two galleries of sheds (*vineae*) were placed upon the rearmost pile. Under cover of these, workmen passed fresh logs to others standing upon the pile immediately below; and so on. The third and fourth series were laid in the same way.

Nothing could be gained by criticising this theory. Right or wrong, it can neither be disproved nor proved.<sup>2</sup> But the colonel does not

<sup>1</sup> *Guerre civile*, ii. 358-9.

<sup>2</sup> Colonel Stoffel refers to Planches 89 and 90 of Frohner's *La Colonne Trajane* for illustrations of an *agger* in course of construction. But Frohner himself describes these illustrations as "construction d'un camp et rempart de troncs d'arbres et catapultes"; and what Colonel Stoffel calls an *agger* Frohner regards as "un énorme rempart de troncs d'arbres derrière lequel l'armée s'est retranchée." See also S. Reinach, *La Colonne Trajane au musée de Saint-Germain*, 1886, p. 56.

explain how the work would have been executed when the ground, as at Uxellodunum, sloped *upward* in the direction of the town.

3. M. Viollet-le-Duc, the eminent architect and military engineer, devised an entirely novel theory of the construction of the *agger*.<sup>1</sup> Like Colonel Stoffel, he believed that it was parallel with the wall of the besieged town. He described it as a terrace about 100 paces long, 10 feet high and 20 feet wide, with a gap in the middle, 12 feet wide. From the two ends of this gap, he said, there extended, at right angles to the *agger*, two covered galleries (*vineae*), about 100 paces long, made of trunks of trees. The *agger* had several inclines, on the side furthest from the wall, to enable soldiers to reach the summit. The rollers on which the tower moved rested upon the galleries.

Now it is unnecessary to say that there is no evidence for this theory, which is simply the creation of the brain of a clever engineer. And there is evidence to prove that it is wrong. *Vineae* were not constructed in the way which M. Viollet-le-Duc described; and his theory is irreconcilable with Caesar's statement that the towers on the *agger* at Avaricum rose daily higher, as they were forced up by the daily increase in the height of the *agger*.

III. Von Göler<sup>2</sup> holds with Lipsius<sup>3</sup> that the terrace must have sloped gradually upward as it approached the wall of the besieged town. They infer this from Caesar's statement that the daily rise in the height of the terrace at Avaricum raised, in a corresponding degree, the elevation of the towers.<sup>4</sup> There is a drawing in the *Journal asiatique* (4<sup>e</sup> série, tome v., 1845, Planche lii.) taken from a bas-relief found at Khorsabad, which represents an *agger* forming an inclined plane.<sup>5</sup>

IV. Guischard,<sup>6</sup> pointing to a passage in which Livy<sup>7</sup> says that an *agger* collapsed into a trench because it was ill compacted, maintains that the front part of the *agger* was, as a rule, strongly revetted and constructed with especial care. But the *agger* of which Livy speaks was merely the rampart of a camp! Moreover, it is hard to see how the work which Guischard imagines could have been done unless a wide gap was left between the *agger* and the wall; and if so, how was the storming party to get into the town? Colonel Stoffel<sup>8</sup> maintains, on the contrary, that the *agger*, in the last 20 feet of its length, could only be made by shooting material into the vacant space in the manner which I have described on page 113: but I am not quite sure whether he is referring to terraces in general or only to the "terrasse-viaduc."

<sup>1</sup> *Annals of a Fortress* (translated by B. Bucknall. 1875), pp. 78-81.

<sup>2</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 251 and n. 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Opera*, 1637, iii. 295.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 22, § 4. It would be interesting to learn how Napoleon reconciled his picture of the *agger* with this statement. According to him, the ground on which the *agger* at Avaricum was built sloped down so much towards the wall that the soil on which the hinder parts of the viaducts were built was nearly on a level with the surface of the front parts, and the whole rise in the elevation of the towers would not have been more than 6 or 7 feet (*Hist. de Jules César*, ii. pp. 256, n. 1, 259, and Pl. 20). Napoleon's Planche 32 represents the *agger* at Uxellodunum as level.

<sup>5</sup> In Planche 10 of the Atlas to Stoffel's *Guerre civile* there is an illustration of a "terrasse-viaduc," which forms an inclined plane.

<sup>6</sup> *Mém. mil.*, ii. 7.

<sup>7</sup> x. 5.

<sup>8</sup> *Guerre civile*, p. 359.

V. As to how the *vineae*, or sheds, were used, it is impossible to give a full and satisfactory account. Guischart<sup>1</sup> explains the phrase *vineas agere* as follows:—two rows of *vineae* inclined gradually inwards until each reached a certain point, where they were joined by a third row, which served as a protection to the front of the *agger*. But on this theory, after the *agger* had risen to the very moderate height of the *vineae*, the latter would have been useless. Caesar<sup>2</sup> says that the men who brought up the material for the construction of the first *agger* at Massilia passed it from hand to hand under the protection of *vineae*: but he does not say how the *vineae* were placed when the *agger* was actually being constructed. We learn from Caesar<sup>3</sup> that *vineae* were placed on the *agger*: but were they placed there to protect columns of assault or to protect workmen or for both the purposes? I believe that the last is the true explanation; <sup>4</sup> and Colonel Stoffel, as I understand him, takes the same view.<sup>5</sup>

VI. It may be worth while to warn readers against an unfounded statement which has been made about the *agger*. Rüstow,<sup>6</sup> who is followed by Mr. Judson,<sup>7</sup> says that it was on a level with the top of the enemy's wall, or even higher. That this was not always the case is proved by Caesar's statement that the troops who assaulted Avaricum had to climb the wall,<sup>8</sup>—doubtless by ladders. At the same time Colonel Stoffel<sup>9</sup> is wrong when he concludes that the *agger* never reached the top of the wall; for Lipsius<sup>10</sup> quotes instances to the contrary from Josephus and Zosimus. "The banks," says Josephus, "cast up by the Romans,"—at the siege of Jotapata,—“were becoming higher than the wall.”<sup>11</sup>

VII. Colonel Stoffel<sup>12</sup> asserts that, when a town was assaulted by the aid of a terrace, such as he believes to have been constructed at Avaricum, drawbridges were let down from the towers on to the wall. Vegetius<sup>13</sup> says that drawbridges were used in this way: but he also says that scaling-ladders were used in storming towns; and we learn from Josephus<sup>14</sup> that they were used in the assault of Jotapata. Caesar merely says that, at Avaricum, his soldiers scaled the wall (*murum ascendissent*).<sup>15</sup>

The whole subject is very difficult; and neither Marquardt nor Daremberg and Saglio nor, as far as I know, any other writer is able to give an adequate explanation. Colonel Stoffel's is the most satisfactory: but I wish he would explain more fully his views as to the way in which the *agger* at Avaricum was constructed.

<sup>1</sup> *Mém. mil. sur les Grecs et les Romains*, 1758, ii. 5-9.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C.*, ii. 2, § 3.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 27, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 732-3.

<sup>5</sup> Guischart, on the other hand, asserts (*Mém. mil.*, ii. 6) that “les Galeries étant trop basses pour protéger ce travail, lorsque l'ouvrage approchoit de son étendue et de sa hauteur, projetées, on avoit recours aux Mantelets.”

<sup>6</sup> *Heerwesen und Kriegführung*, etc., pp. 147-8.

<sup>7</sup> *Caesar's Army*, p. 90.

<sup>8</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 27, § 2.

<sup>9</sup> *Guerre civile*, ii. 362.

<sup>10</sup> *Opera*, 1637, iii. 294.

<sup>11</sup> Whiston's translation, ed. 1858, ii. 317 (*De bello Judaico*, ed. Dindorf, iii. 7, § 33).

<sup>12</sup> *Guerre civile*, ii. 361.

<sup>13</sup> *De re mil.*, iv. 21.

<sup>14</sup> *Wars of the Jews*, Bk. iii., ch. vi., § 24.

<sup>15</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 27, § 2.

THE *VINEA*, THE *MUSCULUS*, THE *TESTUDO* AND THE  
*PLUTEUS*

I. The *vinea*, as described by Vegetius,<sup>1</sup> was a stout movable wooden hut, 16 feet long, 8 feet high, and 7 feet wide. The sides were defended by wicker-work; and the roof was made of planks and protected against fire by raw hides. According to A. Rich,<sup>2</sup> one only of the four sides of the *vinea* was open: but constructed in this way, it would have been useless. The *vineae* mentioned in the *Gallie War* were intended to protect soldiers while they were constructing the *agger* and while they were forming on the *agger* prior to delivering the assault;<sup>3</sup> and it seems clear that they were placed end to end in a row. Therefore, in order to enable soldiers to move from one to another, they must have been open at the ends.<sup>4</sup> Marquardt<sup>5</sup> and Colonel Stoffel<sup>6</sup> represent them as open both at the ends and on one side, the roof being supported by the solid side and by posts at the corners. Rich, who ignores the purpose for which *vineae* were used in constructing the *agger*, says that "a sufficient number of them were joined together in a line, and run up close to the walls, so that the ram . . . could be securely plied . . . underneath them." On this theory, if the *vineae* were built in the way which Rich describes, there would have been one ram for each *vinea*!<sup>7</sup> Rich completely misunderstands Vegetius, who says that several *vineae* "are joined together,"—obviously in a direction perpendicular to the wall,—“and afford a safe shelter to the besiegers, who advance under cover.”<sup>8</sup>

Maissiat<sup>9</sup> tries to prove that the *vineae* of Caesar had nothing in common with those described by Vegetius, but were simply trenches: but, as his arguments have convinced nobody and were conclusively refuted in advance by Guischart,<sup>10</sup> it is unnecessary to discuss them.

II. The *musculus* is only mentioned once in the *Gallie War*.<sup>11</sup> Caesar says that Vercingetorix brought out *musculi* from Alesia when he was about to make his final attempt to break through the Roman lines. The *musculus*, as used at the siege of Massilia, is described fully in *B. C.*, ii. 10. It was a sapper's hut, 60 feet<sup>12</sup> long, 4 feet wide and 5

<sup>1</sup> *De re mil.*, iv. 15.

<sup>2</sup> *Dict. of Roman and Gk. Ant.*, 4th ed., p. 727.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 732-3.

<sup>4</sup> See Jull'son, *Caesar's Army*, p. 98.

<sup>5</sup> *De l'organisation mil. chez les Romains*, 1891, p. 267.

<sup>6</sup> *Guerre civile*, Atlas, Planche 10.

<sup>7</sup> Of course the ram was really worked under the cover of a *testudo* or a *musculus*, not of *vineae*, which would have been much too weak.

<sup>8</sup> *De re mil.*, iv. 15 (Clarke's translation, p. 179). See also Stoffel, *Guerre civile*, ii. 352.

<sup>9</sup> *Jules César en Gaule*, i. 189, 195, 202-3, 208-10, 226-7.

<sup>10</sup> *Mém. crit. et hist.*, t. iv., 1774, pp. 34-68.

<sup>11</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 84, § 1.

<sup>12</sup> Lipsius (*Opera*, 1637, iii. 281) believes that Caesar wrote *IX* not *LX*. He argues that it would have been impossible to procure beams 60 feet long, and that the number *IX* would harmonise with the statement of Vegetius (iv. 16),—*musculos dicunt minores machinas*. But Lipsius was not a practical man. It was not necessary that the individual beams should be as long as the *musculus*; and the *musculus* itself was evidently of a special kind.

feet high, made of timbers so strong that no heavy weights thrown upon its roof could break through. The roof was two-sided and sloping, so that missiles might roll off. It was covered by a layer of bricks, unbaked or only slightly baked, and of clay: hides were spread over the bricks, to prevent their being displaced by water; and above the hides again wet mattresses or cushions, to guard against fire and break the impact of stones. This *musculus* was used for the purpose of protecting Trebonius's soldiers while they were trying to undermine the wall of Massilia. As Caesar describes it so fully and gives its dimensions, I believe that it was a novel kind, devised for a special purpose. Vercingetorix must have used his to protect his men while they were attempting to fill up Caesar's trenches.

Mr. Judson<sup>1</sup> describes and gives an illustration of another kind of *musculus*, the sloping roof of which almost touched the ground, while the front was open for a few inches above the ground, so as to admit of a spade's being thrust through the aperture. It "was used," he says, "by workmen engaged in . . . filling up the enemy's ditch." But he does not say where he learned about this *musculus*. He evidently means to identify it with the *χελώνη χωστρίς* or *testudo* which Vitruvius describes.

According to Commandant Rouby,<sup>2</sup> the *musculus* also served to protect the men who received the materials brought up through *vineae* for the construction of the *agger*, and who put the finishing touches to the *agger* by levelling its surface (*aequandi loci causa*). The passage on which he bases this assertion runs as follows:—*Itaque pedibus lignis coniunctis inter se porticus intuebantur atque hac agger inter manus proferebatur. Antecedebat testudo pedum IX aequandi loci causa facta*, etc.<sup>3</sup> It will be observed that Caesar here uses the word *testudo*, not *musculus*; and there is no evidence that this particular *testudo* was a *musculus*. Moreover, *aequandi loci causa* does not mean "to level the surface of the *agger*," but "to level the surface of the ground" (on which the *agger* was to be constructed).

III. The *testudo* used for protecting soldiers when they were filling up ditches (*quae ad congestionem fossarum paratur*), as described by Vitruvius<sup>4</sup> and by Athenaeus and Apollodorus, who call it *χελώνη χωστρίς*,<sup>5</sup> was 25 feet square and mounted upon rollers; and the men who worked inside it were protected in front by a sloping roof or, so to speak, shutter, which almost reached the ground, and descended from

<sup>1</sup> *Caesar's Army*, p. 97.

<sup>2</sup> *Spect. mil.*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., xxxv., 1874, p. 178.

<sup>3</sup> *B. C.*, ii. 2, §§ 3-4.

<sup>4</sup> x. 21 (15), ed. V. Rose and H. Muller-Strubung, 1867.

<sup>5</sup> The illustration of the *χελώνη χωστρίς* in Smith's *Dictionary of Antiquities*, ii. 808, which differs from that given by Marquardt (*De l'organisation mil. chez les Romains*, p. 268) is identical with the one in A. de Rochas d'Aiglun's *Traité de Fortification, d'attaque et de défense des places*, par Philon de Byzance (*Mém. de la Soc. d'émulation du Doubs*, 4<sup>e</sup> sér., vol. vi., 1872, p. 286), and is taken from Heron, i. 8. The editor of the *Dictionary of Antiquities* offers an illustration of the *χελώνη διορυκτής* identical with that given by Marquardt (p. 265), which is borrowed from Rüstow and Köchly (*Die Geschichte des griechischen Kriegswesens*, 1852, p. 207, fig. 83).



the line joining the corners of the two sloping sides of the roof, properly so called. Another kind (*χελώνη διορυκτής*) described by the same writers,<sup>1</sup> was used for protecting soldiers when they were undermining a wall. According to Mr. Purser,<sup>2</sup> who follows Marquardt,<sup>3</sup> the front was perpendicular, to admit of the *testudo's* being rolled right up against the wall; and "the line of the roof formed by the two sides, which sides themselves sloped down to the ground, extended backwards," in order that stones dropped on to the *testudo* by the besieged might slide off harmlessly.

The Nervii used *testudines* when they were attacking Quintus Cicero's camp.<sup>4</sup> It is only in inference to this episode that Caesar mentions *testudines* in the *Gaulic War*: but in the civil war Trebonius used a *testudo* of some kind to protect his men in levelling the ground for the construction of the *agger* at Massilia;<sup>5</sup> and Caesar may have used one for the same purpose in Gaul.

I have done my best; but I am aware that the result is unsatisfactory. What I wanted to find out was (1) the nature of the *vineae* which Caesar used; (2) of the *musculi* which Vercingetorix used; and (3) of the *testudines* which the Nervii used. About the *vineae* we do know enough: but it is extremely unlikely that Vercingetorix's *musculus* was like the one which Caesar describes; and the *testudines* of the Nervii may, for aught we know, have been different from the *testudines* which Vitruvius describes. However, the *testudines* of the Nervii and the *musculi* of Vercingetorix were intended to serve practically the same purpose,—namely to protect men in the attempt to fill up trenches and to tear down ramparts: the Nervii built their *testudines* under the direction of Roman captives; and it is probable that they were built and protected against damage on the same general principles, the nature of which has been sufficiently described. More detailed information it is impossible to obtain. Again, the dimensions of the *testudo* which Caesar used at Massilia differed widely from those given by Vitruvius: Vitruvius borrowed his description from a Greek, Philo: there is no evidence that Caesar's *testudines* were identical with those of the Greeks; and the descriptions of Vitruvius, of Athenaeus and of Apollodorus are so obscure in certain points that commentators differ widely in their interpretation. All these difficulties are ignored, perhaps wisely, by the compilers of dictionaries of antiquities and handbooks.

IV. The *pluteus*, as described by Vegetius,<sup>6</sup> which was used to protect soldiers when they were constructing siege works, was a convex wicker shield with an arched roof, covered with hides and running on three rollers,<sup>7</sup> "one of which was placed before in the middle, and the other two at the corners behind."

<sup>1</sup> See Athenaeus, ed. C. Wescher, 1867, pp. 19-20.

<sup>2</sup> *Dict. of Ant.*, ii. 807-8.

<sup>3</sup> *De l'organisation mil. chez les Romains*, p. 265.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, v. 42, § 5.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, ii. 2, § 4.

<sup>6</sup> *De re mil.*, iv. 15.

<sup>7</sup> Rich (*Dict. of Rom. and Gk. Ant.*, 4th ed., p. 513), who misunderstands Vegetius, defines the *pluteus* which he mentions as "a movable tower with a roof overhead . . . fixed upon wheels."

But although Caesar doubtless used *plutei* of this sort, it is not certain that he uses the word in this sense in the *Gallic War*. In *B. G.*, vii. 25, § 1, he speaks of *pluteos turrium*, which Napoleon<sup>1</sup> explains as "les mantelets protégeant les approches des tours." Von Göler<sup>2</sup> regards them as wet hides intended to protect the towers from fire. Long<sup>3</sup> says they were "the planks on the 'turrets,' the breastworks which protected the soldiers"; and in support of this view he refers to *B. G.*, vii. 72, § 4, where Caesar uses the word to designate the breastworks which protected the rampart in his line of contravallation round Alesia. But there is no evidence that these *plutei* were identical with the *plutei turrium*. Köchly,<sup>4</sup> as far as I understand him, thinks that these *plutei* were separate from the towers, and placed some in front and others along the sides of the terrace, in order to protect the workers. But if so, why were they called *plutei turrium*? Köchly gets over this difficulty by deleting *turrium*, which is too drastic a remedy for my taste. Curtius<sup>5</sup> speaks of *plutei* which were intended to protect the men who moved towers; and accordingly Schneider<sup>6</sup> concludes that the *plutei* used at Avaricum were identical with those which Vegetius describes. We must not, he argues, regard them as breastworks attached to the stories of the tower itself, because Caesar says that, in consequence of the burning of the *plutei*, it was difficult for the Romans *adire apertos ad auxiliandum*. I do not regard this argument as conclusive, because the men who are described as *aperti* might have been the men who were stationed in the towers, and not those who moved them. I am inclined, however, to believe that the *plutei turrium* were of the kind to which Curtius alludes, because, if they had been breastworks attached to the towers and had been burned, the flames would probably have consumed the towers themselves.

In *B. G.*, vii. 41, § 4, 72, § 4, Caesar uses the word *pluteus* in the sense of breastworks, which were used as an extraordinary defence. In the former chapter we read that Fabius, whom Caesar left in command of his camp at Gergovia when he went to meet the Aeduan infantry, added *plutei* to the rampart. In the other passage Caesar, describing the line of contravallation which he constructed round Alesia, says that he "threw up a rampart 12 feet high, which he strengthened with a palisade and an embattled breastwork, with large forked branches projecting along the line where the breastwork joined the rampart (*aggerem ac vallum XII pedum exstruxit. Huic lorica pinnaeque adiecit grandibus cervis eminentibus ad commissuras pluteorum atque aggeris*). These *plutei* were identical with the *lorica pinnaeque*, and perhaps also with the *vallum* or palisade.

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 261.      <sup>2</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 255, n. 9.

<sup>3</sup> *Caesar*, p. 349.

<sup>4</sup> See von Göler, *Gall. Krieg*, p. 256, note.

<sup>5</sup> *Caesa materia . . . pluteis faciendis, ut qui turres admoveant extra teli ictum essent. De rebus gestis Alexandri Magni*, v. 3, § 7.

<sup>6</sup> *Caesar*, ii. 407-8.

THE *FALX MURALIS*

The *falx muralis* was used for loosening and dragging down the stones and timbers in the wall of a besieged town,<sup>1</sup> and was worked by men who were protected by a *testudo* or *musculus*.<sup>2</sup> According to Vegetius,<sup>3</sup> it was a wooden beam with a piece of iron at the end, bent into the shape of a hook. A specimen was discovered in 1862 in the Gallic wall of Vesontio (Besançon), of which Daremberg and Saglio (*Dict. des antiquités grecques et rom.*, ii. 970) give an illustration.

## CAESAR'S BRIDGES

Caesar does not describe any of his bridges, except the one which he built over the Rhine in 55 B.C. He tells us, however, that Labienus crossed the arm of the Seine which separated him from the island on which Melodunum was situated by lashing boats together; and he also says that he himself threw his army across the Saône (not far from its junction with the Rhône) in a single day.<sup>4</sup> We may infer that he generally used bridges of boats of some sort.<sup>5</sup> His legionaries crossed a narrow tributary of the Nile by means of long hollowed out trunks of trees, which stretched from bank to bank, the hollows being filled with *agger*,—probably earth or rubble,—to render them easily passable; and during his second Spanish campaign the river Bactis was hastily spanned by an inpromptu bridge, which was kept in position by means of baskets weighted with stones.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 22, § 2.

<sup>2</sup> See Stoffel, *Guerre civile*, ii. 354, and his Atlas, Planche 10.

<sup>3</sup> *De re mil.*, iv. 14.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, i. 13, §§ 1-2; vii. 58, § 4.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Fröhlich, *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, 1891, pp. 213-14, and Guischart *Mém. crit. et hist.*, .. 45-52.

<sup>6</sup> *Bell. Alex.*, 29, § 4; *Bell. Hisp.*, 5, § 1. See also Fröhlich, p. 213.

## SECTION VII.—RELATING TO THE NARRATIVE OF CAESAR'S CAMPAIGNS

### THE ROUTES OPEN TO THE HELVETII

CAESAR says that "there were two routes and only two by which the Helvetii could leave their country" (*Erant omnino itinera duo, quibus itineribus domo exire possent*),<sup>1</sup> namely the route through the Pas de l'Écluse, which they actually took, and the route leading across the Rhône into the Roman Province. On this question Long<sup>2</sup> writes a sensible note. "It has been objected," he says, "to Caesar's text, that there are other practicable passes through the Jura; but that is nothing to the purpose. All he says is that there was only one road through the Jura by which the Helvetii could leave the country, encumbered with their women, children and waggons. The Helvetii had formed their plan to go through the Province, as the shortest and easiest way, and accordingly had mustered . . . in the neighbourhood of Geneva. If they had anticipated opposition, they might have mustered somewhere else, and crossed by the road that leads to Pontarlier . . . or by any other, if there was any other waggon-road at that time, and at this season of the year. But they would choose the shortest route to the Santones, and not the longest." (The italics are mine.) Desjardins, however, who believes that the Helvetii dared not go through any of the more northerly passes, for fear of Ariovistus, insists that detachments of the host went through the more southerly passes. "La texte," he argues, "n'exige nullement que la sortie ait été accomplie en entier par le pas de l'Écluse."<sup>3</sup> Desjardins is certainly wrong. "What can be clearer than the text? "*Erant omnino itinera duo. . . . Relinquebatur una per Sequanos via, qua Sequanis invititis propter angustias ire non poterant.*"

Heller also says<sup>4</sup> that the Helvetii would have taken the route leading past Basle if they had not been afraid of Ariovistus. But we know nothing of their relations with Ariovistus, and cannot tell whether they were afraid of him or had reason to be.

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 6, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 661-2

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, p. 44.

<sup>4</sup> *Philologus*, xxvi., 1867, p. 662.

## CAESAR'S LINES ON THE RHONE

I. Caesar says,<sup>1</sup> that the distance from the Lake of Geneva *ad montem Iuram* was 19 Roman miles, or about 28 kilometres. Desjardins,<sup>2</sup> who assumes that the terminus of Caesar's entrenchment was the Pas de l'Écluse, finds fault with Napoleon for saying that the distance is 28 kilometres, measured along the bank, and says that it is really 28 kilometres in a straight line. Desjardins, however, is himself mistaken; for, as any one may see who will examine Sheet 150 and 160 of the *Carte de l'État-Major*, the distance in a straight line is only 20½ kilometres. According to Colonel Stoffel,<sup>3</sup> the distance, "following the sinuosities of the river," is 32 kilometres. My own measurement agrees more closely with Napoleon's: but at all events Caesar was thinking of the distance "following,"—as far as it was necessary to do so,—“the sinuosities of the river”; for how was he to measure the distance in a straight line? His measurements were rough and ready, and we have no right to assume that by *ad montem Iuram* he meant the Pas de l'Écluse *exactly*: but he was not far wrong.

II. *A lacu Lemanno*, writes Caesar, *qui in flumen Rhodanum influit, ad montem Iuram . . . milia passuum decem novem murum in altitudinem pedum sedecim fossamque perducit.* *B. G.*, i. 8, § 1.

Napoleon points out<sup>4</sup> that Caesar's description is not to be understood literally, because it would have been impossible for the Helvetii to attempt the passage of the Rhône, between Geneva and the Pas de l'Écluse, with any prospect of success, except at a few places. Those places are described in full detail by Napoleon, in a summary of the report of Colonel Stoffel, who was sent by him to examine the ground; and they are marked in his map, in accordance with the results of Colonel Stoffel's examination.

Long believes, in spite of Colonel Stoffel and Napoleon, that the lines were continuous, (1) because Caesar says so, and (2) because continuous lines would have been a better protection, as the Helvetii might otherwise have climbed the banks.<sup>5</sup> Put how could they have done so, where the banks were precipitous, with all their waggons? And, supposing that some of them had crossed the river without their waggons and had climbed the precipitous banks, they would also have been able to climb the (assumed) rampart unless Roman soldiers had been there to defend it; while if they had been there, the bank would have served as a natural rampart, and the Helvetii would not have been allowed to climb. Caesar was not writing a technical treatise, but a popular narrative; and he doubtless expressed himself loosely, as he did, on certain points of detail, in describing his works at Alesia. Dion Cassius had the wit to perceive his meaning; for he tells us that Caesar fortified the most important points (*τὰ ἐπικαιρότατα διετάφρευσεν καὶ ἀπετείχισεν*, xxxviii. 31, § 4).

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 8, § 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 598, n. 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 49-51, note.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, ii. 48.

<sup>5</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 2, note.

WHAT ROUTE DID CAESAR TAKE WHEN HE MARCHED  
IN 58 B.C. VIA OCELUM AGAINST THE HELVETII?

Caesar<sup>1</sup> says that he took the shortest route over the Alps into Transalpine Gaul; that the Ceutrones, Graioceli and Caturiges attacked him on the way; that, seven days after he left Ocelum, he reached the territory of the Vocontii; and that he made his way thence into the country of the Allobroges, and thence into the country of the Segusiavi.

I have shown on pages 432-3, that Ocelum stood upon the site of Drubiaglio, from which it follows that, in the first stage of his march, Caesar moved along the valley of the Dora Riparia. On this point von Goler and Napoleon are wrong. But they and all other modern commentators, except Maissiat,<sup>2</sup> are agreed that Caesar crossed the Mont Genève, and passed by Brigantio (Briançon); and, as he went by way of the Dora Riparia, he must have done so. From Brigantio divergence begins. According to von Goler,<sup>3</sup> Caesar subsequently advanced by the left bank of the Romanche and the right bank of the Drac to Cularo (Grenoble), where he crossed the Isère, and thence to Vienna (Vienne) and Lugdunum (Lyons). This itinerary, says General Creuly,<sup>4</sup> contradicts Caesar's implied statement that he crossed the country of the Vocontii; and Long<sup>5</sup> who agrees with this argument, makes the further objection that there was probably no practicable road at that time between Brigantio and Cularo, and concludes that "Caesar took the comparatively easy road,"—from Brigantio,—“through Embrun, Gap, Die (Dea) to Valence (Valentia) on the Rhône.” The route traced by Kiepert<sup>6</sup> leads from Brigantio to Cularo along a slightly different line from that indicated by von Goler: from Cularo to Lugdunum his route and von Goler's coincide. Napoleon<sup>7</sup> also takes Caesar to Cularo: but thence he leads him by a nearly direct route to a point on the Rhône a few miles above Lugdunum. His route and Kiepert's are both open to the objection which Creuly makes to the theory of von Goler.

As far as Brigantio, I repeat, the route is certain. As to Caesar's objective was that part of the country of the Segusiavi which extended between the Rhône and the Saône, in the neighbourhood of Lyons, it will be obvious to any one who consults a good map<sup>8</sup> that his shortest route would have led past Grenoble, if between Briançon and Grenoble there was a practicable road; and, at the time when the Peutinger Table was constructed, there certainly was. From Briançon to Grenoble the modern traveller must go either by the valleys of the Guisane, the Romanche and the Drac, or, by a longer road, past

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 10, §§ 3-5.

<sup>2</sup> *Jules César en Gaule*, 1865-81, i. 49-105, 330-41.

<sup>3</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 13 and Taf. I.

<sup>4</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, p. 255.

<sup>5</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 6.

<sup>6</sup> *Tabulae Galliae Cisalpinæ et Transalpinæ in usum scholarum descripta*.

<sup>7</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 57, note, and Planche 19.

<sup>8</sup> The best is Feuille 60 of the *Carte de France* (1:200,000).

<sup>9</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, vol. ii. (map facing p. 224), vol. iv., p. 155.

Embrun, Chorges and Gap, and thence down the valley of the Drac. But it is doubtful whether either of these routes would have led Caesar into the country of the Vocontii.<sup>1</sup> I am therefore disposed to believe that he did not pass Grenoble at all, but took the road, indicated by Long, which leads past Embrun, Chorges, Gap and Die.

## CAESAR'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HELVETII<sup>2</sup>

I. The route which the Helvetii pursued, after threading the Pas de l'Écluse, to the Saône, cannot be traced exactly. We only know that they passed through the outlying territory of the Allobroges<sup>3</sup> on the northern bank of the Rhône, and that they struck the Saône not far north of Lyons. Napoleon, following M. Valentin-Smith,<sup>4</sup> assumes that they moved along the right bank of the Rhône as far as Culoz, and then struck off to the west, along the line of the Roman road which led past Vivien-le-grand, Tenay and St-Rambert, and across the plateau of Dombes to the Saône. By following this route, says A. Bernard,<sup>5</sup> they would have avoided incommoding the Sequani. Spreading out, as M. Valentin-Smith thinks, in the latter part of their route, they crossed the Saône at various points between St-Bernard and Montmerle, or, according to C. Cadot<sup>6</sup> and Thomann,<sup>7</sup> at Villefranche, Messimy, Montmerle and Belleville. Cadot points out that above Belleville access to the river would have been barred by "de forêts inextricables, dont le défrichement, assez récent, n'est même pas complètement achevé." M. A. Senault<sup>8</sup> also brings the Helvetii to St-Bernard, but by a different route, namely Nantua, la Cluse and Brion. He argues that they could not have marched along the bank of the Rhône, because, if they had done so, Caesar, instead of going to Italy for reinforcements, would have attacked them in flank. How Caesar was to attack in flank a vast host from which he was separated by a broad and rapid river, I cannot see, nor, even if such an operation had been practicable, would he have attempted it with his insignificant force.

II. Where did Caesar defeat the Tigurini,—the rearguard of the Helvetii,—and from what place did he march against them?

De Sauley makes him cross the Rhône at Vienne in his march from Italy, then cross the Saône, and finally recross the Saône after defeating the Tigurini.<sup>9</sup> But this itinerary is obviously wrong. Why should

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 511-13.

<sup>2</sup> See *Carte de France* (1 : 200,000), Sheets 41 and 47, and *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000), Sheet 136, N.E. and S.E. ;

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 376-7.

<sup>4</sup> *Fouilles dans la vallée du Formans en 1862*, map facing p. 6.

<sup>5</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. Roy. des antiquaires de France*, nouv. sér., t. xviii., 1846, pp. 372-3.

<sup>6</sup> *Note sur l'invasion des Helvètes*, 1862, pp. 6-8.

<sup>7</sup> *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, etc., xci., 1865, p. 697.

<sup>8</sup> *L'Œuvre de Jacques Maissiat*, 1892, pp. 24-5, 28-9.

<sup>9</sup> *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, 1862, p. 287.

Caesar have three times performed the troublesome operation of crossing a river when it was only necessary to do so twice? De Saulcy misunderstands the passage (Caesar) *ab Allobrogibus in Segusiavos exercitum ducit. Hi sunt extra provinciam trans Rhodanum primi*.<sup>1</sup> These words mean that Caesar, after crossing the Rhône, found himself in that part of the territory of the Segusiavi which lay between the Rhône and the Saône. General Creuly, however, agrees with de Saulcy. He says that in *Segusiavos* must mean "le véritable pays ségusiave, le Forez," even if the Segusiavi possessed any territory on the eastern bank of the Saône.<sup>2</sup> I have proved on pages 480-81, that they did possess territory on this bank. Why should not that part of their territory have been "véritable" as well as the other? General Creuly's theory leads him to an absurd conclusion. He is forced to make Caesar cross the Saône in order to attack the Tigurini, although Caesar does not say one word about any such crossing. If Caesar did cross the Saône, he must either have made a bridge or found one. But if so, he would surely have recrossed the Saône, after destroying the Tigurini, by the same bridge. Yet he tells us that, in order to cross from the eastern to the western bank of the Saône, he was obliged to make a bridge.<sup>3</sup> It is therefore clear that he crossed the Saône once only, and that that part of the country of the Segusiavi in which he encamped on his return from Italy, was on the eastern bank of the river.

When he set out on his night march to attack the Tigurini, he was somewhere in this territory. M. Valentin-Smith argues that his camp could not have been so far north as Trévoux, because Trévoux, being situated between two places called Ambérieux, must have been in the country of the Ambarri;<sup>4</sup> and this may be a reasonable conclusion. Anyhow, Caesar could not have encamped anywhere on the north of Trévoux; for Cadot<sup>5</sup> has proved that the vast host of the Helvetii must have crossed the Saône at various points, and that those points must have lain between Belleville and St-Bernard, which is nearly due west of Trévoux and only 18 kilometres south of Belleville; and it is obvious that Caesar's camp was some distance south of the southernmost point of passage. Now in the country south of Trévoux the most suitable spot for a camp is on the heights which command Sathonay. The Tigurini were attempting to cross the Saône at some point where it flowed so slowly that one could hardly tell, by merely looking at it, in which direction it was flowing. Caesar left his camp soon after midnight, doubtless with the intention of attacking the Tigurini before sunrise, and succeeded in surprising them as they were attempting to cross the Saône.<sup>6</sup> We may infer, then, that he had not far to march, and that the lie of the ground had masked his approach.

1. De Saulcy believes that the defeat of the Tigurini took place a little to the north of Mâcon.<sup>7</sup> But that it did not take place so far

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 10, § 5.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, i. 18, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Note sur l'invasion des Helvètes*, pp. 6, 8.

<sup>4</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, p. 256.

<sup>5</sup> *Fouilles dans la vallée du Formans*, p. 5.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, i. 12, §§ 1-3.

<sup>7</sup> *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, pp. 289-94.



north as this, still less at Chalon, where it has also been placed, is proved by the following facts. First, the current of the Saône only answers to Caesar's description in that part of its course which lies between Trévoux and Thoissey;<sup>1</sup> secondly, Caesar would not have taken the trouble to leave his camp in the country of the Segusiavi at midnight, in order to march to a spot which he could hardly have reached at any time on the following day; and thirdly, if the Helvetii had started from a point so far north as Mâcon on their march towards a point south-east of Mont Beuvray, they would not have taken a fortnight or more to accomplish so short a distance.<sup>2</sup>

2. Napoleon places the attempted passage of the Saône by the Tigurini at the point where it is joined by the Formans.<sup>3</sup> If their encampment was not more than a few miles north of Trévoux, the route by which they had approached the Saône must have been the valley of this stream. This valley is dominated on the left by hills which would have screened the Roman column from observation as it marched from Sathonay. Napoleon, however, simply asserts that "the excavations carried on in 1862 leave no doubt of the place of this defeat." The results of the excavations have been described by M. Valentin-Smith.<sup>4</sup> The excavations were carried on in the valley of the Formans, on the plateau of St-Bernard and at the hamlet of Cormoz. Out of a total of 60 excavations 41 yielded results. These included cinders, human bones, fragments of flint weapons, pottery, bronze bracelets, a bronze sword and a couple of iron weapons. Two vases are said to resemble some which have been discovered in the lake dwellings at Neufchâtel. Desjardins maintains that some of the objects go to prove that the battle was *not* fought at the spot which Napoleon indicates; for, he says, the Helvetii, in the stage of civilisation which they had reached, no longer used flint weapons.<sup>5</sup> But all evidence shows that the stone, bronze and iron ages overlapped; flint weapons have often been found side by side with those of metal; and therefore some at least of the Tigurini may still have used primitive weapons.<sup>6</sup> Desjardins objects further that, if the Tigurini had been encamped near Trévoux, Caesar, who, on Napoleon's theory, was only 18 kilometres off at Sathonay, would not have needed scouts to tell him what they were doing; and that the Tigurini would not have been such fools as to attempt to cross the Saône "under the eyes, so to speak, of six Roman legions."<sup>7</sup> These objections have no force. Caesar could not have *seen* what the Tigurini were doing 18 kilometres<sup>8</sup> off; and if he wanted to know, he had no choice but to employ scouts. If the

<sup>1</sup> Ch. Cadot, *Note sur l'invasion des Helvètes*, pp. 6-8, 10.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, i. 15, § 5, 16, §§ 1-3, 23, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 60, 61, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Fouilles dans la vallée du Formans*, pp. 22-3, 25, 29, 31-2.

<sup>5</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 607, n. 3.

<sup>6</sup> See E. Chantre, *Études paléolithologiques*, 1867, pp. 50-51, and V. Smith, p. 138, note.

<sup>7</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 606.

<sup>8</sup> Desjardins says 13 kilometres, which is a mistake.

Tigurini had attempted to move their unwieldy waggons further up the bank, they would have gained nothing, for Caesar could have overtaken them whenever he pleased; and, whether they were fools or not, they certainly attempted to cross the Saône at a point which was within a night-march from Caesar's camp. M. C. Guigne argues<sup>1</sup> that as, in the disposal of the dead, towards the close of the republican period of Roman history, incineration was usual and inhumation exceptional, the sepultures of the former kind, which the excavations revealed, are those of Romans, and the sepultures of the latter kind are those of Gauls. But 37 of the former were discovered, against 4 of the latter: and, as the loss of the Tigurini must have been far greater than that of the Romans, M. Guigne's argument is worthless. It has also been urged that, in the sepultures by incineration which the excavations disclosed, "the cremation had nowhere been complete, which proves that they had been burnt hastily and excludes all notion of an ordinary cemetery."<sup>2</sup> Such discoveries, however, unless they are as unmistakable as the Arvernian coins found at Alise-Ste-Reine, have little independent value as evidence in inquiries of this kind. By far the strongest argument which can be urged in favour of Napoleon's site is the purely geographical one which I have already stated; and perhaps the results of the excavations lend the argument some support.

3. General Creuly believes with Heller that Caesar crossed the Saône at Belleville:<sup>3</sup> but it is much more likely that the Tigurini had approached the river by the valley of the Formans.

III. Assuming that Caesar defeated the Tigurini in the valley of the Formans, and there crossed the Saône, we have next to inquire by what route the Helvetii marched to the scene of their final overthrow. Their object was to reach the country of the Santones, that is to say, the valley of the Charente. After telling us that they marched for a fortnight about 5 miles ahead of his vanguard, Caesar remarks that they had moved away from the Saône,—*iter ab Arure averterant*. He does not say when they began to move away; but the phrase which he uses seems to imply that for some time they had marched parallel with the river. When he had reached a point not more than 18 Roman miles from Bibracte (Mont Beuvray), he changed his direction and marched towards Bibracte. It is therefore clear that the general direction of the march up to that point had been towards the north-west.

1. Napoleon's route leads by way of Belleville, over the Col d'Avenas, through the valley of the Grosne, past Cluny to St-Vallier, thence westward across the river Arroux, about 3 miles south of Toulon, past Issy l'Evêque and Mont Tauffrin to Remilly on the Alène. From a point near Remilly, he thinks, Caesar struck off for Bibracte: but he does not say by what road the Helvetii marched back to attack Caesar.<sup>4</sup>

Heller, who, like Napoleon, makes Caesar diverge from the Saône

<sup>1</sup> *Fouilles dans la vallée du Formans*, p. 93.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 61, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Rev. arch.*, viii., 1863, pp. 257-8.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 62-6 and Planche 4.

near Belleville, argues, in a criticism of the map published by the Commission de la carte des Gaules, that if he had marched up the valley as far as Chalon, he could have procured grain from his boats on the river and would never have felt any anxiety about his supplies, since for the short distance between Chalon and the scene of the final overthrow of the Helvetii, the legionaries could have carried enough food on their backs.<sup>1</sup>

2. General Creuly so far agrees with Heller that he admits the absurdity of the theory which makes Caesar march up the valley of the Saône as far as Chalon: but he holds that he must have gone as far as Mâcon, remarking, that his words, *quod iter ab Arare Helvetii averterant*, imply that he had pursued the road along the valley for a considerable distance after crossing the river. From Mâcon he suggests that Caesar followed the Helvetii by way of Cluny, Joney and St-Eusèbe or Blanzey.<sup>2</sup> The latter part of this route, as the reader will presently see, is too far east.

3. Colonel Stoffel, whose opinion is worth having, believes that the Helvetii marched up the right bank of the Saône till they neared Mâcon; then struck off in a north-westerly direction towards Prissé; followed the line of the modern road leading from Mâcon to Autun by way of Cluny, Salornay and Mont St-Vincent, where they were at the lowest point of the mountains which separate the valley of the Saône from the valley of the Loire; and thence turned westward, past Sanvigne to Toulon-sur-Arroux.<sup>3</sup> The tracing of the last few miles of the route must depend upon the identification of the battle-field.

I believe that Colonel Stoffel has traced the general direction of the route accurately; for, as I shall presently show, his identification of the battle-field is almost certainly correct: but all that can be said for certain is that Caesar did not advance up the valley of the Saône nearly as far as Chalon, but that he did follow that route for some distance. It remains to look for the scene of the battle.

IV. Caesar, in his description of the battle, says that, when the Roman army formed in three lines, was pursuing the Helvetii, after their first repulse, the Boii and Tulingi attacked the Romans on their exposed flank,—*ex itinere nostros (ab) latere aperto aggressi circumvenire*.<sup>4</sup> The meaning of the words (*ab*) *latere aperto* has been much discussed, because it affects the question of the identity of the battle-field.

The words are usually taken to mean "on the right flank,"—unprotected, because the shield was worn on the left arm; and Napoleon quotes, in support of this interpretation, a passage in which Livy describes the escape of 600 Roman soldiers from Cannae. The 600

<sup>1</sup> *Philologus*, xix., 1863, pp. 558-9.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. arch.*, viii., 1863, pp. 259-60.

<sup>3</sup> *Guerre civile*, ii. 443-4. The route traced by Cadot coincides with that of Colonel Stoffel as far as Mont St-Vincent. He shows that the valley of the Little Grosne, through which runs the road from Mâcon to Autun, offered a practicable and even easy route. In tracing the later stages, however, he argues on the untenable hypothesis that Bibracte was on the site of Autun. *Note sur l'invasion des Helvètes*, pp. 12-17.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, i. 25, §§ 6-7.

were formed in the shape of a wedge ; and, says Livy, " Seeing that the Numidians aimed at their right sides, which were exposed, they changed their shields to their right arms, and escaped to the number of six hundred into the greater camp " <sup>1</sup> (*cum in latus dextrum, quod patebat, Numidæ iacularentur, translatis in dextrum scutis, in maiora castra ad sexcentos evaserunt*).<sup>2</sup> I do not regard this passage as decisive, because the 600 were not fighting in line, but, as I have already said, in the shape of a wedge ; and therefore they were of course completely exposed, on the unshielded side, along the whole depth of the formation.

F. Fröhlich<sup>3</sup> quotes two passages in support of the orthodox view. In the former we read that when the legions were fighting outside the wall of Gergovia, they were panic-stricken by the sight of an Aeduan force, suddenly appearing on their exposed flank, which they mistook for an enemy (*subito sunt Aedui visi ab latere ostriis aperto*).<sup>4</sup> In the latter we read that, at Pharsalus, Pompey determined to attack Caesar's right wing on its exposed flank (*Persuasi equitibus nostris . . . ut . . . dextrum Caesaris cornu ab latere aperto adgrederentur*).<sup>5</sup> The "exposed flank," in each of these cases, is universally admitted to have been the right flank ; and Fröhlich infers, perhaps hastily, that *ab latere aperto* always means "on the right flank."

Colonel Stoffel<sup>6</sup> ridicules Fröhlich's arguments. At Gergovia, he observes, the Roman left was covered by Sextius's legion and therefore the right, which was unprotected, was of course, on this particular occasion, the *latus apertum*. At Pharsalus, Caesar's left rested on the Enipeus : his right was exposed in the plain of Pharsalus ; therefore here too his right flank was the exposed flank, not because it was the right, but simply because it happened to be exposed. Again, Colonel Stoffel asks, if the right flank of a line of battle rested upon a river and the left were uncovered in a plain, how could the soldiers' shields prevent an enemy from turning that flank ? Every soldier would call the left flank of an army so situated its exposed flank. To prove his point, Fröhlich ought to have shown that no Latin writer ever called the left flank of an army *latus apertum*.

With all respect, however, for the professional knowledge of Colonel Stoffel, his reply, at least in so far as it relates to Gergovia, is inconclusive. Let him look at Napoleon's map of Gergovia, and he must admit that, if the Roman left was covered by the legion of Sextius, the Roman right was equally covered by the 10th legion. As a matter of fact, neither the left nor the right was, strictly speaking, covered at all, except during the retreat. But, if Colonel Stoffel's reply is inconclusive, so is Fröhlich's argument, at least in so far as it relates to Pharsalus. Heller,<sup>7</sup> indeed, argues that, at Pharsalus, the right flank of Caesar's right wing was covered by his cavalry, and yet was called *latus apertum*.<sup>8</sup> But to this I reply that it was not until Caesar's right wing had become

<sup>1</sup> I reproduce Messrs. Church and Brodribb's translation. <sup>2</sup> xxii. 50.

<sup>3</sup> *Das Kriegswesen Cæsars*, 1891, p. 225.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 50, § 1.

<sup>5</sup> *B. C.*, iii. 86, § 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Rev. de Philologie*, xv., 1891, pp. 139, 144-5.

<sup>7</sup> *Philologus*, xxvi., 1867, p. 659.

<sup>8</sup> *B. C.*, iii. 93, §§ 3-4.

exposed by the rout of his cavalry that Pompey's cavalry attacked the right wing *ab latere aperto*.

Nevertheless, there are several passages in Caesar which would seem to show that *ab latere aperto* does mean "on the right flank." In *B. G.*, v. 35, § 2, 'describing the destruction of Sabinus's division by the Eburones, Caesar tells us that one of the Roman cohorts occasionally charged forth from the hollow square in which the division was formed. "Meanwhile," he continues, "the cohort was necessarily exposed, and missiles rained in on its exposed flank" (*Interim eam partem nudari necesse erat et ab latere aperto telu recipi*). Now here is a fact which Colonel Stoffel would find it difficult either to contradict or to explain away: *that cohort was equally uncovered*, in the modern sense of the word, *on its left flank and on its right*. Therefore, unless *ab latere aperto* means *ab utroque latere* (on both flanks) either it must have had a technical meaning, which Caesar's Roman readers would have at once understood, or it must have conveyed no meaning whatever! *Ab latere aperto* "may mean," says Long,<sup>1</sup> "that the cohort was altogether exposed after leaving the 'orbis.'" Of course it was,—as regarded position. But if *ab latere aperto* meant what Long suggests, why did not Caesar write *ab utroque latere* (or *ab lateribus*) and make his meaning clear?

In *B. G.*, vii. 82, § 2, Caesar describes the night attack which the Gallic army of relief made upon the Roman line of circumvallation in the plain on the west of Alesia. Towards daybreak the Gauls retreated, for fear they might be attacked on their exposed flank by a Roman force sallying forth from one of the camps on the high ground (*veriti, ne ab latere aperto ex superioribus castris eruptione circumvenirentur*). The Gallic left was exposed, as regarded position, no less than the Gallic right. There were Roman camps on high ground on the left and also on the right. Either, then, *ab latere aperto* signified the right and unshielded flank, or it signified nothing. There is no escape from this conclusion unless *ab latere aperto* means *ab utroque latere* or *ab lateribus*.

But if Caesar had meant *ab utroque latere* or *ab lateribus*, surely he would have said so? It would have been so easy to make his meaning clear; and he does use the phrases *ab utroque latere* and *ab lateribus*<sup>2</sup> when they are required. According to Colonel Stoffel, *ab latere aperto* means either "on the left flank" or "on the right flank," as the case may be: in other words, Caesar does not take the trouble to say which flank he means. Perhaps. But it would have been so easy to say *ab latere dextro* or *ab latere sinistro*; and he does use the phrase *ab dextro latere*.<sup>3</sup> Is there not some ground, then, for arguing that *ab latere aperto* had a fixed technical meaning?

One word more. Thucydides, in his description of the battle of Mantinea, tells us that "All armies, when engaging, are apt to thrust outwards their right wing; and either of the opposing forces tends to outflank his enemy's left with his own right, because every soldier indi-

<sup>1</sup> *Caesar*, p. 252.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 8, §§ 3-4 and vii. 24, § 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, vii. 49, § 1. A third passage, which is strictly analogous to the two which I have just examined, is to be found in iv. 26, § 3.

vidually fears for his exposed side, which he tries to cover with the shield of his comrade on the right, conceiving that the closer he draws in the better he will be protected. The first man in the front rank of the right wing is originally responsible for the deflection, for he always wants to withdraw from the enemy his own exposed side, and the rest of the army, from a like fear, follow his example." I quote from Jowett's translation.<sup>1</sup> Does not this passage lend some support to the view that *ab latere aperto* means "on the right flank"?<sup>2</sup>

Lastly, Lucan, in his description of the rash attack which some of Caesar's troops made upon those of Afranius and Petreius at Ilerda,<sup>3</sup> calls the left flank of the Roman cavalry "their protected flank" (*munitionum latus*),<sup>4</sup> which is an additional argument in support of my view, that *apertum latus* was a technical phrase, meaning "the right flank."

It is true that, in describing the battle with the Helvetii, Caesar, if the MSS. are right, does not use the phrase *ab latere aperto*, but simply *latere aperto*. This would, I suppose, mean that the Boii and Tulingi attacked the Romans in flank, as their flank was exposed; and there would be nothing to show whether the exposed flank was the right or the left. But Dittenberger and Doberenz-Dinter, following H. Meusel,<sup>5</sup> supply *ab* before *latere aperto*.

The battle-field, according to Caesar,<sup>6</sup> was less than 18 Roman miles from Bibracte. This is all that is certainly known: but we may be sure that it was somewhere to the south-east, south or south-west of Bibracte, simply because the Helvetii could have had no motive for passing by the east and north of that town, in order to reach the Loire.

1. De Sauley, writing before the results of M. Bulliot's investigations had been published, identified Bibracte with Autun, and placed the battle-field at Cussy-la-Colonne, 16 miles, in a direct line, north-east by east of Autun and about 25 miles east-north-east of Mont Beuvray.<sup>7</sup> Now Bibracte was on Mont Beuvray;<sup>8</sup> and Cussy-la-Colonne is much further from Mont Beuvray than the battle-field was from Bibracte.

2. Ch. Aubertin, also assuming the identity of Bibracte with Autun, found the battle-field at Viécourt, about 2 miles south-west of Nolay.<sup>9</sup> But Viécourt is much more than 18 Roman miles from Beuvray, and, like Cussy-la-Colonne, far to the east of it.

3. Von Goler,<sup>10</sup> who also argues on the untenable hypothesis that Bibracte was at Autun, concludes that when Caesar struck off towards Bibracte, he had reached Château-Chinon. But Château-Chinon is at least 9 miles further north than Beuvray and than Autun. What conceivable motive could the Helvetii have had for marching so far northward?

<sup>1</sup> *Thucydides, Translated into English*, i. 389.

<sup>2</sup> There may perhaps be some force in Thomann's remark that, in a passage in the *Civil War* (ii. 33, § 2), Caesar speaks of a man's right shoulder as *humerus apertus*:—*humerum apertum gladio appetit paulumque affuit quin Varum interficeret, quod ille periculum sublatum ad eius conatum scuto vitavit*. See *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, etc., xci., 1865, p. 968.

<sup>4</sup> *Pharsalia*, iv. 43-5.

<sup>5</sup> *Lec. Cæs.*, ii. 414.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, i.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, i. 23, § 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Les compagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, pp. 317-74.

<sup>8</sup> See pp. 387-94.

<sup>9</sup> *Rev. des Soc. savantes*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér. t. iv., 1864, p. 120 ff.

<sup>10</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 24.

4. Kiepert,<sup>1</sup> who makes the Helvetii march along the right bank of the Saône as far north as Chalon, and then turn sharply to the west, places the battle-field about 8 miles east by south of Autun. But the Helvetii would have needlessly increased the length of their journey by taking this route; and I have proved that they did not follow the line of the Saône as far as Chalon.<sup>2</sup>

5. Heller insists that the battle must have taken place on the east of Bibracte; for, he argues, if the Helvetii had got westward of that town by the time when Caesar moved off towards it, they would have tried to push on as far ahead of Caesar as possible, and would not have turned back. If, he adds, they had been on the west of Caesar when they changed their line of march, they would not have brought back their waggons. His view is that they only attacked Caesar in order to force a passage towards the west.<sup>3</sup> But he overlooks several important considerations. First, the Helvetii must have known that Caesar could easily overtake their unwieldy host. Secondly, they would have taken their waggons with them to the battle-field in any case: partly because they would not have been so foolish as to leave them alone and unprotected with the women and children; partly, as B. Muller<sup>3</sup> points out and as we may gather from Caesar's description of the battle, to serve as a *laager*. Thirdly, even if the Helvetii had been on the east of Bibracte, they would not have been obliged to attack Caesar: when he moved off towards Bibracte, they would only have had to move on and leave him to his own devices. Finally, if the Helvetii were actuated by the motive which Heller imputes to them, why did Caesar impute to them a motive wholly different?<sup>4</sup>

6. Napoleon<sup>5</sup> points to a site on the rivulet of La Roche, about 7 miles, in a direct line, south-south-west of Mont Beuvray; and he identifies the *proximus collis*, on which Caesar formed his line of battle, with a hill between the villages of Grand-Marié and Petit-Marié.

7. Colonel Stoffel claims to have established the identity of the site beyond all doubt; and he has certainly written a most valuable and interesting essay on the campaign.<sup>6</sup> He tells us that he was commissioned by Napoleon to search for the battle-field; that, after a careful study of the country round Mont Beuvray, he selected two possible sites,—the one which Napoleon adopted, and Montmort, about 3 miles north of Toulon-sur-Arroux; that he himself very decidedly preferred the latter: but that, as his choice involved a heterodox interpretation of the phrase (*ab latere aperto*), he deferred to the authority of certain scholars who assured the Emperor that the phrase in question could only mean "on the right flank." He goes on to say that in later years he became so strongly convinced of the truth of his original opinion that he determined to put it to a practical test. He believed that the hill on which

<sup>1</sup> *Galliae Cisalpinæ et Transalpinæ . . . tabula in usum scholarum descripta.*

<sup>2</sup> *Philologus*, xxvi., 1867, p. 658.

<sup>3</sup> *Zur Kritik und Erklärung von Caesars gall. Kriege*, 1877, p. 27.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, i. 23, § 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 68, 71, n. 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist. de Jules César : Guerre civile*, ii. 439-52.

Caesar formed his line of battle was Armecy, just south of Montmort. Concluding from Caesar's narrative<sup>1</sup> that an entrenchment had been thrown up on the plateau of Armecy, he in 1886 set navvies to work, who presently discovered the remains of an entrenchment. West of Montmort, in the neighbourhood of a farm called La Bretache, numerous fragments of Gallic pottery were found; and in 1889 on the hill of Armecy itself were discovered nine trenches, filled with ashes and charcoal, and containing bones, which crumbled under the touch.

Now there is not the slightest doubt about the genuineness of Colonel Stoffel's discovery. His good faith is absolutely above suspicion: his skill as an excavator has been proved beyond question.<sup>2</sup> The entrenchment which he discovered is not that of a camp: it can only have been intended to serve a temporary purpose such as that which Caesar describes. Its shape is that of a crescent, the width from horn to horn being about 300 yards. The colonel points out that the work of entrenching must have been hurriedly going on while the battle was raging on the lower slope of the hill; and, he remarks, "ainsi s'explique que les fossés soient simples sur divers points, doubles sur d'autres." The depth of the trenches was only 1<sup>m</sup>. 50, or about 4 feet 11 inches. If the entrenchment was not that which Caesar mentions, it is impossible to account for its existence. Since the colonel made his discovery, M. Carion, mayor of Montmort, has found calcined bones and *débris* of swords, javelins and helmets hard by the entrenchment.<sup>3</sup> The distance of the hill of Armecy from Mont Beuvray tallies with Caesar's statement, that on the morning of the battle he was not more than 18 Roman miles from Bibracte; while Napoleon's site appears to be too near Mont Beuvray, and, moreover, his theory compels him to assume that the Helvetii, when hurrying back to intercept Caesar, transported their unwieldy waggon-train across the river Alène. I confess that I clung for a long time to the belief that Napoleon was right: but the force of Colonel Stoffel's reasoning gradually prevailed; and, after I had discussed the matter, map in hand, with General Maurice, all my doubts were dispelled. In truth, there is only one objection, worth considering, to Colonel Stoffel's view; and that is the objection based upon the words (*ab latere aperto*). I have argued that those words probably mean "on the right flank." How do I reconcile my conclusion with my acceptance of Colonel Stoffel's identification of the battle-field? Well, I have explained that, if the MSS. are right and Caesar wrote *latere aperto* and not *ab latere aperto*, my argument does not touch this particular question. If he did write *ab latere aperto*, then either (1), as I suggested to General Maurice, who was inclined to agree with me, the Boii and Tulingi may have worked round to their left so as to strike Caesar's right flank; or (2) my interpretation of the Latin must be wrong. Anyhow, I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that Colonel Stoffel's discovery of the entrenchment has solved the main problem.

<sup>1</sup> Sarcinas in unum locum conferri et eum ab his, qui in superiore acie constiterant, muniri iussit. *B. G.*, i. 24, § 3.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. xxvi.-xxx., *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. éducenne*, xx., 1892, pp. 304-5.



V. Describing the dispositions which he made for the battle, Caesar says that he had the *sarcinae* stacked on a hill, fortified the spot on which they lay, and detailed two legions and his auxiliary corps for their protection (*Ipse interim in colle medio triplicem aciem instruxit . . . ita uti supra se in summo iugo duas legiones . . . et omnia auxilia collocaret . . . interea sarcinae in unum locum conferri et eum ab his qui in superiore acie constiterant muniri iussit*).<sup>1</sup> As *sarcinae* generally means, not heavy baggage (*impedimenta*), but only the bundles which the soldiers carried, von Goler<sup>2</sup> and Colonel Stoffel<sup>3</sup> infer that the heavy baggage had been sent on, under a slender escort, towards Bibracte. Napoleon,<sup>4</sup> on the contrary, maintains that *sarcinae* here includes *impedimenta*: but the phrase *sarcinaria iumenta*,<sup>5</sup> to which he refers, does not prove that *sarcina* can be used in such an extended sense; and when he goes on to argue that, if Caesar had sent on the baggage-train in advance, he would have sent two legions to escort it, he apparently forgets that the road to Bibracte led through the country of the Aedui, who were, on the whole, friendly.<sup>6</sup> Two legions, however, and the auxiliaries would seem to have been a large force to detail merely for the protection of the men's bundles; and if Caesar had sent on the heavy baggage, we should have expected him to say so. Moreover, as his army apparently remained near the battle-field for three days after the victory, it seems reasonable to suppose that they must have wanted some of their heavy baggage. On the other hand, it has occurred to me that the baggage-cattle, or some of them, may have been sent on to Bibracte in order to fetch a supply of corn, as the legions had only two days' rations left. May we suppose that the necessary baggage was left upon the hill, and that the cattle and their drivers were sent on to Bibracte?<sup>7</sup>

VI. Describing the first stage of the battle, Caesar says, "There was one thing which hampered the Gauls a great deal in fighting: several men's shields were pierced and fastened together by a single javelin; and as the iron got bent, they could neither wrench it out nor fight properly with their left arms encumbered; inasmuch that many, after working their arms about for a time, preferred to throw away their shields, and fight unprotected" (*Gallis magno ad pugnam erat impedimento, quod pluribus eorum scutis uno ictu pilorum transfiris et colligatis, cum ferrum se inflexisset, neque evellere neque sinistra impedita satis comode pugnare poterant, multi ut diu iactato brachio praeoptarent scutum manu emittere et nudo corpore pugnare*).<sup>8</sup> V. Wenning finds serious difficulties in this passage. Must not *pluribus*, he asks, mean at least three? Could one javelin have pierced three shields? And could *pluribus* have been used in a distributive sense?<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> B. G., i. 24, §§ 2-3.

<sup>2</sup> Gall. Krieg, p. 26.

<sup>3</sup> Guerre civile, ii. 449.

<sup>4</sup> Hist. de Jules César, ii. 68, n. 2.

<sup>5</sup> B. C., i. 81, § 6.

<sup>6</sup> I find that Colonel Stoffel (Guerre civile, ii. 449) has anticipated my argument.

<sup>7</sup> I doubt whether the entrenchment discovered by Colonel Stoffel on the hill of Armezy would have been large enough to hold the entire baggage-train.

<sup>8</sup> B. G., i. 25, §§ 3-4.

<sup>9</sup> Correspondenz-Blatt für die Gelehrten und Realschulen Württemberg, 1881, p. 80.

I think we had better accept the passage as it stands; for Caesar could have had no motive for misrepresentation or invention. No doubt *pluribus* strictly means at least three: but we are not obliged to suppose that, in every instance of the occurrence which Caesar describes, more than two shields got fastened together. One javelin might certainly have pierced two light shields and stuck in a third; and *pluribus* is obviously used in a distributive sense. Wenning has overlooked a passage in which Livy<sup>1</sup> describes a similar incident.

VII. Adverting to the words *pedem referre*, which Caesar uses in describing the conclusion of the first stage of the battle, Long<sup>2</sup> says that "the Helvetii drew back, still facing the Romans, to a hill a mile distant." I have no doubt that *pedem referre* does mean "to draw back, facing" (the enemy), because Caesar goes on to describe the actual retreat by the words *se recipere*:<sup>3</sup> but, as those words and common sense alike show, Long's statement that the Helvetii "drew back" in this fashion for a mile, is absurd.

VIII. Describing the flank attack which the Boii and Tulingi made upon the Romans, Caesar says, "Boii et Tulingi, qui . . . *agmen hostium clauderant*, et *novissimis præsidio erant*,"<sup>4</sup> etc. Colonel Stoffel understands this passage to mean that the Boii and Tulingi *habitually* served as the rearguard of the enemy's train of waggons, and *habitually* marched in front of the Helvetian column of fighting men.<sup>5</sup> Surely in such a position as this they would not have been described as a rearguard at all. If, as Colonel Stoffel rightly holds, the column simply retraced its steps after hearing that Caesar had taken the road for Bibracte, it is obvious that the Boii and Tulingi would then have found themselves *in front of* the train of waggons, and *in rear of* the Helvetian column of fighting men. Now there are two objections to this interpretation. First, it compels us to assume that the Boii and Tulingi were needlessly separated, on the march, from the Helvetii by a space, to traverse which required the whole time that was occupied by the first portion of the battle and the retreat of the Helvetii to the hill on which they rallied. Colonel Stoffel maintains that this time was short. I maintain, on the contrary, that the words *diu* and *tandem* in Caesar's description of the first portion of the battle prove that it was considerable. Secondly, Colonel Stoffel's interpretation is opposed to Caesar's implied statement that the train of waggons immediately followed the Helvetian fighting column, and began to encamp as the action was about to begin.<sup>6</sup> If the order of Caesar's narrative does not prove that the Boii and Tulingi arrived upon the field *after* the waggons began to be parked, the narrative is obscure. It would appear, then, that the words *qui novissimis præsidio erant* mean that, after the emigrants retraced

<sup>1</sup> xxxviii. 21.—In eos qui portas . . . clauserant legionum antesignani pila coniecerunt. Hi vero non vulnerabantur, sed, transverberatis cutis, plerique inter se conserti haerebant.

<sup>2</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 16.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, i. 25, § 5. Caesar's words are *Tandem vulneribus defessi et pedem referre, et quod mons suberat circiter mille passuum eo se recipere coeperunt*.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, i. 25, § 6.

<sup>5</sup> *Guerre civile*, ii. 450.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, i. 24, § 4.

their steps, the Boii and Tulingi served as the rearguard of the waggon-train, which they marched past in order to come into action. I freely admit, however, that this interpretation, which is generally accepted, presents a difficulty. According to Colonel Stoffel's calculation of the length of the entire Helvetian column,<sup>1</sup> the nearest company of the Boii and Tulingi must have been nearly 15 miles from the battle-field when the column began to retrace its steps. The battle began about 1 o'clock,—between 2 and 3 hours, as Colonel Stoffel argues, after the Helvetian vanguard began to harass the Romans. The Helvetian waggons of course moved with extreme slowness: but would the first stage of the battle have lasted long enough to enable the Boii to hurry up on to the field? The question is very difficult: but about the natural sense of Caesar's words I do not think that there can be two opinions.

IX. Describing the last stage of the battle, which followed the attack made by the Boii and Tulingi upon the Romans, Caesar writes: "Thus two battles went on simultaneously; and the fighting was prolonged and fierce. When the enemy could no longer sustain the onslaught of our men, one division drew back, in continuation of their original movement, up the hill, while the other rallied round their baggage and waggons" (*Ita ancipiti proelio diu atque acriter pugnatum est. Diutius cum sustinere nostrorum impetus non possent, alteri se, ut coeperant, in montem receperunt, alteri ad impedimenta et carros suos se contulerunt*).<sup>2</sup> The common view is that the first *alteri* denotes the Helvetii, the second the Boii and Tulingi. Schneider,<sup>3</sup> however, with whom A. Hug<sup>4</sup> agrees, holds that some of the Helvetii joined the Boii and Tulingi at the waggon laager. He argues that Caesar would not have praised the valour of the Helvetii, as he did, if they had kept away from the fight at the laager. Hug thinks that *Diutius . . . contulerunt* is an interpolation. He insists that, at the moment of which Caesar was speaking, the Helvetii had not begun to retreat at all, but had descended the hill on which they stood, in order to renew their attack on the Romans;<sup>5</sup> and he concludes that the words *ut coeperant* could not have been written by Caesar: following Schneider, he remarks that *carros suos*, if written only with reference to the Boii and Tulingi, would have been inaccurate, as the waggons belonged to the whole host; and he thinks that the words *Nam hoc toto proelio, cum ab hora septima ad vesperum pugnatum sit, aversum hostem videre nemo potuit*,<sup>6</sup> which, in the MSS., follow *contulerunt*, ought to follow *pugnatum est*.

<sup>1</sup> 30 kilometres (*Guerre de César et d'Arionviste*, p. 36). Colonel Stoffel suggests, however, in *Guerre civile*, ii. 416, n. 1, that some of the Helvetii may have marched by the track along the line of which has been made the modern road from Toulon to Luz. Also, is it not possible that some of the Helvetian fighting men may have marched alongside of the waggons?

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, i. 26, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Caesar*, i. 53.

<sup>4</sup> *Rheinisches Museum*, Neue Folge, xv., 1860, pp. 480-1.

<sup>5</sup> *Id conspicati Helvetii, qui in montem sese receperant, rursus instare et proelium redintegrare coeperunt. B. G.*, i. 25, § 6.

<sup>6</sup> "For throughout the whole of this battle, though the fighting lasted from noon till evening, none could see an enemy turn to flee."

I believe that both Schneider and Hug are wrong. The Helvetii could have fought just as bravely on the hill as at the laager; and, as Caesar distinctly says that two separate battles went on, some of the Helvetii at all events must have remained on the hill. There is no reason for regarding *Diutius . . . contulerunt* as an interpolation. Caesar had a perfect right to say that the Boii and Tulingi retreated *ad carros suos*, even though only some of the waggons belonged to them: the Helvetii had begun to retreat, as the words *qui in montem sese receperant* prove, before the arrival of the Boii and Tulingi, and therefore *ut coeperant* is perfectly accurate; and I am quite unable to see that *Nam . . . potuit* is out of place. If *Diutius . . . contulerunt* is not an interpolation and is taken in its plain sense, the first *alteri* can only refer to the Helvetii and the second to the Boii and Tulingi.

X. Colonel Stoffel estimates that the Helvetii had only about 32,000 men actually engaged in the battle before the Boii and Tulingi came into action: but his calculations,<sup>1</sup> which are very elaborate, are based upon insufficient data.

XI. What route did the Helvetii take after their defeat? What route did Caesar take, after he had overtaken them, in his march to Vesontio (Besançon)?

Caesar says that they fled all night without stopping, and reached the territory of the Lingones "on the fourth day" (*Ex eo proelio circiter milia hominum CXXX superfuerunt eaque tota nocte ierunt: nullam partem noctis itinere intermisso in fines Lingonum die quarto pervenerunt*).<sup>2</sup> Before starting in pursuit, he was obliged to remain three days on the battle-field. The fugitives sent envoys to meet him, and halted, in obedience to his orders, at the spot which they had reached when the envoys returned. After he had overtaken them, a portion of their host made a vain attempt to escape in the direction of the Rhine. After this, Caesar received a deputation from the states of Celtic Gaul, and then resolved to march against Ariovistus, who was in the country of the Sequani (Alsace). He advanced by forced marches for three days, and then, hearing that Ariovistus was hastening to occupy Besançon, pushed on at the top of his speed (*inagnis nocturnis diurnisque itineribus*), in order to anticipate him.<sup>3</sup> The phrase which I have just quoted proves that, after he was informed of the movement of Ariovistus, Caesar must have marched, at the very least, two days and two nights before he reached Besançon. We may infer from his narrative that, when he received the Gallic deputies, he was in the country of the Lingones. It is therefore clear that his journey to Besançon was sufficiently long to occupy three days of forced and at least two days and two nights of extraordinarily rapid marching. We shall be well within the mark if we assume that its extent was at least 110 Roman miles.

1. The route which Napoleon traces leads by way of Moulins-Engilbert, Lormes and Avallon to Tonnerre, where he believes Caesar

<sup>1</sup> *Guerre civile*, ii. 450-51; *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 77.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, i. 26, § 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 27, 30-37.

to have overtaken the Helvetii; thence by way of Tanlay, Gland, Laigues, Etrochey and Dancevoir to Arc-en-Barrois, where he believes Caesar to have received the news of Ariovistus's advance; and thence by way of Langres, Grenant, Seveux and Oiselay to Besançon.<sup>1</sup>

Now, as regards the flight of the Helvetii, everything depends upon the meaning of the words *quarto die*. Kraner, arguing that the Helvetii would not have required four days and nights to reach the country of the Lingones, proposed to regard these words as a gloss or to substitute for them *postero die*<sup>2</sup> ("on the next day"), which shows that he did not know how far the country of the Lingones was from the battle-field; and A. Hug<sup>3</sup> conjectured that Caesar had written *die orto* ("at daybreak"). But this part of the text, at all events, requires no alteration; and it is certain that when we translate *quarto die* by "on the fourth day," we must, remembering the Roman method of reckoning, regard the day of the battle as the first day. Thus, if the battle was fought on a Sunday, the Helvetii reached the country of the Lingones on Wednesday. According to Napoleon, they would have reached it on Thursday. But Napoleon made the same mistake here which he made in his note on the meaning of *altero die*.<sup>4</sup> Another question is whether the words *nullam partem noctis itinere intermisso* are simply a re-affirmation of *ea tota nocte continenter ierunt* or whether they convey fresh information. In other words,—Did the Helvetii march all Sunday night, and then march on on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday; or did they, throughout their journey, march in the night only and rest in the day-time? Napoleon's view, that they marched "without interruption day and night" may be set aside as absurd.<sup>5</sup> Schneider<sup>6</sup> holds that Caesar wrote the words *nullam partem noctis itinere intermisso* in order to emphasise the fact that it was only because the Helvetii marched throughout the whole of the first night that they reached the territory of the Lingones on the fourth day:—"Quod si illa nocte vel paululum quiescissent, die quarto fines Lingonum non attigissent." B. Müller,<sup>7</sup> who calls this a very naive explanation, holds that the Helvetii marched by night only, and rested in the day-time. After marching the whole of the first night, they naturally, he argues, had to rest the next day. In the evening they made a fresh start; and so on till they reached the country of the Lingones. I am sure that Müller is wrong;

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 70, 80.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, ed. Dittenberger-Kraner, p. 87.

<sup>3</sup> *Rhein. Mus.*, N.F., xv., 1860, pp. 477-8.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 723-5, *infra*.

<sup>5</sup> It is hardly necessary to point out that, even if the Helvetii marched on four consecutive days and nights, they must have rested during a large part of each day and of each night, except the first; or that when Caesar says of his own march in 52 B.C., *neque diurno neque nocturno itinere intermisso* (*B. G.*, vii. 9, § 4), he did the same. B. Müller (*Zur Kritik und Erklärung von Caesars gallischem Kriege*, 1877, pp. 23-4) points out that, to say nothing of the superhuman endurance with which Napoleon credits the Helvetii, if Caesar had meant to describe a continuous march by day and night, he would have expressed himself as he has done in *B. G.*, vii. 9, § 4, and 56, § 3:—"Ibi nactus recentem equitatum . . . *neque diurno neque nocturno itinere intermisso*, per fines Aeduorum in Lingones contendit," and "admodum magnis diurnis atque nocturnis itineribus confectis . . . ad Ligerim pervenit."

<sup>6</sup> *Caesar*, i. 55.

<sup>7</sup> *Zur Kritik und Erklärung von Caesars gall. Kriege*, p. 23.

for a succession of night marches seems very unlikely; and I believe that if Caesar had meant to describe such a thing, he would not have laid stress on the fact, if it had been a fact, that the Helvetii marched *all night (nullam partem noctis itinere intermisso)*:<sup>1</sup> he would, I believe, have used some such expression as *nocturnis (solum) itineribus confectis* or simply *nocturnis itineribus*. But this by the way. The important point is that, as Napoleon exaggerates the duration of the flight and also the duration of each day's march, the Helvetii could hardly, as he believes, have arrived "on the fourth day" at Tonnerre.<sup>2</sup>

2. According to von Gölér's map,<sup>3</sup> Caesar marched eastward in pursuit of the Helvetii; crossed the Saône about 10 miles, in a direct line, above its confluence with the Doubs; and thence marched for Besançon. But on this theory he did not enter the country of the Lingones at all. However, von Gölér's map does not represent von Gölér's opinion; for he rightly says in his text (pp. 31 and 332) that the Helvetii did enter the country of the Lingones. But I cannot find out what route he thinks that they followed.

3. According to Kiepert,<sup>4</sup> Caesar first marched to Dijon, then struck off in a south-easterly direction, crossed the Saône at Segobodium (Seveux) and marched thence to Besançon. But on this theory the distance which he had to march from the country of the Lingones to Besançon was so short that he would not have required at least five days' forced marching to perform it.

I am afraid that this is one of our insoluble problems. The Helvetii could not have reached Tonnerre on the fourth day of their retreat; and it is waste of time to attempt to determine the exact distance which they covered in a time which is stated so vaguely. And if we cannot tell where Caesar overtook them, neither can we tell by what route Caesar marched to Besançon. This conclusion will not please those who require definite results. But I did not promise to solve all the problems connected with the Gallic war; and to know that a problem is insoluble is the next best thing to solving it.

<sup>1</sup> Morus, who is followed by H. Meusel (*Caesar*, p. 16), deletes the words *nullam . . . intermisso* as a gloss: but Caesar has a way of repeating statements which he wishes to emphasise, e.g. in *B. G.*, i. 49, §§ 1-3.

<sup>2</sup> Colonel Stoffel (*Guerre de César et d'Arioniste*, p. 78) takes the sensible view that the Helvetii arrived in the country of the Lingones on the fourth day, counting that on which the battle took place as the first. Yet his map agrees with that of Napoleon; and accordingly he requires from the unhappy fugitives and their still more unhappy cattle exertions even more herculean than had satisfied his imperial master. The retreat, he says, lasted about 60 hours: the length of the retreat was 160 kilometres or about 100 miles; and the Helvetian waggons were tugged, for the most part, by oxen. Was any bullock ever yet required to drag a cart 100 miles in two days and a half? It is safe to say that if the Helvetian oxen had been goaded in this way, not one of them would have reached Tonnerre alive.

<sup>3</sup> *Ball. Krieg*, Taf. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Galliae Cisalpinæ et Transalpinæ . . . tabula in usum scholarum descripta*.

# WHAT GALLIC STATES WERE REPRESENTED IN THE DEPUTATION WHICH CONGRATULATED CAESAR AFTER THE OVERTHROW OF THE HELVETII?

*Bello Helvetiorum confecto* writes Caesar, *totius fere Galliae legati, principes civitatum, ad Caesarem gratulatum convenerunt*.<sup>1</sup> On this Long<sup>2</sup> remarks that "Gallia here means Celtica,"—that is to say, the whole of Gaul, except the Province, Aquitania and the country of the Belgae.<sup>3</sup> Desjardins,<sup>4</sup> who expresses the same<sup>5</sup> opinion, excludes the Belgae, on the ground that they made war upon Caesar in the following year (57 B.C.). But might not the Armorican states, which rebelled in 56 B.C., be excluded on the same ground? Apparently Mommsen thinks so; for he calls the *concilium totius Galliae*,<sup>6</sup> which met, with Caesar's sanction, just after the conclusion of the Helvetic campaign, "a diet of the Celtic tribes of central Gaul."<sup>7</sup> Contradicting himself, Desjardins, in another place, describes it as comprising both Celtae and Belgae.<sup>8</sup> My belief is that Mommsen is right, because we may gather from *B. G.*, ii. 34 that the maritime states between the Seine and the Loire did not acknowledge Caesar's authority until towards the end of 57 B.C.; and because, taken in conjunction with this last passage, the words *omni pacata Gallia*, which occur in *B. G.*, ii. 1, § 2, can only refer to the tribes of central Gaul. Besides, the envoys of the more distant tribes would not have had time to reach Caesar.

## ON THE PROBABLE LENGTH OF CAESAR'S MARCH FROM VESONTIO AGAINST ARIOVISTUS

Vegetius<sup>9</sup> says that Roman soldiers used to march 20 miles in full armour, by way of practice, three times a month; and from this statement Rustow<sup>10</sup> and others infer that the length of an ordinary day's march was 20 Roman miles, or between 29 and 30 kilometres. Colonel Henrard,<sup>11</sup> however, argues that Caesar's average rate of marching was much less than this. He asserts that Caesar only once made a march of this length, namely when he was marching from Samarobriva (Amiens) to relieve Quintus Cicero, and that he mentions the fact as something extraordinary.<sup>12</sup>

There can be no doubt that the colonel's conclusion is right; but he makes a gross blunder. The fact that Caesar only once mentions a day's march of 30 kilometres does not prove that he only once made such a

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 30, § 1.

<sup>2</sup> See *B. G.*, i. 1.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, i. 30, § 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 542.

<sup>5</sup> *Heervesen, und Kriegführung C. J. Cäsars*, 1855, pp. 92-3.

<sup>6</sup> *Mém. couronnés . . . publiés par l'Acad. Roy. de Belgique*, xxxiii., 1882, pp. 26-7.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, v. 47, § 1.

<sup>8</sup> Caesar, p. 70.

<sup>9</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 616.

<sup>10</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 243.

<sup>11</sup> *De re mil.*, i. 9.

march: he did not start on that particular march until about half-past nine o'clock in the morning,<sup>1</sup> and for aught we know, the country may have been then, as it had been three years before,<sup>2</sup> intersected by thick hedges, which it would have been necessary to cut through: he once made a forced march of 50 Roman miles, or 74 kilometres, with four legions, in less than 30 hours;<sup>3</sup> and he marched from Agedincum (Sens) to Cenabum (Orléans), a distance of at least 108 kilometres, in two periods of two days each, separated by an interval of three days, during which he captured Vellaunodunum.<sup>4</sup> The *Commentaries on the Civil War* supply another instance. On the 21st of February, 49 B.C., Caesar left Corfinium, and marched thence to Brundisium, a distance of 465 kilometres, arriving on the 9th of March. If he marched on every one of these 17 days, his average daily march was  $27\frac{1}{2}$  kilometres: if he allowed his troops two days' rest, his average was 31.<sup>5</sup>

From these data it may be concluded with certainty that, although Caesar's average daily march was, as Colonel Hennard argues, much less than 30 kilometres, he could have marched, in an open country, at least 27 kilometres a day, for seven days, if he had wished to do so. The Duc d'Aumale, an experienced soldier, holds that as many as ten legions could have easily marched, in an open country, 28 kilometres a day.<sup>6</sup>

## CAESAR'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARIOVISTUS

I. The data for drawing a map of Caesar's campaign against Ariovistus are very scanty. The gist of Caesar's narrative is as follows. He marched, apparently from the place in the country of the Lingones where he received the Gallic deputies after his victory over the Helvëti, to encounter Ariovistus. After he had marched for three days he heard that Ariovistus was marching with his whole force to seize Vesontio (Besançon), and that he had,—apparently at the time when Caesar's informant started on his errand,—advanced three days' journey beyond his own frontier. Thereupon Caesar pushed rapidly on, and making

<sup>1</sup> M. J. Liagre remarks that Caesar meant to convey that, in spite of his late start, he marched 20 miles in the day. *Mém. couronnés . . . publiés par l'Acad. Roy. de Belgique*, xxxiii., 1882, pp. 48-59.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 17, § 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, vi. 40-41.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 409-10, 505.

<sup>5</sup> See Stoffel's *Hist. de Jules César*,—*Guerre civile*, i. 196-7, and F. Fröhlich, *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, p. 207.

<sup>6</sup> *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2<sup>e</sup> pér., t. xv., 1858, p. 95. According to Lord Wolseley (*The Soldier's Pocket-Book*, 3rd ed., p. 226) the "length of ordinary marches, for a force not stronger than one division, moving by one road, should be from 12 to 15 miles a day, for 5 days out of 6, or at most 6 days out of 7." Guischart, however, remarks (*Mém. crit. & hist.*, t. i., 1773, pp. 40-43) that ancient armies could march faster than modern because "ils étoient dispensés d'un grand nombre de besoins, que nous nous sommes rendus nécessaires, et d'être par conséquent de l'obligation de traîner après eux tout cet attirail de guerre, et ce grand train d'équipages, qui ne peuvent qu'embarasser les mouvemens de nos armées."

<sup>7</sup> See *Carte de France* (1: 200,000), Sheets 28, 36, 55, and *Carte de l'État-Major* (1: 80,000), Sheet 101.



forced marches by day and night, seized Besançon himself. He remained a few days in the neighbourhood. Marching from Besançon, he reached his final camping ground on the seventh day; and he marched on every one of those seven days. After leaving Besançon, he took a circuitous route, in order to gain the advantage of moving in an open country. I shall discuss in the proper place the disputed passage in which he describes this movement. When he reached his camping ground, he was 24 Roman or about 22 English miles from Ariovistus. A few days later the two leaders had an interview at or on an earthen mound or a knoll of considerable size, nearly equidistant between the two camps and situated in a great plain. Two days after the interview Ariovistus broke up his encampment, marched to a point 6 Roman miles from Caesar's camp, and encamped at the foot of a mountain. Next day he marched past Caesar's camp and encamped 2 Roman miles beyond it, with the object of intercepting the supplies which were being brought up to the Romans from the territories of the Aedui and the Sequani. Five days later Caesar made a retrograde march past Ariovistus's camp and constructed a smaller camp about 1000 yards (*circa passus sexcentos*) from it, in order to re-establish his communications. Two days later he marched against Ariovistus. Thereupon the Germans moved out to fight, leaving their waggons ranged in rear of their line, in order to deprive themselves of all hope of flight. The Germans were beaten and fled, and "did not cease their flight till they came to the Rhine," which, according to the *Commentaries*, was 5 Roman miles from the battlefield.<sup>1</sup> For reasons which I shall presently examine the word *quinque* (5) has been altered by some editors to *quingenta* (50).

II. Von Göler, who wrongly identifies Bibracte with Autun, makes Caesar start from Autun on his march to Besançon.<sup>2</sup> In other words, he fetches Caesar the whole way back from the neighbourhood of Langres, where he says that he overtook the Helvetii, in order to meet the Gallic deputies; although there is not a word in the *Commentaries* to support such a theory, and although the deputies would naturally have met Caesar in the place which was most convenient for him. Napoleon<sup>3</sup> and Colonel Stoffel<sup>4</sup> make Caesar start from Arc-en-Barrois, and march to Besançon by way of Langres, Grenant, Seveux and Oiselay. But I have already argued<sup>5</sup> that it is impossible to trace Caesar's route with certainty; and it therefore appears to me best to make Besançon the starting-point in any attempt to trace his route of march against Ariovistus. The next question is, what was the theory from which Ariovistus marched to seize Besançon.

III. According to the speech which Caesar puts into the mouth of Divitiacus,<sup>6</sup> Ariovistus annexed one-third of the Sequanian territory, "which is the most fertile land in the whole of Gaul." L. W. Ravenèz,<sup>7</sup> like Napoleon, holds that the territory which Ariovistus annexed was

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 37-53.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 80.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 624-5, *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, pp. 31, 43 and Taf. I.

<sup>5</sup> *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 86-7.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, i. 31, § 10.

<sup>7</sup> *L'Alsace illustrée*, 1849, i. 382-3.

Upper Alsace, which, he remarks, is the most fertile part of Sëquania. C. Martin,<sup>1</sup> on the other hand, maintains that it was bounded by the Vosges, the Jura and the frontiers of the Aedui and the Lingones. If, he argues, it had been in Alsace, the Sequani would have had no reason to fear Ariovistus; for they would have been secured from his attacks by the Vosges. Martin fails to see that his argument recoils against himself. On his theory, the Sequani who dwelt between the Vosges and the Rhine would have been equally secure from the tyranny of Ariovistus. He denies, it is true, that the territory of the Sequani touched the Rhine, arguing that when Caesar says that Gallia Celtica *attingit etiam ab Sequanis et Helvetiis flumen Rhenum*,<sup>2</sup> he only means that "en passant par les Séquanais et les Helvétiens (Gallia Celtica) toucha au Rhin." By mistranslating an author, a commentator can construct any theory he likes out of his text.

I hold to the belief that Ariovistus's territory was in Alsace; partly for the reason given by Lavenèz, partly because Ariovistus would naturally have settled in that part of Sequania from which he could most easily communicate with his countrymen beyond the Rhine, and partly because, as I shall presently show, it is impossible, on any other theory, to explain Caesar's narrative of his campaign against the German king.<sup>3</sup> If I am right, Ariovistus, when he had made a three days' march beyond his southern frontier, to occupy Besançon, was either in the southern part of Upper Alsace or just outside its south-western boundary.

IV. Speaking of the circuitous route which he took after leaving Vesontio, Caesar says *itinere exquisito per Divitiacum . . . ut milium amplius quinquaginta circuitu locis apertis exercitum duceret*,<sup>4</sup> etc. It has been argued that these words mean that the whole length of the march was rather more than 50 Roman miles. But it is incredible that Caesar should have marched barely 7 English miles a day through an open country. Von Goler<sup>5</sup> indeed reads AC instead of L: but L or *quinquaginta* is found in all the MSS. It has also been suggested that Caesar meant that the whole length of the march was 50 miles more than it would have been if he had taken the direct road. But it is impossible to get this meaning out of the Latin.<sup>6</sup> The words can only mean that the circuitous part of the march was 50 miles long; and this is just what it would have been if Caesar had taken the natural circuitous route which Napoleon and Colonel Stoffel trace on their maps.

1. According to Napoleon,<sup>7</sup> Caesar marched by way of Pennesières

<sup>1</sup> *Questions alsaciennes*, etc., 1867, pp. 19-20.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, i. 1, § 5.

<sup>3</sup> See also Stoffel *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 88-90.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, i. 41, § 4.

<sup>5</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 46, n. 1.

<sup>6</sup> Napoleon (*Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 84, note) concludes from a passage in *B. C.* i. 64, § 8, — *Ac tantum fuit in militibus studio ut, milium VI ad iter addit circuitu*, etc., — that "when Caesar means to speak of a turn of road to be added to the total length of the route, he is careful to indicate it."

<sup>7</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 84-5. K. Thomann (*Der französische Atlas zu Cäsar gall. Kriege*, 1868, pp. 12-13) and Heller (*Philologus*, xxvi., 1867, p. 660) accept this itinerary.

Vallerois-le-Bois, Villersexel and Belfort, to a point about a mile and a half south-west of Cernay, and there encamped. Ariovistus was, he supposes, encamped at the time near Colmar. The interview between Caesar and Ariovistus took place at a knoll near Feldkirch. Two days afterwards Ariovistus made his long march southward, and encamped between Hartmannsweiler and Roedersheim. Next day he made his flank march, which, according to Napoleon, led him by an immense détour, south-eastward and then westward, past Pulversheim and Pfasstadt, to a hill about a mile north-east of Schweighausen. Caesar made his smaller camp on rising ground west of Ariovistus's camp and north of Schweighausen. But von Kampen<sup>1</sup> remarks that Caesar would not have pitched his larger camp in the plains as Napoleon makes him do; and that the site which Napoleon selects for the smaller camp is dominated by a hill which Ariovistus might have easily occupied. 2. Accordingly von Kampen places the larger camp on rising ground just south of the river Thur and about a mile and a half west-south-west of Cernay; the final camp of Ariovistus on a hill just north-east of Nied Aspach on the river Doller; and Caesar's smaller camp on a hill half a mile south-west of Ariovistus's camp. According to him, Ariovistus made his flank march along the line of an old Roman road, which crossed the Thur between Cernay and Wittelsheim.

Caesar, as we have seen, says that, at the end of his seven days' march from Vesontio, he encamped at a distance of 24 Roman miles from Ariovistus.<sup>2</sup> A week later Ariovistus broke up his camp and in a single day marched to within 6 Roman miles from Caesar's.<sup>3</sup> "It is probable," observes Napoleon,<sup>4</sup> "that, during the negotiations, Ariovistus had approached nearer to the Roman camp, in order to facilitate inter-communication, for if he had remained at a distance of 36 kilometres from Caesar, we should be obliged to admit that the German army, which subsequently advanced towards the Roman camp, in a single day, to within 9 kilometres, had made a march of 25 kilometres at least, which is not probable when we consider that it dragged after it waggons and women and children." But Napoleon was obliged to assume that "during the negotiations, Ariovistus had advanced nearer to the Roman camp," in order to make the knoll which he identified with the *tumulus terrenus*,<sup>5</sup> at which the conference between Caesar and Ariovistus took place, equidistant between the Roman and the German camp.

It is generally taken for granted that the *tumulus* was a natural feature,—a knoll. But if so, why did Caesar describe it as *terrenus* (earthen)? He mentions a *tumulus* near the camp which Labienus occupied in the country of the Treveri; another near Aduatua; a third near Herda; a fourth near Dyrrachium: but to none of them does he apply the epithet *terrenus*.<sup>6</sup> It is certainly possible that the *tumulus terrenus* was simply an earthen mound or barrow.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. comm. tabulae*, ii.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, i. 41, § 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 48, §§ 1-2.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 85, n. 1.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, i. 43, § 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, vi. 8, § 3, 40, § 1; *B. C.*, i. 43, § 2; iii. 51, § 8.

<sup>7</sup> It is true that Livy (xxxviii. 20. § 4) speaks of *colles terrenus*; but he is contrasting them with rocky heights.

3. Von Göler conducts Caesar from Besançon by way of Vesoul, Lure, Belfort, Damerkirch and Aspach to the Thur: he places Caesar's larger camp on rising ground south of the Thur and about a mile south-east of Cernay: he places the smaller camp on the site which von Kampen chooses for the final camp of Ariovistus; and he places the latter in the plain on the left bank of the Little Doller and about half a mile north of Ober Aspach.<sup>1</sup>

I cannot see how, on any of these theories, the flank march of Ariovistus is to be explained. Von Göler, indeed, urges that Ariovistus would have been protected by the hilly ground on the left bank of the Thur; and J. Schlumberger<sup>2</sup> appeals to Dion Cassius,<sup>3</sup> who says that the German cavalry engaged and defeated Caesar's, and that Ariovistus thus succeeded in passing Caesar's camp unscathed. But von Göler does not explain why Caesar says that Ariovistus, before making his flank march, encamped at the foot of a mountain (*sub monte*);<sup>4</sup> and the unsupported testimony of Dion Cassius is not to be trusted. Napoleon argues further that von Göler is wrong in making Caesar fight the battle with his back to the Rhine. "It would be impossible," he says, "to understand in this case how, after their defeat, the Germans would have been able to fly towards that river, Caesar cutting off their retreat; or how Ariovistus, reckoning upon the arrival of the Suevi, should have put Caesar between him and the reinforcements which he expected."<sup>5</sup> This objection does not appear to me conclusive. If the Germans had fought, as Napoleon holds, with their backs to the Rhine, it is evident that, their rear and perhaps their flanks being closed by their line of waggons, they could only have commenced their flight in a northerly or southerly direction. If they had fought facing the Rhine, they would have done just the same. Napoleon's first objection then collapses. As to the expected arrival of the Suevi, it must be remembered that the great object of Ariovistus was to cut Caesar's line of communication. In order to do this, it may have been necessary for him, as Colonel Stoffel thinks, to hold to the line of the Vosges. Moreover, if a man compares von Göler's map with Napoleon's, he will, I think, find it hard to believe that Ariovistus would have found it more difficult to effect a junction with the Suevi in one case than in the other.

Colonel Stoffel,<sup>6</sup> following Plutarch,<sup>7</sup> places the camp of Ariovistus on the slope of a hill. Plutarch is certainly no authority on a point of this kind. He may have been thinking of Caesar's statement that Ariovistus *sub monte consedit*, and have forgotten that Ariovistus marched 8 miles further on the day after he encamped there. Still it is very likely that Ariovistus did encamp on a hill; and if that hill was a spur of the Vosges, he probably fought the battle with his face towards the Rhine.

C. Martin, for reasons which I have already discussed, denies that

<sup>1</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, Taf. I. and III.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar und Ariovistus*, 1877, p. 168.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xxxviii. 48, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, i. 48, § 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 91, n. 2.

<sup>6</sup> *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 10-11.

<sup>7</sup> *Caesar*, 19.

the territory of Ariovistus was in Alsace. He gives various other reasons to show that Napoleon's explanation of the campaign, and indeed every explanation which is based upon the hypothesis that the decisive battle took place in the plain of Alsace, is wrong. First, he says, Caesar tells us that, while he was encamped in the country of the Lingones, and before he started on his march against Ariovistus, the Harudes devastated the territory of the Aedui. If, he concludes, Ariovistus had encamped in the plain of Alsace, the Harudes could not have rejoined him before the battle without being destroyed by Caesar on the march.<sup>1</sup>

The conclusion is inconclusive. The Harudes may have got the start of Caesar, while he was waiting at Besançon; or, if they were afraid to go through the pass of Belfort, they may have gone through one of the passes in the Vosges.

Secondly, says Martin, on Napoleon's theory, it is impossible to discover the earthen mound or knoll (*tumulus terrenus satis grandis*) at which Caesar says that the interview between himself and Ariovistus took place. Napoleon thinks that the *tumulus* was either near Feldkirch or between Wittenheim and Ensisheim. But, objects Martin, the alleged *tumulus* near Feldkirch "N'EXISTE MÊME PAS : nous avons été sur les lieux." And the one between Wittenheim and Ensisheim does not deserve the name of knoll; for its summit is only 2 metres above the level of the plain at its base!<sup>2</sup>

Martin's statement is, I believe, correct. I was at Mulhausen in September 1895, but was unable, from want of time, to make a personal exploration of the country. I was so fortunate, however, as to meet an English gentleman, who had lived at Mulhausen for six years and was in the habit of cycling in the plain of Alsace, which he knew thoroughly. He assured me that there was no such thing as a knoll at either of the places which Napoleon mentions. Von Kampen indeed, who professes to have constructed his map (Tab. 2) on the basis of that of the German military staff, marks two knolls near Feldkirch, one just outside Wittelsheim, and a fourth near Ensisheim. The last, which, I suppose, is the one to which Martin alludes, is marked on the German Government map (1 : 25,000), Sheet 3678 : but its height is not indicated; and I can discover no traces of the others on Sheet 3677. Still, Martin has, at the most, only succeeded in discrediting Napoleon's map of the campaign. The theory which finds the theatre of the war in the plain of Alsace remains unshaken. And if it is true, as I have suggested, that the *tumulus* may have been not a natural feature at all, but a mound or barrow, he has not shaken even the theory of Napoleon.

Thirdly, says Martin, on Napoleon's theory, the flank march by which Ariovistus endeavoured to cut off Caesar's communication with the convoys which he expected from the Sequani and the Aedui would have been useless; for Caesar could still have communicated with the Sequani by the valley of the Lauch. If Caesar does not say that his communications with the Leuci and the Lingones were also cut, that is because

<sup>1</sup> *Questions alsaciennes*, p. 25.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 3<sup>o</sup>-3.

Ariovistus's territory, which really lay on the west of the Vosges, intervened between them and the Romans.<sup>1</sup>

The first of these arguments breaks down unless Martin can prove that the Sequanian convoy would have taken the route through the valley of the Lauch; whereas it is much more likely that it was coming by the pass of Belfort. The second argument is absurd; for if the Leuci and the Lingones had been cut off from the Romans by the territory of Ariovistus, Caesar would not have called upon them to furnish him with supplies.

Fourthly, says Martin, although excavations were carried on at the place indicated by Napoleon as the site of Caesar's larger camp, no antiquities were discovered there.<sup>2</sup>

This may be a reason for not accepting Napoleon's indication of the site: but it is no reason for discrediting the general principles upon which he based his search.

4. Schlumberger<sup>3</sup> takes the words *ut milium amplius quinquaginta circuitu locis apertis exercitum duceret* to mean that the distance which Caesar actually covered in his seven days' march was 50 Roman miles more than he would have had to do if he had taken the direct route. This interpretation compels Schlumberger to take Caesar quite unnecessarily out of his way. He makes him, after leaving Besançon, march by way of Cussey on the Oignon to the Saône, and by Seveux to Port-au-Saône, where, says Schlumberger, he found the road which led by way of Lure, Chalonnvilliers and Belfort into Alsace. Schlumberger assumes that Caesar marched at the rate of 20 Roman miles a day, and that his march lasted not seven whole days, but six days and a fraction, say  $6\frac{1}{8}$ ,  $6\frac{1}{4}$  or  $6\frac{1}{2}$ . On this hypothesis, the whole distance marched would have been  $122\frac{1}{2}$ , 125 or 130 Roman miles; and the direct distance, being about 50 Roman miles shorter, would have been  $72\frac{1}{2}$ , 75 or 80 Roman miles. Schlumberger reckons that, after travelling  $72\frac{1}{2}$  Roman miles by the shortest road from Besançon into Alsace, one would arrive at La Chapelle-sous-Rougemont, on the rivulet St-Nicholas, about

<sup>1</sup> *Questions alsaciennes*, p. 36. From Caesar's statement that he made his second camp *ne diutius comedeat prohiberetur* ("to avoid being cut off from his supplies any longer") Thomann (*Der französische Atlas zu Cäsars gall. Kriege*, 1868, pp. 12-13) argues that his communications were, for a time, completely broken. With the Sequani and the Aedui certainly; but I do not see that we can draw any conclusion about the other two peoples.

Mommsen (*Hist. of Rome*, iv. 245, note) says, "The corn exported from the Sequani, Leuci and Lingones was not to come to the Roman army in the course of their march against Ariovistus, but to be delivered at Besançon before their departure and taken by the troops along with them; as is clearly apparent from the fact that Caesar, while pointing his troops to those supplies, comforts them at the same time with the hope of corn to be brought in on the route." What Caesar says on the matter is merely this:—*frumentum Sequanos, Leucos, Lingones subministrare, iamque esse in agris frumenta matura* (*B. G.*, i. 40, § 11). Caesar quitted Besançon the night after he gave this assurance to the troops (*Ib.*, § 14), so that he did not give much time for Mommsen's imaginary "delivery" of the corn. Moreover, Mommsen notwithstanding, Caesar distinctly says (*Ib.*, 48, § 2) that the Sequani were to supply him with corn during the campaign.

<sup>2</sup> *Questions alsaciennes*, pp. 36-7.

<sup>3</sup> *Caesar und Ariovistus*, p. 148.

50 Roman miles from the Rhine ; and in this neighbourhood accordingly he looks for the battle-field.

The elaborate calculations which lead Schlumberger to this result are useless, because (a) he misunderstands the most important passage in Caesar's narrative ; (b) he cannot tell how far Caesar marched each day ; (c) when he assumes that Caesar marched 20 Roman miles, or nearly 30 kilometres a day, he almost certainly exaggerates ; and (d) he cannot tell whether he made a full march or only a fraction of a march on the last day. But is the site which he selects intrinsically objectionable ? I think it is, because, for reasons which I shall presently state, I hold that the battle-field was much less than 50 miles from the Rhine.

5. M. Trouillet<sup>1</sup> is among those who hold that Caesar's march from Besançon was 50 miles longer than it would have been if he had taken the direct route. He argues that Caesar would have taken the direct route,—that is the line of the Roman road which in later years ran along the northern bank of the Doubs, crossed it between Clerval and l'Isle-sur-le-Doubs, thence ran along the southern bank past Montbéliard, and thence northward to Belfort,—if he had not had reason to fear that Ariovistus would attack him from the forests that covered the northern valley of the Doubs. Therefore, he concludes, when Caesar quitted Besançon, Ariovistus was not encamped in the plain of Upper Alsace. But M. Trouillet condemns the circuitous part of Napoleon's route, not merely the site which he selects for the battle-field. Why ? Because, in order to make Caesar's march 50 miles longer than it would have been if Caesar had taken the direct route, he is obliged to conduct him much further to the north than Napoleon does. The route which he traces leads past Vesoul, Luxeuil and Champagny to Malbouhans. He holds that the battle-field was 50 miles from the Rhine, by the shortest road ; and accordingly he places the camp which Ariovistus occupied during his negotiations with Caesar at Bavans, near l'Isle-sur-le-Doubs. He brings Caesar, at the end of his seven days' march, to Malbouhans, which, as the *Commentaries* require, is 24 miles from the encampment which he assigns to Ariovistus : he places Caesar's larger camp on a plateau just west of Gonvillars, about midway between Malbouhans and Bavans ; his smaller camp to the north of this plateau, and just north of Corcelles ; and Ariovistus's camp still further north, just north of Saulnot. Needless to say, human remains, etc., have been discovered near Gonvillars.

Now, to say nothing of M. Trouillet's misinterpretation of the words *ut milium amplius quinquaginta circuitu locis apertis exercitum duceret*, his theory is open to several objections. According to him, Caesar only marched 65 miles,—the distance from Besançon to Malbouhans,—in seven days. Yet Caesar evidently made haste ; for he tells us that he marched for seven days continuously, without allowing a single day for rest. Secondly, Caesar says that the country between the camp which he formed at the end of his seven days' march and the camp which

<sup>1</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. d'émulation de Montbéliard*, xiii., 1881, pp. 17-19. 21-4, 29-31, 36-8, 41-4.

Ariovistus occupied during the progress of the negotiations was a great plain.<sup>1</sup> But the country between Malboushans and Bavans is not a plain at all.<sup>2</sup> Thirdly, in order to reach the Rhine from the battle-field which M. Trouillet selects, the Germans, with the victorious Romans in hot pursuit, would have had to cover 50 miles in one heat,<sup>3</sup> and to cross a network of streams!

6. According to M. Trouillet's map, the site of the battle has also been placed by various writers (a) about 3 miles west of Luxeuil; (b) between Ronchamp and Champagny; (c) just south of Arcey, which is about 8 miles west of Montbéliard; (d) just west of Bavans; (e) just south of Bavans and of the Doubs;<sup>4</sup> (f) just east of Porrentruy; and (g) 5 miles from Basle, between Mulhausen and the Rhine.<sup>5</sup> All these guesses are wrong. The first five are irreconcilable with the words *ut milium amplius quinquaginta circuitu locis apud his exercitum duceret*: all, except the last, are irreconcilable with the statement that the meeting of Caesar with Ariovistus took place in a great plain; and the last is irreconcilable with the statement that Ariovistus halted, on the night before he marched past Caesar's camp, at the foot of a mountain, unless we are to assume that the "mountain" was one of the low hills between Altkirch, Mulhausen and Basle, or that it was one of the northern heights of the Jura; and in either case it will be obvious to any one who can read a map that Ariovistus would not have succeeded in cutting Caesar's line of communication with the source of his supplies. And, even if no argument could be alleged against any of these sites, it would be impossible to prove that the battle took place on any of them.

7. Desjardins adopts the reading *quinquaginta* in the passage in which Caesar states the length of the flight of the Germans to the Rhine: he believes that they would not have fled up the valley of the Ill, as Napoleon makes them do, but would have taken the shortest route to the Rhine; and accordingly he places the battle-field somewhere within a triangle whose points are formed by Belfort, Montbéliard and Lure.<sup>6</sup> But there is no "great plain" here; and Desjardins has no right to assume that Ariovistus fled in a bee-line.

8. M. A. Delacroix publishes what he calls "une tradition séquanais" concernant Arioviste," which he takes quite seriously. He begins by asserting that the site of the battle-field is fixed by the *Commentaries* at a point 50 miles from Besançon and 50 miles from the Rhine. This point, he asserts, is the Pas de Ronchamp. Near this place there is a hill called Errevet. Errevet, according to the "tradition séquanais," preserves the name of Ariovistus, and was therefore the hill at the foot

<sup>1</sup> B. G., i. 43, § 1.      <sup>2</sup> See *Carte de l'Etat-Major* (1:80,000), Sheet 114.

<sup>3</sup> neque prius fugere destiterunt, etc. B. G., i. 53, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> This may be the site selected by Cluver (*Germania antiqua*, ed. 1631, p. 361), namely Dampierre, at the confluence of the Doubs and the Allaine. Cluver calmly asserted that Caesar, *pro more suo* (!), had only marched 7 miles a day.

<sup>5</sup> This, I suppose, is the site adopted by Beatus Rhenanus (*Rerum Germ. libri tres*, ed. 1610, p. 13), who says, without giving any reason, "quae pugna ad D. Apollinaris (what?) facta putatur. is locus milliario Germanico a Rheno et Basilea distat."

<sup>6</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 621.



of which Ariovistus encamped (*sub monte consedit*), before he marched to outflank Caesar.<sup>1</sup> Into the details of the battle, as described in the tradition, we need not enter; because, as I have already shown, in placing the battle-field 50 miles from Besançon, M. Delacroix and his tradition flatly contradict the statement of Caesar,—*ut milium*, etc.

9. Rustow<sup>2</sup> originally fixed the site in the valley of the upper Saar, a view which nobody who looks at the map will consider worthy of refutation, but which Rustow himself subsequently refuted. According to his revised conclusion,<sup>3</sup> the battle was fought in the plain of Alsace, between Ostheim and Sigolsheim: and in order to reach this spot, Caesar marched, not through the pass of Belfort, but *across the Vosges*, travelling at the rate of 30 kilometres a day for seven days! &

All the theories which I have hitherto examined are not only incapable of proof, but open to serious objection. One only remains.

10. Colonel Stoffel's itinerary agrees with that of Napoleon, as far as the latter goes. But the battle-field to which he ultimately brings Caesar is much further north than the site selected by von Göler, Napoleon and von Kampen; and his explanation of the military operations described in *B. G.*, i. 48-53 differs radically from each of theirs.

Caesar says that he marched from Besançon to the spot where he encamped immediately before his interview with Ariovistus in seven days. How far did he march in that time? Napoleon says 20 kilometres or 12 miles a day. But, according to Colonel Stoffel, 20 kilometres was too short a distance for the average day's march. Arguing from Caesar's narrative that he must have advanced rapidly, and yet not by forced marches, he assumes an average daily march of 27 kilometres, and accordingly conducts Caesar to a point 189 kilometres from Besançon, between Ostheim and Genvar, on the left bank of the Fecht. The *tutulus*, at or on which the interview took place, he identifies with the "tertre de Plettig," a hill which rises to the height of 55 metres, or about 180 feet, above the plain. The slopes of this hill are very gentle; and although it is close to the eastern side of the Vosges, "il se présente, surtout à qui s'en approche par le nord ou par le sud, comme . . . entièrement isolé dans la plaine." Subsequently the colonel examines Caesar's description of the manœuvre by which Ariovistus cut his line of communication with the Aedui and the Sequani. Caesar's description<sup>4</sup> is even more laconic than usual. Ariovistus broke up his encampment, marched southward to a point 6 Roman miles north of Caesar's camp, and encamped at the foot of a mountain (*sub monte consedit*). Next day he marched past Caesar's camp, and encamped 2 (Roman) miles beyond it. The key to this description, says Stoffel, is in the words *sub monte consedit*. Why, he asks, did not Caesar attack Ariovistus while he was making this flank march? Evidently because Ariovistus was protected by the nature of the ground along which he was marching. To secure

<sup>1</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. d'émulation du Doubs*, v<sup>e</sup> sér., vol. i., 1876, pp. 442-55.

<sup>2</sup> *Einführung zu Cäsars Comm.*, 1857, p. 117.

<sup>3</sup> See Thomann, *Der französische Atlas zu Cäsars gall. Kriege*, 1868, pp. 13-15.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, i. 48, §§ 1-2.

this protection, he must have marched either along high ground or across a plain covered by forests or marshes. But the words *sub monte consedit* prove, as every contemporary reader of the *Commentaries* would have understood, that he marched along high ground,—that is to say, along the lower slopes of the Vosges. Now in the whole length of the chain, between Cernay and Schlettstadt, the only part in which Ariovistus could have executed his manœuvre is that comprised between the defiles of the Weiss and the Strengbach. Having marched past Caesar's camp along the heights of Zellenberg, he encamped between the defiles, on rising ground which dominated the road by which Caesar's supplies were coming up. We have next to fix the spot on which Caesar, after re-establishing his communications, constructed his smaller camp. Caesar describes it as an *idoneus locus*,—doubtless a strong position commanding the same road. Stoffel finds it on a spur of the Vosges, between Bebelnheim and Mittelweier, about 900 metres, or 980 yards, south of the extreme right of the assumed German position.<sup>1</sup>

Let us examine Colonel Stoffel's arguments. And first with regard to the distance which Caesar covered in his seven days' march from Besançon. If Colonel Stoffel's determination of the site of the battle rested solely upon his calculation of this distance, it would not be worth examining. We may, indeed, infer from Caesar's narrative that, after quitting Besançon, he marched at more than his usual speed. But it would be very rash to fix his daily average at exactly 27 kilometres. Besides, he does not tell us how far he marched on the seventh day. That last march may, for aught we know, have been a short one. All that we are justified in saying is that, as he was moving in an open country, he could have marched at the rate which Stoffel fixes.<sup>2</sup>

But it is upon his other arguments that Stoffel mainly rests his case. The deduction which he draws from the words *sub monte consedit* appears to me well-nigh irresistible. It is a truism to say that Caesar was economical of words. He would hardly have told us that Ariovistus encamped at the foot of the mountain, unless the statement had been essential to his narrative; nor would the statement have been essential unless it had implied that Ariovistus, after encamping there, ascended the slopes in order to execute his flank march without the risk of being attacked by Caesar. If we may accept Colonel Stoffel's further statement, that the only part of the Vosges along which the flank march would have been practicable is the part between Hestenholtz and the defile of the Weiss, his map of the campaign must be regarded, at least in its main features, as the most satisfactory which we have. Now Colonel Stoffel is a soldier and a trained observer: he has studied the ground carefully; and the map bears out his contention.<sup>3</sup> He insists, moreover, that the "tertre de Plettig" corresponds exactly with the description, *tumulus terrenus satis grandis*, and that between Cernay and Barr "no other height, separated from the chain of the Vosges, is to be

<sup>1</sup> *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 8-10, 13-15, 19, 64-5, 94-6, 98-100.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 626-7, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> *Carte de France* (1 : 200,000), Sheet 28. I may add that the English gentleman whom I met at Mulhausen (see p. 632, *supra*) confirmed Colonel Stoffel's statement.

found."<sup>1</sup> This last statement is true; and unless, as I have suggested, the *tumulus* may have been artificial, it settles the question.

There is one objection, which, however, only touches a point of detail, to Colonel Stoffel's view. Like Napoléon, he traces the German line of retreat down the valley of the Ill; and he remarks that from the site which he identifies with the battle-field to the confluence of the Ill and the Rhine is just 50 Roman miles. The Ill now joins the Rhine 12 kilometres north-west of Strasbourg. But, if M. Reclus<sup>2</sup> is to be believed, in Caesar's time the confluence was above Strasbourg. "Un proverbe patois," he adds, "de la haute Alsace . . . dit . . . 'Die Ell geht, wo sie well'" (The Ill floweth where it listeth).

Apart from this objection, Colonel Stoffel's explanation of the campaign is by far the most probable of all that have been offered: but I fear that it is not quite conclusive. It is possible that excavation may one day prove its truth: <sup>3</sup> but unless and until such a discovery is made, the problem must remain unsolved.<sup>4</sup>

V. "The enemy, writes Caesar, "all fled, and did not cease their flight until they came to the Rhine, which was about 5 miles from the battle-field" (*Omnes hostes terga verterunt, neque prius fugere destiterunt quam ad flumen Rhenum milia passuum ex eo loco circiter quinque pervenerunt*).<sup>5</sup> All the MSS.,—except Vind. C., which has *II*, a number often confounded by the copyists with *V*,—have the reading *quinque* or *V*.<sup>6</sup> Plutarch,<sup>7</sup> on the other hand, writes *σταδίων τετρακοσίων* (50 miles), or, according to some MSS., *τριακοσίων* (37½ miles), and Orosius<sup>8</sup> and Eutropius<sup>9</sup> *quingenta milia passuum*; and all of these writers must, one would think, have followed some MS. of Caesar. If so, it is certain that MSS., several centuries older than any which are now extant, had the reading *quingenta* (50). Schneider<sup>10</sup> thinks that the word *circiter* ("about") agrees better with *quingenta* than with *quinque*. Mommsen<sup>11</sup> places the battle-field at Cernay, the spot fixed upon by von Goler and Napoleon, which is at least 15 miles from the Rhine, as the crow flies: he does not say that the channel of the Rhine, in the latitude of Cernay, was different then from what it is

<sup>1</sup> *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 14-15.

<sup>2</sup> *Nouv. Géogr. univ.*, iii., 1878, pp. 514-15.

<sup>3</sup> The colonel was not able to test his theory by excavation, as the site was covered by vineyards. *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 19.

<sup>4</sup> Caesar says (*B. G.*, i. 54, § 2) that, after the rout of Ariovistus, he led his army into the country of the Sequani, into winter-quarters (*in hibernis in Sequanos exercitum deduxit*); and from this expression it has been inferred that the battle-field was not in the country of the Sequani. Colonel Stoffel, however, points out (*Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 117) that the army marched *in Sequanos* not from the battle-field, but from the banks of the Rhine, to which it had pursued Ariovistus; and this part of the bank of the Rhine may, he thinks, have been in the territory of the Raurici. Nor is there any need to suppose that the battle-field was, strictly speaking, in the territory of the Sequani. It may have been in that of Ariovistus (*B. G.*, i. 31, § 10), which he had wrested from the Sequani.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, i. 53, § 1.

<sup>6</sup> Schneider's *Caesar*, i. 115; Meusel's *Lec. Caes.*, ii. 1567.

<sup>7</sup> *Caesar*, 19.

<sup>8</sup> vi. 7, § 10.

<sup>9</sup> *Breviarium Hist. Rom.*, vi. 17.

<sup>10</sup> *Caesar*, i. 115.

<sup>11</sup> *Hist. of Rom.*, iv. 244, note.

now; and yet he argues that "the whole description of the pursuit continued as far as the Rhine, and evidently not lasting for several days but ending on the very day of the battle, decides—the authority of tradition being equally balanced—in favour of the view that the battle was fought five, not fifty, miles from the Rhine"! Long<sup>1</sup> says "A flight or pursuit of fifty miles after a hard battle is impossible; and again, "Caesar says nothing of night coming on; which would have stopped the pursuit in an unknown country even if fatigue did not. But he says that the routed Germans did not stop and the horsemen pursued them to the Rhine: and some of the Germans swam the river; a thing impossible after a heat of fifty miles." Napoleon<sup>2</sup> insists that the distance was 50 miles, because (1) Caesar would not have used the words *neque prius fugere destiterunt* ("did not cease their flight") of "a flight of merely a few miles"; and (2) the Germans probably retreated down "the valley of the Ill, which they had previously ascended."

All that I have to say is this. Schneider's argument that *circiter* harmonises better with *quingenta* than with *quinque* is futile; for in *B. G.*, ii. 13, § 2, Caesar uses the phrase *circiter milia passuum quinque*. On the other hand, assuming that the battle took place at any point on the west of the Ill, the distance cannot have been only 5 miles, unless the Ill was then regarded as an arm of the Rhine. As to Long's argument, the pursuit after the siege of Alesia was not stopped by night, for it began just after midnight. The country was open: the Germans, at any rate, knew it; and the Romans only had to follow. But there is much force in Long's other objection; and there is very little force in the argument which Napoleon bases upon the phrase *neque prius fugere destiterunt*. Caesar uses the very same phrase in *B. G.*, iv. 12, § 2, where he is describing a flight which could not have extended over anything near 50 miles. Von Goler asserts, on the authority of a nameless manuscript by "Tulla," that the Ill was at that time a branch of the Rhine.<sup>3</sup> As Long says,<sup>4</sup> "this hypothesis or assumption settles all difficulties, and makes Caesar's narrative perfectly intelligible." Yes, if it is true: but is it? It is scarcely credible that Caesar should not have known that a very few miles to the east of the Ill flowed the main stream of the Rhine; and if he did know this and yet spoke of the Ill as the Rhine, he used the word *Rhenus* in two consecutive chapters to describe two different streams. For in chapter 53 he describes the flight of the Germans, and in 54 he tells us that, on hearing of the defeat of their countrymen, the Suevi, who had advanced to the banks of the Rhine, returned home; and by the Rhine in this passage he could not have meant the Ill. If I am right, Caesar could not have written *quinque* unless he made a slip, because the Rhine is nowhere nearer than 12 miles from any site with which the battle-field can be identified. But I agree with Long that it is not credible that the

<sup>1</sup> *Caesar*, pp. 97-8.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 93, n. 1. Napoleon assumes that the fugitives crossed the Ill first, and afterwards crossed the Rhine at Rheinau.

<sup>3</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 58 and n. 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 43.

Germans should, after a desperate battle, have fled 50 miles in one heat,<sup>1</sup> still less that some of them should have then swum the Rhine: I cannot see why they should have fled 50 miles when the Rhine, to cross which was their only object, was not more than 12 to 15 miles away; and I can therefore only make the lame suggestion that Caesar may have written XV. If this suggestion is wrong, he must have mistaken the Ill for the Rhine.

VI. Napoleon<sup>2</sup> and Colonel Stoffel<sup>3</sup> assume that Ariovistus took the auxiliaries, whom Caesar drew up on the morning of the battle in front of the smaller camp, for the two legions which had previously occupied it. But there is nothing in Caesar to justify such an assertion. What he says is that "he posted all his auxiliaries in full view of the enemy, in front of the smaller camp, his object being to use them to make a show of strength, as his regular infantry, compared with the enemy, were numerically rather weak" (*omnes alarios in conspectu hostium pro castris minoribus constituit, quæ minus multitudine militum legionariorum pro hostium numero valebat, ut ad speciem alariis uteretur*);<sup>4</sup> and, as Long remarks,<sup>5</sup> Ariovistus would not have been duped. I may add that, if Caesar had intended to dupe him, he would have had to distribute and form up the men of the six legions which he brought into the line of battle, so as to make them look like four; just as he afterwards, in order to deceive Vercingetorix, distributed the men of four legions in order to make them look like six.<sup>6</sup> But the circumstances were very different. Vercingetorix was only deceived because a considerable distance separated him from Caesar's army, which was marching in column, parallel with his own. Moreover, the auxiliaries were dressed and equipped differently from the legionaries. Caesar's object was simply to make as imposing a display as possible.<sup>7</sup>

VII. Colonel Stoffel conjectures that some of Caesar's light-armed troops ascended<sup>1</sup> the slope on which he believes the German encampment to have stood, and, by hurling missiles into the encampment, provoked the Germans to descend.<sup>8</sup> This conjecture is founded upon the statement of Plutarch that Caesar "attacked their (the Germans') entrenchments and the hills upon which they were posted; which provoked them to such a degree that they descended in great fury to the plain."<sup>9</sup> It is not safe to follow Plutarch: but it may be true that Caesar adopted this method of enticing the Germans from a strong position which he could not have safely attempted to storm.

<sup>1</sup> Even the exhausting retreat from Waterloo to Charleroi was not more than 25 miles. See, however, E. Desjardins, *Alesia,—suivre d'un appendice renfermant des notes inédites écrites de la main de Napoléon I<sup>er</sup> sur les campagnes de Jules César*, p. 148.

<sup>2</sup> *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 112.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, i. 51, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 41.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 35, §§ 3-4.

<sup>6</sup> Guischart (*Mém. crit. et hist.*, iii. 304), who believes that Ariovistus did take the auxiliaries for legionaries, says, as I have said, that he would not have been duped unless the auxiliaries had been armed and accoutred like legionaries; and accordingly he assumes that they were not auxiliaries at all but the nucleus of the legion which Caesar called *Alauda*: but it is needless to tell scholars that this is nonsense.

<sup>7</sup> *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 68.

<sup>8</sup> *Caesar*, 19.

VIII. Caesar says that he began the battle by attacking the enemy's left, because he noticed that that part of their line was the weakest (*ipse a dextro cornu, quod eam partem minime firmam hostium esse animadverterat, proelium commisit*).<sup>1</sup> These words are generally taken to mean that the Roman right wing, commanded by Caesar in person, struck the first blow. But Colonel Stoffel denies this. "A moins de circonstances exceptionnelles," he says, "il était de principe, dans les combats de l'antiquité, que l'attaque se fit . . . en même temps sur tous les points de la ligne."<sup>2</sup> He takes the passage to mean that Caesar reserved the command of the right wing for himself "dans l'espoir de remporter un prompt succès qui déconcerterait les Germains de l'aile droite et lui faciliterait la victoire complète." I venture to ask the colonel whether Caesar may not have temporarily refused his left wing in the manner described by Vegetius (iii. 20):—(*cum instructae acies ad congressum veniunt, tunc tu sinistram alam tuam a dextra adversarii longius separabis . . . dextra autem alam tuam sinistrae alae illius iunge, et ibi primum inchoa proelium*).

IX. Allowing for the losses which Caesar had suffered in the battle with the Helvetii, Colonel Stoffel calculates that he had about 27,000 legionaries in the battle with Ariovistus.<sup>3</sup> This calculation rests on the assumption that, when he began his campaign against the Helvetii, the strength of each of his six legions was about 5000 men: but I have given reasons for believing that, if those legions, two of which were newly raised, were of normal strength, they were each 6000 strong.<sup>4</sup> It is, however, impossible to tell whether the four veteran legions had been brought up to the normal standard when Caesar took command of them. Nor can we tell what loss Caesar had suffered in the battle with the Helvetii: we only know that it was heavy.

Of the assumed 27,000 men Colonel Stoffel believes that six cohorts, or, according to his estimate, about 2700 men, were left to guard the large camp; that there were about 300 invalids; and therefore that there were some 24,000 legionaries in the line of battle. The small camp, he assumes, was guarded by some of the auxiliaries. He gives the following reasons for believing that six cohorts were left to guard the larger camp. When Caesar joined Fabius near Ilerda, and was about to march towards the camp of Afranius, he left six cohorts to guard Fabius's camp and the lower bridge over the Sicoris. Colonel Stoffel infers that he did the same in the battle with Ariovistus, in which he had the same number of legions.<sup>5</sup> But there was no bridge to be guarded during the battle with Ariovistus; and, as Caesar does not inform us, it is useless to conjecture what provision he made for the defence of his camp.

X. Colonel Stoffel believes that Ariovistus had about 36,000 men in the battle.<sup>6</sup> He points out that, according to Caesar,<sup>7</sup> the entire host

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 52, § 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, p. 83.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, i. 41. See *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 110-11.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 84-5.

<sup>2</sup> *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 113.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 563-7, *supra*.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, i. 31, §§ 5, 10.

of Ariovistus amounted to 144,000 souls; and from the estimate which Caesar gives of the Helvetian forces<sup>1</sup> he infers that one fourth of these were fighting men, of whom 6000 were cavalry.<sup>2</sup> Of course we cannot implicitly trust the figures with which Divitiacus supplied Caesar: but it should seem from his account of the battle that the Germans outnumbered the Romans.

XI. It has often struck me that there is an apparent inconsistency between the fact that the Germans escaped from the battle-field and Caesar's statement that, before the battle, they closed their rear with a semicircle of waggons, "to deprive themselves of all hope of escape" (*ne qua spes in fuga relinqueretur*).<sup>3</sup> Frontinus,<sup>4</sup> as Thomann<sup>5</sup> remarks, offers a solution of the puzzle, but we cannot tell on what authority. "As the Germans," he says, "being hemmed in, were fighting desperately, Caesar ordered that they should be allowed an exit, and fell upon them when they were fleeing" (*Caesar Germanos inclusos, ex desperatione fortius pugnantes, emitti iussit fugientesque aggressus est*).

XII. The battle with Ariovistus was fought in September; for we may gather from a statement in *B. G.*, i. 40, § 11,—“the standing corn was already ripe” (*iam esse in agris frumenta matura*),—that Caesar was at Vesontio during the latter half of August. Astronomical calculations have shown that it was new moon on September 18; and the battle was fought before the new moon. The date of the battle was therefore, Colonel Stoffel infers, about September 14.<sup>6</sup>

## ON CAESAR'S ACCOUNT OF ONE OF THE MOTIVES OF THE BELGAE FOR CONSPIRING IN 57 B.C.

*Coniurandi has esse causas . . . quod ab nonnullis Gallis sollicitarentur, partim qui . . . mobilitate et levitate animi novis imperiis studebant.* *B. G.*, ii. 1, § 2. Schneider<sup>7</sup> understands Caesar to mean that some of those who had (virtually) submitted to the Romans were tired of their supremacy and wished to exchange it for that of the Belgae.<sup>8</sup> This is the sense in which I had myself understood the passage. But perhaps Caesar's meaning is not as definite as this. He may perhaps only mean that the Gauls, being tired of Roman supremacy, were bent on making a revolution of some sort.<sup>9</sup> Messrs. Bouché and Walpole<sup>10</sup> misunderstand the passage. "Rather than submit to foreign rule," they say, "the

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, i. 29, §§ 2-3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 48, § 5. See also Dion Cassius, xxviii. 47; Plutarch, *Caesar*, 19; and Appian, *B. C.*, iv. 1, § 3.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, i. 51, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Strat.*, ii. 3, § 6.

<sup>5</sup> *Der französische Atlas zu Cäsars gall. Kriege*, 1868, p. 14.

<sup>6</sup> *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 80.

<sup>7</sup> *Caesar*, i. 121.

<sup>8</sup> Dr. W. G. Rutherford (*Caesar*, Bk. ii., p. 47) refers to *B. G.*, i. 17, § 3, where the Aedui are said *Gallorum* (i.e. *Helvetiorum*) *quam Romanorum imperia praeferre*.

<sup>9</sup> See Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 44.

<sup>10</sup> *Caesar*, p. 259.

Belgae, like the Aedui (i. 17, § 3), preferred to be subject to the Gauls." But it was not the Belgae who *novis imperiis studebant*, but the Gallic chiefs who egged them on to fight.

### WHAT WAS THE STRENGTH OF THE BELGIC HOST IN 57 B.C.?

The sum of the various Belgic contingents enumerated by the representatives of the Remi in their interview with Caesar<sup>1</sup> amounted to 296,000 men. We can only guess what proportion the effective host bore to the numbers which had been promised but it may probably be inferred from Caesar's narrative<sup>2</sup> that, at all events, the Nervii and their allies,—the Atrebatæ, the Viromandui and the Aduatuci,—took no part in the earlier stage of the campaign; and if so, the nominal strength of the confederate host would have been reduced to about 200,000. Very likely the actual strength was much less: all that we can tell is that it was very great.<sup>3</sup>

### DID ADRA SUCCEED GALBA AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE BELGAE?

According to Dion Cassius who, if the MSS. are right, does not mention Galba, the commander-in-chief of the Belgae in 57 B.C. was named Adra.<sup>4</sup> De Sauley, the late eminent antiquary, affirmed that a Gallic coin had been found at Pasly, bearing the name *Adra*; and he identified the personage whose name appears on the coin with the Adra of Dion Cassius, and suggested that he might have succeeded Galba. The name on the coin, however, is not *Adra*, but *Arda*.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, M. Michaux pointed out that, according to Dion Cassius, Adra was appointed at the beginning of the war, and argued that he commanded the Bellovaci alone.<sup>6</sup> If so, Dion Cassius made a mistake: but it seems more likely that in this passage of his book the MSS. are at fault.

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 4, §§ 5-10.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 5, § 4, 15, § 3, 16, §§ 2-3. I doubt whether the more distant tribes,—the Morini and Menapii, the Eburones, Condrusi, Caeroci and Paemani,—sent their contingents either.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 7, § 4, 8, § 1. See my essay on "The Credibility of Caesar's Narrative," pp. 228-9, *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xxxix. 1, § 2. Xylander and Bekker read Γάλβαν instead of Ἀδραν.

<sup>5</sup> See *Cat. des monnaies gauloises*, ed. Muret and Chabouillet, pp. 204-5, Nos 8841-57, and H. de la Tour's *Atlas de monnaies gauloises*, 1892, pl. xxxvi. The coins of Arda are assigned in the Catalogue and the Atlas to the Treveri, who, in this war, were on the side of Caesar. See *B. G.*, ii. 24, § 4.

<sup>6</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. arch. de Soissons*, ix., 1878, pp. 64-71.



WHERE DID THE BELGAE MUSTER IN 57 B.C., BEFORE  
MARCHING AGAINST CAESAR?

Von Güler<sup>1</sup> believes that the Belgae mustered in the country of the Suessiones, apparently at or near Noviodunum, which he identifies with Soissons. The reason which he gives is that their commander-in-chief was the king of the Suessiones.<sup>2</sup> But, as General Creuly points out,<sup>3</sup> the king would have been glad to avoid the injury which the presence of such a huge host could not but have inflicted upon his standing crops. Besides, there is a passage in Caesar, which proves that Soissons could not have been the place of muster. Describing his own movements at the outset of the campaign, he writes, "Finding that the whole host of the Belgae had concentrated and were marching against him, and learning from the scouts whom he had sent out and from the Remi that they were not far off, he pushed on rapidly, crossed the Aisne . . . and encamped near its banks" (*Postquam omnes Belgarum copias in unum locum coactas ad se venire vidit, neque iam longe abesse ab his, quos miserat, exploratoribus et ab Remis cognovit, flumen Axonam . . . exercitum traducere maturavit atque ibi castra posuit*).<sup>4</sup> He was indisputably on the south of the Aisne, when he began his march. If the Belgae had started from Soissons, which is on the south of the Aisne, as their base, is it credible that they would have marched, as they undoubtedly did, on the north of that river, to attack him?<sup>5</sup> Nay, they would not have done so even if he had already encamped on the north of the Aisne; for, if they had marched on the south, they would, by the mere fact of doing so, have compelled him to abandon his position for fear his communications should be cut.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, it is, as I have shown,<sup>7</sup> impossible to find a suitable site for Bibrax, the stronghold which they attacked when they were marching against him, at any point on or near the road leading from Soissons to the point where he crossed the Aisne. It is certain, therefore, that the point where the Belgae concentrated was somewhere north of the Aisne, and at a considerable distance from it. Assuming, with good reason, that Caesar crossed the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac, Creuly infers that it must have been somewhere north of Laon; for otherwise, he argues, their line of march would have been threatened by Berry-au-Bac, and Caesar would not have hesitated to seize that point at the earliest possible moment. We must conclude, he continues, that they were at least as far north as the neighbourhood of La Fère on the Oise, whence they could march against Caesar and his allies, the Remi, by way either of Laon or of Soissons; and that it was only when Caesar had ascertained from his scouts which route they had decided upon, that he put his own troops in motion.

Although we cannot be absolutely sure that Caesar was ready to march before he actually did so, General Creuly's conclusion appears to

<sup>1</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 67.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, p. 298.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 5-6.

<sup>6</sup> *Rev. arch.*, viii., 1863, p. 298.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 4, § 7.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 5, § 4.

<sup>7</sup> See pp. 394-6, *supra*.

me well-grounded ; for it may be inferred from Caesar's narrative that the Belgae had begun to move against him before he marched to meet them ; he probably had to make a whole day's march at least before he could reach his camping ground at Mauchamp : and on the night of his arrival the Belgae were still 8 Roman miles to the north.

## WHERE DID CAESAR CROSS THE AISNE IN HIS FIRST CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BELGAE?

The number of pamphlets and articles that have been published upon this question is bewildering. It has been discussed as hotly as the question of Cenabum or the question of Alesia.

I. 1. Since Napoleon published his *Histoire de Jules César*, the prevalent view has been that Caesar crossed the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac, and pitched his camp near Mauchamp, on a hill between the Aisne and the Miette, a small stream which flows into the Aisne on its northern bank. Napoleon was not, indeed, the first to adopt this site ; for von Goler and more than one French antiquary<sup>1</sup> had anticipated him : but he claimed that the results of the excavations which had been undertaken by his orders had established its identity. Besides Berry-au-Bac, however, Condé-sur-Suippe, which is about 3 miles higher up, and Pontavert and Pontarcy, which are respectively about 4 and 11 miles, as the crow flies, lower down the Aisne, have found ardent champions.

Caesar tells us that he marched from the country of the Sequani to the frontier of the Belgae, entered the territory of the Remi, and remained there some days. It is probable that, during this time, his headquarters were at or near their chief town, Durocortorum (Reims). Hearing that the hostile Belgae were marching against him, he put his own army in motion, crossed the Aisne by a bridge, at a point which was within an easy march of the eastern frontier of the Suessiones, and "there" (*ibi*), that is to say, close to the right bank, pitched his camp. On the left bank he stationed six cohorts to guard his communications.<sup>2</sup> He pitched his camp on a hill. He describes the hill and the measures which he took to render it impregnable in the following sentence :—*Ubi nostros non esse inferiores intellexit, loco pro castris ad aciem instruendam natura opportuno atque idoneo, quod is collis, ubi castra posita erant, paululum ex planitie editus tantum adversum in latitudinem patebat quantum loci acies instructa occupare poterat, atque ex utraque parte lateris deiectus habebat et in fronte leniter fastigatus paulatim ad planitiem redibat, ab utroque latere eius collis transversam fossam obduxit circiter passuum CD et ad extremas fossas castella constituit ibique tormenta collocavit, ne, cum aciem instruxisset, hostes, quod tantum multitudinem poterant, a lateribus pugnantes suos circumvenire possent. Hoc facto duabus legionibus quas proxime conscripserat in castris relictis ut, si*

<sup>1</sup> E.g., M. Piette in *Bull. de la Soc. acad. de Laon*, viii., 1858, p. 188.

<sup>2</sup> B. G.; i. 1, § 2 ; ii. 2, § 6, 3-5.

*quo opus esset, subsidio duci possent, reliquas sex legiones pro castris in acie constituit. Hostes item suas copias ex castris eductas instruxerant.*<sup>1</sup>

According to my unbiassed comprehension of this passage, the hill rose gradually from level ground on the right bank of the Aisne: it descended gradually to level ground in front: its flanks, on the right and left, did not insensibly merge into the plain, but descended to it, so to speak, with a definite slope; and its length, or extension from right to left, was just sufficient to allow six legions to be drawn up on it in line of battle. Between this hill and the enemy's camp, which was in front of it, was a small marsh. In order to prevent the enemy from outflanking him, Caesar drew a trench, about 400 paces, or 650 yards long, cross-wise, that is at right angles with the extension of the hill, on either flank of it; and at each end of each ditch he constructed a redoubt. Then, leaving two legions in reserve in his camp, he drew up the other six in line of battle *in front of his camp*.

I am certain that the foregoing description would agree substantially with the interpretation of Caesar's narrative that any unprejudiced scholar, examining the passage without reference to other sources of information, would give; and I find that it is substantially identical with the interpretation given by Long.<sup>2</sup> It might perhaps be argued that the two trenches started from the two northern ends of the hill; and this was the view of Turpin de Crissé.<sup>3</sup> But this interpretation hardly seems to agree with the natural meaning of *ab utroque latere*<sup>4</sup> and *transversam*;<sup>5</sup> and, as will presently appear, even if it is right, my argument remains unaffected. If the description which I have given really represents Caesar's meaning, Napoleon's Plan,<sup>6</sup> which traces one of the trenches from the north-western angle of the camp to the Miette, and the other from the south-eastern angle to the Aisne, is obviously wrong.<sup>7</sup> Accordingly Dr. Gunion Rutherford offers a different interpretation; and, what is more, he maintains that he alone of all the editors has explained Caesar's narrative correctly.<sup>8</sup> I was for a long time of opinion that Dr. Rutherford had deceived himself: but deeper consideration has compelled me to acknowledge that he is substantially right. Still, I believe that in a case of this kind it is well to let one's original comment stand. So, after first acting as *Advocatus Diaboli*, I will proceed to show that I was trying to make the better appear the worse cause.

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 8, §§ 3-5.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, p. 115. See also Schneider's *Cæsar*, vol. i., pp. 140-41. Schneider, who wrote before Napoleon's day, had only his own common sense and uncommon knowledge of Latin to rely upon; and I am glad to find that my interpretation of Caesar's text is sanctioned in advance by his authority.

<sup>3</sup> *Comm. de César*, 1785, t. i., p. 128. "On either side" (of the hill).

<sup>4</sup> "Crosswise," i.e. at right angles to the axis of the hill.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, Planche 8. See Plan facing p. 49 of this volume.

<sup>7</sup> Long (*Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 50, n. 5) takes substantially the same view as mine. While he accepts Berry-au-Bac as the place where Caesar crossed the Aisne, and the hill between the Aisne and the Miette as the site of his camp, he says plainly that, in the matter of the transverse fosses, Napoleon's Plan does not agree with Caesar's text.

<sup>8</sup> *Caesar, Books II.-III.*, Preface and pp. 55-6.

["The key of this description," says Dr. Rutherford, "is *pro castris*, which proves that Caesar was looking westward towards the Aisne along the axis of the hill." Where the proof is, I cannot see. In fact Dr. Rutherford himself supplies *disproof*. In his Vocabulary (p. 124) he translates *pro castris* by "in front of the camp." The front of the camp, it is needless to say, was that side of it which faced the enemy; and the side of this particular camp which faced the enemy was confessedly the north. The "key" which Dr. Rutherford found only opens the door to fresh mistakes. Having mistranslated *pro castris*, he is compelled to mistranslate *in fronte*. "*In fronte*," he says, "refers to that end of the hill's ridge furthest removed from the camp." A scholar like Dr. Rutherford could not have made such a mistake as this if he had not been biased by Napoleon's Plan. Let anyone look at the Plan, and he will see at once that the *front* of the hill can only be that side of it which faced the enemy. Besides, Dr. Rutherford forgets that, according to Caesar, the hill, from its right to its left flank, was just wide enough to enable the line of battle to be formed along it; whereas, according to Dr. Rutherford's interpretation of Caesar and according to Napoleon's Plan, the hill was wide enough to allow the line of battle to be formed upon it *alongside of the camp*, that is to say, wider, by the length of one side of the camp, than Caesar says. It is perfectly clear that, *if Caesar's narrative was not misleading*, the line of battle was formed in front of, not alongside of the camp. Finally, Caesar says that his object in constructing the two trenches was to prevent the enemy from surrounding his troops on their flanks (ne, cum aciem instruxisset, hostes . . . a lateribus pugnantes suos circumvenire possent). Would he have used the plural *lateribus* if he had only meant his right flank?] . . .

Now for my recantation. I assume, what I shall afterwards prove, that the camp near Berry-au-Bac was really Caesar's camp. There is no doubt that in every other passage in which Caesar writes *pro castris* he means "on the side of the camp which faced the enemy" (see *B. G.*, i. 48, § 3, 51, § 1; iv. 35, § 1; v. 15, § 3, 16, § 1, 37, § 5; vii. 24, § 5, 66, § 6, 68, § 1, 70, § 2, 83, § 8, 89, § 4; *B. C.*, i. 43, § 4; iii. 56, § 2). But a glance at the Plan will show that the camp near Berry-au-Bac could only have faced the extreme left of the Belgic line: the Roman troops would naturally have been drawn up on the left of the camp; and as they would have been confronting the enemy and at the same time resting upon the support of the camp, even though not, so to speak, between it and the enemy, the ground which they occupied might, I believe, have fairly been described as *loco pro castris*. If Dr. Rutherford mistranslates *in fronte*, that mistake does not, I think, violate his main contention. Although Caesar does certainly imply that the whole extent of the hill was just wide enough to enable the line of battle to be formed along it, he doubtless meant that part of the whole extent,—about three-fourths of the whole,—which was on the left of the camp. Again, if he used the phrase *a lateribus* (on the flanks) instead of *a dextro latere* (on the right flank), the loose expression perhaps finds its parallel

in *ripas* and in *ripis*, which he uses more than once when he is only speaking of one bank of a river.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, it is quite certain, although no previous commentator has remarked upon the fact, that the transverse fosses, unless they were traced in the manner indicated by Turpin de Crissé,<sup>2</sup> were not dug on the right and left of the hill on which the Roman line stood; for the sufficient reason that, being each not more than 650 yards (about 400 "paces") long, they would have been actually shorter than one side of the Roman camp, and therefore, if they had been dug on either flank of the hill, they would have been useless.

I conclude that Caesar, writing in haste, expressed himself obscurely, as a man, however clear-headed, may sometimes do who forgets that what is plain enough to his own mind may not be plain to readers who have not, like himself, witnessed the scene which he describes. What has principally led me to change my mind and accept Dr. Rutherford's explanation, is the fact that it is more likely that Caesar should have used the expressions *pro castris* and *a lateribus* loosely than that he should, as Kraner-Dittenberger<sup>3</sup> suggest, have forgotten the nature of the ground and the direction of the trenches. Still, it is safe to say that Dr. Rutherford would never have explained Caesar's text as he has done, if he had not assumed the correctness of Napoleon's Plan and been guided by it.

In what I have said hitherto my object has been, not to find fault with Napoleon's Plan, but to show that, in certain respects, it is irreconcilable with the natural meaning of Caesar's narrative. I shall now examine the objections that have been made to Napoleon's view.

(a) The trench which, according to Napoleon's Plan, touches the Aisne is only 400 metres long, whereas, according to Caesar,<sup>4</sup> each trench was about 400 *paces*, or nearly 2000 feet long; and it shows no trace of a redoubt.<sup>5</sup> To this E. Fleury replies that the Aisne has changed its course since Caesar's day, and that, in so doing, it has destroyed all traces of the end of the trench and of the redoubt.<sup>6</sup>

(b) According to L. Fallue,<sup>7</sup> the camp at Mauchamp, being only 41 hectares, or about 101 acres in area, was insufficient for Caesar's six legions;<sup>8</sup> for, he says, Hyginus assigns nearly as much space to a camp intended for only three legions. But Fallue is mistaken. The camp described by Hyginus was, indeed, intended for three legions: but those three legions, with the foreign auxiliaries and the camp-followers who accompanied them, amounted to at least 40,000 men.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, the great Napoleon,<sup>10</sup> whose opinion on such a point is more valuable than that of Fallue, estimates that 24,000 infantry and 1800 horses could have found room in a space of 110,000 square toises,<sup>11</sup> or about 103 acres.

<sup>1</sup> H. Meusel, *Lex. Caes.*, ii. 1750-51. <sup>2</sup> See p. 646, *supra*. <sup>3</sup> Caesar, p. 122.

<sup>4</sup> B. G., ii. 8, § 3. <sup>5</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. acad. de Laon*, xiv., 1864, p. 104.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, xiii., 1863, p. 185.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, xiv., 1864, p. 103.

<sup>8</sup> Eight, he ought to have said; or rather seven legions and four cohorts, six cohorts having been left with Sabinus.

<sup>9</sup> Hyginus, *De munitionibus castrorum*, § 21 (ed. A. von Domaszewski, 1887).

<sup>10</sup> *Précis des guerres de Jules César*, pp. 31-2.

<sup>11</sup> A toise is 6·39582 English feet.

(c) The Miette is not, and never could have been a stream flowing through a marsh ; for one of the transverse trenches actually touches it.<sup>1</sup> To this A. E. Poquet<sup>2</sup> answers that the surrounding land is still known as the "marais de la Miette," and that the existing channel of the Miette itself was *dug* in order to drain the stagnant waters.

As Colonel Stoffel's discovery has not been universally accepted as conclusive, I shall now examine the claims of the other places that have been proposed for Caesar's passage of the Aisne.

2. Before Napoleon's book appeared, Pontavert was generally pointed out as the place of crossing.<sup>3</sup> It is believed that there was a Gallic road from Durocortorum (Reims) to Bagacum (Bavay), which crossed the river by a bridge at Pontavert.<sup>4</sup> But, on the theory that this was the bridge which Caesar mentioned, it is impossible to find any site for his camp which corresponds, even approximately, with his description. Any one can verify this for himself by referring to Sheet 34 of the *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000). Lebeuf selected the plateau of Chaudardes : but this site was carefully examined by General Creuly and various members of the Société académique de Laon, and unhesitatingly rejected.<sup>5</sup> The great Napoleon<sup>6</sup> made Caesar's right rest on the Aisne between Pontavert and the village of Chaudardes, and his left on a rivulet : but he could not have been acquainted with the ground ; for there is no hill here which corresponds with Caesar's description. Craonne has also been suggested : but Thillois points out that it is scarped on all sides, and that it is 6 kilometres, or nearly 4 miles, from the river.<sup>7</sup>

3. On behalf of Pontarcy all that can be said has been said by Caignart de Sauley. After the publication of the results of Colonel Stoffel's excavations he acknowledged that he was wrong :<sup>8</sup> but it may be well, in order finally to settle the question, to examine the arguments by which he had defended his former opinion. First, he explains Caesar's phrase, *flumen Axonam, quod est in extremis Remorum finibus* ("the river Aisne, which is in the most distant part of the country of the Remi"), as meaning that Caesar crossed the Aisne "au point où cette rivière

<sup>1</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. acad. de Laon*, xiv., 1864, p. 104.

<sup>2</sup> *Jules César et son entrée dans la Gaule Belgique*, 1864, p. 64.

<sup>3</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. hist. et arch. de Soissons*, xv., 1860, pp. 127, 129.

<sup>4</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. acad. de Laon*, vii., 1858, p. 188. M. Melleville (*Le passage de l'Aisne par J. César*, 1864, p. 19) asserts that this was the only ancient road within the line of the Aisne from Neufchâtel to Pontavert : but A. Piette, the principal authority on the ancient roads of the department of the Aisne, maintains (*Itinéraires gallo-rom. dans le dépt de l'Aisne*, p. 92) that the road which leads from Reims to Arras by way of Berry-au-Bac existed in the Gallo-Roman period.

<sup>5</sup> Poquet, pp. 69-70.

<sup>6</sup> *Précis des guerres de César*, p. 43.

<sup>7</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. acad. de Laon*, xix., 1869-70, p. 272. Melleville (*Le passage de l'Aisne*, pp. 21-2, 25, 27-8) placed Caesar's camp on the hill of St-Thomas, which is at least 6 miles from the nearest point of the Aisne ! It would be an insult to the reader's intelligence to point out the various fatal objections to this theory ; and one of them is so obvious that one wonders that it did not occur to Melleville himself :—how could Caesar have said that one side of his camp was protected by the Aisne (*latus unum castrorum ripis fluminis muniebat*) if the camp had been 6 miles from that river ?

<sup>8</sup> *Journal de l'Aisne*, Mai 7, 1862. \*

coule à proximité de la frontière du pays des Rémes."<sup>1</sup> It is hardly necessary to say that this interpretation is wrong. Caesar very rarely uses *finis* in the sense of "frontier";<sup>2</sup> and then his meaning is unmistakable. *Fines*, in the *Commentaries*, almost always means "territory."<sup>3</sup> Moreover, Pontarcy has always formed part of the diocese of Soissons, and was therefore probably in the country of the Suessiones, not, as Caesar's narrative requires, in that of the Remi.<sup>4</sup>

Secondly, de Sauley argues that the very name Pontarcy, which he derives from *pons arcis*, implies the former existence at Pontarcy of a bridge.<sup>5</sup> But if so, what proof is there that the bridge existed in Caesar's time, or that, if it did, no other bridge spanned the Aisne in that part of its course within which Caesar must have crossed it? Besides, according to M. Piette,<sup>6</sup> who has made a special study of the ancient roads in the department of the Aisne, no ancient road passed through Pontarcy.

Thirdly, de Sauley points out that in the neighbourhood of the village of Ceuilly there are fords;<sup>7</sup> and it was by these fords, he maintains, that the Belgae attempted to cross the Aisne, in order to attack Sabinus. But this is not the only point in the course of the Aisne which is fordable. There is a ford between Berry-au-Bac and Pontavert.

Fourthly, from Caesar's statement that one side of his camp was covered by the Aisne, de Sauley infers that the hill on which the camp stood "s'étendait perpendiculairement au cours de l'Aisne et dominant le terrain compris entre elle et la rivière, ne laissait pas d'attaque à craindre dans cette direction."<sup>8</sup> De Sauley was driven to adopt this singular interpretation of Caesar's words because the plateau of Comin, the only hill which he could find near Pontarcy, extends in a direction perpendicular to the course of the river. Caesar meant of course that the hill extended in a direction parallel with the Aisne. Moreover, as M. Piette observes,<sup>9</sup> the hill of Comin is about 200 feet above the level of the valley beneath it, and is surrounded by steep escarpments; whereas the hill which Caesar describes rose only a little above the plain, and its northern slope was very gentle.

Fifthly, the slope of the hill descending towards the valley which de Sauley believed to have separated the Romans from the Belgae is bounded, he says, by two parallel trenches. These trenches were identified by de Sauley with Caesar's *transversae fossae*, which, I need hardly say, would have been filled up by the inhabitants after his departure. The distance between them is, he says, about 450 metres, or nearly 500 yards. This space corresponded, on his theory, with the width of the Roman line of battle. There were, he assumes, 800 men in each rank,<sup>10</sup> and, as there were six legions in order of battle, or perhaps about 24,000 men, who were probably arranged in three lines, each eight men deep, this estimate

<sup>1</sup> *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, 1862, pp. 83-4.

<sup>2</sup> See Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i. 1302.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 1302-7.

<sup>4</sup> Poquet, p. 23.

<sup>5</sup> *Les campagnes de Jules César*, etc., p. 103.

<sup>6</sup> *Itinéraires*, etc., map at end of volume.

<sup>7</sup> *Les campagnes de Jules César*, pp. 111-12.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, p. 95.

<sup>9</sup> *Itinéraires*, etc., p. 251.

<sup>10</sup> *Les campagnes*, etc., pp. 98, 107.

is not very far from the truth. Now observe that, on de Saulcy's theory, each man would have had a space of just five-eighths of a yard, or  $22\frac{1}{2}$  inches, to stand in! In other words, the men would have been packed like sardines in a box, not like Roman soldiers, who had to use their swords and shields. Enough has been said to show that Caesar did not cross the Aisne at Pontarcy. M. Piette justly argues that Caesar would not have attempted to cross either at Pontarcy or at Pontavert, as to reach either of these places he would have had to traverse the difficult and broken country which stretches north-westward from Reims.<sup>1</sup>

By the process of *exhaustion*, then, I am forced to conclude that Caesar crossed the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac, and that he encamped on the hill between the Aisne and the Miette. That hill corresponds with Caesar's description; and I can find no other hill on the right bank of the Aisne which does so. But were the camp and the trenches which Colonel Stoffel's excavations revealed, the camp and the trenches which Caesar described? I believe they were, for this reason. No commentator, as far as I know, has noticed the fact that, if Caesar had drawn one trench about 650 yards long, *athwart* each flank of the hill, as his narrative would seem to imply, those trenches would have been absolutely useless! For they would have been no longer than the sides of the Roman camp; and they would have rested upon nothing. Consequently the Belgae would only have had to walk round them in order to strike the Roman rear. And even if the trenches had started from the two northern ends of the hill, as Turpin de Crissé makes them do, the rear of the Romans would have been left exposed, unless their camp had occupied the whole length of the hill. But the two trenches which are traced in Napoleon's Plan would have effectually protected the right flank and the right rear of the Romans; and the junction of the Miette and the Aisne would have protected their left.

II. One or two minor points remain to be settled. Napoleon says that the road by which Caesar marched "led straight to the Aisne";<sup>2</sup> but M. Piette says that he probably marched by the route along which subsequently ran the Roman road from Reims to Bavay, and which crossed the Aisne about 4 kilometres east of the confluence of the Suippe and the Aisne; that he left Sabinus in the so-called "camp of Condé," at the confluence of the Suippe and the Aisne; and that he encamped himself on the hill of Mauchamp, that is to say, in the position selected by Napoleon.<sup>3</sup> But M. Piette is certainly mistaken. For the camp of Condé, if it is a Roman camp at all, is far too large to have been occupied by the small force of Sabinus:<sup>4</sup> it is tolerably clear from Caesar's narrative that he encamped just north of the point where he crossed the Aisne, not several miles to the west of it, and that the camp of Sabinus was immediately south of and opposite to the *tête-de-pont*, not 4 kilometres to the west of it: if we may believe Napoleon, "the retrench-

<sup>1</sup> *Itinéraires*, etc., pp. 97-8. See Sheet 34 of the *Carte de l'État-Major* (1:80,000).

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 100.

<sup>3</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. acad. de Laon*, vii., 1858, p. 188.

<sup>4</sup> See Poquet, pp. 28-9. ◊



ments of this *tête-de-pont* . . . are still visible at Berry-au-Bac ;"<sup>1</sup> and, as M. Piette believes that the road leading from Reims to Arras by way of Berry-au-Bac existed in the Gallo-Roman period, I cannot see why he refuses to believe that Caesar marched by it.

III. Referring to the *tête-de-pont* which is shown in Napoleon's Plan, Long says, "this *tête-de-pont* would be of little or no use on the north side of the river ; and if the 'praesidium' of c. 5 and the 'castellum' of c. 9 are the same, as I think they are, Caesar placed the *tête-de-pont* on the south side of the Aisne."<sup>2</sup>

This note is unworthy of Long. How could he have thought that the *praesidium* of chapter 5 and the *castellum*, which Sabinus occupied, of chapter 9 were the same, after reading this passage :—*In eo flumine pons erat. Ibi praesidium ponit et in altera parte fluminis Quintum Titurium Sabinum legatum cum sex cohortibus relinquit?*<sup>3</sup> These words immediately follow Caesar's description of the position which he himself took up on the northern side of the Aisne. '*Altera parte fluminis*, then, must mean the southern side ; and the *praesidium* must have been on the northern. Besides, from chapter 9 it is clear that the *castellum* was on the southern side.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, as the *praesidium* was on the north, the *castellum* and the *praesidium* were not the same.

Of course Long made a great mistake when he asserted that "this *tête-de-pont* would be of little or no use on the north side of the river." The *tête-de-pont* made it absolutely impossible for any hostile force to cross the river by the bridge.

IV. According to Napoleon and von Kampen, the Belgæ attempted to cross the Aisne by the ford of Gernicourt, between Berry-au-Bac and Pontavert : but M. Piette thinks that they marched to attack Sabinus by the north-east, hid their march behind the hill of Proviseux, and then gained the ford of St-Pierre, near Guignicourt.<sup>5</sup> The map shows that the route indicated by Napoleon was the easier : but of course M. Piette was obliged to choose the other because he had made the mistake of placing Sabinus's camp, which the Belgæ intended to attack, at Condé-sur-Suippe.

### HOW LONG DID CAESAR TAKE TO MARCH FROM HIS CAMP ON THE AISNE TO NOVIODUNUM ?

Caesar's words are *Postridie eius diei Caesar . . . in fines Suessionum, qui proximi Remis erant, exercitum duxit et magno itinere confecto ad*

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 100, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 51, n. 6.

<sup>3</sup> "The river was spanned by a bridge. At the bridge-head he established a strong post, and on the other side of the river he left one of his lieutenants, Quintus Titurius Sabinus, with six cohorts." *B. G.*, ii. 5, § 6.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibi vadis repertis partem suarum copiarum traducere conati sunt, eo consilio ut, si possent, castellum . . . expugnarent, etc.*

<sup>5</sup> *Itinéraires gallo-rom. dans le dépt de l'Aisne*, pp. 100-1.

*oppidum Noviodunum contendit*.<sup>1</sup> The question is whether he reached Noviodunum on the day of the *magnum iter* or on the next day.

Nipperdey<sup>2</sup> says that the words *magno itinere confecto* would be absurd unless some place were indicated as the terminus of the *magnum iter*; and Schneider<sup>3</sup> virtually takes the same view, remarking that in other passages where Caesar uses the words *itinere confecto*, the general who performed the march is said to have reached some definite place, or to have fallen upon his enemy.<sup>4</sup> But as, in this particular passage, no place is, in Schneider's opinion, *expressly* indicated as the terminus of the *iter*, he concludes that, after *confecto*, we must understand *in fines Suessionum pervenit*; that is to say, that Caesar reached the territory of the Suessiones by a forced march, and then marched on for Noviodunum. But, to say nothing of the fact that Caesar had already told us that he had entered the territory of the Suessiones (*in fines Suessionum . . . exercitum duxit*), the point from which he started was close to that territory; and therefore, on Schneider's theory, the word *parvo* would be more applicable than *magno*. We are to assume, then, says Nipperdey, who waxes very sarcastic at his brother editor's expense, that Caesar marched about to amuse himself, and deliberately wasted his time for want of something better to do (*Scilicet animi causa ambulavisse Caesarem putabimus et de industria tempus trivisse in summa rerum gerendarum inopia*). Nipperdey concludes that the word *confecto* is spurious, and that Caesar reached Noviodunum in a single march. Long,<sup>5</sup> on the other hand, while admitting with Schneider that *contendere ad* "properly means to march towards a place," suggests that "it does not seem to exclude the notion of reaching it also." No! it does not exclude that notion: but in order that Long's suggestion should have any weight, it would be necessary that *contendit* should mean the same, in this passage, as *pervenit*. Of course, if this were so, the difficulty presented by the suspected word *confecto* would disappear; and the passage would mean "Caesar led his army into the country of the Suessiones, and, after making a forced march, arrived at Noviodunum." But *contendit* cannot mean the same as *pervenit*.

I am not, however, convinced by the arguments of Nipperdey. Supposing that Caesar had wished to say that he made a forced march, which did not take him the whole way to Noviodunum, and that on the following day he pushed on for Noviodunum, would not the words *magno itinere confecto ad oppidum Noviodunum contendit* have adequately expressed his meaning? And how was he to indicate the terminus of the *iter*, if it had no name? The interpretation which I have suggested (though, for reasons which I shall presently give, I do not press it) is, in some measure, supported by the fact that Caesar began to attack *Noviodunum* immediately after his arrival, and, having failed in an attempt to take it by storm, proceeded *on the same evening* to make preparations for a regular siege. Could he, it might be asked, have done

<sup>1</sup> B. G., ii. 12, § 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, pp. 60-61.

<sup>3</sup> *Caesar*, i. 148-9.

<sup>4</sup> B. G., iv. 4, § 5, 14, § 1; vi. 30, § 1; vii. 56, § 3, 83, § 7.

<sup>5</sup> *Caesar*, p. 119.

all this if he had already marched 28 miles<sup>1</sup> on the same day? It may, however, be replied that, as Schneider says, the word *postridie* proves that Caesar hastened to Noviodunum (*ad oppidum Noviodunum contendit*) on the same day on which he made the *magnum iter*. Similarly Dr. W. G. Rutherford,<sup>2</sup> who retains the word *confecto*, translates the passage thus, "the long march accomplished, he hastens to Noviodunum." It is astonishing that neither of the two editors should have seen that Caesar could not have said that, *after* having made a forced march (*magno itinere confecto*), he "hastened" *on the same day* to Noviodunum; seeing that the hastening would itself have formed a part of the forced march, and would have changed the *magnum iter* into a *maximum iter*.

But another explanation has been proposed. "Perhaps," remarks Mr. Peskett,<sup>3</sup> "as Vielhaber suggests, this word (*confecto*) is to be explained by the consideration that 'we occasionally find *ablativi consequentiae* formed with the participle perfect to express a circumstance which does not precede but accompanies or follows the main action,' Madvig, L. G., § 431, obs. 2: in the present passage the forced march is not *prior* to his hastening to Noviodunum but synchronous with it. 'Caesar hastened to Noviodunum, making a forced march.'" If Caesar did really reach Noviodunum on the same day on which he made the *magnum iter*, then either we must accept Vielhaber's explanation or with Nipperley we must expunge *confecto*. But there remains the difficulty of understanding how, at the end of a *magnum iter*, Caesar's troops could have attempted to take Noviodunum by storm, and then begun their preparations for a regular siege. Nevertheless, considering the force of the word *postridie*, I am inclined to agree with Long that "Caesar seems to speak of one day only"; and I hold that an editor has no right to reject words which are found in all the MSS., without the very strongest reason. I therefore provisionally accept Vielhaber's explanation of *confecto*; and I am constrained accordingly to admit that the soldiers of Caesar were so strong that, even after making a forced march, they were able to undertake fresh labours. [Since I wrote the rough draft of this note, I have remembered that during the Indian Mutiny, Colonel Greathed's column fought the battle of Agra almost immediately after making a forced march of 44 miles, and that the famous corps of Guides went into action at Delhi two hours after they had finished their wonderful march of 580 miles in 22 days. See my *History of the Indian Mutiny*, 5th ed., 1898, pp. 339, 392-3.]

## THE BATTLE WITH THE NERVII

I. 1. I have followed MM. Creuly<sup>1</sup> and Bertrand,<sup>4</sup> who carefully examined the course of the Sambre, and on whose notes Napoleon

<sup>1</sup> See p. 473.

<sup>2</sup> Caesar, p. 59.

<sup>3</sup> Caesar, *B. G.*, ii., ed. Peskett (1888), Notes, pp. 26-7.

<sup>4</sup> *Rev. arch.*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. iv., 1861, pp. 453-67.

evidently relied, in placing this battle on the left bank, on the heights of Neuf-Mesnil, opposite Hautmont. Long<sup>1</sup> agrees with Napoleon; and von Göler,<sup>2</sup> who wrote before the publication of Napoleon's book, takes the same view. Desjardins says of Napoleon's site:—"Cette position convient en effet assez bien, mais ce n'est pas la seule du cours supérieur de la Sambre qui présente les conditions exigées par le texte; nous n'avons donc pas plus de certitude à cet égard que pour le reste, le texte de César étant, comme toujours, d'une désespérante sobriété de renseignements topographiques."<sup>3</sup> But Caesar's description, the substance of which I have embodied in pages 53-56 of my narrative, is perfectly clear; and Long, von Göler and MM. Creuly and Bertrand give reasons for believing that the site adopted by Napoleon is the only one which exactly corresponds with it.

2. J. Des Roches<sup>4</sup> and V. Gantier<sup>5</sup> find the battle-field at Presles. This place, which is about 8 kilometres, or 5 miles, east of Charleroi, is on the right bank of the Sambre, not, like Napoleon's site, on the left. Gantier maintains that if Caesar had marched against the Nervii by the left bank, he must have crossed the country of the Atrebatés before entering that of the Nervii, which would be contrary to his statement<sup>6</sup> that the country of the Nervii, where he entered it, bordered on that of the Ambiani. Furthermore, says Gantier, the western frontier of the Nervii was probably the Scheldt, not, as Napoleon, who is anxious to allow space enough for a march of three days across the Nervian territory<sup>7</sup> to Neuf-Mesnil, maintains, close to Fin and Bapaume. On page 213 of his book Napoleon himself implies that the frontier was far to the east of Fin and Bapaume. Hautmont, continues Gantier, is only 50 kilometres from the Scheldt: even from Bapaume it is only 80; and this distance is not enough to answer the requirements of Caesar's narrative. A Roman army generally marched 30 kilometres a day; and therefore the march from the Nervian frontier to the battle-field, including the march on the fourth day,—that of the battle,—must have been between 105 and 110 kilometres. Presles satisfies this condition: tradition is in favour of Presles; and at Presles, as at Hautmont, antiquarian discoveries have been made. Dewez adds that the name "Presles," or, as he spells it, "Prêle," is derived from *proelium*; and that human bones have been found on the spot. There is no record, he says, of a later battle having been fought there; and we may therefore conclude that the bones are those of men who were killed in the battle with the Nervii. Finally, Des Roches says that the lie of the ground at Presles and the depth of the river correspond with Caesar's description.<sup>8</sup>

These arguments will not bear examination. One fact alone overthrows them. If Caesar marched down the right bank of the Sambre,

<sup>1</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 59.

<sup>2</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, pp. 75-7.

<sup>3</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 635-6.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. anc. des Pays Bas autrichiens*, 1787, t. ii. pp. 37-40.

<sup>5</sup> *La conquête de la Belgique par Jules César*, 1882, pp. 113-14, 156-64.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 15, § 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 16, § 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Nouv. mém. de l'Acad. Roy. de Bruxelles*, ii., 1822, pp. 238-9.

he must, as a glance at the map will show, have crossed that river near its source, and then continued his march, always comparatively close to the right bank, until he reached the alleged battle-field at Presles. If so, would he have told us, as he does, that, after marching for three days across Nervian territory, he learned that the Sambre was not more than 10 (Roman) miles from his camp, evidently implying that he had not yet come within sight of the Sambre?<sup>1</sup> Colonel A. Sarrette<sup>2</sup> indeed, who makes him march down the right bank, avoids the necessity of taking him across the river near its source: but his method is peculiar. He takes Caesar from Breteuil (which he identifies with Bratuspantium) direct to Péronne and thence to Wassigny: there he makes him turn sharply to the right, round the headwaters of the Sambre, advance to Avesnes and thence move on to Hautmont. Caesar was obliged, says the colonel, to march down the right bank, for fear his communications with the Remi, from whom he drew his supplies, should be cut.

I reply that, separated from the Remi by the Sambre, Caesar would have been in no more danger than he was when he penetrated into the hostile country of Ariovistus, when he invaded the country of the Veneti, when he marched into the heart of Britain, when, in the seventh campaign, he again and again ran risks about supply to gain a great end; or than his lieutenant, Crassus, was when he penetrated far into hostile Aquitania; finally, that, on Colonel Sarrette's theory, his convoys would equally have been exposed to attack from the Viromandui. Besides, as General Creuly asks, what business had Caesar on the right bank of the Sambre? Why should he have gone out of his way to avoid the country which he wished to invade? His objective was doubtless Bagacum (Bavay), the Nervian capital.<sup>3</sup> Von Moltke, in 1870, might as well have marched for Marseilles or Toulouse, instead of Paris. Moreover, Roman armies did not generally march 30 kilometres a day, but much less.<sup>4</sup>

Gantier's theory being now demolished, it is unnecessary to refute his arguments one by one. But it is strange that he should have overlooked the obvious fact, expressly pointed out by Caesar,<sup>5</sup> that the Roman army could not have marched at its ordinary speed across a country intersected by thick hedges, which had to be cut through; and it follows from this fact that there is no need to look for the battle-field further to the west than Napoleon has placed it. Moreover, Napoleon does not imply on page 213 of his *Histoire* that the Nervian frontier was far to the east of Fin and Bapaume. On this fact, however, I lay no stress; for, assuming that the territory of the Nervii was bounded by the Scheldt, the distance from the Scheldt to Neuf-Mesnil was as much as the Romans, marching through a difficult country, would have been able to accomplish in three days.

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 16, § 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Quelques pages des comm. de César*, 1863, map facing p. 75.

<sup>3</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, p. 36.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 626-7, *supra*.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 17, §§ 4-5.

The arguments of Des Roches and Dewez are not more convincing than those of Gantier. If the lie of the ground at Presles corresponds with Caesar's description, so does the lie of the ground at Neuf-Mesnil: the name "Presles" is common to eight places in France alone, and, as Dinaux sensibly remarks, "nous serions bien embarrassé de leur assigner huit champs de bataille";<sup>1</sup> and the argument drawn from the alleged discovery of bones has been so often used by rival antiquaries on behalf of their pet sites that cautious investigators have come to regard it with suspicion. Besides, ancient weapons, human remains and rows of graves have also been discovered in the wood of Quesnoy, near Hautmont.<sup>2</sup>

3. Nicholas Le Long<sup>3</sup> places the battle-field near Landrecies, but gives no reasons.<sup>4</sup> Nor can any be given; for the country near Landrecies does not correspond with Caesar's description.

4. A. de Vlamincx<sup>4</sup> objects to Neuf-Mesnil on the ground that it is only 20 miles (8 "lieues") from Cambrai, and that the Roman army could not have taken three days to march so short a distance. Following P. G. Baert,<sup>5</sup> he decides for the village of La Buisnière, about 7 kilometres, or 4½ miles, south-west of Thuin. But there must be some mistake in de Vlamincx's map. From Cambrai to Neuf-Mesnil is 30 miles, *as the crow flies*. Nor is it certain that Cambrai was on the Nervian frontier, where the three days' march began. There is nothing to be said for La Buisnière or for Thuin itself, where the battle has also been placed;<sup>6</sup> and, as Thuin is about 14 and La Buisnière about 13 miles further down the Sambre than Neuf-Mesnil, it is unlikely that Caesar could have marched to either place, across such a difficult country, in the time which he mentions.

5. M. Ganchez<sup>7</sup> finds the battle-field near Hautes-Wihéries, on the right bank of the Sambre, about 20 kilometres, or 12 miles, below Hautmont. He bases his choice on the hypothesis that Caesar marched 20 Roman miles a day; and in justification of this hypothesis he refers to *B. G.*, v. 47-8. Caesar there tells us that, in 54 B.C., on an occasion when everything depended upon speed,<sup>8</sup> he marched 20 miles in one day through the territory of the Nervii. So we are to assume that, in 57 B.C., when he had no motive for making haste, he marched 60 miles in three days!

6. M. L. Caudet makes Caesar march, after the submission of Samarobriva (Amiens), to Vermand, establish there a magazine, and then begin his three days' march *per Nerviorum fines*, along the left bank of the Oise, which, says M. Caudet, protected him against the danger of a sur-

<sup>1</sup> *Archives hist. et litt. du Nord de la France et du Midi de la Belgique*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. iii., 1852, p. 187.

<sup>2</sup> Von Goler, *Gall. Krieg*, p. 86.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. eccl. et civ. du diocèse de Laon*, 1783, p. 12.

<sup>4</sup> *Messenger des sciences hist. de Belgique*, 1882, p. 385.

<sup>5</sup> *Mém. sur les campagnes de César dans la Belgique*, p. 58 (published in 1833).

<sup>6</sup> *Archives hist. et litt. du Nord de la France et du Midi de la Belgique*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. v., 1856, p. 326; N. Le Long, *Hist. eccl. et civ. du diocèse de Laon*, p. 12.

<sup>7</sup> *Annales de l'Acad. d'arch. de Belgique*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. viii., 1882, pp. 422-7.

<sup>8</sup> *unum salutis auxilium in celeritate ponebat.*

prise. The battle took place, according to M. Caudet, at Catillon-sur-Sambre.<sup>1</sup>

All this is simply wild imagination. M. Caudet ignorantly translates *per fines* by "along the frontier," whereas of course *fines* means, in this as in almost every other passage where it occurs in Caesar, "territory," and *per* means not "along" but "through."<sup>2</sup> Moreover, Catillon is on the right bank of the Sambre, and must therefore be rejected for the same reason as Presles.

7. Achaintre,<sup>3</sup> Leglay<sup>4</sup> and others believe that Caesar wrote *Sabim* by mistake for *Scaldem*, and that the battle was fought on the banks of the Scheldt. Achaintre argues first, that Caesar, marching from the country of the Ambiani against the Nervii, would have marched through the district in which are situated Cambrai, Bouchain and Valenciennes, and thus would necessarily have come to the Scheldt; secondly, that it is absurd to suppose that if he had marched to Neuf-Mesnil, the Nervii would have abandoned the left bank of the Sambre and waited for him on the other side;<sup>5</sup> and thirdly, that in *B. G.*, vi. 33, § 3, Caesar confounds the Sambre with the Scheldt.

It is difficult to say which of these reasons is the worst. To say that Caesar, marching from the country of the Ambiani into that of the Nervii, "would necessarily come to the Scheldt" and not the Sambre, is about on a par with saying that an invader having effected a landing in England, would "necessarily" come to the Severn and not the Thames. The second reason is not much better. The Nervii chose the strongest position that they could find. If Caesar had determined to attack that position, he would first have had to cross a river. They attacked him from ambush; and it was all that he could do to avoid defeat. As for the third reason, there is no proof that Caesar ever confounded the Sambre with the Scheldt;<sup>6</sup> and it is not credible that he should have mistaken the name of a river which was the scene of one of his most memorable exploits.

Le Glay,<sup>7</sup> who finds the battle-field on the hill of Bonavis, opposite Vaucelles, reasons no better than Achaintre. He says that the Nervii, being a brave people, would have defended the threshold of their territory. The answer is that they did not defend the threshold of their territory; for Caesar says that, when he was still 10 Roman miles from the battle-field, he had already marched for three days *across* their territory. In order to get over the difficulty presented by the extreme nearness of the site which he selects to Caesar's starting-point, Le Glay asserts that the Romans marched with extreme slowness in order to avoid being surprised. No doubt they marched more slowly than usual, owing to the difficulty of the country: but I will not believe that they crawled, like old ladies out for an airing.

<sup>1</sup> *Comptes rendus et mém. du Comité arch. de Senlis*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. iv., 1878, pp. 28-9, 34.

<sup>2</sup> See *B. G.*, i. 6, § 4, 9, § 4, 11, § 1, 19, § 1, 28, § 1. etc.

<sup>3</sup> Caesar, i. 82.

<sup>4</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. d'émulation de Cambrai*, 1830, p. 87.

<sup>5</sup> So also A. Eberz in *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, etc., lxxxv., 1862, p. 221.

<sup>6</sup> See p. 720, *infra*.

<sup>7</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. d'émulation de Cambrai*, 1829, pp. 87, 91-2.

It has been argued, as Lebeau<sup>1</sup> remarks, that the Sambre, in that part of its course near which the battle must have taken place, if it took place on the Sambre at all, was not wide (*latissimum*); and that there were no marshes in the country of the Nervii such as those in which Caesar says that the Nervian non-combatants took refuge, except near the sea-coast. But Lebeau replies that in Caesar's time, when the climate was much damper than it is now, the country in the neighbourhood of the Sambre must have been constantly flooded, and that the epithet *latissimum* has a purely relative signification. This, however, is no answer to the one strong argument which has been brought against the theory that the battle was fought on the Sambre. For Caesar does not only say that the non-combatants took refuge in marshes: he also says that they took refuge in *aestuaria*; and there is no evidence that the word *aestuarium* can be used of marshes formed by a river which does not flow into the sea. It must therefore, I think, be admitted that the *aestuaria* to which Caesar refers were formed by the tide. But there is nothing incredible in the hypothesis that the Nervii sent some of their non-combatants to a place of refuge in the remotest parts of their country, while they themselves prepared to defend the all-important line of the Sambre;<sup>2</sup> and it is incredible that the Nervii abandoned the basin of the Sambre, which was the heart of their territory.

The battle, then, was undoubtedly fought somewhere on the left bank of the upper Sambre. But is there any proof that it was fought opposite Hautmont? Long offers a most ingenious and, I think, almost convincing proof. "The banks of the river," he says,<sup>3</sup> "opposite to the enemy's left were, as Caesar describes them (c. 27) very high, a statement which is the strongest proof that the site of this great battle has been truly determined. The heights of Neuf-Mesnil . . . descend to the river with a uniform slope; but at Boussières, a little farther up the stream, the heights which are connected with Neuf-Mesnil terminate on the river in escarpments from sixteen to about fifty feet high, which are not accessible at Boussières, but may be scaled lower down. The bank of the river on the right side opposite to Boussières is flat." I should add that, as MM. Creuly and Bertrand<sup>4</sup> observe, near Hautmont the Sambre widens so much as to justify Caesar's epithet *latissimum*; and this cannot be said of any other part where the ground corresponds at all with Caesar's description. To every site that has been proposed, except the site opposite Hautmont, the objections are fatal. There is no objection worth considering to the latter, except that, according to Caesar, the Sambre opposite the battle-field was only 3 feet deep, whereas the depth of the Sambre opposite Hautmont is much more. But the Sambre at Hautmont is deeper now than it was in Caesar's time

<sup>1</sup> *Archives hist. et litt. du Nord de la France et du Midi de la Belgique*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. v., 1856, pp. 315-17.

<sup>2</sup> I find that General Creuly has a similar argument in *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, p. 36.

<sup>3</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 59.

<sup>4</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. iv., 1861, pp. 456-7.



because it has been canalised.<sup>1</sup> The site may therefore be regarded as fixed beyond all reasonable doubt.

II. In his description of the battle, Caesar states that he could not see all the legions at once, because thick hedges interrupted the view (*sepibusque densissimis, ut ante demonstravimus, prospectus impediretur*). A. Eberz contends that this passage is either a gloss or a fiction. Caesar's own words, he says, prove that there were no hedges on the battle-field. He was not stopped by hedges when he moved from the 10th legion to the right wing; nor were the 9th and 10th legions when they drove the Atrebrates down to and across the Sambre.<sup>2</sup>

Now any one who examines the Plan of the battle-field may convince himself that the statement in the *Commentaries* is not necessarily false. If there was a hedge in Caesar's way, as he was moving from one part of the field to another, he might have turned it; or, if that was impossible, a few sappers could have cut a passage for him in a trice; and hedges might have run in such a way, as to intercept his view and yet not to hinder the free passage of troops moving down or up the slope, to or from the Sambre. It is just possible that the passage of which Eberz complains may be a gloss: but I do not believe that it is a fiction; for I cannot see that Caesar could have had any motive for telling an untruth. The rest of his narrative made it clear that he had allowed himself to be surprised, and that, hedges or no hedges, the difficulties which he had brought upon himself were serious enough. He would not have exaggerated his difficulties by making a statement the falsity of which would have been noticed at once by every officer who had served under him.

III. According to von Goler, Napoleon and von Kampen, the 10th legion stood on the extreme left of the Roman line. There is no authority for this view; and M. Crain<sup>3</sup> adduces an argument against it. He points out that in chapter 23 Caesar mentions the six legions in three pairs, the 9th and 10th, the 11th and 8th, the 12th and 7th; and he draws attention to the fact that in the first pair the smaller number takes precedence, in the other two the larger. Now it is clear from chapters 25 and 26 that the 7th legion was on the extreme right; and it is therefore probable that the 9th was on the extreme left.

IV. The battle must have been as brief as it was eventful. The Nervii began their charge when they saw the head of the approaching Roman baggage-train, which immediately followed the legions that were already on the ground: the decisive blow was struck by the two legions which had immediately followed the train; and they marched up at their utmost speed to join in the action.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. arch.*, iv., 1861, p. 457; Dinaux, pp. 182-3.

<sup>2</sup> *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, etc., lxxxv., 1862, p. 221.

<sup>3</sup> *Zeitschrift f. d. Gymnasialwesen*, 1866, pp. 485-6.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 19, 26-7.

### THE MEANING OF THE PASSAGE IN WHICH CAESAR DESCRIBES HOW THE ADUATUCI JEERED AT THE ROMANS

In his description of the siege of the stronghold of the Aduatuci, Caesar tells us that the Gauls who were standing on the wall jeered at the efforts of the Romans:—"quibusnam manibus aut quibus viribus praesertim homines tantulae staturae (nam plerumque hominibus Gallis prae magnitudine corporum suorum brevis nostra contemptui est) tanti oneris turrin *in muro* (v. l. *muros*) *sese* (posse) *conlocare confiderent*"<sup>1</sup> Following the MSS, I have written in my narrative (p. 58), "The garrison . . . despised the Romans for their small stature, and asked them if they imagined that such pygmies as they could get a huge tower like that on to the wall." But Kraner and others are dissatisfied with the MSS. Kraner, says J. C. Laurer,<sup>2</sup> rightly thinks that the MS. readings give the Aduatuci no credit for common sense: they knew too much of Roman siege methods. Accordingly Kraner proposed (*tanti oneris turrin moturos* (*sese confiderent*); Vielhaber *sub muros sese conlaturos esse*; and Laurer *in muros ex aequo* (*conlocare*). All of these conjectures are quite unnecessary. There is no evidence that the Aduatuci knew anything of Roman siege methods;<sup>3</sup> and if they did, they must have known that the tower could and would be moved. The emendators, having no sense of humour, failed to see that the Aduatuci were laughing at the Romans. (Compare Long's *Caesar*, p. 137.) Or if they meant what they said, they were simply ignorant.

### THE ASSAULT ON GALBA'S CAMP AT OCTODURUS

I. Everybody admits that Octodurus was between Martigny-la-ville and Martigny-Bourg: but the topographical details of the struggle are disputed. De Sauley maintains that Galba encamped on the right, or eastern, bank of the Dranse, and the Gauls on the left; first, because on the right bank, but not on the left, the Romans would have been near the timber which they required for the camp; secondly, because on the right bank Galba would have cut the communications of the Gauls with the rest of the Veragri and with the Seduni; thirdly, because on the right bank, he would probably have been on the road which led over the Pennine Alps; and fourthly, because the Gauls could not have attacked him from the steep heights that overlook the left bank.<sup>4</sup>

These reasons have no weight. The mere advantage of being a few

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 30, § 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Zur Kritik und Erklärung von Caesars Büchern, über den gallischen Krieg*, 1883, pp. 7-8.

<sup>3</sup> Caesar expressly says (*B. G.*, ii. 12, § 5) that the Suessiones had never seen or heard of the Roman towers, etc.

<sup>4</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. iv, 1861, pp. 4-7.

hundred yards nearer timber would not have led Galba to encamp on the right bank unless it had been advisable, on more important grounds, to do so. Besides, there is timber on the left bank now (1893), south of the vineyards; and why should there not have been then? If on the right bank Galba would have cut the communications of the Gauls with the rest of the Veragri and with the Seduni,—and a glance at the map will show that he could not have done so without quitting his camp,—the Gauls, on the left bank, would have effectually cut his communications with the two cohorts which he had left among the Nantuates; and in the event of an attack he would have been compelled to cross the Dranse in the face of an enemy, or else to surrender. Finally, the Gauls could have attacked him from the heights overlooking the left bank. I arrived at this conclusion after examining Blatt 526 of the *Topographischer Atlas der Schweiz* (1 : 50,000); and my conclusion was confirmed by a visit to Martigny. It is true that for a space of about 1000 yards leading southward up the valley of the Dranse from the so-called Roman tower, the slope of the hill is very steep, and, at certain points in this space, too steep and too rocky to be rapidly descended by armed men: but south of this space the slope is no steeper than that of the opposite mountain; while in the immediate vicinity of the tower there is a slope which can be easily descended. I think it probable, however, that men were posted on the eastern as well as on the western slope, in order to cut off the Romans from all possibility of escape; and in fact Caesar says that almost all the high ground which dominated the valley was occupied (*omnia fere superiora loca multitudo armorum completa conspicerentur*).<sup>1</sup> Desjardins says that Galba must have compelled the Veragri to encamp on the right bank not only of the Dranse, but also of the Rhône;<sup>2</sup> but Caesar says nothing about this. When he says that Galba left one bank of the river, that is of the Dranse, for the Veragri, he doubtless means only the Veragri who inhabited Octodurus.

II. Caesar says that Galba destroyed 10,000 of the enemy.<sup>3</sup> De Saulcy<sup>4</sup> and Desjardins<sup>5</sup> with good reason declare that this is a gross exaggeration. The former remarks that, as the entire population of the country occupied by the Nantuates, Veragri, Seduni and Viberi amounted, at the time when he wrote (1861), to no more than 81,559 souls, the Seduni and Veragri could not, in Caesar's time, have numbered more than 40,000; and that, deducting women and children, they could not have put more than 10,000 men into the field. Galba, says Desjardins, must have misled Caesar in his report.

#### TO WHAT TRIBE WAS TERRASIDIUS SENT IN 56 B.C.?

Speaking of the envoys whom Crassus sent in 56 B.C. to make requisitions of corn, Caesar says, according to the *a* MSS., *quo in numero est*

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 3, § 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 610.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 6, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. iv., 1861, p. 8.

<sup>5</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 610.

*T. Terrasidius missus in Esubios, M. Trebius Gallus in Curvisolitas, Q. Velantius cum T. Silio in Venetos.*<sup>1</sup> Instead of *Esubios* the  $\beta$  MSS. have *Unellos Sesuvios*. Napoleon<sup>2</sup> reads *Unellos* simply, on the ground that the geographical position of the Unelli, who dwelt in the Cotentin, agrees better with Caesar's narrative than that of the Esubii, who probably dwelt in the department of Orne<sup>3</sup>. I cannot understand this argument, unless Napoleon means that the Unelli played a prominent part in the campaign and that the Esubii did not. Heller points out that the reading of  $\beta$  cannot be right, first because it is not to be believed that Terrasidius was sent to two peoples, and secondly because *Unellos Sesuvios*, without a conjunction, is nonsense. It is unlikely, he continues, that any copyist would have added (*Sesuvios*), as this people are not mentioned again in the narrative of the campaign. On the other hand, somebody might have inserted *Uaellos* for the same reason which I assume to have influenced Napoleon. Therefore it is probable that Caesar wrote *Esubios*. Besides, argues Heller, the country of the Esubii (*q.v.*) is a rich corn-growing district; and it was probably for this reason that Caesar sent Roscius and his legion there in 54 B.C., when there was a drought in Gaul.<sup>3</sup>

#### THE THEATRE OF THE WAR WITH THE VENETI<sup>4</sup>

1. Caesar says that the Veneti were by far the most powerful of all the maritime peoples in "those parts"; that *all* the ports on the coast, which was exposed to the full force of the open sea, were in their hands; and that almost all the tribes who navigated the sea paid them toll. He goes on to say that, on hearing that the Veneti had committed an act of rebellion, he ordered ships of war to be built on the Loire; and that, as soon as the season was sufficiently advanced, he joined his army, which had been cantoned in the territories of the Carnutes, the Turones and the Andes,—that is to say, along the valley of the Loire, from the neighbourhood of Orléans to the neighbourhood of Angers. The Veneti, he says, assembled their fleet in Venetia; and they were confident of victory, partly because they knew that the Romans would find navigation in that vast and open ocean a very different thing from navigation in the Mediterranean. The roads running through the country of the Veneti were interrupted by estuaries; and their strongholds were situated upon promontories and tongues of land, which were insulated at high water. Caesar, as soon as he had completed his arrangements, made his way with his army into the country of the Veneti, ordering D. Brutus to follow as soon as possible with the fleet and also with a number of Gallic ships, borrowed from the Pictones, the Santones and

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 7, § 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 121, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Philologus*, xxvi., 1867, p. 667.

<sup>4</sup> Sheets 88, 89, 103 and 104 of the *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000) may be consulted.

other peoples. He besieged and captured a considerable number of the Venetian strongholds: but, as he found that his labour was futile, he determined to wait for his fleet, which had been detained by storms and by the difficulty of navigating in a vast and open sea, where there were hardly any harbours. When the fleet did at last arrive and was sighted by the enemy, they sailed out of port; and the decisive battle, which immediately followed, was witnessed by the Roman legions, who, from the position which they occupied on the cliffs, had a full view of every detail of the fighting.<sup>1</sup>

II. According to Napoleon, the strongholds of the Veneti which Caesar attacked were situated on the coast of Morbihan: the Venetian fleet issued from the river Auray to fight the battle: the battle took place in Quiberon Bay off Point St-Jacques; and the Roman army was encamped, during the battle, on the heights of St-Gildas.<sup>2</sup> This view, which is founded upon a paper written by a naval officer, the Comte de Grandpré,<sup>3</sup> is adopted by Long, von Kampen, Mr. Froude, most of the modern English editors, the American editors, Messrs. Allen and Greenough, and the American historian, Colonel Dodge. There is not the faintest sign that any of these writers is aware that reasons have been given to show that Napoleon's view is untenable.

The chief opponents of Napoleon's system are MM. Siochan de Kersabiec, Kerviler, Blanchard and Desjardins. They contend that the theatre of the war was the peninsula of Guérande, which lies between the Loire and the Vilaine; and they naturally endeavour to show that the territory of the Veneti extended southward as far as the Loire.

Ptolemy<sup>4</sup> places the Veneti north of the Samnitae (*q.v.*). Strabo<sup>5</sup> says that the Loire enters the sea between the Pictones and the Namnetes; and, like Ptolemy, he places the Veneti south of the Osismi, whose southern boundary, according to Ptolemy, was the Gobæan promontory, that is to say, the Pointe du Raz.

M. Blanchard<sup>6</sup> tries to explain away the testimony of Strabo,—ὁ δὲ Λεῖγερ μεταξὺ Πικτόνων τε καὶ Ναμνιτῶν ἐκβάλλει,—by denying that ἐκβάλλει means "discharges itself" (into the Ocean). He asserts that whenever ἐκβάλλειν has this meaning, it is followed by εἰς. He quotes a passage in which Strabo, after saying that the Loire flows past Cenabum, adds that it ἐκβάλλει πρὸς τὸν Ὠκεανόν (flows on towards the Ocean). But this quotation is not to the purpose. In the former passage ἐκβάλλει undoubtedly means "discharges itself." For the Pictones unquestionably occupied the territory bordering on the Ocean, south of the Loire. Therefore, according to Strabo, the Namnetes, between whose country and that of the Pictones the Loire ἐκβάλλει, occupied the territory bordering on the Ocean, north of the Loire.

Again, it has been argued, when Strabo says that the priestesses of the Veneti were Samnitae, he implies that the country of the Veneti

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 35, § 3; iii. 8, § 1, 9, §§ 1-8, 11, § 5, 12, 14, §§ 1-2, 9.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 124-5, 126, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. des antiquaires de France*, 1820, pp. 325 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 8, § 6.

<sup>5</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 2, § 1, 4, § 6.

<sup>6</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. arch. de Nantes*, xx., 1881, pp. 212-14.

extended to the Loire; for he also says that those priestesses dwelt in an island opposite the mouth of the Loire, and that they visited their husbands, who dwelt in the mainland, in boats.

The answer is that Strabo does not say that the priestesses of the Veneti were Samnitae: he only says that, according to Posidonius, an island opposite the mouth of the Loire was inhabited by the women of the Samnitae, who worshipped Bacchus there, and from time to time sailed across to the mainland to visit their husbands. Moreover, "the women of the Samnitae" never existed. The so-called Samnitae were almost certainly Nannetes.<sup>1</sup> And if there was a people called Samnitae, they were, according to Ptolemy, distinct from the Veneti.

Furthermore, Strabo regularly tells us what peoples dwelt by the mouths of the principal rivers of Gaul.<sup>2</sup> He says that the Pictones and the Nannetes dwelt by the mouth of the Loire. He does not say that the Veneti dwelt there: and we may therefore conclude that they did not.

On the other hand, M. de Kersabiec<sup>3</sup> insists that, according to Caesar, the Veneti possessed all the harbours on the coast of Brittany as far south as the estuary of the Loire. What Caesar really says is that the Veneti held the few harbours that existed "on all the seaboard of those parts" (*omnis orae maritimae regionum earum*),<sup>4</sup> which vague phrase apparently means the western coast of Brittany. Admitting that his statement is to be taken literally, it is not proved that the Veneti possessed the seaboard between the Vilaine and the Loire. The natural conclusion to be drawn from his statement is that they possessed, or were able, owing to their naval strength, to blockade harbours in territory which was not theirs. There would have been no point in saying that the Veneti were masters of the harbours in their own country, unless those were the only harbours on the coast to which Caesar alludes. And if they were, M. de Kersabiec's argument falls flat.

It has been argued<sup>5</sup> that the Veneti must have possessed the peninsula of Guérande, because, according to the lists furnished by the ancient geographers, they would not otherwise have had a sufficient number of harbours. But M. Orieux<sup>6</sup> points out first, that, unless the coast of the peninsula has undergone great changes, it did not offer a single harbour in which ships could have found shelter at low tide; secondly, that the ancient geographers did not profess to furnish exhaustive lists of harbours; and thirdly that, assuming that the Venetian seaboard extended only from the mouth of the Vilaine to the Pointe du Raz, the Veneti must have possessed ten harbours, namely Audierne, Pont l'Abbé, Quimper, Concarneau, Pont-Aven, Quimperlé, Lorient, Auray, Vannes and Penerf.

Desjardins<sup>7</sup> urges that writers of the early Middle Ages constantly speak of the country of the Veneti as having extended as far south as the Loire. But, although the Veneti, retreating before the British

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 479-80.

<sup>2</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 3, §§ 4-5; iv. 1, § 12, 2, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Études archéologiques, Corbilon*, etc., 1868, pp. 62-3.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 8, § 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. arch. de Nantes*, xx., 1881, p. 220.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, xxi., 1882, pp. 218-20.

<sup>7</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 284-5.

invaders, may, in the fifth century, have taken possession of the southern bank of the Vilaine, we have no right to assume that they possessed it in the time of Caesar.

According to M. Kerviler, the name of *insulae Veneticae*, which, he affirms, is applied by Pliny to the group of islands that extends from Belle-Ile to Noirmoutier, tends to prove that the Veneti possessed the peninsula of Guérande, which is opposite the southern islands of the group.<sup>1</sup> But there is no reason for including Noirmoutier among the *insulae Veneticae*,<sup>2</sup> and whoever looks at the map will see that the name might well have been applied to the more northerly islands; if the Vilaine had been the southern boundary of the Veneti.

To sum up. There is no evidence that the proper territory of the Veneti extended, in Caesar's time, as far south as the Loire; and there is evidence that it did not. Nevertheless, if Caesar was correctly informed, and if he meant precisely what he said, the Veneti did occupy the harbours, if any existed, on the coast of Guérande. But Caesar says distinctly that he invaded the actual territory of the Veneti; and therefore I conclude that he invaded not the peninsula of Guérande, but only Venetia proper, which lay to the north of it. But, although I have come to this conclusion, I will examine the arguments by which M. de Kersabiec and his school have tried to prove that Caesar did not invade the country north of the Vilaine.

III. M. de Kersabiec<sup>3</sup> argues that the theatre of the war, in its first stage, was an ancient group of quasi-insular headlands on the northern bank of the estuary of the Loire. The modern explorer will look in vain for these headlands, and find nothing in their place but the plain of La Grande-Brière, which is only thinly covered even by the floods of winter: but according to M. de Kersabiec, the configuration of the coast has completely changed. He holds that Caesar crossed the (assumed) gulf in flat-bottomed boats and captured the (assumed) strongholds; that afterwards, moving westward into the peninsula of Guérande, he captured successively the (assumed) strongholds of Guérande, Saillé, Batz and Pen-château; that the Veneti finally took refuge in Le Croisic; that their fleet anchored in the Grand-Trait; that the Roman fleet, which had hitherto been weather-bound in a harbour opposite the Grande-Brière, sailed to join Caesar; and that the decisive battle took place off the promontory of Castelli. He says that, north of the peninsula, no part of the Venetian seaboard corresponds with Caesar's description until one reaches the gulf of Etel, north of Quiberon.<sup>4</sup> Napoleon's theory, that the sea-fight took place off the mouth of the Auray, that is to say, some 50 miles from the mouth of the Loire, he

<sup>1</sup> *Comptes rendus de l'Ass<sup>n</sup> bretonne*, 1874, p. 46.

<sup>2</sup> See d'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 687.

<sup>3</sup> *Études archéologiques*, pp. 78, 80-81, 84-7, 90.

<sup>4</sup> M. Orieux (*Bull. de la Soc. arch. de Nantes*, xix., 1880, pp. 69-70) affirms, on the contrary, that the promontory of Penerf, on the north-west of the Vilaine, and the peninsulas of Arzon and Larmor, which command the entrance to the bay of Morbihan, all correspond with Caesar's description. See also Le Moyne de la Borderie, *Hist. de Bretagne*, i., 1896, p. 71.

covers with ridicule. "Comment!" he exclaims, "ces deux flottes qui n'ont aucune communication entre elles, sans s'être donné le mot et sans se voir, sont parties toutes les deux le même jour, à la même heure, ont mis le temps pour franchir une très-grande distance, et sans désenparer et se reposer, se sont rangées en bataille, et sont battues, et tout a été fait en une demi-journée." All this rhetoric, however, is directed merely against a suggestion of Napoleon's, which in no way touches his real argument. Caesar does not say that his fleet had started from the Loire on the morning of the battle; though, if it had done so, it would have had time, with a fair wind, to reach the mouth of the Auray before the battle began.<sup>1</sup> What he says is that, as soon as his fleet was sighted by the enemy, they sailed out of port to attack it. Moreover, it is absurd to assume that the Venetian ships would have had to sail out of the river Auray at the same hour that the Roman ships left the mouth of the Loire, in order to reach the alleged scene of the battle off Point St-Jacques. M. de Kersabiec denies that the Veneti could have seen the Roman fleet at such a distance: but Caesar's words do not imply that the Roman fleet was actually seen by the Venetian crews. The Veneti had, I should suppose, stationed look-out men at convenient points; and they may have sent out cruisers to watch for and signal the approach of the Roman fleet.

But further proof is offered that the theatre of the war could not have been the gulf of Morbihan. It is nothing less than this,—that in Caesar's time the gulf of Morbihan did not exist! If, argues Desjardins,<sup>2</sup> it had existed then, it would have had a Roman name. M. Gerard, moreover, affirms that it has been proved by the investigations of MM. Ariondeau and de Closmadeuc that the bed of the gulf has undergone a subsidence of some 5 or 6 metres. They found knives of flint in a part of the bed which is never exposed even at the lowest tide.<sup>3</sup> M. Reclus<sup>4</sup> endorses the statement of M. Girard.

Now on a matter like this the opinions of two such geographers as MM. Desjardins and Reclus carry great weight, and if it were certain that the subsidence of which they speak had not taken place *before the time of Caesar*; if it were certain that the map in which Desjardins contrasts the modern Morbihan with the Venetian coast, as he believes it to have existed in Caesar's time, were correct; then we should have nothing to do but to accept unreservedly the theory of MM. Desjardins and de Kersabiec, that the theatre of the war was not the gulf of Morbihan. But is it certain? Is it not probable that those flint knives were thousands of years old even in Caesar's time?<sup>5</sup>

But M. de Kersabiec offers other arguments. Caesar, he insists, would never have crossed the Vilaine; first, because he had not the means of crossing it, and secondly, because, if he had crossed it, the Namnetes, who

<sup>1</sup> See *Mém. de la Soc. royale des antiquaires de France*, ii., 1820, pp. 345-57.

<sup>2</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i. 281-3, 304.

<sup>3</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. de Géogr.*, Sept., 1875, p. 234.

<sup>4</sup> *Nouvelle Géogr. univ.*, iv. 533.

<sup>5</sup> Since I wrote this article, I have found that M. Le Moyne de la Borderie (*Hist. de Bretagne*, i. 7) rejects Desjardins's argument.



had rebelled, would have been on his right rear. But it is hard to see why Caesar, who found no difficulty in crossing the Rhine, should have been baffled by a river like the Vilaine. It is quite true that in the lower part of its course and at La Roche-Bernard, at the head of the estuary, where Napoleon<sup>1</sup> asserts that Caesar crossed it, it presents considerable difficulties. But M. Orioux<sup>2</sup> affirms that there was nothing to prevent Caesar from crossing it either to the north of Semnon or between Semnon and the Chère; and it may have been spanned by a bridge. Over and over again, throughout his campaigns, Caesar marched on, leaving on his rear tribes stronger than the Namnetes. Moreover, it is absurd to suppose that he would have hesitated to cross the country of that people when he was about to penetrate into the country of the far more powerful Veneti. Anyhow, the logical and absurd result of M. de Kersabiec's argument is this, that if Venetia had lain entirely on the north of the Vilaine, Caesar never would have dared to invade Venetia at all.

M. de Kersabiec says that the bay of Morbihan is *now* always deep enough for ships to sail round the islands, which stud its surface; whereas Caesar speaks of headlands which were only insulated at high tide. But was it deep enough *then*? According to Desjardins, it did not exist. This, as I have observed, cannot be proved. But may it not have been in a state of transition from the time when it certainly did not exist to the time when it assumed its modern condition? Moreover, M. Orioux affirms that the islands of Tascon and Boued can now be reached on foot at low tide.<sup>3</sup>

Summing up the arguments on this part of the case, I think there can be no doubt that Caesar could, if he had wished, have crossed the Vilaine, and that it is not proved that Morbihan did not, in his time, correspond with his description of the country which he invaded. I will now examine the arguments that have been advanced to prove that the theatre of the war was the Grande-Brière and the peninsula of Guérande.

IV. The plain of the Grande-Brière, which is now inundated during a part of the year, produced, at some remote epoch, abundant vegetation. Upon a bed of clay there is a layer of decomposed plants about 75 centimetres, or two feet and a half thick. Above this there is a second layer, somewhat thicker, of peat, which contains a vast number of fallen trees, all lying in the same direction, as if they had been uprooted by some cataclysm. At the bottom of this layer have been discovered bronze weapons and, according to M. Orioux,<sup>4</sup> Roman coins. It follows that at the time when the weapons were lost the layer of peat did not exist. If, says M. Orioux,<sup>5</sup>—to choose the alternative most favour-

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 124.

<sup>2</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. arch. de Nantes*, xix., 1880, p. 52.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 69-70. See also *Mém. de la Soc. arch. . . des Côtes-du-Nord*, i., 1852, p. 360.

<sup>4</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. arch. de Nantes*, xix., 1880, pp. 57-8. M. Orioux gives no authority for his statement about Roman coins, and I cannot find any. Four *Gallic* coins, however, were discovered under the peat between 1835 and 1855. See *Rev. des provinces de l'Ouest*, iii., 1855, p. 731.

<sup>5</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. arch. de Nantes*, xxi., 1882, p. 189.

able to the theory of M. de Kersabiec,—the peat<sup>3</sup> was formed before Caesar's conquest of Gaul, the level of the subsoil was identical with that of the lowest layer of the peat: that is to say, about one or two metres lower than the existing surface of the Grande-Brière, and above the level of the low tides of summer.

About 500 yards north-east of Bréc., there is a menhir 5 feet 3 inches high, which is entirely submerged by the floods of winter. M. Orioux also points out that on the borders of the plain of the Grande-Brière are various monuments of stone, notably the menhirs of Clos d'Orange and la Vacherie.<sup>1</sup> "Est-ce," he asks, "est-ce que sous les eaux on a construit ces monuments de pierre?"<sup>2</sup> M. Orioux's argument of course is that the level of the Grande-Brière, so far from having risen, as M. de Kersabiec maintains, since Caesar's time has actually sunk; at all events it is lower now than it was when the monuments in question were erected.<sup>3</sup>

M. de Dréneuc argues in a similar strain.<sup>4</sup> The surface of the plain of the Grande-Brière, he says, is now 85 centimetres above the mean level of the sea. The thickness of the peat is 2 metres. The subsoil is therefore 1 metre 15 centimetres, or about 3 feet 9 inches, below the mean level of the sea. The Grande-Brière, he adds, has been carefully explored. Bronze weapons, belonging probably to a period much earlier than that of Caesar, have been found there, for the most part along the course of the river Brivet. From this fact M. de Dréneuc concludes that at the time when these weapons were lost the river already existed, and the Grande-Brière was therefore no longer a bay. Another fact points to the same conclusion. A bronze sword was found in 1877 on the islet of Bru, near St-Joachim. It was covered by the fallen trunk of an ancient tree. Now, argues M. de Dréneuc, if since the latest time when bronze weapons were used in Gaul, a forest had arisen on the site of the former gulf, it is to the last degree unlikely that the sword would have lain there on the ground, waiting for a tree to grow near it and afterwards fall upon it. The inevitable conclusion is that at the time when the sword was dropped the forest already existed, and that the sea had receded behind the alluvial bar formed at the entrance of the bay.

M. Kerviler, on the other hand, urges that in the time of the Normans Besné in the Grande-Brière was called *l'indunita insula*; and that Montoir, Méans, Trignac, Sabine and Penhouet are *les îles* that is nothing to the purpose.<sup>5</sup> They are islands and are called *îles* in the sense that in winter, when the plain out of which they rise is flooded, they are high and dry.<sup>6</sup> You might go in a punt or a boat of

<sup>1</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. arch. de Nantes*, xxi., 1882, pp. 185-6. The positions of these monuments are marked on Sheet 104 of the *Carte de l'Etat-Major* (1:80,000).

<sup>2</sup> *Bull. arch. de l'Ass<sup>n</sup> bretonne*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. vii., 1887, p. 27.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2<sup>e</sup> pér., t. lxxix., 1869, p. 432.

<sup>4</sup> *Des Gaulois vendétes*, pp. 3, 5-7.

<sup>5</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. arch. de Nantes*, xxi., 1882, pp. 33-4.

<sup>6</sup> M. de la Borderie justly remarks that peninsulas were sometimes called *insulae* in mediæval documents (*Bull. arch. de l'Association bretonne*, ii., 1860, p. 109).

shallow draught from one to another, but not in such a ship as the Veneti used: in Caesar's time the level of the plain was probably higher than it is now;<sup>1</sup> and Caesar attacked the Veneti not in winter but in summer.

It will be remembered that, on the theory of M. de Kersabiec, Caesar crossed the (assumed) gulf of the Grande-Brière in flat-bottomed boats. But there is no evidence that Caesar had any flat-bottomed boats;<sup>2</sup> and there is evidence that he had none. For he expressly says that, when he was besieging the strongholds of the Veneti, he was at a disadvantage, because his ships, being differently constructed from the flat-bottomed ships of the Veneti, were or would have been unable to act in waters where they were liable, at low tide, to be left stranded.

Let us now pass on to the peninsula of Guérande. It should be premised that the advocates of the theory which makes the peninsula of Guérande the theatre of the war differ widely among themselves. M. Blanchard, for instance, holds that Caesar, invaded the peninsula from the north, after crossing the Vilaine, and worked his way southward!<sup>3</sup> But this view is opposed to the whole drift of Caesar's narrative.

M. Orieux affirms that, with the exception of the islands of Batz and Le Croisic, there was not a single stronghold on the coast of Guérande which Caesar could not have approached by land at high tide.<sup>4</sup> He remarks, further, that, at present, the Grand-Trait,—the bed of the land-locked sea on the north of Le Croisic,—is dry, between the tides, during several hours. It is for his opponents, he says, to prove that, in Caesar's time, it was not so, and that the Venetian fleet would have been able to ride continuously at anchor, out of reach of Caesar's army: otherwise the Romans would not have failed to burn or destroy the fleet; or if the ships could have put out to sea before low tide, it is for the opposition to prove that, during their absence, it would have been impossible for Caesar to reach Batz and Le Croisic and to make himself master of those places without the aid of his fleet.<sup>5</sup>

On the other hand it is affirmed that all the alluvial deposits that have formed the existing salt-marshes of Guérande, and have united the former islands of Saillé, Le Croisic and Batz to the mainland, are of modern formation; and that, by long-continued observation, one may actually see the process going on.<sup>6</sup>

M. Orieux admits, of course, the truth of M. Kerviler's statement that the modern salt-marshes are above the Roman; but his conclusion is diametrically opposite. The bottom, he says, of a salt-marsh ought, if it is to be profitably worked, to be high enough to be only slightly covered by water at high tide, in order that evaporation may proceed quickly. Therefore the soil of the district in question must have sunk

<sup>1</sup> "L'été," says a well-informed writer. "C'est une immense plaine." *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, xxix., 1869, p. 431.

<sup>2</sup> Dion Cassius (xxxix. 40, § 3) says that Caesar had constructed vessels capable of standing the ebb and flow of the tide: but this is a pure invention. See p. 676, *infra*.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, xix., 1880, p. 63.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, p. 64.

<sup>6</sup> *Mém. de l'Ass<sup>n</sup> bretonne*, 1877, pp. 62-9.

rather than risen; otherwise the Roman salt-marshes, instead of being below the existing level of the modern, would now be above the sea.<sup>1</sup>

Again, M. Orieux has pointed out that, at the distance of one kilometre, or about 1100 yards, north-east of Saillé, the hamlet of Kerbrenézé is now washed by high tides; and that the land stretching to the north of it is covered over a space of one hectare, or more than two acres, with the *débris* of Gallo-Roman *books*. From these facts, which are not disputed, he draws the same conclusion, namely that the plain of the salt-marshes has sunk rather than risen. Therefore, he argues, at the time of Caesar's conquest, that land was above the level of the highest tides.<sup>2</sup> M. Blanchard, however, believes that he can demolish this argument. An old sailor told him that, to his certain knowledge, the bed of the Trais de Mesquer, which is about midway between the town of Guérande and the mouth of the Vilaine, had risen nearly a yard in the fifty years preceding 1883. The promontories, he adds, on the coast of the peninsula, notably those of Penbé and Merquelle, are continually being eaten away by the sea; and on the other hand, the sea is continually filling up the harbours and inlets of the same coast with sand. Thus, he triumphantly remarks, the argument that, near Kerbrenézé, Gallo-Roman *débris* are washed by high tides, falls to the ground: "il n'y a eu, pour cela, croyons-nous, ni affaissements, ni soulèvements violents du sol, mais simplement un exhaussement lent et continu du lit de la Brière et des anses de nos côtes."<sup>3</sup> I cannot, I confess, see the force of M. Blanchard's reasoning. If M. Orieux's statement of fact is correct,—and I have never seen it contradicted,—the ground on which the Gallo-Roman *débris* lie must have been, in Gallo-Roman times, above the sea-level, and that part, at all events, of the Grande-Brière on which the *chénir* of Brée, stands must have been, if not in Caesar's time, yet in earlier times, out of reach of the floods of winter.

So much for the arguments which have been based upon an examination of the soil of the peninsula. Others of a different class remain. M. Blanchard appeals to the authority of Dion Cassius, who, he says, tells us that the Veneti attacked the Roman fleet while it was riding at anchor. M. Blanchard concludes after a long argument, which, as will presently appear, it is needless to examine, that the Roman fleet was anchored in an allied port, that is to say in a port belonging to the Pictones, probably the bay of Bourgneuf, on the southern bank of the Loire. The Veneti, according to M. Blanchard, sailed across the estuary to attack Brutus; and when the battle went against them, they fled to "la côte guérandaise."<sup>4</sup>

Now if Dion said what M. Blanchard makes him say, Dion contradicted Caesar; and, as I have remarked *ad nauseam*, when Dion contradicts Caesar, Dion is unworthy of credit. But on this particular point it is not certain what Dion said. According to the MSS., the

<sup>1</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. arch. de Nantes*, xxi., 1882, p. 215.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, xix., 1880, pp. 61-2.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, xxii., 1883, pp. 130-31.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 166-8.

passage to which M. Blanchard refers runs as follows:—*οἱ βάρβαροι οἷα μήπω πρότερον τοιούτου ναυτικοῦ πεπειραμένοι πρὸς τε τὴν ὄψιν τῶν νεῶν καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῶν ἐν οὐδενὶ λόγῳ ἐποιήσαντο καὶ εὐθὺς ναυλοχοῦσαι σφίσιν ἐπανήχθησαν ὡς καὶ δι' ἐλαχίστου τοῖς κοντοῖς αὐτὰς καταποντώσουσιν.*<sup>1</sup> The accepted Latin translation of *ναυλοχοῦσαι σφίσιν ἐπανήχθησαν* runs *suas (naves) ex portu contra educerent.*<sup>2</sup> This translation cannot be got out of the Greek; nor will *ναυλοχοῦσαι* make sense at all. The word can only refer to *οἱ βάρβαροι*, with which it does not agree, nor does it tally with the masculine *καταποντώσοντες*. Accordingly Melber, following Reiske and Boissonade, discards the MS reading and prints *ναυλοχοῦσαις*. If Dion Cassius wrote this, he meant what M. Blanchard says,—and he talked nonsense! The only alternative is to assume that he was right, and Caesar wrong; in other words, that Caesar, without any motive, told a lie!<sup>3</sup>

Finally, Caesar says that when he was besieging the Venetian strongholds, he was separated from his fleet by a “vast and open sea.” But between the estuary of the Loire, where the fleet was anchored, and the Grande-Brière or even Le Croisic, there is no such thing. Therefore the strongholds of which Caesar spoke could not have been in the Grande-Brière or even in the neighbourhood of Le Croisic: at all events he must have besieged other strongholds far to the north of those places.

To sum up. It is not denied that, in Caesar's time, Le Croisic and Batz may have been islands. If it is not proved that the Grand-Frait was navigable, M. Orioux has failed to prove that it was not. If it is not proved that the headlands north of Le Croisic in the peninsula of Guérande corresponded with Caesar's description, M. Orioux has failed to prove that they did not. Therefore, if it is admitted that the peninsula belonged to the Veneti, the campaign may possibly have begun there. But this much appears to me to be proved,—(1) that whether Caesar attacked any forts in the neighbourhood of Le Croisic or not, the plain of the Grande-Brière could not have been the scene even of his earliest operations; and (2) that even if the campaign began in the peninsula of Guérande, it did not end there. For Caesar distinctly says that he captured *several* (or *many*) of the Venetian strongholds, and that, before his fleet could join him, it had to sail across a “vast and open sea.” His statements can only mean that he penetrated far to the northward into Venetia. Therefore, even if Venetia included the peninsula of Guérande, it is very probable that he pushed far to the north of it; and, as it is most unlikely that Venetia did include the peninsula of Guérande, the probability amounts to a moral certainty.

V. M. de la Monneraye has proposed a compromise.<sup>4</sup> He too contends that Caesar must have penetrated far into Venetia: but he then brings him back again far to the south, and places the sea-fight off the

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xxxix. 41, § 2.

<sup>2</sup> M. Bonquet, *Recueil des hist. des Gaules*, i. 498.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 179-80, 205-6, *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> *Géogr. de la péninsule armoricaine*, pp. 149-52, 156, 166-7.

miniature peninsula enclosed by the entrenchments of St-Lyphard. He argues that, when Caesar decided to wait for his fleet, he must have chosen for his encampment some spot near the place where the fleet was to assemble, that is to say, near the mouth of the Loire; for otherwise he could not have got supplies. The best place, continues M. de la Monneraye, would have been the peninsula enclosed by the entrenchments of St-Lyphard. These, he argues, were probably the very fortifications which the legions constructed. He admits that Caesar's statement regarding the difficulty which his admiral experienced in joining him appears to militate against his theory: but he disposes of this difficulty by appealing to the authority of Dion Cassius. When, he argues, Caesar says that the fleet was weather-bound, he is probably referring to the ships which, according to Dion, were coming from the Mediterranean. Therefore there is no need to assume that there was a "vast open sea" between Caesar's camp and the mouth of the Loire. The sea in question was the sea between the mouth of the Loire and the straits of Gibraltar.

This theory will not bear examination. No unbiassed mind could detect in Caesar's narrative anything to warrant the assumption that he marched back from the northernmost of the forts which he captured into the peninsula of Guérande. His commissariat was always perfectly organised; and if he was able to feed his army during the time which he spent in reducing the forts of the Veneti, there was no reason why he should not be able to feed it during the time that he passed in waiting for his fleet. To assume that the "retranchements" of St-Lyphard are the remains of his camp is simply a wild guess. Finally, the authority of Dion Cassius, where it contradicts the authority of Caesar, is worth nothing. For these reasons I believe not only that Caesar penetrated into Venetia far to the north of Guérande, but also that the sea-fight took place in some higher latitude.

VI. This is also the view of M. de Dréneuc.<sup>1</sup> He maintains that cliffs answering to Caesar's description of those from which the Roman legions watched the battle are not to be found until, moving towards the north, one approaches the Pointe du Raz, the seaward termination of the northern frontier of Venetia. Accordingly he maintains that the battle took place off the "Pointe de la Cornouaille." But Caesar's description of the place from which he watched the battle is vague: he simply tells us that he watched it from high ground overlooking the sea, and that in the vicinity of his camp there was a harbour. As he says that, after the battle, the survivors had no means of defending the strongholds which had not yet been captured, one might be inclined to argue that he had not advanced nearly as far as the northern frontier of the Veneti. On the other hand, it is possible that the strongholds of which he speaks did not belong to the Veneti, but to their allies.<sup>2</sup> Be this, however, as it may, I find it difficult to reconcile the theory that Brutus had sailed so far northward as the Pointe de la Cornouaille with Caesar's narrative.

<sup>1</sup> *Des Gaulois vendes*, pp. 8-9.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *B. G.*, iii. 9, § 3.

After studying the whole literature of the question, the only conclusion to which I can come is that the theory which Napoleon borrowed from the Comte de Grandpré, although its truth cannot be demonstrated, is in a high degree probable. The only serious objection to that theory is the objection urged by Desardins, that, in Caesar's time, the Bay of Morbihan did not exist; and I have shown that this theory cannot be established. It may or may not be true that, as M. Tranois affirmed,<sup>1</sup> traces of the dykes which Caesar built when he was besieging the strongholds of the Veneti still existed in 1852 at the islands of Conlo, Goalabre and Gavarnis: but any one who may study the subject independently will conclude that, given the existence in 56 B.C. of the Bay of Morbihan, M. de Grandpré's commentary on Caesar's narrative of the campaign is convincing.

### 1 CAESAR'S OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VENETI

I. Caesar describes the dykes which he constructed for the purpose of capturing the strongholds of the Veneti, in these words:—*si quando, magnitudine operis forte superati, extruso mari aggere ac molibus atque his oppidi moenibus adaequatis suis fortunis desperare coeperant,*<sup>2</sup> etc. Napoleon,<sup>3</sup> following von Goler, interprets this passage as follows:—"the Romans constructed two parallel dykes. . . . During the process of construction, the space between the two dykes was regularly inundated at high tide; but as soon as the besiegers had brought them into contact with the stronghold, the water could no longer find its way into the space, and it served them as a kind of 'place d'armes.'" Thomann,<sup>4</sup> however, agrees with Rustow in questioning the necessity for two dykes, and justly remarks that Caesar's text does not support von Goler's view.

II. Did Caesar employ any ships while he was besieging the Venetian strongholds?

"The Romans," says Long,<sup>5</sup> describing the battle between the Roman fleet and that of the Veneti, "*in previous conflicts*<sup>6</sup> had discovered that they could not injure the enemy's ships by the beaks of their vessels." The passages upon which he bases this statement are, *Rostro enim noceri non posse cognoverant*, which occurs in Caesar's narrative of the battle,<sup>7</sup> and,—in the general description of the Venetian ships,<sup>8</sup>—*Neque enim his nostrae rostro nocere poterant, tanta in his erat firmitudo*; and accordingly, when Caesar writes that, after capturing a number of the Venetian strongholds, he determined to wait for his fleet,<sup>9</sup> Long explains, "He means all his fleet, the complete fleet." Of course he does: but he does

<sup>1</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. arch. . . . des Côtes-du-Nord*, i., 1852, pp. 363, 365, 367.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 12, § 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 124-5.

<sup>4</sup> *Der französische Atlas zu Cäsars gall. Kriege*, 1871, p. 22.

<sup>5</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 112.

<sup>6</sup> The italics are mine.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 14, § 4.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.* 13, § 8.

<sup>9</sup> *Compluribus expugnatis oppidis Caesar . . . statuit expectandam classem.* *Ib.*, 14, § 1.

not mean that he already had a part of the fleet with him; for he says distinctly<sup>1</sup> that the weather was too stormy for his ships to put to sea. Also, after telling us that he placed Decimus Brutus in command of the fleet, which he had ordered to assemble in the estuary of the Loire, he says that he marched in person for Venetia with the land forces (*D. Brutum . . . classis Gallicisque navibus, quae ex Pictonibus et Santonis reliquisque pacatis regionibus convenire iussit, praeficit; et cum primum posset, in Venetos proficisci iubet. Ipse eo pedestribus copiis contendit*).<sup>2</sup> Not a word to show that he sent on any ships to meet him. Besides, if he had been foolish enough to employ a part of his fleet, any that escaped shipwreck would have been destroyed by the powerful fleet of the enemy. His meaning is clear enough. In the two passages which Long quotes he is simply stating, as a fact, that the enemy's ships were too stout to be rammed by his light galleys. Immediately before the second passage he writes that the only advantage which his fleet had over the enemy's ships was in speed (*Cum his navibus nostrae classis eiusmodi congressus erat, ut una celeritate et pulsu remorum praestaret*).<sup>3</sup> It is clear that this is only a general statement, and does not mean that the enemy's fleet and Caesar's fleet, or any part of it, came to blows before the decisive battle; because a few lines further on, Caesar, using the word *classis* again, says that he was obliged to wait for his fleet. A moment's reflection might have convinced Long that the word *cognoverant* does not support his argument; for it is obvious that Brutus and his officers, who had been weather-bound for weeks and had only just arrived upon the scene of action, could not have "discovered in previous conflicts that they could not injure the enemy's ships by the beaks of their vessels." They, at all events, had not engaged in any "previous conflicts"; and the same storm which had prevented them from putting to sea would probably have also prevented any of the imaginary ships which might have engaged in "previous conflicts" from communicating with them." Is it credible that, if Caesar had used ships when he was besieging the Venetian forts, he would have said that the Veneti were able to escape in their ships from one port to another because the Roman ships were prevented by storm from joining him (*quod nostrae naves tempestatibus detinebantur*)? And if the fleet, as a whole, was unable to put to sea, how could individual ships belonging to that fleet have encountered the storm with impunity? *Cognoverant* means not "they had discovered (in previous conflicts)," but "they knew,"—probably because they had ascertained the truth by inquiry. Schneider<sup>4</sup> indeed denies that *cognosco* can bear this meaning, unless it relates to an event which has actually happened (*nisi ad rem factum relatum*). But refer to *B. G.*, v. 19, §§ 1, 2<sup>5</sup> and vii. 44, § 3,<sup>6</sup> and you will see that Schneider is wrong.

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 12, § 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 13, § 7.

<sup>3</sup> Cassivellaunus . . . iis regionibus, quibus nos iter facturos cognoverat, pecora atque homines ex agris in silvas compellebat.

<sup>6</sup> Constabat inter omnes, quod iam ipse Caesar per exploratores cognoverat, dorsum esse eius ingi prope aequum, etc.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 11, § 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Caesar*, i. 255.



M. Blanchard says that we may gather from the narrative of Dion Cassius that Caesar employed ships when he was besieging the Venetian *oppida*.<sup>1</sup> But Caesar himself distinctly says that it would have been impossible to do so.<sup>2</sup> What Dion Cassius says is that when Caesar marched for Venetia, he conveyed a number of ships, specially constructed to stand the ebb of the tide, which he had caused to be built "in the interior," down the Loire.<sup>3</sup> But Dion, as usual, misunderstood Caesar, and invented. Caesar says that when he marched for Venetia, he put Brutus in command of the Roman fleet and of the ships of the Pictones and Santones, and ordered him to set sail as soon as he could.<sup>4</sup> If Dion is right, the ships which were built on the Loire set sail at once in spite of the storm, while Brutus remained weather-bound with the rest of the fleet. As a matter of fact, it is plain from Caesar's narrative that Brutus's fleet consisted of the ships which had been built on the Loire. Dion, however, says that after Caesar had spent nearly the whole summer in besieging the Venetian strongholds, Brutus arrived with his fleet from the Mediterranean! This ridiculous fiction flatly contradicts Caesar's narrative. Evidently Dion imagined that the ships which were built on the Loire were flat-bottomed, like those of the Veneti; whereas Caesar expressly says that they were Roman galleys (*naves longae*).<sup>5</sup>

III. Napoleon<sup>6</sup> says that the Venetian fleet was more numerous than the Roman: Thomann<sup>7</sup> holds that Caesar's statement that certain Venetian ships were hemmed in, each by two and, in some cases, three Roman ones,<sup>8</sup> proves the contrary. Thomann's argument is futile; for the Romans may have destroyed their unwieldy opponents in detail: but there is nothing to show which of the two fleets was numerically the stronger.

IV. Dion's account of the battle<sup>9</sup> differs, in certain respects, from Caesar's; and when they differ, M. de la Monneraye prefers the testimony of Dion. In my essay on "The Credibility of Caesar's Narrative" (pp. 205-6, *supra*) I have criticised Dion's account.

<sup>1</sup> *Bull. de la Soc. arch. de Nantes*, xxii., 1883, p. 166.

<sup>2</sup> *Erant eiusmodi fere situs oppidorum, ut posita in extremis lingulis promonturiisque neque pedibus aditum haberent . . . neque navibus, quod rursus minente aestu naves in vadis afflicterentur.* *B. G.*, iii. 12, § 1. On the force of the subjunctive *afflicterentur* see Schneider's *Caesar*, i. 245.

<sup>3</sup> *αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τοῖς Οὐνετοῖς ἤλασε καὶ πλοῖα ἐν τῇ μεσορείᾳ, ἃ ἤκουεν ἐπιτήδεια πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὤκεανου παλίσροισιν εἶναι, κατασκευάσας, διὰ τε τοῦ Αἰγροῦ ποταμοῦ κατεκόμισεν.* *Hist. Rom.*, xxxix. 40. § 3.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 11, § 5.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 9, § 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 126, n. 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Der französische Atlas*, etc., 1871, pp. 23-4.

<sup>8</sup> *cum singulas naves binas ac ternas circumsteterant.* *B. G.*, iii. 15, § 1.

<sup>9</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xxxix. 41-43.

### WHERE DID SABINUS ENCAMP WHEN HE INVADED THE COUNTRY OF THE UNELLI?

Napoleon,<sup>1</sup> who is followed by von Kampen, Froude and Colonel Dodge, places the camps of Sabinus "on a hill, about 4 miles east of Avranches, belonging to the line of heights which separates the basin of the Sée from that of the Célune." A Roman camp has been discovered there: but Napoleon admits that it was probably made at a time later than that of the conquest of Gaul. L. Fallue says that local tradition identifies the camp with Montcastré:<sup>2</sup> but local tradition is easily manufactured, and usually originates in the opinion of some local antiquary. Moreover, the area of this camp is 40 hectares, or about 100 acres, which, tested by the standard of Caesar's camps at Gergovia and on the Aisne, would have been much too large for Sabinus's three legions. "Sabinus," says Caesar, "made his way into the country of the Unelli (*in fines Unellorum pervenit*).<sup>3</sup> M. Mayeux-Doual,<sup>4</sup> misunderstanding the meaning of *fines*, says that the camp must have been on the frontier of the Unelli, and places it at Champrepus, which, he says, answers exactly to Caesar's description. Perhaps it does; but so do other places in the country of the Unelli. It is useless to attempt to fix the site; for Caesar tells us nothing about the camp, except that it was in the country of the Unelli, and on high ground, which sloped gently down for the distance of about one Roman mile to the plain.<sup>5</sup>

### ON A DIFFICULTY (?) DISCOVERED BY W. PAUL IN CAESAR'S ACCOUNT OF CRASSUS'S ATTACK ON THE AQUITANIAN CAMP

W. Paul, remarking that the four cohorts which attacked the Aquitanian camp in the rear made their way thither quickly, in spite of the long *détour* which they took in order to avoid observation, argues that they must have ridden to the scene of action on horseback.<sup>6</sup> Caesar's account runs as follows:—*Crassus equitum praefectos cohortatus, ut magnis praemiis pollicitationibusque suos excitarent, quid fieri velint ostendit. Illi, ut erat imperatum, ductis iis cohortibus, quae praesidio castris relictæ intrinse ab labore erant, et longiore itinere circumductis, ne ex hostium castris conspici possent, omnium oculis mentibusque ad pugnam intentis, celeriter ad eas, quas diximus, munitiones pervenerunt,*<sup>7</sup> etc. On

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 129, 130, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Études arch. sur l'hist. de Jules César par l'empereur Napoléon III.*, 1867, p. 30.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 17, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Mém. hist.*, 1876, pp. 259-72.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 17, § 1, 19, § 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Berliner philologische Wochenschrift*, v., 1885, pp. 1185-6.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 26, §§ 1-2.

this Paul observes that Caesar never uses *educo* in the *Gallie War* in its present sense without mentioning the point of departure: accordingly he proposes, as an emendation, *devectis*, which Meusel actually adopts in his edition of Caesar!

This is a striking instance of the perverted ingenuity which is responsible for most of the conjectural emendations that swarm in German periodicals. *Celeriter* is a relative term and simply means that the cohorts made haste, whether they went on foot or on horseback. And if Caesar does not use *educo* in the sense required in any other passage in the *Gallie War* without mentioning the point of departure, he does so in no less than eight passages in the *Civil War*, namely in i. 41, § 2, 64, § 6, 81, § 4; iii. 41, § 1, 54, § 2, 64, § 6, 67, § 3, 81, § 4, and 85, § 4.

#### DID CAESAR ATTACK THE MORINI OR THE MENAPII IN 56 B.C.?

Caesar says that he intended to attack both the Morini and the Menapii;<sup>1</sup> and Napoleon<sup>2</sup> carelessly infers from his narrative that he actually did so. But close study will show that he invaded the territory of one only of the two tribes; and a passage in *B. G.*, iv. 38, §§ 1-2,<sup>3</sup> proves that, as we might expect from their geographical position, it was the Morini whom he attacked, not the Menapii.<sup>4</sup>

#### WHERE DID THE USIPETES AND TENCTERI CROSS THE RHINE?

Caesar says that the Usipetes and Tencteri crossed the Rhine "not far from the sea" (*non longe a mari*), and that, at the point where they crossed it, the country on both banks belonged to the Menapii.<sup>5</sup> General Creuly<sup>6</sup> holds that by *Rhenum* Caesar meant the Meuse, below its junction with the Waal at Gorkum, a view which I have combated on page 381. Moreover, as Heller points out, the territory on the right bank of the lower Meuse belonged not to the Menapii, but to the Batavi;<sup>7</sup> and M. Wauters argues that if the Usipetes and Tencteri

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 28, § 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 134-5.

<sup>3</sup> Caesar postero die T. Labienum legatum cum his legionibus quas ex Britannia reduxerat in Morinos qui rebellionem fecerant misit. Qui cum propter siccitates paludum quo se recipere non haberent, quo perfugio superiore anno erant usi, omnes fere in potestatem Labieni pervenerunt.

<sup>4</sup> See A. de Vlainck's *La Menapie*, etc., 1879, p. 23.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 1, § 1, 4, § 2.

<sup>6</sup> *Rec. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, pp. 27-8.

<sup>7</sup> *Philologus*, xxii., 1865, pp. 131-2. M. A. de Vlainck indeed argues that the Batavi were only a *pogus* of the Menapii; but I have refuted this theory on p. 459.

had crossed the stream below Gorkum, their cavalry could not have existed in the marshy country near the sea.<sup>1</sup> But it is doubtful whether the Meuse, in Caesar's time, joined the Waal at Gorkum; and if, as Cluver, Desjardins and Kiepert believe,<sup>2</sup> the confluence was at Geervliet, only 7 miles from the sea, M<sup>r</sup> Wauters's argument gains in force. If the Usipetes and Tencteri crossed the Rhine anywhere below the point where the Waal diverged from the main stream, they must have crossed either the Waal or, if they crossed the lower Meuse at the point which Creuly indicates, the Meuse as well: but of two passages Caesar says nothing. Föler remarks that if Caesar used the word *Rhenum* in its strict sense, the passage must have taken place above the first bifurcation of the Rhine;<sup>3</sup> and this is the common opinion. It has been objected that, in that case, the words *non longe a mari* would be inaccurate; but *longe* is a relative term, and, in relation to the whole length of the Rhine, Emmerich or Cleve might fairly be described as "not far from the sea." On the left bank of the Rhine, above its first bifurcation, between Xanten and Nymegen, there is a chain of heights. The only practicable points of passage for the host of the Germans would have been at Xanten itself and lower down, near Cleve. Napoleon<sup>4</sup> asserts that the Germans crossed at both these points. It would appear, however, from Caesar's narrative<sup>5</sup> that they crossed at one point only; and, having regard to the words *non longe a mari*, it seems reasonable to look for that point as near the sea as possible. I feel little hesitation, then, in concluding that the Usipetes and Tencteri crossed the Rhine near Cleve.<sup>6</sup>

#### ON A DIFFICULTY RAISED BY G. LONG REGARDING ONE OF CAESAR'S REASONS FOR ATTACKING THE USIPETES AND TENCTERI

Stating his reasons for having determined, after the treacherous attack of their cavalry upon his, to march against the Usipetes and Tencteri without further delay, Caesar writes:<sup>7</sup> — *cognita Gallorum infirmitate, quantum iam apud eos hostes uno proelio auctoritatis essent consecuti sentiebat; quibus ad consilia capiendu nihil spatii dandum existimabat.* Gallorum, according to Long,<sup>8</sup> means Caesar's Gallic cavalry, "for . . . the defeat of the cavalry could have no immediate effect on those Galli who were at a distance." But it is contrary to Caesar's practice to speak of his Gallic cavalry by the generic name of "Galli":<sup>9</sup> they were not likely to side with the invaders by whom

<sup>1</sup> *L'Athenaeum belge*, 1883, p. 77.

<sup>2</sup> *Rheinisches Archiv*, iv., 1811, p. 235.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 137, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. von Göler, *Gall. Krieg*, p. 113.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 13, § 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 155.

<sup>7</sup> I can only discover one passage (*B. G.*, vii. 13, § 2) in which he does so; and then his meaning is unmistakable. See Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i. 1364-9.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 683.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 1, § 1, 4.

they had just been so roughly handled : if they had attempted to do so, the legions would have crushed them in five minutes ; and, as Caesar tells us in a later book<sup>1</sup> that the news of an important event could travel among the Galli 160 (Roman) miles between sunrise on a winter's day and eight o'clock at night, the defeat of the cavalry could have had a very "immediate effect on those Galli who were at a distance."

## WHERE WERE THE USIPETES AND TENCTERI DEFEATED ?

The question which I am going to discuss is the most complicated and difficult that Caesar's memoirs present. Broadly speaking, three solutions have been propounded :—(1) that the Usipetes and Tencteri fled to one or the other of the known confluences of the Meuse and the Waal or to some point in the neighbourhood of one or the other ; (2) in spite of the statement of the text,<sup>2</sup> that they fled to the confluence of the Rhine and the Moselle ; and (3) that they fled to the confluence of the Meuse with some river unknown. Let us see, first of all, what Caesar has to say.

1. The Usipetes and Tencteri crossed the Rhine, not far from the sea, took possession of all the buildings of the Menapii, passed the winter in their country and fed on their stores. On hearing of their incursion, Caesar proceeded to join his legions and, as soon as he reached their quarters, learned that the Germans had wandered further south and reached the territories of the Eburones and Condrusi. When his preparations were complete, he marched towards the district where he heard that the Germans were ; and when he was within a few days' march of their whereabouts, their envoys met him. The envoys undertook to convey his ultimatum to their principals, and to return with their answer in three days. Caesar was aware, at the time when he was parleying with the envoys, that the German cavalry were in the country of the Ambivariti, on the opposite side of the Meuse, whither they had gone to plunder and collect corn.<sup>3</sup> Having reached this point in his narrative, Caesar describes the course of the Meuse. His words are *Mosa profluit ex monte Vosego, qui est in finibus Lingonum, et parte quadam ex Rheno recepta, quae appellatur Vacalus insulam[que] efficit Batavorum, [in Oceanum influit] neque longius ab Oceano (v. l. eo) milibus passuum LXXX in Rhenum (v. l. Oceanum) influit.*<sup>4</sup> Now these various readings only concern us in so far as they affect the question where the

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 3, §§ 2-3.

<sup>2</sup> Germani . . . cum ad confluentem Mosae et Rheni pervenissent, etc. *Ib.*, iv. 15, § 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, iv. 1, § 1, 4-9.

<sup>4</sup> The editors are unable to agree upon the wording of this passage (*Ib.*, iv. 10, § 1). In the MSS. it runs as follows :—(*Mosa profluit . . . Vacalus insulamque efficit Batavorum, in Oceanum influit neque longius ab Oceano milibus passuum LXXX in Rhenum influit.* None of the well-known editors, however, except Frigell, accept this reading. Walckenaer, indeed, argues (*Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 494-7) that the words *in Rhenum influit* simply reaffirm the junction, already mentioned, of the Meuse with the Waal : but it is to the last degree unlikely that Caesar would have

Meuse was joined by the Waal. If Caesar wrote *neque longius ab eo milibus passuum LXXX in Oceanum influit*, *eo* means *Vacalo*,<sup>1</sup> and Caesar meant that from the point where the Waal joined the Meuse, the Meuse flowed 80 Roman miles to the sea. If he wrote *neque longius ab Oceano milibus passuum LXXX in Rhenum influit*,<sup>2</sup> he may possibly have meant that the Meuse, after joining the Waal at Fort St-Andries, flowed on till it rejoined the Waal (considered as a branch of the Rhine) at Gorkum, and thence (under the name of the Rhine<sup>3</sup>) flowed 80 miles to the sea: but it is doubtful whether the confluence at Gorkum existed in Caesar's time; and Napoleon<sup>3</sup> concludes from a "study of the deserted beds of

expressed himself so badly as this. According to Walckenaer, Caesar first says that the Meuse receives a branch from the Rhine, called the Waal; then that it flows into the Ocean; and then in the same breath, speaking of this same Waal as the Rhine, says that the Meuse flows into the Rhine. Schneider (*Caesar*, i. 325-7), who refuses to credit Caesar with such obscure diction, objects further that the *insula Batavorum* was formed, not by the Waal alone but by the Waal and the Meuse with the main stream of the Rhine. Accordingly, following certain inferior MSS., he deletes *que* and in *Oceanum influit*, and reads *insulam efficit Batavorum neque longius ab Oceano milibus passuum LXXX in Rhenum influit*, assuming that in *Oceanum influit* was added by some copyist who knew that the Meuse finally discharged itself into the sea, and that *que* was subsequently inserted to make sense. Nipperdey (*Caesar*, pp. 75-6), refusing to believe that Caesar could have made the mistake of saying that the Meuse flowed into the Rhine, and not contemplating the possibility of his having written in *Rhenum* and meant in *Vacalo*, conjectures that he wrote *insulam efficit Batavorum neque longius ab Rheno milibus passuum LXXX in Oceanum influit*. The words *ab Rheno* are found in the inferior MS. Vind. D. Nipperdey explains as follows:—the copyist who wrote out the *codex archetypus* wrote by mistake *ab Oceano* for *ab Rheno* and in *Rhenum* for in *Oceanum*; then, perceiving one of his mistakes, he wrote in the margin in *Oceanum*, but either he failed to add in the margin *ab Rheno*, or, if he did so, his correction was overlooked by the next copyist, and the words in *Oceanum influit* found their way into the wrong place. The copyist who wrote Vind. D. duly made the two corrections *ab Rheno* and in *Oceanum*, but foolishly kept the words in *Oceanum influit*. All this is mighty ingenious: but whether it is true or not, is another question. According to Nipperdey, Caesar meant "the Meuse flows into the sea not more than 80 (Roman) miles from the first bifurcation of the Rhine." The Aldine edition has *ab eo* instead of *ab Rheno*, otherwise agreeing with Nipperdey; and this correction is accepted by Dittenberger. T. Bergk (*Zur Geschichte und Topographie der Rheinlande in Römischer Zeit*, 1882, p. 5, n. 1), who is followed by Meusel, writes *inde* instead of *ab Rheno*; and F. A. Ukert (*Geogr. der Griechen und Römer*, 1816-46, vol. ii. 2, p. 146) deletes *neque longius . . . influit* as a gloss.

<sup>1</sup> C. Müller, in his edition of Ptolemy (*Geogr.* i. 221), holds that *eo* means *Rheno*, and that Caesar was speaking of the distance from the mouth of the Meuse to the western mouth of the Rhine. In this opinion he is, I believe, alone.

<sup>2</sup> General Creully (*Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, pp. 27-8), remarking that Tacitus (*Ann.*, iii. 6) speaks of the Meuse, below its junction with the Waal, as *Mosa*, argues that Caesar's statement,—*Mosa . . . in Oceanum influit, neque longius ab Oceano milibus passuum LXXX in Rhenum influit*,—proves that it was also called *Rhenus*. "La plume rapide de l'écrivain," he says, "verse la Meuse dans l'Océan, puis elle se rectifie en faisant couler d'abord la Meuse dans le Rhin." Creully refers to Tacitus (*Hist.*, v. 23), who says *Mosae fluminis os amorem Rhenum oceano affundit*.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 143, n. 1 and Planche 14. M. Reclus (*Nouv. Géogr. univ.*, iv. 213) as well as Napoleon denies that the Meuse, in Caesar's time, joined the Waal at Gorkum: it flowed on, he says, towards the west in the bed of the Oude-Maas. Cf. *Rev. d'hist. et d'arch.*, i., 1859, pp. 296-303. On the other hand, A. Belpaire (*Étude sur la formation de la plaine maritime depuis Boulogne jusqu'à Danemark*,

the Rhine" that the Waal then joined the Meuse at Fort St-Andries, and that the channel of the Waal which is now prolonged to the east of Fort St-Andries did not then exist. Walckenaer maintains that the words *in Rhenum influit* refer to the junction of the Meuse with the Waal at Fort St-Andries, and that, from the point of junction, the Meuse flowed 80 miles to the sea. The former interpretation is consistent with the theory that the Meuse in Caesar's time, as before 1856, joined the Waal by a connecting channel at Fort St-Andries<sup>1</sup> and again joined it at Gorkum,—if we assume that Caesar made a mistake in speaking of 80 miles:<sup>2</sup> but it is inconsistent with the statements of Tacitus, who says (1) that the sea bounded the western side of the *insula Batavorum* and the Rhine its rear and sides (*insulam . . . quam mare Oceanus a fronte, Rhenus amnis tergum et latera circumluit*), and (2) that, at the beginning or southern extremity of the island, the Rhine divides into two branches; that the northern branch flows direct to the sea; that the southern branch, under the name of *Vahalis*, flows on until it joins the Meuse; and that the Meuse flows on until it joins the sea (*Rhenus . . . apud principium agri Batavi velut in duos amnes dividitur, servatque nomen et violentiam eursus, qua Germaniam praevehitur, donec Oceano misceatur: ad Gallicam ripam latior et placidior adfluens; verso cognomine Vahalem accolae dicunt; mox id quoque vocabulum mutat Mosa flumine, eiusque immenso ore eundem in Oceanum effunditur*).<sup>3</sup> In other words, the statement of Tacitus, except in the fact that it does not specify any distance, agrees with the reading *neque longius ab Rheno (or ab eo) milibus passuum LXXX in Oceanum influit*. But the point which I wish to emphasise is this:—whatever reading we adopt, unless it be Nipperdey's conjecture,<sup>4</sup> Caesar places the junction, or a junction, of the Meuse and the Waal at a point about 80 Roman miles from the sea.<sup>5</sup>

1855, pp. 200-201) concludes that the Meuse "s'est toujours dirigé vers Gorcum . . . ou que la branche, dirigée par Heusden . . . a dû s'oblitérer à une époque bien antérieure à celle de . . . 1421 (the year of the great inundation) de manière à être définitivement abandonnée par les eaux à cette époque." His argument is as follows:—"Ce qui est de nature à jeter le plus grand doute sur la réalité de l'ancien cours de la Meuse par Heusden et Geertruidenberg c'est que si l'inondation de 1421 avait eu pour effet d'attirer . . . les eaux du Waal vers le Hollandsdiep, à bien plus forte raison les eaux de la Meuse qui auraient dans ce cas été traversées par l'inondation, auraient dû être attirées du même côté et par conséquent le cours prétendu par Heusden, au lieu de se fermer comme on soutient qu'il l'a fait à la suite de l'inondation de 1421, aurait dû s'accroître de manière à devenir le seul débouché des eaux de la Meuse. Est-il croyable que ce soit, l'inverse qui ait eu lieu, et que la branche qui s'éloignait de l'inondation se soit accrue au dépens de celle qui s'y rendait directement?"

<sup>1</sup> See p. 683.

<sup>2</sup> It should be noted, however, that in Caesar's time Zeeland extended somewhat further seaward than it does now. See *Mém. couronnés par l'Acad. Roy. des sciences et belles-lettres de Bruxelles*, vi., 1827, p. 77; At Esquiros, *The Dutch at Home*, 1861, i. 31-2, 35; and Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i. 391, 398.

<sup>3</sup> *Ann.*, ii. 6.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 681, note, *supra*.

<sup>5</sup> Walckenaer indeed says (*Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 494) that the text accepted before the appearance of Gudendorp's edition,—*neque longius ab eo . . . in Oceanum transit*,—might mean that the Waal, from the point where it leaves the Rhine to its junction with the Meuse, has a course of 80 miles: but it is impossible to extract this sense from any reading which has been proposed.

Resuming his narrative, Caesar says that he had got within 12 Roman miles of the Germans, when the envoys returned to him. They asked him to give them three days' grace, in order that they might send messengers to the Ubii, to find out whether the Usipetes and Tencteri might safely settle in their country. Within three days these messengers would undertake to go to the country of the Ubii and return to Caesar. Caesar told them in reply that he would only march 4 miles further on that day, in order to get water; and he ordered them to return to him on the following day that he might take their request into consideration. Next day he marched against and attacked the Germans in their encampment, and drove them in rout *ad confluentem Mosae et Rheni*.<sup>1</sup>

II. The points that we have first to determine are these:—(1) Where did the Waal, in Caesar's time, join the Meuse? (2) Where were the Germans when they "had reached the territories of the Elburones and Condrusi"? (3) Had they all or had only their advanced guard reached that territory? (4) Had they moved from that position when Caesar attacked them? (5) On which bank of the Meuse were the Ambivariti? (6) How far were the German envoys from the country of the Ubii when they promised to go thither and return with an answer to Caesar in three days? (7) How far from the river in which the remnant of the fugitives perished was the camp which Caesar attacked?

(1) The Meuse at present joins the Waal near Gorkum. Before 1856 it was joined to the Waal by a connecting channel at Fort St-Andries as well.<sup>2</sup> According to P. Cluver,<sup>3</sup> who is followed by Desjardins<sup>4</sup> and Kiepert,<sup>5</sup> it did not join the Waal, in the time of Caesar, either at Fort St-Andries or at Gorkum. Those two junctions were, Cluver maintained, due to modern canalisation. In Caesar's time the Meuse quitted its present bed at Megen, flowed past Battenburg, Heusden, Waelwyck, Gertruidenberg, Maasdam, Weernaas, Simonshaven and Biert, and joined the western branch of the Rhine at Geervliet, only 7 miles from the sea. Cluver's argument is that the channel of an old river runs from the neighbourhood of Boekhoven in the direction which I have just indicated; that this channel, in the eastern part of its course, is called the Hedickse Maas, and thence to its western extremity the Oude Maas or "Old Meuse"; and that this name proves that the Meuse, in Caesar's time, flowed in the channel in question. But in Cluver's map and in Desjardins's the Oude Maas quits the channel of the modern Meuse at Megen: in the *Descriptio Fluminum Rheni, Vahalis et Mosae*, a map which, in the Catalogue of the British Museum, is dated 1630, it is not traced further eastward than a point

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 11-15.

<sup>2</sup> See Reclus, iv. 218. Numerous maps of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the British Museum show the junction of the Meuse and the Waal at Fort St-Andries, e.g. *Fluviorum Rheni, Mosae . . . descriptio, emendata per F. de Witt*.

<sup>3</sup> *Germania antiqua*, 1616, Lib. iii. pp. 144-5; *De tribus Rheni alveis*, 1611, pp. 34-8.

<sup>4</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i. 118-19, 124-6.

<sup>5</sup> *Galliae Cisalpinæ et Transalpinæ . . . tabula in usum scholarum descripta*.



about two miles south-east of Heusden; and with this M. Reclus's map agrees.<sup>1</sup> The Hedickse Maas, moreover, appears in the *Descriptio* as a streamlet, which enters the Meuse between Bockhoven and Hedickhuysen. It is true that in sheets 39 and 45 of a map called *Topographische en militaire Kaart van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden* (1 : 50,000) the Oude Maas is depicted in the neighbourhood of Megeu : but it is simply a sheet of water which extends about 2 miles in a south-easterly direction from a point about half a mile from the bank of the Meuse. It should seem, then, that for tracing the channel of the Oude Maas as far eastward as Megeu Cluver had no authority except the existence of this isolated sheet of water; nor does he adduce any proof of his assertion that the Meuse did not, in Caesar's time, join the Waal at Fort St-Andries.<sup>2</sup> Finally Desjardins's map is absolutely inconsistent with Caesar's description : his theory forces him to maintain that Caesar and Tacitus were wrong in saying that the Meuse helped to form the *insula Batavorum*; and he is therefore driven to assert that Caesar knew nothing of the matter which he undertook to describe.<sup>3</sup> But it is most unlikely that he should have been so completely misled by his informants; especially as his statement that the Meuse received the Waal 80 Roman miles from the sea is, in some sort, confirmed by the implied statement of Tacitus that the junction between the two rivers took place at a considerable distance from the sea. I therefore conclude that it is impossible to prove that, in Caesar's time, the Meuse did not receive the Waal at Fort St-Andries.<sup>4</sup> (2) When the Germans "had reached the territories of the Eburones and Condrusi" they must have advanced at least as far southward as the latitude of Liège. (3) There is no direct evidence to show whether their entire host or only their advanced guard had moved so far. General Creuly insists that there is not a single word in Caesar's narrative which goes to show that the Usipetes and Tencteri retreated before him as he advanced against them. Therefore, he argues, those who had advanced as far as the territories of the Eburones and Condrusi were only a party of cavalry who had been sent to reconnoitre the country in which the host proposed to settle.<sup>5</sup> Now Caesar is often desperately concise; and this part of his narrative is confessedly the most obscure in the whole of his book. If Creuly is right, Caesar omitted to mention that those Germans who had penetrated into the country of the Condrusi were only a

<sup>1</sup> *Nouv. Géogr. univ.*, iv. 217. Cf. *Kaart van de Rivier de Boven Maas*, etc., (1 : 10,000), Blad 32.

<sup>2</sup> "Tout nous porte à croire," says Desjardins (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i. 122), who professes himself a faithful disciple of Cluver, "que la réunion . . . au fort St-André . . . est moderne." *Tout nous porte à croire* is not proof. Where is the record? After a prolonged search I cannot find any. Nor, it should seem, can M. Reclus. Nor could Johannes Pontanus, a diligent geographer of the seventeenth century. See his *Disceptationes chorographicae de Rheno divortio*, etc., 1614, p. 32.

<sup>3</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i. 122.

<sup>4</sup> Having patiently studied all the monographs that have been written on the subject, I believe that it is impossible to trace with certainty the courses of the lower Meuse, the lower Rhine and the Waal, as they existed in the time of Caesar.

<sup>5</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, p. 29.

reconnoitring party: therefore in either case Caesar was silent on an important matter. When we read that "Germani" had advanced as far as the territories of the Eburones and the Condrusi, and that Caesar began to march towards the place where he heard that "Germani" were,<sup>1</sup> we naturally take for granted that "Germani" means the entire German host; for it is hardly credible that Caesar would have marched against a mere reconnoitring party. A. Dederich,<sup>2</sup> quoting Caesar's words,—*iter in ea loca facere coepit, quibus in locis esse Germanos audiebat*,—lays stress upon his use of the imperfect tense, and argues, as I understand him, that Caesar was speaking of successive reports which reached him on his march; and accordingly he infers that by the time Caesar crossed the Meuse, the (assumed) reconnoitring party may have retreated to join the main body. Perhaps; but the meaning which Dederich attaches to *audiebat* seems to me irreconcilable with Caesar's use of the word *coepit*. All that seems certain is that if the whole host moved away from the territories of the Eburones and the Condrusi, they did so before or soon after Caesar quitted the winter-quarters of his army; for his narrative shows unmistakably that he moved nearer and nearer to a fixed, not a receding point. But the natural meaning of Caesar's words appears to be that the Germans as a body, not merely their advanced guard, had reached the territories of the Eburones and the Condrusi. (4) If so, they must have moved from that country before Caesar attacked them unless their flight occupied more than one day. For it is generally<sup>3</sup> admitted that they fled either to the confluence of the Meuse and the Waal or to the confluence of the Rhine and the Moselle. In either case their final destruction would have taken place at a considerable distance from the territories of the Eburones and Condrusi. (5) I have already given reasons for believing that the Ambivariti dwelt, as is generally held, on the left bank of the Meuse.<sup>4</sup> (6) Caesar makes it clear that, when the German envoys proposed to him to send a message to the Ubii, they were not more than 12 Roman miles from the German camp, which he attacked on the following day. If, then, the defeat of the Germans took place near the confluence of the Meuse and the Waal, and if the said confluence was near the site of Fort St-Andries, the envoys were at least 60 miles, *in a direct line*, from the nearest frontier of the Ubii. If, on the other hand, that defeat took place near the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine, the German messengers would only have had a travel the few miles that separated them from the Rhine, and, after crossing that river, they would have found themselves in Ubian territory. (7) It is generally taken for granted that the scene of the rout of the Usipetes and Tencteri was comparatively near the confluence whether of the Waal and the Meuse or of the Rhine and the Moselle. Levesque de la Ravalière, however, infers from Caesar's saying that the Germans were

<sup>1</sup> *iter in ea loca facere coepit, quibus in locis esse Germanos audiebat.* B. G., iv. 7, § 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Julius Cæsar am Rhein*, 1870, pp. 19, 28.

<sup>3</sup> Generally, but not universally. Von Cohausen, A. Dederich, von Kampen and T. Bergk think otherwise, as will presently appear: but I engage to prove that they are all wrong.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 380-82.

tired out when they reached the confluence of the Rhine and the Meuse that their flight had extended over a considerable distance.<sup>1</sup> This is also the opinion of Achaintre.<sup>2</sup> As Caesar does not say that the Usipetes and Teneteri had moved away from the country of the Condrusi, he infers that their defeat took place somewhere in the neighbourhood of Aix-la-Chapelle. I believe, however, that almost every one who reads his Caesar attentively will conclude that Aix-la-Chapelle is much too far from either "confluence"; and I am sure that the "considerable distance" of which de la Ravalière speaks was performed within a single day. Moreover "considerable distance" is an elastic expression. On the theory of Napoleon, the scene of the rout, 8 miles north-west of the river Niers, was quite 20 miles from the alleged confluence of the Meuse and the Waal at Fort St-Andrieux. Surely this distance was enough to tire the Germans.

III. As we have seen, if the MSS. are correct, Caesar says that the Usipetes and Teneteri fled to the confluence of the Mosæ (Meuse) and the Rhine. Merivale and Long, however, as well as Cluver, d'Anville and von Goler, have argued that by *Mosæ* (or whatever Caesar may have written) we ought to understand not the Meuse but the Moselle. I say, "whatever Caesar may have written," because Cluver<sup>3</sup> would alter *Mosæ* to *Mosulæ*, and Long's suggestion<sup>4</sup> that the two rivers had the same name is absurd. The Latin name of the Moselle was *Mosula* or *Mosella*. There is no evidence that the Moselle was ever called *Mosæ*; and if it had been, Caesar would not have used the word *Mosæ* to describe the Moselle in *B. G.*, iv. 15, § 2, when he had used the very same word to describe the Meuse in chapters 9, 10 and 12.

Cluver decides for the Moselle because, as I have already shown, he believes himself to have proved that the Meuse did not, in Caesar's time, join the Waal or the Rhine at all until it reached Geervliet. If Cluver's premiss is right, so is his conclusion: but I believe that I have shown that his premiss is very doubtful. Even so, however, it is possible that his conclusion may be right.

Merivale<sup>5</sup> holds that the fact that the Germans "only required three days" to send a message to the Ûbi (on the right bank of the Rhine, between Cologne and Coblenz) is quite inconsistent "with the statement that the battle was fought near the confluence of the Meuse with the Rhine.

Long says<sup>7</sup> that Caesar cannot mean the Meuse; "for he says that this river receives a branch from the Phine (Waal); and therefore it cannot be said to join the Rhine." "Caesar," he adds, "tells us nothing of a long march up the Rhine to make his bridge."<sup>8</sup> And again, "Before Caesar saw the Germans, they had left the Rhine and advanced south of Liège, and when the Romans crossed the Maas and approached them, they could not move westward, nor would they move northwards

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de l'Acad. Roy. des inscr. et belles-lettres*, xviii., 1753, p. 216.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, i. 125.

<sup>3</sup> *De tribus Rheni alveis*, p. 38.

<sup>4</sup> *Caesar*, p. 191.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire*, i. 453, note.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 11, § 3.

<sup>7</sup> *Caesar*, p. 19.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, p. 191.

into the country where they had wintered and fed on the stores of the Menapii; and as they finally fled to the Rhine, it is plain that the junction of the Rhine and Mosa is the junction of the Rhine and Mosel."<sup>1</sup>

Napoleon, on the contrary, thinks that "the country between the Meuse and the Rhine, to the south of Aix-la-Chapelle, is too much broken and too barren to have allowed the German emigration, composed of 430,000<sup>2</sup> individuals . . . with waggons to move and subsist in it. Moreover, it contains no trace of ancient roads, and if Caesar had taken this direction, he must have crossed the . . . Ardennes, a circumstance of which he would not have failed to inform us. Besides . . . on the news of the approach of Caesar, instead of directing their march towards the Ubii, who were not favourable to them, the Germans . . . would have concentrated themselves towards the most distant part of the fertile country on which they had seized,—that of the Menapii."<sup>3</sup>

Napoleon places the battle-field 8 miles north of Goch, which is on the river Niers. Caesar states that, on the day before the battle, he intended to march 4 miles to get water; and Napoleon's argument is that "since, to the north of the Roer, there exists, between the Rhine and the Meuse, no other watercourse but the Niers, he (Caesar) was evidently obliged to advance to that river to find water."<sup>4</sup>

Desjardins, who accepts Cluver's theory regarding the course of the Meuse, nevertheless places the scene of the rout near Fort St-Andries, but he does not discuss the question. He merely observes, following Cluver, that the Meuse and the Waal probably approached each other above Bonn without actually mingling their waters, and then separated, to flow, each in its own course, to the sea.<sup>5</sup> But if the rivers merely approached each other, Caesar would not have written "*ad confluentem Mosae et Rheni*."

Mr. A. G. Peskett's note<sup>6</sup> is worth transcribing. "Mr. Long," he says, "who expresses no doubt of the genuineness of (chapter) 10, seems to think it possible that Caesar could describe the course of one important river, the Meuse, in 10, mention it again in 12, and then, without a word of explanation, apply the same name in 15 to another large river 100 miles off. Florus and Dion Cassius have been quoted in support of the Mosel: but Florus only says *iterum de Germano Tencteri querebantur*. *hic vero iam Caesar ultro Mosellam navali ponte transgreditur ipsumque Rhenum et Hercyniis hostem quaerit in silvis*, i. 45, § 14 (Haln). Dion Cassius says that the Tencteri and Usipetes *τόν τε Πήνον διέβησαν καὶ εἰς τὴν τῶν Τρηονίρων ἐνέβαλον*.<sup>7</sup> Florus says absolutely nothing about the site of the battle and Dion may have been thinking of B. G., iv. 6, where Caesar says that the Germans got as far as the Condrusi, who were the clients of the Treveri. . . . The Tencteri and Usipetes . . . crossed the Rhine and wintered among the Menapii . . . in (ch.) 6 we

<sup>1</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, pp. 157-8.

<sup>2</sup> The number is probably a gross exaggeration. See p. 208, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 138 § 2, note.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, p. 141.

<sup>5</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 652.

<sup>6</sup> *Caesar*, Bks. iv.-v., pp. 60-61.

<sup>7</sup> "crossed the Rhine and invaded the country of the Treveri."

read . . . *Germani latius vagabantur et in fines Eburonum et Condrusorum, qui sunt Treverorum clientes, pervenerant*; taking this passage in connexion with 12, where it is stated that they had sent a great part of their cavalry on a foraging expedition among the Menapii on the left bank of the Meuse, we naturally conclude that the Germans were still somewhere in the neighbourhood of the Meuse. . . . Caesar, in the passage above quoted, is doubtless speaking, as Kraner suggests, not of the whole body of the Germans but of wandering predatory bands; and there is no need to suppose that even these had advanced further south than Aix-la-Chapelle, which would be on the northern border of the Condrusi. Yet though every hint given by Caesar up to the present chapter (15) points to the Meuse as the scene of hostilities, we are suddenly transferred by Goler and Mr. Long to the Mayenfeld near Cologne . . . though the greater part of the cavalry, which must have formed no slight element of strength in these vast predatory hordes, were left about 100 miles away among the Ambivariti."

There are several flaws in Mr. Peskett's argument. As Caesar had mentioned the Meuse in chapter 9, and was to mention it again in chapters 11 and 15 and in *B. G.*, v. 24, § 4, and vi. 33, § 3, there was no reason why he should not describe its course in chapter 10, even if it had not been otherwise of importance to his narrative. Secondly, when Mr. Peskett concludes that "the Germans were still somewhere in the neighbourhood of the Meuse," he is confusing dates. So long as they remained in the country of the Condrusi, they were no doubt in the neighbourhood of the Meuse: but, as I have already shown, whether the battle was fought near the confluence of the Meuse and the Waal or near the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine, either the Germans had moved away from the country of the Condrusi, or their main body had never gone near that country. Undoubtedly they were in the neighbourhood of the Meuse, if the rout took place near the confluence of the Meuse and the Waal. But this is the very point which Mr. Peskett has to prove.

Still, if Mr. Peskett fails as an advocate, it does not follow that his cause is bad. It remains for me to deal with the arguments which he has left unnoticed. Assuming, with Napoleon,<sup>1</sup> that when the Germans asked for three days' grace, they were at Straelen, the distance, in a straight line, to the frontier of the Ubii,—a few miles north of Cologne,—and back, was about 120 miles, which, if the Germans had meant what they said, their mounted messengers might perhaps have covered in three days. But this calculation assumes that the chiefs of the Ubii would have been found waiting on their northern frontier, and that the business of negotiation could have been settled off hand, both of which assumptions are absurd. Mr. C. E. Moberly, indeed, says,<sup>2</sup> "The difficulty would be hardly less on the other supposition, as the German cavalry would then have had to get from the lower Meuse to Coblenz in the same time." But the German cavalry had been expected for days past; and the German envoys, in asking for three days' grace, might

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 141.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, p. 266.

take for granted that they were already on the road. "It is possible," Mr. Moberly proceeds, "either that *ad eas res conficiendas*<sup>1</sup> may mean 'in order to arrange for the embassy,' or that the ambassadors wildly pressed for these three days without considering what they promised to accomplish in them." Heller offers another suggestion. Either, he says, the territory of the Ubii may have extended further northward than is commonly believed, or the envoys may have thought that it did.<sup>2</sup> Both of these suggestions appear to me extremely far-fetched.

Long's first argument,—that Caesar cannot mean the Meuse, "for he says that this river receives a branch from the Rhine (Waal), and therefore it cannot be said to join the Rhine,"—is not conclusive. Long himself frequently points out the occasional looseness of Caesar's writing. Caesar, in the passage to which Long alludes, wrote *Mosa . . . parte quadam ex Rheno recepta, quae appellatur Vacalus*, etc.,—that is to say, the Meuse received a branch of the Rhine, called the Waal. Why then should not Caesar afterwards speak of the confluence of the Rhine and Meuse (*confluentem Mosae et Rheni*)? As we have seen, the lower course of the Meuse was called by Tacitus both *Mosa* and *Rhenus*.

Long's argument that Caesar could not have attacked the Germans near the confluence of the Meuse and the Waal, because he "tells us nothing of a long march up the Rhine to make his bridge," has more force. It is true, as Napoleon points out, that, if he beat the Germans near the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine, he must have made a long march across the Ardennes, and that of that he tells us nothing either. Still, Caesar, who disregards facts that are not essential to his narrative, might have omitted to tell us that he marched across the Ardennes; for he tells us that he was marching steadily and continuously on, and he gives us to understand that he was marching towards the Rhine; and he may have thought this information sufficient. But he certainly leaves on our minds the impression that he crossed the Rhine near the spot where he defeated the Usipetes and Tencteri:<sup>3</sup> it is certain that he crossed the Rhine at least as far south as Bonn;<sup>4</sup> and we certainly should have expected him to tell us that he had to make a long march southward to get there.

IV. And now I will do my best to seize the vital points in this discussion. If we decide that the Germans were defeated near the confluence of the Meuse and the Waal, (1) our decision harmonises with the reading *ad confluentem Mosae et Rheni*, which is found in all the MSS.; if (2) we assume that *Rheni* is equivalent to *parte quadam ex Rheno recepta, quae appellatur Vacalus*, or else that *confluentem* means, as Heller supposes,<sup>5</sup> "the connecting link" between the Rhine and the Meuse, that is to say, the Waal; (3) we are obliged to assume that the Germans retreated before Caesar, or on receiving the first news of his approach, from the positions which they had taken up in the territories of the Eburones and Condrusi to the country of the Menapii, which they had recently left; unless indeed we accept General Creuly's theory,

<sup>1</sup> B. G., iv. 11, § 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Philologus*, xiii., 1858, p. 587.

<sup>3</sup> B. G., iv. 15-16.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 694-7.

<sup>5</sup> *Philologus*, xxii., 1865, pp. 132-3.

that those who had penetrated into the territories of the Eburones and Condrusi were only a reconnoitring party; (4) we are obliged to assume that when Dion Cassius said that the Germans invaded the country of the Treveri, he either included the Condrusi among the Treveri or simply made a blunder;<sup>1</sup> (5) we are obliged, unless we accept Heller's far-fetched suggestion, to assume that, when the German envoys offered to send a message to the Ubii and to get an answer in three days, they were offering to perform a manifest impossibility, and that, unless they were talking wildly, their sole object was to gain time,—*in which case they would surely have asked for more than three days*, unless indeed they knew that their cavalry would rejoin them within that time; (6) we are obliged to assume that, after the defeat of the Germans, the Ubii sent a message at least 70 miles down the valley of the Rhine to Caesar's camp, asking him to march up the valley and cross the Rhine into their territory; that he did so; that he then marched northward again into the country of the Sugambri; that he then marched southward again into the country of the Ubii; that then, after recrossing the Rhine, he made another long march down the valley of the Rhine to the port from which he embarked on his first expedition to Britain; and all this in spite of the fact that his narrative leaves on our minds the impression that he crossed the Rhine near the spot where he had defeated the Germans; (7) we are obliged to assume, with Napoleon, that the confluence of the Waal with the Meuse took place at Fort St-Andries, because, if it took place at Gorkum or at Geervliet or at Dordrecht, where d'Anville<sup>2</sup> places it, the difficulty regarding the proposed message to the Ubii and the difficulty regarding Caesar's passage of the Rhine and his unrecorded marches up and down the valley of the Rhine are enormously increased.

The objections to the above-mentioned theory which I have numbered 3, 5 and 6 seem to me to be serious.

If, on the other hand, we decide that the defeat took place near the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine, (1) our decision flatly contradicts the MSS. of the *Commentaries*. We are obliged to assume either that Caesar wrote *Mosae* by mistake when he meant *Mosellae*, or that he wrote *Mosellae*, but that some blundering copyist put *Mosae* instead; (2) the difficulty about *Rheni* disappears: we are not obliged to assume that Caesar wrote *Rheni* when he meant *Vacali* or that *confluen* means "connecting link"; (3) we are obliged to assume that the Germans moved away from the positions which they had taken up in the terri-

<sup>1</sup> Zeuss indeed (*Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme*, 1837, pp. 84, 216) infers from Caesar's statement that the forest of the Ardennes extended from the Rhine through the heart of the territory of the Treveri to the frontier of the Remi (*silvam Arduennam, quae . . . per medios fines Treverorum a flumine Rheno ad initium Remorum pertinet*. B. G., v. 3, § 4) that Bonn and Cologne may have been in Treveran territory; and Dederich goes on to argue that Dion may have been quite right in saying that the Usipetes and Tencteri penetrated into the country of the Treveri. But Zeuss's remark is quite unfounded; for the Ardennes, as we know it, is partly in Luxembourg far to the south of Bonn and Cologne, and the forest may, in Caesar's time, have extended even to Coblenz; and moreover it is certain that the territory of the Treveri did not extend so far northward as Bonn, still less Cologne.

<sup>2</sup> *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 668-9.

\*ories of the Eburones and Condrusi; and that, instead of retreating in the direction whence they had come, they struck off, through the Ardennes, towards the south-east, and plunged into the land of the Treveri. (4) We are obliged to assume that the Germans had taken up a position at least 75 miles, in a direct line, from the nearest point of the Meuse, to the further side of which they had sent their cavalry on a foraging expedition; (5) we are obliged to assume that Caesar mentioned by name, for the first and only time, so important a river as the Moselle, without one word of introduction; (6) *the difficulty regarding the offer of the German envoys to send a message to the Ubii disappears*; (7) *the difficulty regarding the unrecorded marches of Caesar up and down the valley of the Rhine, up and down again, also disappears*.

To this view also there are serious objections.\* It is, of course, conceivable that Caesar did write *ad confluentem Mosellae et Rheni*, and that some meddling copyist altered *Mosellae* into *Mosae*: but it needs great confidence in one's own judgement, even with the support, such as it is, of Dion Cassius and Florus, to assume that he did so. The objection which I have numbered 5 appears to me hardly less grave.

Nevertheless, I conclude that the confluence to which the routed Germans fled was the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine.<sup>1</sup> What has principally led me to this conclusion is the conviction, which deepens with each successive reading of Caesar's narrative, that the rout took place opposite the country of the Ubii. First, we see the German hosts marching southward into the district of Condroz and the neighbouring country of the Eburones. A few marches further southward would bring them to the neighbourhood of Coblenz. It seems to me quite in accord with Caesar's manner that, having already told us that they had moved far from the country of the Menapii, he should have omitted to mention these marches: but I cannot conceive that if they had retreated northward 90 Roman miles,<sup>2</sup> he would have neglected to say so. Then their envoys ask for 3 days' grace to negotiate with the Ubii; and the inevitable conclusion is that the Ubii were close by. Finally, the Ubii ask Caesar to bring his army into their country; and it is hardly credible that they should have expected him to march 90 Roman miles before he could cross the Rhine.<sup>3</sup> Again, it is natural to suppose that, if the rout had taken place near the confluence of the Meuse and the Waal, Caesar would have written "*confluentem Mosae et Vacali*." Finally, he tells us that the fugitives who plunged into the stream were overwhelmed "by the force of the current" (*vi fluminis*); and these words are inapplicable to the waters that flow past Fort St-Andries.

V. It remains to notice the views of those commentators who refuse to believe that the rout of the Germans took place either in the neighbourhood of Fort St-Andries or in that of Coblenz. And first of those who accept the reading *ad confluentem Mosae et Rheni*.

<sup>1</sup> Whether Caesar took the shortest road to the Mayenfeld or made the detour which von Göler and Colonel Henrard (*Mém. couronnés . . . publiés par l'Acad. Roy. de Belgique*, xxxiii., 1882, p. 23) trace, I do not pretend to decide.

<sup>2</sup> Napoleon III., *Hist. de Jules César*. Planche 14.

<sup>3</sup> *Id.*



1. According to the French Commission,<sup>1</sup> the Germans, when they were attacked, were in the neighbourhood of Woudrichem (Gorkum), on the left bank of the Meuse, and had the estuary of Bies-Bosch on their left. This theory, which is based on the erroneous assumption that the Germans crossed the Meuse (regarded as a branch of the Rhine) below Gorkum, requires us to place the Ambivariti on the right bank of the Meuse, a view which I have shown to be wrong.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, I doubt whether Caesar's cavalry could have acted in a region which was at that time probably a vast swamp: as I have already shown, there is some reason to doubt whether, at that time, the confluence at Gorkum existed; and on the theory of the Commission the difficulties involved in the assumption that the rout took place at a point remote from the country of the Ubi<sup>3</sup> are greatly increased.

2. According to von Cohausen, who is followed by von Kampen, the German encampment was near Wissen, about 10 miles south of Goch; and the beaten host fled to the Rhine, which they reached at a point near the Cranenburger Bucht, about 5 miles west of Cleve. At this point, says von Cohausen, the Meuse *appeared* to join the Rhine, because the Bucht was inundated by water from the latter.<sup>4</sup> But von Cohausen's suggestion that Caesar was misled on this point by the report of his cavalry is nothing but a wild guess. Moreover, I can find no evidence that the Rhine then flowed in the direction which von Cohausen indicates. According to Dederich,<sup>5</sup> indeed, the Cranenburger Bucht is actually inundated, early in the year, by water from the Rhine; and the inundation is only divided from the Meuse by a spit of land not more than 1000 paces wide:<sup>6</sup> but granting the correctness of his statement, it is hardly necessary to point out that Caesar would not have described the Cranenburger Bucht as *confluens Mosae et Rheni* or, indeed, as a confluence of anything with anything else.

3. Dederich<sup>7</sup> infers from a statement of Dion Cassius<sup>8</sup> that the German camp, which, like Napoleon, he places north of Goch, must have been within one and a half "Stunde," or about 4 Roman miles, from the *confluens Mosae et Rheni* to which the Germans fled. It will be objected, he says, that at this distance from Goch there is no confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine. But the answer is easy. It was not Caesar himself but his cavalry who pursued the Germans. Caesar mistook the bifurcation of the Rhine for a confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine: the Meuse was near the Rhine, and this led him astray (!)

The objection which Dederich anticipates and vainly attempts to answer is conclusive. He bases his theory that Caesar mistook the bifurcation of the Rhine for a confluence of the Meuse with the Rhine on those MSS. which make Caesar say that the Meuse *in Rhenum influit*.

<sup>1</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 52.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 380-82.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 690.

<sup>4</sup> *Jahrbücher des Vereins von Alterthumsfreunden im Rheinlande*, xliv., pp. 44, 50.

<sup>5</sup> *Julius Caesar am Rhein*, 1870, p. 35.

<sup>6</sup> See *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, etc., xc., 1867, p. 43.

<sup>7</sup> *Julius Caesar am Rhein*, pp. 8, 28-31, 33-4.

<sup>8</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xxxix. 48, § 2. Dion, whose authority is *nil*, merely says that Caesar reached the German camp at mid-day.

Other MSS. make him say *in Oceanum influit*; and if the MSS. to which Dederich appeals are right, he was referring to the confluence of the Meuse with the Waal. How any man in his senses could delude himself into the fancy that Caesar, knowing as he did that the Meuse joined the Waal, should nevertheless have imagined that the bifurcation of the Rhine was a confluence of the Meuse with the Rhine, passes one's power of conception.

4. T. Bergk has made an attempt to solve the problem, which is at all events original and ingenious.<sup>1</sup> He holds that what Caesar really wrote was simply *nam ad confluentem Mosae pervenissent* ("when they had reached a point where a river flows into the Meuse"); and that some commentator, unable to understand the meaning of these words, added *et Rheni*. If he says, it be objected that Caesar would have given the name of the other river, the answer is easy. Such reticence was one of Caesar's characteristics. He knew the weaknesses of the general reader; and he was too wise to trouble him with outlandish names. The word *confluens*, says Bergk, did not originally mean "a confluence": it meant "a river which flows into another river." A confluence was designated by the word *confluentes*, for example in Livy (i. 27),—*ubi Anienem transiit ad confluentes, collocat castra*; and it was only in later writers<sup>2</sup> that *confluens* was used in the same sense.

Having amended the text to his own satisfaction, Bergk proceeds to identify his *confluens*. The German camp, he says, was at Heinsberg, on the left bank of the Roer; and the Germans fled to the confluence of the Roer and the Meuse. In the narrowing peninsula formed by these two rivers Caesar's cavalry could have acted with effect; and they could not have done so near the confluence of the Meuse with any other stream which joins it in the country of the Condrusi or of the Eburones.

General von Veith agrees with Bergk in deleting *et Rheni* after *ad confluentem Mosae*, but differs from him in details. He believes that the scene of the German rout was Louveigné, between the Ourthe, which joins the Meuse at Liège, and the Vesdre, which flows into the Ourthe about a mile and a half south-east of the same town.<sup>3</sup>

Now the reason why Bergk thought it necessary to amend the text was simply that he regarded it as an inevitable inference from Caesar's narrative that the battle took place in the country of the Eburones or in the country of the Condrusi; and I have shown that this inference is not inevitable. I freely admit that Caesar was sparing in his use of geographical names: but Bergk has wholly failed to prove that *confluens* was ever used in the sense which he claims for it or that it was not used in classical Latin in the sense of "confluence." In fact, he begs the question, which is whether Caesar did not himself use the word in this very sense.

<sup>1</sup> *Zur Geschichte und Topographie der Rheinlande in Römischer Zeit*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>2</sup> Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, vi. 26 (30), § 122.

<sup>3</sup> Pick's *Monatsschrift f. d. Gesch. Westdeutschl.*, vi., 106-30, referred to in *Jahresberichte der Geschichtswissenschaft*, Jahrg. 3, 1880, ii. 2.

### WHERE DID CAESAR MAKE HIS FIRST BRIDGE OVER THE RHINE?

This question is inseparably connected with that which I have discussed in the preceding note. If the rout of the Usipetes and Tencteri took place near the confluence of the Meuse and the Waal, it is natural to look for the site of the bridge at a position as near that spot as may be consistent with Caesar's narrative. If, on the other hand, the rout took place near the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine, the bridge must have been made in the neighbourhood of Coblenz.

1. Napoleon<sup>1</sup> fixes on Bonn, for the following reasons.—(a) The bridge joined the western bank to the territory of the Ubii.<sup>2</sup> Two years later Caesar built another bridge *paulum supra*,—a little higher up the river than the site of the former one,—which connected the territory of the Treveri with that of the Ubii.<sup>3</sup> Therefore it is almost certain that the western end of the older bridge also touched the territory of the Treveri. (b) Those critics who have chosen Andernach as the site of the former bridge argue on the hypothesis, which Napoleon claims to have disproved, that the defeat of the Usipetes and Tencteri took place near the confluence of the Moselle,—not the Meuse,—and the Rhine. (c) Cologne, which has also been adopted, is too far north to agree with the *Commentaries*; for when, two years later, Caesar had recrossed his second bridge, he traversed the Ardennes, passed near the country of the Segni and Condrusi, and marched for Aduatuca,<sup>4</sup> which Napoleon identifies with Tongres: but, if he had started from Cologne,—or, as Napoleon ought to say, a little above (*paulum supra*) Cologne,—he would not have passed near the country of those tribes. (d) South of Bonn, as far as Mainz, “the Rhine flows upon a rocky bed, where the piles could not have been driven in, and presents, owing to the mountains which border it, no favourable point of passage.” (e) “Less than fifty years after Caesar's campaigns, Drusus, in order to proceed against the Sicambri,—that is, against the same people whom Caesar intended to combat,—crossed the Rhine at Bonn.”

The first of these arguments tells against Napoleon's theory; for it is unlikely that the territory of the Treveri extended as far northward as Bonn,<sup>5</sup> whereas they certainly did possess the western bank of the Rhine between Coblenz and Andernach. The second I have dealt with in the preceding note. The third rests upon the false hypothesis that Aduatuca was at Tongres.<sup>6</sup> Napoleon would, I think, have been wiser if he had based his objection to Cologne on the ground that it was probably opposite the territory, not of the Ubii but of the Sugambri. And when he asserts that the bridge could not have been constructed south of Bonn, he surely forgets that, on his own theory, Caesar's second

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 143, n. 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, vi. 9, 29, § 2.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 490-91.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 16, §§ 5-8, 19.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, vi. 29, § 4, 32, §§ 1-3.

<sup>6</sup> See pp. 337-43.

bridge was a little south (*paulum supra*) of Bonn. Moreover, it is certain that the bed of the Rhine between Coblenz and Andernach would admit of the construction of a bridge such as Caesar describes.<sup>1</sup>

2. Heller<sup>2</sup> tells us that, according to E. Hübner, the remains of an old bridge have been discovered near the "large tower" of Bonn. But the alleged antiquity of the bridge proves nothing, unless it can be shown that Caesar built it.

3. M. F. Essellen<sup>3</sup> argues that the first bridge was built at or near Cologne. He says first, that it may be regarded as certain that in Caesar's time the Ubii possessed a strip of land between the mouth of the Wupper and the mouth of the Sieg and between the Rhine and the territory of the Sugambri; and secondly, that if the bridge had been built at any point between Cologne and Coblenz, Caesar, in order to reach the country of the Sugambri, would have been obliged to take the road leading through narrow passes past Linz, Unkel and Königswinter, thus exposing himself to attack from the Suevi, who inhabited the mountains on the right. Neither of these arguments has any value. Essellen offers no evidence or even argument in support of his assertion that the territory of the Ubii extended as far northward as the mouth of the Wupper; and if Caesar had crossed the Rhine at Bonn, he would not have had to march a single yard by the road to which Essellen alludes, Königswinter, the most northerly of the three places which he mentions, being at least 6 miles south-east of Bonn. Moreover, the mountains in question belonged, not to the Suevi but to the Ubii, who were Caesar's humble servants.<sup>4</sup>

4. Long,<sup>5</sup> who holds that the rout of the Usipetes and Tencteri took place near the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine, naturally goes on to express his belief that the bridge was made between Coblenz and Andernach. "Caesar," he says, "could not cross above Coblenz, if the battle was fought where I have placed it, without crossing the Mosel; nor is the river practicable above Coblenz . . . nor could he cross below Andernach till he came to Bonn. He must therefore have crossed between Andernach and Coblenz, or at some place near Bonn, or lower down. . . . But he crossed in the country of the Treveri, and we cannot make the Treveri extend further north than Andernach, or, at the most, the valley of the Ahr."

Assuming that the battle took place near the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine, there is no fault to find with any of these arguments, except the one which is founded upon the assumption that Caesar crossed the Rhine from the country of the Treveri, and that the country of the Treveri extended no further north than the valley of the Ahr. It is true that when Caesar made his second bridge, he was in the country of the Treveri: but it is not certain that he was there when he made the first. He may have been near the southern frontier

<sup>1</sup> See von Göler's *Gall. Krieg*, p. 123, and Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 161, n. 8.

<sup>2</sup> *Philologus*, xlii., 1890, p. 695.

<sup>3</sup> *Zur Frage, wo Julius Cäsar die beiden Rheinbrücken schlagen liess*, 1864, pp. 9, 11.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 8, § 3, 16, §§ 5-8.

<sup>5</sup> *Caesar*, p. 194.

of the Eburones. It is also probable that the Ahr, if not the Vinxtbach, was the northern frontier of the Treveri:<sup>1</sup> but we cannot be sure. But even if Long's assumptions are wrong, his error is unimportant. Everybody who accepts his view regarding the place of the rout of the Usipetes and Tencteri will admit that Caesar would not have needlessly marched as far north as Bonn, when, between Coblenz and Andernach, a site, or rather a variety of sites equally practicable, lay ready to his hand.

5. The remains of a so-called bridge, which was believed to have been Caesar's, are said to have been discovered in 1744 at Engers, between Coblenz and Andernach.<sup>2</sup> But I can find no evidence that this bridge, if it was a bridge, was made by Caesar. u

6. Herr Isphording, an architect, has recently argued that the second bridge was made a little above Neuwied.<sup>3</sup> But the only evidence which he produces is the discovery of Roman coins, broken pots and old timber in the neighbourhood of a chapel (Kapelle der Guter Mann) at the place indicated.

7. Von Goler<sup>4</sup> and Heller<sup>5</sup> believe that the second bridge was built at some point in the course of the river where there is an island. General Creuly<sup>6</sup> remarks that, on this theory, there would have been two bridges, not one, a fact which Caesar would have mentioned; and he adds that when Caesar says that, after recrossing the bridge, he broke down, for the length of 200 feet, that part of it which touched the German bank, and constructed a tower on the end in the stream,<sup>7</sup> he plainly gives us to understand that there was no island. I do not agree with him.<sup>8</sup>

8. A. von Cohausen<sup>9</sup> holds the amazing opinion that the first bridge was made at the foot of the Furstenberg, near Xanten. This place is at least 90 miles, in a direct line, from Neuwied, where Cohausen believes that Caesar made the second bridge; and Caesar says that this second bridge was only "a little above" the first one. But this does not shake the conviction of Cohausen. As Caesar says that the Usipetes and Tencteri crossed the Rhine "not far from the sea" (*non longe a mari, quo Rhenus influit*),<sup>10</sup> and as, according to Cohausen, the point where they crossed could not have been less than 90 miles from the sea, he concludes that Caesar might have described Neuwied as only "a little above" Xanten.<sup>11</sup> The answer is (1) that, *in relation to the whole length*

<sup>1</sup> See p. 491.

<sup>2</sup> See J. N. Honthéim's *Prodromus Hist. Trevirensis*, 1757, i. 209.

<sup>3</sup> *Philologus*, xlix., 1890, p. 695.

<sup>4</sup> *Jall. Krieg*, p. 214.

<sup>5</sup> *Philologus*, xlix., 1890, p. 695.

<sup>6</sup> *Rev. arch.*, viii., 1863, p. 388.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 29, § 3.

<sup>8</sup> See Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 243, note.

<sup>9</sup> *Cæsar's Rheinbrücken*, 1867, pp. 7-11.

<sup>10</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 1, § 1.

<sup>11</sup> Cohausen tries to bolster up his theory by referring to a passage in *B. G.*, ii. 35, § 3, which has given commentators a great deal of unnecessary trouble. The passage, as it is generally quoted, runs as follows:—*Ipse in Carnutes, Andes, Turmes, quæ civitates propinquæ his locis erant, ubi bellum gesserat, legionibus in hibernacula deductis, in Italiam profectus est.* Now Caesar had been making war in the country of the Belgæ; and the nearest of the territories which he mentions in this passage was more than 40 miles from the nearest point of the theatre of the war. Therefore, triumphantly concludes Cohausen, *paulum supra* may mean 90 miles. To which I reply that, if Caesar really wrote the passage as I have printed

of the Rhine, the point where the Usipetes and Tencteri crossed might be said to be "not far from the sea"; and (2) that Caesar's information about the lower Rhine was confessedly vague. Moreover, there is one fact which simply pulverises Cohausen's theory. It is certain that Caesar's first bridge touched the western frontier of the Ubii. Everything points to this conclusion. The Ubii begged Caesar to cross the Rhine into their country. After he had punished the Sugambri, he returned to the country of the Ubii (*se in fines Ubiorum recepit*); and, having obtained from them information as to the movements of the Suevi, he immediately recrossed the Rhine.<sup>1</sup> It is clear then that, when he was about to set foot on the bridge to recross the Rhine, he was standing upon Ubian territory. Now the northern frontier of the Ubii, trace it as far north as we possibly can, was many miles south of Xanten.

My conclusion is that both the first and the second bridge were built between Andernach and Coblenz, but that there is no evidence for defining their positions more exactly.

## CAESAR'S BRIDGE OVER THE RHINE

I. The bridge was constructed as follows. First of all, a couple of piles, a foot and a half square in the thickness, and sharpened at the lower ends, were fastened together by cross-pieces, which kept them exactly two feet apart. They were then driven by pile-drivers into the bed of the river, in a line at right angles to the bank, and sloping in the direction of the current. Forty feet lower down, another couple of piles, similarly joined together, were driven in exactly opposite to them, and sloping towards them. A beam two feet wide was laid across from one couple to the other, being let into the space, which it exactly filled, between the two piles of each couple. The two couples of piles were kept at the right distance apart by two pairs of "fasteners," each pair being attached, by some unexplained method, to the upper ends of the piles and to the extremity of the beam. The effect of the whole arrangement was that, the greater the force of the current, the more firmly were piles, transverse beam and "fasteners" held together. Similar couples of piles, with similar transverse beams, and similarly

it, either his memory or his geographical knowledge was defective, unless he was only thinking of the distance between the south-western frontier of the Bellovaci and the north-western frontier of the Carnutes, which is not more than 12 miles. It has been suggested that if we read *quaque*, which is found in good MSS., for *quae*, the difficulty disappears. But I agree with K. Thomann (*Der französische Atlas zu Cäsars gall. Kriege*, 1871, pp. 12-13) that the reading *quaque* is unsatisfactory; for if Caesar had sent his legions into the territories of any other peoples besides the Carnutes, Andes and Turones, he would have mentioned them by name. On the other hand, Thomann's suggestion that *ubi bellum gesserat* means *ubi bellum et per se et per Crassum gesserat* is futile; for there is no evidence that Crassus had made war at all. He appears simply to have received the submission of the maritime peoples. See *B. G.*, ii. 34.

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 16, §§ 5-8, 19.

kept apart and yet held together by "fasteners," were driven, in a straight line with the two original couples, right across the stream. Then, to form the roadway, timbers were laid, in the direction of the bridge, over the transverse beams, and covered by a second layer of smaller joists laid transversely, above which was placed a third layer of fascines. The bridge was strong enough already: but, to make assurance doubly sure, another row of piles was driven obliquely into the bed of the river along the down-stream side of the bridge. They were arranged in pairs corresponding with the several couples of piles in the main structure. Each pile of the pair leaned like a buttress against the couple, obliquely athwart the stream; and they were intended of course to take the greatest possible strain off the main structure of the bridge. On the up-stream side, piles were driven in vertically at a short distance from the bridge, to protect it from the shock of any timber or vessels which the Germans might float down to destroy it. These piles were arranged in triangular groups, each group being exactly opposite to each couple of piles in the main structure.<sup>1</sup>

The above description represents the view which I have myself formed, after studying Caesar's description and the remarks of the numerous editors and modern writers on the subject. But to a modern reader Caesar's description is, on certain points, obscure; and these points will probably always continue to be disputed.

A. Rheinhard, finding Caesar's description wanting in lucidity, argues that he had no knowledge of engineering; that, his express statement notwithstanding, he did not himself design the structure; that he borrowed the materials of his description from his chief engineer, Mamurra; and that, as he failed to understand them, his description was jejune, loose and merely intended for popular reading.<sup>2</sup> Lieutenant A. Schleussinger replies that Caesar would not have dared, even if he had wished, to rob Mamurra of his credit, for fear the truth should come out; that he did, as a matter of fact, give his lieutenants the credit which was their due; and that he must have known that professional readers at Rome would study his description in a critical spirit.<sup>3</sup> I agree with Schleussinger; and it appears to me most unlikely that a man like Caesar should have been ignorant of the principles of a most important branch of his business.

II. J. Rondélet holds the singular opinion that the two piles of each couple in the main structure were not two feet apart the whole way down, but only at the top. He bases his opinion on the words *prone ac fastigate*. The word *prone*, he thinks, shows that the two piles sloped in the direction of or against the current, as the case might be; and the word *fastigate* that they sloped inwards towards each other.<sup>4</sup> But this theory is disproved, first, by the fact that Caesar says that the piles

<sup>1</sup> B. G., iv. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Caesar's *Rheinbrücke*, 1883, pp. 6-9. There is no evidence that Mamurra was Caesar's "chief engineer." He was, as far as we know, simply a *præfectus fabrum*. See p. 217, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> *Studie zu Caesar's Rheinbrücke*, 1884, pp. 25-30.

<sup>4</sup> *Traité théorique et pratique de l'art de bâtir*, 1812-14, iv. 305-7.

were joined by cross-pieces at an interval of two feet ;<sup>1</sup> and secondly, by the fact that Rondelet's arrangement would have served no purpose except that of making the bridge weak. As Schneider<sup>2</sup> says, explaining *fastigate*, each couple of piles was so placed that it formed, with the opposite couple, a figure resembling a gable or sloping roof.

Another theory which hardly requires even a passing mention is that of O. Pohl,<sup>3</sup> who represents the two piles of each couple as crossing each other, two feet above the surface of the water, in the shape of an X, the transverse beam resting upon them at the point where they crossed. Pohl's theory is irreconcilable with Caesar's description.

The two piles of each couple, which were separated by an interval of two feet and connected by cross-pieces, of course stood side by side, in a line at right angles to the bank of the river. It would be unnecessary to affirm this truism if T. Mauer,<sup>4</sup> reviving the preposterous theory of Feldbausch,<sup>5</sup> had not argued that they were placed one behind the other. Maurer's theory is irreconcilable, by any ingenuity, with Caesar's statement that "beams two feet wide, fitting into the interval between the two piles of each couple, were laid across,"<sup>6</sup> etc.

III. M. Sonntag<sup>7</sup> contends that all the plans<sup>8</sup> of the bridge, except his own, exaggerate the true inclination of the couples of piles. The result, he says, of their having inclined towards each other at the angles which most of the plans represent, would have been (1) that the pile-drivers would have worked less effectively ; (2) that the piles would not have been firmly fixed ; and (3) that the obtuse angles which they formed with the transverse beam would have been too great to admit of the insertion of the *fibulae*. (It will be observed that Sonntag here begs the question, how the *fibulae* were fixed.) The true inclination of the piles, he maintains, would have been such that, if the distance along the surface of the water between the opposite couples of piles had been, as Caesar says, 40 feet, the distance, 6 feet from the surface, would have been 39.

IV. According to Rheinhard,<sup>8</sup> the piles were lowered separately into the water : after they had been rammed in, the cross-pieces were added ; then the transverse beam (*trabs*), and then the "fasteners" (*fibulae*).

<sup>1</sup> Tigna bina sesquipedalia paulum ab imo praeacuta dimensa ad altitudinem fluminis intervallo pedum duorum inter se iungebat. Haec cum machinationibus immissa in flumen dixerat fistucisque adegerat, non sublicae modo directe ad perpendiculum, sed prone ac fastigate, ut secundum naturam fluminis procumberent, his item contraria duo ad eundem modum iuncta intervallo pedum quadragenum ab inferiore parte contra vim atque impetum fluminis conversa statuebat.

<sup>2</sup> Caesar, i. 353. Cf. Porcellini, *Totius latinitatis Lexicon*, iii., 1865, p. 39.

<sup>3</sup> *Festschrift des Realgymnasiens am Zwinger zu Breslau*, 1886, reviewed by R. Schneider in *Jahresberichte des philol. Vereins*, xiii., 1887, p. 367.

<sup>4</sup> See *Noch einmal Julius Cäsar's Brücke über den Rhein*, 1883, and the diagram on p. 4 of the said pamphlet.

<sup>5</sup> *Über die Konstruktion der Brücke, welche J. Cäsar über den Rhein schlug*, 1830.

<sup>6</sup> Haec utraque insuper bipedalibus trabibus immissis, quantum eorum tignorum iunctura distabat, etc.

<sup>7</sup> *Bemerkungen zu Caesar de B. G.*, iv. 17, 1890, pp. 4-5.

<sup>8</sup> *Caesar's Rheinbrücke*, 1883.



Most commentators, however, hold that the piles were coupled before they were lowered into the bed of the river; and this appears to be the only conclusion which can be drawn from Caesar's words.

V. Again, there is a difference of opinion as to the distance between the opposite couples of piles. Caesar writes that "opposite these,"—that is to say, the couple of piles which were first lowered into the water,— "he planted another couple, similarly joined together, on the downstream side, at an interval of 40 feet" (*is item contraria duo ad eundem modum iuncta intervallo pedum quadragenum ab inferiore parte . . . statuebat*). G. Hubo argues that the distance of 40 feet could not have been measured along the bed of the river, on account of the difference between the depth of the river near the bank and in mid-stream, which would have caused a variation either in the width of the roadway or in the angle formed by the piles. Nor, he argues, could the measurement have been made between the tops of the piles, because transverse beams 40 feet long would have been difficult to procure and could not have sustained the weight which the bridge had to bear, and because the difficulty of building the bridge on such a scale would have been very great. He concludes that the distance must have been measured along the surface of the water. But, he adds, Napoleon is wrong in measuring the 40 feet so as to include the thicknesses of the two opposite couples of piles. In that case the *intervallum* of which Caesar speaks would have been only 37, not 40 feet; and it is clear from Caesar's words, *Tigna bina sesquipedalia periculum ab imo præacuta dimensa ad altitudinem fluminis intervallo pedum duorum inter se iungebat*,<sup>1</sup> that he used *intervallum* in its strict sense.<sup>2</sup>

Now there can be no doubt that if Hubo is right in his main contention, his correction of Napoleon is justified; and that his first argument is sound is proved by Caesar's statement that the piles were made of varying lengths to suit the varying depth of the stream (*dimensa ad altitudinem fluminis*). A. Eberz,<sup>3</sup> indeed, holds that the distance of 40 feet was measured between the tops of the piles, that is to say that the roadway of the bridge was 40 feet wide, because, according to Rüstow,<sup>4</sup> the breadth of a cohort marching in column was just 40 feet. A weaker argument could hardly be imagined. Caesar was not bound by red tape: it was necessary for him to build his bridge at the least possible cost of time and labour, and not at all necessary to adhere pedantically to rules of formation; and nothing could have been easier than to contract the breadth of the column while it was marching across the bridge. Moreover, it cannot be proved that the breadth of a cohort marching in column was 40 feet. But there is not much force in Hubo's second argument; for if the distance, measured along the surface of the water, between the opposite couples of piles had been 40 feet, the length of the

<sup>1</sup> "He took a couple of beams a foot and a half thick, had them sharpened to a point just at the lower end and adapted in length to the (varying) depth of the river, and fastened them together at an interval of two feet."

<sup>2</sup> *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, etc., cxlv., 1892, pp. 485-92.

<sup>3</sup> *Neue Jahrbücher*, etc., lxxv., 1857, pp. 849-50.

<sup>4</sup> *Heerwesen und Kriegführung C. Julius Cæsars*, 1855, p. 61.

transverse beams would only have been a little less; and the difficulty of finding beams of the required length would surely have been almost as great as if they had been fully 40 feet long.

VI. The next difficulty concerns the "fasteners," which Caesar calls *fibulae*,—their exact nature, number and arrangement. Caesar's statement is as follows:—"beams two feet wide, fitting into the interval between the piles of each couple, were laid across; and the opposite couples were kept apart by two bolts (*f*) on either side at their extremities. As they were thus kept asunder, and on the other hand held firmly in their places, the strength of the structure was so great and its principle so ordered that the greater the force of the current, the more clearly were the parts locked together" (*haec utraque insuper bipedalibus trabibus immissis quantum eorum tignorum iunctura distabat, binis utrimque fibulis ab extrema parte distinebantur; quibus disclusis atque in contrariam partem revinctis tanta erat operis firmitudo atque ea rerum natura ut quo maior vis aquae se incitasset, hoc certius illigata tenerentur*).<sup>1</sup>

1. Lipsius<sup>2</sup> conceived of the *fibulae* as iron bolts, driven right through the transverse beam, one on the inner side, the other on the outer side of each couple of piles.

2. Kraner and Heller believe that there were eight *fibulae*, or bolts, to each pair of couples of piles. Kraner<sup>3</sup> holds that four were driven, at each end of the transverse beam, through the transverse beam itself into the "cross-piece" immediately underneath it. Heller considers that two bolts were driven horizontally through the transverse beam on the outer side, and two on the inner side of each couple of piles. He defends his view by the following reasoning:—*utrimque* must be understood as referring to the inner and the outer side of each couple of piles; for on any other theory it must be regarded as a mere repetition of (*haec*) *utraque*. The words *ab extrema parte*, he continues, were essential to Caesar's description, as the reader will perceive if he will reflect that the *fibulae* were placed on the inner and the outer edges of each couple of piles (observe that Heller here begs the question): otherwise we should have infallibly received the false impression that the *fibulae* had been driven through the middle of the two piles of each couple as well as through the transverse beam. The opposite couples of piles were kept apart (*distinebantur*), he explains, by the inner *fibulae*; while they were prevented by the outer *fibulae* from moving too far apart (*revinciebantur*).<sup>4</sup>

Heller is a thorough Caesarian scholar; but I believe that on this point he is partly mistaken. It is certain that the words *ab extrema parte* might bear another meaning from that which he attaches to them; and if they can bear this meaning too, they must have been obscure even to Roman readers. But, if Caesar had meant to convey this meaning,

<sup>1</sup> As will be seen presently, the meaning not only of *fibulis*, but also of *binis*, *utrimque*, *ab extrema parte*, *quibus* and *in contrariam partem* has been disputed.

<sup>2</sup> *Opera*, ed. 1637, iii. 306 and illustration on p. 308.

<sup>3</sup> *C. Julii Caesaris comm. de b. G.*, 1855, pp. 158-9.

<sup>4</sup> *Philologus*, Suppl. Band v., 1889, pp. 386-8, and *Philologus*, x., 1855, pp. 732-4.

would he not have written *ab exteriore* or *ab externa* (not *extrema*) *parte*? The word *extremus*, in Caesar, when applied to a country, means "the furthest part" (of the country in question) from the point of view of the person who is moving towards it.<sup>1</sup> The word is also applied, in the *Gallic War*, to an army moving in column (*cum ab extremo agmine ad quos ventum erat consisterent*, ii. 11, § 4); to trenches (*ad extremas fossas castella constituit*, ii. 8, § 4); to a baggage-train (*cum iam . . . extrema impedimenta ab nostris tenerentur*, iii. 29, § 2); to promontories ([*oppida*] *posita in extremis lingulis*, iii. 12, § 1); and to a bridge, part of which had been broken down (*in extremo ponte turrim constituit*, vi. 29, § 3); and in all these cases the context shows unmistakably which end of the object in question is referred to. With these passages before him, an unbiassed reader will, I think, have no hesitation in concluding that Caesar could not have meant by *ab extrema parte* the outer or the inner edge of the piles, but that he must have meant "at the top of the piles."<sup>2</sup> As to *utrimque*, Heller may possibly be right: but I am rather inclined to believe that Caesar used the word in order to make it clear that each couple of piles was provided with two *fibulae*. Read the sentence, in this sense, without the word, and you will see that it is needed. I should add that an engineer whom I have consulted regards Heller's arrangement of the *fibulae* as wholly unpractical.

3. It is amusing to read Fröhlich<sup>3</sup> after reading Heller. Caesar, he argues, did not write *distinebantur*, but *destinabantur* ("were made fast"), the reading of *E.* *Distinebantur*, he insists, makes no sense; for, if Caesar had written it, we should be obliged to conclude that *fibulae* were placed on the inner side of the piles, in order to keep the opposite couples apart. But this conclusion is negatived by the words *ab extrema parte*, which can only mean "on the outer side" (of the piles). In support of this view, Fröhlich says that in the other passages in which Caesar uses the word *extremus*, "a double standpoint" cannot be understood. The *fibulae* therefore, which, as the derivation of the word proves, were bolts, were inserted in the transverse beam, outside the piles, two to each couple. Their object was to prevent the couples of piles from moving apart. The couples could not move towards each other, because the transverse beam was notched at the points of contact. In fine, the transverse beam kept the couples of piles apart (*quibus disclusis*); while the *fibulae* kept them sufficiently close together.

It will be seen that Fröhlich agrees with Heller as regards the meaning of *ab extrema parte*, except that he understands the words as referring only to the outer edge of the piles,<sup>4</sup> but differs from him in his interpretation of *utrimque*. As to his explanation of the meaning and arrangement of the *fibulae*, I say nothing. It is not inconsistent

<sup>1</sup> See *B. G.*, ii. 5, § 4; vi. 10, § 4; vii. 66, § 2, and Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i. 1242-3.

<sup>2</sup> I find that Long (*Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 159) takes the same view.

<sup>3</sup> *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, 1890, pp. 216-19.

<sup>4</sup> By the "outer edge of the piles" I mean the lower side of the lower, the upper side of the upper piles.

with Caesar's description, if Caesar wrote *destinabantur*: but that does not prove that it is right. And if the transverse beam was notched at the point of contact with the piles on the inner side of them, it is hard to see why it was not notched on the outer side as well; and why, if notching was sufficient, *fibulae* were used at all.

4. R. Menge, like Fröhlich, prefers *destinabantur* to *distinebantur*. If, he argues, we read *distinebantur*, we must conclude that there was only one *fibula* (why not two?) at each end, on the inner side of the piles; as, if there had been one on either side, they could not both have been said to have kept the opposite couples of piles apart.<sup>1</sup> It appears to me that Menge requires from Caesar a nicety and fullness of expression which it would not be reasonable to look for, except in a technical treatise intended solely for professional readers.

5. A. von Cohausen,<sup>2</sup> who holds that there were only two *fibulae* to each couple of piles,<sup>3</sup> thinks that one of the two served as a cross-piece outside the couple of piles, for the transverse beam to rest upon; that the other was let into a groove cut in the upper surface of the transverse beam and on the inner side of the couple of piles; and that piles, transverse beam and *fibulae* were firmly lashed together by rope.

6. Like Cohausen, Maxa,<sup>4</sup> Rheinhard<sup>5</sup> and Schleussinger<sup>6</sup> hold that the piles were grooved for the reception of the *fibulae*. According to Rheinhard, the *fibulae* bit into grooves in the transverse beam and in the piles. Their arrangement was triangular: that is to say, they rested against the outer sides of the piles, and, sloping upwards, lapped over and met above the transverse beam.<sup>7</sup>

7. Sonntag<sup>8</sup> thinks that the system of *fibulae* devised by Cohausen would have answered for the upper piles, but not for the lower; for, he says, the pressure of the water would have tended to depress the upper and to raise the lower piles, thereby enlarging the acute and diminishing the obtuse angle. He holds that *quibus* must grammatically refer not to *utraque* (tigna) but to *fibulis*: but he does not regard *quibus* as an instrumental ablative. In other words, he holds that *disclusis* agrees with *quibus* (fibulis), not with *quibus* (tignis) or with *tignis* understood. If he is right, Caesar meant, not that the piles were kept apart by the *fibulae*, but that the *fibulae* were themselves kept open. He goes on to argue that if, as appears certain, the plan of Caesar's bridge was new,

<sup>1</sup> *Philologus*, xliv., 1885, pp. 282, n. 3, 287.

<sup>2</sup> *Cæsar's Rheinbrücken*, 1867, p. 47 (Fig. 19).

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Roby (*Classical Review*, i. 242) takes the same view, which makes Heller exclaim (*Philologus*, xlix. 1890, p. 694) "it is inexplicable how the English scholar, when he finds in Caesar's text the words '*binis utrimque fibulis*' can get out of them the meaning '*one on each side*.'" Mr. Roby might retort that "*one on each side*" (of each couple of piles) means "*two at each end*" (of the transverse beam). Where Mr. Roby really differs from Heller is in his interpretation of *utrimque*; and if, as I believe, his interpretation of *utrimque* is right, so is his interpretation of *binis*. See pp. 701-2, *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> *Zeitschrift für die österreichischen Gymnasien*, xxxi., 1880, picture on p. 493.

<sup>5</sup> *Caesar's Rheinbrücke*, p. 14.

<sup>6</sup> *Studie zu Cæsar's Rheinbrücke*, p. 30.

<sup>7</sup> See Rheinhard's plan and p. 14.

<sup>8</sup> *Bemerkungen zu Cæsar de B. G.*, iv. 17. p. 4.

and if *fibula* was not a word used in the terminology of bridge-construction, Caesar must have used it in a sense with which his readers would be familiar. Now the words *disclusis* ("kept apart") and *revinctis* ("made fast") could have been predicated of the *fibula* which was used to fasten clothes,—*revinctis* because "the needle which is inserted in the hook cannot move far from the shaft"; *disclusis* because "shaft and needle are kept apart by folds of clothing." Caesar's *fibulae*, Sonntag concludes, were two beams, adjusted in the angles formed by the piles and transverse beam and held together at the ends by iron bands.

Whatever may be thought of Sonntag's theory, his interpretation of Caesar's words is certainly wrong.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, it cannot be proved that the word *fibula* was never used in the terminology of bridge-construction; and Sonntag does not explain how his imaginary *fibulae* were bent in the way which he describes.

8. Napoleon<sup>2</sup> interprets the word *fibulae* in a wholly different sense. He holds that the opposite couples of piles were kept at the right distance apart by two pairs of wooden tie-beams, each pair being bolted in the shape of the figure  $\times$  to the outside sides of the piles.

Professor E. V. Arnold virtually agrees with Napoleon, only differing from him as to the way in which the *fibulae* were made fast to the piles. "The word *distinebantur*," he says, "shows that the main object of the *fibulae* was to prevent the couples of piles from falling together inwards; and this end would most simply be attained by notching the *fibulae* or by letting them into the beams at each end." He interprets *in contrariam partem revinctis* as meaning "they (i.e. the opposite couples of piles) were linked together crosswise,—i.e. the right-hand upper pile to the left-hand lower pile, and *vice versa*."<sup>3</sup>

Now there is one fatal objection to both Napoleon's theory and Professor Arnold's: neither the one nor the other agrees with Caesar's description. *Fibulae* were not tie-beams;<sup>4</sup> *in contrariam partem* cannot possibly bear the meaning which Professor Arnold gives it; and the words *utrimque* and *ab extrema parte* can only mean that the *fibulae* were at the upper ends of the opposite couples of piles and at the ends

<sup>1</sup> If Sonntag thinks that *quibus* must refer to *fibulis* because it is nearer to *fibulis* than to *utraque*, he ought in consistency to hold that in the passage (Caesar) *Numidas et Cretas sagittarios et funditores Buleares subsidio oppidanis mittit, quorum adventu et Remis cum spe defensionis studium propugnandi accessit*, etc. (*B. G.*, ii. 7, §§ 1-2) *quorum* must refer to *oppidanis* and not to *sagittarios* and *funditores*. If *quibus* refers to *fibulis*, there can hardly be a doubt but that *disclusis* agrees, not, as Sonntag thinks, with *quibus*, but, as Professor E. V. Arnold thinks, with *tignis* understood.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 145-6 and Planche 15.

<sup>3</sup> *Classical Review*, i., 1887, pp. 168-9. The professor takes *quibus* as an instrumental ablative. This view Mr. Roby (*Id.*, p. 242) combats, because *disclusis* would then have no subject expressed.

<sup>4</sup> Forcellini (*Lexicon*, vol. iii., 1865, p. 71), referring to the passage which we are discussing, defines *fibula* as "*vinculum ferreum vel ligneum colligandis inter se trabibus . . . περὶ ὅν*," and refers to Vitruvius, i. 5. Cf. Heller in *Philologus*, xxvi., 1867, pp. 669-70.

of the transverse beam.<sup>1</sup> I do not believe that any competent scholar, if he read Caesar's description with an unbiassed mind, could come to any other conclusion. Professor Arnold was biassed, I think, by the belief that the most effective method of keeping the piles in their proper position would have been to adopt some such plan as that which Napoleon devised; and in this belief he is quite right. Every expert whom I have consulted says so. But it is not our business to construct a plan of Caesar's bridge after the most approved modern principles. All that we are concerned with is to ascertain how Caesar constructed it; and as far as I can discover, every writer who has combined a practical knowledge of the principles of the construction of bridges with an acquaintance with Caesar's text has concluded that the *fibulae* were at the upper ends of the opposite couples of piles.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, I am assured by an engineer and by an architect that if the *fibulae* had been properly fixed at the upper ends of the piles, they would have served Caesar's purpose,—for it must not be forgotten that his bridge was only designed to stand for a few weeks,—well enough. But to say with certainty what the *fibulae* were, how they were arranged and how they were secured, is impossible.

VII. The only remaining difficulty is about the supports and defences which were added after the bridge was built. "Piles," says Caesar, "were also driven in slantwise on the down-stream side: they were connected with the main structure and were planted underneath like buttresses, so as to break the force of the stream. Other piles were likewise planted a little distance above the bridge, so that in case the natives floated down trunks of trees or barges to smash the structure, their force might be weakened by these defences, and they might not injure the bridge" (*sublicae et ad inferiorem partem fluminis oblique agebantur, quae pro ariete subiectae et cum omni opere coniunctae vim fluminis exciperent, et aliae item supra pontem mediocri spatio, ut si arborum trunci sive naves deiciendi operis causa essent a barbaris missae, his defensoribus earum rerum vis minueretur neu ponti nocerent*).

I. Long infers from the words *et aliae item supra* that "the *sublicae* below and above the bridge were fixed in the same manner"; while from Caesar's saying that the piles of the bridge itself were not driven

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Heller in *Philologus*, xxvi., 1867, pp. 669-70.

<sup>2</sup> Rheinhard (*Caesar's Rheinbrücke*, p. 14) and R. Schneider (*Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift*, 1884, pp. 163-4) object to Napoleon's *fibulae* on the additional ground that, "as they have no support at the point of intersection, they must inevitably bend out sideways under a heavy pressure." This, my engineer friend says, would depend entirely on the strength of the diagonals. Besides, the difficulty is easily met in modern trestle-bridges. See Lord Wolseley's *Soldier's Pocket-Book*, 5th ed., pp. 436-7.

<sup>3</sup> The *fibulae*, according to Sonntag (*Bemerkungen*, etc., pp. 2-3), could not have been fastened by nails, for nails would have become looser, not firmer; nor by ropes, for ropes would have been too weak. Nor could the *fibulae* have been iron or wooden bolts; for these too would have become looser, not firmer (see also E. Hubner in *Jahrbücher der Alterthumsfreunde im Rheinlande*, Heft lxxx., 1886, p. 122). But even so, they might and would have temporarily served the purpose of keeping the opposite couples of piles at the right distance apart.

in, like *sublicae*, perpendicularly, but sloping (*non sublicae modo directe ad perpendiculum<sup>1</sup>, sed prone ac fastigate*), he gathers that *all* the *sublicae* were perpendicular. He explains *oblique agebantur* thus:—the *sublicae* “were placed in a triangular form” (that is to say, arranged in a series of triangles), and those on the down-stream side were connected with the piles of the bridge, and “presented as they were viewed from the lower side of the bridge the appearance of a head or solid angle.” His Plan<sup>1</sup> would seem to show that he considered each triangle of *sublicae* on the down-stream side of the bridge to have *enclosed* a separate couple of piles. I believe, however, that his Plan does not represent his meaning; for he goes on to say, “it may be said that it would have been better if the ‘*sublicae*’ on the lower side of the stream had been placed with the ram’s head (‘*aries*’<sup>2</sup>) towards the stream, and inside and under the bridge;”<sup>3</sup> but Caesar seems to place this work in the lower part on the outside, as he certainly does place it outside in the upper part, for there the ‘*sublicae*’ were not connected with the piles, but placed in front of them.”

2. Schneider, like Long, believes that the *sublicae* were vertical, and he interprets *oblique* in the same way as Long: but he holds that to each couple of main piles there were three *sublicae*, close to and below the main piles on the down-stream side, arranged in the form of a triangle with its apex pointing up stream. He argues that, when Caesar says that the *sublicae* were *cum omni opere coniunctae*, he only means that they were *close to*, not in actual contact with, the main structure of the bridge. But arranged on Schneider’s system, the *sublicae* would have had only a very slight effect in breaking the force which the current would have exerted against the bridge. Schneider contends that if the force of the stream, after it had just passed the lower side of the bridge, had been checked, the force of the water above the main piles must have been checked also.<sup>4</sup> No doubt: but, as any mathematician or engineer would have told Schneider, only to a slight extent. Caesar would not have been so foolish as to place the *sublicae* in such a position when, by placing them as they appear in Long’s Plan, he could have effected his purpose better.

3. Napoleon holds that the lower *sublicae* leaned, like a buttress, against each of the main piles.<sup>5</sup> It may be argued that if Caesar had meant to describe such an arrangement as this, he would not have

<sup>1</sup> Facing page 194 of Long’s *Caesar*.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Peskett (*Caesar*, Books iv.-v., 1887, p. 65) says that “it is not easy to see what meaning Mr. Long attaches to *pro ariete*.” Mr. Peskett would have found it easy enough to fathom Long’s meaning if he had read Schneider’s note:—“*ad aquas rumpendas sic subiectae, ut qui vulgo vocatur aries ad muros diruendos adhiberi solet. . . . Sublicae vero subiectae dicuntur, quia humiliores erant, ut ex ponte despicerentur. Neque inepta ad illam, quam statuimus, sublicarum dispositionem arietis comparatio videtur. Quemadmodum enim aries murum, sic illae undarum vim frangebant.*”

<sup>3</sup> This is the very way in which Long’s Plan represents them as having been placed.

<sup>4</sup> Schneider’s *Caesar*, i. 358-9.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 146 and Plaque 15.

written *oblique* but, *prone*. *Oblique*, says Schneider, means that the *sublicae* were driven into the bed of the river, not in a line parallel with that of the bridge, but slantwise with regard to that line. Caesar expressly says, in the earlier part of his description of the bridge, that *sublicae* were fixed perpendicularly. If then he had used the word *sublicae* of piles which sloped, he would have been guilty of inconsistency and obscurity. Moreover, as Long points out, the *sublicae* were placed in position *after* the main structure of the bridge was finished; and it would have been impossible, he maintains, in these circumstances, to drive them into the bed of the river "in the way in which they are represented in the common plates."

Now, assuming that *oblique* is here equivalent to *prone*, I am not sure that the words *sublicae oblique agebantur* are inconsistent with Caesar's previous statement that *sublicae* were fixed perpendicularly. The latter is a general statement: but every rule has its exception; and if Caesar used these *sublicae* as ordinary buttresses, what other word could he have found to describe them? I cannot, however, find any evidence that *oblique* was ever used in the sense of *prone*. I am therefore inclined to believe that, if the *sublicae* were props or buttresses, they leaned *obliquely* against the bridge: in other words, that there were two *sublicae* to each couple of piles, both sloping forward and at the same time obliquely against the stream,—one from right to left, the other from left to right. An engineer, to whom I suggested this arrangement, approved of it as the most effective.

Leaning in this manner like buttresses against the bridge, the *sublicae* would have indirectly broken the force of the current; and would have done so more effectively than the triangular arrangements which Long's diagram represents.

Many drawings of the bridge do certainly represent the *sublicae* in a position in which they could not have been placed after the construction of the bridge: but R. Menge has shown that it would have been possible to drive them into the bed of the river in such a way that they would have been in contact with the bridge and supported it.<sup>1</sup>

The word *aries* ("ram") in Caesar's description is possibly analogous to *capreoli* (literally "wild goats"), as used in *B. C.*, ii. 10, § 3, where it denotes pieces of timber forming the framework of the roof of a sapper's hut.

But the strongest argument in favour of the view, that the *sublicae* served as props is the statement that they "were connected with the main structure" (*cum omni opere coniunctae*). Of Long's triangular groups this could not, I think, have been said; nor would there have been any use in connecting them with the bridge. Nevertheless, I freely admit that Napoleon's view obliges us to assume that Caesar was not consistent in his use of the word *sublicae*; and I do not think that the question can be definitely settled.

4. According to Alberti,<sup>2</sup> there were two *sublicae*, upright and

<sup>1</sup> *Philologus*, xliv., 1885, pp. 288-9.

<sup>2</sup> J. Rondelet, *Traité théorique et pratique de l'art de bâtir*, t. vii., pl. cxxxviii., fig. 1.



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standing apart, for each couple of piles on the lower side. This arrangement ignobres the word *oblique*; and the *sublicae* would have been of no more use than a couple of flag-staffs stuck into the bed of the river.

Napoleon, after describing the lower *sublicae*, says, "Other piles were similarly driven in at a little distance above" the bridge. The word "similarly" might suggest that, in his opinion, the upper piles were also driven in slantwise: but his Plan (15) represents them as vertical and arranged in the triangular form which I have described.

Cohausen thinks that they were not driven into the bed vertically, but were placed at an angle more acute than that formed by the piles of the bridge, and leaned against them.<sup>1</sup> This arrangement is inconsistent with the natural meaning of *mediocri spatia*. Schleussinger, however, defends Cohausen's view. That the upper *sublicae* were in contact with the bridge, is, he maintains, proved by Caesar's having used the word *minueretur*, instead of *frangeretur*, to express that the object of these piles was to protect the bridge from the shock of any timber or vessels which the Germans might float down to destroy it; and also by the word *item*, which, he insists, evidently refers to *oblique agebantur*. Besides, he argues, if the upper *sublicae* had been upright, Caesar would certainly have said so; for those on the lower side of the bridge were unquestionably sloping.<sup>2</sup> I see no force in these arguments. The first implies that Caesar deliberately preferred a less to a more effective and easier method of protecting his bridge: if *minueretur* is to be pressed, it can only mean that Caesar calculated that the *sublicae* would minimise the damaging force of the floating timber, even if they did not absolutely prevent its reaching the bridge. *Item*, Menge<sup>3</sup> remarks, may refer to *agebantur* only, and not to *oblique*; and it is not unquestionable that the lower *sublicae* were sloping. Indeed, those who hold that the upper *sublicae* were necessarily arranged in a triangular form, infer from the words *oblique agebantur* and *item* that the arrangement of the lower *sublicae* was the same.

According to Alberti,<sup>4</sup> there were two separate upright *sublicae* to each couple of piles on the upper side of the bridge: according to Scamozzi,<sup>5</sup> two separate *sublicae* sloping towards, but not touching the bridge. Neither of these contrivances, however, would have answered Caesar's purpose so well as that suggested by Napoleon, whose picture of the *sublicae* on the upper side of the bridge is virtually identical with the picture given by Long. I am told that wooden bridges in Norway are protected in the same way now.

VIII. Perhaps I ought to mention that Colonel Henrard<sup>6</sup> denies that the bridge was constructed with piles at all: it was constructed,

<sup>1</sup> *Cæsar's Rheinbrücken*, pp. 27 (Fig. 10), 44-5.

<sup>2</sup> *Studie zu Cæsar's Rheinbrücke*, pp. 13-14.

<sup>3</sup> *Philologus*, xliv., 1885, p. 289.

<sup>4</sup> J. Rondelet, *Traité théorique et pratique de l'art de bâtir*, t. vii., pl. cxxxviii., fig. 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, fig. 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Mém. couronnés . . . publiés par l'Acad. Roy. de Belgique*, xxxiii., 1882, pp. 18-19.

he insists, with "chevalets."<sup>1</sup> He believes that the site was near Coblenz; and he asserts that the bed of the Rhine above Bonn was too rocky to admit of the construction of a bridge of piles. How, he asks, could the piles have been driven into the bed unless they had been shod with iron? How could they have been driven in slantwise at all with such instruments as the Romans possessed? Having set these posers, he proceeds to describe the way in which Caesar constructed his bridge of "chevalets." "Des pieux," he says, "enfoncés dans la direction du courant à l'aide de bateaux de manœuvre, les Romains mouillaient successivement les deux pieds, composés chacun de deux poutres reliées par des traverses: le pied d'aval était maintenu incliné à l'aide d'un arc-boutant, et le pied d'amont, en laissant les deux poutres jumelées s'incliner légèrement sous l'effort du courant. On fixait ensuite la traverse ou le *chapeau* de deux pieds d'équarrissage au moyen de chevilles, préparées à l'avance, et au-dessus on jetait le tablier qui, par son poids, assurait la stabilité des supports, dont la solidarité était en effet encore accrue par l'action du courant."

I am not competent to form an opinion upon the merits of this imaginary structure; but an engineer to whom I have shown Colonel Henrard's plan condemns it *in toto*. Colonel Henrard's premiss is wrong; for between Coblenz and Andernach the bed of the Rhine is quite suitable for the construction of a bridge of piles. For aught we know, the piles may have been shod with iron; and Caesar distinctly says that *they were driven slantwise into the bed of the river* with rammers. Moreover the *sublicae* were unquestionably driven into the bed of the river; and therefore the colonel's objection collapses.

## WAS COTTA SUBORDINATE TO SABINUS AT ADUATUCA?

Mommsen<sup>2</sup> holds that Cotta was "probably directed, in the event of a difference, to yield" to Sabinus. The reasons which he gives are, first, that Sabinus had already performed important services; secondly, that whenever the two are mentioned together in the *Commentaries*, except in *B. G.*, vi. 37, § 8, Sabinus takes precedence; thirdly, that Caesar would not have placed two officers over one camp without providing for the contingency of a difference of opinion; and fourthly, that Caesar's narrative of the disaster at Aduatuca confirms the foregoing arguments.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Does this mean a trestle bridge?

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 261, note.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 22, § 5, 38, § 3; v. 24, § 5, 26, § 2, 27-37, 52, § 4; vi. 32, § 4.

ON THE MEANING OF A DISPUTED PASSAGE IN  
*B. G.*, v. 31, § 5

Caesar, describing how the troops of Sabinus and Cotta spent the night after it had been decided to abandon Aduatuca, writes, *Omnia excogitantur quare nec sine periculo maneat et languore militum et vigiliis periculum augeatur*. Long<sup>1</sup> explains the meaning of this perfectly. "The passage," he says, "seems to mean 'every reason is suggested why there was no staying without danger, and why the danger would be increased by the lassitude and watches of the soldiers.' Caesar puts it in the most general way. It was settled that they must go, and everybody, at least those who were in favour of going, thinks of every possible reason to confirm his opinion, and to convince others that if they stayed in the camp, it was not without risk," etc. Messrs. Bond and Walpole remark, following Dittenberger, who was himself inspired by F. Ludecke,<sup>2</sup> that the passage is out of place, and "perhaps originally stood in § 3 (of the same chapter) after *perducitur*, being urged by Sabinus and his party at the council of war."<sup>3</sup> But this suggestion is quite uncalled for. To a reader gifted with the least historical imagination the passage, where it stands, will appear far more natural and effective than anywhere else. F. Klein<sup>4</sup> justly remarks that, in the place where Ludecke puts it, it would be very flat. Moreover, as he points out, Caesar represents Sabinus as unsupported in argument: it was Cotta who was backed up by the other officers. After Sabinus had announced his decision, the soldiers would naturally have talked the matter over among themselves.

I subjoin my own translation of a part of the chapter, to show how naturally the passage reads in its proper place:—"The dispute dragged on till midnight. At length Cotta . . . gave up his point: Sabinus's view prevailed. An order was issued that the division was to march at break of day. The men stayed up for the rest of the night, every soldier looking about to see what he could take with him, what part of his winter's outfit he would be forced to leave behind. Men thought of every argument to persuade themselves that they could not remain without danger, and that the danger would be increased by the fatigue of the soldiers and their long spells of night duty. At dawn they marched out of camp," etc.

<sup>1</sup> *Caesar*, p. 249.

<sup>2</sup> *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, etc., cxi., 1875, pp. 429-32.

<sup>3</sup> W. Paul, who has wasted more time and ingenuity than any other scholar in trying to amend the text of the *Commentaries*, deletes the whole passage. *Zeitschrift für das Gymnasialwesen*, xxxv., 1861, pp. 281-4.

<sup>4</sup> *Neue Jahrbücher*, etc., cxi., 1875, pp. 854-6.





# WHAT WAS THE FORMATION OF SABINUS'S COLUMN, WHEN IT MARCHED FROM ADUATUCA?

Caesar describes it thus:—"At dawn they marched out of camp, like men who had persuaded themselves that it was no enemy who had counselled them, but the best of friends, in a column of unwieldy length and with an immense baggage-train" (*Prævaluce sic ex castris proficiscuntur ut quibus esset persuasum non ab hoste, sed homine amicissimo consilium datum, longissimo agmine maximisque impedimentis*<sup>1</sup>). Obviously Caesar implies that Sabinus was to blame for adopting such a formation; and the blame appears to be defined by the two superlatives, *longissimo* and *maximis*. If so, Caesar's censure was directed simply against the needless length of the column and the excessive amount of baggage which accompanied it. He tells us nothing about the arrangement of the baggage; and perhaps he had no fault to find on that score. But Long<sup>2</sup> with whom Kraner<sup>3</sup> agrees, appears to think that the arrangement was similar to that which Caesar himself adopted when marching against the Nervii in 57 B.C., and which he discarded when making his final march before the battle.<sup>4</sup> If so, we may perhaps surmise that the legion and the five cohorts under Sabinus's command were separated from each other, each division being followed by its own baggage-train. But there is not a word of this in Caesar's narrative.

Schneider<sup>5</sup> suggests that the order of march was practically identical with that which Caesar adopted when marching against the Nervii, the only difference being that, on this occasion, each cohort was followed by its own little baggage-train. This is very ingenious, but very improbable. Censuring Sabinus as he did for the undue length of his column, Caesar may have thought that, having foolishly decided to abandon his camp, he ought to have formed his force in what was called a *quadratum agmen*, that is to say, a hollow square or parallelogram, and placed the baggage in the centre.<sup>6</sup> The Emperor Julian once adopted a similar formation, which is minutely described by Ammianus Marcellinus.<sup>7</sup> Colonel Dodge<sup>8</sup> says that the column was "not in close order . . . but strung out." But we cannot get beyond conjecture.

## DID THE EBURONÆS OUTNUMBER THE FORCE OF SABINUS?

This enquiry is suggested by a passage in Caesar's narrative of the disaster at Aduatuca:—*Eran? et virtute et numero pugnandi pares nostri*;

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, v. 31, § 6.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, p. 250.

<sup>3</sup> *L'Armée romaine*, 1884, p. 30.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 53, *supra*; *B. G.*, ii. 17, § 2, 19, §§ 2-3; and Judson's *Caesar's Army*, pp. 65-6.

<sup>5</sup> *Caesar*, ii. 118.

<sup>6</sup> I find that this remark has been anticipated by Turpin de Crissac, *Comm. de César*, 1785, t. i., p. 358.

<sup>7</sup> xxiv. 1, §§ 2-4.

<sup>8</sup> *Caesar*, p. 195.

*tametsi ab duce et a fortuna deserebantur, tamen omnem spem salutis in virtute ponebant*,<sup>1</sup> etc. As the passage stands, the words *Erant* . . . *nostri* yield no sense, because *pugnandi*, which is found in most of the MSS., is untranslatable: but *Nb* have *pugnando*.<sup>2</sup> Admitting this reading, the question arises whether the semicolon should be placed after *nostri* or after *pares*. It has been argued that it ought not to be placed after *nostri*, because the Eburones were more numerous than the Romans.<sup>3</sup> This is not proved: but even if it was the fact, the objection is not necessarily valid; for Caesar may only have meant to say, "Our men were equally matched with the enemy in fighting, both in respect of courage and numbers"; in other words, he may have meant, not that the Romans were actually as numerous as the Eburones, but simply that in fighting with them they were not at a disadvantage on the score of numbers. Moreover, Caesar would hardly have said *Erant et virtute et numero pugnando pares* of the Eburones; for, as Long<sup>4</sup> remarks, "he does not allow that in courage the barbarians were equal to the Romans." Heller, who regards the difficulty presented by *numero* as insuperable, follows Vielhaber in substituting for it *studio* and therefore of course reads *pugnandi*, not *pugnando*.<sup>5</sup> O. May<sup>6</sup> remarks that *et studio pugnandi* would only strengthen *virtute*, and therefore would be practically superfluous: but this is by no means a fatal objection; for Caesar often "strengthens" a word by adding another which differs but little from it in meaning, as, for instance, in the passage *quorum studium alacritatemque pugnandi cum cognovisset Scipio* (*B. G.*, iii. 37, § 4). May's conjecture [*Erant et virtute et saepe numero [pugnando pares nostri]*] does not mend matters. Meusel is inclined to follow Apitz in deleting the whole sentence, which is too heroic a remedy for my taste. Various other attempts, a list of which will be found in Meusel's *Tabula Coniecturorum*,<sup>7</sup> p. 20, have been made to amend the passage: but, as they do not throw any light upon the question which I am discussing, I ignore them.

It appears to me that the MS. reading *Erant et virtute et numero pugnando pares nostri*; *tametsi*, etc., requires no alteration. As to the main question, one would be inclined to say that the Eburones must have outnumbered the Romans, or they would not have ventured to attack their strongly placed and fortified camp.

## ON THE MEANING OF THE WORD ORBIS IN

### *B. G.*, v. 33, § 3

The natural meaning of *orbis* is "a circle": but it is obvious that the military *orbis* could not have been anything approaching a perfect circle. Schneider,<sup>8</sup> however, says that it is to be inferred that the

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, v. 34, § 2.

<sup>2</sup> Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii. 851.

<sup>3</sup> Von Göler's *Gall. Krieg*, p. 161, n. 4. Cf. Schneider's *Caesar*, ii. 123.

<sup>4</sup> *Caesar*, p. 251.

<sup>5</sup> *Philologus*, xxxi., 1872, p. 512.

<sup>6</sup> *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, etc., cxxxix., 1889, p. 840.

<sup>7</sup> *Lex. Caes.*, vol. ii., pars ii.

<sup>8</sup> *Caesar*, i. 419.

military *orbis* was circular from the fact that Livy (iv. 28 and xxii. 29) used the phrases *orbem volventes* and (xxiii. 27) *in orbem coire*, and described the soldiers standing in an *orbis* as forming a "crown" (*corona*), a term which is also used, in a similar connexion, by the author of *Bellum Africae* (17, § 2). But surely Schneider begs the question; and Caesar describes the troops who manned his line of contravallation round Alesia, which was certainly not circular, as a *corona militum*.<sup>1</sup> Aulus Gellius<sup>2</sup> gives a list, in which *orbi* occurs, of the words by which the various military formations were described; and he adds that "the words are derived from the things themselves, which are strictly so called"—*Tralata autem sunt ab ipsis rebus, quae ita proprie nominantur: earumque rerum in acie instruenda sui cuiusque vocabuli imagines ostenduntur*. This passage seems to me to support the view that when Caesar uses the word *orbis*, he means "a circle," or rather a figure approximating thereto.

A friend of mine, a very able officer of the Royal Artillery, suggests that the word *orbis* should be understood loosely as an irregular figure, such as the men would have been able to form in the circumstances described by Caesar; for, as he points out, to dress the line properly, in such hurry and confusion and with the enemy pressing on to the attack, would have been impossible. Colonel Dodge<sup>3</sup> suggests that "the term *orbis* may have come from the natural habit of flattening out the corners of such a square" as a legion in three lines could have readily formed "for easier defence." "It is difficult," he continues, "to imagine the manœuvre by which a legion plowed into anything approaching an actual circle and again deployed into line. It may have been an irregular half-square, half-circle, according to the accentuation of the ground or to the conditions demanding a defensive formation." Having regard to the passage in Aulus Gellius, I am inclined to believe that this is the true explanation.

#### WHAT WAS THE EXTENT OF THE CONTRAVALLATION WITH WHICH AMBIORIX SURROUNDED Q. CICERO'S CAMP?

. . . minus horis tribus milium passuum XV in circuitu munitionem perfecerunt (B. G., v. 42, § 4). Mr. A. G. Peskett<sup>4</sup> says, "In the place of *passuum* the best MSS. have  $\beta$ , which may stand for either *passuum* or *pedum*; all agree in the number XV." The latter remark is not correct, as X is found in the  $\beta$  MSS.<sup>5</sup> It would of course have been absurd to surround Cicero's small camp, the perimeter of which could hardly have been much more than a mile with a contravallation of 15 Roman miles; and Napoleon, Thomann and others agree in holding

<sup>1</sup> B. G., vii. 72, § 2.

<sup>2</sup> Noct. Att., x. 9.

<sup>3</sup> Caesar, p. 363.

<sup>4</sup> Caesar, Books iv.-v., 1887, p. 107.

<sup>5</sup> X milium in circuitu munitionem pedum XV. See Meusel's Caesar, p. 122.



that *pedum* should be read. Desjardins,<sup>1</sup> however, as well as Schneider, Nipperdey and Meusel, adopt the reading *miliū passuum XV*: but they give no reason for their choice. Probably they were influenced by the fact that Orosius<sup>2</sup> described the rampart and ditch as *vallum pedum decem et fossam pedum quindecim per milia passuum quindecim in circuitu*. Von Goler<sup>3</sup> follows the  $\beta$  MSS.; but a rampart 10 miles in extent would have been as unnecessary as one of 15 miles. R. Menge<sup>4</sup> conjectures that Caesar wrote *miliū passuum III*, which would make the extent of the wall identical with that specified by the assumed reading *miliū pedum XV*. I doubt whether Caesar wrote *miliū pedum XV*; for although in *B. U.*, i. 82, § 4, he mentions a distance of 2000 feet, he nowhere computes a distance of more than one Roman mile in feet, except perhaps in *B. G.*, ii. 30, § 2 (*præterea vallo pedum XII in circuitu quindecim miliū*, etc.), where the reading is also doubtful; and this is hardly an exception to his rule (see p. 356, *supra*).

#### THE RED-HOT BALLS WITH WHICH THE NERVII SET FIRE TO THE HUTS IN Q. CICERO'S CAMP

The passage in which Caesar describes this operation runs as follows:—*maximo coorto vento ferventes fusili ex argilla glandes fundis . . . in casas, quæ more Gallico stramentis erant tectæ, iacere coeperunt*.<sup>5</sup> All the MSS. have *fusili*, the ordinary meaning of which is "molten": but clay cannot be melted. Holder, following C. Wagener,<sup>6</sup> reads *fusilis* (es): but this conjecture only makes matters worse; the difficulty of explaining the meaning of the passage remains, and, as Scholl points out, *ferventes fusiles glandes* is bad grammar.<sup>7</sup> Let us then accept the reading of the MSS., and translate *fusili ex argilla* by "of softened (or plastic) clay." But, it has been objected, balls of clay cannot be so heated as to make an object, however inflammable, which they may strike, take fire. If so, the balls must have been made of something else besides clay. Raumer pointed out in 1830 that, in the valley of the Sambre, people still burned balls made of clay mixed with small coal as fuel; and he suggested that the balls of which Caesar spoke were similar to these. Von Goler, however, affirms that he has proved

<sup>1</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 660.

<sup>3</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 190, n. 3.

<sup>4</sup> See Meusel's *Tabula Coniecturarum*, p. 21 (*Lex. Cæs.*, vol. ii. pars ii.).

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, v. 43, § 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, etc., cxxi., 1880, p. 624. Wagener argues that Caesar would never have written *fusili ex argilla glandes* because, as a rule, he places *ex* before both substantive and attribute, except in relative clauses. I know of one exception, and diligent search might reveal more. In *B. G.*, ii. 29, § 3 he writes "*una ex parte leniter adclivis aditus*," etc. As far as I can make out, Wagener attaches to his imaginary *fusiles* the meaning of "capable of being thrown,"—a meaning which is meaningless and destitute of all support.

<sup>7</sup> *Blätter für das bayerische Gymnasialschulwesen*, xvii., 1881.

<sup>2</sup> vi. 10, § 3.

by experiment that balls of clay can be sufficiently heated to set straw on fire.<sup>1</sup>

"The commentators," says Long, "are troubled about these hot balls cast from leather slings. . . . If the barbarians did really throw hot clay balls with slings, let us be satisfied with the fact."<sup>2</sup> Certainly, if——. But the difficulty disappears if we assume "the barbarians" to have had their leather slings lined with metal.<sup>3</sup>

## WAS THE LETTER WHICH CAESAR SENT TO Q. CICERO WRITTEN IN GREEK, OR ONLY IN GREEK CHARACTERS?

Caesar describes the letter as *Graecis conscriptam litteris*;<sup>4</sup> and, taken by themselves, these words can only mean that it was written in Greek characters. Dion Cassius<sup>5</sup> distinctly says that the letter was written in Greek: but his testimony on such a point proves nothing.<sup>6</sup> Long says, "the only characters, as far as we know, that any of the Galli were acquainted with, were Greek. We must conclude then that the letter was written in Greek."<sup>7</sup> But Long is mistaken; for there are Gallic inscriptions and numerous Gallic coins which prove that the Gauls were acquainted with Roman characters.<sup>8</sup> The only plausible reason for concluding that Caesar wrote in Greek is that he would have taken every precaution to prevent the contents of his letter from becoming known; and although it is unlikely that the half savage Nervii and their allies were acquainted with Greek characters, there may have been individuals among them who were. But if Caesar wrote in Greek, he does not say so.

O. Hirschfeld<sup>9</sup> argues that Caesar merely wrote in Greek characters; for, he says, although inscriptions written in Greek characters have been found in southern France, all inscriptions found in central and northern France are written in Roman characters. If Caesar had meant to say that the letter was written in Greek, surely he would have said *Graece* simply. Cf. Cic., *De Or.*, i. 34, 155; *De Off.*, iii. 32, 115; and *Tusc.*, i. 8, 15.

<sup>1</sup> See Achaintre's *Caesar*, i. 213; Schneider's *Caesar*, ii. 144; von Göler's *Gall. Krieg*, p. 191, n. 2; Napoleon's *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 211; R. Bosworth Smith, *Carthage and the Carthaginians*, 1879, pp. 479-80; and *Revue des revues* . . . relatives à l'antiquité classique, vi., 1882, p. 13.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, p. 258.

<sup>3</sup> I find that this remark has been anticipated. See von Göler, *Gall. Krieg*, p. 191, note 2. <sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, v. 48, § 4. <sup>5</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xl. 9, § 3.

<sup>6</sup> It has been said that Polyænus (*Strat.*, viii. 23, § 6) says the same; but this is a mistake. Polyænus professes to give Caesar's words, — *Καίσαρ Κικέρωνι θάπτειν. προσδέχου βοήθειαν*: but as he himself wrote his treatise in Greek, it is natural that he should have given Caesar's alleged letter in the same language.

<sup>7</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 228, n. 1.

<sup>8</sup> See Desjardins's *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 467, n. 2, 476, n. 2, 581, n. 1, and *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, passim.

<sup>9</sup> *Kaiserliche Akad. der Wissenschaften Sitzungsberichte*, Wien, cxiii., 1883, p. 277, note. See also *Caesar*, ed. Dittenberger-Kraner, p. 227.

## DESJARDINS'S SINGULAR INTERPRETATION OF

*B. G.*, v. 53, § 1.

Desjardins has an amazing note on the rapidity with which the news of Caesar's victory over the Gauls who had besieged Cicero's camp reached Labienus. Labienus's camp was rather more than 50 Roman, say about 50 English miles from that of Cicero. The news of Caesar's victory, says Desjardins, traveled over this distance in three hours. Therefore the Romans must have had relays of mounted messengers to carry it!<sup>1</sup> Caesar says that the news reached Labienus before midnight, and implies that it left Cicero's camp *post horam nonam diei*.<sup>2</sup> Evidently Desjardins thought that *horam nonam* meant nine o'clock. Of course it meant about three in the afternoon.

ON THE MEANING OF THE WORD *NOVISSIMUS* IN*B. G.*, v. 56, §§ 1-2

Describing the armed assembly which Indutiomarus summoned towards the end of 54 B.C., Caesar writes, *Hoc more Gallorum est initium belli, quo lege communi omnes puberes armati convenire consueverunt: qui ex iis novissimus venit, in conspectu multitudinis omnibus cruciatibus adfectus necatur.* On this Long remarks,<sup>3</sup> "The words 'qui ex iis novissimus venit' must mean, if any man came late and did not arrive in company with the rest." I do not see how his interpretation can be got out of the Latin. *Novissimus* does not mean "late," but "last." According to Forcellini,<sup>4</sup> who quote the passage, "*Novissimus* significat extremum, ultimum"; and he nowhere hints at the meaning given by Long. If Caesar had meant "late" and not "last," would he not have written, *si quis ex iis serius venit*?

## THE NEW LEVIES WHICH CAESAR RAISED IN 54-53 B.C.

Speaking of the new levies which he made in the winter of 54-53 B.C., in order to increase his army after the destruction of the legion and the five cohorts commanded by Sabinus and Cotta, Caesar says "tribus ante exactam hiemem et constitutis et adductis legionibus, *duplicatoque earum cohortium numero quas cum Q. Titurio* (Sabino) *amiserat*,"<sup>5</sup> etc. The words which I have italicised are generally taken as explanatory of "tribus . . . legionibus"; in other words, Caesar is understood to have meant that his three new legions doubled the legion and five cohorts which he had lost. O. Schanbach, however, argues that the words

<sup>1</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 662, n. 1.<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, v. 53, § 1.<sup>3</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 234, n. 4.<sup>4</sup> *Totius latinitatis Lex.*, t. iv., 1868, p. 301.<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 1, § 4.

*duplœato* . . . *amiserat* convey a fresh piece of information ; that is to say, that Caesar procured not only three new legions but also  $5 \times 2$  cohorts, which were not embodied in any legion. Caesar, he says, is describing how he made good the loss which he had sustained (1) in respect of troops embodied in a legion and (2) in respect of Sabinus's five cohorts, which do not appear to have belonged to any legion.<sup>1</sup> According to Schambach, Caesar did not speak of the ten cohorts which "doubled" those five as a legion, because they were Transalpine Gauls, not Romans.

Schambach is certainly mistaken. Before the destruction of Sabinus's force, Caesar had eight legions and five cohorts. Sabinus's force consisted of one legion and five cohorts ; and at the end of 53 B.C. Caesar had ten legions. This number corresponds with the received view, that he increased his force by three new legions and no more. If he raised ten new cohorts as well, he never again mentioned them, and, as far as we know, never used them.<sup>2</sup>

#### DID LABIENUS ENAMP IN THE COUNTRY OF THE TREVERI IN THE WINTER OF 54-53 B.C.?

Caesar, in describing the distribution of the legions for the winter of 54-53 B.C., says that he ordered Labienus to winter with one legion "in the country of the Remi on the borders of the Treveri":<sup>3</sup> but in a later chapter he says that "the Treveri were preparing to attack Labienus and the single legion which had wintered in their territory."<sup>4</sup> Napoleon,<sup>5</sup> perhaps following Schneider,<sup>6</sup> explains this apparent contra-

<sup>1</sup> *Rheinisches Museum*, xxxi., 1876, pp. 308-9.

<sup>2</sup> Mommsen (*Hist. of Rome*, iv. 262, note) says "the five cohorts : were not counted as part of a legion any more than the twelve cohorts at the Rhine bridge (vi. 29), and appear to have consisted of detachments of other portions of the army." If Mommsen is right, Caesar had eight legions and no more before the destruction of Sabinus's force. Schneider, however, argues (*Caesar*, ii. 95-6) that he had nine, because in 57 B.C. he had eight (*B. G.*, ii. 8, § 5), and he speaks of the entire legion which he gave to Sabinus as that *quam proxime trans Padum conscripserat* (*Id.*, v. 24, § 4). Schneider and Meusel (*Lec. Cæs.*, ii. 1258) take *proxime* as meaning *nuper* ; and, if they are right, the legion in question was raised in the winter of 55-54 B.C. Mommsen, however, and other commentators hold that it was one of the two which Caesar had raised after his first campaign (*B. G.*, ii. 2, § 1). I am disposed to agree with Schneider. But if he is right, the question arises, What had become of the other five cohorts of Sabinus's mutilated legion? We cannot tell. They may, as Long (*Caesar*, p. 243) and Schneider suggest, have perished in Britain or in Gaul ; or the men who composed them may have been distributed among other legions, in order to make up for losses. At all events, my argument against Schambach holds good ; for Caesar says (*B. G.*, v. 24, §§ 2-3) that in 54 B.C. there were seven legions in his army besides Sabinus's force.

<sup>3</sup> *quartam in Remis cum Tito Labieno in confinio Treverorum hiemare iussit. B. G.*, v. 24, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Treveri . . . Labienum cum una legione, quae in eorum finibus hiemaverat, adoriri parabant. Id.*, vi. 7, § 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 227, note.

<sup>6</sup> *Caesar*, ii. 202.

diction by suggesting that "the country in which he (Labienus) encamped was either on the boundary of the two countries, or ground of which the Remi and the Treveri disputed the possession." Labienus, he argues, had remained, throughout the winter, in his original camp, wherever it was; for, he asks, "is it not evident that, after the catastrophe of Aduatuca and the insurrection of the people seduced by Ambiorix, everything dictated to Labienus the necessity of engaging himself no further in a hostile country, by separating himself from the other legions?" Long takes the same view in a note on p. 290 of his edition of Caesar, and the opposite one on p. 412. In his *History*<sup>1</sup> he reverts to Napoleon's opinion. "Unless," he says, "Labienus had moved from his first camp, and it is not said that he had, we must assume that he was still there when Caesar sent the baggage and his legions to him."

Von Goler<sup>2</sup> on the other hand, holds that Labienus did change his quarters, and conjectures that he wished to relieve the friendly Remi of the burden of having to feed his army. This view is certainly defensible. If Caesar's narrative is to be interpreted literally, it is clear that in the autumn of 54 B.C., after Caesar had relieved Cicero's camp, Labienus was still in the country of the Remi; for Caesar says<sup>3</sup> that, on hearing the news of the relief, Indutiomarus, who had determined to attack the camp of Labienus, returned into the country of the Treveri (*copias omnes in Treveros reducit*). But it would seem that in the early part of the following year Labienus was no longer in the country of the Remi, but in that of the Treveri. Caesar tells us this twice: he says that he sent the baggage of the whole army into the country of the Treveri to Labienus (*totius exercitus impedimenta ad Labienum in Treveros mittit*); and he says that Labienus had wintered in their territory.<sup>4</sup> He also says that, after he had finished his campaign against the Menapii, he set out for the country of the Treveri, and that he arrived there;<sup>5</sup> and we may reasonably conclude that when he arrived he rejoined Labienus.

General Creuly, on the other hand, believes with Napoleon that Labienus remained throughout the winter in the same camp. He holds that this camp was in the country of the Treveri; and that in *B. G.*, vi. 5 Caesar corrected the mistake which he had made in v. 24. Besides, he argues, it is reasonable to believe that Labienus, instead of following his instructions to the letter and encamping within the territory of the Remi but close to the Treveran frontier, found a more convenient site within the territory of the Treveri.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 240.

<sup>2</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 209, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, v. 53, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> *ib.*, vi. 5, § 6, 7, § 1.

<sup>5</sup> Achaintre reads *hiemabat* in *B. G.*, vi. 7, § 2, not *hiemaverat* remarking that the winter was not yet over. I do not think much of this argument: but if *hiemabat*, which is found in  $\beta$  MSS., is the right reading, it may lend some little support to von Goler's view. [I find that Meusel in his lately published (1894) edition of the *Commentaries* (p. 136) also reads *hiemabat*.]

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 6, § 4, 9, § 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, p. 38.

Schambach quotes approvingly an argument of Köchly-Rüstow, who say that, if Labienus had really moved into the country of the Treveri, it would be very remarkable that Caesar should not have explicitly stated the fact, seeing that he described the movements of Labienus in detail; and, adds Schambach, Caesar would not have sent his baggage, as he did, to Labienus if Labienus had abandoned his original camp; for the second camp would not have been fortified so thoroughly as the first.<sup>1</sup> This is a groundless assumption. If Labienus had made a second camp, he was passing the winter in it; and, as he was a thorough soldier, we may be certain that he had fortified it with all possible care. As to the argument of Köchly-Rüstow, I admit that Caesar's silence would be (or is) remarkable; but the reticence of the *Commentaries* is frequently remarkable. Schambach offers to extricate us from the difficulty by the usual and futile expedient,—an emendation; and, as it happens, the emendation which he proposes was made two centuries before he was born, by Cluver.<sup>2</sup> In *B. G.*, vi. 7, § 1, says Schambach, for *eorum* read *Remorum*: the false reading *eorum*, you are to understand, led some copyist to interpolate *in Treveros* before *ad Labienum* in vi. 5, § 6. I don't believe it.

Heller, assuming that Labienus remained throughout the winter in the same camp, suggests that it was situated in the territory of some small tribe, perhaps the Segni, between the proper territories of the Remi and the Treveri, which may have belonged to one or the other of the two peoples.<sup>3</sup> But if the camp was in the country of the Segni, whom Caesar mentions by name, why did he not say so? Nothing is gained by making conjectures of this sort.

I admit that there is room for doubt: but I am inclined to believe that Schneider and Napoleon are right, and that the explanation of Caesar's apparent inconsistency lies in the fact that Labienus's camp was very near the common frontier of the Treveri and the Remi.

### WHAT WAS THE RANK OF BASILUS?

Caesar does not call Basilus a *legatus*. Napoleon includes him among the *legati*:<sup>4</sup> but I doubt whether he was one, as Caesar, without giving him any title, mentions him in the same breath with another officer, whom he expressly calls a *legatus*:—*Quirum Fabium legatum et Lucium Minucium Borulum cum legionibus duabus in Remis collocat*.<sup>5</sup> From the other passage (vi. 29, § 4) in which Basilus is mentioned, and in which Caesar says that he was sent in command of all the cavalry to hunt down Ambiorix, Nipperdey<sup>6</sup> infers that he was simply a *præfectus equitum*, or officer of cavalry.

<sup>1</sup> *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, etc., cxxv., 1862, pp. 218-20.

<sup>2</sup> Meusel's *Tabula Coniecturarum*, p. 23 (*Lex. Caes.*, vol. ii., pars ii.).

<sup>3</sup> *Philologus*, xxii., 1865, pp. 159-60.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 571.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 90, § 5.

<sup>6</sup> *Caesar*, p. 111. See also Schneider's *Caesar*, ii. 640.

# DID CAESAR CONFOUND THE SCHELDT WITH THE SAMBRE?

Caesar says that in 53 B.C. he left Q. Cicero at Aduatuca and marched towards the river *Scaldis* (Scheldt) *quod influit in Mosam*, and the most distant parts of the Ardennes (*extremasque Arduennae partes*<sup>1</sup>). Stephanus, who has been followed by many other commentators, altered *Scaldem* into *Sabim* (the Sambre). The Greek Paraphrast wrote Σάβιν: but all the MSS. of the *Commentaries* have *Scaldem*, *Scaldim* or other forms of the same word.<sup>2</sup> In support of Stephanus's conjecture it has been argued (1) that the Scheldt does not flow into the Meuse; (2) that if Caesar had marched in the direction of the Scheldt, he would not have marched towards "the most distant parts of the Ardennes"; and (3) that he could not have marched from Aduatuca to the Scheldt and back in seven days. In reply to the first of these arguments Des Roches<sup>3</sup> affirms that the Old Meuse (Oude Maas) did communicate with the Scheldt near the island of Tholen; and, according to Ortelius's map of "Brabantia" in his *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum* (ed. 1573), this statement is true. In reply to the second it may be said that Caesar does not imply that the Ardennes extended as far as the Scheldt: he merely says that he intended to march towards the Scheldt and the most distant parts of the Ardennes, which extended north-westward as far as the country of the Nervii;<sup>4</sup> and if he marched towards the Scheldt, he may have been marching towards the most distant parts of the Ardennes. The third argument is worthless; for Caesar does not say that he marched as far as the Scheldt; and if he intended to do so, he probably did not know the distance.

1. Bergk, who is nothing if not original, conjectures that Caesar wrote (ad flumen) *Calbem* (quod influit in) *Mosellam*. *Calbem*, he asserts, means the Kyll, which Ansonius called *Gulbis*.<sup>5</sup> I need not discuss this guess.

It has also been suggested that Caesar confounded the Scheldt with the Sambre; in other words, that although he wrote *Scaldem*, he intended to march towards the Sambre and believed that it was the Scheldt. I have refuted this suggestion on p. 658, *supra*.

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 33, § 3.

<sup>2</sup> Schneider's *Caesar*, ii. 290; Meusel's *Caesar*, p. 152.

<sup>3</sup> *Archives hist. et litt. du Nord de la France et du Midi de la Belgique*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. v., 1856, pp. 339-40. In support of the correctness of the statement in the *Commentaries*, it has also been remarked that Pliny (*Nat. Hist.*, iv. 14-15 (28-9)), while mentioning that the Meuse and the Rhine flow directly into the sea, does not say the same of the Scheldt. A writer in *Bull. de la Soc. de géogr. d'Anvers*, 1877, pp. 175, 185, believes that he has discovered a deserted bed by which the Scheldt once joined the Meuse.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 29, § 4.

<sup>5</sup> *Zur Geschichte und Topographie der Rheinlande in röm. Zeit*, 1882, pp. 33-4.

## THE PREDATORY EXPEDITION OF THE SUGAMBRI IN

53 B.C.

Caesar says that the Sugambri raised 2000 horsemen and crossed the Rhine:—*Cogunt equitum duo milia Sugambri*, etc. (*B. G.*, vi. 35, § 5): I originally understood this passage in the accepted sense, namely that the expeditionary force of the Sugambri consisted of 2000 horse, and no more. A. de Vlamincq, however, maintains<sup>1</sup> that this interpretation is wrong, and that the cavalry formed only a portion of the force. This, he says, is proved by the statement of Caesar<sup>2</sup> that, when the Sugambri saw the foraging party, which Cicero had allowed to go out of camp, returning, they advanced to attack them, “despising the smallness of their numbers”:—*despecta paucitate ex omnibus partibus impetum faciunt*. The foraging party consisted of five cohorts, 300 convalescents, a large number of camp-followers, and not more than 200 horsemen,<sup>3</sup>—probably considerably more than 2000 men all told. As the Germans despised the smallness of this force, it is reasonable to infer that they outnumbered it; and de Vlamincq is probably right. The explanation may be that, according to German custom,<sup>4</sup> the cavalry were accompanied by a number of light-armed footmen.

HOW WAS THE NEWS OF THE CARNUTIAN RAID ON  
GENABUM SPREAD ABROAD?

“The news,” says Caesar, “spread quickly to all the tribes of Gaul. Whenever an event of signal importance occurs, they make it known by loud cries from field to field and from district to district: others take up the cry in turn and pass it on to their neighbours. So it happened on this occasion” (*Celeriter ad omnes Galliae civitates fama perfertur; nam ubi maior atque illustrior incidit res, clamore per agros regionesque significant: hunc alii deinceps excipiunt et proximis tradunt, ut tum accedit*. *B. G.*, vii. 3, § 2). On this Napoleon remarks<sup>5</sup> that “An ancient manuscript belonging to Upper Auvergne, the manuscript of Drugeac, informs us that the custom continued long in use and that it still existed in the Middle Ages. Rough towers were built for this purpose on the heights, 400 or 500 metres apart; watchmen were placed in them, who transmitted the news from one to another by sonorous monosyllables. A certain number of these towers still exist in the Cantal. If the wind prevented this mode of transmission, they had recourse to fire. It is evident that criers had been posted beforehand from Genabum to Gergovia, since it was agreed that the Carnutes should give the signal of the war.” No such agreement is mentioned by Caesar. He merely says that it was agreed that the Carnutes should

<sup>1</sup> *La Ménapié*, etc., 1879, pp. 50-52.<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 39, § 4.<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 36, §§ 2-3, and Schneider's *Caesar*, ii. 301, note.<sup>4</sup> See *B. G.*, i. 48, §§ 5-7.<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 241, n. 1.



strike the first blow.<sup>1</sup> If Napoleon is right, criers must have been "posted beforehand" *along every route* leading from Cenabum; for Caesar says that the news flew rapidly to *all* the states of Gaul. Can anything be more grotesque than this notion of criers "posted beforehand," standing expectant on *all* the great thoroughfares of Gaul, and bawling out news from one to another?

See also, as a curiosity in note-making, C. E. Moberly's *Caesar*, p. 309. He completely misunderstands Napoleon's note, and commits himself to the absurd statement that the news was transmitted from Cenabum to Gergovia by means of "a series of telegraphic towers (some of which still remain) placed at distances of about 300 yards from one another. The message was passed either by criers or by fire-signals." What is there in Caesar about "fire-signals"? And where did Mr. Moberly learn that the "towers, some of which still remain," existed in Caesar's time?

Colonel T. A. Dodge also fails to see that Napoleon was not such a fool as to commit himself to the statement that the towers existed in Caesar's time, and naively remarks that "the news was passed along by men stationed in towers on convenient hills, who gave out shouts of peculiar kinds."<sup>2</sup> Colonel Dodge's narrative is hardly less peculiar. A country in which "convenient hills," dotted with towers, are to be found, at regular intervals of 500 yards, must be worth exploring.

Long<sup>3</sup> examines the passage with his usual common sense. "What Caesar describes," he says, "is simple enough. The country was populous, and great news was quickly carried from one spot to another . . . to make it like a telegraph, there must have been stationed persons in readiness, always waiting for the news, and at distances within which the human voice could clearly convey intelligence; not a trace of which is there in Caesar."

#### WHERE DID CAESAR CONCENTRATE HIS LEGIONS AT THE OUTSET OF THE SEVENTH CAMPAIGN?

Caesar says that, after leaving Decimus Brutus in the country of the Arverni, he made his way into the country of the Lingones, where two of his legions were wintering; and that, on his arrival, he sent messengers to the other legions, two of which were quartered among the Treveri, and the remaining six at Agedincum (Sens), and concentrated the whole ten in one spot before Vercingetorix, who was marching from the Berri into Auvergne, was informed of his arrival.<sup>4</sup> Vercingetorix, as soon as he heard what Caesar had done, determined to besiege Gorgobina; whereupon Caesar, *leaving*, as he says,<sup>5</sup> two of his legions and all his heavy baggage at Agedincum, marched to relieve the threatened town. From this last statement of Caesar it has generally been inferred that the spot at which the ten legions were first concentrated was

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 2, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 9.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, p. 230.

<sup>3</sup> *Caesar*, p. 330.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, vii. 10, § 4.

Agedincum; but the statement only proves that they were concentrated there immediately before Caesar set out for Gorgobina.

Colonel Stoffel,<sup>1</sup> combats the common view, on the ground that, first, Caesar himself<sup>2</sup> gives us to understand that the concentration was effected somewhere in the country of the Lingones; secondly, time would have been saved by concentrating on the central one of the three posts occupied by the legions rather than on either of the other two; and thirdly, if Agedincum had been the place of concentration, Caesar would have written "ad reliquas legiones mittit, priusque omnes Agedincum (instead of *in unum locum*) cogit,"<sup>3</sup> etc.

I believe that Colonel Stoffel is right. When we read that Caesar sent messages from the camp of the two legions in the country of the Lingones to the other two divisions in the country of the Treveri and at Agedincum, respectively, and concentrated them in one spot, we are justified in inferring that that spot was not Agedincum; for the meaning of his words appears to be that he sent for the two divisions. The other two arguments appear to me not less sound.

Colonel Stoffel conjectures that the central post was Châtillon-sur-Seine: but it is obviously impossible to get beyond conjecture.

#### ON THE MEANING OF ALTERO DIE (B. G., vii. 11, 68)

I discuss this question because, unless one can find an answer to it, it is impossible to search, with any prospect of success, for the site either of Vellaunodunum or of the battle-field on which Caesar defeated Vercingetorix just before the blockade of Alesia.<sup>4</sup>

Napoleon believes that *altero die* means "the second day after." The former of the two passages in the *Commentaries on the Gallic War* in which the expression occurs, runs thus:—"Duabus Agedinci legionibus atque impedimentis totius exercitus relictis ad Boios prodiscitur. *Altero die* cum ad oppidum Senonum Vellaunodunum venisset," etc. Supposing that Caesar left Agedincum on March 1, Napoleon would say that he reached Vellaunodunum on March 3.

Napoleon's arguments may be thus summarised:—(1) he quotes a passage in which, speaking of the events that followed a certain session of the Senate, Cicero says, "Proximè, altero, tertio, denique reliquis consecutis diebus,"<sup>5</sup> etc. "Is it not evident," asks Napoleon, "that here *altero die* signifies the second day which followed the session of the Senate, or two days after that session?" He goes on to quote several other passages, which I omit, because they only prove, what nobody denies, that *alter* means "second." (2) He states that, in the whole of the *Commentaries* the expression *postero die* is to be found sixty-three times, *proximo die* thirty-six, *insequenti die* ten, *postridie eius diei* or *prædie eius diei* eleven,

<sup>1</sup> *Guerre de César et d'Arrioviste*, pp. 142-3.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 9, §§ 4-5.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, § 5.

<sup>4</sup> See *B. G.*, vii. 10, § 4, 11, § 1, 68, § 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 246, n. 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Phil.*, i. 13, § 32.

and *altero die* only five. "Does it not appear certain," he asks, "that, if Caesar had arrived at Vellaunodunum the day after his departure from Agedincum, he would have written, *Postero die* (or *proximo die*) *cum ad oppidum Lenonum Vellaunodunum venisset?*" etc. (3) He asserts that Caesar defeated the cavalry of Vercingetorix on the Vingeanne, and arrived at Alesia, 40 miles off, *altero die*,—which distance he could not have completed until the second day after the battle.

No weight can be attached to any of these reasons. The quotation from Cicero only proves,—what everybody admits,—that *altero* means "second." In the quotation, *altero* means "second," in relation to *proximo*. Therefore, says Napoleon, in *B. G.* vii. 11, § 1, it means "second" in relation to the day following that on which Caesar left Agedincum. No! his opponents reply, it only means "second" in relation to the day on which he left Agedincum. In other words, in the quotation from Cicero, the use of the word *proximo* makes all the difference. Or, as Long puts it, in the quotations which Napoleon gives, "there is a word which expresses directly or indirectly, 'first,' and so 'alter' of course means 'second.'"

Napoleon's second argument is equally weak. Supposing some future commentator were to discover that, in So-and-So's *History of the Decline and Fall of the British Empire*, the expression "On the next day" occurred ten times, and the expression "On the following day" a hundred times: would that prove that "on the next day" and "on the following day" meant two different things? On Napoleon's theory, *postridie* would mean something different from *postero die*.

The third argument is absolutely worthless. There is no proof that the cavalry combat between Caesar and Vercingetorix was fought on the Vingeanne.<sup>2</sup> In fact, in order to bolster up the feeble evidence which he adduces in support of that site, Napoleon is obliged to bring forward his interpretation of *altero die*!

In Virgil's Eighth Eclogue occurs this line,—*Alter ab undecimo tum me iam acceperat annus*. "Authorities," says Conington,<sup>3</sup> "were at one time divided on the question whether 'alter ab undecimo' meant the twelfth or the thirteenth. . . . Modern editors have found little difficulty in deciding it to be the twelfth, considering 'alter' to be convertible with 'secundus,' but following the inclusive mode of counting." With this passage Conington compares *alter ab illo*<sup>4</sup> and *heros ab Achille secundus*.<sup>5</sup> He might have added that the Romans called the 29th of June the third not the second day before the 1st of July, and that in Greek *τῇ τρίτῃ* means the same as *τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ*.

Furthermore, in one of the three passages in which *altera die* occurs in *De Bello Civili* (iii. 19, § 3) Napoleon might have found proof positive that his theory was wrong. Caesar is describing the colloquies that passed between his troops and the Pontpeians on the banks of the Apsus. Speaking of his lieutenant, P. Vatinus, he says, "Multa suppliciter locutus est ut de sua atque omnium salute debet, silentioque ab utris-

<sup>1</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 334, n. 6.

<sup>2</sup> *Virgil*, i. 87.

<sup>3</sup> *Virg.*, *Ecl.* v. 49.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 775-6.

<sup>5</sup> Horace, *Sat.* ii. 3, 193.

que militibus auditus. Responsum est ab altera parte, Aulum Varronem profiteri se *altera die* ad conloquium venturum atque eundem visurum quemadmodum tuto legati venire et, quae vellent, exponere possent; certumque ei rei tempus constituitur. Quo cum esset *postero die* ventum, magna utrimque multitudo convenit, magnaue erat expectatio eius rei, atque omnium intenti animi esse ad pacem videbantur," etc. Is it not clear that *altera die* and *postero die* in this passage mean the same thing? [Since I wrote the above, I have found that Heller (*Philologus*, xxvi., 1867, 682-4) quotes the same passage to prove the same point; and his arguments are endorsed by Meusel (*Lex. Caes.*, i. 239).]

### THE MEANING OF MISERICORDIA VULGI (B. G., vii. 15, § 6)

*Datur petentibus venia, dissuadente primo Vercingetorige, post concedente et precibus ipsorum et misericordia vulgi.* Long<sup>1</sup> interprets *miseriordia vulgi* as "pity for the common sort," who, he adds, "would have been turned out of their houses in the winter." But this, as Schneider<sup>2</sup> shows, is certainly wrong. "Since Vercingetorix," he writes, "as may be gathered from his own speech, felt no pity, and the others who were present at the council do not appear to have considered the common sort any more than the whole body of the inhabitants of Avaricum, . . . the word *vulgus* must be understood of the majority of the council, from whom a few, possibly the leading men, dissented." There is, moreover, a passage in ch. 28—*Quos ille multa iam nocte silentio ex juga exceperit, veritus ne qua in castris ex eorum concursu et misericordia vulgi seditio oriretur*,—which proves that *vulgi* is a subjective, not an objective genitive, and that *miseriordia vulgi* in ch. 15 means "pity felt by the mass (of those present at the council of war)." Another passage (ch. 29) completes the proof. In the speech which he made to encourage his men after the fall of Avaricum, Vercingetorix is reported to have said, "sibi numquam placuisse Avaricum defendi, cuius rei testes ipsos haberet; sed factum imprudentia Biturigum et nimia obsequentia reliquorum uti hoc incommodum acciperetur." *Nimia obsequentia reliquorum* obviously describes the same feeling as *miseriordia vulgi*. Great men of action do not allow themselves to be turned away from a wise policy by "pity for the common sort" or pity for any one else.

### ON THE PASSAGE VICOS . . . VIDEANTUR (B. G., vii. 14, § 5)

Describing the arguments by which Vercingetorix persuaded his followers to burn their towns and granaries, Caesar writes *vicos atque aedificia incendi oportere hoc spatio (a Boia) quoqueversus, quo pabulandi*

<sup>1</sup> Caesar, p. 340, and *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 296.

<sup>2</sup> Caesar, ii. 374.

*causa adire videantur*. The words which I have bracketed appear in various forms,—*ab oia*, *aboia* and *a boia*,—in the best MSS.<sup>1</sup> The word *Boia*, on the analogy of *Venetia*,<sup>2</sup> would mean the territory of the Veneti. Scaliger bracketed the word: other scholars regard it as a marginal gloss, which crept into the text;<sup>3</sup> and the French Commission<sup>4</sup> justly remark that it adds nothing to the clearness of Caesar's narrative. Why, indeed, should Vercingetorix have decided to burn the towns all round Boia, and yet to spare Boia itself, from which the Romans expected supplies? Von Göler indeed remarks that the Boii were in a position to defend themselves, and would not have submitted quietly, on Caesar's approach, to the burning of their towns.<sup>5</sup> But it seems clear that if Vercingetorix was master of all the country between Caesar's camp at Avaricum and the frontier of the Boii, he could, if he had wished to do so, have devastated the country of that feeble tribe<sup>6</sup> as well. As General Creuly sensibly remarks,<sup>7</sup> von Göler (and Heller, who agrees with him) "n'ont pas saisi l'idée, pourtant si simple . . . si bien exprimée par César, du vide à créer par l'incendie autour des Romains dans la circonférence que leurs fourrageurs pouvaient atteindre." What likelihood was there that Caesar, who was encamped at Avaricum, in the country of the Bituriges, would send out foraging parties to the further side of Boia, which was in the country of the Aedui? And if Caesar was alluding in this passage to the ravages which Vercingetorix ordered to be carried out in the territories of the neighbouring states,<sup>8</sup> why should Vercingetorix have specified Boia as the central district round which this devastation was to be enacted? Besides, if the country on all sides of Boia was devastated, the Aedui, in whose country Boia was situated, must have burned their towns: but it is certain that they did not, for they had not yet joined Vercingetorix. A. Holder reads *ab via*, an emendation of Madvig,<sup>9</sup> which is also found in the old edition referred to by Schneider as Ven. c; and Dittenberger adopts Hoffman's emendation *obvia*. Various other absurd conjectures have been made. If one must have a conjecture, nothing could be better than Madvig's; but for historical purposes the sense is perfectly clear.

### WHERE DID VERGINGETORIX MAKE HIS FIRST CAMP DURING THE SIEGE OF AVARICUM?

Caesar tells us that Vercingetorix made his first camp on a spot protected by marshes and woods, 16 (Roman) miles from Avaricum:<sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Holder's *Caesar*, p. 156.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, iii. 9, § 9.

<sup>3</sup> See Schneider, ii. 367-8, and Nipperdey, pp. 89-90.

<sup>4</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, 170.

<sup>5</sup> *Stall. Krieg*, p. 242, n. 5.

<sup>6</sup> *civitas erat exigua et infirma*. *B. G.*, vii. 17, § 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, p. 396.

<sup>8</sup> *Hoc idem fit in reliquis civitatibus*. *B. G.*, vii. 16, § 1.

<sup>9</sup> *Adv. crit.*, vol. ii., 1873, pp. 256-7.

<sup>10</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 16, § 1.

but he does not say on what side. Von Güler,<sup>1</sup> who holds that Vercingetorix would not have encamped between Caesar and the Boii, fixes on a site near Vierzon, north-west of Avaricum. But General Creuly makes light of this argument, remarking that the Boii were not strong enough to attack Vercingetorix.<sup>2</sup> Creuly, assuming that Vercingetorix started from the neighbourhood of Châtillon-sur-Loire,<sup>3</sup> believes that he halted on the heights behind Morogues, about 15 miles north-east of Avaricum.<sup>4</sup> Napoleon thinks that he encamped about a mile and a half north of Dun-le-Roi, to the south of Avaricum. "It was indeed natural," he says, "that he should place himself between the Roman army and the land of the Arverni, whence probably he drew his provisions."<sup>5</sup> Colonel St-Hypolite,<sup>6</sup> on the other hand, argues that Vercingetorix would not have encamped on the south of the town, because Caesar attacked it on that side, and because the marshes, by which the besieged communicated with Vercingetorix, were on the north. Accordingly he selects for the site of the Gallic encampment Allean, which is near Baugy. But the town was surrounded by marshes on every side, except the narrow neck of land, not more than 400 feet wide, on the south, on which Caesar made his *agger*.<sup>7</sup>

It is impossible, with such slender data as Caesar gives, to decide the question. As to Napoleon's argument, there was no reason why Vercingetorix should not have drawn his supplies from the Bituriges, who were his allies and were on the spot. If he encamped on the south of Avaricum, he probably wished to prevent Caesar from making a raid into the country of the Arveni.

#### WHAT WAS THE HILL NEAR AVARICUM ON WHICH THE GALLIC INFANTRY AWAITED CAESAR'S ATTACK?

Caesar says that the hill was nearer to Avaricum than Vercingetorix's original encampment, which was 16 Roman miles off; that its slope was gentle (*collis leniter ab infimo acclivis*), and that it was almost entirely surrounded by a marsh not more than 50 feet wide.<sup>8</sup>

Von Güler<sup>9</sup> places the hill on the right bank of the Yèvre, between Vignoux and Mehun; but General Creuly<sup>10</sup> denies that this position is a *collis* at all;<sup>11</sup> and he affirms that the Yèvre, in this part of its course, is too swift to have been called a marsh (*palus*), unless it over-

<sup>1</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 242, n. 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, p. 396.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 471, *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 255, note.

<sup>5</sup> *Rev. arch.*, viii., 1863, p. 400.

<sup>6</sup> *Recherches sur quelques points hist. relatifs au siège de Bourges exécuté par César*, 1842, pp. 10-11.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 15, § 5, 17, § 1.

<sup>8</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 18, 19, §§ 1-2.

<sup>9</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 247.

<sup>10</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, p. 397.

<sup>11</sup> It is represented as a hill in von Güler's map, which, however, as Creuly remarks, is imaginary. See Sheet 122 of the *Carte de l'Etat-Major* (1 : 80,000).

flowed its banks, in which case the marsh formed by it must have been far more than 50 feet wide. He himself fixes upon Baugy. Napoleon places the hill at La Chenevière, east of Caesar's camp. Von Kampen<sup>1</sup> and Mr. W. C. Compton<sup>2</sup> agree in placing it on the left bank of the Auron, opposite St-Just,—“a position,” says Mr. Compton, “corresponding with the description in chapter 19.” Colonel St-Hypolite<sup>3</sup> places it at Maubranche.

The position, however, can only be guessed at; and in this case it matters little whether our guesses are right or wrong.

### WHERE DID CAESAR PLACE HIS TOWERS DURING THE SIEGE OF AVARICUM?

Different opinions have been expressed regarding the position of the towers which Caesar mentions in his description of the siege of Avaricum.<sup>4</sup> Long<sup>5</sup> in his history, says that the *agger* “was protected by two towers, one on each side of the terrace and not on it.” Von Goler,<sup>6</sup> Napoleon<sup>7</sup> and Colonel Stoffel<sup>8</sup> think otherwise; and indeed there is no evidence in any of the chapters in which Caesar mentions the towers to show that they were “on each side of the terrace”; while there is evidence in *B. G.*, vii. 22 and 24 to show that they were on it. The passage in the latter chapter runs *celeriter factum est ut . . . alii turres reducerent aggeremque interscinderent* (meaning that the towers were drawn back out of reach of the fire which the Gauls had kindled in the front part of the *agger*); while in the former Caesar says that, day by day during the siege, as his own towers were raised to a higher level by the daily increase in the height of the *agger* or which they stood, the enemy added fresh stories to the towers which they had themselves erected upon the wall.\* [See the next note.] Hirtius also says that a tower was erected upon the *agger* which the Romans made at Uxellodunum:—*Exstruitur agger in altitudinem pedum sexaginta, collocatur in eo turris*,<sup>9</sup> etc. To clinch the proof, Colonel Stoffel remarks that the towers could not have been moved except on the levelled surface of the terrace, and that, as it was the business of the artillerymen who manned them to drive the enemy from the wall of the besieged town, they must have dominated the wall.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. comm. tabulæ*, ix.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul*, p. 80.

<sup>3</sup> *Recherches sur quelques points hist. relatifs au siège de Bourges*, etc., 1842, p. 11.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 17, § 1, 18, § 1, 22, § 4, 24, §§ 3, 5, 25, §§ 1-2.

<sup>5</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 300. n. 91.

<sup>7</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 261.

<sup>6</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 251.

<sup>8</sup> *Guerre civile*, ii. 361.

<sup>9</sup> *B. G.*, viii. 41, § 5.

<sup>10</sup> Besides the passages which I have quoted, Colonel Stoffel refers to Lucan, *Pharsalia*, iii. 394-8, 455-7. Lucan writes:—

*Stellatis axibus agger  
Erigitur, geminasque aequantes moenia turres  
Accipit.*

ON THE MEANING OF THE WORD *AGGER* IN

B. G., vii. 22, § 4

Describing the expedients devised by the garrison of Avaricum, Caesar says, *nostrarum turrium altitudinem, quantum has cotidianus agger expresserat, commissis suarum turrium malis adaequabant*. A plain man would understand by this that, as the Roman towers rose daily higher, owing to the rise in the height of the terrace on which they stood, the Gauls matched their height by adding new stories to their own towers. But Rustow assumes that *agger* does not mean "the terrace" here, but the material (timber) which was used for increasing the height of the Roman towers.<sup>1</sup> Of course *agger* does sometimes mean "material." But in all the passages in which the word occurs with that meaning, the meaning is unmistakable;<sup>2</sup> whereas, if *agger*, in the passage under discussion, means "material" the meaning is certainly both liable and likely to be mistaken. Besides, if Rustow is right, the Romans set the example in raising their towers daily higher by successive stories: whereas it is probable that, at the time of which Caesar speaks, they were already completed.<sup>3</sup>

## THE GALLIC WALL

Caesar, as I understand him, describes the construction of the Gallic wall as follows.<sup>4</sup>—At right angles to the direction of the intended wall, balks of timber were laid on the ground, parallel to each other and 2 feet apart. These balks were bound together by beams, 40 feet long, which were laid upon them transversely, that is to say, in the line of the wall, and doubtless mortised into them.<sup>5</sup> The intervals between the balks were filled up, on the inner side of the wall, with earth or rubble; on the outer side, with large stones. The first layer of the wall was now complete. On the top of it was placed a second layer, exactly like it. Layer was placed above layer until the required height was reached. The structure was protected from fire by the earth and stones, and was so firmly held together by the 40-foot beams that the battering ram was powerless to destroy it.

Caesar's account, however, presents various difficulties. Speaking of the second layer, he says, "When these,"—the balks and stones of the first layer,—“have been fixed in their places and fastened together, a fresh row is laid on the top of them, in such a way that the same interval is kept and the balks do not touch each other, but have similar

<sup>1</sup> *Heerwesen und Kriegführung C. J. Cæsars*, 1855, p. 146.

<sup>2</sup> See Meusel's *Lex. Cæs.*, i. 211-12.

<sup>3</sup> My view is confirmed by Colonel Stoffel (*Guerre civile*, ff. 361-2).

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 23.

<sup>5</sup> De Sauley, describing the remains of a Gallic wall, which were discovered at Murceint, says that, at the place where the balks were crossed by the beams, the fastening was secured by enormous bolts of iron. *Journ. des Savants*, 1880, p. 625.



spaces between them, and thus are kept rigidly in their places" (*His conlocatis et coagmentatis, alius insuper ordo additur, ut idem illud intervallum servetur neque inter se contingant trabes, sed paribus intermissis spatiis, singulae singulis sacis interiectis, arte contineantur*).<sup>1</sup> On this Mr. A. G. Peskett remarks,<sup>2</sup> "It is quite possible that the successive layers were so laid, that beam rested on beam, interval on interval . . . if it be so, *trabes* here will not denote any two beams, but the several whole vertical lines of beams, which were prevented from touching each other by the intervening lines of rubble and stones." (For "beams" in the above read "balks.") Schneider<sup>3</sup> interprets the passage in the same way: but, unlike Mr. Peskett, he denies that any other interpretation is admissible. Long, however, points out<sup>4</sup> that the clause, *ut idem illud intervallum servetur*, "expresses the intervals between the balks in the second tier"; and he argues that the second clause, *neque inter se contingant trabes*, "is unnecessary unless it means something else." The argument is a bad one; for Caesar, laconic as he is, sometimes emphasises his meaning by repetition.<sup>5</sup> "The balks of the second," Long proceeds, "were not laid on the balks of the first tier, but on the stones, so that no balks touched one another. . . . The beams (read 'balks') would be also better protected against fire in this way than if they were on one another."

The arrangement may have been what Long describes: Caesar does not inform us upon the point. But what Long fails to see is that, if his interpretation of the Latin is correct, the *trabes* which are the subject of *contineantur* denote something different from the *trabes* which are the subject of *contingant*,—they denote the balks not of the second row only, but of the first and second.<sup>6</sup> Such an interpretation is wholly inadmissible.

Now it happens that remains of Gallic walls have been discovered at Mursceint, in the department of Lot, and on Mont Beuvray. Desjardins<sup>7</sup> gives an illustration of the former, and M. Bulliot<sup>8</sup> of the latter. In the wall of Mursceint there are three or four stones between the balks of each layer, and three layers of stones between each pair of layers of mingled stones and balks. The wall of Mont Beuvray conforms more closely to Caesar's description.

Now Caesar does not guarantee the absolute and invariable accuracy of his description. He only professes to describe the general principles of construction:—"Muri omnes Gallici huc fere forma sunt." Is it not possible that, as the walls which have been discovered are not all alike, and as Caesar does not mention any layer of stones, the wall of Avaricum had no such layer?

There is another point in Caesar's description which has been mis-

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 23, § 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, Bk. vii., p. 65.

<sup>3</sup> *Caesar*, ii. 402.

<sup>4</sup> *Caesar*, p. 347.

<sup>5</sup> See *B. G.*, i. 49, § 3.

<sup>6</sup> Otherwise the clause *sed paribus . . . contineantur* would be as unnecessary as the clause *ut idem . . . servetur*, which Long does not admit.

<sup>7</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 119.

<sup>8</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. xx., 1869, pp. 400-408 and pl. xix.; t. xxi., 1870, pl. vii., x.

understood. "The stone," he writes, "protects (the wall) from fire, and the woodwork from the battering-ram; for it is braced on the inner side by solid beams, generally 40 feet long, and so can neither be smashed through nor pulled to pieces" (*Et ab incendio lapis et ab ariete materia defendit, quae perpetuis trabibus pedes quadragenos plerumque introrsus revincta neque perrumpi neque distrahi potest*). I have, with Napoleon,<sup>1</sup> explained these *perpetuae trabes* as beams laid in the direction of the wall and mortised into the balks. Schneider<sup>2</sup> and Long<sup>3</sup> identify them with the balks themselves. But this theory is refuted by the fact that in the Gallic walls which have been discovered, the 40-foot beams are actually laid in the way which I have described. In the wall of Mursceint there are two beams, laid parallel with each other; and the balks, which are about three yards<sup>4</sup> apart and 23 feet<sup>5</sup> long, occupy the whole thickness of the wall. Moreover, even if no Gallic walls had been discovered, a moment's reflection might have convinced Long of the absurdity of his interpretation. In § 2 of the chapter in question Caesar says that the *trabes directae distant inter se binos pedes* (the balks 2 feet apart) *revinciuntur introrsus* (are bound together on the inner side). In § 5 he describes the *materia* (the balks) as being *perpetuis trabibus pedum quadragenum introrsus revincta* (bound together on the inner side with beams 40 feet long). According to Long, the *trabes directae* were identical with the *trabes pedum quadragenum* with which they were bound together!

### THE DIMENSIONS OF THE AGGER AT AVARICUM

*Aggerem, latum pedes CCCXXX, altum pedes LXXX, exstruxerunt.*<sup>6</sup> Such are the numbers given by all the MSS.; and it is better to trust them than to make conjectures. The *agger* which Trebonius made at the siege of Massilia was also 80 feet high;<sup>7</sup> and here again all the MSS. agree. Napoleon<sup>8</sup> accounts for the great height of the *agger* at Avaricum by pointing to the depression of the ground in front of the wall. Rustow<sup>9</sup> proposes *longum* instead of *latum*. I am sure that Caesar did not write *longum*: first, because it is much more likely that he laid stress upon

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 260.

<sup>3</sup> *Caesar*, pp. 347-8.

<sup>5</sup> 7 m.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, ii. 403.

<sup>4</sup> 2 m. 70 c.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 24, § 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Huius spatii pars ea quae ad arcem pertinet, loci natura et valle altissima munita longam et difficilem habet oppugnationem. Ad ea perficienda opera C. Trebonius . . . vimina materiamque comportari iubet. Quibus comparatis rebus, aggerem in altitudinem pedum LXXX exstruxit.* *B. C.*, ii. 1, §§ 3-4. Commandant Rouby, in his study on the siege of Massilia (*Spectateur mil.*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. XLV., 1874, p. 173, n. 1), remarks that some MSS. have *latitudinem* instead of *altitudinem*. This is a mistake: some old editions have *latitudinem*, but no known MSS. M. Rouby defends *altitudinem* on the ground that it corresponds better with the words *valle altissima*, and that the alleged height of 80 feet agrees perfectly with the features of the ground on which the *agger* must have been constructed.

<sup>8</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 256, n. 1.

<sup>9</sup> *Heerwesen und Kriegsführung C. J. Cäsars*, 1855, p. 143.

the width, as allowing room for the assaulting columns, than upon the length of the terrace; and secondly, because it is more likely that, if there is a mistake in the MSS., the numerals are wrong than the word *latum*. Practical men, like Guischart and Colonel Stoffel, find no difficulty in accepting the statement of the MSS. See my article on the *agger* (pp. 594-601, *supra*).

#### HOW WAS THE COLUMN OF ASSAULT COVERED BEFORE THE STORMING OF AVARICUM?

"The legions unobserved got ready for action under cover of the sheds. (Caesar) . . . gave the troops the signal. In a moment they darted forth from every point and swiftly lined the wall" (*legionibusque intra vineas in occulto cœpeditis cohortatus . . . militibusque signum dedit. Illi subito ex omnibus partibus evolaverunt murumque celeriter compleverunt*).<sup>1</sup> *Intra vineas* is the reading of  $\beta$ . The various readings are *extra vineas*, *e-tra* (*istra vineis*), *extra castra vineas* and *iuxta vineas*,<sup>2</sup> none of which Caesar wrote, as the first and the last are pointless, in the second *extra castra* is superfluous, and the third is nonsense. Messrs. Allen and Greenough<sup>3</sup> observe that there would not have been room for legions inside the *vineae*, and that therefore, if *intra vineas* is the true reading, either *intra vineas* must mean "among and around the sheds," or *legiones* must mean "the storming columns,"—which of course is exactly what it must mean anyhow. If it is objected that there would not have been room even for one legion *intra vineas*, and that Caesar would not have written *legiones* when he meant "columns of assault," which fell short of a single legion in strength, I reply that Caesar did not always write with precision; and that if only the foremost part of the force was simultaneously concealed *intra vineas*, he might have spoken loosely of the legions as *intra vineas*. Heller,<sup>4</sup> in order to get over the imaginary difficulty, invents or borrows from Achaintre<sup>5</sup> the reading *inter castra vineasque*: but one may be sure that in nine cases out of ten conjectural emendations are wrong. The words *in occulto* are not found in all the MSS.: but if they are genuine, they throw additional discredit on Heller's emendation; as it is difficult to see how, from the point of view of the sentries standing upon the wall, the storming columns could have been hidden unless they had been inside, or within a space enclosed by the *vineae*. Achaintre argues, indeed, that, owing to the height of the *agger*, they would have been out of sight. But even if they had not been seen by those sentries who were standing on the wall right opposite the *agger*, they would surely have been seen by those who were standing on the wall on either side of the *agger*; and in any case, if the troops had been standing only where Achaintre and Heller place them, Caesar would have

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 27, § 2.    <sup>2</sup> See Meusel's *Caesar*, p. 176.    <sup>3</sup> *Caesar*, p. 194.

<sup>4</sup> *Philologus*, xix., 1863, p. 534.

<sup>5</sup> *Caesar*, i. 317.

written *inter castra aggeremque*. Von Goler<sup>1</sup> suggests for *intra vineas interea*, — a much more improbable conjecture even than Heller's. Guischart,<sup>2</sup> who accepts the reading *intra vineas*, believes that there were two towers, one on either side of the *agger*, and connected with it by *vineae*; that some of the troops belonging to the assaulting force were formed up, as Heller believes, between the *agger* and the camp; and that the rest were formed up under and immediately behind the connecting *vineae*. This suggestion, he says, makes everything intelligible. To my mind, everything is intelligible without the suggestion; and if there is any difficulty, the suggestion only makes matters worse. For Caesar says that the towers were *on the agger*, not on either side of it;<sup>3</sup> and the imaginary connecting galleries, in order to be of any use for the purpose of communicating between the *agger* and the imaginary towers, would have had to be closed on the side exposed to the town. How then were the assaulting columns to get out of them? And how were they to scale the wall unless they first mounted the terrace?

The reading for which I am contending is supported by the statement, — which Caesar makes in the very next sentence, — that the soldiers “suddenly darted forth from every point and swiftly lined the wall” (*subito ex omnibus partibus evolaverunt murumque celeriter compleverunt*).

Whatever the right reading may be, this much is clear. Caesar intended to surprise the enemy; and therefore he concealed his troops somehow. If they had only been concealed behind the *agger* and had become visible as soon as they set foot upon it, the enemy would have had warning. Therefore the head of the column, at all events, was formed up *on the agger*. The only means of concealing them was to place them inside the *vineae* or within a space enclosed by *vineae* or both.<sup>4</sup>

#### THE STRATAGEM BY WHICH CAESAR CROSSED THE ALLIER ON HIS MARCH TO GERGOVIA

The passage in which Caesar describes his stratagem runs as follows: — “Cum uterque utrique esset exercitus in conspectu, fereque e regione castris castra poneret, dispositis exploratoribus, necubi effecto ponte Romani copias traducerent; erat in magnis Caesari difficultatibus res, ne maiorem aestatis partem flumine impediretur, quod non fere ante autumnum Elaver vado transiri solet. Itaque, ne id accideret, silvestri loco castris positus, e regione iunius eorum pontium, quos Vercingetorix rescindendos curaverat, postero die cum duabus legionibus in occulto restitit; reliquas copias cum omnibus impedimentis, ut consuevit, misit,

<sup>1</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 258, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Mém. mil.*, ii. 22.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 22, § 4. See p. 728, *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> I find that what I have written is supported by Colonel Stoffel, who says (*Guerre civile*, ii. 363), “César . . . disposa ses légions dans les *vineae*.”

*captis quibusdam cohortibus*, uti numerus legionum constare videretur. His quam longissime possent progredi iussis, cum iam ex dici tempore coniecturam caperet, in castra perventum, isdem publicis, quarum pars inferior integra remanebat, pontem reficere coepit. Celeriter effecto opere, legionibusque traductis et loco castris idoneo delecto, reliquas copias revocavit."<sup>1</sup> Now this much is clear. Caesar either kept back two entire legions and sent on four, or selected 20 cohorts out of the 60 of which his six legions were composed, and sent on 40; and he so arranged the four legions or the 40 cohorts which he sent on that, seen from the opposite bank of the Allier, they looked like six legions. To me it seems clear that he meant what he said,—kept back two entire legions and sent on four: otherwise, he would, I believe, have written (postero die cum) *viginti cohortibus* (in occulto restitit).

*Captis quibusdam cohortibus* is found in all the MSS., except Leid. tert., Dorn. and Duk., which have *demptis quibusdam cohortibus*; And., which has *captis quartis quibusque cohortibus*; Oxon., which has *captis quartis quidem cohortibus*; and Leid. sec., which has *captis quartis cohortibus*.<sup>2</sup> The authority of these MSS. is nil.<sup>3</sup>

The modern Editors, with the single exception of Frigell, are unanimous in holding that Caesar did not write *captis*, I suppose on the ground that the word cannot possibly be used in the only sense which can be here attributed to it. Oudendorp<sup>4</sup> explained *captis* as equivalent to *delectis*: but Schneider<sup>5</sup> denies that it would have been possible to make 40 cohorts look like six legions by simply picking out 20 cohorts out of the whole 60. Accordingly he follows Wendel, who reads *carptis*. *Carptis quibusdam cohortibus* would mean, I apprehend, "breaking up a certain number of cohorts into their constituent parts," namely maniples; and Wendel points out that Livy (xxvi. 38) writes *in nullas parvasque partes carpere exercitum*, where some MSS. have *capere*. Van der Mey<sup>6</sup> refuses to believe that Caesar wrote *carptis quibusdam* (cohortibus); for, he argues, if Caesar had made 40 cohorts look like 60 by breaking up cohorts into their constituent maniples, he would have been obliged to break up the whole 40 and not merely some (*quibusdam*). Therefore, if Caesar wrote *carptis*, and used it in the sense of "breaking up," he could not have written *quibusdam*. I cannot see the force of this argument. Why should not Caesar have sent on three of the four legions in their usual formation, broken up the 10 cohorts of the remaining legion into their 30 maniples, and, by diminishing the breadth of each of those maniples, extended their length so as to make them look like cohorts? It would have been impossible for Vercingetorix to detect that the breadth of the sham cohorts had been diminished; for he was probably separated by a distance of several hundred yards, at least, from Caesar's column.<sup>7</sup>

Holder,<sup>8</sup> following an emendation of H. Deiter, reads "*ita apertis quibusdam cohortibus*," which means much the same as Wendel's

<sup>1</sup> B. G., vii. 35.

<sup>2</sup> Caesar, ed. Nipperdey, p. 93.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, Meusel uses none of them.

<sup>4</sup> Caesar, i. 380.

<sup>5</sup> Caesar, ii. 435-6.

<sup>6</sup> Mnemosyne, xii., 1884, pp. 226-7.

<sup>7</sup> See *Eos*, ii., 1866, p. 136.

<sup>8</sup> Caesar, p. 167.

reading. Dittenberger,<sup>1</sup> following an emendation of Vielhaber, reads "*partitis quibusdam cohortibus*": but, as *partitis* is virtually identical in meaning with *carptis*, and much more unlike *captis*, the reading of the best MSS., I cannot see what is to be gained by adopting it. For the same reason, I wonder that Meusel should have adopted B. Muller's conjecture,—*distractis* (*quibusdam cohortibus*).

Nipperdey<sup>2</sup> proposes "*maniplis singulis demptis cohortibus*." "Since," he writes, "Caesar kept back two out of his six legions, the remaining four had to be arranged in such wise as to look like six. Now, as there were 30 maniples in each legion, and three maniples in each cohort, the only way of making six (apparent) legions out of four legions or 120 maniples was to assign 20 maniples instead of 30 to each legion. The most convenient way of doing this was to withdraw one manipule from each cohort; for in this way the number of the cohorts remained the same." But Nipperdey's emendation introduces a new word *maniplis* into the text, which is not found in any of the MSS.; and Caesar could have effected his purpose just as well by sending on 40 entire cohorts, or 120 maniples, and rearranging them so that they should look like 60 cohorts, as by sending on 60 mutilated cohorts, each composed of two maniples.

Other conjectural emendations, which German scholars have amused themselves and tormented people who, like myself, only care to learn what Caesar meant, by devising, are *sectis*, *laratis*,<sup>3</sup> *interceptis*, *sic aptatis*, *cavis*, *dimidiatis*, *distractis*, and *ita positis* (*quibusdam cohortibus*); *detractis* (*quartis quibusque cohortibus*); and *demptis tertiis* (*quibusque cohortibus*). I have no doubt that a good scholar, with a fertile imagination, and an hour to waste, might make considerable additions to this list.

For purely historical purposes, it matters very little what Caesar wrote; for even if all the MSS. and all the emendations are wrong, it is impossible to mistake his drift. Long,<sup>4</sup> following Feibauch, suggests that if he wrote *captis quartis quibusque cohortibus*, he may have meant that he took from his 60 cohorts the first, fourth, seventh and so on, and sent on the rest. "Thus," he adds, "instead of taking two entire legions, which the enemy might from some circumstance or other have missed, he preserved the six legions with diminished numbers." I am certain that Caesar did not write *captis*, for these reasons. First, I believe that he means what he said,—that he kept back two entire legions and not "certain cohorts" or "every fourth cohort": he would not have described 20 cohorts as *quibusdam cohortibus*, and *quartis quibusque cohortibus* is surely bad Latin. Why not *quarta quaque cohorte*? Secondly, if Caesar had written *captis quibusdam cohortibus* or *captis quartis quibusque cohortibus*, he would simply have been

<sup>1</sup> Caesar, pp. 297, 406-7.

<sup>2</sup> Caesar, pp. 93-4.

<sup>3</sup> F. Kindscher (*Zeitschrift f. d. Gymnasialwesen*, 1860, p. 426) defends *larotis* by the argument that Caesar would have made the ranks march further apart than usual. But this is just what he would not have done, for fear of arousing Vercingetorix's suspicions. He would have made the breadth of the column narrower than usual, because from the opposite bank Vercingetorix could not have seen that he had done so.

<sup>4</sup> Caesar, p. 356.

repeating, clumsily and obscurely, his previous statement,—*cum II legionibus in occulto restitit*. Thirdly, there would have been no sense in saying “the rest of the force he sent on as usual, with the whole of the baggage, picking out certain cohorts, so that the number of legions might appear unchanged.” “Picking out,” that is to say, keeping back, certain cohorts would not have made the number of legions appear unchanged: by itself, it would have had the opposite effect; in order to make the four legions look like six, it was necessary to rearrange them.<sup>1</sup> The text, then, is certainly wrong; and we cannot do without an emendation of some sort. Now Professor Tyrrell<sup>2</sup> has remarked, with much good sense, that “the first duty of an editor is to see that the ms. tradition is not put aside, unless it is quite clear that it is wrong, and cannot be reasonably defended. His next duty is to keep as close as he can to the mss. when he is obliged to desert them, and never to put forward a conjecture without a theory to account for the corruption.” And again, “the best copyists . . . on meeting an unfamiliar word almost invariably write down, instead of it, that common word which most closely resembles it in form, without in the least troubling themselves about the meaning of the sentence.” Not one of the emendations of the passage in question fulfils the necessary conditions, except *carptis*. *Carptis*, as I have shown, makes perfectly good sense,<sup>3</sup> and it enables us to form a perfectly intelligible theory of Caesar’s stratagem. Therefore, although I do not know what Caesar wrote, although we shall never know, let emendators run riot till Doomsday, *carptis* is the emendation for me.

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#### WHERE DID CAESAR CROSS THE ALLIER ON HIS MARCH TO GERGOVIA?

1. Napoleon<sup>4</sup> fixes upon Varennes as the site of the bridge which Caesar repaired. He argues that (a) the existence of the bridge proves that there must have been a road leading to it; (b) only two Roman roads, and therefore probably only two Gallic roads led to the Allier below Moulins,—one at Varennes, the other at Yichy; (c) the distance of Varennes from Gergovia, nearly 77 kilometres, or about 48 miles, is about what Caesar would have accomplished through a strange

<sup>1</sup> Messrs. Bond and Walpole (*Caesar*, p. 363) suggest that, “if *captis* is the right reading, the text may mean ‘that although some cohorts had been removed, yet,’ etc. But we should have expected *uti* to come before *captis*.” Certainly we should; and what then would be the sense of *uti numerus legionum constare videretur*? What would be the sense of saying, “the rest of the troops he sent on as usual with all the baggage, in order that, although some cohorts had been removed, the number of the legions might appear unchanged”?

<sup>2</sup> *The Correspondence of Cicero*, vol. ii. pp. vii. viii.

<sup>3</sup> See Forcellini’s *Lexicon*, t. ii., 1861, p. 94. F. gives, as one of the meanings of *carpo*, “rem aliquam in partes tribuo, seco, discerpo.”

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 267, n. 3.

country in five marches, the first of which, owing to the fatigue of the four legions which had done double work on the previous day, was probably short, and likewise the fifth, because Caesar arrived at Gergovia early on that day;<sup>1</sup> and (d) Vichy is only 55 kilometres, or about 33 miles, from Gergovia.

I do not think that the strangeness of the country would have interfered with the speed of Caesar's marching, any more than it did when he was making his rapid march against Ariovistus;<sup>2</sup> for if guides were necessary, he had probably procured them. Desjardins<sup>3</sup> thinks that the data upon which Napoleon's calculations are based are too slight to be of any value.

2. Caesar says that, three days after he left Gergovia to rejoin Labienus, he repaired a bridge over the Allier and crossed by it.<sup>4</sup> Belley<sup>5</sup> infers that this was the same bridge by which Caesar had crossed the river when he was marching to Gergovia. He assumes that Caesar, on his return march, accomplished 28 kilometres a day; and accordingly he places the bridge a little above Moulins. There is nothing in this argument. The fact that Caesar had to repair the bridge by which he crossed the Allier on his return march goes to prove that it was *not* the same as the one by which he had crossed before; for there is no reason to suppose that the latter had meanwhile been injured. And it is impossible to say how far Caesar marched in the three days.

3. General Creuly<sup>6</sup> thinks the distance from Varennes to Gergovia too short to have required five marches. He believes that when Caesar went to Decetia, or Décize, to settle the dispute between the rival candidates for the office of Vergobret,<sup>7</sup> he left his army at Noviodunum, or Nevers, where he had an important dépôt.<sup>8</sup> If so, he observes, Caesar must have begun his march for Gergovia near the point where the Allier flows into the Loire; and therefore, as a glance at the map will show, he might have crossed the Allier, not at Varennes but at Moulins, which is about 18 miles, as the crow flies, lower down the river. This hypothesis, Creuly argues, agrees better than Napoleon's with the fact that Caesar reached Gergovia in five marches. But, even assuming that Caesar started from Nevers, it does not follow that he crossed the Allier at Moulins; for even if there was a bridge at Moulins, it is not certain that the country on the right bank, opposite the bridge, would have afforded the cover which he required for his stratagem.

Desjardins is quite right in saying that the data are insufficient: but Napoleon's choice, Varennes, is the most probable.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See *B. G.*, vii. 35-6.

<sup>2</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 676-7, n. 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, i. 41, §§ 4-5.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 53, § 4. Schneider (*Caesar*, ii. 494) thinks that when Caesar said that he reached the Allier *tertio die*, he reckoned the time from the day on which he rebuked the legions for their disobedience during the attack on Gergovia (*B. G.*, vii. 52). I believe, on the contrary, that by *tertio die* he meant the third day of his march.

<sup>5</sup> D'Anville, *Éclaircissements sur l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 444.

<sup>6</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, p. 401.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 33, §§ 1-2.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, 55, §§ 1-3.

<sup>9</sup> Von Göler (*Gal. Krieg*, p. 289, n. 1) thinks that Caesar crossed the river higher up, as being narrower, when he was retreating from Gergovia than when he



## CAESAR'S OPERATIONS AT GERGOVIA

Since the publication of Napoleon's *Histoire de Jules César*, Caesar's description of his operations at Gergovia has become more intelligible. Whoever reads the letter from Colonel Stoffel which I have printed on pages xxviii.-xxx., will be convinced that he really discovered two Roman camps, connected by a pair of parallel trenches, on the south-east of Gergovia and on the Roche-Blanche; and that Mr. Stock's attempt to discredit his discovery is absurd. Even now, however, the commentators are not all of one mind; and no man can discuss the question with authority who has not carefully examined the ground with his own eyes.

I. I. M. J. B. Bouillet identifies the larger camp with a camp at Gondole, which is five kilometres and a half, or nearly three miles and a half, east of Gergovia. He argues that the camp discovered by Colonel Stoffel was too near Gergovia, and that Vercingetorix could have clearly seen everything that went on in it. He also observes that, according to Dion Cassius, the larger camp was in the plain, and that the camp at Gondole fulfils this condition.<sup>1</sup>

M. Bouillet also differs from Napoléon regarding the position of the smaller camp. It could not, he argues, have been on the Roche-Blanche;<sup>2</sup> for Caesar describes the hill on which it was situated as scarped on every side, whereas the Roche-Blanche is scarped only on the south. It was on the hill of Bonneval, north-east of Gergovia, and 1780 metres, or nearly 2000 yards, from the plateau.

On both these points M. Bouillet is wrong. Napoleon's larger camp is a good mile and a half from the nearest point of the plateau of Gergovia. Vercingetorix, not having a field-glass, could not have seen what went on in it; and it would not have mattered if he could. If the testimony of Dion contradicted the testimony of Caesar, it would be worthless; and it does not contradict either the testimony of Caesar or the discovery of Colonel Stoffel. Napoleon's camp is virtually in

was marching to it. But as he crossed by a bridge, which he only had to repair, it could not have mattered much whether the river was wider or narrower. The truth is that we are as much in the dark on the one point as the other. Caesar crossed the Allier where it suited him to cross it, and that is all that we shall ever know.

<sup>1</sup> *Mém. de l'Acad. des sciences, etc., de Clermont-Ferrand*, nouv. sér., t. xvii., 1875, pp. 45-9. M. Bouillet's view is shared by M. P. P. Mathieu, who regards Col. Stoffel's camp as "une position . . . prise et gardée après la défaite, pour raffermir le moral du soldat" (*Nouvelles observations sur les camps romains de Gergovia*, 1863). He adds that between the camp of Gondole and the Butte d'Orcet, which he regards as the site of Caesar's smaller camp, three trenches are still visible. This very fact,—if it is a fact,—proves that they were not made by Caesar (see p. xxviii., *supra*); and Caesar says that there were two trenches, not three. Moreover, the Butte d'Orcet is a good mile from the nearest of the outlying spurs of Gergovia!

<sup>2</sup> It should be mentioned that the hill on which the smaller camp stood was identified with the Roche-Blanche before Napoleon was heard of,—by d'Aigueperse, for instance, in 1840. See *Œuvres arch. et litt.* de A. J. B. d'Aigueperse, 1862, i. 9-10.

the plain: that is to say, it is on rising ground, sloping gently to a very moderate height above the plain. On a plain strictly so called, on a dead level, Caesar never would have been so foolish as to encamp; <sup>1</sup> nor would he have encamped three miles and a half from the town which he hoped to take. Moreover, if the Roche Blanche is only scarped on the south, the hill of Bonneval, as M. Bouillet himself admits, is only scarped on the south and west; and, as Napoleon says, <sup>2</sup> "The Roche Blanche, which presents in its southern part an escarpment almost as perpendicular as a wall, has lost on the sides its abrupt form by successive land-slips, the last of which took place within the memory of the inhabitants." I can myself testify that the Roche Blanche is extremely steep on the southern part of its western side; and it is plain that Caesar, when he described the hill as *ex omni parte circumciscus* could not have meant to say that it was literally scarped on all sides, but only that it was steep; for if it had been as steep on every side as it is on the south, it would have been impossible for him to capture it, nor would the Gauls, even if they had been as skilful mountaineers as Sir Martin Conway, have attempted to occupy it. It would have required twice as much labour to dig a trench from the camp at Gondole to the hill of Bonneval as from Napoleon's camp to the Roche Blanche: it would have been far more difficult for the Romans to attack Gergovia from the north than from the south; and the undoubted discovery of a pair of trenches between Napoleon's camp and the Roche Blanche and of the smaller camp on the Roche Blanche itself is conclusive.

2. Various other absurd guesses, of which A. Olleris <sup>3</sup> gives a list, have been hazarded as to the site of the smaller camp. A glance at the map will dispel any doubt as to the worth of these guesses; and no man who has carefully reconnoitred the ground will feel the least doubt that the Roche Blanche is the only hill which corresponds with Caesar's description.

II. Colonel T. A. Dodge <sup>4</sup> says, "The north slope is wont to be described as impossible to capture. It is not so. The slope is not steep, though it is long. . . . It is probable that in Caesar's day the slope was concealed by woods and that he did not reconnoitre it thoroughly. But the position could have been surprised on the north far more easily than assaulted on the south." These remarks are altogether misleading. "Steep" is a relative term: but local authorities <sup>5</sup> agree in describing the northern slope of Gergovia as too steep to have been attacked with any chance of success; and the *Carte de l'État-Major*, Sheet 166, confirms their statements. I have myself ascended Gergovia from the north and from the south-west; and I can say positively that the ascent is much more difficult on the north. Caesar tells us that he

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *B. G.*, ii. 8, § 3, 18, § 1, 33, § 2; iii. 17, § 5, 19, § 1; viii. 36, § 3, etc.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 270, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Examen des diverses opinions émises sur le siège de Gergovia*, 1861, pp. 14-15.

<sup>4</sup> *Caesar*, pp. 254-5.

<sup>5</sup> See A. Olleris, *Examen*, etc., p. 8, and A. d'Aigueperse, *Œuvres arch. et litt.*, i. 3-4.

reconnoitred the whole position ;<sup>1</sup> and it is absurd to suppose that he did his work carelessly or that he threw away his best chance of capturing Gergovia. The truth is that, as he was not prepared to blockade the stronghold, there was only one way of attacking it which offered the least chance of success ; and that was to seize the Col des Goules, which linked the south-western part to the outlying heights of Risolles.

III. Caesar says that Vercingetorix "had encamped close to the town and grouped the contingents of the several tribes in separate camps, at moderate distances, round his own quarters" (*castris prope oppidum positis mediocribus circum se intervallis separatim singularum civitatum copias conlocaverat*).<sup>2</sup> From the words *circum se* von Göler inferred that the Gallic camps stood in a circle on the slopes of the mountain all round the town ;<sup>3</sup> but, as Napoleon<sup>4</sup> shows, this is a mistake. The words *circum se* only imply that the camps of the contingents surrounded the camp of Vercingetorix. Vercingetorix could have had no object in placing any of the camps on the northern or the eastern face of the mountain ; and they doubtless stood on the southern slope and on the heights of Risolles.

IV. Long insists that when Caesar temporarily quitted Gergovia, in order to intercept Litavicus, he left his smaller camp undefended. "Caesar, he says, "took four legions out of the larger camp, and left two legions to defend it. These two legions were therefore transferred from the small camp to the large camp, and the small camp . . . might have been seized by the Galli, but it probably contained nothing that they would value, and they would not have been able to defend it when Caesar returned."<sup>5</sup> This is a sorry argument. It was not what the small camp contained that the Gauls would have valued, but the commanding position on which the camp stood, the possession of which enabled Caesar to cut them off from the principal source of their supplies of water and forage. He had only been able to seize this position originally because it was inadequately garrisoned ;<sup>6</sup> and if the Gauls had once recovered it, they would have taken care not to lose it a second time. Caesar simply says that he left two legions to defend his *castra* (*Gaium Fabium . cum legionibus duabus castris praesidio relinquit*) ;<sup>7</sup> and I believe that *castris* in this passage, as in vii. 82, § 2, 83, § 1, means "camps," not "camp." Anyhow, Caesar would have been mad if he had left the smaller camp undefended.

V. The identity of the *collis nudatus*,—the hill which, on the day before his final repulse, Caesar observed to be bare of defenders,—is still an open question. Caesar says that it was visible from the smaller camp, that is to say from the Roche Blanche ; and that there was a ridge or col (*dorsum*) belonging to *eius vugi*, which was nearly level, and, in a place where it gave access to "the other part of the town,"

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 86, § 1.<sup>a</sup>

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, § 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, Taf. ix.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 270, n. 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 312, note.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 86, §§ 5-6.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, 40, § 3.

was wooded and narrow. Finally, he says that the Gauls who had previously occupied the *collis* had been withdrawn by Vercingetorix to fortify "this place," that is to say the place which gave access to "the other part" of the town.<sup>1</sup> *Eius iugi* must mean either the whole range formed by the mountain of Gergovia and the heights of Risolles or, more probably, the latter only.

1. According to d'Aigueperse, the *dorsum*, or ridge, was the western part of the plateau of Gergovia (!) and the town was on the eastern part.<sup>2</sup> He distinguishes the *dorsum* from the narrow wooded saddle, or, as he calls it, "la partie par laquelle on arrivait à la ville du côté opposé," which, as he says, "était étroite et couverte de bois (*silvestre et angustum*)"; and this he identifies<sup>3</sup> with the eminence "située au-dessus du village de Prat" on the north of the plateau! But it was the *dorsum* itself, as Caesar distinctly says, which, where it gave access to the town, was wooded and narrow; and it is difficult to understand how any man who had seen Gergovia could have imagined that the hill of Prat should have given access to the plateau, or that it should have been necessary to fortify it. The possession of the hill of Prat would have been absolutely useless to Caesar; and nothing can be more certain than that the *dorsum*, or at least that part of it which was wooded and narrow, was the Col des Goules.

2. Von Kampen identifies the *collis nudatus* with that part of the mass of Risolles which is marked in the map as 723 metres high; but Mr. W. C. Compton<sup>4</sup> truly observes that "the Puy de Jussat partially obscures the view of Risolles from the Roche Blanche."

3. Napoleon, with whom Mr. Compton agrees, identifies the *collis* with a hill, marked A in his Plan (No. 21), 692 metres high, which forms a part of the mass of Risolles, and is about 550 yards south-west of the nearest part of the plateau of Gergovia.<sup>5</sup>

4. Desjardins says that the *collis* was "sans doute le puy de Jussat."<sup>6</sup> Of the hill which Napoleon chooses he says, "elle nous semble trop haute, trop près de l'accès du plateau, c'est-à-dire du col des Goules, pour avoir été dé garnie des troupes, puisque le système du général gaulois aurait été au contraire de mieux défendre cet accès." Of course. But in order to defend the "accès," Vercingetorix was obliged to remove troops temporarily from the *collis* to fortify it. Whatever may be said

<sup>1</sup> Cum in minora castra operis percipiendi causa venisset, et, animadvertit collem, qui ab hostibus tenebatur, nudatum hominibus, qui superioribus diebus vix prae multitudine cerni poterat. Admiratus quaerit ex perfugis causam. . . . Constat inter omnes, quod iam ipse Caesar per exploratores cognoverat, dorsum esse eius iugi prope aequum, sed silvestre et angustum, qua esset aditus ad alteram partem oppidi; vehementer huic illos loco timere, nec iam aliter sentire, uno colle ab Romanis occupato, si alterum amisissent, quin paene circumvallati atque omni exitu et pabulatione interclusi viderentur: ad hunc munierum locum omnes a Vercingetorige evocatos. *B. G.*, vii. 44.

<sup>2</sup> It has been proved by excavation, and indeed it is obvious that the town covered the whole of the plateau.

<sup>3</sup> *Œuvres arch. et litt.*, p. 15.

<sup>4</sup> *Caesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul*, 1889, p. 93.

<sup>5</sup> So also Fischer in *Annales scientifiques de l'Auvergne*, xxviii., 1855, map facing p. 416.

<sup>6</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 682.

of Napoleon's choice, Desjardins's is certainly wrong. It is incredible that Vercingetorix would have occupied a hill the possession of which would have been useless to him and which was so far from Gergovia as the Puy de Jussat. Moreover, any one who has seen the "puy" will have seen that it would have been impossible for Vercingetorix to occupy any part of it which was visible from the Roche Blanche with more than a handful of men, except the lower slopes.<sup>1</sup>

5. According to von Güler,<sup>2</sup> the *collis nudatus* was simply that part of the southern slope of Gergovia which lies between the plateau and the Gallic wall of loose stones: by the words *alteram partem oppidi* he understands the northern or rather the north-western side of Gergovia; and he identifies the place which the Gauls attempted to fortify with Mont Rognon, the nearest point of which is at least two kilometres, or about a mile and a quarter, from the nearest point of the plateau! It is difficult to understand how a soldier like von Güler could have blundered in this fashion; and if he had ever seen the country, he would have realised that for Vercingetorix to fortify Mont Rognon would have been about as useful as to fortify the Puy de Dôme. His son frankly admits that he was wrong.<sup>3</sup>

My conclusion is that Napoleon's choice was almost certainly right. That he traced correctly the line which the Gauls fortified, no one who has seen the ground will deny.

VI. Describing the stratagem by which he endeavoured to distract the attention of Vercingetorix before attempting to take Gergovia, Caesar says that he sent a number of horsemen by a circuitous route in the direction of the place which Vercingetorix was fortifying; and then he goes on to say that he sent a legion "by (or along) the same ridge" (*eodem iugo*).<sup>4</sup> It has been conjectured that *eodem iugo* means the hill which Vercingetorix was fortifying: but it is needless to say that *eodem iugo* cannot mean the same as *ad idem iugum* ("to the same hill"); and the context shows that the legion was not sent to this place. If Caesar wrote *eodem iugo*, the words must mean that the legion was sent along the same line of high ground by which the horsemen had gone, that is to say, the northern slopes of the Montagne de la Serre.<sup>5</sup> Von Güler, however, believes that Caesar wrote *eodem*

<sup>1</sup> Independently of the argument in the text, I think that it may be inferred from Caesar's narrative that the *collis nudatus* formed a part of *eius iugi*, that is to say of the mass of Rislefies.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, p. 277, n. 3-4. See also Napoleon's *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 275, note, for an elaborate and conclusive refutation of von Güler.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 45, §§ 1-5.

<sup>5</sup> So Heller (*Philologus*, xxvi., 1867, p. 686). Dittenberger quotes from Livy (ii. 50, § 10) "*ni iugo circummissus Veiens in verticem collis evasisset*"; and a passage in *B. C.*, i. 70, § 4,—"eo consilio, uti ipse . . . iugis Octogesam perveniret," is decisive. Paul argues (*Berliner philologische Wochenschrift*, iii., 1883, p. 563) that *iugo* must mean "along the ridge," not along the slope of the hill. This is an arbitrary assertion; and it is certain that the legion did not go "along the ridge"; for no general who was not a lunatic would have sent them on such an errand. Paul contends that Caesar would have mentioned the time at which he despatched the legion; and accordingly he conjectures that he wrote (*legionem unam eodem iuce* (*mittit*), etc.,—"Caesar sent a single legion in the same direction

*illo*, "just towards that side."<sup>1</sup> There is no necessity for this emendation; and in fact, as Steinberg remarks,<sup>2</sup> von Göler only made it because he had fallen into the mistake of supposing that the place which Vercingetorix fortified was Mont Rognon.

VII. It is impossible and unnecessary to trace the exact route by which this legion marched. According to Napoleon, after leaving the large camp, it crossed the Auzon about a mile east of the foot of the Roche Blanche and recrossed it near the village of Chanonat. Mr. Compton<sup>3</sup> thinks that it moved along the northern bank of the Auzon throughout: but he fails to see that his theory is stultified by the words *eodem iugo*; and, according to his Plan, the legion, instead of descending to lower ground before it halted, as Caesar says that it did, ascended to higher ground. That part, at all events, of the route which Napoleon traced along the slope of the Montagne de la Serre is indicated correctly, at least in its general direction.

Paul<sup>4</sup> believes that Napoleon has made the legion advance further westward than Caesar's words *paulum progressam*<sup>5</sup> entitle him to do. He considers that it halted on the southern or south-eastern edge of the Puy de Jussat. The point is of infinitesimal importance: but I believe that Paul is mistaken. Caesar's words are vague; and on a question like this the opinion of a military expert like Colonel Stoffel is more likely to approximate to the truth than that of the most learned of scholars. Napoleon, following the colonel, made the legion halt just north of Chanonat.

VIII. The various positions occupied by the 10th legion and by Sextius<sup>6</sup> during the attack on Gergovia cannot be exactly fixed. It is indisputable, however, that the 10th was posted on the left and Sextius's division on the right of the Roman line of retreat, so as to check the pursuing Gauls.

Caesar says, in chapter 46, that about half-way up the mountain of Gergovia the Gauls had made a wall of loose stones; and the line of this wall is drawn in all maps about 300 yards north of the village of Gergovie, which was formerly called Merdogne. In chapter 47 Caesar says that after the other legions had passed the wall and taken their camps, he sounded the trumpet for them to retreat, or fall back (*receptui cani iussit*), and made the 10th legion, which he commanded in person, halt: but he adds that the other legions did not hear the signal because a

in broad daylight." This is one of the many instances in which this eminent scholar has wasted his time and his ingenuity in correcting what requires no correction. There was no reason why Caesar should mention any time. It was evidently daylight when he sent the legion on its journey; for in an earlier section of the same chapter he mentioned that he had sent a body of horsemen on a similar errand at dawn (*prima luce*). Therefore he would have conveyed little new information by writing *luce* afterwards, to say nothing of the fact that he would never have used the simple word *luce* to express the idea which Paul imputes to him.

<sup>1</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 281, note.

<sup>2</sup> *Philologus*, xxxiii., 1874, p. 452.

<sup>3</sup> *Caesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul*, Plan facing p. 30.

<sup>4</sup> *Berl. phil. Woch.*, iii., 1883, pp. 563-4.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 45, § 5.

<sup>6</sup> *Id.*, vii. 47, 49, 51.

wide valley intervened between him and them. This valley was undoubtedly the hollow or depression on the west of Gergovie.<sup>1</sup>

Heller maintains that when Caesar gave the order for the legions to retreat, he set the example of obedience by retreating himself.<sup>2</sup> Steinberg, however, justly observes that it was not necessary for him to do this. As he was himself outside and south of the Gallic stone wall, he could conveniently remain where he was until the other legions should have fallen back.<sup>3</sup> If, as Long believes,<sup>4</sup> he only ordered the legions to halt, or perhaps fall back to where he was himself standing, it is of course plain that he did not retreat himself.

Napoleon<sup>5</sup> fixes the first position of the 10th legion on a knoll on which stands the south-western part of the village of Gergovie: von Kampen<sup>6</sup> and Mr. Compton,<sup>7</sup> who has studied the ground, agree with him; and the position is almost certainly right or very nearly so. It is determined by a survey of the ground guided by the indications given by Caesar in chapters 45-47. Goler<sup>8</sup> selects a spot about 200 yards north-east of Gergovie, which is too far from the valley, and where, moreover, as any one who has seen the ground will admit, it would have been very difficult for the 10th legion to assist the others.

The second position of the 10th legion is fixed by Napoleon about a quarter of a mile east-south-east of the first. He bases his choice upon the reading *regressus*, in chapter 49, which von Goler and he substitute,

<sup>1</sup> If this depression was not the *satis magna callis*, Caesar must have referred to the very broken valley or gorge on the east of Gergovie; and although von Goler (*Gall. Krieg*, Taf. ix.) takes this view, nobody who has seen the ground will admit that Caesar would have taken up his position on the east of this gorge.

<sup>2</sup> *Philologus*, xxvii., 1867, p. 686. Caesar's text here presents a difficulty; and Heller selects the spot where he believes the 10th legion to have stood in accordance with an emendation of his own.<sup>6</sup> According to the MSS., Caesar wrote:—"Caesar recepti cani iussit legionisque (v. l. legionique) decimae, quacum erat *contionatus*, signa constituerunt (v. l. constituit)." Schneider (*Caesar*, ii. 477-9) defends *contionatus*, remarking that Caesar was referring to the speech which, as he tells us in chapter 45, he made to his lieutenants before sending them to attempt the capture of Gergovie, and suggesting that he addressed the assembled legions,—and particularly the 10th,—to the same effect. Nipperley (*Caesar*, p. 95), who puts a comma after *erat*, takes *contionatus* absolutely, and says "there is no obscurity as to the subject of Caesar's harangue: he announced that, as he had achieved his purpose, he intended to retreat." Other scholars, despairing of extracting any satisfactory meaning from *contionatus*, have made attempts, more or less futile, to amend the text. Paul (*Berl. phil. Woch.*, iii., 1883, p. 801) argues that Caesar would have been too busy to harangue the 10th legion at such a crisis, and proposes to read (quacum) *ierat C. Trebonius legatus* (!) Great is the ingenuity of the German emendator; and if he does not contribute much to the elucidation of the *Commentaries*, he presumably enjoys his self-imposed task. Whitte simply deleted *contionatus*; Heller (*Philologus*, xix., 1863, p. 540), who is followed by Holder, proposed *clivum nactus*; and von Goler, who is followed by Dittenberger, Meusel and others, *continuo*. See Meusel's *Tabula Conjecturarum*, p. 31 (*Lex. Caes.*, vol. ii., pars ii.).

<sup>3</sup> *Philologus*, xxxiii., 1874, p. 455.

<sup>4</sup> *Caesar*, p. 367; *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 319-21. See pp. 212-18, *supra*.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii., 278.

<sup>6</sup> *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. comm. tabulae*, x.

<sup>7</sup> *Caesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul*, Plan facing p. 30.

<sup>8</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, Taf. ix.

without any authority, for *progressus*. "The 10th legion," says Napoleon, "must, in the presence of a combat, the issue of which was uncertain, have taken up a position behind rather than towards the front."<sup>1</sup> In other words, the legion which acted as a reserve must have retreated just when its services seemed likely to be required! Von Göler defends *regressus* on the ground that, as Caesar had caused the 10th legion to halt immediately after the capture of the three camps, he would not have advanced nearer to the town, when his object was to be ready to support the legions, which were hard pressed by the Gauls.<sup>2</sup> But the circumstances were now changed, for the legions, in defiance of orders, had not halted, but had pushed on to the wall of Gergovia: *progressus* would not necessarily imply that Caesar advanced nearer to the town; and he certainly would have advanced nearer to the legions. Moreover, as Long points out, Caesar nowhere else uses the word *regressus*.<sup>3</sup> It is perhaps doubtful whether *progressus* means "advancing nearer" (to the town) or "advancing nearer" (to the hollow by which the legions had climbed the hill). Von Kampen and Compton adopt the latter meaning. They find the second position about 150 yards south-west of Gergovie, which seems to me unobjectionable.

As to the third position of the 10th legion, Caesar simply says, "Our men were overborne at every point and driven from their position with the loss of 46 centurions. The Gauls were in hot pursuit when the 10th legion, which had taken post in reserve on ground somewhat more level (than their former position) checked them" (*Nostri, cum undique premerentur, XLVI centurionibus amissis deieci sunt loco. Sed intolerantius Gallos insequentes legio decima tardavit, quae pro subsidio paullo aequiore loco constiterat*). Where the comparatively level ground was, depends upon the line of retreat taken by the defeated legions. Napoleon fixes upon a position about a quarter of a mile east-south-east of the second position, as indicated in his Plan; and about 600 yards east of this third position, on the Puy de Marmant, he and von Göler find the second position of Sextius, of whom Caesar says, "The 10th was in its turn covered by the cohorts of the 13th, which, under the command of T. Sextius, had quitted the smaller camp and taken a position higher up" (*Hanc rursus XIII legionis cohortes exceperunt, quae ex castris minoribus eductae cum T. Sextio legato ceperant locum superiorem*). Napoleon misunderstands the words *locum superiorem*, which do not mean "a high hill." In *B. G.*, iii. 4, § 2, Caesar describes the rampart of a camp as a *locus superior*; and, as A. Eberz points out, the *locus superior* which Sextius occupied was only *superior* in relation to the position at the foot of the mountain of Gergovia, which he had occupied before.<sup>4</sup> Von Kampen<sup>5</sup> holds that "the flight of the Gauls assuredly took place along the valley which runs from Merdogne (Gergovie) to Donnezat, and not across the hills, the less so because the

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 279, note.

<sup>2</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 286, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> See Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii. 1655.

<sup>4</sup> *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, etc., lxxv., 1857, p. 854.

<sup>5</sup> *Quindecim ab Caesaris de b. G. comm. tabulae*, x.



Romans had regarded the Aedui, who appeared on their right flank, as enemies, whom therefore they would certainly have not hastened to meet." Heller, objecting to the third position which Napoleon assigns to the 10th legion, says that Caesar would there have been separated from the other legions by the valley of Gergovie, and therefore could not have supported them. Accordingly he puts the 10th legion on the west of the valley.<sup>1</sup> I do not agree with this view. If the line of retreat of the other legions lay *along* the valley, Caesar could have supported them from the east just as well as from the west. Moreover, Sextius was unquestionably on the right of the line of retreat; and it is clear that Caesar remained on the side opposite to that of Sextius. Von Kampen finds the third position of the 10th legion immediately north-east of Donnezat, and the second position of Sextius immediately north-east of the village of La Roche Blanche. The latter of these positions is perhaps too far south; for von Kampen makes the retreating Romans cross the parallel trenches which connected the larger with the smaller camp. If he is right in tracing the line of retreat, I believe that the second position of Sextius was on the eastern slope of the Roche Blanche, and the third position of the 10th legion just opposite, on the north-west of Donnezat. I do not feel certain about the line of retreat: but Caesar's narrative seems to me to suggest that the Romans retreated, as they had advanced, along the valley of Gergovie. It might be argued in favour of Napoleon's view, that they would have retreated towards their large camp for fear of exposing it to attack: but Caesar had doubtless left a force to guard it; and if the Gauls had ventured to attack it, they would have been compelled to abandon their strong position on the high ground, and to fight a battle with the Romans in the plain.<sup>2</sup>

Regarding the first position of Sextius, Caesar's words,—“he sent an order to T. Sextius, whom he had left to guard the smaller camp, to take his cohorts, out quickly, and form them up at the foot of the hill, on the enemy's right, so as to check the freedom of their pursuit in case he saw our men driven from their position” (*ad T. Sextium legatum, quem minoribus castris praesidio reliquerat, misit ut cohortes ex castris celeriter educeret et sub infimo collis ab dextro latere hostium constitueret, ut, si caestros loco depulsos vidisset, quo minus libere hostes insequerentur, terreret*),—leave no room for doubt. Sextius was certainly in the hollow between the Roche Blanche and the hill of Gergovia; and Napoleon,

<sup>1</sup> *Philologus*, xxvi., 1867, pp. 687-8.

<sup>2</sup> Caesar says (*B. G.*, vii. 51, § 3) that the legions, as soon as they reached the plain, halted and stood fronting and threatening their pursuers. Heller (*Philologus*, xix., 1863, p. 539) actually holds that the plain was the narrow depression between the mountain of Gergovia and the Roche Blanche; and in support of this view, which he never could have adopted if he had seen the ground, he refers to the passage in which Caesar says that the distance, in a straight line, from the plain and the starting-point of the ascent to the wall of Gergovia was 1200 paces (about 1940 yards). But the distance from the depression between the Roche Blanche and the mountain of Gergovia to the wall of the town, is considerably less than 1200 paces. Probably, as Napoleon holds, the legions started on their ascent from the low ground between the Roche Blanche and the Puy de Marmant. The ground on the east of the Roche Blanche and just north of Donnezat might fairly be called a *planities*.

von Kampen and Steinberg<sup>1</sup> agree in placing him there, just on the right of the Roman line of retreat.

IX. The path followed by the Aeduan contingent, whom the legionaries, at the time when the fighting under the wall of Gergovia was going on, mistook for enemies, cannot of course be fixed with absolute precision. Caesar says that they appeared on the exposed (that is the right) flank of the legions; and that he had sent them by a path on the right, to distract the attention of the garrison.<sup>2</sup> The legions had climbed the southern slope of Gergovia. It is clear, then, that the Aedui ascended the mountain by some path on its eastern or south-eastern flank. According to Napoleon and von Kampen, they went up the south-eastern slope, taking the shortest road from the larger Roman camp, and passing about 500 yards north of the Puy de Marmant: but while von Kampen brings them to a point on the north-west of Gergovia and about 160 yards south of the outer Gallic wall, Napoleon makes them turn off to the left from a point about 550 yards due east of Gergovie, and strike off in a south-westerly direction. I am sure that Napoleon is wrong, because, on his theory, the Aedui would never have created a diversion at all; and it was for this reason that Caesar had sent them up the hill. Mr. Compton takes them to the same goal as von Kampen by a long *détour*, passing northward of the long spur which Gergovia throws out on the east, the height of which is marked as 445 metres; and this is in part the route indicated by von Goler: but von Goler makes the Aedui stop short at a point about 900 yards east of the northern extremity of Gergovie, in which case the Romans would not have noticed them until they were themselves in full retreat. Mr. Compton<sup>3</sup> says, "A second survey of the ground, after some years' interval, has only sufficed to confirm the impression that the point at which the Aedui are seen is the *upper* shoulder, the lower position being out of sight from the ravine under the south gate, where the fight took place (c. 48). But in order to reach the upper shoulder, a troop of armed men would be obliged to make a longer circuit to the north, the south-east corner of the hill being practically inaccessible."

I believe that Napoleon, von Goler, von Kampen and Mr. Compton are all mistaken, but that Mr. Compton goes nearest to the truth. It is obvious that the Aedui would not have fulfilled their mission of creating a diversion unless they had penetrated the space between the town and the outer wall; and it is clear from Caesar's narrative that the legions, when they caught sight of them, were still striving to hold their ground under the wall of the town. Besides, it is very unlikely that if the Aedui had been *below* the outer wall when they were descried, the Romans would have taken them for Vercingetorix's troops. What conceivable object could the latter have had in voluntarily descending from their strong position? I believe, therefore, that the Aedui, having climbed the hill on the east by the route

<sup>1</sup> *Philologus*, xxxiii., 1874, p. 457.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 50, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Caesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul*, p. 95.

which Mr. Compton indicates, and encountering no opposition, marched westward along the south side of the hill and on the north of the outer wall.

In 1896 and 1898 I spent nine afternoons in examining Gergovia and its environs. I was already familiar with the whole literature of the subject and had studied the best maps: but I found that I had a great deal to learn. The results of my observations, which I jotted down either on the hill-side or immediately after returning to Royat, are embodied in the foregoing pages and on pages 118-126 of my narrative. One or two minor points cannot be determined: but I believe that any student of the *Commentaries* who takes the trouble to reconnoitre the ground thoroughly will endorse my conclusions.

X. According to Mr. Compton,<sup>1</sup> "a story is told that in the fight Caesar himself lost his sword, which he afterwards was shown in a temple of the Arverni." No such story is told, except by Mr. Compton, Napoleon and other inaccurate modern writers. Plutarch,<sup>2</sup> indeed, says that Caesar lost a sword, but in the cavalry combat that preceded the blockade of Alesia. Another apocryphal story is told by Napoleon in such a way as to suggest that the incident which it describes took place at Gergovia. "Servius," he says, "relates that . . . when Caesar was taken away prisoner by the Gauls, one of them began to cry out *Caecos Caesar*, which signifies in Gaulish *let him go*, and thus he escaped."<sup>3</sup> But Servius only says that this happened in one of Caesar's battles in Gaul:—"Caius Julius Caesar, cum dimicaret in Gallia et ab hoste raptus equo eius<sup>4</sup> portaretur armatus, occurrit quidam ex hostibus qui eum nosset, et insultans ait *Cuesar Caesar* (v. l. *Cecos Caesar*), quod Gallorum lingua *dimicite* significat; et ita factum est ut dimitteretur. Hoc autem ipse Caesar in Ephemeride sua dixit."<sup>4</sup>

### LITAVICCU'S MARCH TO GERGOVIA

Caesar says that when Litaviccus was marching from the country of the Aedui to Gergovia, he halted about 30 Roman miles from that place to harangue his troops, and told them that they must push on and join Vercingetorix, and not Caesar. On the following night, at some time after twelve, Caesar started to intercept Litaviccus and encountered his force 25 Roman miles from Gergovia. Thereupon Litaviccus and his personal retainers made their escape to Gergovia.<sup>5</sup>

According to Napoleon,<sup>6</sup> Litaviccus marched towards Gergovia along the left or western bank of the Allier, halted to harangue his troops

<sup>1</sup> *Caesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul*, p. 97.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, 29.

<sup>3</sup> H. A. Lion's ed. (1826), ii. 48.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 271-2.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 282, n. 1.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 38-40.

near Serbannes, and encountered Caesar near Randan. C. Hartung<sup>1</sup> objects that, on this theory, Litaviccus would only have marched 5 miles, the distance between Serbannes and Randan, while the news of his approach was travelling to Gergovia and Caesar was marching 25 Roman miles from Gergovia to meet him. Hartung argues further that Litaviccus would have marched by the right or eastern bank of the Allier, in order to avoid falling into Caesar's clutches. He supposes that Litaviccus harangued the troops near Vichy, which is about 8 miles, as the crow flies, from Randan, and then marched in an easterly direction, so as to avoid Caesar and reach Gergovia by a *détour*. Caesar, however, so Hartung tells us, had foreseen this move. Accordingly he crossed from the left to the right bank of the Allier; made his legions march on a widely extended line, so as to avoid all possibility of missing Litaviccus; and encountered him near Thiers, E.N.E. of Gergovia.

A. Hug<sup>2</sup> admits that there is some force in Hartung's objection: but he holds that Hartung's theory presents greater difficulties than Napoleon's. It is quite inconceivable, he argues, that Caesar should not have regarded the passage of the Allier as a hindrance at a moment when everything depended upon speed; and, he asks, if Caesar commanded the passage of the river, why did he allow Litaviccus to cross it?

I agree with Hug's first argument, though Litaviccus might have got across the Allier before Caesar could stop him. Anyhow Hartung's theory is simply a bad guess. Caesar does not say a word about having marched on a widely-extended line; and if he had done so, he would have lost the all-important advantage of presenting himself before the Aedui in irresistible force. If Eporedorix had not told him by what route Litaviccus was advancing, his own cavalry could have procured the necessary information. Litaviccus might have kept out of Caesar's way by moving away from the Allier in a westerly direction and entering Gergovia by its north-western gate. Caesar's narrative, interpreted in its natural sense, inevitably leads to the conclusion that Litaviccus, after leaving his halting-place, marched straight on; and the conclusion is perfectly credible, even if he did not advance more than 5 miles while Caesar marched 25. Litaviccus may have nearly finished his day's march when he halted to harangue his troops: Caesar merely says that he halted about (*circiter*) 30 miles from Gergovia: he himself was marching at the utmost speed of which his men were capable: and he may have been misinformed about the distance.

<sup>1</sup> *Philologus*, xxxii., 1873, pp. 369-71.

<sup>2</sup> Bursian's *Jahresbericht*, i., 1873, pp. 1167-8.





WHAT BECAME OF THE AEDUAN INFANTRY, WHICH  
HAD SERVED UNDER CAESAR AT GERGOVIA?

We are not told: but it may be taken for granted that they joined the rebels; for Caesar never mentions them after his narrative of the failure of his attempt to take Gergovia.<sup>1</sup>

ON THE MEANING OF THE PASSAGE *IPSI EX FINITIMIS*  
... *TRANSIRI VIDERETUR* (B. G., vii. 55, §§ 9-10)

*Ipsi ex finitimis regionibus copias cogere, praesidia custodiasque ad ripas Ligeris disponere, equitatumque omnibus locis iniciendi timoris causa ostentare coeperunt, si ab re frumentaria Romanos excludere aut adductos inopia ex provincia expellere possent. Quam ad spem multum eos adiuuabat, quod Liger ex nivibus creverat, ut omnino vado non posse transiri videretur.*<sup>2</sup> So runs this famous passage in the  $\alpha$  MSS. Another reading is (*provincia*) *excludere*: but Nipperdey,<sup>3</sup> remarking that this is only found in the  $\beta$  MSS., reads *in provinciam expellere*, an emendation suggested by Nicasius. Nipperdey had, as I have shown,<sup>4</sup> an undue contempt for the  $\beta$  MSS. Still, if Caesar wrote *expellere*, the emendation is obviously required; for the Aedui could not have expelled Caesar from the *provincia*, unless *provincia* meant, not the Province properly so called, but the rest of Gaul; and, as a matter of fact, he never uses the word in this sense.<sup>5</sup> Achaintre,<sup>6</sup> indeed, who reads *expellere*, contends that *provincia* means the country of the Aedui, and refers to a passage<sup>7</sup> in which Caesar makes Ariovistus speak of the Gallic territory which he had annexed as *provincia sua*. But in this passage the meaning of *provincia* is unmistakable; and the use of the word gives additional point to Ariovistus's argument. In the passage which I am discussing every reader of Caesar, except Achaintre, has always understood that by *provincia* he meant the Roman Province; and if he had meant the country of the Aedui, he would have written not *ex provincia* but *ex finibus suis*. Schneider, who regards the reading of  $\alpha$  as obviously absurd, follows Morus and deletes *aut adductos inopia provincia excludere*.<sup>8</sup> Eporedorix and Viridomarus, he argues, had no

<sup>1</sup> B. G., vii. 50, §§ 1-2.

<sup>2</sup> "They (the Aedui) then proceeded to raise forces from the neighbouring districts, establishing a chain of outposts and piquets along the banks of the Loire, and throwing out cavalry in all directions, to inspire the Romans with alarm, in the hope of being able to prevent them from getting corn or to drive them, under stress of destitution, from the province. What greatly encouraged them to indulge this hope was that the Loire was swollen by the melting of the snow, so that, to all appearance, it was quite unfordable."

<sup>3</sup> Caesar, p. 96.

<sup>5</sup> See H. Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii. 1279-84.

<sup>7</sup> B. G., i. 44, § 8.

<sup>8</sup> See Oudendorp's *Caesar*, i. 401, and Schneider's *Caesar*, ii. 502.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 165.

<sup>6</sup> Caesar, i. 348.

prospect of being able to *exclude* Caesar from the province, and would have been delighted to send him thither. Therefore the emendation of Nicasius does not mend matters. Men, he adds, who are said to have been influenced by hunger (*adductos inopia*), would be said to have been influenced to *do* something, not to *suffer*. It would be absurd to say that a man was *influenced* to be *excluded* from a place. Besides, the repetition in the same sentence, of the word *excludere* would be extremely harsh. We may therefore conclude, says Schneider, that the words *aut adductos inopia ex provincia excludere* (or *expellere*) are a gloss.

Long's note,<sup>1</sup> strikes me as showing so much good sense that I transcribe it entire. " '*Adductos inopia*,' " he writes, " '*induced*,' or '*led by*,' requires something after it to express what those do who are '*adducti inopia*.' The next sentence, — *Quam ad spem multum eos adiuuabat, quod Liger ex nivibus creverat, ut omnino vado non posse transiri videretur*, — shows that the direct object of the Aedui was to prevent Caesar from crossing the river. If they kept him on the west side, he would have to levy contributions in a country which he had already passed through, and which was probably devastated. He had also Vercingetorix in his rear. There was corn on the east side of the Loire, for Caesar got it as soon as he crossed. '*Quam ad spem*' therefore would be quite intelligible if the direct object of the Aedui was to prevent his getting supplies, by preventing him from crossing the river. If he crossed the river, however, he would readily get into the '*provincia*' by a much easier and shorter road than by crossing the Cévennes. It seems likely then that the Aedui wished to prevent his getting supplies and also to prevent his getting into the '*provincia*' by crossing the Loire, for Caesar would plunder all the country of the Aedui, if he crossed the river. Davis's conjecture, '*in provinciam repellere*,' is without any authority; and it is absurd. If they simply drove him into the '*provincia*,' where he could get supplies, and from Italy too, they might expect to see him among them again, and the country of the Aedui would be the first to suffer. Their plan was to starve him where he was, between the Allier and the Loire, or if he retired into the '*provincia*,' to compel him to pass south through the Cévennes. I conclude that the text is corrupt; but there is enough to show what was meant."

I agree with Long that there is enough to show what was meant; and I believe that his explanation of the meaning is right: nevertheless, I consider that his condemnation of Davis's conjecture, which is virtually identical with Nipperdey's, is hasty and unjust. For both Davis's conjecture and Nipperdey's do really harmonise with Long's explanation of Caesar's meaning: and of the readings found in the MSS., *ex provincia excludere*, following *adductos inopia*, is, as Schneider points out, ungrammatical; while *ex provincia expellere* is, as I have shown, absurd. The MSS., therefore, being plainly corrupt, we are driven to conjecture. The only question, for historical purposes, is whether the Aedui desired to prevent Caesar from reaching the Province, or whether they desired to drive him into it. The only satisfactory answer is that they desired,

<sup>1</sup> *Caesar*, p. 374.



if possible, to prevent him from reaching the Province, by starving him out between the Loire and the Allier; and if this were impossible, to drive him into it, by the most difficult way. This is exactly what Caesar meant, according to Long; and virtually what he said, according to Davis and Nipperdey. There are two other passages which go to prove that the Aedui wished to exclude the Romans from the Province. In *B. G.*, vii. 66, §§ 3-4, we find Vercingetorix telling his officers that Caesar was trying to make his way into the Province. "If he does so," Vercingetorix goes on to say, "we shall be free for the moment; but we shall have done little to secure lasting peace, for he is sure to return with reinforcements, and wage war without end." And in chapter 65, Caesar says that he sent to Germany for reinforcements of cavalry, "*quod . . . interclusis omnibus itineribus, nulla re ex provincia atque Italia sublevari poterat*,"—"because, owing to the roads being blocked, he could not procure assistance from the Province and from Italy." I admit that this passage does not prove my point, because it is not certain that the roads were blocked at the time when Caesar was marching to join Labienus; but it certainly suggests that the object of the Aedui, as of Vercingetorix, was to cut off Caesar from the Province. On the other hand, there is another passage which suggests that the Aedui expected that Caesar would find himself obliged to make for the Province. Describing the rumour which reached Labienus after he had arrived before Lutetia, he says, *Galli in colloquiis interclusum itinere et Ligeri Caesarem inopia frumenti coactum in provinciam contendisse confirmabant*,<sup>1</sup>—"the Gauls . . . affirmed that Caesar was prevented from pursuing his march and from crossing the Loire, and that want of corn had forced him to make a dash for the Province.

To conclude. Either we must delete the doubtful words, or, reading *expellere*, assume that *provincia* here means the whole of Gaul north of the Roman Province, or accept the emendation *in provinciam*. The first two courses are to my mind unwarrantable: but, for historical purposes, the second and the third lead to the same result, and the first is not inconsistent with it.

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#### ON THE DISPUTED PASSAGE *NAM UT COMMUTATO . . . ITERAT* (*B. G.*, vii. 56, § 2)

I am not editing the *Commentaries*; and I only discuss this passage because I want to find out whether Caesar intended to convey that some of his officers were in favour of retreating to the Province, or whether he simply meant that, notwithstanding the difficulties of his position, such a course was out of the question.

Schneider<sup>2</sup> reads "*Nam ut commutato consilio iter in provinciam converteret, ut [non] nemo tunc quidem necessario faciendum existimabat: cum infamia atque indignitas rei et oppositus mons Cevenna viarumque*

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 59, § 1.

*Caesar*, ii. 504-6.

difficultas impediēbat, tum maxime, quod abiuncto Labieno atque iis legionibus, quas una miserat, vehementer timebat." The words which I have italicised are those that are doubtful. The  $\alpha$  MSS. have *ut ne metu quidem*, the  $\beta$  MSS. *ut nemo tunc quidem*, and certain inferior MSS. *id ne metu quidem*.<sup>1</sup> Nipperdey<sup>2</sup> adopts Ciacconius's conjecture, —*ut nemo non tum quidem*. He also follows Elberling in substituting "*ne commutato*" for "*ut commutato*," because, with his reading, *ut*, followed by *impediēbat*, would be ungrammatical, and, as he points out, *ut* and *ne* were often interchanged by copyists.

*Ut ne metu quidem* is certainly not what Caesar wrote. I defy any one who adopts this reading to make sense out of the passage. *Ut nemo tunc quidem* has little or no point; and I agree with Schneider that if we accept this reading, we must supply *non*. Nipperdey's version makes perfectly good sense: but that does not prove that it is right. Schneider says in defence of his, which, but for the ungrammatical *ut*, is nearly identical with Nipperdey's, "I have inserted *non* BEFORE *nemo*, because it is more likely that the course which to Caesar appeared to involve shame and humiliation as well as great difficulty, should have appeared inevitable to some of those whom he was accustomed to consult than to all." He also makes a strenuous effort to prove that, admitting Ciacconius's conjecture, *ut* (commutato, etc.) is not ungrammatical. He explains *ut . . . converteret* by referring to two other passages in the Gallic War,—*damnatum poenam sequi oportebat, ut igni concremaretur* (i. 4, § 1), and *cum id, quod ipse diebus XX aegerrime confecerant, ut flumen transirent, illum uno die fecisse intellexerent* (i. 13, § 2).<sup>3</sup> I may be mistaken; but I think it will presently appear that while these passages are strictly analogous to the one which I am discussing if we accept the reading *id ne metu quidem*, the analogy disappears if we accept Ciacconius's conjecture. In other words, I believe that if we accept that conjecture, *ut* (commutato, etc.) must depend upon *impediēbat*, and therefore must be ungrammatical. Schneider indeed, while he is careful to explain that he does not make *ut* (commutato, etc.) depend upon *impediēbat*, argues that a passage in Cicero,—*di prohibeant, iudices, ut . . . existimetur* (*Pro Roscio Amer.*, 52, § 51),—proves that it might do so. But this is the only passage in Cicero in which *prohibeo* is followed by *ut*; and there is not a single passage in classical Latin in which *ut* follows *impedio*. I believe therefore that if we accept Ciacconius's conjecture, we must follow Nipperdey, and read *ne* for *ut*.

<sup>1</sup> Reading *id ne metu quidem* and inserting *quod* before *infamia*, the passage means "For to change his whole plan of campaign, retrace his steps and march for the Province,—that, he deemed, was a course to which he ought not to allow even the pressure of fear to force him; for the disgrace and the humiliation of the thing, the range of the Cevennes, barring the way, and the difficulty of the roads forbade him to attempt it; and above all he was intensely anxious for Labienus, who was separated from him, and for the legions which he had sent into the field along with him." See J. N. Madvig's *Adversaria critica*, 1873, ii. 258.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, pp. 96-97.

<sup>3</sup> J. C. Held takes *ut . . . converteret* as concessive ("assuming that he were to change his whole plan of campaign," etc.), a view which Schneider effectually, but unnecessarily, demolishes.

I have no love for conjectural emendation: but the commentators are agreed that if we are to make sense out of this passage we must have recourse to conjecture. Long rejects Ciacconius's emendation on the ground that to tell us what others thought in a crisis in which he had to decide is not what we should expect from Caesar.<sup>1</sup> But if he wrote *ut nemo non . . . existimabat*, he was probably alluding to the opinion not of his officers only, but of the Gauls as well. Long adopts the reading which, before the appearance of Oudendorp's edition, was the accepted one,—“*Nam ut commutato consilio iter in provinciam converteret, id ne tum quidem necessario faciendum existimabat*,” etc.; for, although it has no MS. authority, he holds that it “is the only reading that fits the context”; and he argues that “it gets rid of the difficulty of the construction ‘*ut . . . converteret . . . impediēbat*.’”<sup>2</sup> But he has overlooked the obvious fact that, while it gets rid of this difficulty, it introduces another, which can only be removed by supplying *quod* between *cum* and *infamia*.<sup>3</sup> This correction was made by Stephanus, and, although Schneider denies that any classical writer uses *quod* after *cum*, it is followed by Madvig, who, taking as his guide the inferior MSS. to which I have alluded, reads *id ne metu quidem*. If Caesar wrote this, he meant that he had not thought it right, even under the pressure of fear, or, as Achaintre<sup>4</sup> translates, of dire necessity, to retreat to the Province:<sup>5</sup> if Long's reading is right, he meant that he had not thought it right to do so even in that crisis.

I doubt whether any of the readings, MS. or conjectural, represent exactly what Caesar wrote; but I am inclined to believe that Ciacconius's emendation substantially expresses his meaning: it does not seem to me likely that he would have made the remark which Madvig attributes to him.”

It is amusing to read the romance which Mommsen founds upon a piece of doubtful Latin. “It was,” he says,<sup>6</sup> “a grave and momentous crisis, when after the retreat from Gergovia and the loss of Noviodunum a council of war was held in Caesar's headquarters regarding the measures now to be adopted. Various voices expressed themselves in favour of a retreat over the Cevennes into the old Roman province, which now lay open on all sides to the insurrection and certainly was in urgent need of the legions that had been sent from Rome primarily for its protection. But Caesar rejected this timid strategy suggested not by the position of affairs but by government instructions and fear of responsibility.” The words which I have italicised are based solely upon the doubtful

<sup>1</sup> See Long's *Caesar*, p. 375.

<sup>2</sup> Heller (*Philologus*, xlix., 1890, p. 685) also reads *id ne tum quidem*, but inserts *et* before *cum infamia*.

<sup>3</sup> Dübner indeed, (*Caesar*, i. 253) reads *id ne metu quidem* without supplying *quod* after *cum*, which he translates by “dans un temps où”; but if any one will translate the passage to himself, he will see at once that this explanation is hopelessly flat and unprofitable.

<sup>4</sup> Madvig (*Adv. Crit.*, i. 258-9) says “Concedit Caesar necessarias metuendi causas fuisse; sed ne iis quidem cedendum se putasse.”

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 275.

<sup>6</sup> *Caesar*, i. 349.

emendation *ut nemo non tum*, etc., interpreted by a powerful imagination. Not even Dion Cassius, not even that worthless compiler, Florus, says a word to support them. Mommsen has, of course, a perfect right to adopt the emendation. But even on the chance that it is right, what is there to justify the statement that "a council of war was held in Caesar's headquarters"? Or that the "timid strategy" which Caesar is supposed to have rejected was suggested "by government instructions"? No wonder that frivolous persons talk of "that Mississippi of falsehood called history." Historical imagination is a great quality; but it should not be allowed to run riot. If Mr. Froude had written such a passage, what thunderbolts would have been launched at his head by the *νεφέλη γερῆτα* Zeus of Oxford and Somerleaze!

### WHERE DID CAESAR FORD THE LOIRE WHEN HE WAS MARCHING FROM GERGOVIA TO REJOIN LABIENUS?

Napoleon says that "there has always been a ford at Bourbon-Lancy":<sup>1</sup> but Desjardins remarks that "*les gûés se déplacent*."<sup>2</sup> This may be a reason for not accepting Napoleon's conjecture: but there is also a reason for definitely rejecting it. Caesar crossed the Allier three days after he left Gergovia.<sup>3</sup> According to Napoleon,<sup>4</sup> he crossed it at Vichy; and it is hardly credible that he crossed at any point nearer Gergovia. After he had crossed, Eporedorix and Viridomarus left him, hurried off to Noviodunum (Nevers), and burned it. Nevers is more than 70 miles, in a straight line, from Vichy; and it is not to be supposed that Caesar was standing still while Eporedorix and Viridomarus were riding thither. Not until he had heard that they had burned the town did Caesar determine to hurry; and he did not reach the Loire until he had made "forced marches by day and night" (*admodum magnis diurnis nocturnisque itineribus confectis*).<sup>5</sup> Now Bourbon-Lancy is barely 40 miles in a straight line, say 48 miles by road from Vichy. Surely this distance is too short to correspond with Caesar's narrative. The conclusion is that we cannot tell where he forded the Loire.

### LABIENUS'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SENONES AND PARISII

Whoever undertakes to study the problems presented by Caesar's narrative of Labienus's campaign must bear in mind that, after leaving Agedincum (Sens), Labienus marched, in the first instance, up the left

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 284, note.

<sup>2</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 686, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 283.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 53, § 4.

<sup>5</sup> See *B. G.*, vii. 54-6.

bank of the Seine. Achaintre<sup>1</sup> and others have tried to prove that he marched up the right bank and consequently that the battle was fought on the right bank. I have refuted this theory on pages 359-60.

I. The first question is, what was the marsh or marshy stream which baffled Labienus on his march from Sens to Lutetia (Paris)? Labienus, writes Caesar,<sup>2</sup> "marched for Lutetia . . . leaving the draft which had recently arrived from Italy at Agedincum. . . . When the enemy became aware of his approach, large bodies of troops assembled from the neighbouring peoples. The chief command was conferred upon Camulogenus. . . . Observing that there was a continuous marsh, which drained into the Seine and rendered the whole country in its neighbourhood impassable, he took post behind it, and prepared to stop our men from crossing. Labienus at first formed a line of sappers' huts, and attempted to fill up the marsh with fascines and other material and thus to make a causeway across it. Finding this scarcely practicable, he silently quitted his camp in the third watch, and made his way, by the route by which he had advanced, to Metiosedum. This place is a town belonging to the Senones, situated, like Lutetia, of which I spoke a moment ago, on an island in the Seine. . . . Having repaired the bridge, which the enemy had recently broken down, he made the army cross over, and marched on, following the course of the stream, in the direction of Lutetia. The enemy, informed of what he had done by fugitives from Metiosedum, gave orders that Lutetia should be burned and its bridges broken down: then, moving away from the marsh, they encamped on the banks of the Seine, opposite Lutetia and over against the camp of Labienus" (*eo supplemento, quod nuper ex Italia venerat, relicto Agedinci. . . . Lutetiam proficiscitur . . . cuius adventu ab hostibus cognito, maxime ex finitimis civitatibus copiae convenerunt. Summa imperii traditur Camulogeno. . . . Is cum animadvertisset perpetuam esse paludem, quae influeret in Sequanam atque illum omnem locum magnopere impediret, hic consedit, nostrosque transitu prohibere instituit. Labienus primo vineas agere, cratibus atque aggere paludem explere, atque iter munire conabatur. Postquam id difficilius confieri animadvertit, silentio e castris III vigilia egressus, eodem, quo venerat, itinere Metiosedum pervenit. Id est oppidum Senonum in insula Sequanae positum, ut paullo ante de Lutetia diximus. . . . Refecto ponte, quem superioribus diebus hostes resciderant, exercitum traducit, et secundo flumine ad Lutetiam iter facere coepit. Hostes, re cognita ab iis qui a Metiosedo profugerant, Lutetiam incendi pontesque eius oppidi rescindi iubent; ipsi profecti a palude in ripis Sequanae e regione Lutetiae contra Labieni castra considunt).*

The marsh has been identified with three streams,—the Bièvre, which once entered the Seine just above the cathedral of Notre Dame; the Orge, which enters the Seine 15 kilometres, or about 9 miles, in a direct line, above the confluence of the Seine and the Marne; and the Essonne, which enters the Seine about 10 kilometres above the point where it receives the Orge.

<sup>1</sup> Caesar, i. 353-4, 357.

<sup>2</sup> B. G., vii. 57-8.

1. Before Napoleon's work appeared, most commentators were in favour of the Bièvre. Napoleon, however, affirms that it "flows through a calcareous soil" and "can at no epoch have formed a marsh capable of arresting an army."<sup>1</sup> It has also been argued that, if the marsh had been the Bièvre, the Gauls would have been as near Lutetia as they could well be, and that what Caesar says about their movement from the marsh to Lutetia would be not only superfluous but false.<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, M. H. Houssaye<sup>3</sup> maintains that Napoleon was mistaken. The bed of the Bièvre, he says, is of clay (*argileux*); and in some places the depth of the mud in it is 6 feet. Lebeuf<sup>4</sup> says that the stream has always been subject to inundations. The sixth Plan, says M. Houssaye, in Lançare's *Traité de la police*, which represents Paris as it was in the reign of Henri III., shows a small marsh formed by the Bièvre;<sup>5</sup> and in 1579 the river overflowed its banks, and the inundation destroyed several houses in the faubourg St-Marceau. Again, Caumont de Sauley says, "to leave a place does not necessarily imply the necessity of making a long march in order to get to some other place"; and he concludes that Caesar might well have mentioned that the Gauls "departed from" the Bièvre (*profecti a palude*<sup>6</sup>) even if

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 286, note.

<sup>2</sup> J. J. Quicherat, *Mélanges d'arch. et d'hist.*, 1885, i. 215, 238-9.

<sup>3</sup> *Le premier siège de Paris*, 1876, pp. 75-82.

<sup>4</sup> *Recueil de divers écrits pour servir d'éclaircissements à l'hist. de France*, t. ii., 1738, p. 154.

<sup>5</sup> I am unable to discover the alleged marsh in this Plan.

<sup>6</sup> It should be mentioned that the reading of the  $\alpha$  MSS., except S, is not *profecti a palude*, but *prospecta palude* (Mensel's *Caesar*, p. 195). This reading, however, if it is not exactly nonsense, is absolutely without point; for there was no reason why the Gauls should have taken the trouble to reconnoitre or survey the marsh just before they finally quitted it, or why, if they had done anything so silly, Caesar should have taken the trouble to record the fact. *Profecti a* (or *ab*) *palude*, though only found in the  $\beta$  MSS., is read by all the best modern editors, except Nipperdey and Dubner, who follows Hoffmann's unnecessary and absurd emendation *praesepti*. Unnecessary, because *profecti a* (*palude*) makes perfect sense; and absurd because the Gauls could not have been said to be protected by a marsh, which their enemy had abandoned the attempt to force, and which they themselves were about to quit. Nipperdey's emendation *proiecta* (*palude*) is even more absurd; and the arguments by which he defends it (*Caesar*, p. 100) are perhaps the very worst which learned and ingenious editor ever devised. It is clear, he says, that the marsh was either on both banks of the Seine, or only on that bank which was opposite Lutetia. In either case, he continues, as the Gauls crossed from Lutetia to the opposite bank, it is clear that they did not abandon the marsh (*profecti a palude*); for if the marsh was only on the bank opposite Lutetia, they marched to it not away from it; if it was on both banks, they clearly did not march away from it. Therefore we are to read *proiecta* (*palude*)! Now, as Schneider remarks, it seems doubtful whether Nipperdey is writing seriously or only making a bad joke (*omnis eius disputatio talis est, ut dubium sit, utrum serio, an aliter loquatur*. *Caesar*, ii. 513). First of all, Caesar's narrative makes it perfectly clear that the marsh was only on one bank of the Seine, namely the left; for that was the bank by which Labienus was advancing when he came to the marsh; and, as the marsh, or rather marshy stream, emptied itself into the Seine, and as it was continuous (*perpetua*), it could only have been on one bank of the Seine. Secondly, Nipperdey forgets that both banks of the Seine were opposite Lutetia. Thirdly, Caesar does not say a word to show that the Gauls "had crossed from Lutetia to the opposite bank"; and what he does say shows

they were only going to march to Lutetia.<sup>1</sup> M. Houssaye also asks why Camulogenus should have taken the trouble to march all the way from Lutetia to the Essonne when, only one kilometre from Lutetia, the Bièvre offered as formidable an obstacle to the advance of Labienus. Moreover, he continues, Camulogenus could not tell whether Labienus would march along the bank of the Seine or along the line of heights on the west of it. Therefore it would have been madness for him to take up his position behind either the Essonne or the Orge; for if the Romans had marched along the heights, he might have been attacked in flank and in rear.

On an impartial review of these conflicting arguments, it appears to me that if Napoleon has not proved his case, that case is nevertheless impregnable. It is not likely that Labienus could have marched along the heights, for they were probably covered with woods; and Camulogenus had the best of reasons for marching as far as the Essonne, for he must have wished to prevent Labienus from devastating the country of the Parisii. But be this as it may, there is one argument which is absolutely fatal to the claims of the Bièvre. Caesar says, in the passage which I have just quoted, that when the Gauls heard that Labienus had crossed the Seine at Melun, they sent a message to Lutetia, ordering that the town should be burned, and then marched thither themselves. This statement surely implies that they were at a considerable distance from Lutetia and expected to find it burned on their arrival. If they had been within a quarter of an hour's march from the town, why should they have sent any message? They could have kindled the flames themselves. But, as a matter of fact, all the evidence goes to show that the Bièvre was not even a quarter of an hour's march from Lutetia. Plans 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the same *Traité de la police* (tome i.) to which M. Houssaye refers show Paris at various times from that of Caesar to that of Philip Augustus, and represent the Bièvre as entering the Seine exactly opposite the eastern extremity of the island on which Lutetia stood! Plans 2, 3 and 4 are founded upon information furnished by Gregory of Tours, Aimoin and various archives. Besides, a glance at the map will convince any unbiassed reader that if Camulogenus had been encamped behind the Bièvre, he would have

that they had not done so. For the marsh was on the left bank of the Seine; Labienus, finding himself unable to cross the marsh, returned to Metiosedum (Melun), crossed the Seine there, advanced up the right bank, and encamped opposite the island in the Seine on which stood Lutetia; and the enemy encamped on the bank of the Seine opposite Labienus, that is, on the left bank. Therefore the Gauls remained on this bank throughout the campaign. Finally, even if Nipperdey's imaginary and absurd premisses were correct, he would still have failed to prove his point; for he ignores the fact that the marsh probably was, and certainly may have been separated by a considerable distance from Lutetia. It is clear, then, that *profecti a palude* yields perfectly good sense; whereas all the other readings and the various emendations are absurd. I am glad to find, after writing this note, that my view is supported by R. Richter (*Kritische Bemerkungen zu Caesars Comm. vii. de bello Gallico*, 1889, pp. 31-2).

<sup>1</sup> Cf. B. G. i. 51, § 3.—*Et mulieres imposuerunt, quae in proelium proficiscentes implorabant*," etc., where Caesar relates that the Germans under Ariovistus moved out of their encampment to meet the Romans, who were close at hand.

made an effort to prevent Labienus from crossing the Marne; whereas it is clearly implied in Caesar's narrative that Labienus, after he had abandoned the attempt to force the passage of the marsh and recrossed the Seine at Melun, crossed the Marne without opposition.

2. Quicherat identifies the marsh with the Orge. The Orge has two branches. According to Quicherat, the Gauls occupied a position on the heights of Juvisy, about 600 yards north of the northern branch, and were separated by at least a mile and a quarter from the camp of Labienus, which would have been south of the southern branch of the stream.<sup>1</sup> "De quoi donc," naturally asks de Saulcy,<sup>2</sup> "veut-il se garantir à une demi-liene de l'ennemi, avec ses mantelets?"<sup>3</sup> Besides, a marsh formed by the two branches of the Orge would have been so broad that it would have been hopeless for Labienus to attempt to make a causeway across it.

I conclude then that the marsh was the Essonne. Napoleon points out that the ground on the banks of this stream is still "cut up by innumerable peat mosses"; and that it was behind this line that his uncle encamped in 1814, while the enemy occupied Paris.<sup>4</sup>

II. J. J. Quicherat has written an ingenious paper<sup>5</sup> with the object of proving that the accepted explanation, which I have followed,<sup>6</sup> of the campaign is incorrect. His principal arguments are as follows:—First, if Labienus encamped opposite Lutetia, he must have crossed the Marne at its confluence with the Seine. But to cross the Marne at its confluence with the Seine is as difficult as to cross the Seine itself. Why then does Caesar not mention the passage? Secondly, Caesar thus describes the relative positions of the Gauls and Labienus:—*ipsi profecti a palude ad ripas Sequanae e regione Lutetiae contra Labieni*

<sup>1</sup> See map facing p. 234 (t. B) of Quicherat's *Mélanges d'arch. et d'hist.*

<sup>2</sup> *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, 1862, p. 50.

<sup>3</sup> See *B. G.*, vii. 57, § 4, 58, §§ 1-2.

<sup>4</sup> One of Napoleon's arguments, however, is questionable. "The text of the *Commentaries*," he writes, "says clearly that Labienus . . . surprised the passage of the Seine at Melun, and marched upon Lutetia, where he arrived before Camulogenus. To allow of the success of this manoeuvre, the marsh . . . must necessarily not have been far from Melun. The Essonne alone fulfils this condition" (*Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 286, note). But the *Commentaries* do not say that Labienus arrived at Lutetia before Camulogenus. What they do say is that Labienus, after crossing the Seine at Melun, *secundo flumine ad Lutetiam iter facere coepit. Hostes, re cognita ab iis qui a Metiosedo profugerant, Lutetiam incendi pontesque eius oppidi rescindi iubent; ipsi profecti a palude in ripis Sequanae e regione Lutetiae contra Labieni castra considunt.* This does not prove that Labienus was the first to arrive. (See Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 327-8). Maisiat (*Jules César en Gaule*, ii. 228) adduces an argument which, I think, has weight. Assuming, he says, that Camulogenus had been encamped above Lutetia until the moment when the flotilla of Labienus, coming down stream from Metiosedum, appeared in sight, it is clear that he would have promptly marched to the neighbourhood of Lutetia. Therefore, whether he was encamped on the Essonne or on the Bièvre, he must have reached Lutetia before Labienus. Still, one weak argument does not invalidate Napoleon's theory; and I decide for the Essonne because the arguments which I have stated against the claims of the Bièvre and the Orge are unanswerable.

<sup>5</sup> *Mélanges d'arch. et d'hist.* i. 217-8, 220-1.

<sup>6</sup> See pp. 129-31, *supra*.



*castra considunt.*<sup>1</sup> Now, Caesar uses the words *e regione* "pour indiquer . . . 'au droit de.'" Thirdly, Labienus could not have had any object in encamping *opposite* Lutetia, since it had been burned and its bridges destroyed. Fourthly, if Labienus's camp was opposite Lutetia, he was extraordinarily imprudent to send his fleet down stream, under the eye of the enemy, and to march down himself, when he might have been taken in flank from the hills of Chaillot and Passy, which were at that time covered with woods. "Tant de témérité," says Quicherat, "ne serait égalee que par la négligence du général gaulois, à qui l'agitation de l'ennemi aurait complètement échappé malgré la proximité," etc. Fifthly, according to the received view, there was no reason why, in the early morning, just before the battle, Camulogénus should have been informed of the movements of the various Roman divisions; for he could have observed those movements himself.

Accordingly Quicherat makes Labienus encamp in the angle between the confluence of the Marne and the Seine, just south of Créteil, and cross the Seine immediately above the confluence; while he places the camp of the Gauls about half-a-mile south-east of Lutetia, in a line with it and the Roman camp.

The answer to Quicherat's first argument is obvious. Labienus could easily have crossed, and doubtless did cross the Marne with the barges which he had brought from Metiosedum (Melun). Caesar omitted to mention the passage for the same reason that he omitted to mention the passage of the Yonne,—because to mention it was unessential. Quicherat's second argument has virtually to sustain the whole weight of his case. If he is wrong in his interpretation of *e regione*, his whole theory collapses. And assuredly he is wrong. If *e regione* means what Quicherat says, it comes to this, that Caesar is *practically giving us no information whatever as to the actual or the relative positions of the Gauls and of Labienus*. Any reader is free to take his map and place them exactly where he pleases, provided he places them in a straight line with Lutetia and with each other! But if the words mean what everybody, except Quicherat and Creuly, believes, the sense is clear, with or without a map. Labienus is on the north of the Seine, and the enemy are on the south, opposite Lutetia and over against his camp. The meaning of the words is fixed, beyond cavil, by two passages in *B. G.*, vii. 35, where Caesar describes the stratagem by which he transported his army across the Allier:—*Cum uterque utrique esset exercitus in conspectu fereque e regione castris castra poneret* ("The two armies were in full view of one another, and each encamped almost opposite the camp of the other"); and again *castra positis e regione inius eorum pontium quos Vercingetorix rescindendos curaverat* ("encamping opposite one of the bridges which Vercingetorix had caused to be broken down"). If *e regione*, in these passages, does not mean "opposite," it means nothing. Quicherat's interpretation of the phrase

<sup>1</sup> According to my comprehension, this passage means "moving away from the marsh, they encamped on the banks of the Seine, opposite Lutetia and over against the camp of Labienus."

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 117-18, *supra*.

is overthrown by Forcellini, who says<sup>1</sup> "*absolute, adverbiorum more, e regione . . . est recta linea . . . Sæpius vero e regione significat ex adverso*"; and he illustrates this meaning by referring to the passages which I have just quoted.

So much for *e regione*. There is another word in Caesar's narrative, which, by itself, overthrows the whole of Quicherat's case. Describing the measures which the Gauls took when they heard that the Romans were trying to cross the Seine in three places, he says, "*Leaving a force opposite the (Roman) camp, and sending a small body in the direction of Metiosedum . . . they led the rest of their troops against Labienus*" (*praesidium e regione castrorum relicto et parva manu Metiosedum versus missa . . . reliquas copias contra Labienum duxerunt*).<sup>2</sup> Now, on Quicherat's theory, the word *relicto* is simply unintelligible. He assumes that a Gallic outpost had been stationed exactly opposite the place where the bridge of Choisy now stands;<sup>3</sup> and this outpost was, on his theory, the *praesidium* that was left to watch the Roman camp. But Caesar's words obviously do not mean that the *praesidium* had been established, from the outset of the campaign, on the spot where it was left. Besides, according to Quicherat, the Roman camp was about 4 kilometres away from the *praesidium*; and therefore the *praesidium* would have been useless. Lastly, according to Quicherat, the Roman flotilla necessarily waited, before starting on its voyage down the stream, under the very eyes of the Gauls who composed the *praesidium*. To wriggle out of this absurdity, Quicherat is compelled to maintain that the Gauls would not have been able to tell why the barges were about to go down the Seine. "*La descente de la flotille au confluent*" (of the Marne and the Seine), he says, "*est un manœuvre sur laquelle il n'y a rien à décider. Est-elle vraie ou feinte? Est-ce la Marne ou la Seine qu'on se propose de passer?*"<sup>4</sup> This is flagrant special pleading. The manœuvre, whatever its object, would have been promptly reported to headquarters. Again, de Saulcy<sup>5</sup> pertinently asks what would have been the use of Labienus's ordering a noise to be made in the Roman camp, when, according to Quicherat, the Gauls were two miles and a half away, and could not possibly have heard it. On the accepted theory, the word *relicto* is perfectly clear. The Gallic camp on the left bank of the Seine was opposite the Roman camp on the right bank. Camulogenus, hearing that the Romans left in camp were preparing to abandon it and cross the river, left a force to hinder them, sent a detachment up the left bank to follow the Romans who were rowing in that direction, and marched in person with the rest of his army down the same bank to encounter Labienus.

Finally, it may be assumed that Labienus knew, or had ascertained by reconnaissance, that there was no chance of his being attacked in

<sup>1</sup> *Totius latinitatis Lexicon*, v. 142.

<sup>2</sup> See map facing p. 234 (t. i.) of his *Mélanges*.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 61, § 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, p. 221.

<sup>5</sup> *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, p. 59.

flank from the hills of Chaillot and Passy. Why should Camulogenus, who had no inkling of the stratagem which he meditated, have posted troops on those hills, of all places? Nor can I see that Labienus showed any imprudence in sending his barges down the stream. Quicherat cannot tell how near the stream the Gauls were; and they would have been just, as likely to post troops along that part of the river down which Quicherat believes that Labienus sent the barges, as along the part between Lutetia and Point-du-Jour. Besides, as de Saulcy<sup>1</sup> points out, in the latter case, the barges would have been screened from observation, during the first part of their course, by the islands in the Seine, whereas, on the theory of Quicherat, they would have had no cover at all. "Puis voilà," he says, alluding to Labienus's passage of the Seine as described by Quicherat, "Puis voilà que ce passage, qui prend au moins deux heures, se fait forcément au nez et à la barbe de Camulogène, qui met ses deux mains dans ses poches et attend que tout le monde ennemi soit à son rang de bataille pour se permettre de le gêner dans ses mouvements!" Labienus knew that he must risk something. But he ordered the captains of the barges to move as quietly as possible; and if the movement had been prematurely detected, he would not have been any worse off than he had been before.

It is worth mentioning that the great Napoleon took the orthodox view regarding the geography of this campaign, and that he did not detect the blunders which, according to Quicherat, Labienus must, on that theory, have committed.<sup>2</sup>

III. The camp of Labienus, it is sufficient to know, was close to the right bank of the Seine, opposite Lutetia and over against the camp of Camulogenus.<sup>3</sup> But it certainly was not on the heights of Romainville, where M. Duruy<sup>4</sup> places it; for Romainville is a good 5 miles away from the Seine: it would have been quite unnecessary for Camulogenus, when he was about to march against Labienus, to leave a force on the left bank to watch a camp which was 5 miles north of the right bank; and the whole tenor of Caesar's narrative shows that Labienus encamped close to the river.

IV. I have explained in the text<sup>5</sup> why Labienus decided to cross the Seine in the teeth of Camulogenus and his army, instead of marching down the right bank. Ch. Lenormant says that the approach of the Bellovaci would have prevented the Roman general from returning to Sens by the right bank:<sup>6</sup> but Caesar only says that the Bellovaci began to assemble their forces (*manus cogere coeperunt*); and Labienus could easily have got back to Melun before they reached Paris.

V. One word with regard to the point where Labienus crossed the

<sup>1</sup> *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, p. 31.

<sup>2</sup> *Précis des guerres de César*, pp. 102-3.

<sup>3</sup> Napoleon (*Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 287) thinks that it was "near the place where St-Germain l'Auxerrois now stands." Various other attempts, which I need not mention, have been made to define the site exactly.

<sup>4</sup> *Soc. de l'hist. de Paris et de l'Ile de France*, 1881, pp. 162-3.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 130, *supra*.

<sup>6</sup> *Rev. arch., nouv. sér.*, t. iv., 1861, p. 277.

Seine. Von Kampen<sup>1</sup> finds it opposite Auteuil, which is hardly 4 Roman miles from the site which he selects for the Roman camp: Napoleon<sup>2</sup> a little further down the bank, near Point-du-Jour. De Saulcy<sup>3</sup> places the passage opposite the island of Billancourt, which is 6, not 4 miles from the assumed point of embarkation: but he argues that the three legions, marching in column, must have covered a space of at least 3 kilometres; and that, if the whole column had passed the point which was 4 miles from the place of departure, the head of the column would have reached a point opposite the middle of Billancourt. Bronze swords had been found, some years before de Saulcy wrote, in the bed of the river between Billancourt and the left bank; and de Saulcy argued that Labienus probably used this island and the islands of St-Germain and Sequin to assist his passage. De Saulcy's arguments appear to me more ingenious than convincing. Caesar does not say that Labienus ordered the three legions to march 4 miles down the bank: he says that Labienus ordered the knights who commanded the barges in which the legions were to cross the Seine, to move 4 miles down the river, and wait for him.<sup>4</sup> Of course the barges did not all cross the river at the same place: but it is natural to suppose that the 4 miles were reckoned from the point of departure to the point where the foremost barge of the flotilla was moored; and the discovery of the bronze swords proves nothing. M. Housaye<sup>5</sup> sensibly asks whether it is not reasonable to suppose that, as each company reached the place of embarkation, it simply wheeled to the right so as to form a little column at right angles to the stream, ready to embark. Thus the three legions would have been able to embark within a space of one kilometre at the outside.

VI. There is another passage in the Latin text which, even among those who are virtually agreed as to the battle-field and the sites of the two camps, has given rise to discussion. After describing how the Gauls were informed of the operations of Labienus, Caesar writes:—"On hearing this, they imagined that the legions were crossing at three places, and that the Romans, alarmed by the defection of the Aedui, were all preparing for flight. Accordingly they made a corresponding distribution of their own troops into three divisions. Leaving a force opposite the Roman camp, and sending a small body in the direction of Metiosedum, with orders to advance as far as the boats had gone, they led the rest of their troop, against Labienus" (*Quibus rebus auditis, quod existimabant, tribus locis transire legiones, atque omnes perturbatos defectione Aeduium fugam parare, suas quoque copias in tres partes distribuerunt: nam et praesidio e regione castrorum relicto, et parva manu Metiosedum versus missa, quae tantum progredieretur quantum naves processissent, reliquas copias contra Labienum duxerunt*).<sup>6</sup> Desjardins identifies Metiosedum with Meudon, which is below Paris, in the direction

<sup>1</sup> *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. comm. tabulae*, xi.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 288.

<sup>3</sup> *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, p. 41.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 60. § 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Le premier siège de Paris*, pp. 90-91.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 61, §§ 4-5.

opposite to Melun. He considers that *naves* must mean, not the boats (*lîntres*), which Labienus sent up stream, but the large barges, which he sent down; and he adds, to strengthen his argument, that, whereas *Melodunum* is the only reading which occurs where Melun is incontestably alluded to, the readings in this passage are various.<sup>1</sup> But Quicherat rightly remarks<sup>2</sup> that the sense of *naves* is generic:—"il veut dire aussi bien un petit bateau qu'un grand bateau." Forcellini<sup>3</sup> supports this view. "Navis," he says, "dicitur fere de navigio maiori, interdum etiam de cymba, lîntre, scapha, et huiusmodi." The usage of our own language is similar. It is a common thing to speak of an Atlantic liner as a "boat"; and a large yacht is often described as a good sea-boat.<sup>4</sup> And, Quicherat goes on to say, if Metiosedum was Meudon, "le tour de phrase des *Commentaires* est absurde, car César énumérerait de deux côtés trois termes relatifs, sans que le troisième de la seconde énumération répondît au troisième de la première, et après avoir annoncé que les Gaulois ont prévu trois attaques, il les ferait agir comme s'ils n'en avaient prévu que deux, tout en s'exprimant comme s'ils avaient obvié aux trois."<sup>5</sup> This argument is, to my apprehension, unanswerable. If, in the passage<sup>6</sup> which I am discussing, *Metiosedum* meant Meudon, it would follow from Caesar's narrative that the Gauls took no heed of the boats and the cohorts which went up stream in the direction of Melun. Why should Camulogenus have taken the trouble to send a small force (*parva manu*) to the point which the barges of Labienus had reached, when he was marching with the rest of his forces, in the same direction, against Labienus himself? Desjardins<sup>7</sup> tries to get over this difficulty by suggesting that Camulogenus had expected to find Labienus posted above Lutetia, but actually found him at the foot of Meudon and Issy, and, awaited his attack near Bertzy. De Sauley<sup>8</sup> and C. Lenormant<sup>9</sup> agree with Desjardins. The former says that Camulogenus, when he divided his army into three parts, must have marched with the principal force in the direction of what he was informed was the Roman *magnum agmen*, that is, up the stream, towards Melun; and Lenormant says that Camulogenus would not have sent his smallest force (*parva manu*) in the direction whence the greatest noise was heard. But the "principal force" of Camulogenus was the *reliquas copias* which he led against Labienus; and, in order to reach Labienus, Camulogenus had to march down the stream, not up. It would therefore appear that, on the theory of de Sauley, Camulogenus

<sup>1</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 689.

<sup>2</sup> *Mélanges*, etc., i. 238.

<sup>3</sup> *Totius latinitatis Lexicon*, t. iv., 1868, p. 236.

<sup>4</sup> Heller (*Philologus*, xvii., 1861, p. 284) remarks that any difficulty which may be caused by the use of the words *lîntres* and *naves* disappears if one reflects that the passage *Quibus rebus . . . ducerunt* (*B. G.*, vii. 61, § 5) expresses the idea which the Gauls had formed on hearing of the movements of the Romans; and that the word *naves* in the passage in question is to be understood as if Caesar had written *lîntres quos esse naves Galli ex magno remorum sonitu suspicabantur*. This criticism seems over-subtle.

<sup>5</sup> *Mélanges*, etc., i. 238.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.* vii. 61, § 5.

<sup>7</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 689.

<sup>8</sup> *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, p. 45.

<sup>9</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. iv., 1861, p. 281.

would have sent no force at all in the direction of the *magnum agmen*. But de Saulcy, like Desjardins, says that the *parva manus*, which, according to him, was sent in the direction of Mendon, must have returned to the Gallic camp, in order to tell Camulogenus where Labienus was crossing the river.<sup>1</sup> There is not a word about this in Caesar; and his narrative clearly implies that Camulogenus led his *reliquas copias* against Labienus directly after he had sent the *parva manus* in the direction of *Metiosedum*. Lenormant's remark is childish. Camulogenus sent his smaller force in the direction whence the greatest noise was heard because he had reason to believe that the greatest noise was not made by the greatest number of men.<sup>2</sup> The fact is that Camulogenus was only partially deceived by Labienus's stratagem. Moreover, as Schneider<sup>3</sup> observes in one of his admirable notes, the *magnum agmen* was so called because the greater part of it undoubtedly consisted of the baggage-train; and if Caesar had meant to convey that Camulogenus sent his smaller force (*parva manu*) in the direction of the barges which had conveyed the legions of Labienus across the river, he would certainly have expressed himself differently. The barges were stationary: the small boats were moving up the river. Caesar would not have said that the *parva manus* was ordered to advance as far as the *naves* should advance (*parva manu . . . quae tantum progrediatur, quantum naves processissent*), but that it was ordered to proceed to the point where the barges were moored. And, asks de Presle,<sup>4</sup> how can we believe that Caesar would have mentioned Metiosedum for the first and only time without saying a single word to indicate its position? Whatever reading we are to adopt, the place commonly called Metiosedum must have been above Lutetia.

But, as a matter of fact, Desjardins is mistaken in what he says about the MSS. In the Paris MS. 5764, remarks de Presle, the reading in chapter 58, § 2, is *Metiosedum pervenit*. Above the word *Metiosedum* a later hand has written *vel Melodunum*. In the subsequent passages in which the same town is alluded to the correction has not been made; and the word *Metiosedum* stands unaltered. In other MSS., in the three passages<sup>5</sup> in each of which the town, whether its name is *Melodunum* or something else, is obviously one and the same, that is to say, the town at which Labienus originally crossed the Seine, *Melodunum*, *Melledunum* or *Mellodunum* have been substituted for the original reading *Metiosedum*. But, adds de Presle, "par une inconséquence qui est devenue la cause de tous les embarras des éditeurs . . . ils ont laissé subsister l'ancienne leçon *Metiosedum* dans le quatrième passage" (*B. G.*, vii. 61, § 5).<sup>7</sup>

Thus the conclusion to which common sense, backed by a careful study of Caesar's narrative, would lead an ordinary reader who knew nothing of the MSS., turns out to be the true one.

<sup>1</sup> *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, p. 31.

<sup>2</sup> I am glad to find that my argument has been anticipated by M. Houssaye, p. 93.

<sup>3</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. v., 1862, p. 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Caesar*, ii. 521-2.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, p. 2.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 58, §§ 2, 5, 60, § 1.

<sup>7</sup> See Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii. 565.

VII. Concerning the exact position of the battle-field there is also divergence of opinion. According to Napoleon, the hill which the Gauls occupied was that of Vaugirard, a little west of Mont Parnasse. Von Kampen places the two armies in line of battle on the plain of Grenelle, the Romans with their backs to the river, and identifies the hill with Mont Parnasse itself. De Sauley<sup>1</sup> prefers Montrouge. But this problem is insoluble.

VIII. M. E. Toulouze has recently started the theory that Labienus fought a naval battle with Camulogenus in the Seine, near Morsang. Weapons, he says, have been discovered in this part of the river; and as some are of bronze and others of iron, the (assumed) battle could not have been fought between two Gallic peoples, for probably all the Gallic peoples used bronze weapons. Therefore it must have been fought between Gauls and Romans; therefore between Camulogenus and Labienus!<sup>2</sup> This theory, which rests upon nothing but assumptions, is not worth discussing. If the assumed battle had taken place, Caesar would certainly have mentioned it.

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WHERE DID CAESAR, AFTER HIS RETREAT FROM GERGOVIA, REJOIN LABIENUS? HOW LONG DID HE WAIT BEFORE SETTING OUT, AND FROM WHAT POINT DID HE SET OUT ON HIS MARCH TO SUCCOUR THE PROVINCE?

There are not sufficient data to enable us to answer any of these questions with certainty.

I. After leaving Gergovia, Caesar marched down the left or western bank of the Allier; recrossed it on the third day of his march; pushed on to relieve Labienus, who was in the neighbourhood of Lutetia (Paris); crossed the Loire by a deep ford into the country of the Aedui; and, having revictualled his army there, marched on towards the country of the Senones. Meanwhile Labienus defeated a rebel army on the left bank of the Seine, near Paris; then marched southward to Agedincum (Sens); and thence marched to rejoin Caesar. For some weeks active hostilities between Caesar and the rebels were suspended; and within this interval Caesar set out, and was reinforced by a body of German cavalry from beyond the Rhine. At length he marched to succour the Province, which was threatened by a rebel force; and the route which he took led "through the furthest part of the country of the Lingones into the country of the Sequani" (*in Sequanos pertransiremos Lingonum fines*).<sup>3</sup>

In relating the fact that Labienus marched from Sens to join him, Caesar, according to the ordinary reading,—that of the  $\beta$  MSS.,—uses these words: *inde cum omnibus copiis ad Caesarem pervenit*. "After

<sup>1</sup> *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, p. 84.

<sup>2</sup> *Rec. arch.*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. xviii., 1891, pp. 163-85, and especially 164-6, 176, 179, 184.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 53-66.

*inde*," says Mr. A. G. Peskett,<sup>1</sup> "some MSS. have *diem*, which is supposed to have arisen from *die III*, that is *die tertio*." Mr. Peskett is mistaken. No MSS. have *diem* after *inde*. *AB* have *indiem cum omnibus*, etc., which means nothing; and *MQ* have *indie*. Whitte conjectured that Caesar wrote *inde die tertio*.<sup>2</sup> But even if the emendation is correct, the data for fixing the place of junction are insufficient, because we cannot tell how far Labienus marched each day: if it is not correct, we can only guess or leave the matter alone.

1. Napoleon, assuming, wrongly as I believe,<sup>3</sup> that the ford by which Caesar crossed the Loire was at Bourbon-Lancy, says that his junction with Labienus "must necessarily have taken place on a point of the line from Bourbon-Lancy to Sens." "This point," he adds, "in our opinion is Joigny."<sup>4</sup>

2. Mr. W. C. Compton,<sup>5</sup> who bases his opinion upon the doubtful emendation *die III*, but does not print it in his text, thinks that Joigny is too near Sens, and suggests the confluence of the Armançon and the Yonne.

3. Von Goler<sup>6</sup> believes that Caesar and Labienus met at Troyes. Caesar, he says, had gone to Troyes in order that the twelve cohorts which he had left in the preceding year to guard his second bridge over the Rhine might rejoin him more easily. But how does von Goler know that they had not rejoined him before? If they had not, how does he account for the fact that Caesar had ten legions,—all that he is known to have had during this campaign,—without them? At Troyes, von Goler adds, Caesar would have been near the friendly Remi, through whose territory the German cavalry could have marched securely to join him. No doubt. But the same advantage could have been secured at other places.

4. General Creuly holds that Caesar crossed the Loire near Noviodunum (Nevers), and rejoined Labienus at some point between Nevers and Sens, or more probably at Nevers itself; for, argues the General, Caesar does not say that he actually penetrated into the country of the Senones, but only that he intended to do so (*iter facere instituit*).<sup>7</sup> It is amusing to note that Creuly affirms elsewhere that, in Caesar, "le verbe *instituire* a toujours le sens d'une action et non pas d'une simple résolution."<sup>8</sup>

5. M. Rossignol insists that Caesar, when he was marching to rejoin Labienus, crossed the Yonne at Auxerre, arguing that, if he had crossed it lower down he would have found himself at Agedincum, whither he had no intention of going; and that, if he had crossed higher up, he would have struck off too soon from the route, leading into the country of the Senones, which he took after crossing the Loire. I may remark that it is not proved that Caesar crossed the Yonne at all before he

<sup>1</sup> *Caesar*, Bk. vii., p. 83.

<sup>2</sup> Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii., 155.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 755, *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 292.

<sup>5</sup> *Caesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul*, p. 101.

<sup>6</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 296, n. 3.

<sup>7</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, pp. 502-3.

<sup>8</sup> This remark of mine, I find, has been anticipated in substance by Heller in *Philologus*, xxii., 1865, pp. 169-70.



rejoined Labienus. M. Rossignol goes on to argue that the junction of Caesar with Labienus must have taken place at Eburobriga, near St-Florentin. He gives the following reasons:—first, at Eburobriga, Caesar would have been near enough to the Aedui to be able to observe their movements; secondly, he would have been on the frontier of the friendly Lingones; thirdly, he would have been on the natural line of communication between the basins of the Seine and the Saône, that is to say on a route which would have led him into the country of the Sequani; fourthly, in the passage *Labienus revertitur Agedincum . . . inde cum omnibus copiis ad Caesarem pervenit* the word *pervenit* shows that Labienus, after leaving Agedincum, did not change his direction; and fifthly, one day's march from Agedincum, in the same direction, would have brought him to Eburobriga.<sup>1</sup> Good or bad, the first four of these arguments might be used to prove that Caesar rejoined Labienus at some other place, and the fifth is worthless because there is nothing to show how far or how long Labienus marched after leaving Sens. Moreover, there is nothing in Caesar's narrative to show that the place where he rejoined Labienus was identical with the place where he remained during the period of inaction that preceded his march to succour the Province.

*Quot homines tot sententiae.* But the *sententiae* will never lead to anything. We shall never know exactly where Caesar rejoined Labienus. It is almost certain that the place was somewhere between Sens and the point where Caesar crossed the Loire; and we may be sure that Caesar crossed the Loire at the nearest point that he could safely find to the route that would lead him to Sens. I have shown elsewhere<sup>2</sup> that the ford was not at Bourbon-Lancy, but somewhere lower down the stream.

II. It would be futile to attempt to calculate the length of time that elapsed between Caesar's junction with Labienus and his departure for the Province. All that we can say is that it was considerable,—some weeks at least. For we are told that in the interval Caesar had time to send across the Rhine for reinforcements and to receive them; that a Pan-Gallic council was convened and met; and that Vercingetorix, after he had been elected Commander-in-Chief by this council, had time to raise new troops and send them to attack the Province.<sup>3</sup>

III. 1. Napoleon considers that, during the period of inaction, Caesar encamped "not far from the confluence of the Arpançon and the Yonne," that is to say, in the country of the Sentones, and near Joigny, where Napoleon places his junction with Labienus.

<sup>1</sup> *Mém. de la Comm. des antiquités du dépt de la Côte-d'Or*, v., 1857, pp. 11-14. Reference to Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii. 95, 1075, and especially to *B. G.*, vii. 58, § 2, will show that Rossignol's remark about *pervenit* is nonsense. Rossignol, indeed, argues that if Caesar had marched past Auxerre and had not crossed the Yonne, he would have entered a country the resources of which had already been drained by the army of Labienus, and would have been too far from the faithful Lingones. I cannot, however, see any force in either of these arguments; for Caesar's army had just replenished their stores in the country of the Aedui, and in any case they were about soon to enter the country of the Lingones.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 755.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 63-5.

2. The Duc d'Aumale<sup>1</sup> assumes that the immediate object of Caesar, after his junction with Labienus, was to rest his soldiers and to lay in a fresh stock of provisions. Although, continues the Duc d'Aumale, the Lingones were friendly, it would not have suited Caesar to encamp near their chief town, Andematunnum (Langres); for in that neighbourhood he would have been too far from the Remi, who must have needed his protection against the Bellovaci,<sup>2</sup> and from whom he must have wished to obtain supplies; his communication with the Germans, from whom he was about to borrow cavalry, would have been cut off by the hostile Mediomatrici; and he would have made it too evident to Vercingetorix that he intended, sooner or later, to enter Sequania.<sup>3</sup> Nor did he remain near Agedincum; for, if so, why did Labienus abandon Agedincum before rejoining him? Moreover, the Senones were hostile: they had, in the preceding winter, been obliged to feed the Roman army of occupation; and what corn they had left, after supplying their own wants, was probably, in obedience to the orders of Vercingetorix, either destroyed or concealed.<sup>4</sup> The Duc d'Aumale concludes that, during the period of inaction which elapsed between his junction with Labienus and the commencement of his march for the Province, Caesar remained on the Aube, between Arcis and the river Yvoire, or perhaps, as such a position might have been too close to hostile territory, on the Marne, near Vitry.

3. General Creuly, believing that Caesar rejoined Labienus at or near Noviodunum, argues that we may infer from Caesar's silence that he remained there, because his silence would otherwise be inexcusable: he believes that Caesar had no intention of marching as far as the Province in order to succour it (*quo facilius subsidium provincie ferri posset*), but only intended to go as far as some point in the country of the Sequani, whence he could communicate equally with the Aedui and the Province; and he points out that Noviodunum had the advantage of being comparatively near to the Province, and that, situated as it was in the country of the Aedui, Caesar could there exercise a decisive influence upon the political situation, and might expect that the Aedui would return to their allegiance.<sup>5</sup> But it is not proved that Caesar rejoined Labienus at or near Noviodunum: there is no evidence that, at that time, he had any intention of succouring the Province at all: he could easily have communicated with the Aedui if he had remained comparatively near their frontier; and it is difficult to see why he should have thrown away the alleged advantage of proximity to the Province by taking such a roundabout way from Noviodunum to his destination as the route through the country of the Lingones. Helle argues further that on Creuly's theory it is incomprehensible that Vercingetorix should not have opposed the junction of Caesar with Labienus; or that when Labienus made his (assumed) march back to Noviodunum, Vercingetorix should have divined Caesar's intention of

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2<sup>e</sup> pér., t. xv., 1858, pp. 77-8.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 90, § 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 65, § 4, 66, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 62, § 10, 64, § 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, pp. 502-5.

marching past Alesia into the country of the Sequani; or finally that the German cavalry whom Caesar induced to join him should have been able to make their way unopposed to Noviodunum.<sup>1</sup>

The problem is insoluble. Most military men would, indeed, agree with the Duc d'Aumale that Caesar must have established himself somewhere in the country of the Lingones. De Coynart,<sup>2</sup> it is true, argues that he would not have taken up his quarters there for fear of driving the Lingones to revolt by the requisitions of corn which he would have been obliged to make; and he concludes that he remained in the country of the Senones. But Caesar had just laid in a good stock of food, and was not likely to bear hardly upon the Lingones for some time: he did shortly afterwards march through their country;<sup>3</sup> if he thought it worth his while, he could pay for what he took; and the Lingones, having remained loyal so far, doubtless saw that it would be to their interest to cleave to the stronger side to the end. If Caesar had intended to remain in the country of the Senones, he would not have voluntarily abandoned their chief town, Agedincum. He would surely have taken up his quarters, if he could have done so with due regard to considerations of strategy, among a friendly people: the Lingones were the only people, except the Remi, upon whose friendship he could depend;<sup>4</sup> and the country of the Lingones was near that of the Remi, near that of the Aedui, and conveniently situated for the reception of the expected reinforcements from Germany. We may also, perhaps, infer from Caesar's silence that, after his junction with Labienus, he halted as soon as he conveniently could; and, as he tells us that, after he set out on his march to succour the Province, he took a road leading "through the remotest part of the country of the Lingones" (*per extremos Lingonum fines*), which must have been the northern or the south-eastern part of their territory, it is clear that he must have come from some point with regard to which that region was most remote, that is to say, from some point either in the northern or in the north-western part of their territory.<sup>5</sup> But if we strive after greater exactness, we have nothing certain to go upon.

#### DID VERGINGETORIX PREPARE ALESIA FOR DEFENCE BEFORE THE BATTLE WHICH IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE BLOCKADE?

Caesar does not tell us, in so many words, that Vergingetorix provisioned Alesia, or chose it beforehand as a place of refuge. Nevertheless, the statement in my narrative (p. 132) is not merely a conjecture. It is supported by a sentence in *B. G.*, vii. 71, § 7, from which we learn that the Mandubii had driven a large number of cattle into the stronghold,

<sup>1</sup> *Philologus*, xxii., 1865, pp. 169-70.

<sup>2</sup> *Spectateur militaire*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. xvii., 1856, pp. 220-1.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 56, § 5, 66, § 1. <sup>4</sup> *Id.*, vii. 63, § 7. <sup>5</sup> See pp. 772-4, *infra*.

—*pecus cuius magna erat copia ab Mandubiis compulsu, viri in distribuit.* It is incredible that, when Vercingetorix entered Alesia, it should have contained enough cattle and enough corn to feed not only the Mandubii but also a large army for considerably more than 30 days unless special preparations had been made.<sup>1</sup>

### WHY DID VERCINGETORIX ATTACK CAESAR WHEN THE LATTER WAS MARCHING TO SUCCOUR THE PROVINCE?

The Duc d'Aumale argues that Vercingetorix's resolution to attack Caesar, when the latter was marching to succour the Province, was not inconsistent with his plan of campaign.<sup>2</sup> "Évidemment," he says, "Vercingetorix ignorait la présence des auxiliaires germains, ou il se faisait illusion sur leur nombre et leur valeur. Il ne comptait pour rien l'insignifiante cavalerie gauloise qui accompagnait César un mois plus tôt. Il croit n'avoir affaire qu'à l'infanterie des légions. Il sait combien elle est redoutable, mais, embarrassée qu'elle est de bagages, il espère la condamner à une immobilité fatale ou à une retraite qui aurait ressemblé à celle de 1812, car lui aussi avait ses Cosaques."<sup>3</sup>

### WHAT WAS THE SITE OF THE BATTLE BETWEEN CAESAR AND VERCINGETORIX, WHICH IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE BLOCKADE OF ALESIA?<sup>4</sup>

The data for fixing the site of this battle are very scanty. Caesar, marching northward from Gergovia to succour Labienus, crossed the Loire and pushed on for the country of the Senones: Labienus, after his victory at Lutetia (Paris), marched to Agedincum (Sens) and thence moved on to join Caesar. Some time after their meeting, Caesar started from some point unknown and marched through the country of the Lingones, intending to get into the country of the Sequani, "so as to be able to help the Province more easily" (*quo facilius subsidium Provinciae ferri posset*). Vercingetorix, who, after he had been confirmed in his office of Commander-in-Chief, had assembled his cavalry, and apparently all his forces, at Bibracte (Mont Beuvray), marched to intercept him: but whether he started on this march from Bibracte or from Alesia, is a disputed point. While Caesar was marching through "the furthest part of the country of the Lingones" (*cum . . . per extremos Lingonum fines iter faceret*), Vercingetorix formed three camps near the bank of a

<sup>1</sup> See *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, p. 505, and *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2<sup>e</sup> pér., t. xv., 1858, pp. 85, 111-12.

<sup>2</sup> See *B. G.*, vii. 14, 64, §§ 1-3.

<sup>3</sup> *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2<sup>e</sup> pér., t. xv., 1858, p. 81.

<sup>4</sup> See *Carte de l'Etat-Major* (1:80,000), Sheet 97, and *Carte de France* (1:200,000), Sheet 34.

stream, 10 Roman miles from Caesar's army, and next morning fought a cavalry battle with him close to the stream. During the action the Gallic infantry were drawn up on one of the banks of the stream, in front of their camps, in order to produce a moral effect. On the right of the Roman army there was a hill, down which Caesar's German cavalry charged. This charge decided the battle; and the Gallic cavalry fled to the stream. Vercingetorix forthwith retreated to Alesia (Mont Auxois): Caesar pursued the beaten army until nightfall, and arrived *altero die* at Alesia.<sup>1</sup>

*Altero die*, as I have proved, on pages 723-5, means, not "on the second day (after)," but "on the day (after)." The words *cum Caesar in Sequanos per extremos Lingunum fines iter faceret* have been much discussed: but to my mind they are tolerably clear. First of all, they certainly mean that Caesar was still *within* the country of the Lingones at the time when Vercingetorix made his three camps. It has, indeed, been argued that, when Caesar said that he was marching *in Sequanos* "through the furthest part of the territory of the Lingones," he meant that he was marching through the country of the Sequani. But I shall not notice this absurd interpretation here. I have demolished it on pages 362-3, because it was devised in order to bolster up the theory that Alesia was not on Mont Auxois.

Heller, referring to a passage in *B. G.*, i. 1, § 6, argues that Caesar used the word *extremos* from the point of view of the Province, and therefore that he was describing the northern or north-eastern part of the country of the Lingones.<sup>2</sup> But Heller's premiss is wrong. The passage to which he refers, *Belgae ab extremis Galliae finibus oriuntur* ("The territory of the Belgae begins where that of Gallia ends"),—has no analogy with the one which I am discussing. In the former passage Caesar is describing the geography of Gaul from the point of view of an Italian; and he has already fixed the meaning of *ab extremis Galliae finibus* by saying that the Galli are separated from the Belgae by the Marne and the Seine. In the other passage he is describing his march towards the Province from a northern standpoint.

It has been argued that *per extremos Lingunum fines* might mean "through the southern part of the country of the Lingones, and close to and parallel with their southern frontier." Coynart, indeed, holds that the words must mean this. "*Faire voyage (iter facere)*," he insists, "*ne s'applique jamais qu'à une ligne suivie et non à une ligne coupée.*"<sup>3</sup> But Coynart is over-subtle. According to him, Caesar was marching "*par la zone frontière méridionale des Lingons*," with the intention of crossing their south-eastern frontier. Surely we see here "*une ligne coupée*" as well as "*une ligne suivie*." According to the view which Coynart opposes, Caesar was marching through the extreme south-eastern part of the country of the Lingones, with the intention of crossing their southern or south-eastern frontier. Surely we see here

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 56, §§ 3-5, 62, § 10, 66-8.

<sup>2</sup> *Philologus*, xiii., 1858, p. 595. See also xxii., 1865, pp. 125-6.

<sup>3</sup> *Spectateur militaire*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. xxx., 1860, p. 426.

"une ligne suivie" as well as "une ligne coupée." Nobody would contend that Caesar meant that, at the moment of which he spoke, he was actually crossing the frontier; for he rarely uses the word *fines* in the sense of "frontier"; and when he does so, the sense is unmistakable.<sup>1</sup> *Iter facere* simply means "to march,"—in any direction, whether there are frontiers to be crossed or not.<sup>2</sup> If the words *per extremos Lingonum fines* might mean "through the southern part of the country of the Lingones and close to and parallel with their southern frontier," they might also mean "through the eastern part of the country of the Lingones (however far from their southern frontier) and close to and parallel with their eastern frontier." In other words, Caesar would have made use of a phrase which anybody could interpret as he pleased. His words can only, I believe, mean one thing,—“through that part of the country of the Lingones which was furthest from his starting-point in the direction in which he was going.” M. Gouget<sup>3</sup> aptly quotes a passage from Caesar, which seems to show that this was his meaning:—“mandat ut crebros exploratores in Suebos mittant, quaque apud eos gerantur cognoscant. Illi imperata faciunt et paucis diebus intermissis referunt Suebos omnes, postea quam certiores nuntii de exercitu Romanorum venerint . . . penitus ad extremos fines se recipisse.”<sup>4</sup> Now the direction in which Caesar was going was towards the country of the Sequani, and their country extended to the east and south-east of the country of the Lingones.

"Entre Pest et le midi," writes the Duc d'Aumale, "entre 'le long de' ou 'au travers de,' je reconnais que le texte des *Commentaires* laisse toute liberté de choisir."<sup>5</sup> But if Caesar was marching from north to south through the eastern part of the country of the Lingones and at a relatively considerable distance from their southern frontier he was not marching *per extremos Lingonum fines*. For that part of the country could only have been called "extreme" in relation to the western or north-western part; and if Caesar had started from the western or north-western part, he would not have marched eastward right across the country of the Lingones, and then suddenly struck off towards the south. Again, not one of the writers who have searched for the site of the battle-field makes Caesar march through the southern part of the country of the Lingones and parallel with their southern frontier,<sup>6</sup> for the southern frontier, properly so called, is very limited in extent: it is simply the common frontier of the Lingones and the Mandubii, where the country of the latter thrusts itself, so to speak, like a wedge,

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 339, 658, *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> See Meusel's *Lex. Caes.* i. 1269.

<sup>3</sup> *Mém. présentés par divers savants à l'Acad. des inscr. et belles-lettres*, vi., 1864, pp. 208-12.

<sup>4</sup> "He instructed (the Ubii) to send scouts in rapid succession into the country of the Suebi and to ascertain what they were about. The Ubii fulfilled their instructions and, after the lapse of a few days, reported that the Suebi, on the arrival of messengers with trustworthy information about the Roman army, had all retreated . . . to the most distant part of their country." *B. G.*, vi. 10, §§ 3-4.

<sup>5</sup> *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2<sup>e</sup> pér., t. xv., 1858, p. 83.

<sup>6</sup> Not one of them indeed traces his line of march past the true southern frontier at all, but only past the south-western frontier.

into the heart of the country of the former. According to all the writers, except von Güler, who make him pass through the southern, as distinguished from the south-eastern part of the country of the Lingones, he was moving either up the valley of the Serein or up the valley of the Armançon or between the two rivers; and in any of these cases he would have been forced to pass through the country of the Mandubii before entering Sequania. I do not think that his words can bear this meaning. General Creuly, indeed, thinks otherwise: but the only reason which he gives is that the words *iter facere* generally signify a march of several days' duration.<sup>1</sup> Generally, for obvious reasons: but not always. Caesar uses the phrase in describing a short foraging expedition, and in describing the march of Labienus from Metiosedum (Melun) to the neighbourhood of Paris, a march which, according to Creuly himself, was performed in a single day.<sup>2</sup> I find it difficult to believe that Caesar would have used a phrase which left his readers "toute liberté de choisir" between two widely different interpretations.

It will perhaps be objected that the battle-field may possibly have been in the country of the Sequani; because Caesar only says that he was marching *per extremos Lingonum fines* on the night before the battle, and that the camp of Vercingetorix, near which the battle took place, was 10 Roman miles from the point where the Roman army encamped for the night. But it would have been absolutely impossible for Caesar to reach Alesia from any point where the battle could be placed in the country of the Sequani, on the day after the battle. I am aware that Dion Cassius<sup>3</sup> says that the battle took place in the country of the Sequani: but that part of Dion's history which deals with the Gallic war is, as I have shown,<sup>4</sup> full of ridiculous blunders; and in this case he either neglected to attend to Caesar's narrative or misunderstood it.

It seems clear, then, that we must look for the battle-field somewhere in the south-eastern part of the country of the Lingones. If so, the site must be either that on the river Tille, between Is and Selongey, which is suggested, though not advocated by the Duc d'Aumale, or that on the river Ouche, near Dijon, which is advocated by M. Gouget. But, as I do not anticipate that every reader will agree with my interpretation of *extremos fines*, I shall also examine the other sites that have been proposed.

I have discussed on pages 768-70 the question of the point from which Caesar started on his march, and have arrived at the conclusion that it is impossible to fix it exactly, but that it was probably somewhere in the north or north-west of the country of the Lingones. The question remains, from what point did Vercingetorix march to intercept him? He may possibly have started from Bibracte (Mont Beuvray), where the council assembled by which he was elected Commander-in-Chief; where also, it should seem, the new levies assembled

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, p. 510.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, iv. 32, § 1; vii. 58, § 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xl. 39, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 179-80.

which he ordered after his election :<sup>1</sup> but it is much more probable that he started from Alesia. We may infer, as I have shown on pages 770-71, from Caesar's narrative, that Vercingetorix provisioned Alesia before the siege ; and the Duc d'Aumale points out that the country all round Alesia is intersected by the various routes some one of which Caesar must have taken in order to reach the country of the Sequani, and that Alesia itself was the best position which Vercingetorix could have selected in order to rest in security, to observe Caesar's movements, and to sally forth at the right moment to harass his march.<sup>2</sup> This is a good argument : but when the Duc d'Aumale goes on to infer from the words in which Caesar describes the retreat of Vercingetorix to Alesia,—*copias, ut pro castris collocaverat, reduxit protinusque Alesiam . . . iter facere coepit*,—that “le chef gaulois revint sur ses pas après le combat,”<sup>3</sup> he makes a mistake. The word *reduxit* simply means that, after the battle and before commencing his retreat, Vercingetorix withdrew his infantry from the bank of the stream into camp.<sup>4</sup> If *reduxit* meant “led back” (to Alesia), *Alesiam iter facere coepit* would simply mean the same as *copias reduxit*, and *protinus* would mean nothing at all.

1. According to Napoleon,<sup>5</sup> Caesar started from Joigny, crossed the rivers Armançon, Seine and Aube ; struck off in a south-easterly direction from Darsovoir up the right bank of the Aube ; and encamped on the night before the battle on the western bank of the river Vingeanne, near Longeau. Vercingetorix, who had marched from Bibracte by way of Dijon, to intercept him, encamped on the heights of Sacquenay, overlooking the southern bank of the Badin, a rivulet, which flows into the Vingeanne on its western bank. In this position, says Napoleon, he commanded the three roads, leading respectively towards Gray, Pontailler and Chalon ; by one of which Caesar must have intended to advance to the Saône. The battle took place in the angle between the Vingeanne and the Badin ; and the hill from which the Germans charged was Montsaugéon.

Napoleon argues first, that the alleged battle-field answers perfectly to Caesar's description ; secondly, that skeletons “many of which had bronze bracelets round the arms and legs,” as well as bones of men and of horses, have been found in *tumuli* for some distance along the line of retreat which Vercingetorix would have taken to Alesia ; thirdly, that numbers of horse-shoes,—evidently *shoes of dead horses*,—were found in 1860, at the dredging of the Vingeanne ; and fourthly, that Caesar could have reached Alesia on the *second* day after the battle.

Von Kampen<sup>6</sup> agrees with Napoleon. He holds, it is true, that *altera die* means “on the next day” ; but he believes nevertheless that Caesar did not reach Alesia until the second day after the battle. “As regards the words *altera die ad Alesiam castra fecit*, I think,” he says, “that everything depends upon the point of time from which

<sup>1</sup> B. O., vii. 63, §§ 56, 64, § 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2<sup>e</sup> pér., t. xv., 1858, pp. 94-5.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, p. 85.

<sup>4</sup> See Long's *Caesar*, p. 384.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 294-9.

<sup>6</sup> *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. comm. tabulae*, xii.



the calculation is made." Of course! But it is absolutely clear from Caesar's words that that point of time is the day of the battle. "The actual move to Alesia," he continues, "did not take place till after the day of the battle; for on the day of the battle itself there was enough to do in attending to the baggage, and also the return of the troops who pursued the rear of the enemy till the evening had to be awaited." But only two of the ten legions had to attend to the baggage; and Caesar does not say that "the troops who pursued the rear of the enemy" did return. Why should they have returned? Von Kampen's explanation cannot be got out of the Latin.<sup>1</sup>

Napoleon's arguments are, one and all, worthless. The discovery of bronze bracelets and of horse-shoes proves nothing: indeed it is improbable that the horses either of the Gauls or of the Romans were shod.<sup>2</sup> Granted that the alleged battle-field corresponds with Caesar's description, other sites do the same. Napoleon's interpretation of *altero die* is wrong.<sup>3</sup> Caesar reached Alesia on the day after the battle; and in order to do so, he would have been obliged, if the battle had been fought between the Badin and the Vingeanne, to march 80 kilometres, or 50 miles, and to fight a battle, within two days. Again, for no conceivable reason except to bring him to the mythical battle-field on the Badin, Napoleon makes Caesar travel far away from his natural route. Assuming, with Napoleon, that Caesar marched from Joigny to Tonnerre, and from Tonnerre to Châtillon, he would surely have moved from Châtillon up the valley of the Ource, and then down the valley of the Tille, instead of turning away towards the north-east and then, by a long *détour*, doubling back again towards the south. Moreover, Napoleon admits that Vercingetorix's retreat would have been cut off if he had returned to his camp, and accordingly denies that he did so. But Caesar says that he did!

Coyuart<sup>4</sup> gives an additional reason for rejecting Napoleon's site. He points out that it is 24 kilometres from the eastern, and 58 kilometres from the southern frontier of the Lingones, and observes that such a position cannot be reconciled with Caesar's statement that he was marching *per extremos Lingunum fines*.

2. Belley<sup>5</sup> does not attempt to determine the site with precision. He thinks that the battle took place on the Armançon, somewhere between Tonnerre and Ravières; but he gives no reasons. The Duc d'Aumale<sup>6</sup> and M. Gouget<sup>7</sup> have shown that he was wrong. First of

<sup>1</sup> Fugato omni equitatu, Vercingetorix copias, ut pro castris conlocaverat, reduxit protinusque Alesiam . . . iter facere coepit celeriterque impedimenta ex castris educi et se subsequi iussit. Caesar impedimentis in proximum collem deductis, duabus legionibus praesidio relictis secutus, quantum diei tempus est passum, circiter tribus milibus hostium ex novissimo agmine interfectis altero die ad Alesiam castra fecit.

<sup>2</sup> See *Rev. des soc. savantes*, x., 1869, p. 337.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 723-5, *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> See *Mém. de la Comm. des antiquités du dépt de la Côte-d'Or*, viii., 1873, pp. 162-3, 168.

<sup>5</sup> D'Anville, *Éclaircissements sur l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 452-3.

<sup>6</sup> *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, xv., 1858, p. 97.

<sup>7</sup> *Mém. présentés par divers savants à l'Acad. des inscr. et belles-lettres*, vi., 1864, pp. 216-21.

all, the only site between Tonnerre and Ravières that at all answers to Caesar's description is nearly midway between the environs of Agedincum, from which Caesar is supposed by Belley to have started, and Bibracte, from which Vercingetorix is supposed to have started to intercept him. Vercingetorix must then have left Bibracte on the same day that Caesar left the environs of Agedincum, and before he knew anything of Caesar's intended movements. Such a coincidence is highly improbable. I do not see how this objection can be answered, unless one may suppose that Vercingetorix started a day later than Caesar, but marched much faster, or that he had somehow got information beforehand of Caesar's intentions. Secondly, the battle could hardly have taken place on the southern bank of the stream; for, as the Duc d'Aumale puts it, "il serait peu vraisemblable que César eût négligé de se couvrir du flanc dans sa marche (up the valley of the Armançon), et que Vercingétorix eût pris position tournant le dos au territoire ennemi et faisant face à sa base d'opérations." Moreover, if the battle had been fought on the southern bank, the Gauls would have been obliged, in order to reach Alesia, to cross the river immediately after the battle; and this would have been a serious operation for a beaten host to undertake. The battle must then have been fought on the northern bank. But if so, the Roman army, marching up the valley, must have had its right nearest to the bank. Now it was on the right that the German cavalry, having seized a hill, charged the Gallic cavalry and decided the battle. Therefore the hill must have been close to the river. Only one spot that answers to these conditions can be found,—between Stigny and Ravières; and there the ground is covered with woods and deeply scored by ravines,—in other words, unsuited to a cavalry battle.

3. Von Göler<sup>1</sup> finds the battle-field near Beneuvre. Arguing on the assumption,—for it is nothing more,—that Caesar started from Troyes, he holds that he marched by way of Châtillon-sur-Seine with the intention of passing Til-Châtel and crossing the Saône at Gray. I do not think that Beneuvre is *in extremis Lingonum finibus*.

4. Rossignol does not attempt to point out the exact site of the battle-field: but he places the three camps of Vercingetorix at Montbard, Nogent and Courcelles, on the river Brenne. He begins, as I have already shown,<sup>2</sup> by attempting to prove that the place where Caesar, when he was marching from Gergovia, rejoined Labienus, was Eburobriga, near St-Florentin. The next step in his argument is to fix the point from which Vercingetorix started to intercept Caesar. Vercingetorix, he says, knew that he must keep as close to Caesar as possible, partly in order to observe his movements, partly in order to cut off his supplies in accordance with his plan of campaign; and, if he had remained at Bibracte, he could not have done either. Rossignol concludes that, when Caesar was marching towards the country of the Sequani, he was on the direct road leading from Sens to Dijon; and that Vercingetorix, whose object was to intercept him, must have

<sup>1</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, pp. 300-301.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 767-8.

stationed himself on the north of Alesia, at the point where that road entered the country of the Mandubii.<sup>1</sup>

I do not accept this conclusion. Eburobriga may have been the place where Latienus rejoined Caesar: but how can Rossignol be sure that they remained there? And, if they did not, what becomes of Rossignol's conclusion that, when Caesar set out on his march to the Province, he took the direct road leading from Sens to Dijon? Besides, on Rossignol's theory, Vercingetorix was encamped only 8 kilometres, or 5 miles, in a direct line, say 6 miles by road, from Alesia; and this distance is far too short.

5. Coynart traces Caesar's route along the high ground between the rivers Armançon and Serein. He translates *quoniam* by "pendant que"; and he takes *trinis castris* in the sense of "three marches"! He assumes that Vercingetorix started from Bibracte, which he wrongly identifies with Autun, and that he marched about 27 kilometres, or nearly 17 miles a day. This string of assumptions he regards as data sufficient for determining the site of the battle. "La vallée de l'Armançon, entre Montbard et Ancy-le-Franc, satisfait à toutes les conditions,"<sup>2</sup> etc.

We shall see. Coynart's interpretation of *trinis castris* is absurd. It is true that Caesar . . . *quintis castris Gergovium pervenit* means "Caesar reached Gergovia in five marches": but between that phrase and *circa milia passuum X ab Romanis trinis castris Vercingetorix consedit* there is no analogy. According to Coynart, these words mean that Caesar and Vercingetorix marched exactly the same distance each day for three days, and always encamped exactly 10 Roman miles apart; and that all this time Caesar was marching *per extremos Lingonum fines*! Moreover, Bibracte was not Autun, but Mont Beauvray.<sup>3</sup>

Coynart discovers the battle-field near Moutier St-Jean, on the left bank of the Armançon, about 12 miles by road from Alesia. He places the camp of Vercingetorix on a chain of hills on the right bank; and he tells us that the Gallic cavalry attacked the Roman column as it was marching along the ridge between Vassy and the wooded eminence of Bar.

This theory is open to precisely the same objection as that of Belley. First, Vercingetorix, *ex hypothesi*, started from Bibracte to intercept Caesar on the same day that Caesar started to relieve the Province, without knowing what route Caesar intended to take. Secondly, the beaten Gallic cavalry must have crossed the Armançon, with the Romans at their heels, immediately after the battle. And lastly, the site is too near Alesia.

6. I now come to the theory of the Duc d'Aumale.<sup>4</sup> He bases his search upon the hypothesis that Caesar started on his march from the neighbourhood of Vitry,<sup>5</sup> and advanced up the left bank of the Aube; that Vercingetorix marched to intercept him from Alesia; and that (according to the true interpretation of *altero die*) the battle must have

<sup>1</sup> *Mém. de la Comm. des antiquités du dép<sup>t</sup> de la Côte-d'Or*, v., 1857, pp. 16-17.

<sup>2</sup> *Spectateur mil.*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. xvii., 1856, pp. 220-1, 229; *Mém. de la Comm. des antiquités de la Côte-d'Or*, ix., 1877, pp. 144-7.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 387-94.

<sup>4</sup> *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, xv., 1858, pp. 87, 94-5.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 769, *supra*.

been fought at a distance of not more than 30 or less than 15 miles from Alesia. He concludes that Caesar encamped, on the night before the battle, about 7 miles south of Ferté-sur-Aube; that Vercingetorix encamped on a ridge rising above the right bank of the Ource, near Presly: and that the battle took place in an undulating plain between Montigny and Louesme.

Now, on either of the two interpretations of the words *per extremos Lingonum fines* which the Duc d'Aumale himself admits, he must be wrong. Let the reader look at the map, and he will see that Caesar's alleged position was almost in the centre of the country of the Lingones. The Duc d'Aumale endeavours, indeed, to reconcile his theory with the words of Caesar by saying that Caesar's camp was "près de la frontière lingonne (*extremos fines Lingonum*), découpée de ce côté par l'enclave mandubienne." In reality, it was nearly as far from the northern frontier of the Lingones as from the common frontier of the Lingones and the Mandubii. But, even if it had been quite close to the latter frontier, the argument of the Duc d'Aumale would be of no avail. He forgets that Caesar was marching towards the country of the Sequani, not that of the Mandubii; and Dijon, the point at which he conjectures that Caesar intended to cross the Lingonian frontier, is very far from the assumed encampment. Again, as M. Pistolet de St-Ferjeux points out,<sup>1</sup> Vercingetorix, being about 10 kilometres, or more than 6 miles from the battle-field, could not have directed the movements of his cavalry or supported them with his infantry.

7. M. Pistolet de St-Ferjeux, arguing on the hypothesis that Caesar started on his march from a camp, the remains of which are visible on the hill of Ste-Germaine near Bar-sur-Aube, and that he intended to cross the Saône near Pontailler or St-Jean-de-Losne, places the Roman army, on the night before the battle, near Arbot on the Aube, and the three camps of Vercingetorix on three hills separated from one another by the sources of the Aube. The battle-field was a little to the north of these hills: Vercingetorix himself was between the Aube and the hill on which stands the chapel of St-Remi; and the hill from which the German cavalry charged is identified with that of Charbonnière.<sup>2</sup>

Now Arbot was not in *extremis Lingonum finibus*. It was about 30 miles from their eastern, and more than 50 miles from their southern frontier.

8. F. Monnier<sup>3</sup> makes Vercingetorix encamp at the village of Senailly on the right bank of the Armançon. Now from Genay, where Monnier tells us that the retreat of Vercingetorix began, to Mont Auxois, the distance is not more than 10 miles; and it is hard to see why the Romans should have thrown away the immense advantage of continuing the pursuit, on the day of the battle, right up to and into Alesia.

9. Virtually identical with the view of Monnier is that of General Creuly. He too makes Caesar encamp before the battle at Montréal-sur-Serein, and Vercingetorix near Visenpay, which is about a mile and

<sup>1</sup> *Spectateur militaire*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., vol. xlii., 1863, pp. 60-61.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 63-5, 67, 69, 74.

<sup>3</sup> *Vercingetorix*, 1883, pp. 197-200.

a half south-east of Senailly. The distance from Visernay to Alise is, he says, 18 kilometres, or 11 miles,—“c'est qui convient aux détails de cette journée et de la suivante.”<sup>1</sup> I do not think so.

Every one of the foregoing theories, the reader will have perceived, conflicts with the only sound interpretation which, in my judgement, can be given of the words *per extremos Lingonum fines*.

10. The next view which I shall examine is that of M. Gouget.<sup>2</sup> He assumes that Caesar started from Langres (Andematunnum), the chief town of the Lingones; and he interprets *per extremos Lingonum fines* in the same way that I do. Caesar's best route into Sequania led, he considers, down the valley of the Tille, and thence to the Saône, which he would have crossed either near Auxonne or near St-Jean-de-Losne. Pursuing this route, says M. Gouget, he must needs strike the river Ouche, and cross it somewhere between Dijon and the Saône. Evidently, then, Vercingetorix, who was preparing to intercept him, encamped, the night before the battle, on the Ouche. The left camp was on the southern bank of the Ouche, opposite Dijon: the central camp was on the northern bank, in the peninsula between the Ouche and its affluent, the Suzon: the right camp was on the southern bank of the Ouche, just below its confluence with the Suzon. The Romans encamped, the night before the battle, at Arc-sur-Tille. The battle took place on the high ground which extends along the northern bank of the Ouche from Dijon to Fauverney. The hill (*summu iugum*) from which the Germans made their decisive charge was the culminating point of the gently sloping heights between St-Apollinaire and Mirande. The battle-field was about 32 miles from Alesia, whither Vercingetorix retreated, up the right bank of the Ouche.

As far as I can see, there is but one objection to this view. I am inclined to think that M. Gouget under-estimated the distance of the hypothetical battle-field from Alesia. As the crow flies, it is about 48 kilometres; and, allowing for the windings of the road, the actual distance which Vercingetorix and Caesar would have had to accomplish can hardly have been less than 56 kilometres, or about 35 miles. Following the line of the railway, indeed, I make the distance from Fauverney to Alesia 62 kilometres, or between 38 and 39 miles. Still, I have no doubt that such a march was within the bounds of possibility. A considerable part of the distance would doubtless have been covered in the pursuit on the day of the battle. Caesar had every motive for pursuing his beaten enemy as hard as he could. During the operations before Gergovia he made a forced march of 50 Roman miles in 28 hours.<sup>3</sup> Is it incredible that, on the long summer's day that followed this battle, he should have made a forced march of 20 or 25 miles?

It might, perhaps, also be objected to M. Gouget's view that the slope of the ridge which he identifies with the hill from which the Germans

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. arch., nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, p. 509.*

<sup>2</sup> *Mém. présentés par divers savants à l'Acad. des inscr. et belles-lettres, vi., 1864, pp. 208-12, 214, 228-33, 241, 255-6.*

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 121-2 and 626-7, *supra*.

charged is too gentle. But it would be a great mistake to suppose that that hill could have been really steep. It is practically impossible, says Lord Wolseley,<sup>1</sup> for cavalry to charge down a hill of which the gradient is more than 1 in 20.

11. Only one other site has, so far as I have been able to discover, been proposed. The Duc d'Aumale suggests that the battle may have been fought in the neighbourhood of Is-sur-Tille. But this place is 14 miles north of Dijon. If the battle had been fought there, would Caesar have said that, on the previous night, when he was several miles still further to the north, he was *in extremis Lingonum finibus*?

What am I to say, in conclusion? If the explanation which I have given of the all-important words *per extremos Lingonum fines* is right, it should seem that the battle must have been fought on the site pointed out by M. Gouget. But certainty is unattainable. I cannot pretend, at the close of this long discussion, to have done more than put together the data, and examine the conjectures which my predecessors have made.

### WHY DID VERCINGETORIX RETREAT TO ALESIA?

"Vercingetorix," says Mommsen,<sup>2</sup> "had been prepared for a struggle under the walls, but not for being besieged in Alesia; from that point of view the accumulated stores, considerable as they were, were yet far from sufficient for his army."

Merivale thinks that "even though the battle,"—which preceded the blockade—"was lost, the cause might have been maintained by recurrence to the harassing system in which the Gauls had hitherto, with one exception, so successfully persevered. If their vast forces had been dispersed or drawn out of Caesar's immediate reach, and the country wasted around him, he would not, we may presume, have ventured to protract an indecisive warfare under pressure of the circumstances which urged him to seek the Roman frontier. The victory he had gained would in that case have been destitute of any decisive result. But the fatal mistake of assembling the whole Gaulish army in one spot, and there tying it, as it were, to the stake, offered an opportunity for a daring and decisive exploit."<sup>3</sup>

General J. B. Renard<sup>4</sup> conjectures that Vercingetorix retreated to Alesia in the hope of keeping Caesar chained to the spot while the hosts of united Gaul were preparing to come and join him, and annihilate the Roman army. But if so, why did not Vercingetorix send off his cavalry with the fiery cross at once?

Caesar does not tell us why Vercingetorix shut himself up in Alesia. Perhaps he hoped to be as successful there as he had been at Gergovia. At all events, it is certain that, beaten as he was and hotly pursued by

<sup>1</sup> *Soldier's Pocket-Book*, 3rd ed., p. 254.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. of Rome*, i. 277.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire*, 1850, vol. ii. p. 30.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. pol. et mil. de la Belgique*, 1847, pp. 479-80.

Caesar, he was bound to establish himself in some strong position, lest he should be compelled to fight another and yet more disastrous battle, or, as Sir Coleridge Grove has suggested to me, lest his disheartened followers should fall away.

### ON THE NUMBER OF LEGIONS WHICH CAESAR HAD AT ALESIA

From what Caesar himself says<sup>1</sup> we should gather that, during the blockade of Alesia, he had ten legions under his command. For he sent ten legions into winter-quarters at the close of the sixth campaign: just before he started for Gergovia, he divided his army into two parts, assigning four legions to Labienus and keeping six himself; and he nowhere says or implies that another legion joined him. But Napoleon<sup>2</sup> argues that he had eleven. He points out that according to Hirtius (*B. G.*, viii. 4, § 3), one of the two legions which, after the fall of Alesia, Caesar sent into winter-quarters on the Saône, was the 6th; and, as the 6th was not one of the ten legions which Caesar's own narrative accounts for, he concludes that, before the blockade of Alesia, "it had remained in garrison among the Allobroges or in Italy," and implies that, although Caesar employed it in the blockade, he, for some reason or other, omitted to mention it. "The redistribution," he proceeds, "after the siege of Uxellodunum gives also the same result, for in book viii. c. 46 the 'Commentaries' give the position of ten legions, without reckoning the 15th, which, according to book viii. c. 24, had been sent to Cisalpine Gaul. These facts are repeated again, book viii. c. 54."

This reasoning would prove, not necessarily that Caesar had eleven legions at Alesia, but that he had eleven legions to dispose of when he distributed the troops in winter-quarters after the capture of the town, —if it were certain that the number VI in *B. G.*, viii. 4 is genuine, and that, assuming its genuineness, Hirtius did not make a mistake. But it is not unlikely that either Hirtius or one of the copyists did make a mistake,<sup>3</sup> for the MSS. of *B. G.*, viii. 24 have *legionem XII* (or *duodecimam*), and it is certain and is universally admitted that XII ought to be XV.

Desjardins,<sup>4</sup> who agrees with Napoleon that there were eleven legions at Alesia, argues that the eleventh was the one which Caesar had borrowed from Pompey,<sup>5</sup> and which was numbered I. He assumes of course that the number VI in *B. G.*, viii. 4 is genuine. Anyhow, even if the 6th legion did join Caesar in 52 B.C., Napoleon is probably wrong in asserting that it took part in the blockade of Alesia. For Caesar expressly says that, before the blockade, it was impossible for reinforce-

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 44, § 3; vii. 34, § 2, 57, § 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 292-3.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. F. de Coulanges's *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France,—la Gaule romaine*, 1891, p. 46, n. 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 692, n. 1.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, vi. 1.

ments from Italy or the Province to join him because the roads were blocked.<sup>1</sup> How then was the additional legion to march by itself all the way from Italy or from the country of the Allobroges to Alesia? If it did take part in the blockade, it must have arrived in Gaul before the roads were blocked, and yet after Caesar started for Gergovia; and this is most unlikely.<sup>2</sup>

## THE OPERATIONS AT ALESIA

1. The writer of an article in the *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Pädagogik*<sup>3</sup> complains that Napoleon and von Kampen<sup>4</sup> place most of the twenty-three redoubts, of which Caesar speaks, at the foot of the hills surrounding Alesia, although Caesar himself says, in chapters 69 and 80, that they were on the hills. Five of the twenty-three, he remarks, namely those distinguished in Napoleon's and von Kampen's Plans by the numbers 10, 11, 15, 18 and 22, have been discovered (by Colonel Stoffel); and four of the five are on the hills. The inference is that the remaining eighteen were similarly situated.

Now Caesar does not say, in either of the two chapters to which the writer refers or anywhere else, that the redoubts were on the hills. In chapter 69 he says that his camps were constructed in suitable positions, and that "there" (*ibi*), that is to say in their neighbourhood, twenty-three redoubts were made. In chapter 80, he speaks of "all the camps which covered the heights" surrounding Alesia. But we have no right to infer from this that the redoubts were also on the heights. For either the word "all" is here, as in other passages, used loosely by Caesar, seeing that three of the camps were not on the heights at all but in the plain of Les Laumes; or else he means all those camps which were on the heights, and not the others. Besides, one of the redoubts was unquestionably on the lower slopes of the heights; several of them were unquestionably in the plain of Les Laumes; and the word *ibi* is vague. The truth is that it is impossible to determine the position of any one of the redoubts, except the five which have left traces. All that Napoleon and Colonel Stoffel could do or professed to do was to select those sites which appeared to them the most convenient.

2. The author of the article in the *Neue Jahrbücher* points out<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 65, § 4.

<sup>2</sup> Caesar, according to Suetonius (*Divus Iulius*, 24), raised in Transalpine Gaul a legion, which was called *Alauda*. This legion, which is numbered V in various inscriptions (Gruter, *Corpus inscr.*, 1707, t. i., pp. CCCLIII., 1, DCLIV., 2, DCLIX., 4,

Desjardins (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, iii. 48) argues that *Alauda* was raised during the civil war. See Caesar, *B. G.*, i. 39, § 2, and Cicero, *Ad Att.*, ix. 13, xvi. 8, § 2.

<sup>3</sup> Band cxx., 1879, p. 107.

<sup>4</sup> *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. comm. tabulæ*, xiii.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 318 and Planche 25.

<sup>6</sup> P. 106.



that, according to von Kampen, the cavalry of Vercingetorix, after the combat which Caesar describes in chapter 70, fled back to the town in two divisions, one along the valley of the Oze, the other along the valley of the Ozérain; and he remarks that for this view there is no evidence in Caesar. This is quite true: but unless *all* the beaten cavalry were nearer to one than to the other of the two valleys, it is probable that von Kampen is right.

The writer goes on to argue that the terminus of the flight must have been the town itself, and not, as von Kampen holds, the Gallic camp on the east of the town. Only those of the fugitives who could not get into the town owing to the narrowness of its gates (*angustioribus portis*)<sup>1</sup> sought refuge, he maintains, in the camp. Finally, he propounds this question. Will von Kampen explain how, if *angustioribus portis* denotes "the gates of the camp," in which case the fugitives would, at the moment of which Caesar speaks, have reached the camp, the pursuit by the Germans up to the entrenchments could have been said to have then become more severe (*Germani acrius usque ad munitiones sequuntur*)?

Von Kampen is quite right; and the author of the article has thought himself into a muddle. This is what Caesar says:—"The enemy were put to flight. Their numbers were so great that they got in each other's way and jostled each other in the entrances, which had been made too narrow. The Germans pursued them with vigour right up to the entrenchment. The carnage was great. Some of the fugitives got off their horses and tried to get across the trench and swarm over the wall. . . . The Gauls inside the entrenchment were equally alarmed: believing that an attack was imminent, they shouted 'To arms, to arms!' and some in their terror rushed into the town. Vercingetorix ordered the gates to be shut, for fear the camp should be left defenceless," etc. What could be clearer? And how can any one in his senses doubt that *angustioribus portis* means "the gates of the camp," that is to say, the openings in the stone wall, which, as Caesar tells us, the Gauls had made on the east of the camp? Caesar first describes how the flying Gauls jostled each other in the gates of the camp: then, with a perfectly natural sequence, he describes how the Germans pursued them right up to the entrenchments, that is to say, the ditch and the stone wall (*fossam et maceriam*), through which those gates led into the camp. Surely the fugitives reached the entrenchments before their pursuers. And if so, what fault can be found with von Kampen's interpretation? According to this puzzle-headed critic, Caesar describes *two* flights into the town. First the Gallic horsemen fly through the camp into the town; and then the garrison of the camp flies, *in spite of and through the ranks of the pursuing Germans*, also into the town. For, on the writer's theory, the Germans must have penetrated into the camp, or else the fugitives would not have been so foolish as to jostle each other in their efforts to escape through the gates of the town into the town. Finally, those Gallic horsemen who cannot get into the town, owing to the crowd thronging

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 70. § 3.

in its gates, take refuge in the camp, *although they are there already* and although the Germans are there, ready to destroy them! Did ever human brain conceive such nonsense, except in a dream or a learned periodical?

There is one sentence in Caesar's narrative which so unanswerably demonstrates the truth of von Kampen's view<sup>1</sup> that I am quite unable to conceive how the writer in the *Neue Jahrbücher* could have overlooked it. Immediately after saying that "the Germans pursued them (the Gauls) with vigour right up to the entrenchment," Caesar says that "some of the fugitives got off their horses and tried to get across the trench and swarm over the wall." Trench and wall, Caesar expressly says, were outside the camp. It follows that the pursuing Germans were outside it too.

3. According to the great Napoleon's estimate,<sup>2</sup> the entire force which Caesar commanded at Alesia, including auxiliaries and cavalry, amounted to 80,000 men. But there are really no data for forming an estimate. We are not told, and it is useless to guess how many cavalry he had or how many auxiliaries. We know that he had 10 legions; and they must have suffered heavy losses in this and previous campaigns: but we do not know how far their losses had been made good by the *supplementum* which Caesar had brought into Gaul at the beginning of this year.

4. How did the cavalry of Vercingetorix succeed in getting away from Alesia? According to the Duc d'Aumale,<sup>3</sup> we must assume either that the first line of redoubts constructed by the Romans was defective or that the vedettes did not do their duty with proper vigilance. The "first line of redoubts" was certainly defective, in the sense that it was not completed; for Caesar says that the cavalry went out through a gap in the line of works.<sup>4</sup> The only question is whether anything more than redoubts had yet been constructed at all: that is to say, whether the line of contravallation, properly so called, had even been begun. Caesar says that Vercingetorix sent out his cavalry *opere instituto*,<sup>5</sup> that is to say, after the Romans had begun to construct their works, which would seem to imply that they had not had time to do much: indeed a later passage in his narrative would leave on one's mind the impression that the work of constructing the actual line of contravallation was not taken in hand until after the departure of the cavalry; for he distinctly says that he undertook this work after he had learned what Vercingetorix's purpose had been in sending the cavalry out (*Quibus rebus ex perfugis et captivis cognitis, Caesar haec genera munitionis instituit*).<sup>6</sup> But many commentators have deceived themselves by arguing on the assumption that Caesar's narrative, even in matters of chronology, was invariably and rigidly precise. They

<sup>1</sup> I need hardly say that it is also the view of Napoleon (*Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 301-2).

<sup>2</sup> *Précis des guerres de César*, p. 109.

<sup>3</sup> *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2<sup>e</sup> pér., t. xv., 1858, p. 110.

<sup>4</sup> "qua opus erat intermissum," *B. G.*, vii. 71, § 5.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 70, § 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 72, § 1.

seem to forget that he did not write with the fear of German criticisms before his mind. It is possible that he had begun the actual work of constructing the contravallation before Vercingetorix sent out his cavalry; and that, when he wrote the sentence which I have quoted, he only meant that he modified and added to his plan, with a view to repelling the expected army of relief. All that we can say with certainty, then, is that the line of contravallation, if it had been begun, was incomplete, that there was nothing to prevent the departure of the Gaulish cavalry.

5. It is necessary to inquire how far the results of Napoleon's excavations harmonise with Caesar's statements. I say "Napoleon's excavations" for the sake of convenience: but it will be understood that the work was actually directed by Colonel Stoffel alone. Caesar's narrative would, I think, leave upon the minds of most readers the impression that all the works therein described,—the inner 20-foot trench, the two 15-foot trenches and the rampart of the contravallation,—completely surrounded Alesia. He does not, however, distinctly say this; and the results of the excavations show that it was not the case. Nor, indeed, was such an elaborate system of works required; for, as Napoleon remarks,<sup>1</sup> the only sections of the contravallation which required to be fortified with special care were those which crossed the plain of Les Laumes and the valley of the Rabutin. The 20-foot trench extended only across the plain of Les Laumes. Of the two 15-foot trenches the inner surrounded Alesia, the outer was confined to the plain. The circumvallation had nowhere more than one trench. A writer in the *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Pädagogik*<sup>2</sup> maintains that the valley of the Rabutin must have been as strongly fortified as the plain of Les Laumes: but the results of the excavations refute his contention, although the water drawn from the Rabutin gave additional strength to that part of the works.

Achaintre<sup>3</sup> puts the question whether the 20-foot trench formed a part of the completed system of works, or whether it was merely a "fossé perdu," abandoned after it had served the temporary purpose of protecting the legionaries while they were constructing the proper works. The former view is defended by Lipsius, Folard and Turpin de Crissé. Guischart, however, argues, that if this trench had formed a part of the contravallation, properly so called, there must have been another like it in the circumvallation, as we may infer from Caesar's saying that the contravallation and the circumvallation were identical in plan.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, as Achaintre justly remarks, Caesar does not say one word to suggest that the 20-foot trench did form a part of the contravallation; and the passage in which he describes the attempt which the Gauls made to cross it while the relieving army was making its first attack upon the circumvallation in the plain<sup>5</sup> proves that the Romans had abandoned it.

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 319-21.

<sup>2</sup> Band cxx., 1879, p. 114.

<sup>3</sup> *Caesar*, i. 375-6.

<sup>4</sup> *pares eiusdem generis munitiones, diversas ab his, contra exteriorem hostem perfect.* *B. G.*, vii. 74, § 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 79, § 4.

The distance between the 20-foot trench and the inner of the two trenches in the line of contravallation was, according to the *a* MSS., *pedes CCCC* (400 feet).<sup>1</sup> "But," says von Kampen,<sup>2</sup> "in place of reading *pedes CCCC*, it must be *passus CCCC*,"—nearly 2000 feet,—as a simple measurement of the space between the trenches,—traces of which still exist,—gives this distance." Napoleon contradicting the evidence supplied by his own Atlas (Planche 25) says "400 feet";<sup>3</sup> and Mr. W. C. Compton<sup>4</sup> tries to explain the difficulty by saying that "at either end the 20-foot ditch is no more than 400 feet in front of the other fortifications." But this will not do. Tested by their respective scales, both Napoleon's Plan and von Kampen's make the distance at the northern end much more than 400 feet. The Greek paraphrast wrote *τρία στάδια*, which is equivalent to 375 *passus*:<sup>5</sup> and perhaps we may infer that the reading in his copy of Caesar was *passus CCCC*. Following Napoleon's Plan, I have given approximately the distance as measured, according to the scale, from the southern end of the innermost trench to the contravallation.

6. Guischard<sup>6</sup> holds the singular opinion that there was only one trench in the contravallation besides the 20-foot trench; and that the other of the two trenches which Caesar expressly mentions was in the circumvallation. This view is refuted by the results of the excavations: but it may be well to show that the results of the excavations agree with Caesar's narrative. Guischard argues that *fossa interior* means the trench in the contravallation, and *fossa exterior* the trench in the circumvallation. But, as L. V. Berlinghieri<sup>7</sup> points out, after having mentioned these two trenches, Caesar goes on to say that behind them he constructed a rampart; and it is clear that this rampart belonged to the contravallation.<sup>8</sup> Guischard insists that when Caesar, after describing the 20-foot trench, says that he traced all the other works at a distance of 400 feet behind it (*reliquas omnes munitiones ab ea fossa pedes CCCC reduxit*), he means by *reliquas omnes munitiones* both the contravallation and the circumvallation: but this view is refuted by the very fact that the *reliquae omnes munitiones* were separated by the distance of 400 feet (or "paces") from the 20-foot trench. If the *reliquae omnes munitiones* had comprised both the contravallation and the circumvallation, Caesar would not have said that they were both separated by the same distance from the 20-foot trench. It is clear, then, that *reliquas omnes munitiones* refers only to the contravallation. Finally, after describing the construction of the *reliquae omnes munitiones*,

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 72, § 2. The *β* MSS. have *pedibus CCCC*.

<sup>2</sup> *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. Comm. tabulae*, xiii.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 303.

<sup>4</sup> *Caesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul*, p. 105.

<sup>5</sup> See Schneider's *Caesar*, ii. 562.

<sup>6</sup> *Mém. crit. et hist.*, 1773, iv. 499-501.

<sup>7</sup> *Examen des opérations et des travaux de César autour d'Alesia*, 1812, pp. 77-84.

<sup>8</sup> Hoc intermisso spatio duas fossas XV pedes latas, eadem altitudine perduxit, quarum anteriorem campestribus ac demissis locis aqua ex flumine derivata conplevit. Post eas aggerem ac vallum XII pedum exstruxit. *B. G.* vii. 79 § 3.

which included the two trenches above mentioned, and of the subsidiary defences (*lilia*, *cippi* and *stimuli*), Caesar proceeds to describe the construction of the circumvallation. "These defences completed," he says, "Caesar constructed corresponding lines of the same kind, facing the opposite way, to repel the enemy from without" (*His rebus perfectis . . . pares eiusdem generis munitiones, diversas ab his, contra exteriorem hostem perfecit*).<sup>1</sup>

Napoleon<sup>2</sup> speaks of the towers as being erected on that part of the contravallation which crossed the western plain,—clearly implying that they were not erected on any other part; and he says that the works which Caesar describes in chapters 72 and 73 were "peculiar to the plain of Les Laumes." Both these statements are incorrect; and they are contradicted by Napoleon himself, by his Plan (25), and by the *Commentaries*. Caesar tells us that there were *lilia* and *cippi*, as he calls the subsidiary defences which I have described on page 138, in front of the camp on the southern slopes of Mont Réa; and he mentions the towers that defended the *loca praecepta ex ascensu*, which are identified with the Montagne de Flavigny.<sup>3</sup>

8. Guischard<sup>4</sup> holds that the *agger* or rampart in the line of contravallation, which Caesar describes in chapter 72, was protected by a palisade (*vallum*) planted on the berme as well as by the crenellated parapet (*lorica pinnarumque*), which stood upon the rampart itself. Caesar describes the rampart by the words *aggerem vallumque*, which show that there was a palisade somewhere; but there is no evidence that it was planted on the berme, and its proper place was the top of the rampart.<sup>5</sup>

9. Guischard also holds that the towers which Caesar erected at intervals of 80 feet along the line of contravallation were mounds, projecting in front of the curtain and protected by parapets:<sup>6</sup> but this absurd theory is refuted by the passages in which Caesar describes the construction of the wooden towers which Cicero erected upon the rampart of his winter camp in 54 B.C.<sup>7</sup>

10. Describing the subsidiary defences which he calls *cippi*, Caesar writes:—"Itaque truncis arborum, [aut] admodum firmis ramis abscisis atque horum delibratis ac praeacutis cacuminibus perpetuae fossae quinos pedes altae ducebantur. Huc illi stipes denissi et ab infimo revincti, ne revelli possent, ab ramis eminebant. Quini erant ordines coniuncti inter se atque implicati; quo qui infraverant, se ipsi acutissimis vallis induebant"<sup>8</sup> ("Accordingly trunks of trees with very stout branches were felled, and the ends of the branches peeled, and

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 72-4.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 303, 312, 319-22.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 73, §§ 4-8, 85, § 6, 86, § 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Mém. mil. sur les Grecs et les Romains*, 1758, pp. 230-31.

<sup>5</sup> Caesar, says M. Masquelez, frequently uses the expression *viminea lorica*; and we may therefore conclude that the *lorica* was made of wattle-work. *Spect. mil.*, 2<sup>e</sup> sér., t. xliii., 1863, p. 354-5. The conclusion may be right; but Caesar never uses the expression *viminea lorica*. See Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii. 501, 2326.

<sup>6</sup> *Mém. mil.*, pp. 230-31.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, v. 40, § 6.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, vii. 73, §§ 2-5.

sharpened to a point. Continuous trenches 5 feet deep were then dug, in which the trunks were planted, and fastened down at the bottom to prevent their being dragged out, while their branches projected above. There were five rows, connected with one another and intertwined; and all who stepped into the trenches impaled themselves on the sharp points"). Does *quini* . . . *implicati* mean that there were five parallel trenches or five rows of boughs in each trench? Kraner,<sup>1</sup> von Goler<sup>2</sup> and Long<sup>3</sup> suggest the latter interpretation; and it seems the more probable because, first, the passage immediately follows that in which Caesar describes how the boughs were inserted in the trenches;<sup>4</sup> and secondly, if Caesar had meant that there were five *perpetuae fossae*, he would naturally have said so when he first mentioned them. Napoleon<sup>5</sup> adopts the other interpretation, but gives no reasons.

Berlinghieri,<sup>6</sup> however, does give a reason. He says that if each of the trenches had been wide enough to contain five rows of boughs, Caesar would have mentioned their breadth. This is no argument. The fact that each trench contained five rows would of itself prove that the breadth of the trenches was considerable. P. Bial<sup>7</sup> holds with Berlinghieri that if Caesar had meant to convey that there was only one trench, he would have written *perpetua fossa*, not *perpetuae fossae*. I have not tried to prove that there was only one trench, but that Caesar does not say that there were five. But in any case Caesar would not have written *perpetua fossa*. For it would be ridiculous to imagine that he meant to describe an endless trench, surrounding Alesia like a ring. What he meant was that, where the trenches were necessary and practicable, they were continuous.

Berlinghieri holds that the branches were fixed in the earth upside down; in other words, that the thick end was uppermost!<sup>8</sup> This "ludicrous blunder," as Long<sup>9</sup> calls it, was due to Berlinghieri's ignorance of Latin.

The writer of the article in the *Neue Jahrbücher*<sup>10</sup> interprets *quini ordines* as meaning "five trenches"; and he believes that in each group of *cippi* five trenches were intersected at right angles by five others, so that there were 25 points of intersection, at each of which a branch (*stipes*) was inserted. But, he remarks, if there were no more than these 25 *stipites*, the Gauls could easily have walked between the several rows of *stipes* and pushed the branches on one side. Accordingly he concludes that the spaces between the 25 *stipites* "were provided with the same *stipites*, so that there was no way of escape. . . . Each *cippus* formed a whole by itself and contained 65 *stipites*." After

<sup>1</sup> Caesar, ed. Dittenberger-Kraner, p. 326.

<sup>3</sup> Caesar, p. 390.

<sup>5</sup> Hist. de Jules César, ii. 303 and Planche 27.

<sup>7</sup> Chemins, habitations et oppidum de la Gaule au temps de César, 1864, p. 210, n. 3.

<sup>9</sup> Caesar, p. 390.

<sup>2</sup> Gall. Krieg, p. 311.

<sup>4</sup> See Schneider, ii. 571.

<sup>6</sup> Examen, etc., p. 89.

<sup>8</sup> Examen, etc., pp. 90-91.

<sup>10</sup> Band cxx., 1879, pp. 117-18.

remarking that the *cippi* of which Napoleon, von Goler and von Kampen have given illustrations in their respective atlases would not have been difficult to cross, the writer confidently challenges any one to produce a better explanation than his own.

I do not think that this is at all difficult. The writer of the article has gone to his own inner consciousness for an explanation, instead of to Caesar's clear description. His intersecting trenches with their 65 *stipites* are purely imaginary. In the bottoms of the trenches *stipites* were ~~inserted~~, how thickly we cannot tell because we are not told, but thickly enough to prevent the Gauls from getting across. That is all that Caesar tells us, and all that a reasonable man would care to be told.

11. Some commentators have supposed that the line of circumvallation, as well as the line of contravallation, included a "fossé perdu," that is to say a 20-foot trench similar to the one which Caesar describes in his 72nd chapter. I suppose they thought that it was necessary in order to protect the soldiers while they were at work from the attacks of the unarmed rusties in the neighbourhood. Guischart<sup>1</sup> has taken the trouble to refute this absurdity.

12. On page 141 of my narrative I have written, "It was just after the expulsion of the Mandubii when the anxious watchers on the hill saw, moving over the plain, a multitude of cavalry. The infantry were on the heights of Mussy-la-Fosse behind." Caesar does not fix the date of the arrival of the relieving army at Alesia. After describing the fate of the Mandubii, he writes,<sup>2</sup> *Interea Commius reliquique duces . . . ad Alesiam perveniunt*, etc. I should think that *interea* is used loosely here, its "meanwhile" often is in English. If the relieving army had already arrived, we may perhaps presume that the Mandubii would not have been expelled from the town. [Since I wrote these words, I have come across three passages in which Virgil,<sup>3</sup> as Nettleship remarks, uses *interea* in a loose sense.]

13. Caesar says that the relieving army encamped not more than one Roman mile from the circumvallation, on a hill outside Alesia.<sup>4</sup> The hill is generally identified with Mussy-la-Fosse, which is on the south-west of Mont Auxois, and beyond the plain of Les Laumes.

Mr. Compton<sup>5</sup> gives reasons for placing the camp on the slope of this hill, facing Alesia, not, as von Kampen does, on the plateau. He argues that "first, the view towards the besieged town is no more comprehensive from the top of the hill than from the side; secondly, a hill, so high and so far removed from the scene of action would be quite unsuitable for military purposes, especially for cavalry; thirdly, Caesar expressly gives a mile from the Roman lines as the distance at which the Gauls encamped, and the foot of the hill at the nearest point is about a mile from the Roman works; fourthly, the area enclosed by a line of earthworks in von Kampen's map appears out of

<sup>1</sup> *Mém. crit. et hist.*, iv. 501.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 79, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Aen.* x. 1; xi. 1; xii. 842.

<sup>4</sup> *Colle exteriori occupato non longius mille passibus ab nostris munitionibus consistunt.* *B. G.*, vii. 79, § 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Caesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul*, pp. 107-8.

proportion to the needs even of so large a force as that of the text; fifthly, the Roman cavalry pursue the Gauls 'usque ad castra'—right up to the camp—"which would be practically impossible if the camp were on the top of so steep a hill." There can be no doubt that, if the Gauls encamped on the hill of Mussy at all, they encamped, partly at all events, on its slope: but "the foot of the hill at the nearest point" is less than a mile from the Roman line of circumvallation; and any one may convince himself, by merely comparing the area of the plateau of Mussy with the area of the plateau of Mont Auxois and reflecting that the relieving army was at least three times as numerous as the tightly packed garrison of Alesia, that von Goler's camp is not at all too large.

Von Goler<sup>1</sup> objects to the hill of Mussy-la-Fosse altogether, and places the encampment on the hill south of Pouillenay, which is south-west of the Montagne de Flavigny. He holds that, as this hill abounds in springs and is situated near streamlets which flow into the Brenne, the Gauls would have been able to fetch water with less danger than they would have incurred if they had encamped on the hill of Mussy. He also lays stress on Caesar's use of the singular *colle*, arguing that, according to the received view, the Gauls would have occupied not one hill but two.

Von Goler's arguments are not convincing. Streamlets, from which the Gauls could have fetched water without risk, flow into the Brenne near Mussy as well as near Pouillenay: Caesar might, I think, have used the singular *colle* loosely; and Pouillenay is more than a mile from the nearest point of the circumvallation. I do not think that any one who had seen Mont Auxois would have any hesitation in rejecting von Goler's theory.

14. Describing the sortie which the besieged attempted while the relieving army was making its first assault upon the circumvallation, Caesar writes:—*At interiores, dum ea, quae a Vercingetorige ad eruptionem praeparata erant, proferunt, priores fossas explent, duntius in his rebus administrandis morati prius suas discessisse cognoverunt quam munitionibus appropinquarent*<sup>2</sup> ("The besieged lost much time in bringing out the contrivances which Vercingetorix had prepared for the sortie and filling up the front (?) trenches; and before they could get near the contravallation, they learned that their comrades had withdrawn"). The question is what Caesar meant by *priores*. Most commentators make *priores* agree with *fossas*; but while Napoleon<sup>3</sup> understands by *priores fossas* merely the 20-foot trench, which was nearest to the besieged, Dittenberger believes that Caesar was speaking both of it and of the nearer of the two parallel 15-foot trenches. It has been objected to Napoleon's interpretation that Caesar would not have used the plural *fossas* to describe one trench: but I think that he might have used *fossas* in the sense of various parts of one trench, just as he often uses *ripas* and *ripis* in the sense of various parts of

<sup>1</sup> *Gall. Krieg.* p. 316.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 82, §§ 3-4.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 309.



one bank.<sup>1</sup> Schneider,<sup>2</sup> however, thinks it unlikely that Caesar would have used the comparative when he meant the superlative; and it might be argued that if he had meant the trench nearest to the besieged, he would have written *proximam fossam*, as he did in chapter 79. To Dittenberger's view there are three objections. Is it likely that Caesar would have described two out of three trenches, the nearest of which to the besieged was about a quarter of a mile from the second, while the second was quite close to the third, as *priores fossas*?<sup>3</sup> What right has Dittenberger to assume that the besieged successfully crossed not only the nearest trench but also the elaborate system of subsidiary defences, which intervened between the nearest trench and the second, when Caesar's narrative clearly implies that they did nothing of the kind. And if they had reached the inner 15-foot trench, which was quite close to the rampart of the contravallation, how could Caesar have said that they never got near the contravallation? Whatever *priores* means, it is certain that *fossa* (if Caesar did not write *fossam*) can only mean the 20-foot trench,—the *fossé perdu*.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, if *priores* agreed with *fossas*, the omission of *et* before *priores* would be remarkable. For these reasons I am tempted to adopt the view of Schröder<sup>5</sup> and von Goler<sup>6</sup> that *priores* does not agree with *fossas*, but that it is in the nominative case and denotes the front ranks of the besieged, who tried to fill up the nearest trench, while the rest were engaged in bringing up the various implements that were required for the proposed assault on the contravallation. Still, it seems unlikely that Caesar should have drawn a distinction between the front ranks of the besieged and those behind; and after mature consideration, I am inclined to think that the common view is right. Anyhow the meaning of *fossas* is certain; and that is the only important point.

15. The writer of the article in the *Neue Jahrbücher*<sup>6</sup> argues that Napoleon and the majority of commentators are wrong in identifying the hill on the north of Alesia, on the southern slopes of which Regulus and Robilius were encamped, with Mont Réa. Caesar says that the Roman camp was on a gentle slope (*leniter declivi loco*); and the writer denies that this description is applicable to the southern slope of Mont Réa. He also denies that the plateau of Mont Réa extended too far to the north to be included within Caesar's line of circumvallation; and,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Kraner-Dittenberger, *Caesar*, p. 97, and Meusel's *Lex. Cæs.*, ii. 1750.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, ii. 616.

<sup>3</sup> Guischart, indeed, inferring from a statement in chapter 79.—*itaque productis capis ante oppidum consistunt et proximam fossam crateribus integunt atque aggere expleant*.—that the besieged encountered no opposition in crossing the "fossé perdu," argues that the words *priores fossas expleant* can only refer to the small subsidiary trenches which Caesar calls *cippi* and to the inner of the two 15-foot trenches. *Mém. d'Art. et hist.*, 1773, iv. 497-8. Nobody says that the besieged did encounter opposition; but they lost time. Guischart's view is open to the same objection as Dittenberger's; and besides, the Gauls would have had to cross the *stimuli* and the eight rows of wolf-pits (*lilia*) before they could reach the *cippi*.

<sup>4</sup> *Caesar*, ii. 615-16.

<sup>5</sup> *Gall. Krieg.* p. 319, n. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Band cxx., 1879, pp. 175-6.

pointing to the spot in von Kampen's Plan which is indicated as the site of the combat described in chapters 83 and 88 he asks, "Who will believe that on this little spot, in this corner, Vercassivellaunus made his attack with 60,000 men?" "Moreover," he continues, "Vercassivellaunus would have exposed both his flanks to the fire" of the Romans who lined the entrenchments on either side, as shown in von Kampen's Plan. The writer goes on to argue that the hill in question was the Montagne de Bussy, which is on the north-eastern side of Mont Auxois. From the camp (C) which has been discovered on this hill to the valley below, the distance, he estimates, was about 6000 feet with a drop of only 200, an incline which, he maintains, agrees with Caesar's *leniter declivi loco*. Again, in describing the sortie which Vercingetorix made on the day of Vercassivellaunus's attack, Caesar says that Vercingetorix marched out of the town and took out of his camp the sappers' huts and other material which he required for endeavouring to force the Roman lines (*Vercingetorix ex arce Alesiae suos conspicatus ex oppido egreditur; a castris longuius, musculos, fulces reliquaque quae eruptionis causa paraverat profert*).<sup>1</sup> Now many commentators, assuming the identity of Mont Réa with the northern hill, and assuming that Vercingetorix directed his sortie against the works in the plain of Les Laumes, have argued that he would not have marched out of Alesia through his camp, which was on its eastern side, and have therefore altered *a castris* (out of camp) into *cratis* (fascines). But, says the writer of the article in the *Neue Jahrbücher*, if we identify the Montagne de Bussy with the northern hill, this very questionable emendation becomes unnecessary; for Vercingetorix would have supported Vercassivellaunus by directing his sortie against the works opposite the Montagne de Bussy; and in order to do this, he must have passed through his camp. Finally, those who identify Mont Réa with the northern hill find Caesar's point of observation on the western end of the Montagne de Flavigny. But, objects the writer of the article, from this point Caesar could only have looked out over the plain of Les Laumes and Mont Réa, whereas he says himself that he saw what was going on in all parts of the field (*quid quaque in parte geratur cognoscit*). Accordingly the writer places Caesar on the east of the camp which is identified by Napoleon and von Kampen with the camp of Labienus. This camp is on the centre of the Montagne de Flavigny.

The writer's arguments have no weight. He fails to notice that the camp which has been discovered on Mont Réa was on its lowest slope, which fully deserves the description *leniter declivis*. Moreover, when he says that the distance from camp C to the valley below "was about 6000 feet with a drop of only 200," he wholly misapprehends Caesar's meaning. Caesar was of course thinking only of the slope of the ground on which the camp stood, not of the slope from the top of the hill to the valley below. I have proved elsewhere that Mont Réa did extend too far northward to be included within the circumvallation;<sup>2</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 84, § 1.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 373-4, *supra*, and cf. Guischard, *Mém. crit. et hist.*, iv. 506.

when the writer of the article denies that Vercassivellaunus's 60,000 men would have had room to attack the camp on Mont Réa, he forgets that the 60,000 did not all come into action at once, but, as Caesar says, fought in relays, fresh men taking the places of those who were tired.<sup>1</sup> It is obvious that as many men could have attacked the camp on Mont Réa at one time as the extent of its front required; and it is equally obvious that no more would have attacked the camp on the Montagne de Bussy. Again, as Long<sup>2</sup> has pointed out with his usual acumen, the alteration of *a castris* into *cratis* is unnecessary in any case. "Vercingetorix," he says, "had a camp (c. 70), and though it was at the east end of the hill, it was below it, and on such a level that it was much more easy to carry such things as 'musculi' from his camp to the lines on the west side of the town . . . than to bring them from the high plateau of Alesia down its steep sides. Any man who has seen the ground and read Caesar's text with care will reject the emendation *crates*. There would be no use in having all these cumbrous things on the top of the hill in the town." From the point of observation which Napoleon and von Kampen have indicated Caesar could have seen the fighting that went on in the plain of Les Laumes and on Mont Réa; and there is no evidence that, while he remained at his post of observation, any fighting went on anywhere else. The writer of the article has ignored the fact that it was at the spot which Napoleon and von Kampen have indicated as the scene of Vercassivellaunus's attack that the whole of the Gallic coins and the great majority of the Gallic and Roman weapons and other antiquities which Napoleon's excavators unearthed, were found.<sup>3</sup> I do not know where the writer found the statement that the drop from the camp on the Montagne de Bussy to the valley below was only 200 feet; for close to the site of the camp<sup>4</sup> the height, according to the *Carte de l'État-Major* (Sheet 112) is 401 metres, and the height of the valley is only 259'. And there is one other fact, which alone overthrows the writer's argument. The camp on the Montagne de Bussy was not situated, like the camp which Vercassivellaunus attacked, on an *iniquus locus*, that is to say a place where the Romans, fighting against an *exterior* enemy, were at a disadvantage.

<sup>1</sup> For this reason it seems to me that the efforts which Heiler (*Philologus*, xii., 1865, p. 123) makes to demonstrate that there was room on Mont Réa for the manœuvring of 60,000 men are superfluous.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, pp. 402-3.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 369, *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> In Salle xiii. of the Musée de St-Germain there is a map by M. Chartier, which purports to represent the certain and the uncertain results of Napoleon's excavations. According to this map, a considerable part of the tracing of the contravallation and the greater part of that of the circumvallation are only conjectural; and the site of the camp marked C in Napoleon's Plan (25) is only marked in pencil. Napoleon's Plan also professes to indicate those sections of the contravallation and circumvallation which are conjectural: but they are much smaller than those indicated in M. Chartier's map; and he marks the site of camp C as certain, and indeed gives drawings (Planche 22) of the profile of its trenches. Perhaps additional results were obtained after M. Chartier's map had been drawn. Anyhow the general direction of the circumvallation, where it crossed the Montagne de Bussy, is certain; for it is indicated not only by the discovery of camp C but also by the discovery of the two redoubts 15 and 18 and of a number of *trous-de-loup* (*tilia*) close to redoubt 15.

16 Maissiat<sup>1</sup> quotes a passage in Polyænus<sup>2</sup> to show that some Gallic traitor informed Caesar of the intended attack of Vercassivellaunus on the camp at Mont Réa. I do not believe this story; for if Caesar had been warned, he would surely have reinforced the threatened camp before the attack commenced.

17. I think the statement on p. 143 of my narrative,—“The attack on the circumvallation in the plain was comparatively feeble; for the bulk of the relieving force was formidable only in numbers,”—is a fair inference from Caesar’s narrative. 60,000 picked men were sent to attack the camp on Mont Réa. According to the enumeration given in chapter 75, 170,000 or 180,000, allowing for the numbers killed and wounded on previous days, would have been available for attacking the circumvallation in the plain. But Caesar does not lay any stress upon this attack: he merely notifies it; while he does lay great stress upon the efforts of the 60,000 picked men and of the besieged.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, although he implies that the circumvallation in the plain was attacked, he does not expressly say so: he merely says that the cavalry made a demonstration against it, and makes no direct allusion to the infantry. We are perhaps justified in inferring that it was attacked, because Caesar seems to imply that both on the circumvallation and on the contravallation the Romans were distracted by the din of battle in their rear:<sup>4</sup> but possibly in speaking of the circumvallation, he may only have been referring to the attack on the camp of Rebilus. M. A. Réville<sup>5</sup> and the Duc d’Aumale<sup>6</sup> make some remarks upon the matter, which perhaps infer too much, but are worth quoting. M. Réville thinks that the efficiency of the relieving army was paralysed by “l’intérêt oligarchique et particulariste des nobles.” The nobles, he goes on to say, feared the triumph of Vercingetorix as much as the victory of the Romans. All this, indeed, is pure conjecture: but it is well-founded conjecture. Speaking of the Aedui, M. Réville says, “Leur inaction, attestée par le vainqueur, autorise tous les soupçons.” (I may remark, in passing, that to say that the “inaction” of the Aedui is attested by Caesar, is a pure invention.) At the critical moment, “Une troisième attaque sur un des points dégarnis, en dégageant Vergasillaune et Vercingetorix, leur eût permis d’envahir le camp avec leurs forces unies avant que la cavalerie romaine eût achevé son mouvement tournant.” Th. Duc d’Aumale suggests that all the Gauls of the relieving army, except the 60,000 picked men, were a confused ill-armed mob; and that the Aedui were probably half-hearted and had perhaps, after the rebuff which they sustained at the hands of the Pan-Gallic council, when they claimed the right of directing the campaign, made secret overtures of submission to Caesar. Considering what Caesar says about their disgust when they found that they were not to have the direction of the campaign, and

<sup>1</sup> *Jules César en Gaule*, iii. 135, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Strab.*, viii. 23, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 83, § 8, 85-8, and Napoleon’s *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 310, n. 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Multum ad terrendos nostros valet clamor, qui post tergum pugnantibus exstitit, quod suum periculum in aliena vident salute constare.* *B. G.*, vii. 84, § 4.

<sup>5</sup> *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 3<sup>e</sup> pér., t. xxiii., 1877, pp. 67-8.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 2<sup>e</sup> pér., t. xv., 1858, p. 116.

their regret at having flung away their alliance with Rome,<sup>1</sup> we are, I think, justified in assuming that they were half-hearted.

18. Caesar says that on the day of the final attack he occupied "a suitable position," which enabled him to note all the phases of the action (*Caesar idoneum locum nactus, quid quaque in parte geratur cognoscit*).<sup>2</sup> The most, indeed, the only "suitable position" is on the Montagne de Flavigny. (See Napoleon's *Histoire de Jules César*, ii. 311.) M. du Mesnil, "chef d'escadron d'état-major," decides for the hill near Grésigny, which is on the east of Mont Réa, "because it was Caesar's interest to keep as close as possible to the point where danger was imminent."<sup>3</sup> But, as I shall show that the "steep places" (*loca prærupta ex ascensu*), to secure which Caesar marched in person after his visit to the works in the plain of Les Laumes, and from which he went to the relief of Labienus, may probably be identified with the Montagne de Flavigny, on M. du Mesnil's theory Caesar, before he relieved Labienus, would have had to make a long march from the north of Alesia, right across the plain of Les Laumes, to the south, and back again to Mont Réa. See page 144 of my narrative.

19. Describing the final attempt of the besieged to break through the contravallation, Caesar says that abandoning the hope of forcing the formidable works in the plain, they attempted to storm the lines at a point where the ascent was precipitous (*interiores desperans campestribus locis propter magnitudinem munitionum loca prærupta ex ascensu temptant*, etc.).<sup>4</sup> The Duc d'Aumale, who wrote before the appearance of Napoleon's book, considered that the *loca prærupta* which the besieged attacked were Mont Pevenel and the plateau of Sauvigny, in other words the Montagne de Bussy, and that, after Caesar had beaten them, he rejoined Labienus by crossing the valley of the Rabutin.<sup>5</sup> Napoleon particularises the *loca prærupta* as "the works situated at the foot of the precipitous heights of the mountain of Flavigny."<sup>6</sup> The description *loca prærupta ex ascensu* hardly applies to Mont Pevenel or to the plateau of Sauvigny. Besides, the *loca prærupta ex ascensu* were identical with or just above the steep inclines (*declivia et deversa*) which Caesar mentions in chapter 88: the *declivia et deversa* were visible from the camp on Mont Réa; and the slopes of Mont Pevenel were not. Heller, indeed, argues that Caesar must have referred to Mont Pevenel, "because there alone the line of contravallation" crossed the higher slopes.<sup>7</sup> But, as Mr. Compton remarks, "the besieged might be said 'temptare' these heights, if they assailed the lines, the crossing of which would lead to them." The plateau of Sauvigny was not crossed by the line of contravallation; and therefore it is open to the same objection as the Montagne de Flavigny. Mr. Froude describes the final attack of the besieged as having taken place on the north side

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 63, § 8. a

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 85, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Spect. mil.*, xxvii., 1839, p. 630.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 86, § 4.

<sup>5</sup> *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, t. xv., 1858, p. 139.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii., 311-12.

<sup>7</sup> *Philologus*, xiii., 1858, p. 599.

<sup>8</sup> *Caesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul*, p. 111.

of Alesia.<sup>1</sup> "Caesar," he says, "saw the peril,"—of the camp on Mont Réa,—and sent Labienus with six cohorts to their help. Vercingetorix had seen it also, and attacked the interior lines at the same spot. Decimus Brutus was then despatched also, and then Caius Fabius." No one who had studied Caesar's narrative with close attention could have written the last two sentences. "The interior lines at the same spot" could not possibly be described as *loca praerupta ex ascensu*. Mr. Froude goes on to say that "Finally, when the fighting grew desperate, he (Caesar) left his own station . . . and he rode across the field, conspicuous," etc. But what field did he ride across? If Mr. Froude is right in saying that Vercingetorix "attacked the interior lines at the same spot," *there was no field to ride across!* For "the interior lines at the same spot" can only mean the interior lines nearest to the foot of Mont Réa: whatever the "spot" was against which the besieged directed their final attack, Caesar, as he himself tells us, went to rescue its defenders; and, when he had done so, he rode to succour Labienus. That is to say, according to Mr. Froude, he "rode across the field" from "the interior lines at the same spot" to "the same spot"! Besides, how would Mr. Froude explain the words "*de locis superioribus* (that is to say, from the slopes, occupied by the Gauls, above Labienus's position) *haec declivia et deversa cernbantur*." *Haec declivia et deversa* cannot apply to what Mr. Froude speaks of as "the interior lines at the same spot,"—that is, be it remembered, close to the foot of Mont Réa. But if they are understood as applying to the slopes of Flavigny on the opposite, or southern, side of the plain, from which Caesar could be seen descending, Caesar's narrative is perfectly intelligible, and every difficulty disappears.

20. Describing the final movement which he made to succour Labienus, Caesar writes, *equitum partem se sequi, partem circumire exteriores munitiones et ab tergo hostes adoriri iubet*.<sup>2</sup> Napoleon holds that the part which was to ride round the circumvallation (*exteriores munitiones*) came, not from the Montagne de Flavigny, where Caesar was, but from Grésigny; for the results of Colonel Stoffel's excavations show that three of Caesar's cavalry camps were in the western plain, and one in the valley of the Rabutin, near Grésigny. Apart from this consideration, it seems very unlikely that the cavalry which was to ride round the outer lines left the Montagne de Flavigny and went round to Mont Réa by the west; for in that case they would have had to encounter a large part of the relieving army, both cavalry and infantry, on the way. Nor could they, as Long supposed,<sup>4</sup> have gone round Alesia from the Montagne de Flavigny by the east either, because in that case they would have reached the scene of action too late, and they would have lost time by needlessly riding all the way round the outer lines. Caesar's galloper, who, if they started from Grésigny, must have ridden to order them to advance, would have gone between the circum-

<sup>1</sup> Caesar: *a Sketch*, ed. 1886, p. 369.

<sup>2</sup> B. G., vii. 87, § 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 318.

<sup>4</sup> W. Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geogr.*, ii. 259.

vallation and the contravallation, and moreover could have ridden faster than a large body of cavalry.

21. Just before Caesar came to his rescue, Labienus was reinforced by a number of cohorts from the nearest redoubts (*Labienus . . . couctis una XL cohortibus, quas ex proximis praesidiis deductas fors obtulit*,<sup>1</sup> etc.). The MSS. differ regarding the number. *BM* have *una XL*; *AQ* have *una de XL* (39); and *β* has *de XL*, which is nonsense. Guischart<sup>2</sup> defends the reading *una de XL*, arguing that the inaction of Commius allowed this large number to leave the redoubts in the plain and join Labienus: but 39 cohorts were almost four legions, or two-fifths of the whole force; and this number must surely be in excess of the truth. I incline to accept Diaconius's conjecture,—*una XL*.

22. On page 144 I have stated that, during the operations at Alesia, Reginus and Caninius sent a galloper to inform Caesar, who, as we have seen, was probably on the lower slope of the Montagne de Flarigny, that they required reinforcements, and that Caesar sent a galloper to order the cavalry at Grésigny to make the charge which proved decisive. There is no direct evidence for either of these statements; and it might be contended that the messages were communicated by signals in the manner described by Polybius.<sup>3</sup> But from Grésigny the signals could not have been seen, because Mont Auxois would have interrupted the view:<sup>4</sup> and I am inclined to believe that Reginus could have communicated with Caesar by sending a galloper, who would only have had to ride about two miles and a quarter, more quickly than by the elaborate system of signals which Polybius describes.

23. "Eius adventu," writes Caesar, "ex colore vestitus cognito, quo insigni in proeliis uti consuevit, turmisque equitum et cohortibus visis, quas se sequi iusserat, ut de locis superioribus haec declivia et devexa cernebantur, hostes proelium committunt."<sup>5</sup> The MSS. all have *hostes*: but Nipperdey and A. Holder, followed by various English editors, substitute *nostri*. If *hostes* is right, the meaning is that the enemy, seeing Caesar approaching with reinforcements, made a last desperate effort to storm the camp on Mont Réa before he could arrive: if *nostri*, that the Romans under Labienus were encouraged to make a bold sortie. In defence of the emendation *nostri*, which he borrowed from Jurinius, Nipperdey<sup>6</sup> says, "First of all, it is incredible that the approach of Caesar and the reinforcements which the Romans received should have induced the enemy to engage. Secondly the enemy did by no means engage at that moment: they had done so long before, at the time when the attack on the Roman lines commenced; and since then they had not relaxed the vigour of their attack." I cannot see that these are sufficient reasons for setting aside the authority of the MSS. *Hostes* seems to me to make perfectly good sense; and the appearance of *nostri* in the same chapter, a couple of lines further on, militates, I think,

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 87, § 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Mém. crit. et hist.*, iv. 507-8.

<sup>3</sup> x. 43-7. Cf. Vegetius, iii. 5.

<sup>4</sup> The same objection holds good in the other case if, as Napoleon holds, Labienus, whom Caesar sent to reinforce Reginus, was encamped on the Montagne de Bussy.

<sup>5</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 88, § 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Caesar*, p. 110.

against the substitution of *nostri* for *hostes*. But, whichever reading is right, I have no doubt that the effect of Caesar's approach was to stimulate the Gauls to make a last desperate effort to storm the camp before he could arrive, and to encourage the Romans to make a bold sortie.

[Since writing the above paragraph, I have referred to Schneider's edition of Caesar (ii. 634). I find that he reads *hostes*, and that he defends it by practically the same arguments as I have put forward myself; and particularly that he expresses the same opinion as I have done regarding the repetition of *nostri*.]

24. The reader must take the story of the surrender of Vercingetorix, which I have told in the text, for what it may be worth. It only rests upon the authority of Plutarch and of Florus: but Mommsen<sup>1</sup> accepts it without question; and Long<sup>2</sup> says, "It is so lively and so natural a thing, so truly Gallic, that it has been got from some authority,"—perhaps from some lost memoirs by one of Caesar's officers? Florus<sup>3</sup> says, *Ipse ille rex . . . supplex cum in castra venisset, tum et phaleras et sua arma ante Caesaris genua proiecit*; and Plutarch,<sup>4</sup> ὁ δὲ τοῦ σύμπαντος ἡγεμὼν πολέμου Οὐεργεντόριξ ἀναλαβὼν τῶν ὄπλων τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ κοσμήσας τὸν ἵππον ἐξιππάσατο διὰ τῶν πυλῶν, καὶ κύκλῳ περὶ τὸν Καίσαρα καθεζόμενον ἐλάσας, εἶτα ἀφαλόμενος τοῦ ἵππου ἦν μὲν πανοπλίαν ἀφέναι, αὐτὸς δὲ καθίσας ὑπὸ πόδας τοῦ Καίσαρος ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν, ἄχρι οὗ παρεδόθη φρουρησόμενος ἐπὶ τὸν θρίαμβον.

## THE EXECUTION OF VERCINGETORIX

The only ancient writer who mentions the execution of Vercingetorix is Dion Cassius. Colonel Stoffel says that it was in accordance with Roman custom, and that Caesar could not have prevented it if he had wished.<sup>5</sup> But we cannot tell whether he did wish; and for my part I do not care to ask. Ilne,<sup>6</sup> indeed, appears to doubt whether Vercingetorix was executed at all. The silence of Plutarch, he argues, who derived much of his information from the lost books of Livy, throws suspicion on the statement of Dion, who often unjustly charged Caesar with cruelty. I am no admirer of Dion: but I doubt whether he was impudent enough to invent a tale like this.

## ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE AEDUI DURING THE LATTER PART OF THE REBELLION OF VERCINGETORIX

I discuss this question principally because a theory has been constructed regarding it by M. F. Mounier, which, although it may contain

<sup>1</sup> *History of Rome*, iv. 278-9.

<sup>3</sup> *Epitoma*, i. 45 (iii. 10).

<sup>5</sup> *Guerre civile*, ii. 299.

<sup>2</sup> *Caesar*, p. 406.

<sup>4</sup> *Caesar*, 27.

<sup>6</sup> *Röm. Gesch.*, vi. 523, n. 1.



a certain proportion of truth, has, I believe, been pushed too far, and is certainly supported by arguments which will not bear examination. Briefly, his theory is that the Aedui were to a large extent responsible for the ultimate failure of Vercingetorix.

1. On page 175 of his *Vercingetorix* he says, "A ce malheureux siège d'Alise, où domina contre Vercingetorix la faction éduenne, la majorité des nobles gaulois s'opposa . . . à la levée en masse que voulait Vercingetorix, parceque, disent-ils, chaque chef ne pourrait plus ni diriger, ni reconnaître ses vassaux, *nec moderari, nec discernere suos*; et non seulement les Éduens eurent alors la haute main pour fixer les chiffres des contingents, mais ce fut à Bibracte, chez les Éduens, que se forma l'armée de secours, et le commandement réel fut confié à des Éduens, Éporédorix et Viridomar, tous deux ennemis de Vercingetorix." And in the same spirit Desjardins says,<sup>1</sup> "Ces chefs,"—that is to say, the chiefs of Gaul generally,—“redevenus maîtres de la situation par le blocus d'Alisia, craignaient en présence d'une multitude confuse, de ne pouvoir la contenir, de ne pas reconnaître les leurs, ni d'être en mesure de pourvoir aux vivres:—mauvaises excuses, mesquins faux—fuyants, vains prétextes, les mêmes dans tous les temps, et colorant la défection.”

Now, with all deference to Desjardins, the decision of the chiefs was wise, and their reasons were excellent. The experience of the Belgic confederation which opposed Caesar in 57 B.C., had shown how difficult it was to feed an overgrown army.<sup>2</sup> The other reason which Caesar assigns for the decision of the chiefs does not, as Monnier imagines, imply that they were afraid that Vercingetorix would usurp their authority over their own clients; for why should he be able to interfere less with a comparatively small than with a large number? It simply means that they were afraid that, if they sanctioned a levy *en masse*, their respective contingents would get out of hand. How would Desjardins have proposed to feed a host consisting of *all* the fighting men of Gaul? And, if 250,000 were not enough, can any one with an iota of common sense believe that a larger army or rather mob, would have succeeded? It is curious that the Duke of Wellington and Sir Charles Napier, both no doubt unwittingly, sanctioned by their authority the reasons given by the chiefs. "All history," wrote Napier,<sup>3</sup> "tells us that neither barbarous nor civilised warriors of *different tribes*<sup>4</sup> or nations long agree when compressed." Of the Duke, Sir William Napier tells this story:<sup>5</sup>—"Speaking of Waterloo, the Duke said to Mr. Rogers the poet, 'Napoleon should have waited for us at Paris.' 'Why?' 'Because 800,000 men would then have gathered round him.' 'Is not that the reason why he should not?' 'No! why he should; for when 800,000 men get together, there's a damned deal of jostling.'"

With regard to the other statements in the extract which I have

<sup>1</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 702.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 10, § 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Life and Opinions of Charles James Napier*, iii. 218.

<sup>4</sup> The italics are mine.

<sup>5</sup> *Life and Opinions of Charles James Napier*, iii. 218.

given from Monnier's work, there is no evidence that the Aeduan, or any other faction "domina contre Vercingetorix": it is a pure invention to say that the Aedui fixed the numbers of the contingents of the relieving army; and to say that "le commandement réel fut confié à des Éduens Éporédorix et Viridomar," is to be guilty not only of a *suggestio falsi* but also of a *suppressio veri*. For Monnier knows perfectly well that, besides Eporédorix and Viridomarus, two other generals, namely Commius and Vercassivellaunus, were appointed; and he also knows that the two latter figure much more prominently in Caesar's narrative than the two former.<sup>1</sup> Besides, how is Monnier's theory to be reconciled with the fact that, only a few weeks before, the Aedui had been severely snubbed in a Pan-Gallic council, when they claimed the right of directing the campaign?<sup>2</sup> Is it likely that, in the next council,<sup>3</sup> they would have been allowed to have matters all their own way?

2. Monnier says that, after Vercingetorix had been elected commander-in-chief by the Pan-Gallic council, the Aedui, in their chagrin, begged Caesar to pardon them. Monnier's knowledge of Latin is at fault. Caesar says, "Magno dolore Aedui ferunt se deiectionis principatu; queruntur fortunae commutationem et Caesaris in se indulgentiam requirunt; neque tamen suscepto bello suum consilium ab reliquis separare audent."<sup>4</sup> Now the words which I have italicised do not mean, as Monnier supposes, "they ask Caesar to forgive them,"<sup>5</sup> but "they miss Caesar's kindness."<sup>6</sup> Monnier requires us to believe that the Aedui begged Caesar to forgive them, and then proceeded to force on a battle against him, contrary to the better judgement of Vercingetorix; that, while they dared not withdraw from their alliance with the rebels,—*neque tamen suscepto bello suum consilium ab reliquis separare audent*,—those rebels were merely instruments in their hands!<sup>7</sup>

3. Monnier maintains that the fact that the army of relief was assembled in Aeduan territory, proves that the baneful influence of the Aedui was in the ascendant.<sup>8</sup> Does he forget that the council which so emphatically pronounced that not the Aedui, but Vercingetorix was to hold the chief command, assembled at Bibracte,—the Aeduan capital?

4. Monnier appeals, in support of his theory, to the detailed list, which Caesar furnishes,<sup>9</sup> of the several contingents. "Les contingents," he says, "sont d'autant plus nombreux qu'ils sont dévoués aux Éduens, et moins dévoués à la cause nationale."<sup>10</sup> If so, how does he explain the fact that the contingents of the Arverni (Vercingetorix's countrymen) and of the Aedui, with their respective clients, were precisely the same? "Mais," he proceeds, "quand il s'agira des Boiens, alliés des Éduens, cité médiocre cependant, le chiffre du contingent montera à 30,000." He is apparently ignorant that not one of the modern

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 79, § 1, 83, § 6, 85, § 4, 88, § 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, 63, §§ 5, 7.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, 75, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 63, § 8.

<sup>5</sup> "ils . . . envoyèrent demander pardon à César." *Vercingetorix*, pp. 183-4.

<sup>6</sup> See Forcellini, *Totius latinitatis Lexicon*, t. v. 1871, p. 192.

<sup>7</sup> *Vercingetorix*, p. 203.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.*, p. 232.

<sup>9</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 75.

<sup>10</sup> *Vercingetorix*, p. 235.

editor reads XXX (*milia*); that for XXX Nipperdey,<sup>1</sup> who gives excellent reasons for the reading he adopts, Holder and Meusel substitute bina (2000), which is found in some MSS.; and that Schneider rejects the reading XXX on the double ground that the Boii were too weak to have been asked for as many as 30,000 men, and that Caesar, throughout his list, follows a descending scale of enumeration from 30,000, the number demanded from the Aedui and their allies, to 3000, the number that immediately precedes the mention of the Boii. Indeed, as the entire population of the Boii, men, women and children, had amounted, only six years before, to no more than 32,000,<sup>2</sup> and that before the heavy losses which Caesar inflicted on them in battle, it is difficult to see where the 30,000 men were to come from.

To support his argument, Monnier asserts<sup>3</sup> that the united contingents of the Sequani, Senones, Bituriges, Ruteni and Carnutes amounted to only 12,000 men; those of the Pictones, Turones and Helvii to only 8000; and those of the Suessiones, Ambiani, Mediomatrici, Petrucorii, Nervii, Morini and Nitiobrigi to only 5000. Now the only evidence for Monnier's assertion is that a few MSS. have VII instead of *duodena*. He finds an ally, however, in M. A. Réville,<sup>4</sup> who argues (a) that Caesar begins by giving the collective numbers of the Aedui and their clients, and of the Arverni and their clients, and that he does not give any hint that thenceforth he is not using collective figures; (b) that, after writing *Bellovacis X*, he adds *totidem Lemovicibus; octona Pictonis . . . Helvetiis, Suessionibus . . . quina milia, Aulercis Cenomanis totidem*; and, as the Aulerci Cenomani contributed 5000 and yet are not included among the group of Suessiones, etc., it is plain that the group, not each individual member of it, contributed 5000; (c) that on his theory the sum-total of contingents that were levied amounted to 163,000; and as Caesar says that the tribes responded to the summons with alacrity, it is evident that many volunteers came forward besides the 163,000; and accordingly we find that the actual total amounted to 248,000.

M. Réville's arguments may be easily refuted. (a) Caesar certainly does begin by giving the collective numbers of the Aedui and their clients and of the Arverni and their clients: but to any one who carefully reads his list, it will be obvious that thenceforth he does not use collective figures:—*Imperant Aeduis atque eorum clientibus, Segusiavis, Ambivaretis, Aulercis, Frannovicibus, [Blannoviis.] milia XXXV; parem numerum Arvernorum adiunctis Eleutetis, Cadurcis, Gabaliis, Vellavis, qui sub imperio Arvernorum esse consueverunt; Sequanis, Senonibus, Biturigibus, Santonis, Rutenis, Carnutibus duodena milia; Bellovacis decem; [totidem Lemovicibus;] octona Pictonibus et Turonis et Parisiis et Helvetiis; sena Andalus, Ambianis, Mediomatricis, Petrucoriis, Nervii, Morinis, Nitiobrigibus quina milia, etc.* The Aedui and their clients, the Arverni and their clients are treated as two united groups: thenceforth, when states are grouped together, it is not because the group

<sup>1</sup> Caesar, p. 107.

<sup>2</sup> B. G., i. 29, § 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Vercingétorix*, p. 234.

<sup>4</sup> *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. xxiv., 1877, p. 476.

was called upon to furnish a collective force, but obviously because each member of the group was called upon to furnish the same number of men. The grouping is adopted by Caesar simply for the sake of brevity and convenience of enumeration. The proof of this is that we find in the several groups states which were geographically distinct and had no mutual connexion, save that they were all alike members of the Gallic confederation. (b) If the Aulerci Cenomani are not mentioned in the group, each member of which furnished 5000 men, the explanation is easy: Caesar desired to make it clear that the Aulerci Cenomani were not two peoples but one people.<sup>1</sup> (c) The very fact that, on M. Réville's theory, the sum-total of the several contingents amounted to only 163,000 instead of 248,000, is in itself a sufficient refutation of that theory. The "alacrity" which the tribes showed does not prove that they sent half as many men again as they were asked for: we are to understand simply that they obeyed the summons promptly. If they had performed the work of supererogation with which M. Réville credits them, and had thereby disobeyed the orders of their chiefs, who had intentionally limited the numbers of the contingents, Caesar would assuredly have told us so. Besides, he does not say that they responded to the summons with alacrity: he only says that, after they had mustered in the country of the Aedui, they marched with alacrity for Alesia. Lastly, as M. Deloche<sup>2</sup> observes, it is incredible that the small tribe of the Cenomani should, as MM. Monnier and Réville try to make out, have alone contributed as many men as the Ambiani, Mediomatrici, Petrucorii, Nervii, Morini and Nitiobriges taken together.

It is remarkable that a distinguished critic like M. Réville should have devoted an article in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* to eulogising Monnier's book. A writer who speaks<sup>3</sup> of the "cheveux blancs" of Critognatus, when for anything that Caesar says to the contrary,<sup>4</sup> Critognatus may have been a young man with red hair or a bald head; a writer who, in describing the final attack of the besieged garrison of Alesia upon the line of contravallation,<sup>5</sup> thinks it necessary to add the puerile invention that "Vercingétorix . . . plante sur le rempart l'étendard gaulois,"—such a writer can hardly mean to pose as a serious scholar.

## CAESAR'S SECOND CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BELLOVACI<sup>6</sup>

I. The description which Hirtius<sup>7</sup> gives of the geography of this campaign is not sufficiently definite to enable us to determine the

<sup>1</sup> Schneider's *Caesar*, ii. 585-6.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, t. xxiv., 1877, pp. 468-9.

<sup>3</sup> *Vercingétorix*, p. 246.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 77-8.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 86, § 4.

<sup>6</sup> See *Carte de l'État-Major* (1:80,000), Sheets 32 and 33.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, viii. 6-20.

various sites with absolute certainty. The essential part amounts to this. The Bellovaci and their allies encamped on a hill, standing in a wooded country and protected by a morass. This morass was at the bottom of a deep and narrow valley, separating the hill from another on which Caesar pitched his camp; and the position of the Gauls was so strong that it would have been impossible to storm it without very heavy loss. The Roman camp had two ditches with vertical sides (*directis, luteribus*). The hill upon which the Bellovaci were encamped was separated by another small valley (*mediocris vallis*) from a hill, (*iugum*), the summit of which formed a plateau, and the sides of which were steep. This hill was of course on the side of the morass opposite Caesar's camp; and it was large enough to admit of four legions being drawn up on it in line of battle. Caesar reached it by bridging the morass; and the bridge or causeway was constructed within a single day. About 10 Roman miles from the camp of the Bellovaci was a very strong place, upon which they encamped after they had been compelled to abandon their original position. Somewhere in the neighbourhood of this second encampment was a meadow not more than a Roman square mile in extent, which was surrounded partly by woods, partly by a river, very difficult to cross. This meadow, Hirtius tells us, was said to be not more than 8 miles from the second camp of the Bellovaci.

It is generally assumed that the original camp of the Bellovaci was situated somewhere within their own borders. But this is not certain. When Caesar set out on his march against the Bellovaci, they were preparing for a raid against the Suessiones. When he encamped in the territory of the Bellovaci, he found that the bulk of the population had left the country, and that only a few scouts had been sent back (*remissi*).<sup>1</sup> After narrating this, Hirtius goes on to describe the spot which the Bellovaci and their allies had chosen for their encampment: but he does not tell us in whose territory it was. The natural conclusion to be drawn from the word *remissi* is that it was *not* in the country of the Bellovaci. Long, however, thinks differently. "The Bellovaci," he says,<sup>1</sup> "a warlike people, would not quit their country, but their allies would come to them." Yes! But just because they were a warlike people, they had quitted their country, in order to invade that of the Suessiones; and, although the invasion doubtless came to nothing, it is quite possible, and, as I think, it is to be inferred from what Hirtius says, that they found a suitable place for making their stand against Caesar before they got back to their own country.

1. Napoleon claims to have discovered Caesar's camp. The site, Mont St-Pierre, which is on the east of the Oise, and about 3 miles south of its tributary the Aisne, was in the diocese of Soissons,<sup>2</sup> and therefore probably in the territory of the Suessiones. A glance at the map will show that it corresponds exactly with Hirtius's description;

<sup>1</sup> *Caesar*, p. 436.

<sup>2</sup> See map in *Gallia Christiana*, t. ix.

and the only real objection to it is that the sides of the ditches of the camp, as revealed by Napoleon's excavations, are not vertical. . .

Desjardins<sup>1</sup> believes that the problem is insoluble. "Il est impossible," he says, "avec des données aussi vagues qui se bornent même à des descriptions physiques convenant également à beaucoup de lieux situés dans la même région, sans que jamais un seul nom géographique les accompagne,—de déterminer exactement le théâtre des opérations militaires." And in a note he says, "les coupes portées sur la planche 28,"—of Napoleon's Atlas,— "sont loin de correspondre avec cette description, et l'auteur reconnaît lui-même que ces profils 'ne pouvaient pas être à parois verticales': il en conclut que les mots *lateribus directis* devaient signifier 'à fond de cuvé,' ce qui nous paraît inadmissible . . . le ru de Berne n'est pas un marais." Certainly the rivulet itself is not a marsh: but it flowed through marshy ground; and when Desjardins says that many places in the same district correspond with Hirtius's description, he is, as I shall presently show, mistaken.

2. L. d'Arenville<sup>2</sup> labours to prove that Caesar's first camp was close to Bellifontaine, which is in the commune of Liercourt, about 5 miles south-east of Abbeville. But all his labour is wasted; for Liercourt is in the territory of the Ambiani, only a short distance from the mouth of the Somme; and such a position is in complete disaccord with Hirtius's narrative.

3. Peigné-Delacourt,<sup>3</sup> an enthusiastic French antiquary, discovered, before the publication of Napoleon's book, a wooden bridge, apparently of ancient construction, which he took to be the bridge mentioned by Hirtius,<sup>4</sup> near Clermont, in the Brèche, which flows into the Oise on its right bank. But Desjardins<sup>5</sup> objects that the bridge must have taken a long time to make, and that the adjacent country,—the high ground dominating Clermont,—does not suit Hirtius's narrative. Peigné-Delacourt<sup>6</sup> himself admits that his bridge would have taken 60 days to make; and, as it is clear from Hirtius that the bridge was thrown across the marsh in a single morning, this one admission shatters his whole theory. De Grattier<sup>7</sup> points out that Caesar could have reached the hill (Mont de Uron) which Peigné-Delacourt identifies with the *iugum* of Hirtius,<sup>8</sup> without making a bridge at all, and that the hill is not separated from the plateau on which Peigné-Delacourt believes the Bellovaci to have encamped by anything that can be properly called a *mediocris vallis*.

According to von Güler,<sup>9</sup> "Caesar encamped on the north-west of Morfontaine, on the right bank of the Vandy, which enters the Aisne at Lamotte. This position is about 5 miles south-east of the camp which Napoleon identifies with that of Caesar. The Gauls, according to von Güler, occupied a plateau bounded on the south by

<sup>1</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 717-18.

<sup>2</sup> *Dissertation sur les camps romains du dépt de la Somme*, 1828, pp. 85-124.

<sup>3</sup> *Étude nouvelle sur la campagne de Jules César contre les Bellovaques*, pp. 5-6.

<sup>4</sup> *B. G.*, viii. 14, § 4.

<sup>5</sup> *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 719, note.

<sup>6</sup> *Étude*, etc., p. 24.

<sup>7</sup> *Com. arch. de Noyon*, ii., 1868, pp. 168-9.

<sup>8</sup> *B. G.*, viii. 14, § 4.

<sup>9</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 339.

the rîvulet Rétheuil, on the west by that of Pierrefonds and by the forest of Compiègne, and on the north by the woods of St-Étienne. But, says General Creuly,<sup>1</sup> the plateau was assailable on the side of St-Étienne, and, indeed, on every side, except where it touches the valley of the Vandy and a part of the valley of the Rétheuil: it would therefore have been unnecessary to enclose it, as Caesar intended to do,<sup>2</sup> by a line of contravallation; and if such a line had been made, it would have been 22 kilometres, or nearly 14 miles, in extent!

M. Litonnois<sup>3</sup> argues on the hypothesis that, according to Hirtius, the campaign took place in the country of the Bellovaci. The river (*altissimum flumen*) which Hirtius mentions in chapter 18, must then, says M. Litonnois, have been the Oise, because the only other "very deep river" in the territory of the Bellovaci is the Aisne; and as Caesar had already mentioned the Aisne by its name *Arona*, he would not have described it merely as an *altissimum flumen*. But, I may remark in passing, Hirtius, not Caesar, was the author of the Eighth Book of the *Commentaries*.

The Oise, then, continues M. Litonnois, was the furthest limit of Caesar's operations in the campaign; and his point of departure was the common frontier of the Suessiones and the Bellovaci. Therefore the camp of the Bellovaci must have been somewhere between those limits. Now the only spot between them that answers to the narrative of Hirtius is the hill of Gouvieux, near Chantilly. There, protected on its rear by the Oise, was the camp of the Bellovaci: the valley of the Nonette, which flows into the Oise, separated them from Caesar; and the strong place to which they ultimately retreated was somewhere in the mountainous district of the forest of Carnelle.<sup>4</sup>

Now M. Litonnois is mistaken in asserting that Caesar's point of departure must have been on the common frontier of the Suessiones and the Bellovaci. Caesar came from the south-west,—from Orléans; and there is no evidence that he first marched into the country of the Suessiones, and then into that of the Bellovaci. It is true that he had ordered Fabius to march into the country of the Suessiones, in order to repel the threatened invasion of the Bellovaci: but that does not prove that he marched into the country of the Suessiones, to join Fabius, and thence into the country of the Bellovaci. This, however, is only a detail. I believe, that the *altissimum* (or *impeditissimum*) *flumen* was the Aisne, which flows into the Oise. But even if it was the Oise, the camp of the Bellovaci was not on the hill of Gouvieux. For, according to M. Litonnois, in their retreat they left the Oise on their right; that is to say, they moved southward and crossed the Nonette. But, if Caesar was obliged to bridge the Nonette in order to reach the *ingum* which Hirtius describes, how could the Bellovaci have crossed it with all their waggon?

In spite of Desjardins's objections, in spite of the undoubted dis-

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii., 1863, pp. 513-14.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, viii. 11, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Comptes rendus et mém. du Com. arch. de Senlis*, 1865, pp. 129-42.

<sup>4</sup> See *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000), Sheet 32.

crepancy between Napoleon's plan of the ditches of Caesar's camp and Hirtius's description, I believe that the site adopted by Napoleon and selected, before the publication of his book, by Caignart de Saulcy,<sup>1</sup> is by far the most probable of any that can be named. Hirtius's description of the ditches may be incorrect; for, as he probably wrote at second-hand, we cannot put the same faith in his description of minute details as we can in Caesar's. But at all events de Saulcy's site corresponds in every particular with his description; and it is not correct to say, as Desjardins says, that others correspond equally well. To quote de Saulcy, "J'ai souvent parcouru, et dans tous les sens, ces magnifiques forêts (Cuise, Compiègne and Laigrie), et je n'y ai reconnu qu'un seul point qui concorde avec la description d'Hirtius; mais il est vrai qu'il présente une ressemblance si saisissante avec le terrain sur lequel tous les faits de cette campagne se sont déroulés, qu'il faudrait être plus que difficile pour ne pas y reconnaître le lieu cherché." And General Creuly agrees with de Saulcy.

II. Assuming the correctness of de Saulcy's and Napoleon's identification of the camps of Caesar and the Bellovaci, the next problem is to determine the geography of the second stage of the campaign. The strong position (*loco munitissimo*),<sup>2</sup> on which the Bellovaci made their second camp, can only be Mont Ganelon. Hirtius describes it as not more than 10 (Roman) miles from their original position. The nearer part of Mont Ganelon is only about 6 miles off: but the hill stretches so far to the north-west that his vague statement is, in one sense, no exaggeration. Besides, as General Creuly points out, the distance which the Gauls would have had actually to travel in order to reach Mont Ganelon is greater than the distance as the crow flies.<sup>3</sup> Von Kampen<sup>4</sup> makes the retreating Bellovaci first cross the Aisne, and then cross the Oise: but de Saulcy holds<sup>5</sup> that they would not have attempted the passage of the Aisne at all, in which they would have been liable to attack. Anyhow it would have been unnecessary for them to cross both the Aisne and the Oise: all that they had to do, in order to reach Mont Ganelon, was to move up the left bank of the Aisne and then cross the Oise.

According to Hirtius,<sup>6</sup> the plain in which the Bellovaci attacked the Roman cavalry "was said to be not more than 8 miles from their second camp. It must, as de Saulcy remarks,<sup>7</sup> have been on the left bank of the Aisne, because Caesar would not have had time to bridge the river on the day on which he marched against the Bellovaci. De Saulcy and Napoleon place it opposite the village of Choisy-au-Bac: General Creuly<sup>8</sup> and von Kampen, about 2 miles further up the Aisne, in the bend of the river between Choisy and Rethondes. The former site is not more than a mile and a half from the nearer part of Mont

<sup>1</sup> *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, 1862, p. 401.

<sup>2</sup> *B. G.*, viii. 16, § 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii. 1863, p. 513.

<sup>4</sup> *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. comm. tabulae*, xiv.

<sup>5</sup> *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, p. 417.

<sup>6</sup> *B. G.*, viii. 20, § 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Les campagnes*, etc., p. 419.

<sup>8</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 332.

<sup>9</sup> *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. viii. 1863, p. 515.



Ganelon. The latter, as Creuly observes, agrees better with the statement of Hirtius.

### WHERE WAS THE BRIDGE BY WHICH DUMNACUS CROSSED THE LOIRE?

Napoleon<sup>1</sup> asserts that the bridge was at Saumur, but gives no reason. L. Fallue<sup>2</sup> believes, "avec," as he asserts, "les plus savants géographes," that the bridge was at Cé, on the road from Angers to Poitiers, which, he argues, Dumnacus had probably followed, in order to enter the country of the Pictones.<sup>3</sup> But, even if Dumnacus had taken this road, it does not follow that, in trying to escape across the Loire,<sup>4</sup> he returned by it. Hirtius gives us no real clue; and Napoleon, Fallue, and the alleged "savants géographes" are all simply guessing.

### WHO WAS GUTUATRUS?

The MSS. differ a great deal, the various readings being *Gutuatum*, *Gutuatrium*, *Guttruatrum*, *Gutruatium*, *Gutriatrium* and *Gutruatum*:<sup>5</sup> but Gutuatrus was undoubtedly the same man as the Cotuatus mentioned in *B. G.*, vii. 3, § 1. Schneider indeed thinks otherwise. Hirtius, he argues,<sup>6</sup> reminds us that Caesar has related, in the preceding Commentary, that the great rebellion originated among the Carnutes;<sup>7</sup> but he tells us that Gutuatrus was "the author of that signal crime" without quoting Caesar as his authority. This argument is more subtle than convincing. Again, says Schneider, Hirtius speaks of Gutuatrus in such a way that we should take him for a man of great influence and exalted position, and not a desperate outlaw like Cotuatus. Hirtius simply speaks of him as *principem sceleris illius et concitatore belli*. *Sceleris illius* means the massacre at Cenabum or it means nothing. Cotuatus was the leader, or rather one of the two leaders (the other being Conconnetodumnus) of the Carnutes who perpetrated that massacre; and the natural conclusion is that Gutuatrus was Cotuatus.<sup>8</sup> Caesar, as

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 336.

<sup>2</sup> *Études arch. sur l'hist. de Jules César par l'empereur Napoléon III.*, 1867, p. 106. Cf. *Rev. de l'Anjou*, nouv. sér., t. xiv., 1887, p. 215. In this article M. A. Joubert says that popular tradition places the scene of the battle between Dumnacus and Fabius in the neighbourhood of Cé. But arguments based on tradition are worthless, unless it can be proved that the tradition is genuine, and not the offspring of the brain of some local antiquary.

<sup>3</sup> See *B. G.*, viii. 26, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> A. Holder's *Cæsar*, p. 224. See p. 817 *infra*.

<sup>5</sup> *Cæsar*, ii. 329.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 27, § 2.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, viii. 38, § 3.

<sup>8</sup> I find that Heller very sensibly remarks, "There is nothing absurd in the idea that a man who had massacred Roman citizens, even though he had on that account obtained great influence among his own countrymen, should have been called by Caesar a desperado" (*Philologus*, xvii., 1861, p. 283).

we know from the evidence of coins, Romanised the spelling of Gallic proper names, doubtless in order to render them less uncouth to the eyes of his readers; and we need not wonder at the difference between his spelling and that of Hirtius,—if indeed some copyist was not responsible for the difference,—when we remember how variously Indian names are spelt by Anglo-Indian writers.

### THE DURATION OF CAESAR'S PROCONSULSHIP

On page 155, describing Caesar's operations in 51 B.C., I have written, "Only one more summer had to pass, as the malcontents had doubtless reckoned, and his government would be at an end." This sentence is based upon a passage in *B. G.*, viii. 39,—*cum omnibus Gallis notum sciret reliquum esse unam aetatem suae provinciae, quam si sustinere potuissent, nullum ultra periculum vererentur*. Long, who holds that Caesar's term of office was not to expire until the end of 49 B.C., remarks that Hirtius may mean "that Caesar would have no time for a campaign in B.C. 49, for he would be . . . communicating with his friends in Rome about his election in that year."<sup>1</sup> But there is no need to have recourse to this far-fetched explanation if we accept Mommsen's view, that Caesar's term would expire on March 1, 49. Reams have been written upon the question:<sup>2</sup> but all that I am concerned with is the fact, recorded by Hirtius, that the Gauls, as Caesar was aware, knew that the summer of 50 B.C. would be the last season in which he would be free to deal with them. Hirtius was Caesar's intimate friend; and it is incredible that, on a point like this, he should have been mistaken.

### WHAT WAS THE HEIGHT OF THE TERRACE WHICH CAESAR CONSTRUCTED AT UXELLÔDUNUM?

Hirtius describes the terrace as follows:—*Exstruitur agger in altitudinem pedum LX, conlocatur in eo turris X tabulatorum, non quidem quae moenibus adaequaret (id enim nullis operibus efficere poterat), sed quae superare fontis fastigium posset*.<sup>3</sup>

The reading *LX* is doubtful. It is only found in *S* and in the margin of *h*. The rest of the  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  MSS. have *pedes sex* or *pedum VI*, and *ik* have *LX*.<sup>4</sup> Long<sup>5</sup> characterises *sexaginta* (*LX*) as "a bad emendation": but, bad or good, it is not an emendation at all. It is incredible that the terrace should have been only 6 feet or even 9 feet

<sup>1</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 443.

<sup>2</sup> Mommsen, *Die Rechtsfrage zwischen Caesar und dem Senat*, 1857; Hoffmann, *De origine belli Caesariani*; Zumpt, *Studia Romana*; P. Guiraud, *Le différend entre César et le Sénat*, 1878; *Journal des Savants*, 1879, pp. 437-49, etc.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, viii. 41, § 5.

<sup>4</sup> Meusel's *Caesar*, p. 242.

<sup>5</sup> *Decline of the Roman Republic* iv 386 note

high, for the words of Hirtius unmistakably imply that it was raised to the greatest possible height: if Uxellodunum was on the Puy d'Issolu, it must have been very much higher than 9 feet; and if it had been only 6 or even 9 feet high, it is to the last degree unlikely that Hirtius would have taken the trouble to mention its height. But to say what its height really was, is impossible.

Achaintre<sup>1</sup> remarks that, according to Orosius,<sup>2</sup> the combined height of the *agger* and the tower was 60 feet. If Orosius had said this, it would look as if he had found the reading *seraginta* in his copy of the *Commentaries*, but had read Hirtius's narrative carelessly. But it is Achaintre himself who was careless. What Orosius wrote was *Exstruitur agger et turris pedum seraginta*, etc. Evidently *pedum seraginta* belongs only to *turris*; and, as Long<sup>3</sup> remarks, Orosius "must have calculated the height of the 'turris' from the number of . . . stories."

#### SOME CRITICISMS ON CAESAR'S GENERALSHIP EXAMINED

1. Turpin de Cr  <sup>4</sup> holds that Caesar was himself to blame for the failure of his attempt to surprise the Helvetii.<sup>5</sup> He ought, he says, to have instructed Labienus to send messengers from time to time to let him know how he was getting on, and to have arranged with him a system of signals by which he might satisfy himself that he had really succeeded in occupying the hill. If he had done this, and explained the signals to Considius, Considius would not have been duped. Moreover, Caesar ought not to have believed Considius on his bare word, but ought to have promptly taken steps to verify his statement.

I venture to think that in sending an experienced officer of high reputation to find out whether Labienus had succeeded in his attempt, Caesar took all reasonable precaution; and that he can hardly be blamed for not having foreseen that Considius would make a fool of himself. Moreover, as far as I can gather from Caesar's narrative, he did promptly take steps to verify Considius's statement.<sup>6</sup>

2. Turpin de Cr  <sup>7</sup> finds fault with Caesar for having sent his cavalry across the Sambre, before the battle with the Nervii. There could have been no object in doing so, he argues, except to gain time for the legionaries to entrench the camp; and this object could have been gained better in another way. While entrenching his camp and clearing the surrounding country of the hedges which intersected it, Caesar ought to have lined the left bank of the river with his archers

<sup>1</sup> *Caesar*, iv. 454.

<sup>3</sup> *Caesar*, p. 452.

<sup>5</sup> See pp. 32-3, *supra*.

<sup>6</sup> *multo denique die per exploratores Caesar cognovit et montem a suis teneri et Helvetios castra movisse et Considium timore perterritum quod non vidisset pro viso sibi renuntiavisse. B. G., i. 22, § 4. On the meaning of multo die see my essay on "The Credibility of Caesar's Narrative," p. 206, *supra*.*

<sup>7</sup> *Comm. de C  sar*, i. 154-6.

and slingers, and supported them by a legion. If he had done this, there is every reason to believe that the enemy would not have attempted to interfere with the construction of his camp. There can be no doubt that, as the great Napoleon said,<sup>1</sup> Caesar was culpably careless. Still, it is by no means clear that to this very carelessness he did not owe his victory. If he had taken due precautions, the Nervii would probably not have crossed the river at all,—and what then? Turpin says that he owed the victory to his soldiers and to luck. To luck certainly, if luck it was that the skill of the Nervii was not equal to their courage: but also to the tact of Labienus and to his own coolness and inspiring power. For if this was a soldier, not a general's battle, it was also the battle of a great man.

3. Caesar has been taken to task by Lossau and other writers<sup>2</sup> for having distributed his legions, for the winter of 54–53 B.C., over a wide area; and Lossau says that he might have solved the difficulty occasioned by the failure of the harvest in the preceding summer by establishing magazines at suitable points. The criticism would never have been heard of but for the disaster which befell Sabinus and Cotta at Aduatua; and I do not believe that it was well founded. The disaster was due to the folly of Sabinus. Caesar knew what he was about; and it is impertinent to find fault with a great general when one has practically no knowledge of the circumstances in which he was placed. No one can tell whether it would have been possible for him to establish magazines. Moreover, as von Goler<sup>3</sup> points out, winter camps, as we may see from Caesar's narrative, were so strong that, if they were attacked, they could be held with certainty until they were relieved. See the Duc de Rohan's *Le Parfait Capitaine*, ed. 1745, pp. 33–4.<sup>4</sup>

## THE SPELLING OF CELTIC NAMES

In spelling Celtic proper names, I have, throughout my narrative, followed Caesar; and where the MSS. differ, I have followed the best, or have been guided by other ancient writers or by the evidence of coins or inscriptions; while, in default of positive testimony, I have been guided simply by modern usage. But for mere accuracy, where accuracy ran counter to usage, I have cared nothing. We have all been accustomed, as schoolboys, to read of Orgetorix and Divitiacus. What, then, is to be gained by slavishly following the evidence of coins, and writing Orcetirix, and Diviciacos? Besides, in some cases, different coins

<sup>1</sup> See p. 54, n. 1, *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. Turpin de Crissé, i. 345–6.

<sup>3</sup> *Gall. Krieg*, p. 171.

<sup>4</sup> A book called *La guerre de Jules César dans les Gaules*, by M. de Pécis, published in 1786, abounds in deprecatory criticisms of Caesar's generalship, none of which seems to me worthy of notice.

<sup>5</sup> It is not certain that all the names to be mentioned in this note were Celtic: but into that question I need not now enter.

spell the same name in different ways. Caesar dealt with Celtic in the same way that Anglo-Indians dead and gone dealt with Indian names. If his lot had been cast in India in the days of "John Company," he would have written Cawnpore not Kánhpúr. As his lot was cast in Gaul in the last century B.C., he wrote Orgetorix, not Orcetirix. Probably he himself knew the native orthography of some, at least, of the Celtic names that appear in his memoirs, for he must have seen plenty of coins, if not other evidence. Where accuracy does not give a shock to usage, I try to be accurate: but, in a matter of no practical importance, I would rather be wilfully inaccurate than shock people's eyes or ears. Nevertheless, for the satisfaction of the curious and of those who, in season and out of season, are clamorous for accuracy, I subjoin a list of doubtful names and of others the orthography of which there is sufficient evidence either to determine or with reasonable probability to conjecture. The evidence is derived from (1) coins, (2) inscriptions, (3) comparison of the MSS. of the *Commentaries*, with those of other ancient writers, and (4) study of analogous Celtic forms. It is necessary, however, to bear in mind that Latin inscriptions are not conclusive evidence as to the way in which the Gauls spelled their own names.

**Admagetobriga**<sup>1</sup> is sanctioned by the French Commission,<sup>2</sup> who profess to follow the best MSS., and by A. Holder.<sup>3</sup> A Q, however, have (quod proelium factum sit) *Admagetobrigæ*: BMS *Admagetobriae*; and *F ad Magetobrium*;<sup>4</sup> and Schneider,<sup>5</sup> citing B. C., iii. 79, § 4 (*proelio ad Dyrrachium facto*), *ib.*, 53, § 1 (*uno die VI proeliis factis, tribus ad Dyrrachium*) and *ib.*, i. 38, § 4 (*bellum ad Herdum . . . gerere*) maintains that Caesar would have used the preposition, not the locative. C. W. Glück<sup>6</sup> also, who believes that the name of the battle-field in question is derived from *mag* ("a field"), holds that Cæsar wrote *ad Magetobrigam*. He relies on the alleged inscription, MAGETOB, which I have noticed in my geographical note on MAGETOBRIA. He also refers to many Gallic names in which *magus* occurs, and identifies *magus* with the Irish *mag*. Holder,<sup>7</sup> on the other hand, and M. d'Arbois de Jubainville<sup>8</sup> interpret *Admagetobriga* as "fortress of Admagetes."

I believe that Schneider and Glück are right, although, as I have shown in the above-mentioned geographical note, the inscription on which Glück relies is doubtful.

**Aduatuca** and **Atuatuca** are found in the best MSS. of Caesar.<sup>9</sup> Ptolemy<sup>10</sup> writes Ἀτονάτουκον: *Aduca*, with the variant *Aduaga*, is found in the *Itinerary of Antonine*,<sup>11</sup> and *Atuaca* in the *Table*:<sup>12</sup> but, as I have tried to prove in my geographical note on ADUATUCA, the town

<sup>1</sup> B. G., i. 31, § 12.

<sup>2</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 9-10.

<sup>3</sup> Caesar, p. 18.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Meusel's *Cæsar*, p. 20 with his *Lex. Cæs.*, ii. 508.

<sup>5</sup> Caesar, i. 66.

<sup>6</sup> *Die bei Cæsar vorkommenden Keltischen Nâmen*, 1857, pp. 121-3.

<sup>7</sup> *All-celtischer Sprachschâtz*, i. 42.

<sup>8</sup> *Les noms gaulois chez Cæsar et Hirtius*, 1891, pp. 82-3.

<sup>9</sup> Meusel's *Lex. Cæs.*, i. 181.

<sup>10</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 9, § 5.

<sup>11</sup> P. 378.

<sup>12</sup> P. 12, col. 1.

mentioned by Ptolemy and in the *Itinerary* and the *Table* is distinct from the stronghold mentioned by Caesar.

**Aduatuci** derives much more support, on the whole, than any other form from the MSS.<sup>1</sup> of Caesar: but *Atuatu* and *Atuatici* are found in good MSS. Orosius<sup>2</sup> has *Aduatici*, and Dion Cassius<sup>3</sup> Ἀτουατικοί.

**Aedui**.—Glück<sup>4</sup> prefers this form to *Haedui*, which Schneider, Nipperdey, Mommsen and Meusel always write, following the best MSS.<sup>5</sup> of Caesar. Heller,<sup>6</sup> referring to J. C. Orelli (*Inscr. Lat. collectio*, No. 3432), remarks that, if some inscriptions have the form *Aedui*, others have *Haedui*. But this only proves that inscriptions on questions of orthography, are not necessarily conclusive. According to Glück, where an *h* is found in Celtic words, it is only "a breath," which the Romans prefixed to the pure Celtic vowel. Thus they wrote *Helvii* and *Helvetii* for *Elvii* and *Elveii*, which forms are found in inscriptions.<sup>7</sup> Holder<sup>8</sup> derives *Aedui* from *aidu-s* (in Irish *aid*, in Welsh *aidd*), which means "zeal" or "rivalry." *Edyis* is found on coins.<sup>9</sup>

**Agedincum**, which is found in the best MSS. of Caesar,<sup>10</sup> and in the *Itinerary of Antonine*,<sup>11</sup> is right. A Gallic coin has *ATHA*, and an inscription discovered at Sens, which stands upon the site of Agedincum, *AGIES*.<sup>12</sup> M. d'Arbois de Jubainville considers that the *ie* in this inscription is perhaps only an altered form of the *e* in Caesar, "comme on a dit 'piéd' pour *pede*."<sup>13</sup> Glück<sup>14</sup> concludes that the first four letters of the word were certainly *Aged*; and he prefers *Agedincum* to *Agedicum*, which is found in *C*, relying on the authority of the best MSS. of Caesar, and on the analogy of *Alisincum*, *Vapincum* and *Lemincum*. It should be added that, according to Holder, the genuine Gallic form was *Agedin-con*, and that the Gallic termination of all names which Caesar latinised into *um* was *on*.<sup>15</sup>

**Alesia**.—According to an inscription found on the plateau of Mont Auxois, the Gallic form was *ALISI/A*. See Desjardins's *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 467, n. 2, and *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. xv., 1867, p. 314.

**Ambivareti** is, according to Glück,<sup>16</sup> the name of a people whom Caesar mentions in *B. G.*, vii. 75, § 2, 90, § 6. Glück says that the word is formed from *ambi* ("around," "mutually") and *var* (in Cymric *gwared* = "freed"), so that *Ambivareti* would mean "defending

<sup>1</sup> Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i. 182.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist.*, vi. 7, § 14, 10, § 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xxxix. 4, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> Pp. 9-14.

<sup>5</sup> See Meusel's *Caesar*, critical note on p. 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Philologus*, xvii., 1861, p. 272.

<sup>7</sup> J. Gruter, *Inscr. ant. totius orbis Rom.*, 1707, vol. i. dccxxviii., 9; J. W. C. Steiner, *Codez inscr. Rom.*, 1851, 466.

<sup>8</sup> *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, i. 65.

<sup>9</sup> E. Muret and M. A. Chabouillet, *Cat. des monnaies gaul. de la Bibl. Nat.*, 1889, Nos. 4822-31.

<sup>10</sup> Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i. 207. *Agedicum*, according to the French Commission (*Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 18), is the reading of the best MSS.; but this is a mistake. The form is found, according to Frigell, in *C*, in one passage only (vii. 10, § 4): but Meusel does not mention it at all.

<sup>11</sup> P. 383.

<sup>12</sup> *Rev. de philologie*, t. ii., 1847, p. 356.

<sup>13</sup> Desjardins's *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 469, n. 8.

<sup>14</sup> Pp. 15-18.

<sup>15</sup> *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, *passim*.

<sup>16</sup> Pp. 22-4.

each other." The reading of the best MSS. in chapter 75, is *Ambluareti*,<sup>1</sup> which only differs in one letter from the reading for which Glück argues. *Ambluareti*, says Glück, is "a monstrosity." *Ambivareti*, however, is not found in any MS.

**Andi** and **Andes** are found in the best MSS. of Caesar:<sup>2</sup> but Glück<sup>3</sup> and A. Holder<sup>4</sup> regard *Andecuri* as the true form. They find support in Pliny<sup>5</sup> (iv. 18 (32) 107), Tacitus (*Ann.* iii. 41), Ptolemy (ii. 8, § 8), Orosius (vi. 8, § 7) and many other authors, as well as in a coin mentioned by T. E. Mionnet,<sup>6</sup> which bears the legend ANDECAU. M. d'Arbois de Jubainville<sup>7</sup> regards *Andica i*, which is found in Pliny and Orosius, as the oldest form. Holder derives the word from the particle *ande* and *cav* (in Cymric *caw*), which means a "'and" or "tie."

**Aremoricus**, not *Armoricus* is the true form.<sup>8</sup> Glück<sup>9</sup> observes that the final *e* in *are* was dropped in the MSS.: but he believes that Caesar was not responsible. Pliny,<sup>10</sup> Ausonius,<sup>11</sup> Rutilius<sup>12</sup> and Sidonius Apollinaris<sup>13</sup> all write the *e*. The particle *are*, moreover, is found in other Gallic names, for instance *Arecomici*. See also Holder, *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, i. 202.

**Atrebates**, the usual form, is preferred by Glück<sup>14</sup> to *Atrebat*, which has some MS. support;<sup>15</sup> on the ground that Caesar could not have used both forms, since the name *Atrebas* is invariably of the third declension, and the only names which Caesar declines indifferently according to the second and the third declension, are those which have the Gallic termination *on*, e.g. *Turon* (or *Turones*). But, objects Heller,<sup>16</sup> besides *Culetes* and *Culetos*, we find *Veliocasses* and *Veliocassis* (dative). However, as the dative *Atrebat* is only found in a family of MSS., in which syllables are frequently dropped. Heller admits that, in Caesar, *Atrebates* may be the only right form.

**Aulerci**, *Aulurci*, *Auleurci* and *Aurelci* are the forms found in the best MSS.<sup>17</sup> of Caesar of a name which, on coins,<sup>18</sup> appears as *Aulirci*. The editors adopt the form *Aulerci*.

**Caeroesi**, which is found in the α MSS. of Caesar,<sup>19</sup> is adopted by the best MSS. Orosius<sup>20</sup> has *Caerosi* with the variant *Cerosi*. *Caerosi*,

<sup>1</sup> Meusel's *Lex. Cæs.*, i. 248. In chapter 90 the best MSS. have *Ambibareti*.

<sup>2</sup> Meusel's *Lex. Cæs.*, i. 259.

<sup>3</sup> P. 24.

<sup>4</sup> *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, i. 140-3.

<sup>5</sup> Pliny (ed. D. Detlefsen 1866) has *Andicari*, with v. l. *Andigavi*.

<sup>6</sup> *Descr. de médailles antiques*, i. 80.

<sup>7</sup> See Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 483, n. 3.

<sup>8</sup> Meusel's *Lex. Cæs.*, i. 301.

<sup>9</sup> Pp. 31-2.

<sup>10</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 17 (31), § 105.

<sup>11</sup> Ed. R. Peijer, p. 59, i. 28.

<sup>12</sup> *Itin.*, i. 213.

<sup>13</sup> *Carm.*, vii. 247, 369.

<sup>14</sup> Pp. 36-40.

<sup>15</sup> Meusel's *Lex. Cæs.*, i. 359.

<sup>16</sup> *Philologus*, xvi. i., 1861, pp. 278-9.

<sup>17</sup> Meusel's *Lex. Cæs.*, i. 376; Holder's *Caesar*, p. 62. Meusel does not mention the form *Aulerci*, which, according to Holder, is found in *h* in *B. G.*, iii. 17, § 3.

<sup>18</sup> E. Muret and M. A. Chabouillet, *Cat. des monn. gaul. de la Bib. Nat.*, Nos. 7046-9.

<sup>19</sup> Meusel's *Cæsar*, p. 40.

<sup>20</sup> *Hist.*, vi. 7, § 14.

which is the reading of *h*, is adopted by Meusel in his edition,<sup>1</sup> but not in his *Lexicon*.<sup>2</sup> Holder reads *Cuerocsi* in his edition<sup>3</sup> and *Caerosi* in his *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*.<sup>4</sup> *Cerosi* is found in *af*. Gluck<sup>5</sup> says that the Gauls would have written *Caïroisi*.

**Caletes** is preferred by Gluck<sup>6</sup> to *Caleti*. *Cadetes* is found in *B. G.*, vii. 75, § 4; *Caletos* in ii. 4, § 9;<sup>7</sup> Pliny<sup>8</sup> has *Galeti*; Orosius<sup>9</sup> *Caleti*; Strabo<sup>10</sup> *Κάλετοι*; and Ptolemy<sup>11</sup> *Καλήται*. Caesar, as Schneider remarks, often appears to use the terminations *l* and *es* of Gallic proper names indifferently.

**Cebenna** is preferred by Gluck<sup>12</sup> to the usual reading *Cevenna*. *Cebenna* is found once (written by a second hand) in *M*, and once in *A*.<sup>13</sup> Glück refers to Mela,<sup>14</sup> Pliny<sup>15</sup> and Ausonius,<sup>16</sup> and derives the word from *ceb* (in Cymric *kefyn*, *cefn*), which means a "ridge."

**Cenabum** is undoubtedly preferable to *Genabum*, although it is not found in any of the MSS. of Caesar.<sup>17</sup> In the two passages in which Hirtius<sup>18</sup> mentions the name, *an* have *Cenabum*, and *p* *Genabum*. That *Cenabum* is the true form is proved, says Desjardins,<sup>19</sup> by Strabo, Ptolemy, the *Itinerary of Antonine*, the *Table*, and the famous inscription on the marble slab, which was discovered, in 1846, in the faubourg St-Vincent at Orléans. The Gauls themselves would have written *Cenabon*. Gluck<sup>20</sup> derives *Cenabum* from *cēqa*, which, he says, is identical with the Irish *cēn*, and from which *Cenomani* is derived. So also M. d'Arbois de Jubainville.

**Cenomani**.—Gluck<sup>21</sup> prefers this to *Cenomanni* (which is the reading of the best MSS.),<sup>22</sup> on the analogy of many other words of the same termination. He also remarks that Polybius, Strabo and Ptolemy were wrong in writing *Κενομανοί* for *Κηνομανοί*, as the quantity of the *e* is fixed by the line *Te iubet agnos visere Cenimannos*.<sup>23</sup> I do not question the conclusion: but Latin poets occasionally lengthened or shortened the quantities of proper names for metrical purposes. Thus Virgil writes *Nec non Turquinum eiectum Porsennæ iubebat*:<sup>24</sup> while Horace writes *Minacis aut Etrusca Porsennæ manus*.<sup>25</sup>

**Centrones** is, according to Gluck,<sup>26</sup> the name which Caesar gives to one of the client peoples of the Nervii.<sup>27</sup> *Centrones* is found in *ABM*; while *Centrones* is found in *Q*.<sup>28</sup> Gluck says that *centr*, from which

<sup>1</sup> P. 40. Here, in his *apparatus criticus*, Meusel notes *cerosi* as the reading of the  $\beta$  MSS. generally.

<sup>2</sup> i. 432. <sup>3</sup> P. 16. <sup>4</sup> i. 637. <sup>5</sup> P. 40. <sup>6</sup> Pp. 43-4.

<sup>7</sup> Meusel's *Lec. Cæs.*, i. 439. <sup>8</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 18 (32), § 107.

<sup>9</sup> *Hist.*, vi. 7, § 14. <sup>10</sup> iv. 8, § 5. <sup>11</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 8, § 5.

<sup>12</sup> P. 57. <sup>13</sup> Meusel's *Lec. Cæs.*, i. 498.

<sup>14</sup> *Chorographia*, ii. 5, §§ 74, 80.

<sup>15</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iii. 4 (5), § 31, 17 (31), § 105.

<sup>16</sup> *Opuscula*, p. 105, l. 102. p. 151, l. 114.

<sup>17</sup> The adjectival form *Cenabensi* is found in *a*, in *B. G.*, vii. 28, § 4. See Meusel's *Lec. Cæs.*, i. 506.

<sup>18</sup> *B. G.*, viii. 5, § 2; 6, § 2.

<sup>19</sup> *Geogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 477, n. 1.

<sup>20</sup> Pp. 58-9.

<sup>21</sup> P. 59 and n. 1.

<sup>22</sup> Meusel, *Lec. Cæs.*, i. 507.

<sup>23</sup> *Aen.*, viii. 646.

<sup>24</sup> *Epod.*, xvi. 4.

<sup>25</sup> Pp. 62-3.

<sup>26</sup> *B. G.*, v. 39, § 1.

<sup>27</sup> See Meusel's *Lec. Cæs.*, i. 521.



*Ceutrones* would be derived, is a form foreign to Celtic. He derives *Centrones* from *cen'r.* (in Breton *kentr*, in Irish *cinteir*, a spur), and infers that it means "spur-wearing." I have not much faith in this derivation; for it would be very strange that the clients of a people who, as Caesar says,<sup>1</sup> had no cavalry, should have been called "spur-wearers."

Gluck spells in the same way *Centrones*, the name of an Alpine tribe, which Caesar mentions in *B. G.*, i. 10, § 4. *Ceutrones*, however, is found in all the best MSS.,<sup>2</sup> and in the famous inscription of Forclaz.<sup>3</sup> Thus, unless *Ceutrones* was misspelt in the inscription, the etymological argument of Gluck collapses. Having regard to the authority of the MSS., I am inclined to believe that both tribes had the same name, *Ceutrones*.

**Commius** ought strictly to be spelled *Commioz*. See Rhys's *Celtic Britain*, p. 25, and *Rev. celt.*, i. 294.

**Coriosolites** is preferred, as having the best MS. authority, by Holder<sup>4</sup> and Meusel<sup>5</sup> to the more usual *Curiosolites*. *Coriosolites* is found in *X* in *B. G.*, iii. 11, § 4 and vii. 75, § 4; also in *AQß* in ii. 34 and iii. 7, § 4; while *Curiosolites* is found in *BM* in ii. 34, and in *ABM* in iii. 7, § 4. As in so many other Gallic names, the termination varies between *es* and *i*, the accusative *-os* being found in *Qfh* in ii. 34.

**Diablintres**, which is found in the *a* MSS. of Caesar,<sup>6</sup> is preferred by Gluck<sup>7</sup> to the usual form *Diablintes*, which is found in *h*. The MSS. of Pliny<sup>8</sup> have *Diablintes*, *Diablinti* and *Diablindi*; of Orosius<sup>9</sup> *Diablintres*, *Diablintes* and *Diabintes*. Ptolemy<sup>10</sup> has *Διαβλίται*. Gluck decides for *Diablintres*, out of deference to the *a* MSS., and because he thinks it more likely that the *r* was omitted by copyists than inserted. He derives the word from the privative particle *diā* and *blin*, from which he believes that *blintres*, connected with *blinterus* ("weary"), arose.

**Dumnorix** is the popular form of the name of the Aeduan demagogue whom Caesar put to death in 54 B.C. The coins exhibit three forms. *Dubnoreix*, *Dubnoréx* and *Dubnorix*.<sup>11</sup> MM. A. de Barthélemy<sup>12</sup> and d'Arbois de Jubainville<sup>13</sup> regard *Dubnoreix* as the true form, *Dubnoréx* being found only on ill-executed coins.

**Eporëdorix**, the Aeduan chieftain whom<sup>14</sup> Caesar mentions in conjunction with Viridomarus, is so called, at least in the nominative case, in the MSS.<sup>14</sup> *Eporëdrix* is found in an inscription.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *B. G.*, ii. 17, § 4.

<sup>2</sup> Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i. 521.

<sup>3</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 252.

<sup>4</sup> *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, i. 1126-7. Holder refers to Laval, 1892, p. 9 and *Bull. hist. et arch. de la Mayenne*, 1892, p. 163. I have not been able to verify these references.

<sup>5</sup> *Lex. Caes.*, i. 744.

<sup>6</sup> Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i. 882.

<sup>7</sup> Pp. 93-5.

<sup>8</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 18 (32), § 107.

<sup>9</sup> *Hist.*, vi. 8, § 8.

<sup>10</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 8, § 7.

<sup>11</sup> See *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i., Nos. 65-6, 163, and *Rev. celt.*, i., 1870, p. 295.

<sup>12</sup> *Encyclopédie-Roret*, 1890, p. 121. See also *Rev. num.*, xvii., 1853, pp. 6-11.

<sup>13</sup> *Rev. arch.*, 3<sup>e</sup> sér., t. xviii., 1891, p. 84.

<sup>14</sup> Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i. 1019.

<sup>15</sup> *Rev. celt.*, iii., 1876-78, p. 167.

**Esuvii** appears, as I have shown in my geographical note (**Esuvii**), to be the name of the Armorican people whose name occurs, in various forms, in *B. G.*, ii. 34, iii. 7, § 4 and v. 24, § 2.<sup>1</sup> Glück,<sup>2</sup> who knew nothing of the coin to which I refer in the note in question, decided for *Esubii*. He holds, with Whitte, that *Sesuvii*, the reading of *ah* in *B. G.*, ii. 34, grew out of the careless repetition of the last *s* of the preceding word *Curiosolitas*. From the point of view of spoken language, he says, both *Esubii* and *Esuvii* are right; and it is difficult to decide between them, because *b* and *v* were often confused. He thinks it safer, however, to adhere to *Esubii*, the reading of *a* in *B. G.*, iii. 7. Holder reads *Esubios* in ii. 34 and iii. 7, while in v. 24 he adopts the form *Essuvios*, in support of which he cites an inscription on the mile-stone of Ardematunnum (Langres),—*Gaio Essuvio Tetrico pio felici invicto*.

**Geidumni** is, according to Glück<sup>3</sup> and Heller,<sup>4</sup> the name of a people who are mentioned, among the clients of the Nervii, by Caesar<sup>5</sup> only. The MSS. do not help us much; for some of them have *geidūnos* and others *geudūnos*,<sup>6</sup> and of these abbreviated forms the former might mean either *Geidunnos*, which Nipperdey reads, or *Geidumnos*. Schneider, however, prefers the latter, on the analogy of *Garumna* and *Dumnoria*.

**Genava** is, as Glück<sup>7</sup> shows, the true form, although the best MSS.<sup>8</sup> of Caesar have *Genua*. *Genavensibus* and *Cenavensibus* are found in inscriptions.<sup>9</sup> The MSS. of the *Itinerary of Antonine*<sup>10</sup> have *Genaba* and *Cenava*: the *Table*<sup>11</sup> has *Gennava*, and the *Notitia provinciarum*<sup>12</sup> *Genavensium*.

**Gutruatus**, to adopt the form found in *A*,<sup>13</sup> in the second of the two passages in which the word is mentioned by Hirtius,<sup>14</sup> was, as I have proved on pages 808-9, identical with *Otnuatus*, mentioned by Caesar in *B. G.*, vii. 3, § 1. What the true form was, we do not know: but Heller,<sup>15</sup> following Nipperdey, gives reasons for believing that it was *Gutruatus*. It is difficult, he says, to believe that Hirtius, who must have had one of the earliest copies of Caesar before him, could have made a mistake; and since Nipperdey<sup>16</sup> is probably right in thinking it more likely that the copyists should have altered the longer into the shorter form than *vice versa*, in both passages we should read *Gutruatus*. *Gutuatus*, however, which, in Gallic, would have been *Gutuattros*, is found in *QBM*;<sup>17</sup> and M. d'Arbois de Jubainville holds that this is the genuine form. *Gutu-*, he says, means "voice"; and *Gutuattros* means

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i. 1058.

<sup>2</sup> P. 102.

<sup>3</sup> *B. G.*, v. 39, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> Pp. 104-7.

<sup>5</sup> *Inscr. Helv.*, ed. Mommsen, Nos. 33-4. I have not been able to verify this reference.

<sup>6</sup> Ed. Desjardins, p. 55, col. 3.

<sup>7</sup> Meusel's *Caesar*, p. 240.

<sup>8</sup> *Philologus*, xvii., 1861, p. 283.

<sup>9</sup> *Caesar*, p. 88. See also Glück, pp. 101-11.

<sup>10</sup> Holder's *Caesar*, p. 224.

<sup>11</sup> Pp. 95-102.

<sup>12</sup> *Philologus*, xvii., 1861, p. 281.

<sup>13</sup> Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i. 1370.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i. 1370.

<sup>15</sup> I have not been able to verify this

<sup>16</sup> Ed. Wesseling, p. 347.

<sup>17</sup> Ed. B. Guérard, p. 24.

<sup>18</sup> *B. G.*, viii. 38, §§ 4-5.

"orator."<sup>1</sup> M. R. Mowat<sup>2</sup> thinks that *Gutuatrum*, coming from a nominative *Gutuatr*, is the true form of the word in *B. G.*, viii. 38. He cites two inscriptions, in which *GUTVATER* and *GUTVATR* appear. In the second inscription, as restored, the words *Gutuatri Martis* occur; and M. Mowat believes that *Gutuater* means "a priest," and that Hirtius mistook the word for a proper name. O. Hirschfeld,<sup>3</sup> who holds, as I do, that the *Gutruatus* or *Gutuatus* of Hirtius was the person who is designated in the MSS. of Caesar as *Cotuatus*, believes nevertheless that in Caesar the reading *Cotuatus* is right; for, he argues, Caesar gave the man's name, while Hirtius "only intended to point out that the ring-leader held the priestly office of *gutuater*." I do not believe that Hirtius intended to do anything of the kind: if he had, he would surely have explained what *Gutuatum* meant. If he wrote *Gutuatrum* and not *Gutruatum*, it is more likely that both he and Caesar mistook the name of an office for that of a man; or else that the name of the office was also the name of a man.<sup>4</sup>

**Latovici** is the reading of *A*, *Latobici* of *B*, and *Latocibi* of *M* in *B. G.*, i. 5, § 4; while *Latobrigi* is found in the best MSS. in i. 28, § 3 and 29, § 2. A mutilated inscription has *ΑΤΟΒ*:<sup>5</sup> Ptolemy<sup>6</sup> has *Λατοβίκου*. Glück prefers *Latovici*, remarking that Pliny<sup>8</sup> mentions a Pannonian people of that name, and referring to the forms, analogous as he believes, *Eburo-vices*, *Branno-vices* and *Lemo-vices*. He identifies *vici* with the Cymric *guic* and the Irish *fich*, a "district." Zeuss<sup>9</sup> and Meusel hold to the form *Latobrigi*, which, at all events, has more good MS. authority.

**Lemonum**, the reading of *β* and *S*,<sup>10</sup> is better than *Limo*, which Frigell<sup>11</sup> adopts on the authority of the rest of the MSS. Ptolemy, says Glück,<sup>12</sup> is wrong in writing *Λίμωνοι*, just as he is wrong in writing *Λιμνίκοι*. *Lemonum*, according to Glück, is derived from *lem* (in Irish *leamh*), "an elm."

**Litavicus**.—Glück,<sup>13</sup> and also Holder and Meusel prefer *Litaviccus*. The coins have *Litavicus*; <sup>14</sup> but *Lituviccus* is found in an inscription.<sup>15</sup> Glück considers that both forms are right, and remarks that in Celtic names *c* is often doubled.

**Lixovi** appears to be the true form of the name which is usually spelled *Lecovii*.<sup>16</sup>

**Lucterius** is the form found in the best MSS. of Caesar of a name which is spelled on a coin <sup>17</sup> *LYXTURIOS*.

<sup>1</sup> Desjardins, *Héogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 511, n. 3. 721, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Rev. de philologie*, nouv. sér., t. 1, 1877, pp. 274-5.

<sup>3</sup> *Kaiserliche Akad. der Wissenschaften Sitzungsberichte*, Wien, cxlii., 1883, p. 313, n. 7.

<sup>4</sup> Compare the English surnames, Pratt, King, etc.

<sup>5</sup> Glück, p. 113.

<sup>6</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 14, § 2.

<sup>7</sup> P. 112.

<sup>8</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iii. 25 (28), § 148.

<sup>9</sup> *Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme*, 1837, p. 236.

<sup>10</sup> Meusel's *Caesar*, p. 234.

<sup>11</sup> *Caesar*, i. 158.

<sup>12</sup> P. 117.

<sup>13</sup> P. 119.

<sup>14</sup> See *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i., No. 67.

<sup>15</sup> Holder, *All-celtischer Sprachsat.*, ii. 245.

<sup>16</sup> See A. de Barthélemy, in *Encyclopédie-Roret*, p. 112.

<sup>17</sup> Muret and Chabouillet, *Cat. des monnaies gaul. de la Bibl. Nat.*, No. 4367.

**Lutecia** is the form adopted by Holder:<sup>1</sup> but *Lutetia*, which the other editors prefer, has quite as good MS. authority; and *Lucetia* and *Lucetia* are also found.<sup>2</sup> Strabo<sup>3</sup> writes Λουκοτεκία, and Ptolemy<sup>4</sup> Λουκοτεκία.

**Mandubii** is the form found in all the MSS. of Caesar, in *B. G.*, vii. 68, § 1 and 78, § 3: but in 71, § 7, while the β MSS. have *Mandubii*, the α MSS. have *Manduvii*;<sup>5</sup> and other variants, which are not worth recording, are found in inferior MSS.<sup>6</sup> M. d'Arbois<sup>7</sup> Jubainville<sup>7</sup> believes that the true form is *Mandubili*, as an inscription with the form *Mandu-bilos* has been found in the territory usually assigned to the *Mandubii*.<sup>8</sup> The MSS. of Strabo<sup>9</sup> (iv. 2, § 3) have *Μανδυβούλων*.

**Metiosedum** is the form now usually adopted of a name which has given rise to much discussion. Caesar mentions the town, of which I provisionally assume this to be the name, four times.<sup>10</sup> I have proved elsewhere<sup>11</sup> that in all the four passages Caesar is speaking of one and the same town. In all the passages Schneider, Holder and Meusel adopt the form *Metiosedum*, Nipperdey and Frigell *Melodunum*. Gluck<sup>12</sup> thinks that *Metiosedum* is not a Gallic word at all. He holds that *Mellodunum*, which is found in good MSS., is better than *Melodunum*, because we find *Mellosutum* and *Mellentum*, and also because he believes the name to be derived from *meall*, "a hill." But Heller demolishes this argument by pointing out that the town was situated on an island in the Seine, where there is no hill; and he suggests that *Mellodunum* may have been written over *Metiosedum* by a copyist who wished to point out that *Metiosedum* was situated on the island opposite the place where *Mellodunum* (*Melun*) was afterwards built, on the bank of the river.<sup>13</sup>

**Nitiobriges** is preferred by Gluck<sup>14</sup> to *Nitiobriges*. He argues that *Nitiobriges* is formed from *neith* ("battle") and *brig* ("valour"). There is good MS. authority for both *Nitiobriges* and *Nitiobroges*.<sup>15</sup> Strabo<sup>16</sup> and Ptolemy<sup>17</sup> write Νιτιόβριγες. On the analogy of *Allobroges*, which form is found in Cicero, Caesar, Horace, Juvenal, Livy, Pliny, Pomponius Mela, Sallust and Velleius Paterculus, as well as in inscriptions, one might be inclined to think that *Nitiobroges* was the true form. None of the MSS. of Caesar have *Allobriges*, though Ἀλλοβρίγες is found in some MSS. of Strabo and Ptolemy. *Allobroges*, however, is formed from

<sup>1</sup> *Cursar*, p. 305.

<sup>2</sup> *Geogr.*, iv. 3, § 5.

<sup>3</sup> Meusel's *Caesar*, p. 204.

<sup>4</sup> *Les noms gaulois chez César*, etc., p. 128.

<sup>5</sup> R. Mowat, *Inscr. de la cité des Lingons*, 1<sup>re</sup> part, p. 35, No. 67.

<sup>6</sup> Ed. Muller and Dübner, p. 962.

<sup>7</sup> *B. G.*, vii. 58, §§ 2, 6, 60, § 1, 63, § 5.

<sup>8</sup> Pp. 138-9.

<sup>9</sup> P. 127, note.

<sup>10</sup> See Meusel, *Lec. Cacs.*, ii. 778-9. In the *apparatus criticus* of his *Caesar*, however, Meusel does not mention *Nitiobroges*.

<sup>11</sup> iv. 2, § 2.

<sup>12</sup> Meusel's *Lec. Cacs.*, ii. 503.

<sup>13</sup> *Geogr.*, iii. 8, § 10.

<sup>14</sup> Schneider's *Caesar*, ii. 559.

<sup>15</sup> See pp. 763-5.

<sup>16</sup> *Philologus*, xvii., 1861, p. 285.

<sup>17</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 7, § 11.

*allo* ("foreign") and *brogi*<sup>1</sup> ("land"); and, if Glück's derivation of *Nitiobriges* is correct, the apparent analogy between the two words disappears.

**Orgetorix.**—De Saulcy<sup>2</sup> says the correct form is *Orgetirix* or *Orcetirix*, which is found on coins of the Aedui.<sup>3</sup> Mommsen<sup>4</sup> says that none of the Orcitirixes whose names appear on coins can be identified with the Helvetian chief of the same name; and M. d'Arbois de Jubainville<sup>5</sup> agrees with him: but as the name is confessedly the same, I need not concern myself with Mommsen's arguments.

**Osismi**, the reading which has the most MS. authority,<sup>6</sup> is adopted by Glück.<sup>7</sup> Good MSS., he says, of Pliny<sup>8</sup> and several MSS. of Orosius<sup>9</sup> have the same. Mela<sup>10</sup> writes *Osismi*, which is also found in an inferior MS. of Caesar;<sup>11</sup> Strabo<sup>12</sup> and Ptolemy<sup>13</sup> Ὀσισμοί.

**Petrocorii** is found in all the best MSS. of Caesar;<sup>14</sup> but M. d'Arbois de Jubainville<sup>15</sup> regards *Petrucorii* as the true form.

**Rauraci**, the form found in the MSS.,<sup>16</sup> is rejected by Glück,<sup>17</sup> Desjardins<sup>18</sup> and Holder in favour of *Raurici*, which is found in an inscription. The inscription may be right: but who can tell? Inscriptions are not infallible, any more than coins. Some coins show the form *Massalia*; others *Massilia*.<sup>19</sup> Pliny,<sup>20</sup> however, writes *Raurici*, and Ptolemy<sup>21</sup> Ραυρικοί: but Orosius<sup>22</sup> *Raurici*.

Heller<sup>23</sup> defends the form *Rauraci*. He argues that if the name is rightly derived from *rauri* ("lord"), the original form, on the analogy of Segontiaci, Dumnacus and Diviciacus, must have been *Rauriaci*, which would have been corrupted into *Rauraci*.

**Rhedones** is said to be the true form of the name which the editors regularly spell without the aspirate. Like *Rhenus*, *Rhodanus*, *raeda* and *reno*, the word is spelled in some MSS. with, and in others without *h*.<sup>24</sup> Mahn,<sup>25</sup> however, has given reasons for believing that all five words should be aspirated. But see AEDUI.

<sup>1</sup> Holder's *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, i. 97.

<sup>2</sup> *Ann. de la Soc. Num.*, 1867, p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> *Cat. des monn. gaul. de la Bibl. Nat.*, by Muret and Chabouillet, p. 110.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. de la monnaie rom.* (translated from the German), iii. 271, quoted by MM. Muret and Chabouillet (*Cat. des monn. gaul. de la Bibl. Nat.*, p. 110).

<sup>5</sup> *Les noms gaulois chez César*, etc., p. 85.

<sup>6</sup> *Ossismi* is found in a MSS. in *B. G.*, iii. 9, § 10, and vii. 75, § 4.

<sup>7</sup> P. 141.

<sup>8</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 18 (32), § 107. The reading in Detlefsen's ed. is *Ossismi*, with v. l. *Ossimi*.

<sup>9</sup> *Chorographia*, iii. 2, § 23.

<sup>10</sup> *iv.* 4, § 1.

<sup>11</sup> Meusel's *Lec. Cues.*, ii. 1086.

<sup>12</sup> In *B. G.*, vi. 25, § 2, the a MSS. have *Tauriaci*: but this is obviously wrong. See Meusel's *Lec. Cues.*, ii. 1626.

<sup>13</sup> P. 142.

<sup>14</sup> Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i. 322, n. 3.

<sup>15</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 17 (21), § 106.

<sup>16</sup> *Hist.*, vi. 7, § 5.

<sup>17</sup> *Ib.* See Meusel's *Lec. Cues.*, i. 1745, 1748, 1620, 1690.

<sup>18</sup> *Étymologische Untersuchungen über geographische Namen*, 1859, pp. 27-32. Cf. *Philologus*, xvii., 1861, p. 278.

<sup>19</sup> *Hist.*, vi. 8, § 8.

<sup>20</sup> Schneider's *Caesar*, i. 238.

<sup>21</sup> *Géogr.*, ii. 8, § 5.

<sup>22</sup> *Rev. celt.*, xi., 1890, p. 505.

<sup>23</sup> *Gloss. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 463, n. 4.

<sup>24</sup> *Géogr.*, ii. 9, § 9.

<sup>25</sup> *Philologus*, xvii., 1861, p. 275.

**Samarobriva** is the form which the editors adopt of the name of the town which stood upon the site of Amiens. Desjardins<sup>1</sup> thinks that *Samarabriva*, which appears on the famous mile-stone of Tongres, is the true form.

**Segusiavi.**—According to the best MSS.,<sup>2</sup> the people whom Caesar mentions in *B. G.*, i. 18, § 5, were the Sebusiani; the people whom he mentions in vii. 64, § 4, 75, § 2, were the Segusiavi. I have shown elsewhere<sup>3</sup> that in all three passages Caesar was speaking of one and the same tribe.

Nipperdey<sup>4</sup> and Gluck,<sup>5</sup> trusting to four inscriptions collected by A. Bernard,<sup>6</sup> maintain that *Segusiavi* is the true form; and Nipperdey adds that this form is supported by Strabo, Pliny<sup>7</sup> and Ptolemy. The MSS. of Strabo<sup>8</sup> exhibit a variety of forms, among which are Σεγοσιανῶν and Συγοσιανῶν, which agrees with Nipperdey's reading. The MSS. of Ptolemy<sup>9</sup> likewise exhibit various forms, among which are Σεγοσιανοί and Σεγοσιανοί. Against the authority of the inscriptions, says Schneider,<sup>10</sup> is to be set that of a coin mentioned by Mionnet,<sup>11</sup> which has the form *Segusianus*. But when I refer to Mionnet's work, I find that the coin in question bears the abbreviated legend SEGVIA only. On the other hand, Gluck refers to a coin<sup>12</sup> which has SEGVIAVS (= *Segusianus*); and the inscription on this coin is one of the four to which Bernard refers. Schneider,<sup>13</sup> remarking that his business is to decide, not what is the right form, but what Caesar wrote, decides for *Segusiavi*, "because in *B. G.*, vii. 64 and 75 the MSS. agree in exhibiting the form *Segusianos*." But in both of these passages the MSS. have *Segusianos*; and the inscriptions, coupled with the MSS. of Strabo, Pliny and Ptolemy appear to prove that the true form is *Segusiani*.

**Sotiates** is found in the *a* MSS. of Caesar; *Sotiates* and *Sociates* in the *β*.<sup>15</sup> Gluck<sup>16</sup> pronounces for *Sotiates*. Piny,<sup>17</sup> he says, has *Sothiates*: various MSS. of Orosius<sup>18</sup> have *Sotiates* and *Sociates*; of Dion Cassius<sup>19</sup> Σοτριάται and Σοτριάται. It is hard, Gluck thinks, to decide between *Sotiates* and *Sotiates*, which, he says, appears to be authorised by a coin;<sup>20</sup> but he decides to follow the *a* MSS. on the ground that there is no certainty that the name on the coin is rightly deciphered. This is a mistake. Several coins of the *Sotiates* exist, which are numbered 3604-3613 in *Catalogue des monnaies gauloises*, edited by MM. Muret and Chabouillet. In Planche xi. of the accom-

<sup>1</sup> *Itogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i. 137, n. 1. <sup>2</sup> Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii. 1811.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 481.

<sup>4</sup> Caesar, p. 792.

<sup>5</sup> Pp. 152-4.

<sup>6</sup> *Mém. de la Soc. des antiquaires de France*, xviii., 1846, pp. 343-8.

<sup>7</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 18 (32), § 107. Detlefsen reads *Secusiavi*.

<sup>8</sup> Ed. Müller and Dübner, p. 963.

<sup>9</sup> Ed. Müller, i. 217.

<sup>10</sup> Caesar, ii. 532.

<sup>11</sup> *Descr. des médailles antiques*, i. 78.

<sup>12</sup> A. Duchalais, *Descr. des médailles gaul.*, 1846, p. 129, No. 377.

<sup>13</sup> Caesar, i. 23; ii. 538.

<sup>14</sup> Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii. 1811.

<sup>15</sup> Meusel's *Caesar*, p. 71, and *Lex. Caes.*, ii. 1905.

<sup>16</sup> Pp. 154-5.

<sup>17</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 19 (33), § 108. Detlefsen reads *Sotiates*.

<sup>18</sup> *Hist.*, vi. 8, § 19.

<sup>19</sup> *Hist. Rom.*, xxxix. 46, § 2.

<sup>20</sup> Duchalais, p. 16, No. 30.

panying *Atlas de monnaies gauloises*, by H. de la Tour, there<sup>o</sup> is an illustration of one of these coins. On the obverse it bears the legend REX ADIETVANVS,—evidently the same name as that of Adiatunnus, the commander of the Sotiates, whom Caesar mentions in *B. G.*, iii. 22, §§ 1, 4 : on the reverse SOTIOTA. Having regard to the coins, I think it probable that Caesar wrote *Sotiates*.

**Suevi** appears to have rather more MS. authority than *Suebi*.<sup>1</sup> Strabo<sup>2</sup> writes Σόηβοι, and Ptolemy<sup>3</sup> Σύηβοι.

**Sugambri**, which has the most MS. authority,<sup>4</sup> and is found in Orosius,<sup>5</sup> is preferred by the modern editors to *Sigambri*. The latter form, however, and *Sygambri* occur in a MSS. Strabo<sup>6</sup> writes Σούγαμβροι and Ptolemy<sup>7</sup> Σύγαμβροι.

**Trëveri** is preferred by Glück<sup>8</sup> to *Treviri*, which, however, is found, in some passages, in good MSS.<sup>9</sup> Glück appeals<sup>1</sup> to the authority of Mela, Pliny, Ausonius, the *Itinerary of Antonine* and many inscriptions.<sup>10</sup> The MSS. of Tacitus vary between *Treveri* and *Třeviri*. A. de Valois<sup>11</sup> argues in favour of *Treviri*, remarking that it has the support of Strabo, of the *Table* and of a coin belonging to the time of Vespasian.

**Unelli** is found in all the MSS. of the *Commentaries*.<sup>12</sup> Pliny<sup>13</sup> has *Venelli*, and Ptolemy<sup>14</sup> Οὔνελλοι. Glück<sup>15</sup> prefers *Venelli*, believing that the word comes from *venia*, which he regards as the root of *Veneti*: but, he admits, there is no evidence for explaining either name. He also points out, in support of the form *Venelli*, that *Ubisci* is found by mistake for *Vivisci*, *Uridovis* in one MS. for *Viridovis*, and in Ptolemy (ii. 3, § 11) Οὔρολάνιον for Οὔερολάνιον, which form is supported by the *Itinerary of Antonine*<sup>16</sup> and by Tacitus.<sup>17</sup>

**Veliocasses**.—Glück,<sup>18</sup> who cites an inscription in Orelli (No. 6991), and the editors adopt this form. The various readings in the MSS. of the *Commentaries* are very numerous.<sup>19</sup> Gallic coins bear the legend VELIOCAEI.<sup>20</sup>

**Vellavii**, the reading of *a*, is adopted by Glück<sup>21</sup> and the modern editors. Glück refers to an inscription:<sup>22</sup> but in another<sup>23</sup> one finds *Vellavorum*. The  $\beta$  MSS. have *Vell-his*.

<sup>1</sup> See Mergel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii. 1954, and his *Caesar*, pp. 24, 37, 76-8, 80, 86-7, 139-40, 149.

<sup>2</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 11, § 11.

<sup>3</sup> *iv.* 3, § 4.

<sup>4</sup> Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii. 1958.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist.*, vi. 9, § 1.

<sup>6</sup> *iv.* 3, § 4.

<sup>7</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 11, § 6.

<sup>8</sup> Pp. 155-6.

<sup>9</sup> Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii. 2211.

<sup>10</sup> Orelli, 6718, 5898, 7392, 6838, 7254, etc.; Gruter, 64, § 6, 482, § 5, 13, § 5, etc.

<sup>11</sup> *Notitia Galliarum*, pp. 560-61.

<sup>12</sup> Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii. 2274. Meusel says that, according to F. Ramorino, in one passage (*B. G.*, iii. 11, § 4), in *l.* the original copyist wrote *Venellos*, for which *Unellos* was substituted by a later hand.

<sup>13</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 18 (32), § 107.

<sup>14</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 8, § 2.

<sup>15</sup> Pp. 165-7.

<sup>16</sup> Ed. Wesseling, pp. 471, 476, 479.

<sup>17</sup> *Ann.*, xiv. 33.

<sup>18</sup> Pp. 161-2.

<sup>19</sup> Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii. 2271.

<sup>20</sup> Desjardins, ii. 437, n. 2, 461, n. 4, 462.

<sup>21</sup> P. 164.

<sup>22</sup> *Hist. de l'Acad. des inscr.*, xxv., 1759, p. 143.

<sup>23</sup> Orelli, No. 5221.

**Vercassivellaunus**, the name of the chief who led the assault on Mont Réa at Alesia, is preferred by Glück<sup>1</sup> to *Vergassillaunus* and other variants.<sup>2</sup> He cites, in support of this reading, the name *Cassivellaunus*, and compares with these two the similarly allied *Cingetorix* and *Vercingetorix*.

**Vercingetorix** is the Latin form of *Vercingetorixs*.<sup>3</sup>

**Viromandui** is preferred by Glück<sup>4</sup> to *Veromandui*, which has equal MS. authority.<sup>5</sup> The best MSS. of Pliny<sup>6</sup> have *Viromandui*, and Ptolemy<sup>7</sup> has Ούρομανδύες; while Orbsius<sup>8</sup> and the *Itinerary of Antonine*<sup>9</sup> have *Veromandui*. Glück relies upon two inscriptions<sup>10</sup> and upon the analogy of many compound names, for instance, *Viro-marus*, *Viro-manus*, *Viro-viſca*, *Virovius* and *Virovedrum*; and he accounts for the form *Veromandui* by the fact that *i* and *e* were often interchanged. M. d'Arbois de Jubainville adds that the name is spelled with an *i* by Gregory of Tours<sup>11</sup> and on a Merovingian coin.<sup>12</sup> It is impossible, Glück says, to decide whether the *i* is long or short.

<sup>1</sup> P. 174.

<sup>2</sup> Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii. 2283-4.

<sup>3</sup> Pp. 184-7.

<sup>6</sup> *Nat. Hist.*, iv. 17 (31), § 106.

<sup>8</sup> *Hist.*, vi. 7, § 14.

<sup>10</sup> Gruter, t. i., cccxxv. 3; J. de Wal, *Mythologiae septentrionalis monumenta epigr. Lat.*, 1847, p. 226, ccvii.; A. de Boissieu, *Inscr. ant. de Lyon*, 1846-54, p. 260.

<sup>11</sup> *In gloria martyrorum*, p. 536. l. 13, ed. B. Krusch.

<sup>12</sup> *Bibl. de l'École des Chartes*, xxvii., 463, No. 690.

<sup>5</sup> *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i., No. 69.

<sup>6</sup> Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii. 2332.

<sup>7</sup> *Geogr.*, ii. 9, § 16.

<sup>9</sup> H. Wesseling, p. 379.

## ADDENDA

Page 5. "These men maintained . . . interglacial epoch." Such is the opinion of Professor James Geikie; but I ought to have said that it is by no means universally accepted. Many geologists hold that the evidence for interglacial epochs, properly so called, is insufficient, though all, I believe, admit that there were, at all events, periodical diminutions in the magnitude of the glaciers, which rendered the climate temporarily less severe. See Professor T. G. Bonney's *Ice-work, Past and Present*, 1896, pp. 244-6; *The Story of our Planet* (by the same writer), 1898, p. 556; *Quarterly Journal of the Geological Society of London*, liv., 1898, p. xcvi.; and, for evidence in favour of the interglacial theory, p. 223 of the same volume.

Page 7. "It was perhaps . . . across the Rhine." See M. Salomon Reinach in *L'Anthropologie*, iii., 1892, pp. 275-81, and A. Bertrand, *Les Celtes dans les vallées du Rhet et du Danube*, p. 35.

Pages 21-2. "If Suetonius . . . sphere of action." Mommsen (*History of Rome*, iv. 203) apparently disbelieves the statement of Suetonius that Caesar received from the Senate Gallia Comata as part of his province; for he merely says (*Ib.*), "Subsequently there was added to



Caesar's official district the province of Narbo" (which, by the way, as Pomponius Mela says in his *Chorographia*, ii. 5, § 74, was then called Gallia Bracata, not Gallia Narbonensis). I see no reason for doubting Suetonius's testimony, which seems to be confirmed, though not expressly, by Cicero (*De Provinciis Consularibus*, 15, 36) and Dion Cassius, xxxviii. 8, § 4. See p. 195, *supra*.

Titus Portus.—In confirmation of Long's argument (5), which I have quoted on page 437 and endorsed on pages 441 and 443, the following passage may be quoted from *B. C.*, iii. 15, § 2,—*neque naves ad terram deligandi potestas fiebat*.

Page 56. "Caesar told the tribunes . . . on every side." The passage in the *Commentaries* (ii. 26, §§ 1-2) on which this sentence is based runs as follows:—*Caesar, cum septimam legionem, quae iuxta constiterat, item urgeri ab hoste vidisset, tribunos militum monuit, ut paulatim sese legiones coniungerent et conversa signa in hostes inferrent. Quo facto cum alii alii subsidium ferrent neque himerent, ne aversi ab hoste circumvenirentur, audacius resistere at fortius pugnare coeperunt.* The exact meaning of the words (*ut conversa signa in hostes inferrent*) is doubtful and has given rise to much discussion. In 24, § 4 Caesar says that, before he ordered the manœuvre which I have briefly described, the 7th and 12th legions were almost surrounded (*paene circumventus*), and in 25, § 1 that the Nervii were attacking the 12th legion,—or, as I believe he means, both the 12th and the 7th legion,—in front and on either flank (*hostes neque a fronte ex inferiore loco subeuntes intermittere et ab utroque latere instare*). It seems certain, therefore, that the object of this formation which Caesar describes,—to modern readers,—somewhat obscurely, was to enable the two legions to face the enemy on all sides. They certainly had to repel attacks in front and on either flank; and Caesar says that when they had effected the movement which he ordered, they no longer feared an attack in the rear. Roesch gives an ingenious description, which Long (*Caesar*, pp. 144-5) reproduces with a plan, of a complicated evolution by which the movement may have been effected. Fröhlich (*Das Kriegswesen Cæsars*, p. 183) supposes that the 7th legion moved to the rear of the 12th, and stood back to back with it. Giesing (*Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, etc., cxlv., 1892, p. 495) ridicules this conjecture. "This going one behind the other," he says, "of two legions, which were hemmed in, in front and on the flanks, by a victorious enemy, is quite impossible." It was only necessary, he says, for the rear companies of the two legions to turn round and for the wing companies to make a quarter-turn, thus forming a closed parallelogram. I believe that Giesing is right; but it is enough to get a clear general idea of Caesar's meaning without going into conjectural details.

Mr. Stock on Caesar's operations at Gergovia (*Caesar de Bello Gallico*, 1898, pp. 315-16).—Mr. Stock, who attempts to discredit the genuineness of Colonel Stoffel's discovery of Caesar's two camps at Gergovia, goes on to argue that Caesar attacked Gergovia not from the south but from the north. It has been proved on pp. xxvi-xxx. that

Colonel Stoffel's discoveries were genuine; and even if they had never been made, no military critic who had seen Gergovia would think Mr. Stock's theory worth refuting: but for the satisfaction of the readers of his book who have not visited the place it may be worth while to notice his arguments. "As Caesar," he says, "approached Gergovia from the north . . . it is perhaps natural to suppose that he attacked the town from that quarter, unless we are told something to the contrary." It might be natural for a reader who was not familiar with Caesar's style to suppose this if he had never seen Gergovia, or if, having seen it, he were totally ignorant of military requirements. Caesar approached Avaricum also from the north, and he unquestionably attacked it from the south: yet he does not say so.

"In the next place," continues Mr. Stock, "Caesar tells us that the hill he captured was *e regione oppidi*.' Now as a straight line can be drawn from any one point to any other, this description could not be employed intelligibly by Caesar except in reference to some third point, which would presumably be his own camp. We are therefore led to infer that the hill captured lay in a straight line between Caesar's camp and the town. Napoleon's plan, however, makes the small camp form the apex of a triangle with a line between the *oppidum* and the large camp for its base. Again, Caesar speaks of the hill in question as being '*egregie munitus atque ex omni parte circumcisus*,' a description which is not applicable to La Roche Blanche."

I wonder whether there is any other Caesarian scholar besides Mr. Stock who does not know how to translate *e regione oppidi* (*B. G.*, vii. 36, § 5). I have said something about these words on pp. 760-61. Let me invite Mr. Stock to point out on the north of Gergovia any hill, answering to Caesar's description, situated *sub ipsis radicibus montis*, and lying in a straight line between the town and any site on which Caesar could have pitched his large camp. I have shown on p. 739 that La Roche Blanche did correspond with Caesar's description. It is curious that Mr. Stock, having seen the meaning of *e regione* in his note (p. 273) on *B. G.*, vii. 35, should fail to see it in his note on Gergovia. Will he name the "third point" in reference to which Caesar uses the words in vii. 35, § 1? *E regione oppidi* means of course "opposite the town," that is to say on a line perpendicular to the plateau on which it stood.

"Further," says Mr. Stock, "if Caesar stood on La Roche Blanche, he could see for himself any operations that were taking place on the '*dorsum silvestre* (*et angustum*.'" No operations were taking place on the *dorsum* (the Col des Goules). The object of the operations was to protect the approach to the Col; and these operations were taking place along the line, invisible from the Roche Blanche, which is traced on Napoleon's Plan. See pp. 740-42.

"I found," proceeds Mr. Stock, "that M. Vimont, the librarian of Clermont-Ferrand . . . has all along been of opinion that the attack was delivered from the north." No doubt: but he has all along been virtually alone in his opinion. Now he has got Mr. Stock to share his delusion.



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[I HAVE not given a complete index of authors, first, because I found that it would run to an excessive length, and secondly, because I thought that it was unnecessary. Nearly all the articles in Part II. are brief; and if, for example, any reader wished to look up what Herr Schambach had to say about Caesar's cavalry, he would turn to "Cavalry" in the index, and would find on the pages referred to what he wanted. But, as there are two very long essays in Sections I. and II., it seemed to me that it would be much more difficult for a reader to find therein or in the footnotes to the Narrative what this or that commentator had said; and therefore I concluded that the partial index given below, which embraces pp. v.-327, might be useful. The names of authors whose works are simply referred to in footnotes are not indexed.]

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